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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation: Report

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation


Report

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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation: Backgrounder

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

On February 10, 2021, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) presented the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness with a classified report on its review of the CSIS-RCMP relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation.

NSIRA’s review found that in the specific region, the agencies have developed a strong relationship that has fostered effective tactical de-confliction of operational activities. Nonetheless, technological constraints are making CSIS-RCMP de-confliction excessively burdensome and time-consuming. Furthermore, NSIRA observed a general reluctance on the part of both agencies to connect CSIS information to an RCMP investigation.

NSIRA found that the current framework guiding the CSIS-RCMP relationship sets out principals and guidelines to manage the risks of interaction and information sharing between the two agencies; however, it left fundamental issues related to the “intelligence-to-evidence” problem unresolved.

On the whole, NSIRA found that CSIS and the RCMP have made little progress in addressing the threat under investigation. Moreover, CSIS and the RCMP do not have a shared vision or complementary strategy to address the threat.

Publishing this summary aligns with NSIRA’s efforts at increasing transparency and being more accessible to Canadians through its work. Going forward, NSIRA will review CSIS and the RCMP’s implementation of the Operational Improvement Review which set out ambitious recommendations to improve the way in which CSIS and the RCMP jointly manage threats.

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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation


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Status:

Published

Review Number:

19-04

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Quarterly Report: For the quarter ended June 30, 2021

Quarterly Report: For the quarter ended June 30, 2021


Date of Publishing:

Introduction

This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards, GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2021-22 Main Estimates.

A summary description of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat (NSIRA) program activities can be found in Part II of the Main Estimates. For information on the mandate of NSIRA, please visit its website at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.

Mandate

The NSIRA is an independent external review body, which reports to Parliament. NSIRA was established in July of 2019 and is responsible to conduct reviews of the Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. NSIRA also hears public complaints regarding key national security agencies and activities. NSIRA replaces the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which reviewed CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service) activities as well as those related to the revocation or denial of security clearances. It also hears complaints regarding the Communication Security Establishment (CSE), as well as national security-related complaints regarding the RCMP.

Basis of presentation

This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the department’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the department, consistent with the 2021-22 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.

The authority of Parliament is required before moneys can be spent by the Government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authority for specific purposes.

Highlights of the fiscal quarter and fiscal year-to-date results

This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended June 30, 2021.

NSIRA spent approximately 9% of its authorities by the end of the first quarter, compared to 5% in the same quarter of 2020-21 (see graph 1 below).

Graph 1: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q1 2021–22 and Q1 2020–21

Graph: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures - Text version follows
Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q1 2021–22 and Q1 2020–21
  2021-22 2020-21
Total Authorities $30.2 $24.3
Q1 Expenditures $2.8 $1.2

Significant changes to authorities

As per graph 2 below as at June 30, 2021, NSIRA had authorities available for use of $30.2 million in 2021-22 compared to $24.3 million as of June 30, 2020, for a net increase of $5.9 million or 24.3%.

Graph 2: Variance in authorities as at June 30, 2021

Graph: Variance in authorities as at June 30, 2021 - Text version follows
Variance in authorities as at June 30, 2021 (in millions)
  Fiscal year 2020-21 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2021 Fiscal year 2021-22 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2022
Vote 1 – Operating $22.8 $28.5
Statutory $1.5 $1.7
Total budgetary authorities $24.3 $30.2

The authorities’ increase of $5.9 million is mostly explained by the ramp-up of approved funding for the mandate of NSIRA and the approval of a funding reprofile into fiscal year 2021-22 for accommodation and infrastructure projects.

Significant changes to quarter expenditures

The first quarter expenditures totaled $2.7M for an increase of $1.5M when compared to $1.2M spent during the same period in 2020-21. Table 1 below presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.

Table 1

(in thousands of dollars)

Material Variances to Expenditures by Standard Object YTD Expenditures as of June 30, 2021 YTD Expenditures as of June 30, 2020 Variance $ Variance %
Personnel 2,312 1,111 1,201 108%
Transportation and communications 13 7 6 86%
Information 2 50 (48) (96%)
Professional and special services 196 68 128 188%
Repair and maintenance 8 0 8 100%
Utilities, materials and supplies 3 9 (6) (67%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 216 0 216 100%
Other subsidies and payment 12 0 12 100%
Total gross budgetary expenditures 2,762 1,246 1,516 122%

Personnel

The increase of $1.2M relates to additional staffing to support NSIRA’s departmental mandate as well as higher statutory expenditures in 2021-22.

Transportation and communications

The increase of $6K is mainly explained by the relocation of an employee.

Information

The decrease of $48K is explained by lower expenditures for electronic subscriptions.

Professional and special services

The increase of $128K is mainly due to contracts in management consulting, including procurement and business advisory services.

Repair and maintenance

The increase of $8K is explained by office accommodation fit-up costs.

Utilities, Materials and Supplies

The decrease of $6K is mainly explained by lower expenditures for cleaning supplies and personal protective equipment for the pandemic over the previous year.

Acquisition of machinery and equipment

The increase of $216K is mainly explained by the acquisitions of informatics equipment and related cyber security products.

Other Subsidies and payments

The increase of $12K due to multiple payroll system overpayments processed in the first quarter of 2021-22.

Risks and uncertainties

The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the ability of NSIRA to grow its organization in a way that is commensurate with its new mandate. The physical distancing requirements decreased the ability of staff to concurrently work with departments and agencies subject to reviews. In light of that, NSIRA revised its Review Plan and has advanced the introduction of a new approach to the review of complaints.

The ability to hire a sufficient number of qualified personnel within relevant timelines remains a short- and medium-term risk for NSIRA, particularly given the specialized knowledge and skillset required for many positions. This is further compounded by the requirement for candidates to obtain a Top Secret security clearance, which can incur significant delays, especially during the pandemic.

While NSIRA has been able to secure temporary space to address its immediate space requirements, significant delays have been incurred for the fit-up of this space due to the pandemic. NSIRA is working closely with Public Services and Procurement Canada and Shared Services Canada to expedite the office expansion plans.

The ability of NSIRA to access the information it needs to do its work and speak to the relevant stakeholders to understand policies, operations and ongoing issues is closely tied to the reviewed departments’ and agencies’ capacity to respond to the demands of NSIRA. The pandemic impacts including the ability to conduct classified work at the workplace combined with existing resource constraints of the reviewed departments and agencies continue to delay the conduct of reviews.

NSIRA is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner and continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls, which were implemented in 2016.

Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA’s approach to the conduct of its mandate.

Significant changes in relation to operations, personnel and programs

The pandemic forced changes in the way NSIRA conducts operations. The requirement for physical distancing and the existing challenge with respect to the high security zone accommodation has led NSIRA to authorize staff to work with non-sensitive files from home.

In late March 2021, NSIRA was victim of a cyber attack on its public network. The attack did not affect its classified networks. That attack has led NSIRA to change its Information Technology (IT) operating model and NSIRA has since then been using the Privy Council Office IT infrastructure for the conduct of it’s unclassified and up to protected B activities.

The Honourable Marie Deschamps has also recently been named interim Chair for NSIRA.

There have been no changes to the NSIRA Program.

Approved by senior officials:

John Davies
Deputy Head

Pierre Souligny
Senior Director, Corporate Services, Chief Financial Officer

Appendix

Statement of authorities (Unaudited)

(in thousands of dollars)

  Fiscal year 2021–22 Fiscal year 2020–21
  Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2022 (note 1) Used during the quarter ended June 30, 2021 Year to date used at quarter-end Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2021 (note 1) Used during the quarter ended June 30, 2020 Year to date used at quarter-end
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures 28,490 2,336 2,336 22,801 875 875
Budgetary statutory authorities
Contributions to employee benefit plans 1,705 426 426 1,484 371 371
Total budgetary authorities (note 2) 30,195 2,762 2,762 24,285 1,246 1,246

Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.

Departmental budgetary expenditures by standard object (unaudited)

(in thousands of dollars)

  Fiscal year 2021–22 Fiscal year 2020–21
  Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2022 (note 1) Expended during the quarter ended June 30, 2021 Year to date used at quarter-end Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2021 Expended during the quarter ended June 30, 2020 Year to date used at quarter-end
Expenditures
Personnel 13,222 2,312 2,312 11,510 1,111 1,111
Transportation and communications 673 13 13 1,162 7 7
Information 375 2 2 364 50 50
Professional and special services 5,904 196 196 3,250 68 68
Rentals 188 0 0 237 0 0
Repair and maintenance 8,737 8 8 7,134 0 0
Utilities, materials and supplies 103 3 3 173 9 9
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 991 216 216 393 0 0
Other subsidies and payments 0 12 12 63 0 0
Total gross budgetary expenditures
(note 2)
30,195 2,762 2,762 24,285 1,246 1,246

Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.

Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

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Quarterly Report: For the quarter ended December 31, 2020

Quarterly Report: For the quarter ended December 31, 2020


Date of Publishing:

Introduction

This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards, GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2020- 21 Main Estimates.

A summary description of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat (NSIRA) program activities can be found in Part II of the Main Estimates. For information on the mandate of NSIRA, please visit its website at http://www.nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

Mandate

The NSIRA is an independent external review body, which reports to Parliament. NSIRA was established in July of 2019 and is responsible to conduct reviews of the Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. NSIRA also hears public complaints regarding key national security agencies and activities.

NSIRA replaces the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which reviewed CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service) activities as well as those related to the revocation or denial of security clearances. It also hears complaints regarding the Communication Security Establishment (CSE), as well as national security-related complaints regarding the RCMP.

Basis of presentation

This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the department’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the department, consistent with the 2020-21 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.

The authority of Parliament is required before moneys can be spent by the Government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authority for specific purposes.

Highlights of the fiscal quarter and fiscal year-to-date results

This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended December 31, 2020.

NSIRA spent approximately 28% of its authorities by the end of the third quarter, compared to 15% in the same quarter of 2019-20 (see graph 1 below).

Graph 1: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q3 2020–21 and Q3 2019–20

Graph: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures - Text version follows
Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q3 2020–21 and Q3 2019–20
  2020-21 2019-20
Total Authorities $24.0 $24.8
Q3 Expenditures $2.7 $2.0
Year-to-Date Expenditures $6.6 $3.8

Significant changes to authorities

As per graph 2 below as at December 31, 2020, NSIRA had authorities available for use of $24.0 million in 2020-21 compared to $24.8 million as of December 31, 2019, for a net decrease of $0.8 million or 3.2%.

Graph 2: Variance in authorities as at December 31, 2020

Graph: Variance in authorities as at December 30, 2020 - Text version follows
Variance in authorities as at December 31, 2020 (in millions)
  Fiscal year 2019-20 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2020 Fiscal year 2020-21 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2021
Vote 1 – Operating $23.6 $22.6
Statutory $1.2 $1.4
Total budgetary authorities $24.8 $24.0

The authorities’ decrease of $0.8 million is mostly explained by a transfer of funding to CSE for the fit-up and maintenance of office space.

Significant changes to quarter expenditures

The third quarter expenditures totaled $2.7M for an increase of $0.7M when compared to $2.0M spent during the same period in 2019-20. Table 1 below presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.

Table 1

Material Variances to Expenditures by Standard Object Fiscal year 2020-21: expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2020 Fiscal year 2019-20: expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2019 Variance $ Variance %
Personnel 1,732 1,504 228 15%
Transportation and communications 19 99 (80) (81%)
Information 37 3 34 1133%
Professional and special services 389 377 12 3%
Rentals 41 4 37 925%
Repair and maintenance 189 47 142 302%
Utilities, materials and supplies 21 14 7 50%
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 257 6 251 4183%
Other subsidies and payment (13) (68) 55 (81%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures 2,671 1,985 686 35%

* Details may not sum to totals due to rounding

Personnel

The increase of $0.2M relates to additional staffing to support NSIRA’s new departmental mandate as well as higher statutory expenditures in 2020-21.

Transportation and communications

The decrease of $80K is mainly explained by the absence of travel due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Information

The increase of $34K is explained by a contract for communication services.

Rentals

The increase of $37K is mostly due to new fees paid for the maintenance of NSIRA’s Finance and HR systems.

Repair and maintenance

The increase of $142K is explained by office accommodation fit-up costs.

Utilities, Materials and Supplies

The increase of $7K is mainly explained by higher expenditures for cleaning supplies and personal protective equipment due to the pandemic.

Acquisition of machinery and equipment

The increase of $251K is mainly explained by furniture acquisitions and office redesign to accommodate more employees and to equip NSIRA personnel to work from home.

Other Subsidies and payments

The increase of $55K is explained by fewer salary overpayment recoveries processed in the third quarter of 2020-21 compared to 2019-20.

Significant changes to year-to-date expenditures

Year-to-date expenditures recorded to the end of the third quarter totaled $6.7M for an increase of $2.8M when compared to the same year-to-date expenditures in 2019-20. Table 2 below presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.

Table 2

Material Variances to Expenditures by Standard Object YTD Expenditures as of 31 December, 2020 YTD Expenditures as of 31 December 2019 Variance $ Variance %
Personnel 5,072 2,814 2,258 80%
Transportation and communications 37 184 (147) (80%)
Information 78 7 71 1014%
Professional and special services 731 555 176 32%
Rentals 104 43 61 142%
Repair and maintenance 247 53 194 366%
Utilities, materials and supplies 28 20 8 40%
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 300 35 265 757%
Other subsidies and payment 28 76 (48) (63%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures 6,626 3,786 2,840 75%

Details may not sum to totals due to rounding

Personnel

The increase of $2.3M is mainly explained by additional staffing to support NSIRA’s new departmental mandate as well as higher statutory payments.

Transportation and communications

The decrease of $147K is mainly explained by the absence of travel due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Information

The increase of $71K is explained by higher expenditures for electronic subscriptions and communication consultants.

Professional and special services

The increase of $176K is mainly due to additional management consulting contracts.

Rentals

The increase of $61K is mostly explained by new fees paid for the maintenance of NSIRA’s corporate information technology systems.

Repair and maintenance

The increase of $194K is mainly due to office accommodation fit-up costs.

Utilities, Materials and Supplies

The increase of $8K is mainly explained by higher expenditures of cleaning supplies and personal protective equipment due to the pandemic.

Acquisition of machinery and equipment

The increase of $265K is mainly explained by furniture acquisitions and office redesign to accommodate more employees and to support home offices.

Other Subsidies and payments

The decrease of $48K is due to multiple salary overpayments processed in the first three quarters of 2019-20.

Risks and uncertainties

The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the ability of NSIRA to grow its organization in a way that is commensurate with its new mandate. The physical distancing requirements decreased the ability of staff to concurrently work with departments and agencies subject to reviews. In light of that, NSIRA revised its Review Plan and has advanced the introduction of a new approach to the review of complaints.

The ability to hire a sufficient number of qualified personnel within relevant timelines remains a short- and medium-term risk for NSIRA, particularly given the specialized knowledge and skillset required for many positions. This is further compounded by the requirement for candidates to obtain a Top Secret security clearance, which can incur significant delays, especially during the pandemic.

While NSIRA has been able to secure temporary space to address its immediate space requirements, significant delays have been incurred for the fit-up of this space due to the pandemic. The timing at which staff will be able to operate within this high security zone has yet to be determined. NSIRA is working closely with Public Services and Procurement Canada and Shared Services Canada to expedite the office expansion plans.

The ability of NSIRA to access the information it needs to do its work and speak to the relevant stakeholders to understand policies, operations and ongoing issues is closely tied to the reviewed departments’ and agencies’ capacity to respond to the demands of NSIRA. The pandemic impacts including the ability to conduct classified work at the workplace combined with existing resource constraints of the reviewed departments and agencies could delay NSIRA’s ability to deliver on its mandate in a timely way.

NSIRA is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner and continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls, which were implemented in 2016.

Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA’s approach to the conduct of its mandate. 

Significant changes in relation to operations, personnel and programs

The pandemic forced changes in the way NSIRA conducts operations. The requirement for physical distancing and the existing challenge with respect to the high security zone accommodation has led NSIRA to authorize staff to work with non-sensitive files from home.

In September 2020, Murray Rankin stepped down as Chair of NSIRA. The Honourable L. Yves Fortier was named acting Chair until the end of his term. Since, The Honourable Dr. Ian Holloway acted as Chair and now The Honourable MarieLucie Morin has been reappointed as acting Chair.

In addition, Faisal Mirza has been appointed as a new member of NSIRA. 

Approved by senior officials:

John Davies
Deputy Head

Pierre Souligny
Senior Director, Corporate Services, Chief Financial Officer

Appendix

Statement of authorities (Unaudited)

(in thousands of dollars)

  Fiscal year 2020–21 Fiscal year 2019–20
  Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2021 (note 1) Used during the quarter ended December 31, 2020 Year to date used at quarter-end Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2020 (note 1) Used during the quarter ended December 31, 2019 Year to date used at quarter-end
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures 22,565 2,300 5,513 23,618 1,854 3,392
Budgetary statutory authorities
Contributions to employee benefit plans 1,484 371 1,113 1,240 131 394
Total budgetary authorities 24,049 2,671 6,626 24,858 1,985 3,786

Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.

Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Departmental budgetary expenditures by standard object (unaudited)

(in thousands of dollars)

  Fiscal year 2020–21 Fiscal year 2019–20
  Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2021 (note 1) Expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2020 Year to date used at quarter-end Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2020 Expended during the quarter ended December 30, 2019 Year to date used at quarter-end
Expenditures
Personnel 11,512 1,732 5,072 8,677 1,504 2,814
Transportation and communications 1,162 19 37 961 99 184
Information 364 37 78 402 3 7
Professional and special services 3,250 389 731 3,353 377 555
Rentals 237 41 104 229 4 43
Repair and maintenance 6,681 189 247 9,641 47 53
Utilities, materials and supplies 173 21 28 179 14 20
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 293 257 299 1,356 6 25
Other subsidies and payments 278 (13) 28 70 (68) 76
Total gross budgetary expenditures
(note 2)
24,049 2,671 6,626 24,858 1,985 3,786

Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.

Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

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Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Disclosures of Canadian Identifying Information: CSE Responses

Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Disclosures of Canadian Identifying Information


CSE Responses

CSE Management Response to NSIRA Review of 2018-2019 Disclosures of Canadian Identifying Information

NSIRA delivered its classified review to the Minister of National Defence in November 2020.

Throughout NSIRA’s review of CSE’s disclosure process, CSE responded to NSIRA requests in a timely manner and offered to provide additional context and briefings to NSIRA regarding CSE processes.

Importance of independent external review

CSE values independent, external review of our activities, and we remain committed to a positive and ongoing dialogue with NSIRA and other review and oversight bodies.

This oversight frameworks allows us to deliver our important mission of foreign intelligence, cyber security and foreign cyber operations in a way that demonstrates accountability, and that builds trust and confidence with Canadians.

CSE operates within a culture of compliance, grounded in our understanding of and commitment to our legal and policy regime, and evidenced by our record of self-reporting and addressing incidents and errors that may occur.

We appreciate NSIRA and their continued work to provide Canadians with greater insight and understanding of the important work that CSE does on a regular basis to keep Canadians safe.

We accept the recommendations aimed at improving our processes, yet are concerned that the overall conclusions do not fully appreciate CSE’s commitment to, and work on protection of privacy.

Canadian Identifying Information and CSE’s Commitment to Privacy

CSE is Canada’s national lead for foreign signals intelligence and cyber operations, and the national technical authority for cybersecurity. We provide critical foreign intelligence and cyber defence services for the Government of Canada (GC). Protecting Canadian information and the privacy of Canadians is an essential part of our mission.

CSE does not direct its foreign signals intelligence activities at Canadians or anyone in Canada. The CSE Act, however, recognizes that incidental collection of Canadian communications or Canadian information may occur even when targeting only foreign entities outside Canada. CSE takes very seriously our responsibility to protect Canadian privacy interests that may occur as a result of this incidental collection.

In the event that Canadian information is incidentally acquired in foreign signals intelligence collection, CSE may include obfuscated references to Canadian individuals or organizations in intelligence reporting if those references are essential to understand the foreign intelligence.

The obfuscation of this Canadian Identifying Information (CII) in reporting represents one of many layered privacy measures that are applied at different points in CSE’s end-to-end intelligence process. These include, among others, legal and policy training and on-site support for intelligence analysts, mandatory annual privacy tests for all operational employees, data tagging and auto-deletion, strict retention limits, specific handling guidelines, escalating approvals for reporting that includes CII, compliance spot checks, and separate vetting processes for disclosing obfuscated information and taking action on intelligence reporting.

Pursuant to the Privacy Act, government clients who receive CSE foreign intelligence reports may ask for obfuscated CII to be “disclosed” to them if that information relates directly to their department’s operating program or activities. Any disclosed CII is provided solely to inform their understanding of the foreign intelligence presented in the report. Government officials may not take action, share or otherwise use the CII disclosed to them under the disclosure process.

CSE continually refines its CII disclosure process. For example, to help support audit and review, CSE implemented a requirement for government clients to provide an operational justification to support their CII disclosure requests. It is important to note, however, that this is a matter of internal policy and that the Privacy Act does not require the documentation of legal authorities before information can be collected and disclosed.

Review Recommendations

CSE is committed to continuous improvement. We know that the recommendations from independent external review play an important role in that improvement. CSE has 25 years of experience working with the Office of the CSE Commissioner and now NSIRA to help improve our processes. We thank these review bodies for their work to help build trust and confidence with Canadians.

CSE continuously refines our privacy-protection measures, including those associated with the disclosure process. Improvements made over the past decade have been informed by the recommendations made by the CSE Commissioner as part of his annual reviews of CSE’s CII disclosures. Prior to NSIRA taking over review duties, CSE had accepted and implemented 95% of the recommendations made by the CSE Commissioner. Those not adopted were duplicative or overtaken by events such as new legislation. In his final 2018-2019 review, the Commissioner confirmed that CSE’s disclosures of CII complied with the law and were done in accordance with ministerial direction.

In this NSIRA review, as with previous CSE Commissioner reviews, we appreciate and have accepted the recommendations aimed at improving our internal policies and practices.

Given the overlap in this review period between the two bodies, certain NSIRA recommendations duplicate some presented in the CSE Commissioner’s reviews. As a result, we are pleased to note that many have already been implemented at this time; other NSIRA recommendations are in the process of being implemented.

Review Findings

Throughout this CII disclosure review, CSE provided extensive feedback and context to NSIRA, and sought clarification regarding the assessment criteria used to determine adequacy or inadequacy of specific records, the vast majority of which were deemed adequate by NSIRA. Without explaining the methodology used to support the findings, we are concerned that broad generalizations based on specific aspects of certain records within a single privacy measure may leave the reader with an incorrect impression about CSE’s overall commitment to privacy protections for Canadians.

CSE’s case-by-case process for disclosing CII to authorized GC recipients is part of robust and comprehensive internal measures that protect Canadians’ privacy. We balance the sharing of our intelligence with the privacy and safety of Canadians at all times. CSE disclosure analysts receive training and follow internal policies, guidelines and standard operating procedures to guide decision making.

While committed to implementing the recommended process improvements contained in the report, CSE remains concerned by NSIRA’s overall conclusions and characterization of the disclosure process and its role in the broader privacy framework, which we have expressed to NSIRA.

Referral to Attorney General of Canada

The Minister of National Defence submitted NSIRA’s classified report to the Attorney General of Canada in January 2021, supported by a comprehensive analysis of each record identified by NSIRA in its review.

The analysis supports the view that our activities, including applying protections for the privacy of Canadians, were conducted within a robust system of accountability, including compliance with the Privacy Act.

Additional Information

Top Secret-cleared and special intelligence-indoctrinated GC clients received thousands of foreign intelligence reports via CSE’s mandate under the CSE Act. These reports corresponded to Cabinet-approved intelligence priorities and were delivered to government clients who had both the authority to receive them and the ‘need to know’ their contents.

These reports reflect a wide range of intelligence requirements, from support to Canadian military operations, espionage, terrorism and kidnappings to geostrategic concerns, cyber threats, foreign interference and global crises, among others. While only a very small percentage of these reports contain obfuscated CII, the underlying Canadian information is often essential for GC officials to understand the context of the threat and its Canadian nexus.

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Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019: Report

Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019


Report

Date of Publishing:

Executive Summary

The Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (Avoiding Complicity Act or Act) and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual as a result of information exchanged between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated or not. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. This review covers the implementation of the directions sent to 12 departments and agencies from their date of issuance, September 4, 2019, to the end of the previous calendar year, December 31, 2019. It was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Act.

While this was the inaugural annual review under the NSIRA Act, it builds upon previous work in this area undertaken by NSIRA and its predecessor SIRC. NSIRA’s review on the 2017 Ministerial Direction on information sharing with Foreign Entities is an example. The results from this previous review were sent to applicable departments in July 2020. NSIRA is building upon this previous review and strongly supports the findings and recommendations within it. As of the date of this report, departmental responses have not been received regarding the recommendations provided in NSIRA’s July 2020 Ministerial Direction review.

(U) It was essential to ensure that both NSIRA and the departments being reviewed met their obligations under the Avoiding Complicity Act and the NSIRA Act. The approach used to gather information during a global pandemic was purposely designed for this first and unique review period.

To capture a complete view on the departmental implementation, NSIRA requested information that related directly to every department’s specific obligations under the Act and the directions. The responses and associated information captured departmental activities related to the Act during the review period, and what procedures, policies, tools, etc. (frameworks) were leveraged to support these activities. NSIRA believes that having a robust framework is an essential part of an effective implementation of the directions departments have received.

