Canadian Security Intelligence Service Lifecycle of Warranted Information: Report – HTML
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This departmental plan details National Security and Intelligence Agency Secretariat’s (NSIRA Secretariat) priorities, plans, and associated costs for the upcoming three fiscal years.
These plans align with the priorities outlined in NSIRA’s Vision, mission, raison d’être and operating context.
NSIRA Secretariat identified the following five key priorities for 2026-27:
As part of meeting this review’s targets, NSIRA Secretariat must plan the following spending reductions:
It is anticipated that these spending reductions will involve a decrease of approximately 12 full-time equivalents by 2028-29.
NSIRA Secretariat will achieve these reductions by doing the following:
The figures in this departmental plan reflect these reductions.
The NSIRA Secretariat will focus on sustaining its ability to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations as it prepares for a more complex review environment. The organization’s priorities reflect the dual need to uphold statutory obligations while ensuring operational readiness for the coming into force of the Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC) Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).
A central focus for the year will be ensuring that mandatory and high‑impact reviews are completed within statutory and calendar‑year timelines. This work directly supports NSIRA’s mandate to provide rigorous, independent review of national security and intelligence activities. To achieve this, the NSIRA Secretariat will intensify efforts to make review timelines more predictable, with improved early identification of risks and targeted mitigation strategies. Strengthening our internal planning and coordination practices and streamlining review processes will be essential to deliver high‑quality outputs within established timeframes.
At the same time, the NSIRA Secretariat will advance major initiatives to ensure the organization is fully prepared for the transition to the new complaint investigation regime created by the PCRC Act. This includes establishing clear, operationalized procedures for all phases of complaints involving the RCMP and CBSA, supported by the finalization of a revised Memorandum of Understanding with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC)/Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC). These foundational procedures will ensure NSIRA’s investigative processes are consistent, transparent, and aligned with the new legislative requirements.
Close collaboration with the CRCC/PCRC will be another priority. Enhanced coordination mechanisms will support a smooth transition to the new reality and promote procedural efficiency. Joint planning, information‑sharing protocols, and alignment of investigative expectations will help ensure operational readiness when the Act comes into force.
Across both the reviews and investigations programs, the NSIRA Secretariat will prioritize efforts to sustain a stable, fully staffed, and skilled workforce capable of meeting growing operational demands.
Collectively, these initiatives ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat is well positioned to support the Agency in fulfilling its statutory obligations, responding effectively to legislative change.
In 2026-27, total planned spending (including internal services) for NSIRA Secretariat is $18,438,436 and total planned full-time equivalent staff (including internal services) is 85.
The following provides a summary of the results the department plans to achieve in 2026-27 under its main areas of activity, called “core responsibilities.”
The NSIRA Secretariat will strive to sustain its capacity to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations while preparing for the new complaint investigation mandate under the PCRC Act. To support readiness for the new complaints’ regime, the NSIRA Secretariat will establish clear procedures for handling RCMP and CBSA complaints and finalize a revised MOU with the CRCC/PCRC, ensuring efficient investigations and a smooth transition. A stable, skilled, and fully staffed workforce will remain central to meeting growing operational demands. Together, these efforts will enhance the Secretariat’s ability to support the Agency in meeting its investigative mandate and maintaining public trust as the national security and accountability landscape evolves.
Planned spending: $ 10,599,557
Planned human resources: 54
More information about National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations can be found in the full plan.
For complete information on the NSIRA Secretariat’s total planned spending and human resources, read the Planned spending and human resources section of the full plan.
I am pleased to present the 2026–27 Departmental Plan for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat. This plan outlines the priorities that will guide our work as we continue to support the Agency in delivering rigorous, independent review that upholds accountability and strengthens public trust in Canada’s accountability framework.
The Secretariat’s role remains to provide the expertise, infrastructure, and operational support necessary for the Agency to effectively fulfill its mandate. In 2026–27, we will focus on maintaining our capacity to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations despite budget reductions. Predictable planning, stronger coordination, and streamlined internal processes will be used. Meeting statutory timelines for mandatory and high‑impact reviews will remain a core priority, as will improving our ability to anticipate and mitigate risks.
A significant area of work will involve preparing for evolving legislative responsibilities around the PCRC Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the CBSA. The Secretariat will continue to refine its procedures, documentation, and operational readiness to ensure that future complaint investigations are handled as consistently and transparently as expected by members of the public, and in alignment with the Agency’s mandate.
Our people remain central to our success. Sustaining a stable, skilled, and fully staffed workforce across all review, operational, and legal functions is essential to meeting increasing demands. This will prove challenging in the context of funding reductions affecting the Secretariat.
The coming period will bring both opportunities and operational pressures, including greater complexity in review work and a broader investigative landscape. At the same time, the Secretariat must navigate resource constraints arising from government‑wide expenditure reductions, which limit its flexibility at a moment when the scope and technical footprint of national security and intelligence activities continue to grow at great speed. The Secretariat will continue to strive to advance its work with professionalism, adaptability, and a strong commitment to sound stewardship.
I want to express my appreciation to the Secretariat’s employees for their remarkable dedication, expertise, and resolute commitment to strengthening Canada’s national security accountability framework. I encourage you to explore this plan to see how the NSIRA Secretariat will advance its work in support of the Agency’s mandate.
Charles Fugère
Executive Director
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat (NSIRA Secretariat) supports the Agency, which reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary. The NSIRA Secretariat also supports the Agency in investigating complaints from members of the public on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security related complaints. The NSIRA Secretariat’s support of the Agency contributes to strengthening accountability and enhancing public confidence in Government of Canada institutions.
This core responsibility contributes to the “Good Governance” domain of the Quality of Life Framework for Canada and, more specifically, “Confidence in institutions”, “Discrimination and unfair treatment”, and “Resolution of serious legal problems”, through all the activities mentioned in the core responsibility description.
This section presents details on the department’s indicators, the actual results from the three most recently reported fiscal years, the targets and target dates for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations. Details are presented by departmental result.
| Indicator | Actual Results | Target | Date to achieve |
|---|---|---|---|
| Percentage of all mandatory reviews undertaken under NSIRA’s direction that are completed within the calendar year |
2022-23: 100% 2023-24:100% 2024-25:100% |
100% | December 31, 2027 |
| Average number of months to complete Secretariat activities in support of NSIRA reviews. |
2022-23: NA* 2023-24: 20 months 2024-25: 16 months |
12 months | March 31, 2027 |
* Data for the reporting year in question are not available. As the indicator was established after the reference period, no data collection had been undertaken. Consequently, no results can be reported for that fiscal year. Results will be available for subsequent fiscal years.
| Indicator | Actual Results | Target | Date to achieve |
|---|---|---|---|
| Percentage of investigations completed within the NSIRA Secretariat service standards |
2022-23: 100% 2023-24: 100% 2024-25: 100% |
100% | March 31, 2027 |
Additional information on the detailed results and performance information for the NSRIA Secretariat’s program inventory is available on GC InfoBase.
The following section describes the planned results for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations in 2026-27.
NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to inform Ministers and Canadians whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary.
To uphold its mandate, NSIRA will continue to deliver independent, timely, and high‑quality reviews that strengthen accountability across Canada’s national security and intelligence community. The NSIRA Secretariat will support this work by sustaining strong performance against all legislated obligations. This includes enabling NSIRA to maintain a 100% completion rate of all mandatory reviews within the calendar year, as required under its mandate. The Secretariat will also ensure that all secretariat support activities for both mandatory and discretionary reviews are completed within an average timeframe of 12 months or less.
The NSIRA Secretariat will strengthen the operational foundation needed to support timely and independent investigations of national security‑related complaints. This includes modernizing NSIRA’s investigative procedures, streamlining processes to handle certain types of complaints more efficiently, and maintaining a skilled, multi‑disciplinary investigative workforce. The Secretariat will also work closely with partners to prepare for the new Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC) Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). including developing procedures for RCMP and CBSA‑related complaints and establishing required data‑reporting mechanisms. These efforts will help ensure that NSIRA continues to deliver fair, high‑quality complaint investigations.
The NSIRA Secretariat will advance its commitment to integrating gender and diversity considerations by moving toward the implementation of its renewed GBA Plus Framework. Early implementation efforts will focus on strengthening foundational capacity in the area of data collection. This includes assessing current data practices, identifying relevant indicators, and exploring methods to enhance the collection and use of disaggregated data where appropriate. These efforts will help build the basis for more consistent monitoring and future reporting on the differential impacts of the Secretariat’s activities, supporting a more inclusive and evidence‑informed approach to oversight and review.
| Resource | Planned |
|---|---|
| Spending | $10,599,557 |
| Full-time equivalents | 54 |
Complete financial and human resources information for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat’s program inventory is available on GC InfoBase.
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations is supported by the following programs:
Additional information related to the program inventory for the National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations is available on the Results page on GC InfoBase.
Internal services are the services that are provided within a department so that it can meet its corporate obligations and deliver its programs. There are 9 categories of internal services:
This section presents details the department’s plans to achieve results and meet targets for internal services.
Internal Services enable the NSIRA Secretariat to operate effectively and uphold its commitment to transparency, integrity, and accountable governance. Through strong communications, prudent financial management, strategic HR practices, robust information governance, digital innovation, and strengthened risk management, these functions provide the foundational support needed to advance the Secretariat’s mandate and ensure excellence in service delivery.
Ensuring Effective Communications
Through proactive communication efforts, the Communications team plays a key role in promoting public trust and reinforcing NSIRA’s mission to serve as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians. The team will continue to support the Agency and Secretariat by providing strategic communications advice, producing both internal and external content, managing media relations, and enhancing NSIRA’s digital presence across the web and social media platforms. These efforts ensure that information reaches diverse audiences, aligning with NSIRA’s values.
Financial Management Services
The NSIRA Secretariat will continue to take steps to ensure resources are deployed in the most effective and efficient manner possible, and its operations and administrative structures, tools, and processes continue to focus on supporting the delivery of its priorities. The NSIRA Secretariat will work to implement the newly developed the finance and procurement frameworks. We will work to adapt to the new reality created because of the Comprehensive Expenditure Review, ensuring expenditures are monitored diligently.
Strategic Human Resources Focus
Human resources (HR) management remains a critical enabler in helping the Secretariat achieve its organizational objectives, ensuring that investments in people translate into measurable improvements in performance, integrity and service quality. The HR strategic focus emphasizes ensuring effective workforce management aligned with the Comprehensive Expenditure Review, while supporting the Secretariat in strengthening employee competencies and performance management practices. Ongoing efforts include implementing HR initiatives that reflect the NSIRA’s mission, vision, and values, and reinforcing a values-based culture across the organization. The Secretariat also continues to enhance organizational governance through the management of conflict of interest matters and the consistent application of high standards of values and ethics. Sustained prioritization of wellness programs and well-being initiatives continues to foster an engaged, healthy, and resilient workforce, an essential asset during periods of continuous change and uncertainty.
Strengthening Information Governance and Lifecycle Stewardship
The NSIRA Secretariat will fully implement its new Disposition Authority and strengthen its information management governance. The Secretariat will also enhance its use of IM technologies, ensuring compliance, improving access to information, and supporting more effective information handling across the organization. Additionally, the Secretariat will continue to pursue digitization initiatives, transforming paper-based records into digital formats to streamline access, management, and long-term preservation. These initiatives will provide a solid foundation for managing records and data assets while improving operational efficiency.