Beyond the specific requirements of implementation, the information provided by the departments also helped to identify gaps, considerations for best practices, and the work departments have undertaken since the review period to build and formalize their frameworks. This information and knowledge will help set up the foundation for future reviews and assist efforts on creating consistent implementation across departments. While many of the issues discussed in this report go beyond the specific requirements of the directions, their consideration is critical to the overall improvement of the implementation process and how departments ultimately support the Act. No case studies were undertaken for this review. However, the information gathered has helped establish a baseline for overarching issues the community is facing. Building on this, future reviews will begin to examine specific sharing framework challenges and questions and look closely at specific cases and departmental legal opinions to guide review findings.

While NSIRA was pleased with the considerable efforts made by many departments new to the Avoiding Complicity Act in building up their supporting frameworks, it was clear during this review that departments are employing very different approaches to guide their information handling activities. The responses received demonstrate various inconsistencies across the departments. Having a consistent and coordinated approach when addressing the concerns related the Act is not a requirement for implementation, however, NSIRA believes that there is value in such an approach. And while departments will always require unique aspects in their sharing frameworks to address the unique characteristics of their mandates and activities, to improve the implementation process, a goal all involved likely have, the identification and sharing of best practices is critical.

For example, determining the best means for having a unified approach when engaging with foreign entities of concern or ensuring that an information sharing activity is consistently evaluated for risk by all departments. The recommendations provided on these issues in this review capture what NSIRA believes to be important concerns and considerations for supporting and improving departmental implementation.

Additionally, as the directives received under the Act do not describe the specific means by which departments ‘implement’ them, it is incumbent on the community to ensure that they have sufficiently robust frameworks and programs in place to fully support an assertion of implementation. Therefore, the information gathered during this review went beyond a strict assessment of implementation, but also considered the aspects required to better support this implementation. Going forward, this approach will help establish the foundation for subsequent reviews. Drawing on the findings and concerns identified here, NSIRA will continue to consider aspects that will ultimately improve underlying frameworks, thereby supporting an improved implementation of the Act across the community.

Authorities

This review was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act, which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity Act.

Introduction

Focus of the Act

In the same spirit as the Ministerial Direction (MD) that preceded it, the Avoiding Complicity Act and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual due to the exchange of information between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. The Act also aims to limit the use of information received from a foreign entity that may have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual. While the previous MD guided the activities of a selection of Canada’s security and intelligence departments, the Act broadened this scope to capture all departments whose interactions with foreign entities included information exchanges where such a concern may apply.

The focus of the Act is to ensure departments take the necessary steps during their information sharing activities to avoid contributing in any way to the mistreatment of an individual. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. There is an expectation that each department will satisfy these requirements by leveraging departmentally established mechanisms and procedures, or frameworks that will allow each department to confidently demonstrate how it has responded to its responsibilities under the Act.

During the first year that the Act was in force, written directions using nearly identical language were sent to the Deputy Heads of 12 departments. In regard to disclosure, the directions read as follows:
“If the disclosure of information to a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that Department officials do not disclose the information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.”

With respect to requesting information, the directions state:
“If the making of a request to a foreign entity for information would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that Department officials do not make the request for information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.”

Lastly, as it relates to the use of information, the directions indicate:
“The Deputy Head must ensure that information that is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity is not used by the Department

  • (a) in any way that creates a substantial risk of further mistreatment;
  • (b) as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding; or
    (c) in any way that deprives someone of their rights or freedoms, unless the Deputy Head or, in exceptional circumstances, a senior official designated by the Deputy Head determines that the use of the information is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant personal injury and authorizes the use accordingly.”

At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated or not. This determination is done on a case-by-case basis. Each department is responsible for making these determinations as it applies to its activities. Following the outcome of a department’s determination of these important questions, cases may be approved, denied, or elevated to the Deputy Head for consideration. For the latter cases, this then results in additional reporting requirements for the Deputy Head. Throughout this process, there is also a requirement to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and limitations of use of all information being handled.

Review Objectives

After the Avoiding Complicity Act came into force in July 2019, the Governor in Council’s written directions were sent to each applicable department in September 2019. The period for this year’s review is September 4, 2019 to December 31, 2019. The short timeframe (approximately 4 months) associated with this year’s review means that departments are being assessed, in large part, on what they would already have had in place to address risks of mistreatment associated with information sharing, or what they were able to implement in a four-month window. NSIRA is cognizant that for the departments that were not previously subject to the 2017 MD on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities, the timeframe to implement the written directions was somewhat limited, as it would have been challenging to create and operationalize new procedures such that they would be reflected in the department’s activities during the period being reviewed.

While it was essential to ensure that both NSIRA and the departments being reviewed met their obligations, these challenges were kept in mind when evaluating the objectives for this first review. Given these considerations, the objectives of this year’s review were to determine whether:

  • departments had fully implemented the directions received under the Act in conformity with the obligations set out therein;
  • departments had established and operationalized frameworks that sufficiently enabled them to meet the obligations set out in the Act and directions; and,
  • there was consistency in implementation across applicable departments.

Methodology and assessment focus

To capture a complete view of the departmental implementation of the Act, NSIRA constructed a series of questions related directly to every department’s obligations under the Act and the directions. The responses and associated information captured what specific activities took place during the review period and what departmental frameworks were leveraged to adequately support these activities.

The information provided by the departments also helped to identify gaps, considerations for best practices, and the work departments have undertaken to build and formalize their frameworks to meet their obligations under the Act and directions. The information provided and the knowledge gained will help set up the foundation for future reviews and help create consistent implementation across departments.

The method used to gather information during a global pandemic was designed for this first and unique review period. We believe it allowed departments to quickly and efficiently indicate both whether the directions had been implemented, and what frameworks, processes, and policies had been leveraged or put in place.

Responses to many of the RFI questions were simply yes/no answers. Often, answers were dependent on what information handling activities took place with foreign entities by the department during the review period. As such, a number of questions could be returned with ‘not applicable’, and this was an acceptable response. Many of the questions were related to specific and easily defined requirements under the Act and its associated directions, e.g. ‘was a report submitted to the Minister?’ or ‘Did the Deputy Minister inform the applicable bodies of all their decision made under the act?’.

Other questions were designed to capture the details of the underlying processes that supported a department’s implementation, i.e. a department may indicate that they ensured no substantial risk of mistreatment was present in any of their information sharing activities, but how did they support this claim? Likewise, for an assertion that a possible substantial risk of mistreatment had been mitigated, what was in place that allowed a department to make this assertion? Therefore, this series of questions required sufficiently detailed responses to fully capture what a department had in place that allowed it to confidently state that it has met its implementation obligations under the Act and the issued directions.

Finally, a portion of the questions was intended to capture the level of uniformity in implementation across departments. This includes such things as country/entity assessments, triage practices, and record keeping. Much of this information will also help with recommendations going forward. This multi-faceted approach resulted in three main areas being evaluated to assess implementation for this review period and help set the groundwork for future reviews.

  • Departments have clear and comprehensive frameworks, policies, and guidelines such that they can demonstrate how they have fully implemented the directions under the Act.
  • All reporting requirements associated with both the Act and its applicable directions have been met.
  • Differences or gaps associate with areas such as country/entities assessments, record keeping, case triage, etc., such that consistent implementation across departments would be challenging.

Summary of the results table

The table in Annex A captures a summary of both the departmental responses to the implementation questions and NSIRA’s assessment regarding these responses. The assessment was based on the associated details provided by departments in the context of the specific information requested. As explained above, many of the responses were returned as not applicable (n/a). Since many implementation requirements are connected to specific activities, the absence of such activities would mean that the requirement does not come into play. The best example of this for the current review is the absence of any Deputy Minister level determinations. All 12 departments indicated that they did not have any cases referred to the Deputy Minister level for determination. All additional reporting requirements associated with this level of decision were not applicable and thus considered satisfied.

If a specific requirement was not met, it was flagged. The relatively few instances of this were connected with departments not meeting certain reporting obligations under the Act. In all cases, the department involved pre-identified these missing requirements and indicated that efforts were underway to address them.

The concerns and findings captured in the table (and others) are discussed subsequently. A concern was flagged in two situations: where there was an uncertainty associated with a department’s ability to support their implementation requirements; and cross-cutting issues related to general aspects of all of the frameworks described, both of which led to the findings and recommendations proposed.

Findings and Recommendations

Realities of Implementation for 2019

A challenge for departments for this first review was associated with one of the assessment items listed above, i.e. whether they had established frameworks to demonstrate how they supported the implementation of the directions they received.