Accessibility Posture and Digital Innovation
The NSIRA Secretariat will continue strengthening its accessibility posture while digitally innovating its internal and external web platforms. The Secretariat will explore ways to visually showcase and highlight its work through these platforms, while also providing new ways to keep Canadians and the public informed and updated on the organization’s activities. It will also review its full Information Technology footprint to identify opportunities for improvements and efficiencies, while continuing to strengthen internal and external communications to support the department’s broader goals, enhance service delivery, foster collaboration, and optimize operations.
Strengthening Risk Management Frameworks
The NSIRA Secretariat will enhance its risk management capabilities by reviewing and updating security controls and policies to address gaps, eliminate outdated practices, and integrate emerging risks. This will be supported by comprehensive risk assessments alongside initiatives to foster a strong risk-aware culture where employees clearly understand their role in managing risks. A key priority will be investing in risk awareness and accountability training, equipping the NSIRA Secretariat with the knowledge and tools needed to identify and mitigate risks effectively. These actions will strengthen organizational resilience, safeguard critical assets, and ensure continuity in achieving departmental objectives.
Together, these Internal Services initiatives reinforce the Secretariat’s capacity to deliver credible oversight, maintain public trust, and adapt to emerging demands. By enhancing communication, governance, workforce capability, digital and information stewardship, and organizational resilience, they directly support the achievement of departmental results and strengthen NSIRA’s ability to serve Canadians effectively.
Table 4 provides a summary of the planned spending and full-time equivalents required to achieve results.
| Resource | Planned |
|---|---|
| Spending | $7,838,879 |
| Full-time equivalents | 31 |
Complete financial and human resources information for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat’s program inventory is available on GC InfoBase.
Government of Canada departments are to meet a target of awarding at least 5% of the total value of contracts to Indigenous businesses each year.
The NSIRA Secretariat achieved this goal in 24-25 and forecasts to continue to do so in the coming years.
Measures to meet the mandatory target include on-going training and awareness of the Indigenous Business Directory for cost centre managers as well as procurement staff.
Table 5 presents the current, actual results with forecasted and planned results for the total percentage of contracts the department awarded to Indigenous businesses.
| 5% Reporting Field | 2024–25 Actual Resul | 2025–26 Forecasted Result | 2023–24 Planned Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total percentage of contracts with Indigenous businesses | 10% | 5% | 5% |
The Secretariat’s primary organizational risk in 2026–27 stems from the resource constraints created by the Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER). These reductions intersect with growing operational demands, rising complexity in national security and intelligence activities, and an expanding investigative landscape. Together, these pressures reduce flexibility across core functions and heighten the risk that the Secretariat will be unable to sustain the same depth, breadth, and timeliness of support to the Agency. While internal efficiencies and strengthened financial oversight will help mitigate impacts, the CER creates structural pressures that will continue to influence operational performance throughout the planning period.
The resource constraints introduced by the CER also limit the Secretariat’s ability to invest in innovation, modernization, and process improvements that support high‑quality oversight. Enhancements to tools, methodologies, and practices normally essential in keeping pace with increasingly complex national security and intelligence activities will be more difficult to advance under current fiscal conditions. This constrains the Secretariat’s capacity to adopt new analytical techniques that are dependent on increased investments in technology. . As a result, the organization must balance its commitment to delivering timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations with reduced flexibility to modernize or introduce new approaches that enhance effectiveness over the longer term.
Resource limitations will directly affect the timeliness of investigations in 2026–27. This risk is amplified by the significant surge in complaints received in recent years, driven primarily by systemic delays in immigration application processes. The sharp increase in caseload volume requires substantial analytical, legal, and administrative effort, and under current resource conditions will create delays in addressing both existing and new complaints. Without the ability to supplement capacity, the Secretariat faces increased pressure in meeting expectations for timely access to justice and maintaining service standards in investigative work. In addition, the Agency and Secretariat are expected to absorb a significant additional workload arising from the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). This is expected to come into force in 2026-27. No additional resources were contemplated by the government for NSIRA in relation to this work.
Legal Services within the NSIRA Secretariat and to the Review Agency are provided in-house owing to the requirement for NSIRA to operate independently from Government. Moreover, the Department of Justice Canada (DOJ) does not readily accept to represent NSIRA or its Secretariat in litigation before the courts as the DOJ often finds itself in an adversarial position to NSIRA when it carries out its reviews and investigations and in litigation files. Given this operational reality, and as a micro-organization, the NSIRA Secretariat traditionally utilized contracts with external law firms for the provision of litigation services on an as needed basis. Our reduced O&M budget for FY 2026-27 means that no funding has been allocated for the external provision of litigation services. Litigation capacity will have to be absorbed in-house for both existing litigation matters, and any new litigation involving NSIRA or its Secretariat that may come before the courts–including litigation instituted by other federal government organizations against NSIRA or its Secretariat. This will represent a corresponding reduction in the capacity to provide advisory Legal Services in support of reviews, investigations and internal services, and thus impact delivery on core responsibilities.
This section provides an overview of NSIRA Secretariat’s planned spending and human resources for the next three fiscal years and of planned spending for 2026-27 with actual spending from previous years.
This section presents an overview of the department’s planned expenditures from 2023-24 to 2028-29.
Table 6 Three-year spending summary for core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)
Table 6presents NSIRA Secretariat’s spending over the past three years to carry out its core responsibilities and for internal services. Amounts for the 2025–26 fiscal year are forecasted based on spending to date.
| Core Responsibilities and Internal Services | 2023-2024 Actual Expenditures | 2024-25 Actual Expenditures | 2025-2026 Forecast Spending |
|---|---|---|---|
| National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations | $9,110,398 | $10,856,293/td> | $10,916,634 |
| Subtotal | $9,110,398 | $10,856,293 | $10,916,634 |
| Internal services | $10,535,328 | $7,983,206 | $8,628,304 |
| Total | $19,645,726 | $18,839,499 | $19,544,937 |
While planned spending appears to have increased from 2024-25 to 2025-26, it is likely, based on historical forecasting results, that the actuals for 2025-26 will come in similar to or lower than 2024-25 actuals. The decrease from 2023-24 to 2024-25 is due to a large capital infrastructure project that was completed in 2023-24 so the inflated expenditures in internal services stopped in 2023-24. We are seeing a gradual increase in both ongoing O&M expenditures and particularly in salaries, due to the growth of the organization and the approach towards a steady state.
More financial information from previous years is available on the Finances section of GC Infobase.
Table7 presents NSIRA Secretariat’s planned spending over the next three years by core responsibilities and for internal services.
| Core Responsibilities and Internal Services | 2026–27 Planned Spending | 2027–28 Planned Spending | 2028–29 Planned Spending |
|---|---|---|---|
| National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations | $10,599,557 | $10,293,901 | $9,682,300 |
| Subtotal | $10,599,557 | $10,293,901 | $9,682,300 |
| Internal services | $7,838,879 | $7,701,302 | $7,456,666 |
| Total | $18,438,436 | $17,995,203 | $17,138,966 |
Due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review that was undertaken in 2025-26, expenditures will decrease in the coming three fiscal years according to the prescribed targets from Treasury Board.
More detailed financial information on planned spending is available on the Finances section of GC Infobase.
This section provides an overview of the department’s voted and statutory funding for its core responsibilities and for internal services. For further information on funding authorities, consult the Government of Canada budgets and expenditures.

Graph 1 summarizes the department’s approved voted and statutory funding from 2023-24 to 2028-29.
| Fiscal Year | Total | Voted | Statutory |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023–24 | $24,388,394 | $22,633,165 | $1,755,229 |
| 2024–25 | $19,458,632 | $17,857,264 | $1,601,368 |
| 2025–26 | $20,425,774 | $18,517,997 | $1,907,777 |
| 2026–27 | $18,438,436 | $16,389,075 | $2,049,361 |
| 2027–28 | $17,995,203 | $15,962,458 | $2,032,745 |
| 2028–29 | $17,138,966 | $15,274,167 | $1,864,799 |
Due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review that was undertaken in 2025-26, funding will decrease in the coming three fiscal years according to the prescribed targets from Treasury Board.
For further information on NSIRA Secretariat’s departmental appropriations, consult the 2026-27 Main Estimates.
The future-oriented condensed statement of operations provides an overview of NSIRA Secretariat’s operations for 2025-26 to 2026-27.
Table 8 summarizes the expenses and revenues which net to the cost of operations before government funding and transfers for 2025-26 to 2026-27. The forecast and planned amounts in this statement of operations were prepared on an accrual basis. The forecast and planned amounts presented in other sections of the Departmental Plan were prepared on an expenditure basis. Amounts may therefore differ.
| Financial Information | 2025–26 Forecast Results | 2026–27 Planned Results | Difference (Planned Results minus Forecasted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total expenses | $22,205,341 | $21,038,245 | $1,167,095 |
| Total revenues | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers | $22,205,341 | $21,038,245 | $1,167,095 |
The decrease in expenses is due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review cuts.
A more detailed Future-Oriented Statement of Operations and associated Notes for 2026-27, including a reconciliation of the net cost of operations with the requested authorities, is available on NSIRA Secretariat’s website.
This section presents an overview of the department’s actual and planned human resources from 2023-24 to 2028-29.
Table 9 shows a summary of human resources, in full-time equivalents, for NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for the previous three fiscal years. Human resources for the 2025–26 fiscal year are forecasted based on year to date.
| Core Responsibilities and Internal Services | 2023–24 Actual Full-time Equivalents | 2024–25 Actual Full-time Equivalents | 2025–26 Forecasted Full-time Equivalents |
|---|---|---|---|
| National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations | 51 | 58 | 69 |
| Subtotal | 51 | 58 | 69 |
| Internal services | 24 | 29 | 31 |
| Total | 75 | 87 | 100 |
Over the last three fiscal years, the Secretariat’s full‑time equivalent (FTE) levels have remained relatively stable, reflecting steady workforce planning in support of its mandate. During this period, staffing levels were sustained through targeted recruitment and low turnover, allowing the organization to maintain core capacity while continuing to build specialized expertise in review, investigative, and corporate functions. Operational demands and caseload complexity continued to grow, underscoring the importance of sustaining a skilled and stable workforce. While staffing remained consistent through 2025–26, the Secretariat anticipates increased pressure on workforce levels beginning in 2026–27 as new fiscal constraints take effect.
Table 10 shows information on human resources, in full-time equivalents, for each of NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services planned for the next three years.
| Core Responsibilities and Internal Services | 2026–27 Planned Full-time Equivalents | 2027–28 Planned Full-time Equivalents | 2028–29 Planned Full-time Equivalents |
|---|---|---|---|
| National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations | 54 | 54 | 54 |
| Subtotal | 54 | 54 | 54 |
| Internal services | 31 | 31 | 31 |
| Total | 85 | 85 | 85 |
In the context of the Comprehensive Expenditure Request (CER), the organization was required to undertake a review of its planned workforce levels in order to meet externally established financial targets. As a result, certain positions will be abolished and reductions to the overall size of the workforce will be implemented. These measures will be applied in the first year of the planning horizon (2026–27) to comply with the required expenditure levels and to stabilize planned full-time equivalent levels in subsequent years. The organization continues to manage these impacts while maintaining its core capacity to deliver on its mandate.
NSIRA Secretariat’s Departmental Plan does not include information on tax expenditures.
The tax system can be used to achieve public policy objectives through the application of special measures such as low tax rates, exemptions, deductions, deferrals and credits. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for these measures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures.
This report also provides detailed background information on tax expenditures, including descriptions, objectives, historical information and references to related federal spending programs as well as evaluations and GBA Plus of tax expenditures.
Appropriate minister(s): The Right Honourable Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada
Institutional head: Charles Fugère, Executive Director
Ministerial portfolio: Privy Council Office
Enabling instrument(s): National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act
Year of incorporation / commencement: 2019
Mailing address:
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat P.O. Box 2430, Station B
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5W5
Email: info@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca
Website(s): nsira-ossnr.gc.ca
appropriation (crédit)
Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
budgetary expenditures (dépenses budgétaires)
Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, organizations or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.
core responsibility (responsabilité essentielle)
An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a core responsibility are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence.
Departmental Plan (plan ministériel)
A report on the plans and expected performance of an appropriated department over a 3year period. Departmental Plans are usually tabled in Parliament each spring.
departmental result (résultat ministériel)
A consequence or outcome that a department seeks to achieve. A departmental result is often outside departments’ immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes.
departmental result indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel)
A quantitative measure of progress on a departmental result.
departmental results framework (cadre ministériel des résultats)
A framework that connects the department’s core responsibilities to its departmental results and departmental result indicators.
Departmental Results Report (rapport sur les résultats ministériels)
A report on a department’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.
full‑time equivalent (équivalent temps plein)
A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person‑year charge against a departmental budget. For a particular position, the full‑time equivalent figure is the ratio of number of hours the person actually works divided by the standard number of hours set out in the person’s collective agreement.
gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus) (analyse comparative entre les sexes plus [ACS Plus])
Is an analytical tool used to support the development of responsive and inclusive policies, programs, and other initiatives. GBA Plus is a process for understanding who is impacted by the issue or opportunity being addressed by the initiative; identifying how the initiative could be tailored to meet diverse needs of the people most impacted; and anticipating and mitigating any barriers to accessing or benefitting from the initiative. GBA Plus is an intersectional analysis that goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences to consider other factors, such as age, disability, education, ethnicity, economic status, geography (including rurality), language, race, religion, and sexual orientation.
Using GBA Plus involves taking a gender- and diversity-sensitive approach to our work. Considering all intersecting identity factors as part of GBA Plus, not only sex and gender, is a Government of Canada commitment.
government priorities (priorités gouvernementales)
For the purpose of the 2026-27 Departmental Plan, government priorities are the high-level themes outlining the government’s agenda in the most recent 2025 Speech from the Throne.
horizontal initiative (initiative horizontale)
An initiative where two or more federal departments are given funding to pursue a shared outcome, often linked to a government priority.
Indigenous business (entreprise autochtones)
Requirements for verifying Indigenous businesses for the purposes of the departmental result report are available through the Indigenous Services Canada Mandatory minimum 5% Indigenous procurement target website.
non‑budgetary expenditures (dépenses non budgétaires)
Non-budgetary authorities that comprise assets and liabilities transactions for loans, investments and advances, or specified purpose accounts, that have been established under specific statutes or under non-statutory authorities in the Estimates and elsewhere. Non-budgetary transactions are those expenditures and receipts related to the government’s financial claims on, and obligations to, outside parties. These consist of transactions in loans, investments and advances; in cash and accounts receivable; in public money received or collected for specified purposes; and in all other assets and liabilities. Other assets and liabilities, not specifically defined in G to P authority codes are to be recorded to an R authority code, which is the residual authority code for all other assets and liabilities.
performance (rendement)
What a department did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the department intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified.
performance indicator (indicateur de rendement)
A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an organization, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.
plan (plan)
The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how a department intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally, a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead to the expected result.
planned spending (dépenses prévues)
For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts presented in Main Estimates.
A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports.
program (programme)
Individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels.
program inventory (répertoire des programmes)
Identifies all the department’s programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department’s core responsibilities and results.
result (résultat)
A consequence attributed, in part, to a department, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single department, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the department’s influence.
statutory expenditures (dépenses législatives)
Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made.
target (cible)
A measurable performance or success level that an organization, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.
voted expenditures (dépenses votées)
Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an appropriation act. The vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) recently completed its annual review of Government of Canada institutions’ disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) for 2024. SCIDA allows federal institutions to share information to safeguard national security, including sensitive personal data like immigration and travel details. Under section 39 of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA is required to review these disclosures annually and publicly report on their compliance with legal standards, including necessity, proportionality, and privacy protection.
Information sharing under SCIDA can have significant implications for individuals’ privacy and Charter rights.
NSIRA’s review highlights both improvements in how institutions apply the Act and areas where further clarification and safeguards are needed to ensure disclosures remain lawful, proportionate, and privacy compliant.
This oversight helps protect Canadians’ rights while supporting effective national security operations.
NSIRA’s review assessed whether federal institutions:
The review examined disclosures made in 2024 by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Due to a substantial increase in disclosures from IRCC to CSIS, NSIRA focused its review primarily on information sharing between those two organizations.
NSIRA made a number of recommendations to strengthen compliance with SCIDA:
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| CBSA | Canada Border Services Agency |
| CFIA | Canadian Food Inspection Agency |
| CNSC | Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission |
| CRA | Canada Revenue Agency |
| CSE | Communications Security Establishment |
| CSIS | Canadian Security Intelligence Service |
| DND/CAF | Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces |
| FINTRAC | Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada |
| GAC | Global Affairs Canada |
| GC | Government of Canada |
| IRCC | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada |
| NSIRA | National Security and Intelligence Review Agency |
| PHAC | Public Health Agency of Canada |
| PS | Public Safety Canada |
| RCMP | Royal Canadian Mounted Police |
| SCIDA | Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act |
| TC | Transport Canada |
| Contribution test | The first part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (paragraph 5(1)(a)). |
| Proportionality test | The second part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances (paragraph 5(1)(b)). |
This review assessed Government of Canada (GC) institutions’ compliance with the disclosure and record-keeping requirements of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) throughout 2024. The review also captured the volume of SCIDA disclosures and identified trends in its application across GC institutions over time.
NSIRA found that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) generally complied with their record-keeping obligations under the SCIDA.
Due to the substantial increase of nearly 300% in disclosures from IRCC to CSIS in 2024, NSIRA focused its review primarily on these two institutions.
During the review period, IRCC and CSIS implemented a tiered request and disclosure process which reduced the amount of third-party information disclosed by IRCC, contributing to enhanced compliance with the SCIDA. However, NSIRA found instances when the information provided to IRCC by CSIS was limited and hampered IRCC’s ability to fulfill its obligations as a disclosing institution to satisfy itself that the information disclosed is in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada.
In addition, NSIRA found that IRCC lacked a formal policy governing the disclosure of information about minors.
NSIRA found that CSE, in three of its requests for information under the SCIDA, provided IRCC with more information than was relevant to its disclosures.
NSIRA made four recommendations designed to ensure that institutions minimize the privacy impact to individuals in their requests and disclosures under the SCIDA.
With regard to the SCIDA’s requirement in subsection 5.1(1) that recipient institutions destroy or return unnecessary personal information, NSIRA found that CSIS may not have complied in its retention of one disclosure containing erroneous personal information.
This review was conducted under the authority of paragraphs 8(1)(a), 8(1)(b), and subsection 39(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (“NSIRA Act”).
In accordance with section 39 of the NSIRA Act, this review fulfills NSIRA’s requirement to submit an annual report to the Minister of Public Safety regarding disclosures made under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA, or the Act) in the preceding calendar year.
The objective of this review was to assess Government of Canada (GC) institutions’ compliance with the SCIDA’s disclosure and record-keeping requirements in 2024. The review also tracked the volume of SCIDA disclosures, analyzed usage patterns across institutions and over time, and examined how GC institutions employed information-sharing agreements.
The review’s assessment of compliance was limited to GC institutions that disclosed or received information under the SCIDA in 2024: the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
The review was primarily based on records provided to NSIRA by disclosing and recipient institutions under subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA. It was supplemented by an examination of the institutions’ SCIDA policies and procedures, as well as their responses to related information requests.
NSIRA assessed administrative and substantive compliance with the SCIDA’s record-keeping requirements for all disclosures made by CBSA, CSE, GAC, and the RCMP. With respect to disclosures from IRCC to CSIS, NSIRA reviewed a random representative sample of 250 disclosures.
The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA rights of timely access to any information in the possession or under the control of a department (except for Cabinet confidences) and to receive from the department any documents and explanations NSIRA deems necessary. NSIRA monitors cooperation with access requests, including the completeness and accuracy of disclosures, which inform its overall assessment of a department’s responsiveness in each review.
CBSA, CSE, CSIS, GAC, and the RCMP met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness during this review. IRCC only partially met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness, given extended delays in IRCC’s responses to requests for information.
The SCIDA provides an explicit, stand-alone authority to disclose information between GC institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine its security. Its stated purpose is to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.
Section 9 of the SCIDA prescribes record-keeping obligations for all institutions who disclose or receive information under the Act. Subsection 9(3) requires that these records be provided to NSIRA within 30 days after the end of each calendar year.
Subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA authorizes GC institutions to disclose information—subject to any prohibitions or restrictions in other legislation or regulations—to designated recipient institutions if the disclosing institution is satisfied that (a) the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (the “contribution test”); and (b) the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances (the “proportionality test”).
Subsection 5(2) requires disclosing institutions to, at the time of the disclosure, also provide information regarding the disclosure’s accuracy and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained.
When a GC institution receives information under the Act, subsection 5.1(1) requires that the institution destroy or return any unnecessary personal information as soon as feasible after receiving it.
The SCIDA’s guiding principles reinforce the notion that effective and responsible disclosure of information protects Canada and Canadians. Of note, subsection 4(c) suggests that GC institutions enter into an information-sharing arrangement when they regularly disclose information to the same recipient.
Finding 1. NSIRA found that IRCC’s disclosures to CSIS under the SCIDA increased significantly in 2024.
In 2024, GC institutions made a total of 900 disclosures under the SCIDA (see Table 1). The number of disclosures increased 235% overall since 2023.
| Designated Recipient Institutions | |||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Disclosing Institution | CBSA | CFIA | CNSC | CRA | CSE | CSIS | DND/CAF | Finance | FINTRAC | GAC | Health | IRCC | PHAC | PSC | RCMP | TC | TOTAL (proactive) |
| CBSA | – | – | – | – | – | (2) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | (2) | – | (4) |
| GAC | – | – | – | – | (1) | 41 (12) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 (2) |
– | 49 (15) |
| IRCC | – | – | – | – | 76 | 770 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | (1) | – | 847 (1) |
| TOTAL (proactive) | – | – | – | – | 77 (1) |
813 (14) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 (5) |
– | 900 (20) |
This substantial increase in records was primarily driven by IRCC’s disclosures to CSIS, which grew nearly 300% from 194 in 2023 to 770 in 2024. IRCC previously disclosed similar information to CSIS under the Privacy Act, whereas now the SCIDA is the primary mechanism for CSIS to obtain immigration information. CSIS also credits the increase in disclosures to enhanced collaboration with IRCC aimed at improving operational staff awareness and understanding of the SCIDA regime.