With the Avoiding Complicity Act coming into force in July 2019, it was not feasible that departments would create and stand-up new frameworks for information exchanges in time for the period being reviewed. Although the Act did specify several Deputy Heads that were to receive directions, it only included those who received the previous 2017 MD. The remaining new departments received their directions in September 2019. Regardless of this two-month difference, each department would have been required to rely on, to some extent, existing procedures when handling information sharing with foreign entities during the review period.

This put the departments that had previously formalized policies and processes at an advantage when implementing the directions. For those departments who were not subject to the previous 2017 MD on information sharing, NSIRA considered how they leveraged and adjusted what was already in place to respond to their new responsibilities under the Act. What we then expected to see, for all departments, was what subsequent steps were taken during the review period and afterwards, to either adjust or create frameworks to better meet implementation requirements going forward. NSIRA noted that in response to questions on frameworks for handling information and mitigating risk, several of the departments new to the considerations of the Act provided extensive detail on their efforts and progress on building out their frameworks to support the directives. References to having these frameworks formalized over the subsequent year were also encouraging.

Finding no. 1: NSIRA found that several departments, new to the considerations of the Act, described considerable progress being made during the review period and afterwards to build out formalized frameworks to support implementation.

Importance of establishing operational framework

As discussed, having fully established operational frameworks in place for this review period may not have been feasible for the departments that did not previously have processes to support their activities. This, however, did not exempt a department from the requirements of implementation. Each department was still expected to leverage what it currently had in place to properly address the concerns associated with the Avoiding Complicity Act. Furthermore, there was a logical follow-on expectation that departments would take subsequent steps to build out formal frameworks to address any perceived gaps to support the implementation of the Act going forward if necessary.

After reviewing the responses received, NSIRA is concerned that departments with minimal information sharing activities taking place during their operations have yet to address the necessity of having a robust framework in place, regardless of how often that framework is leveraged. For example, although PS and TC may primarily act as facilitators or coordinators for information exchanges on specific programs, they are still interacting with foreign entities, and therefore are required to fully assess their interactions with a foreign entity in this regard.

If a department without a formal framework assesses that it has few or no cases associated with the Act, then it may believe it is adequately positioned to address any sharing concerns should they arise. This, however, is not the case. Even single instances of information exchange in which the concerns of the Act may apply require a framework to support it properly. In many cases, it will be the framework itself that properly identifies whether a sharing activity raises concerns under the Act. If there is no formal process in place, then this identification becomes problematic. Simply saying that there are no cases or activities associated with the Act is not sufficient. That determination can only be made after a sharing activity is scrutinized through the lens of a robust framework. Going forward, all departments who receive directions should demonstrate a formal framework that ensures all information sharing activities are adequately evaluated against the considerations of the Act.

Finding no. 2: NSIRA found that departments conducting minimal information exchanges with foreign entities have not yet fully addressed the importance of having an official information sharing framework in place.

Recommendation no. 1: NSIRA recommends that all departments in receipt of directions under the Act have an official framework that ensures they can fully support their implementation of the directions.

Community coordination and best practices

While departmental coordination and the sharing of best practices are not a requirement of the Avoiding Complicity Act or the directions, NSIRA considered such an approach’s value. What became clear during this first review was that every department employs a very different framework to guide their information sharing activities with foreign entities. This is to be expected to some extent, given the different mandates, sharing requirements, and areas of focus associated with each department. However, these differences are also a reflection of the independent, internal development that has taken place for the different frameworks being used. While the departments receiving directions under the Act do interact on this subject to some extent, to date, based on the responses provided, it appears that the majority of the work done by the departments to build supporting frameworks to address their responsibilities associated with the Act have been done so independently. There was little to no overlap with how departments described the various aspects of their frameworks, even amongst the departments subject to the earlier MD on this issue.

There would be value in departments collectively identifying the key aspects common or required in all information exchanges with foreign entities and then working together to craft best practices, irrespective of what a department currently has in place. This process should draw on all available resources to make this determination. Each department can then turn to their existing frameworks to consider where and how they can be adjusted to match this community-agreed upon ideal. This is not to say that aspects of what a department already has in place in their framework will not ultimately be seen as the best practice. Several departments do have robust sharing frameworks in place, and these will contribute significantly to this exercise. However, arriving at this determination independently will provide an additional level of confidence.

Department-specific challenges, of course, cannot be ignored. In fact, they will weigh in strongly on such a conversation. Departments share information under their mandates for various reasons, and this will mean that coordination on certain aspects of a sharing framework may not be possible. However, this needs to be evaluated. It is important that what already exists, or what is hard change, does not unduly influence what may be best. This approach will create uniformity (where possible) across the community and provide a starting point for ‘must haves’ for each department to evaluate their existing processes against.

The Public Safety Information Sharing Coordination Group (ISCG) was established to support departments on information sharing. As such, it is in an ideal position to help mitigate issues arising from the lack of coordination. Leading such efforts would build on the work already being done by this group. During recent discussions with NSIRA, the ISCG indicated that the tracking of lessons learned and the sharing of best practices was not yet routine. Going forward, there would be value in a more coordinated effort when departments are updating/changing their framework. Ensuring that this coordination takes place will require support and leadership by senior-level officials. This will help in sharing best practices once identified, and establish more consistent approaches across departments.

Finding no. 3: NSIRA found that the differences and variability in departmental frameworks demonstrate a previous lack of coordination across the community and a need to identify best practices.

Recommendation no. 2: NSIRA recommends that departments coordinate to identify best practices for all essential components of information sharing frameworks and that the ISCG is leveraged to ensure these practices are shared where possible across the community to support the implementation of the Act.

Framework application inconsistency

A series of questions in this review was related to aspects of consistency in how departments apply their frameworks. From this series, a comparison was made on how many times an information sharing/use event triggered an evaluation of any kind against the considerations of the Avoiding Complicity Act, versus how many of these triaged cases were elevated or referred up for decision. The results helped gauge two important aspects of a framework: One, the threshold requirements, i.e. how often a sharing activity triggers an evaluation of any kind; and two, the decision making power given to the operators who are initially handling these activities.

The feedback and the responses received demonstrate potential inconsistencies in both aspects across departments. For example, several departments indicated zero cases as being triaged/evaluated under the concerns of the Act during the review period, yet also specified that they are involved in regular information sharing or, specified that no information received from foreign entities was derived from mistreatment. These responses appear to be inconsistent as it would be problematic to participate in information sharing or to make such mistreatment determinations without the activity being evaluated on some level.

Other departments indicated a larger number of cases as initial triaged/evaluated, but also indicated that none of them were elevated in their decision making process for higher-level decisions. This would seem to suggest that all determinations were being made at the operational level. Such a result puts significant weight on the operator and the initial assessment tools they are leveraging if they are making all determinations independently. This reinforces the importance of a robust framework to help make these determinations, as previously indicated in Finding no. 2. As a result of these differences, potential challenges arise on accurately assessing the volume of cases being handled by departments, the tracking of those cases deemed to present a substantial risk, those which can be mitigated for, and those where the risk was not found to be substantial or even present.

These responses may result from how each department defines a ‘case’ or how it records a case, or they may be a result of differences in how a department’s decision-making process is leveraged. NSIRA’s concern is that these differences may indicate an inconsistency in application thresholds at different departments. As such, the following results were viewed as a potential issue based on the responses received:

  • if a department was involved in any kind for information exchange with a foreign entity during the review period, but did not indicate that any cases were formally triaged/evaluated; or
  • if there was a significant number of cases triaged, but none were elevated to a higher level for determination.

Such results do not necessarily indicate a problem as aspects of a framework may be able to account for this, however, looking further into how and why the department’s framework produced these outcomes is important. Future reviews will be able to do this. Consistent initial steps for information sharing activities, including triage/evaluation thresholds and documentation, are critical to the effective application of a framework, and ultimately to identifying best practices.

Finding no. 4: NSIRA found that there are inconsistencies in the application of existing sharing frameworks between departments, specifically concerning information evaluation thresholds, and decisions being elevated for senior level determinations,

Recommendation no. 3: NSIRA recommends that departments establish consistent thresholds for triggers in their information sharing frameworks, including initial evaluations against the concerns of the Act, when a case is to be elevated in the decision process, and how this is documented.

Country and entity assessments

A key recommendation of NSIRA’s previous review on information sharing related to the country/entity assessments being used by departments to inform their decision making process when sharing or using information with a foreign entity. While the use of country/entity assessments is not a required aspect of implementing the directions under the Act, NSIRA continues to support this tool as an important aspect of any sharing framework. In its previous review, NSIRA determined that having a firm grasp on the human rights situation, as well as any other pertinent information associated with a country/entity, was essential to making an informed decision on whether there should be concerns, caveats, or limitations when handling information with that country/entity. Moreover, having such information captured to ensure all departments consistently approach these countries/entities is critical. At the time of the previous review, the following recommendation was made:

  • a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including as standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and
  • to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.