As observed in prior years, institutions predominantly made disclosures following a request. Only 2% of disclosures were sent proactively by the disclosing institution.
Section 9 of the SCIDA establishes record-keeping obligations for both disclosing and recipient institutions. These requirements are designed to promote accountability and transparency by mandating the documentation of essential information, including descriptions of the disclosed or received data, the individuals involved, relevant dates, and the legal basis for the disclosure. Institutions are also required to record whether the information was destroyed or returned.
NSIRA’s analysis of records submitted by CSIS and IRCC revealed several minor discrepancies in record-keeping. These discrepancies can be attributed to duplicated, amended, and cancelled requests from CSIS. For example, in some cases, follow-up questions from CSIS regarding disclosures it had received were recorded by IRCC as a different request.
In addition, IRCC assigned sequential file numbers for a number of requests that were sent in 2024 but not processed until 2025. These disclosures were included in the record-keeping logs submitted to NSIRA. IRCC explained that, moving forward, it will only assign file numbers to requests that are completed in the current calendar year to minimize confusion.
IRCC also noted that it has committed to sharing its record-keeping log with CSIS on a quarterly basis to address potential discrepancies early. Clear and effective communication between disclosing and recipient institutions is vital to accurate record-keeping and enables secure information management, legal compliance, and administrative precision.
In August 2023, CSE and IRCC signed an information sharing agreement (ISA) to formalize their regular information exchanges and facilitate compliance with the SCIDA. The primary purpose of IRCC disclosures to CSE under the SCIDA is to determine a subject of interest’s legal citizenship status and/or immigration status in Canada. These disclosures help to ensure CSE’s lawfulness, as its mandate prohibits the direction of operational activities at Canadians and persons in Canada.
In its requests, CSE provides an individual’s identifying information in order for IRCC to conduct a search in the relevant systems, primarily the Global Case Management System (GCMS). The GCMS holds all citizenship and immigration information of Canadian citizens, foreign nationals, and permanent residents. It includes any application submitted by individuals as well as information entered by immigration officers and/or other departments, such as the CBSA.
At minimum, CSE provides IRCC with an individual’s full name and date of birth in its request. When available, CSE may include additional identifying information such as an individual’s known or suspected nationality, place of birth, and phone number(s), among others. The ISA between CSE and IRCC contains a comprehensive list of all the information that CSE may provide to assist IRCC in producing accurate results.
In three different instances, however, NSIRA observed that CSE provided IRCC with additional personal information that was not identified in the ISA. CSE explained that all relevant details were disclosed to increase the likelihood of IRCC yielding results. IRCC confirmed to NSIRA that it could not, and has never, leveraged the specific personal information provided by CSE to conduct its searches.
The ISA does not formally prohibit CSE from sharing information outside of the parameters agreed upon with IRCC. Nevertheless, CSE should verify whether the information it shares is relevant to the disclosing institution to avoid unnecessary sharing of personal data.
In the spring of 2024, IRCC and CSIS developed a tiered process for sharing under the SCIDA and introduced the classification of SCIDA requests and disclosures into “basic” or “advanced”. In implementing this process, IRCC and CSIS also formally adopted three standardized templates: a request letter, a checklist, and a response form. The checklist and response forms, in particular, aim to guide IRCC analysts in providing only necessary information and were included in all disclosures.
At minimum, a basic disclosure contains biographic details from the past five years, such as citizenship or immigration information, marital status, and contact information. It may also include photographs, recent employment information, travel history, and physical characteristics.
Should CSIS require an extensive personal history and supporting documents, such as scanned immigration applications, the request becomes an advanced SCIDA disclosure requiring additional rationale. This type of disclosure often contains information from a longer period of time (past ten years or more).
Previously, in order to share even basic biographic information, IRCC would include a scanned copy of an individual’s most recent immigration application (e.g. a passport or visa application). As a result, a number of disclosures from early in the review year contained third party information, such as unredacted guarantor, emergency contact, or reference information. NSIRA observed that the tiered system reduced the number of instances where IRCC included third party information in a basic SCIDA disclosure, in part because scanned copies of applications were no longer included.
Typically, IRCC will redact references from passport applications in an advanced disclosure. Other types of third-party information are redacted on a case-by-case basis.
The disclosure process begins when IRCC receives a request letter from CSIS containing a standardized list of items agreed upon by both institutions. This approach allows CSIS to identify only the information necessary for its request, addressing previous issues with customized and inconsistent information lists. For example, CSIS may request biographic details, such as citizenship and passport information, but choose not to request contact information. Advanced request letters include an option to receive scanned copies of applications.
Throughout 2024, the request letter, checklist, and response form evolved to meet the needs of IRCC and CSIS. NSIRA observed that new types of commonly requested information that had been previously absent from the request letter would be added as needed. In addition, IRCC combined the checklist and response form to reduce its administrative burden. The tiered process enabled IRCC to manage the increase in disclosures while limiting the amount of third-party information shared.
Importantly, IRCC’s decision to use a response checklist and form indicates an iterative process that improved the operational efficiency and legal compliance of both institutions under the SCIDA. Specific response times are prioritized into the following three categories: urgent life-threatening requests, priority operational requests, and routine requests. IRCC intends to prioritize requests from other institutions under the SCIDA in a similar manner.
The disclosures below briefly illustrate how the tiered process improved IRCC’s minimization of personal information in disclosures under the SCIDA. The first case represents a typical disclosure prior to the tiered system, while the second and third disclosures occurred after its introduction.
CSIS sent a letter to IRCC requesting the disclosure of information about a foreign individual under investigation relating to a particular institution. The request was to include records from the past five years.
Without a system to limit what information was shared, IRCC disclosed all available scanned copies of the individual’s study permit, work permit, permanent residence, and temporary resident visa applications. All documents provided in the disclosure were without redactions and included third party, minor, and financial information.
CSIS requested a basic SCIDA disclosure from IRCC for information relating to individuals affiliated with a particular foreign entity. In its justification, CSIS noted that the foreign entity and any individuals identified were of “national security interest” in relation to a CSIS investigation.
As this was a basic request, IRCC took steps towards limiting the disclosure by providing CSIS with a chart containing only the name, place and date of birth, status or immigration history, and the nature of affiliation. In email correspondence, IRCC stated that should CSIS require additional details or would like to request an advanced SCIDA for any or all of the individuals implicated, it would be required to include an additional detailed rationale.
CSIS requested an advanced disclosure from IRCC for information relating to several individuals with the justification that it had “reasonable grounds to believe” the subjects may have been in contact with “known members” of a foreign intelligence service. CSIS continued to justify its reasoning in detail, providing IRCC with a substantial amount of contextual information about the foreign entity in question and how the information it requested would contribute to its investigation.
CSIS also requested scanned copies of all documents in its request. IRCC disclosed nearly all categories of information requested by CSIS. In the checklist attached to the disclosure, IRCC stated that it had redacted third party information as well as other records that were irrelevant to CSIS’s request.
When compared to the first case, the delineation of basic and advanced disclosures under the SCIDA prevented the over sharing of personal information by IRCC in the second case without further justification. Despite CSIS’s expanded justification in the third case, IRCC did not include all the information in its holdings on the identified subjects because not everything was relevant.
SCIDA disclosures made under section 5(1) require IRCC to satisfy itself of two specific criteria. First, IRCC must satisfy itself that the disclosure will contribute to CSIS’s exercise of its jurisdiction in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. Second, IRCC must satisfy itself that the disclosure will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. If IRCC is satisfied in both instances, it “may” make a disclosure. The onus is on the disclosing institution to assure itself that the information it discloses will contribute in the requisite sense.
While CSIS may not be required to share detailed information about its investigations, programs, or activities with IRCC, it needs to provide enough information in a request so that IRCC can responsibly exercise its discretion. A succinct high-level explanation of the link between the information sought and CSIS’s national security jurisdiction and responsibilities may be enough. However, disclosing institutions can seek clarification by requiring a more specific articulation of the activity that undermines the security of Canada that the request relates to.
In the majority of basic requests reviewed by NSIRA, CSIS elected to use scant phrasing in its justifications, such as “Subject is of national security interest in relation to the Service’s investigation of” the threat in question. In contrast, NSIRA observed other basic requests where CSIS demonstrated how the requested information would contribute to its investigations in a clear and descriptive manner in its justification. As a matter of course, advanced requests almost always contained robust justifications.
Inconsistencies in the description of the undermining activity in CSIS’s basic request letters did not often prompt IRCC to seek further clarification. In practice, IRCC maintained an institutional understanding that CSIS would only request information that will contribute to its mandate. NSIRA did not observe that IRCC conducted independent assessments based on a structured framework or consistent criteria.
IRCC has stated that it redacts any information it deems irrelevant in its disclosures to ensure that only pertinent details are disclosed. Particularly for advanced and bulk requests, IRCC was not always satisfied with CSIS’s justifications. NSIRA observed that IRCC either required additional rationale, disclosed less information than had been requested, or redacted unnecessary third-party information.
The absence of detailed justifications in SCIDA requests risks compromising compliance with paragraph 5(1)(b). Consequently, recipient institutions should provide disclosing institutions with the necessary information and rationale to satisfy the disclosing institution’s contribution threshold. A sufficient analysis of the activity that undermines the security of Canada requires that IRCC have knowledge of those circumstances.
The recommendation below echoes those from NSIRA’s 2024 review of the SCIDA, namely that IRCC should not automatically accept, without an independent assessment, a recipient institution’s request. The review also recommended that IRCC disclose only the minimum information reasonably necessary to protect individuals’ privacy in the circumstances and comply with the legal standards of the SCIDA.
In 2024, IRCC indicated that it had received an increase in requests for disclosures regarding minors and engaged with CSIS to ensure their privacy. IRCC’s existing SCIDA policy, however, does not address the treatment of minors in disclosures under the regime.
NSIRA observed that IRCC was inconsistent in its approach to disclosing information about minors and did not redact information appropriately in several disclosures reviewed. In at least one instance, IRCC stated that it had redacted a minor’s information. However, NSIRA observed that IRCC had done so inconsistently, leaving the minor’s name, date of birth, and national identification number unredacted elsewhere in the same disclosure. In other disclosures, IRCC either redacted information about a minor in full or chose not to make the disclosure at all.
The care attendant to a minor’s privacy rights in other areas of the law (as seen in, among others, the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and various international conventions) indicates that minors may also attract a heightened privacy expectation in a national security context. Children under 16, for example, may not have a choice in submitting applications for passports which are completed on their behalf by a parent or guardian.
Subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA requires, as soon as feasible, the destruction or return of any personal information received under section 5 of the Act that is not necessary for a department to fulfill their lawful responsibilities related to national security. CSIS is excluded from this requirement by subsection 5.1(3) when a disclosure is retained pursuant to the performance of its duties and functions under section 12 of the CSIS Act.
In 2024, CSIS was the only institution to identify disclosures containing information that was destroyed or returned under subsection 5.1(1): three were deemed non-reportable, one was incorrect (wrong subject), and one had been disclosed by IRCC before CSIS could cancel the request, although it was not disseminated.
Separately, NSIRA identified one disclosure where CSIS retained personal information about the wrong individual. In early 2024, CSIS sent a letter to IRCC requesting a foreign citizen’s current and past applications for the past five years. As the request was made before the tiered process had been implemented, IRCC’s disclosure was extensive and included full visa and work permit applications, as well as unredacted familial and financial information.
Shortly following receipt of the disclosure, CSIS assessed that the individual implicated was not the subject of the request. Despite the requirement to destroy the information, CSIS retained it in its entirety for “reference purposes.” When asked, CSIS confirmed the disclosure should not have been retained “in its totality and possibly at all” and that the matter had been referred to its internal compliance section.
To the extent that it is strictly necessary, section 12 of the CSIS Act allows CSIS to collect, analyse and retain on activities constituting threats to the security of Canada. However, as CSIS did not claim that this information was retained pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act, and thus was not strictly necessary to keep, the exception at 5.1(3) of the SCIDA did not apply and CSIS was required to destroy or return the information pursuant to 5.1(1).
This review marks the sixth year that NSIRA has examined GC institutions’ compliance with the SCIDA. NSIRA concluded that, within the disclosures reviewed, institutions generally adhered to the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record-keeping.
NSIRA noted important improvements that streamlined the request and disclosure process between IRCC and CSIS and enhanced compliance. However, NSIRA observed risks with IRCC’s application of the substantive requirements under paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA.
NSIRA also identified possible non-compliance with subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA owing to CSIS’s retention of personal information that it had identified as unnecessary.
NSIRA’s recommendations in this review are designed to assist both recipient and disclosing institutions in adhering to the SCIDA’s privacy standards while effectively supporting national security and lawful mandates.
| Disclosing Institution | Designated Recipient Institutions under the SCIDA, Schedule 3 | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CBSA | CFIA | CNSC | CRA | CSE | CSIS | DND/CAF | Finance | FINTRAC | GAC | Health | IRCC | PHAC | PS | RCMP | TC | TOTAL | |
| 2023 | |||||||||||||||||
| CBSA | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 (2) | – | 2 (2) |
| GAC | – | – | – | – | 1 (1) | 10 (0) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 (1) |
| RCC | – | – | – | – | 58 (0) | 194 (7) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 252 (7) |
| TOTAL | – | – | – | – | 59 (1) | 204 (7) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 (2) | – | 269 (10) |
| 2022 | |||||||||||||||||
| CBSA | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | – | 4 |
| GAC | – | – | – | – | – | 39 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | – | 53 |
| IRCC | – | – | – | – | 59 | 56 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 115 |
| RCMP | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | 1 |
| TOTAL | – | – | – | – | 59 | 95 | 2 | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 16 | – | 173 |
| 2021 | |||||||||||||||||
| DND/CAF | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 |
| GAC | – | – | – | – | – | 41 | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | – | 44 |
| IRCC | – | – | – | – | 68 | 79 | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 149 |
| TOTAL | – | – | – | – | 68 | 122 | – | – | – | 2 | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | – | 195 |
| 2020 | |||||||||||||||||
| CBSA | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 4 |
| GAC | – | – | – | – | 1 | 25 | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 13 | – | 40 |
| IRCC | – | – | – | – | 60 | 61 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 37 | 1 | 159 |
| RCMP | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 3 | – | 5 | – | – | – | 9 |
| TC | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 2 |
| Other | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 |
| TOTAL | – | – | – | – | 61 | 88 | 1 | – | – | 3 | – | 6 | – | – | 55 | 1 | 215 |
| 2019 | |||||||||||||||||
| CBSA | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 3 |
| GAC | – | – | – | – | – | 23 | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 1 | 15 | – | 42 |
| IRCC | – | – | – | – | 5 | 17 | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | – | 59 |
| RCMP | – | – | – | 4 | – | – | – | – | 1 | 3 | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | 9 |
| TC | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 1 |
| TOTAL | – | – | – | 4 | 5 | 41 | 1 | – | 1 | 3 | – | 4 | – | 1 | 54 | – | 114 |
NSIRA made the following findings and recommendations in this review:
Finding 1. NSIRA found that IRCC’s disclosures to CSIS under the SCIDA increased significantly in 2024.
Finding 2. NSIRA found that, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, every institution that disclosed or received information pursuant to the SCIDA in 2024 generally complied with its record-keeping obligations under section 9.
Finding 3. NSIRA found that CSE provided IRCC with more information than necessary in three of its requests for disclosure under the SCIDA.
Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that CSE limit the sharing of information when requesting a disclosure under the SCIDA to only that which IRCC has identified as relevant to its information holdings.
Finding 4. NSIRA found that IRCC and CSIS’s implementation of a tiered request and disclosure process reduced the amount of third-party information disclosed by IRCC, which contributed to enhanced compliance with the SCIDA.
Finding 5. NSIRA found instances when the information provided to IRCC by CSIS was limited and hampered IRCC’s ability to fulfill its obligation as a disclosing institution to satisfy itself that the information disclosed is in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada.
Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that IRCC seek clarification from requesting institutions, as needed, to ensure it has all relevant information necessary to fulfill its obligations as a disclosing institution under the SCIDA, before making a disclosure.
Finding 6. NSIRA found that IRCC did not have a policy governing the disclosure of information concerning minors under the SCIDA.
Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that IRCC institute a policy on the disclosure of information related to minors that recognizes their distinct privacy interests.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS may not have complied with subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA when it retained one disclosure containing personal information that was not necessary for exercising its jurisdiction.
Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that CSIS destroy all personal information in one disclosure that was not necessary for exercising its jurisdiction.
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The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) has completed its review of Canada’s Passenger Protect Program (PPP), commonly known as the “no-fly list,” and how it’s managed under the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA). This program, overseen by the Minister of Public Safety, plays an important role in national security but also impacts people’s ability to travel. NSIRA’s review looked at the entire process, from how people are added to the list, to 90-day reviews of the list, actions taken when listed individuals try to fly, and ways to challenge their listing or get removed.
It’s vital to review how security measures interplay with individuals’ rights. Since the Passenger Protect Program can prevent people from traveling by air, being unclear or inconsistent could lead to unfair treatment. A well-functioning program is crucial for public trust in both national security and individual freedoms.
NSIRA found that recent improvements to the Passenger Protect Program, like centralized passenger screening, have made the process more accurate, reduced errors, and improved security. Public Safety Canada has also generally made sure that people on the list aren’t unfairly restricted from traveling.
However, there are areas that need attention:
In light of its findings, NSIRA made ten recommendations aimed at ensuring a more principled, coordinated, and fair approach to managing the Passenger Protect Program.
The review highlights progress in the Passenger Protect Program, including improved screening and better protections for travellers. However, it also identifies gaps in governance, consistency, and oversight, particularly regarding relisting decisions and the impact on travellers.
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Ottawa, Ontario, December 4, 2025 – The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) 2024 Annual Report has been tabled in Parliament.
The report outlines NSIRA’s key achievements and progress, showcasing how the organization has played a vital role in shaping the national security and intelligence review landscape. Through its work, NSIRA fosters public trust, upholds democratic oversight, and safeguards the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.
In 2024, NSIRA completed nine reviews, including the Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference. Given its public interest, NSIRA determined that the report and its conclusions should be released to Parliament. As such, this review resulted in NSIRA’s first special report tabled under section 40 of the NSIRA Act.
Other key reviews in 2024 included:
As of publication of the Annual Report, five of the nine reviews completed in 2024 have been published. Other reviews from 2024 are, as are unpublished reviews from previous years, undergoing processes in relation to redaction of potentially injurious information. NSIRA continues to advance all review reports submitted to the Minister, with additional publications expected upon completion of the redaction processes.
In 2024, NSIRA introduced dedicated follow-up cycles to evaluate how departments implement its recommendations. Work is underway to develop new internal tracking tools and protocols to improve awareness, follow-up, and public communications about institutional responses and progress.
While NSIRA has observed encouraging progress in the timeliness and completeness of responses from several reviewees, the Agency and Secretariat have faced ongoing challenges. Tensions persist regarding institutional resistance to NSIRA’s access rights, inconsistent disclosures in response to requests for information, and overbroad or unsubstantiated demands for redactions in access-to-information consultations.
NSIRA is exploring options to provide better real-time public visibility into these challenges to support greater departmental accountability.
From January 1 to December 31, 2024, NSIRA received 79 new complaints, including 67 related to CSIS. Of these, 52 (66%) involved delays in immigration and citizenship security screening. Under sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA, and CSIS advised that the time required can vary based on several factors. As shown in the statistics in the report, many complaints were resolved informally once CSIS completed its screening and issued a letter confirming that its advice had been provided to the requesting department.
NSIRA closed a total of 22 investigations in 2024, with 34 carried into 2025.
NSIRA finalized its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, setting clear priorities for the next three years. The plan reaffirms NSIRA’s core values — Independence, Professionalism, Transparency, and Inclusiveness — and serves as a foundation for continuous improvement.
The Agency continues to closely collaborate with domestic and international partners to strengthen its review and investigative capabilities. NSIRA aspires to be a globally recognized centre of excellence and a hub for a professional community dedicated to national security accountability.
Date of Publishing:
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA, Review Agency) is pleased to present its 2024 Annual Report, highlighting key achievements, progress, and our direction for coming years.
2024 Key Highlights
In 2024, NSIRA observed a notable increase in the number of complaint investigations linked to immigration security screening delays.
Additionally, NSIRA has released its first Section 40 public interest report this year, marking an important milestone in its mandate. This report underscores NSIRA’s dedication to transparency and accountability in national security matters.
NSIRA’s 2024–2027 Strategic Plan
After five years of operation, NSIRA has developed its triennial strategic plan for 2024-2027, which will guide the Review Agency’s efforts in the coming years. The strategic plan focuses on NSIRA’s commitment to enhancing review; investigating complaints in a timely, fair, and efficient manner; fostering transparency; and strengthening public trust in NSIRA’s rigorous, fully independent review approach to Canada’s national security and intelligence activities.
NSIRA’s Role on the International Stage
NSIRA continues to strengthen its international partnerships, ensuring its work remains informed by, and a contributor to, global best practices in review. By engaging with international counterparts, NSIRA positions Canada as an active leader in upholding democratic values on the global stage.
We would like to thank the staff of NSIRA’s Secretariat for their expertise, efforts and resilience throughout this ambitious year and for their innovation, energy and commitment for the year ahead.
Marie DeschampsWithout specialized national security review, much security service conduct would be immunized from scrutiny by reason of national security secrecy. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA)’s raison d’être is to ensure that there is no such immunity. NSIRA has two mandates: conducting national security reviews of security or intelligence activities and conducting investigations of complaints from the public brought against a subset of national security and intelligence services.
In five years of existence, NSIRA has become a robust and professional reviewbody that conducts reviews and investigates public complaints, which reflect thehighest standards and core values of Canadian society: democracy, transparencyand the rule of law.
This 2024 Annual Report outlines the multiple spheres of activity through which NSIRA has contributed meaningfully to shaping the landscape of national security and intelligence review. This work is central to strengthening public trust, ensuring democratic oversight, and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.
The Reviews section of this report provides a summary of each of the nine review reports that were approved by Members during 2024, including the Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, which resulted in NSIRA’s first special report tabled under section 40 of the NSIRA Act, where NSIRA determined that releasing the report and its conclusions to Parliament was in the public interest. The review reports that NSIRA presented to the relevant departments and agencies in 2024 contain 67 findings and 45 recommendations.