It is important to note that there has been no formal response from departments on this previous recommendation as of the date of this report. Furthermore, during this report, two departments continue to raise concerns with NSIRA’s stance on this issue during the consultation process. While NSIRA continues to support this recommendation, as explained below, further discussions with departments on how to approach this matter may be warranted, specifically on the distinction between how this recommendation may apply to a foreign country/entity vs a specific foreign partner a department may be dealing with.

Based on the responses provided on this topic for the current review period, there is still inconsistency in this area. While almost all departments indicated that country/entity assessments were a standard part of their framework, the responses also indicate differences in which country assessments are used, how they are leveraged, and who is responsible for updating them. For example, several departments rely on their own in-house created assessments, while others leverage the assessments created by Global Affairs Canada and others. While departments who indicated that they are leveraging country/entity assessment tools in their process also indicated that these assessments captured human rights concerns, this has yet to be independently evaluated. NSIRA is concerned that these differences could result in different approaches/stances being taken by departments when dealing with the same foreign entity. While the country/entity assessments tools themselves are not necessarily in question, the fact that every department is not leveraging or does not have access to all useful or applicable information is.

NSIRA remains of the view that having a consistent stance on all countries and entities when implementing the requirements of the Act is important. Issues such as mistreatment and human rights should not be decided at a departmental level, but on a whole-of-government level. While mindful of classification levels, ensuring all departments have access to the same relevant information associated with a foreign country/entity is critical to making an informed decision. Due to the nature of their work, departments may be privy to unique information on a country/entity, some or all of which can be shared. This would lead to fully informed assessments that allow for a consistent approach when dealing with any country/entity. In addition to improving duplication of effort in this area by departments, NSIRA continues to see standardized country and entity assessments, which can be accessed and contributed to by all departments, as key to moving toward a more consistent and effective implementation of the Act across the community

Finding no. 5: NSIRA found a lack of unification and standardization in the country and entity assessments being leveraged by departments, resulting in inconsistencies in approach/stance by the community when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern related to the Act.

Recommendation no. 4: NSIRA recommends that departments identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach by departments when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern under the Act.

Conclusion

While aspects of implementation can be easily quantified and evaluated e.g. reporting requirements to a Minister, others, which support implementation are more difficult to measure, e.g.:

  • What does a sufficiently robust framework for assessing and mitigating risk when sharing with a foreign entity look like?
  • Does this depend on the specific requirements and activities of the department; or,
  • Are there steps that should always be involved when vetting a foreign entity under the considerations of the Act?

Measuring and weighing the answers to such questions is challenging. They are more nuanced, and can’t be as easily quantified. Regardless, they must be considered and addressed. Drawing on the considerations and concerns identified in this review will help departments to ask the questions that will improve their underlying frameworks with the following goals in mind:

  • To identify the essential/key elements that need to be a part of any framework for it to address the concerns associated with the Avoiding Complicity Act sufficiently; and,
  • To have all identified best practices implemented as consistently as possible across departments.

Future reviews will push towards these goals by seeking answers to those questions above. By looking more closely at specific case studies, departmental legal opinions, items of inconsistency, and the departmental frameworks that are already demonstrating best practices that should be shared. Ultimately the results of such efforts will contribute to improving the implementation of the Act across the community.

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Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019: Backgrounder

Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

In 2011, the Government of Canada implemented a general framework for Addressing Risks of Mistreatment in Sharing Information with Foreign Entities. The framework aimed to establish a coherent and consistent approach across government when sharing and receiving information with Foreign Entities. Following this, Ministerial Direction was issued to applicable departments in 2011 on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities, and then again in 2017 on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities.

On July 13, 2019, the Avoiding Complicity Act came into force. This Act codifies and enshrines Canada’s commitments in respect to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Canada’s international legal obligations on prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment.

On September 4, 2019, pursuant to section 3 of the Act, the Governor in Council (GiC) issued written directions to the Deputy Heads of the following 12 departments and agencies: Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Public Safety Canada (PS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Transport Canada (TC).

The GiC issued directions focused on three aspects of handling information when interacting with a foreign entity: the disclosure of information, the requesting of information, and the use of any information received.

Pursuant to section 7 of the Act, every Deputy Head having received direction must, before March 1 of each year, submit to the appropriate Minister a report regarding the implementation of those directions during the previous calendar year. Following this, every Deputy Head must, as soon as feasible after submitting the report, make a version of it available to the public.

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Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019

Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019


Last Updated:

Status:

Published

Review Number:

20-03

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Departmental Plan: 2021-2022

Departmental Plan: 2021-2022


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Cat. Number: PS106-6E-PDF
ISSN: 2563-0334

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2020

Date of Publishing:

From the Executive Director

I am very pleased to present the 2021–22 Departmental Plan for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). The year ahead will build on a very successful 2020–21, in which we achieved several key milestones for our new agency, despite the challenges imposed on us and the organizations we review as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2021–22, we will be continuing to implement NSIRA’s three-year review plan, which emphasizes reviews of increasing scale and complexity as we become familiar with the operations of departments and agencies that have only recently become subject to review.

In the year ahead, we will also roll out a new process for taking in and investigating complaints from members of the public. Multiple key stakeholders will help to shape this new process, which aims to provide greater accessibility and greater timeliness to our complaints investigation function.

Significant efforts to scale up our operations will continue in 2021–22, including expanding to a second site, recruiting staff across all business lines, and continuing our support to staff working from home. In all aspects, we will continue to prioritize our staff’s health and safety as we build on our successes and pursue ambitious organizational goals. We will also continue to emphasize diversity and inclusion in the workplace, including developing an employment equity strategy.

More details on this and other initiatives are found in this report. I hope that it helps inform Canadians of NSIRA’s priorities for the year ahead.

John Davies
Executive Director

Plans at a glance

Over the coming year, NSIRA will continue its ambitious review agenda, based on the three-year review plan established in 2020–21. This will include mandatory reviews related to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and Governor in Council directions under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act. NSIRA will also continue to expand the agency’s knowledge of departments and agencies not previously subject to expert review, including through the conduct of interagency reviews and by “following the thread” of activities from one agency to another. Of note, in 2021–22, NSIRA will continue its comprehensive review, announced in July 2020, to fully identify the systemic, governance and cultural shortcomings and failures that resulted in CSIS engaging in illegal activity and a related breach of candour to the Federal Court.

In 2021–22, NSIRA will also focus on implementing a new model for investigating complaints. This work will be rooted in the development of new rules of procedure, which will be implemented after consultation with key stakeholders in the year ahead. The goals of this process are to enhance access to justice for complainants and to ensure that NSIRA investigates complaints in a timely manner.

An important responsibility over the coming year will be further adapting operations to the conditions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, with a priority on maintaining a safe and healthy work environment. NSIRA will also emphasize employment equity, diversity and inclusion as a major corporate theme over the year ahead, including training staff on key concepts.

For more information on NSIRA’s plans, priorities and planned results, see the “Core responsibilities: planned results and resources, and key risks” section of this report.

Core responsibilities: planned results and resources, and key risks

This section contains detailed information on the department’s planned results and resources for each of its core responsibilities. It also contains information on key risks related to achieving those results.

National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations

Description

NSIRA reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. It investigates complaints from members of the public regarding activities of CSIS, CSE or the national security activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security–related complaints. This independent scrutiny contributes to the strengthening of the framework of accountability for national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions and supports public confidence in this regard.

Planning highlights

In support of this outcome, in 2021–22, NSIRA will implement an ambitious review agenda. It will continue to review the activities of CSIS and CSE to provide responsible ministers and the Canadian public with an informed assessment of these activities, including their lawfulness, reasonableness and necessity. NSIRA will also build on the knowledge it has acquired of departments and agencies, such as the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. Using that knowledge, NSIRA will ensure these organizations’ national security or intelligence activities are independently verified and assessed. NSIRA is committed to transcending the silos that have characterized national security review until now, and will “follow the thread” of an activity between agencies to ensure its assessments reflect the complex and interwoven approach Canada takes to national security.

In 2021–22, NSIRA will complete its review of the systemic, governance and cultural factors that led to CSIS engaging in illegal activity and breaching its duty of candour to the Federal Court. This review is being conducted jointly by two NSIRA members, the Honourable Marie Deschamps, a former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, and Craig Forcese, a professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa. This matter was referred to NSIRA by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Justice. NSIRA is confident its findings and recommendations will play a constructive role in ensuring that future national security activities reflect Canadians’ expectations of these fundamental institutions.