During the last five months of 2024, NSIRA observed a significant increase of public complaints against CSIS, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening which resulted in NSIRA ingesting an unprecedented number of new complaints.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA, the Review Agency) is an independent entity that reviews and investigates public complaints related to national security or intelligence activities to assess their lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity. NSIRA may have up to seven Members, supported by a Secretariat with expertise in law, technology and national security, and led by an Executive Director appointed by the Governor-in-Council.
NSIRA has two mandates: reviewing Government of Canada national security or intelligence activities and investigating public complaints related to those activities.
NSIRA’s approach in managing its review process is innovative. Review teams are comprised of individuals with diverse skill sets. They execute reviews under the direction of a designated NSIRA member and relevant Secretariat management personnel. Similarly, NSIRA’s model for investigations of complaints relies on an NSIRA Member serving in a quasi-judicial investigative role, supported by legal, registry, and research staff.

NSIRA holds a unique and pivotal position within Canada’s national security accountability framework. With a mandate spanning the entire federal government, NSIRA can review any national security or intelligence activity, irrespective of the department or agency involved. This extensive jurisdiction enables NSIRA to carry out comprehensive, integrated, in-depth reviews of sensitive operations.
NSIRA also functions as a complaint investigation body, primarily examining national security-related allegations against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) closely related to national security, and denials of security clearance by federal departments. These public complaints often involve serious allegations, and NSIRA’s capacity to address them enhances access to justice and the protection of individual rights.
With access to classified and legally privileged information, NSIRA is uniquely equipped to examine whether national security powers are exercised incompliance with Canadian law.
As part of Canada’s national security and intelligence accountability framework, NSIRA and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) serve complementary yet distinct roles. While both play crucial roles in ensuring accountability, they differ in structure and mandate.
NSICOP is a committee of parliamentarians and focuses its reviews on the effectiveness of the national security and intelligence agencies. It is impacted by events such as elections or dissolutions. NSICOP’s makeup makes it uniquely well positioned to examine both the efficacy of the national security and intelligence community, in particular, its legal frameworks, and broad strategic trends across the national security landscape.
NSIRA operates year-round and maintains consistent engagement regardless of the Parliamentary schedule. Its mandate is to focus on the legality and legal compliance of national security and intelligence activities through in-depth reviews that dig down vertically into the operational events conducted on the ground. To deliver on its mandate to investigate complaints, NSIRA’s continuous operations are essential to ensuring that investigations are conducted without delay.
NSIRA and NSICOP both enhance transparency and accountability in national security via their distinct mandates, which ensures a complete approach to independent review. They actively coordinate efforts and avoid duplication. The respective secretariats have established a strong working relationship. Together, NSICOP and NSIRA form a complementary system supporting democratic accountability and continuous legal scrutiny.
NSIRA is committed to working within a system of partnerships with key actors. It is part of a larger network of federal review and accountability bodies and regularly engages with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). These collaborations are about best practices, ensuring aligned mandates, minimizing redundancy, and reinforcing a broader framework of transparency.
NSIRA’s independence is the cornerstone of its credibility and effectiveness as a national security review body. Operating independently from the executive branch, NSIRA conducts impartial and expert reviews of Canada’s most sensitive security and intelligence activities. This institutional autonomy is not just a privilege, it is an attitudinal necessity and a responsibility that NSIRA takes seriously. It’s vital for preserving the integrity of its operations and cultivating public trust.
The NSIRA Act grants access to all information held by reviewed departments, including classified and legally protected information, except for Cabinet confidences. This access allows NSIRA to independently review the legality, necessity, and proportionality of government actions.
NSIRA’s reports, findings, and recommendations are not subject to any editorial control from the prime minister or any other minister, nor are they subject to any editorial control from senior officials. This approach preserves NSIRA’s voice and commitment to transparency and accountability.
To uphold this independence, NSIRA invests in secure digital systems, enhances internal governance, and develops expertise through targeted hiring and training. These initiatives improve the professionalism and integrity of NSIRA’s work.
NSIRA ensures Canada’s national security activities align with the rule of law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enhancing public confidence in Canada’s national security framework. NSIRA’s role is vital in upholding a national security system based on legality and democratic accountability.
In 2024, NSIRA’s reviews tackled foreign interference, bulk data, and technology-enabled intelligence activities. NSIRA’s findings led to recommendations to keep these powers within legal and ethical limits. By reviewing the extraordinary powers of the national security community, NSIRA plays a vital role in preserving the integrity of the rule of law in Canada.
Transparency is a core value at NSIRA, shaping how the Review Agency conducts its work. Increasing public understanding of NSIRA’s work and its findings and recommendations is a fundamental value of the organization. NSIRA aims to ensure that Parliamentarians, media, civil society, academia, and the broader Canadian public remain engaged in its work, enabling them to form their independent views on national security or intelligence issues and to hold government accountable.
In the challenging context of national security operations, absolute public transparency could unfortunately provide adversaries and threat actors with information that might harm Canada’s security interests, as well as those of its allies. NSIRA applies a rigorous balanced approach to release as much information as possible about its work in its commitment to transparency and openness, while safeguarding genuinely injurious national security information.
In 2024, NSIRA enhanced its public reporting efforts by announcing on social media each time a report was submitted to a Minister and by informing the public that reports can be accessed under the Access to Information Act. NSIRA also began publishing backgrounders to provide Canadians with greater clarity on the context of its reviews. As part of its commitment to openness, the Agency launched an updated and more accessible website.
Additionally, in 2024, NSIRA expanded its outreach initiatives to enhance public awareness and understanding of its mandate. NSIRA hosted new events with civil society, media, and academia. These initiatives aimed to deepen the understanding of NSIRA’s role and to foster informed dialogue about NSIRA’s work.
NSIRA’s partnerships extend beyond Canada’s borders through its active role in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC). As a permanent member, NSIRA actively collaborates with review agencies from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, fostering robust collaboration and knowledge exchange.
NSIRA has established strong partnerships with European counterparts, including agencies involved in the Intelligence Oversight Working Group made up of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These partnerships transcend routine collaboration, enabling collective learning on review methodologies and facilitating coordinated knowledge exchange on the development of international review best practices.
NSIRA has also been an active collaborator in some initiatives led by certain United Nations divisions that aim to improve global partnerships in the review and oversight sector. This has led to engagement with new international partners, delivery on online training modules, and new contributions to global standards in review.
Through these international engagements, NSIRA plays an active role in shaping a global community of practice that promotes the values of rigorous independent review of national security or intelligence activities.
Access to information is fundamental to NSIRA’s ability to conduct effective reviews and investigations. In 2024, NSIRA observed encouraging progress in the responsiveness of several reviewees, particularly regarding the timeliness and completeness of their responses.
Despite these improvements, frustrations persist: overbroad, unsubstantiated or excessive demands for redactions in access to information consultations a reoccurring in every file, inconsistent disclosures in response to requests for information are routine, institutional resistance to NSIRA’s access rights occurs, and outdated departmental information systems at times impede NSIRA’s ability to conduct its work. NSIRA raises these issues with senior departmental officials and escalates to the Minister when necessary, with mixed results. While responsiveness performance varies across departments, it is fair to say that the status quo is one where process challenges regularly challenge NSIRA’s ability to deliver on its mandate. NSIRA is looking at ways to provide better real-time public awareness of its responsiveness challenges so that relevant departments can be held accountable.
Monitoring the execution of recommendations is pivotal to NSIRA’s commitment to facilitate systemic improvement. In 2024, NSIRA strengthened its follow-up practices by initiating dedicated review cycles designed to evaluate the implementation of prior recommendations. The timeliness and comprehensiveness of recommendation responses differ among departments and agencies.
To facilitate this endeavour, NSIRA is in the process of developing internal tracking tools and protocols to assist in ensuring more consistent awareness, follow-up, and public communications about institutional responses and progress on NSIRA’s recommendations. NSIRA will continue to make advances in the years to come on this significant initiative.
In 2024, NSIRA addressed a surge of CSIS-related complaints from the public tied to delays in immigration and citizenship screening. More than half of the new complaints related to such delays. Several of those new complaints resulted in informal resolutions.
NSIRA advanced initiatives to improve and streamline its investigative processes and procedures, as detailed in this report’s Complaint Investigations section.
In 2024, NSIRA finalized its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, setting a clear direction for its priorities over the next three years. The plan reaffirms NSIRA’s core values —Independence, Professionalism, Transparency, and Inclusiveness — and serves as a foundation for continuous improvement. It positions both NSIRA and its Secretariat to deliver effective, forward-looking review and investigations of public complaints. NSIRA aims to maintain the highest standards by focusing on contemporary issues, applying rigorous methodologies, delivering on its mandates with impartiality and efficiency, and continuing to modernize NSIRA’s processes and leverage new technologies to accomplish improved outcomes for Canadians.
To support NSIRA’s mission, the strategic plan invests in sustainable corporate infrastructure. This includes fostering a culture of continuous learning and maintaining high standards in information management, security, and human resources. The NSIRA Secretariat strives to be an agile and efficient workplace that attracts and retains top talent.
NSIRA also emphasizes its continued collaboration with domestic and international partners to strengthen its review and investigative capabilities. NSIRA aspires to be a globally recognized centre of excellence and a hub for a professional community dedicated to national security accountability. Through this strategic vision, NSIRA reaffirms its role as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians in an evolving security landscape.
Between 2021 and 2024, NSIRA’s Secretariat led the planning, development, and delivery of a new office space for its staff. This complex undertaking involved meeting the highest standards of security, functionality, and design, all while supporting NSIRA’s growing operational needs. Despite tight timelines and evolving requirements, the Secretariat successfully transitioned into the new space efficiently, securely, and with minimal disruption to NSIRA’s core mandate.
NSIRA’s review mandate is outlined in subsection 8(1) NSIRA Act and includes reviewing national security or intelligence activities of CSE and CSIS, as well as those of any other federal departments and agencies.
The review reports presented in 2024 to the relevant departments and agencies contain 67 findings, and NSIRA issued 45 recommendations.
Table 1 lists the reviews that gave rise to the reports produced and submitted to the responsible minister(s) by NSIRA, in 2024.
| Review | Department(s) | Status** |
|---|---|---|
| 22-07—Canadian Security Intelligence Service Lifecycle of Warranted Information | CSIS | Published |
| 23-05—Annual Review of Select CSIS activities | CSIS | Submitted |
| 23-02—Annual Review of Select CSE Activities | CSE | Submitted |
| 23-10—Communications Security Establishment’s Equities Management Framework | CSE | Submitted |
| 21-20—Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Human Source Program | RCMP | Published |
| 22-12—Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Accountability Mechanisms | CSIS, GAC, PS, DOJ | Published |
| 23-11—Review of FederalInstitutions’ Disclosures of Information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2023 | PS, CSE, CSIS, GAC, RCMP, CBSA, IRCC | Published |
| 24-03—Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2023 | CBSA, CSIS, CSE, DND/CAF, GAC, RCMP | Submitted |
| 23-07—Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, 20218-2023 | CSIS, RCMP, GAC, CSE, PS, PCO | Published |
**Status as of the writing of this report. A review is marked as “Submitted” when the review report has been approved by NSIRA members and sent to the relevant minister(s).
NSIRA examined CSIS’s lifecycle management of data resulting from a specific and novel technical capability used to execute a Federal Court warrant. NSIRA inspected CSIS’s primary collection and processing system to directly observe how data was collected, processed, and managed.
CSIS introduced heightened non-compliance risks when deploying the technical capability with inadequate operational policies and procedures, inadequate data stewardship practices, and inadequate technical systems to handle the resulting data. Consequently, CSIS retained information without a clearly articulated authority.
CSIS did not consult with Public Safety Canada as required by the Ministerial Direction prior to using the novel technology under review. CSIS’s failure to consult may not have been in compliance with the CSIS Act. CSIS mischaracterized the novel technology as an extension of an existing CSIS technology and failed to inform Public Safety Canada in a timely manner. CSIS did not advise the Federal Court of this novel technology.
These shortcomings raised concerns about CSIS’s readiness to assess, prepare for and deploy other novel technologies.
| Findings | Recommendations | Reviewee’s Response | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [*Technology*] as a Novel Technology | |||||
| Finding 1. NSIRA found that [*technology*] are a novel technology within CSIS’s suite of technical capabilities. | |||||
| Finding 2. NSIRA found that [*technology*] introduce a significant expansion of collection capabilities and operational risks. | |||||
| Finding 3. NSIRA found that CSIS does not have adequate policies and procedures to manage its [*technology*] program. | |||||
| Finding 4. NSIRA found CSIS did not consult Public Safety Canada in a timely manner regarding its planned use of [*technology*] contrary to the Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service on Accountability issued pursuant to section 6(2) of the CSIS Act. Moreover, CSIS may not be in compliance with section 7(1)(b) of the CSIS Act, which requires the Director to consult with the Deputy Minister when required pursuant to Ministerial Direction. | Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that CSIS establish and maintain adequate policies and procedures to manage its [*technology*] program. | Agree | |||
| Data Lifecycle Management | |||||
| Finding 5. NSIRA found that CSIS incorrectly labelled some data collected during [*operation*] and no quality assurance or compliance process detected this prior to NSIRA’s technical inspection. | |||||
| Finding 6. NSIRA found that CSIS retained collected information without clearly articulating the authority for its retention. | |||||
| Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS does not adequately consider data stewardship requirements accruing from new collection activities, which introduces heightened non-compliance risks. | Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize investing in technical processes and systems that can assess, ingest, label, use, and destroy data in compliance with its legal obligations. | Agree | |||
| Risk Assessment Practices | |||||
| Finding 8. NSIRA found that CSIS relies on the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to operationalize the 2019 Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on Accountability. However, the 2020 Framework does not fully capture the requirements of the 2019 Ministerial Direction. | Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service be revised to fully align with the 2019 Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on Accountability. | Agree | |||
| Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that the definition of “novel technique or technology” in the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service be revised to err on the side of inclusivity. | Agree | ||||
| Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that CSIS ensure risk assessments performed throughout the lifecycle of new technologies and techniques are rigorous, documented and comprehensive in their scope. | Agree | ||||
| Operational Technology Review Committee (OTRC) | |||||
| Finding 9. NSIRA found that the creation of the Operational Technology Review Committee was an important step forward in CSIS’s management of new technologies and techniques. |
Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that, as part of its ongoing development, the Operational Technology Review Committee refine its processes to:
|
Agree | |||
| Execution of Warranted Powers | |||||
| Finding 10. NSIRA found that, in [*operation*], CSIS intended to [*specific operation details*] beyond warranted targets at a [*location]. | Recommendation 7. NSIRA recommends that language in the [*warrant type*] Warrant more clearly describe the breadth and limitations of what constitutes incidental collection. | Partially Agree | |||
| Recommendation 8. NSIRA recommends that CSIS specify the warrant authority in the operational planning documents in support of [*sensitive info*] to be sought in the operation. | Agree | ||||
| Regulations | |||||
| Finding 11. NSIRA found that CSIS’s [*use of technology*] may not be in compliance with [*specific*] Regulations. | |||||
| Duty of Candour | |||||
| Finding 12. NSIRA found that CSIS did not advise the Court prior to using [*technology*] in the execution of warranted powers. | Recommendation 9. NSIRA recommends that the classified version of this report be shared with the Federal Court. | Partially Agree | |||
In 2024, NSIRA launched a process called the Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities (ARSCA-CSIS). This review covers a range of operational categories which are either routinely communicated to NSIRA by CSIS under a standalone statutory obligation or are of unique interest to NSIRA due to high legal risks or findings of prior reviews. In previous years, NSIRA conducted annual reviews of CSIS Activities that were primarily focused on NSIRA’s requirement to report annually to the Minister of Public Safety. However, these reviews did not culminate in a final report with findings and recommendations issued pursuant to section 34 of the NSIRA Act. The work completed this year as part of the ARSCA-CSIS is being captured in a final report with findings and recommendations, thereby aligning with NSIRA’s other thematic reviews. The report, which starting this year will be completed annually, will also contain the results of NSIRA’s efforts in reviewing an aspect of the CSIS Threat Reduction Regime. The ARSCA-CSIS report that will provide a high level overview of CSIS activities during the 2024 calendar year has been completed in 2025. Its findings and recommendations will appear in NSIRA’s public annual report for the calendar year 2025.
In 2024, NSIRA launched a process called the Annual Review of Select CSE Activities (ARSCA-CSE). This review covers a range of operational categories which are either routinely communicated to NSIRA by CSE under a standalone statutory obligation, or are of unique interest to NSIRA due to high legal risks or findings of prior reviews. In previous years, NSIRA conducted Annual Reviews of CSE Activities that were primarily focused on NSIRA’s requirement to report annually to the Minister of National Defence. However, these reviews did not culminate in a final report with findings and recommendations issued pursuant to section 34 of the NSIRA Act. The work completed this year as part of the ARSCA-CSE is being captured in a final report with findings and recommendations, thereby aligning with NSIRA’s other thematic reviews. The ARSCA-CSE report that will provide a high level overview of CSE activities during the 2024 calendar year has been completed in 2025. Its findings and recommendations will appear in NSIRA’s public annual report for the calendar year 2025.
NSIRA review of CSE’s Equities Management Framework (EMF) resulted in ten findings and seven recommendations that relate to two areas of concern, as well as several shortcomings related to governance and practices. However, at the time of writing, the full report remains heavily classified. As such, more information regarding this review, along with the related findings and recommendations, will be made available at a later date.
This review was conducted alongside reviews of similar programs at the Canada Border Services Agency and the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces.
NSIRA’s review focused on three areas: risk management, duty of care to human sources, and ministerial direction accountability. NSIRA found that risk assessments were inconsistently applied, leading to varied assessments on source suitability. The RCMP was overly reliant on confidentiality promises and failed to fully consider risks to sources. Risk assessments often prioritized investigative outcomes over the safety of informants and lacked proper documentation.
Additionally, NSIRA found that the RCMP did not exercise the required “special care” when sources operated in sensitive sectors. There were no mechanisms to assess the cumulative impact of such operations. Anecdotal evidence suggested these practices negatively affected both investigations and Canadian society. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.
| Findings | Recommendations | Reviewee’s Response | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy Implementation | |||||
| Finding 1. NSIRA found that the RCMP’s dated human source policy does not provide a sufficient framework for the consistent application of the Source Development Unit methodology in the proactive recruitment of human sources. | Recommendation 1. NSIRA
recommends that the RCMP update
its human source policy to include,
at a minimum:
|
||||
| Policy Governance — Risk Assessment | |||||
| Finding 2. NSIRA found that the risk assessment for agents is adequate because it is comprehensive and details the management of risk as a shared responsibility involving multiple independent stakeholders. | |||||
Findings 3. The risk
assessment framework for
confidential informants is
inadequate. The current
assessments of risk:
|
Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that the RCMP revise its risk assessment framework for confidential informants to require officers to consider all applicable risks to the confidential informant, and to aggregate and document those risks, thereby providing for a full accounting. | ||||
| Agents — Duty of Care and Informed Consent | |||||
Finding 4. RCMP’s discharge
of its duty of care toward
agents is satisfactory because
the current process:
|
Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the RCMP adjust the parameters for the conduct of agent interviews so that agent feedback is more descriptive concerning their experience; and documented with greater frequency. | ||||
| Confidential Informants — Duty of Care and Informed Consent | |||||
| Finding 5. NSIRA found that the RCMP over relies on the promise of confidentiality and does not adequately consider the risk to confidential informants. | Recommendation 4. NSIRA
recommends that the RCMP
improve its risk assessment
framework for confidential
informants. At a minimum, the
framework should:
|
||||
| Ministerial Direction — National Security Investigations in Sensitive Sectors | |||||
| Finding 6. NSIRA found that the RCMP has not demonstrated special care in its national security investigations in sensitive sectors, contrary to obligations under the Ministerial Direction — National Security Investigations in Sensitive Sectors. | |||||
| Finding 7. NSIRA found that the RCMP has an inadequate framework to ensure the appreciation of the cumulative impact of national security investigations in Canadian Fundamental Institutions | Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that the RCMP create a specialized Sensitive Sector Unit that is responsible for monitoring and aggregating information on the RCMP’s activities as they relate to Canadian Fundamental Institutions, assessing the impact of these activities on the community, and conduct long-term analysis of the cumulative effects. | ||||
Following a September 2022 referral by the former Minister of Public Safety (PS), NSIRA reviewed whether CSIS’s risk assessment model, Ministerial Direction, and information-sharing mechanisms supported the Minister’s discharge of their responsibilities for CSIS.
Directions to CSIS coming from political level actors—rather than the Minister or the CSIS Director—during an active operation created unnecessary danger for the CSIS team and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation.
CSIS and PS failed to provide timely and accurate information to the Minister, which may result from PS’s dependence on CSIS to identify and receive relevant information. This would inhibit PS’s ability to prepare independent advice to the Minister.
Certain Ministerial Directions to CSIS are subject to inconsistent and contradictory interpretation, which affects their implementation. The report raises a number of issues with the pillars of risk evaluated: operational, legal, foreign policy, and reputational.