NSIRA is committed to ensuring its review agenda remains responsive and topical. In 2021–22, NSIRA will continue to engage with community stakeholders to understand their concerns surrounding national security and intelligence activities. NSIRA will ensure that matters of equity and non-discrimination are reflected in its review agenda. NSIRA’s work must also be accessible to the public and civil society. In 2021–22, NSIRA will increase its activities on Twitter and ensure that the agency’s processes, methodologies and findings are readily available on its website. NSIRA will proactively publish unclassified versions of its reports throughout the year. The annual report will continue to summarize NSIRA’s review findings and recommendations in context, situating these elements within a broader discussion of the key trends and challenges NSIRA has observed over the year.

In 2021–22, NSIRA will continue to draw on the close relationships it has established with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. The agency will coordinate its activities to ensure review is efficient and comprehensive, and avoids unnecessary duplication of effort. NSIRA is also developing close ties to its international equivalents. It will host a conference in 2021–22 that will bring together review agency representatives from Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to discuss artificial intelligence and other topics of common interest. NSIRA will also deploy multidisciplinary review teams in 2021–22, leveraging the integrated expertise of researchers, lawyers and technical experts right from the start. This will ensure NSIRA reviews reflect a sound understanding of many complex issues, and that the agency is equipped to provide clear, precise analysis of the impacts of new technology in an ever-changing national security environment.

In 2021–22, NSIRA will also strengthen institutions’ accountability and enhance public confidence by ensuring consistency, quality and timeliness in investigating national security–related complaints. The independent investigation of complaints plays a critical role in maintaining public confidence in Canada’s national security institutions. In 2021–22, NSIRA will continue to offer an informal resolution process to complement the investigative process to respond to complaints. NSIRA also developed new rules of procedure to ensure timeliness in the investigation of complaints. The ambition is to ensure access to justice. New service standards to be set in January 2021 will enable baseline measurements to be established in 2021–22.

Gender-based analysis plus

In 2021–22, NSIRA will undertake several initiatives related to employment equity, diversity and inclusion. Incorporating baseline data derived from employee self-identification, NSIRA will develop an employment equity strategy to increase representation and to ensure it reflects the diversity of the Canadian public, which it serves.

Training and learning events for staff on issues related to systemic discrimination will continue over the coming year. These activities will ensure a common understanding of key concepts and build a corporate culture that promotes the values of diversity and inclusion in the workplace.

Work will continue in 2021–22 to incorporate analysis of bias and discrimination into reviews and complaints investigations. NSIRA will also work with centres of excellence within the Government of Canada to enhance its understanding of how gender-based analysis plus concepts can be more formally integrated into its work.

Finally, NSIRA will build on outreach and engagement conducted over the past year to expand its range of stakeholder partnerships and learn more about concerns related to the differential impacts of national security and intelligence activities.

Key risks

NSIRA’s ability to access the information it needs to do its work and speak to the relevant stakeholders to understand policies, operations and ongoing issues is closely tied to the capacity of the organizations being reviewed to respond to NSIRA’s demands. The resource constraints of those organizations might continue to be compounded next year by disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. This presents a risk of hindering NSIRA’s ability to deliver on its mandate in a timely way. NSIRA is mitigating this risk by ensuring clear communication about information requests and by setting review priorities.

The physical distancing precautions required by the COVID-19 pandemic might continue to be needed in 2021–22. This would limit employees’ access to NSIRA offices and to classified physical and electronic documents. Such restrictions could slow NSIRA’s ability to deliver on its mandate in a timely way and limit the frequency and type of outreach NSIRA can do in person. The pandemic also complicates the recruitment, on-boarding and training of new review staff. NSIRA is mitigating these risks by adapting its office space and investing in communications technology. It will continue to innovate to enable its operations and engage virtually with stakeholders, departments and agencies.

Departmental results Departmental result indicator Target Date to achieve target 2017-18 actual results* 2018-19 actual results* 2019-20 actual results*
*Because NSIRA was created on July 12, 2019, there is no comparative information to provide for 2017–18 and 2018–19. Actual results for 2019–20 are not available as the new Departmental Results Framework in the changeover from the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) to NSIRA was being developed. This new framework is for measuring and reporting on results achieved starting in 2021–22.
Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis 100% completion of mandatory reviews 2021-22 Not applicable (N/A) N/A N/A
Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year At least one national security or intelligence activity is reviewed in at least five departments or agencies annually 2021-22 N/A N/A N/A
All Member-approved high priority national security or intelligence activities are reviewed over a three- year period 100% completion over three years; at least 33% completed each year 2021-22 N/A N/A N/A
National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner Percentage of investigations completed within NSIRA service standards 90% 2021-22 N/A N/A N/A

Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s program inventory is available in the GC InfoBase.

Planned budgetary financial resources for assisting the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

2021–22 budgetary spending (as indicated in Main Estimates) 2021–22 planned spending 2022–23 planned spending 2023–24 planned spending
12,047,835 12,047,835 10,740,923 10,744,262

Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s program inventory is available in the GC InfoBase.

Planned human resources for assisting the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

2021–22 planned full-time equivalents 2022–23 planned full-time equivalents 2023–24 planned full-time equivalents
69.0 69.0 69.0

It is expected that NSIRA will be at full capacity by the close of 2021–22 to fulfil its new mandate.

Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s program inventory is available in the GC InfoBase.

Internal Services: planned results

Description

Internal Services are those groups of related activities and resources that the federal government considers to be services in support of Programs and/or required to meet corporate obligations of an organization. Internal Services refers to the activities and resources of the 10 distinct services that support Program delivery in the organization, regardless of the Internal Services delivery model in a department. These services are:

  • Management and Oversight Services
  • Communications Services
  • Legal Services
  • Human Resources Management Services
  • Financial Management Services
  • Information Management Services
  • Information Technology Services
  • Real Property Management Services
  • Materiel Management Services
  • Acquisition Management Services

Planning highlights

A key priority in the coming year will be Internal Services support and leadership with respect to the development and implementation of effective employment equity, diversity and inclusion strategies.

NSIRA will also continue to leverage technologies and proven information management practices to increase the effectiveness of operations as the agency continues to operate under COVID-19 pandemic conditions.

The ability of NSIRA to continue its rapid increase in personnel will be contingent on effective Internal Services functions. As a result, over the coming year, NSIRA will continue to invest in and strengthen its frameworks for human resources management, information technology and security, and continue to implement its accommodation strategy.

Planned budgetary financial resources for Internal Services

2021–22 budgetary spending (as indicated in Main Estimates) 2021–22 planned spending 2022–23 planned spending 2023–24 planned spending
18,147,084 18,147,084 15,386,717 7,691,725

Planned human resources for Internal Services

2021–22 planned full-time equivalents 2022–23 planned full-time equivalents 2023–24 planned full-time equivalents
31.0 31.0 31.0

Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s program inventory is available in the GC InfoBase.

Spending and human resources

This section provides an overview of the department’s planned spending and human resources for the next three consecutive fiscal years, and compares planned spending for the upcoming year with the current year’s spending.

Planned spending

Departmental spending 2018–19 to 2023–24

The following graph presents planned (voted and statutory) spending over time.

Departmental spending trend graph
2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24
Statutory 0 371,057 1,056,362 1,704,632 1,704,632 1,704,632
Voted 0 5,254,250 16,662,479 28,490,287 24,423,008 16,731,355
Total 0 5,625,250 17,718,841 30,194,919 26,127,640 18,435,987

Because NSIRA was created in July 2019, the actual expenditures of fiscal year 2019–20 do not reflect a full fiscal year of spending. The increase from 2019–20 to 2020–21 is also explained by growth in personnel and the initiation of accommodation, infrastructure and systems investments that were delayed from the previous fiscal year.

Fiscal years 2021–22 to 2023–24 present planned spending based on approved authorities. The fluctuation in planned spending between fiscal year 2020–21 to 2023–24 is mainly explained by funds earmarked for the completion of accommodation, infrastructure and systems projects.

When compared with the Departmental Plan from the previous year, the change in planned spending for 2021–22 and 2022–23 is largely resulting from a reprofile of funding from 2019–20 to 2021–22 and 2022–23 to align funding with the delayed projects noted.

Planned spending for 2023–24 shows the ongoing financial authorities after completion of the office expansion project.

Budgetary planning summary for core responsibilities and Internal Services (dollars)

The following table shows actual, forecast and planned spending for NSIRA’s core responsibility and for Internal Services for the years relevant to the current planning year.

Core responsibilities and Internal Services 2017–18 expenditures 2018–19 expenditures 2019–20 forecast spending 2020–21 budgetary spending (as indicated in Main Estimates) 2020–21 planned spending 2021–22 planned spending 2022–23 planned spending
* Because NSIRA was created on July 12, 2019, there is no comparative information to provide for prior years. Numbers for 2019–20 are for the reporting period of July 12, 2019 – March 31, 2020.
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations N/A 3,009,066 6,716,166 12,047,835 12,047,835 10,740,923 10,744,262
Subtotal N/A 3,009,066 6,716,166 12,047,835 12,047,835 10,740,923 10,744,262
Internal Services N/A 2,616,241 11,002,675 18,147,084 18,147,084 15,386,717 7,691,725
Total N/A 5,625,307 17,718,841 30,194,919 30,194,919 26,127,640 18,435,987

Planned human resources

The following table shows actual, forecast and planned full-time equivalents (FTEs) for the core responsibility in NSIRA’s departmental results framework and for Internal Services for the years relevant to the current planning year.

Human resources planning summary for core responsibilities and Internal Services

Core responsibilities and Internal Services 2018-19 Actual full-time equivalents 2019-20 Actual full-time equivalents 2020-21 Forecast full-time equivalents 2021-22 Planned full-time equivalents 2022-23 Planned full-time equivalents 2023-24 Planned full-time equivalents
* Because NSIRA was created on July 12, 2019, there is no comparative information to provide for prior years. Numbers for 2019–20 are for the reporting period of July 12, 2019 – March 31, 2020.
Assist the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency N/A 17.5 44.1 69.0 69.0 69.0
Subtotal N/A 17.5 44.1 69.0 69.0 69.0
Internal Services N/A 11.2 23.6 31.0 31.0 31.0
Total N/A 28.7 67.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

Over the course of 2019–20, funding for an additional 26 FTEs was received to account for NSIRA’s expanded mandate. It is expected that NSIRA will be at full capacity by the close of 2021–22 to fulfil its new mandate.

Estimates by vote

Information on NSIRA’s organizational appropriations is available in the 2021–22 Main Estimates.

Condensed future-oriented statement of operations

The future-oriented condensed statement of operations provides an overview of NSIRA’s operations for 2020–21 to 2021–22.

The amounts for forecast and planned results in this statement of operations were prepared on an accrual basis. The amounts for forecast and planned spending presented in other sections of the Departmental Plan were prepared on an expenditure basis. Amounts may therefore differ.

A more detailed future-oriented statement of operations and associated notes, including a reconciliation of the net cost of operations to the requested authorities, are available on NSIRA’s website.

Future-oriented Condensed statement of operations for the year ending March 31, 2022 (dollars)

Financial information 2020-21 Forecast results 2021-22 Planned results Difference (2021-22 planned results minus 2020-21 Forecast results)
Total expenses 17,695,822 28,235,300 10,539,478
Total revenues
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers 17,695,822 28,235,300 10,539,478

The difference between the 2021–22 planned results and 2020–21 forecast results is mostly explained by $8.5M of planned accommodation, infrastructure and systems project costs. It is also explained by the increase in personnel to reach NSIRA’s full capacity of 100 FTE’s by the close of 2021–22.

Corporate Information

Organizational profile

Appropriate minister: The Right Honourable Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada
Institutional head: John Davies, Executive Director
Ministerial portfolio: Privy Council Office
Enabling instrument: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act
Year of incorporation / commencement: 2019

Raison d’être, mandate and role: who we are and what we do

“Raison d’être, mandate and role: who we are and what we do” is available on NSIRA‘s website.

Operating context

Information on the operating context is available on NSIRA’s website.

Reporting framework

NSIRA’s Departmental Results Framework, with accompanying results and indicators, is under development. Additional information on key performance measures will be included in the 2021- 22 Departmental Plan.

Core Responsibility: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Departmental Results Framework Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary Indicator: All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis Internal Services
Indicator: Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year
Indicator: All Member-approved high priority national security or intelligence activities are reviewed over a three-year period
National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner Indicator: Percentage of investigations completed within NSIRA service standards
Program Inventory Program: National security and intelligence activity reviews and complaints investigations

The changeover of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) to NSIRA required significant changes to the Departmental Results Framework, expected results and indicators. With NSIRA’s broader mandate, these changes now provide a framework for measuring and reporting on results achieved starting in 2021–22 and beyond.

Changes to the approved reporting framework since 2020-21

Structure 2020-21 2021-22 Change Reason for change
Total expenses Investigations of Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS’s) operational activities National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations New Core responsibility New Departmental Results Framework
Programs Review of CSIS’s operations National security and intelligence activity reviews and complaints investigations New Program New Departmental Results Framework
Investigation of complaints against CSIS

Supporting information on the program inventory

Supporting information on planned expenditures, human resources, and results related to NSIRA’s program inventory is available in the GC InfoBase.

Supplementary information tables

The following supplementary information tables are available on NSIRA‘s website.

  • Departmental Sustainable Development Strategy
  • Gender-based analysis plus

Federal tax expenditures

NSIRA’s Departmental Plan does not include information on tax expenditures that relate to its planned results for 2021–22.

Tax expenditures are the responsibility of the Minister of Finance, and the Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for government-wide tax expenditures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures.[xi] This report provides detailed information on tax expenditures, including objectives, historical background and references to related federal spending programs, as well as evaluations, research papers and gender-based analysis. The tax measures presented in this report are solely the responsibility of the Minister of Finance.

Organizational contact information

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 5W5

Telephone: The phone number is temporarily disabled
Fax: 613-907-4445
Email: info@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca
Website: www.nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Appendix: definitions

appropriation (crédit)

Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

budgetary expenditures (dépenses budgétaires)

Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, organizations or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.

core responsibility (responsabilité essentielle)

An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a core responsibility are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence.

Departmental Plan (plan ministériel)

A report on the plans and expected performance of an appropriated department over a 3‑year period. Departmental Plans are usually tabled in Parliament each spring.

departmental priority (priorité)

A plan or project that a department has chosen to focus and report on during the planning period. Priorities represent the things that are most important or what must be done first to support the achievement of the desired departmental results.

departmental result (résultat ministériel)

A consequence or outcome that a department seeks to achieve. A departmental result is often outside departments’ immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes.

departmental result indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel)

A quantitative measure of progress on a departmental result.

departmental results framework (cadre ministériel des résultats)

A framework that connects the department’s core responsibilities to its departmental results and departmental result indicators.

Departmental Results Report (rapport sur les résultats ministériels)

A report on a department’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.

experimentation (expérimentation)

The conducting of activities that seek to first explore, then test and compare the effects and impacts of policies and interventions in order to inform evidence-based decision-making, and improve outcomes for Canadians, by learning what works, for whom and in what circumstances. Experimentation is related to, but distinct from innovation (the trying of new things), because it involves a rigorous comparison of results. For example, using a new website to communicate with Canadians can be an innovation; systematically testing the new website against existing outreach tools or an old website to see which one leads to more engagement, is experimentation.

full‑time equivalent (équivalent temps plein)

A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person‑year charge against a departmental budget. For a particular position, the full‑time equivalent figure is the ratio of number of hours the person actually works divided by the standard number of hours set out in the person’s collective agreement.

gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus) (analyse comparative entre les sexes plus [ACS Plus])

An analytical process used to assess how diverse groups of women, men and gender-diverse people experience policies, programs and services based on multiple factors including race ethnicity, religion, age, and mental or physical disability.

government-wide priorities (priorités pangouvernementales)

For the purpose of the 2020–21 Departmental Results Report, those high-level themes outlining the government’s agenda in the 2019 Speech from the Throne, namely: Fighting climate change; Strengthening the Middle Class; Walking the road of reconciliation; Keeping Canadians safe and healthy; and Positioning Canada for success in an uncertain world.

horizontal initiative (initiative horizontale)

An initiative where two or more federal organizations are given funding to pursue a shared outcome, often linked to a government priority.

non‑budgetary expenditures (dépenses non budgétaires)

Net outlays and receipts related to loans, investments and advances, which change the composition of the financial assets of the Government of Canada.

performance (rendement)

What an organization did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the organization intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified.

performance indicator (indicateur de rendement)

A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an organization, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.

performance reporting (production de rapports sur le rendement)

The process of communicating evidence‑based performance information. Performance reporting supports decision making, accountability and transparency.

plan (plan)

The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how an organization intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally, a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead to the expected result.

planned spending (dépenses prévues)

For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts presented in Main Estimates.

A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports.

program (programme)

Individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels.

program inventory (répertoire des programmes)

Identifies all the department’s programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department’s core responsibilities and results.

result (résultat)

A consequence attributed, in part, to an organization, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single organization, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the organization’s influence.

statutory expenditures (dépenses législatives)

Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made.

target (cible)

A measurable performance or success level that an organization, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.

voted expenditures (dépenses votées)

Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an appropriation act. The vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.

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