Ultimately, the Minister of Public Safety may not be consistently supported and briefed about pertinent CSIS operations, which raises concerns about the possible erosion of ministerial accountability for the CSIS.
| Findings | Recommendations | Reviewee’s Response | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Accountability and Consequences for Halting the Operation [*codename*] | |||||
| Finding 1. NSIRA found that a decision was made to halt an active CSIS operation overseas that was not made by the CSIS Director under section 6(1) of the CSIS Act, and for which there is no written record of a direction comingfrom the Minister of Public Safety under sections 6(1) or 6(2) of the CSIS Act. | Recommendation 1. NSIRA Recommends that whenever there is a decision affecting an active CSIS operation, which is not made by the Director of CSIS or their delegates, it must come as a direction from the Minister of Public Safety under section 6(1) of the CSIS Act and should be accompanied by a written record in keeping with section 6(2). | Agree | |||
| Finding 2. NSIRA found that [*political-level actors*] halted an active operation, creating unnecessary danger for the CSIS team [**], and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation. | |||||
| Responsibility for Briefing the Minister About [*codename*] | |||||
| Findings 3. NSIRA found that Public Safety and CSIS failed in their responsibility to provide timely and accurate information to the Minister of Public Safety about [**] human source [**] operation. | |||||
| Public Safety’s Role in Relation to CSIS | |||||
| Finding 4. NSIRA found that Public Safety willingly remains dependent on CSIS to identify and receive relevant information, which inhibits Public Safety’s ability to prepare independent advice to the Minister about the activities and operations of CSIS. | Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that the Minister of Public Safety take action to ensure that the Deputy Minister obtains any information required to fulfill their responsibility to provide independent advice to the Minister about the activities and operations of CSIS. | Partially Agree | |||
| Ministerial Direction to CSIS | |||||
| Findings 5. NSIRA found that multiple Ministerial Directions to CSIS are subject to inconsistent and contradictory interpretation by those responsible for their implementation. | Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the Minister of Public Safety consolidate ministerialdirections into clear, concise and harmonized instruments that are derived from meaningful consultation among those responsible for their implementation. | Agree | |||
| Findings 6. NSIRA found that when preparing Ministerial Directions to CSIS, Public Safety insufficiently consulted with Global Affairs Canada and CSIS. | |||||
| CSIS’s Risk Assessment Process | |||||
| Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS’s risk assessment process has evolved to become the central mechanism for planning operations and managing associated risks, and, while it is generally effective, it lacks clear guidance to employees on when risk should be reassessed as operations evolve. | |||||
| Legal Pillar | |||||
| Findings 8. NSIRA found that legal advice is often absent from the final risk assessment record for CSIS operations. | Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that CSIS, in consultation with the Department of Justice and Global Affairs Canada, ensure that legal risk assessments are comprehensive and memorialized in writing. | Agree | |||
| Findings 9. NSIRA found that the scope of legal considerations within legal risk assessment is underinclusive. | |||||
| Foreign Policy Pillar | |||||
| Finding 10. NSIRA found that Global Affairs Canada and CSIS do not have a shared vision with respect to the role of Global Affairs Canada in the foreign policy risk assessment. | Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that any pending changes to CSIS’s risk assessment process maintain a robust consultation and information sharing mechanism between Global Affairs Canada and CSIS. | Agree | |||
| Reputational Pillar | |||||
| Finding 11. NSIRA found that Public Safety is not adequately contributing to the preparation of reputational risk assessments. | Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that Public Safety and CSIS develop a more robust consultation mechanism for reputational risk assessment for CSIS operational activities, and that these assessments account for the risk of discreditingthe Government of Canada. | Partially Agree | |||
The purpose of this review was to determine whether Government of Canada (GC) institutions complied with the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in 2023. For the first time in SCIDA’s history, NSIRA has found full compliance with the Act, but NSIRA made seven recommendations to mitigate the risks of non-compliance.
Albeit compliant with the SCIDA, some IRCC disclosures presented a risk of non-compliance with SCIDA’s contribution and proportionality tests. The disclosing institution must be satisfied that both tests are met before making a disclosure under the SCIDA. Yet, four disclosures raised concerns with regard to the amount of personal information that IRCC disclosed.
At times, CSIS request letters were unclear, which hindered IRCC’s effort to conclude that the disclosure was authorized. The departments are required to provide information on the accuracy and reliability of the manner the disclosed information was obtained. However, NSIRA found that IRCC provided template statements on accuracy and reliability that were not always relevant.
CBSA’s record of disclosure form contradicts the SCIDA by suggesting that the provision of information on accuracy and reliability is optional.
| Findings | Recommendations | Reviewee’s Response | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Record Keeping Requirements — Section 9 | |||||
| Finding 1. NSIRA found that every institution that disclosed or received information pursuant to SCIDA in 2023 complied with their record keeping obligations under section 9, but some records were inaccurate or imprecise. | |||||
| Contribution and Proportionality Tests — Subsection 5(1) | |||||
| Finding 2. NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed that disclosing institutions demonstrated they had satisfied themselves under the contribution and proportionality tests in compliance with subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA. | Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that disclosing institutions explicitly address the requirements of both paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the records that they prepare under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA. | Agree | |||
| Finding 3. NSIRA found that IRCC did not, in one instance, independently consider whether its disclosure related to activities that fell under the SCIDA exception for advocacy, protest, or dissent. Instead, IRCC satisfied itself of the SCIDA’s contribution test based on assumptions about how CSIS assessed activities that undermine the security of Canada. | Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that IRCC amend their SCIDA policy to underscore that IRCC must independently assess whether the disclosure is authorized. This assessment should consider whether the activity amounts to one of the exceptions to the SCIDA’s definition of activities that undermine the security of Canada. | Agree | |||
| Finding 4. NSIRA found that, throughout the course of 2023, IRCC improved the rigour of its proportionality assessments regarding disclosure of passport information. However, NSIRA identified three instances where IRCC disclosed visa information without applying the same rigorous approach, which risked disclosing more personal information than reasonably necessary in the circumstances. | Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that IRCC apply an iterative approach to its proportionality assessments, with a view to disclosing only the minimum information reasonably necessary in the circumstances to enable the recipient institution to further their investigation. | Agree | |||
| Finding 5. NSIRA found that CSIS requests to IRCC used inconsistent terminology and were often unclear about the relationship between the subject of the request and its investigation. At times, this lack of clear communication hindered IRCC’s efforts to satisfy itself that the disclosure was authorized underthe SCIDA. | Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that CSIS use consistent terminology, and be clear about the nature of the link that has been established between the subject of a request and its investigation, to assist IRCC in satisfying itself of the proportionality test. | Agree | |||
| Reliability and Accuracy Statement — Subsection 5(2) | |||||
| Finding 6. NSIRA found that disclosing institutions provided information regarding the accuracy of the information and reliability of the manner in which it was obtained in relation to all disclosures. However, CBSA made one verbal disclosure that did not include an explicit statement on accuracy and reliability. | Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that institutions avoid disclosures whenever possible. When they must occur, verbal disclosures should explicitly convey the requisite information on accuracy and reliability. | Agree | |||
| Finding 7. NSIRA found that CBSA’s record of disclosure form contradicts the SCIDA by allowing officials to opt out of providing information regarding accuracy and reliability. | Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that CBSA harmonize its record of disclosure form with the SCIDA, to convey the mandatory nature of providing information on accuracy and reliability at the time of the disclosure. | Agree | |||
| Finding 8. NSIRA found that IRCC used “templated” language to describe the disclosure’s accuracy and reliability that was not always relevant or specific to the circumstances of the disclosure. | Recommendation 7. NSIRA recommends that IRCC tailor its statements on accuracy and reliability as to ensure that each disclosure’s statement is specific to the circumstances of the case. | Agree | |||
| Information Sharing Agreement — Subsection 4(c) | |||||
| Finding 9. NSIRA found that disclosures between IRCC and CSE that occurred following the enactment of their new information sharing agreement were compliant with both the SCIDA and their information¬ sharing agreement. | |||||
This review assessed departments’ compliance with the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and their implementation of the ACA’s associated directions (ACA Directions) during the 2023 calendar year. It focused on how departments mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with foreign entities.
NSIRA reviewed a number of cases concerning disclosures to foreign entities engaged in armed conflict and considered how armed conflict affected departments’ ability to mitigate.
Three departments that shared with foreign entities engaged in armed conflict may not have been compliant with the ACA Directions.
A foreign country’s involvement in armed conflict created challenges for departments in meeting their mitigation obligations under the ACA Directions. NSIRA further observed challenges related to disclosures contemplated to serve humanitarian objectives. NSIRA noted that the circumstances of armed conflict left few options for departments pursuing humanitarian objectives to mitigate the risks resulting from sharing.
NSIRA directed departments to conduct a study of information-sharing with the foreign entities of countries engaged in armed conflict to analyze challenges incompliance with the ACA Directions and gaps in the ACA regime. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.
| Findings | Recommendations | Reviewee’s Response |
|---|---|---|
Finding 1. NSIRA found that, in
the cases examined, CSIS, GAC,
RCMP, and IRCC’s mitigation
determinations demonstrated
common deficiencies, including:
Finding 3. NSIRA found that, in the case examined, GAC’s poor record-keeping practices impeded NSIRA’s ability to determine their compliance with the ACA Directions. Finding 4. NSIRA found that, in the case examined, the RCMP may not have been in compliance with the ACA Directions, as they were unlikely to have sufficiently mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with a foreign entity. Specifically, the RCMP relied upon caveats that were inadequately designed to address the specific risks of mistreatment present. Finding 5. NSIRA found that, in the case examined, IRCC may not have been in compliance with the ACA Directions, as they were unlikely to have sufficiently mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with a foreign entity. Specifically, IRCC relied upon measures that were inadequately designed to address the specific risks of mistreatment present. Finding 6. NSIRA found that many of DND/CAF’s mitigation practices served to provide decision-makers with information necessaryto determine whether a substantial risk of mistreatment could be mitigated. |
Recommendation 1. NSIRA
recommends that departmental ACA
risk assessments include thorough
mitigation plans wherever a
substantial risk of mistreatment is
identified. These plans should:
|
|
| Finding 7. NSIRA found that a foreign country’s involvement in armed conflict created challenges for departments in meeting their mitigation obligations under the ACA Directions when seekingto share information with that country’s entities. | Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that officials clearly document how each identified risk was mitigated prior to disclosing information to foreign entities. | |
| Finding 8. NSIRA found that the practicalrealities of compliance with the ACA Directions can, in certain circumstances, create a dilemma for departments seeking to share for humanitarian purposes. |
This review evaluated processes regarding how collected information was shared and escalated to relevant decision-makers, and indicated that there were significant disagreements in the national security and intelligence community as to whether, when, and how to share relevant information.
Three basic schisms existed: CSIS struggled to reconcile competing imperatives given the unique sensitivities of political foreign interference; the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP) Panel were geared toward broad, systematic interference and therefore could not adequately address riding-by-riding interference. PCO and CSIS analysts produced overviews of what they considered to be PRC foreign interference activities, but which the Prime Minister’s National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) saw as recounting standard diplomatic activity.
This challenging situation prompts us to ask how to address the so-called grey zone whereby political foreign interference may stand in close proximity to typical political or diplomatic activity. NSIRA saw evidence of this challenge across the activities under review. NSIRA’s eight recommendations address these deficiencies. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.
| Findings | Recommendations | Reviewee’s Response | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CSIS’s Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence on PRC Foreign Interference in the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections | |||||
Finding 1. NSIRA found that
CSIS’s dissemination of
intelligence on political foreign
interference during the 43rd
and 44th federal elections was
inconsistent. Specifically, in
certain instances:
|
|||||
| Finding 2. NSIRA found that CSIS’s dissemination and use of intelligence on political foreign interference were impacted by the concern that such actions could interfere, or be seen to interfere, in the democratic process. | |||||
| Finding 3. NSIRA found that CSIS often elected to provide verbal briefings as opposed to written products in disseminating intelligence on political foreign interference duringelections. | |||||
| Finding 4. NSIRA found that there was a disconnect within CSIS between a region and National Headquarters as to whether reporting on political foreign interference was subject to higher thresholds of confidence, corroboration and contextualization for dissemination. | Recommendation 1. NSIRA
recommends that CSIS develop,
in consultation with relevant
government stakeholders, a
comprehensive policy governing
its engagement with threats
related to political foreign
interference. This policy should:
|
||||
| The SITE Task Force and the CEIPP Panel | |||||
Finding 5. NSIRA found that the
SITE Task Force and the CEIPP
Panel were not adequately
designed to address
traditional, human-based
foreign interference.
Specifically:
|
Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that the SITE Task Force align its priorities with the threat landscape, including threats which occur outside of the immediate election period. | ||||
| Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and the Privy Council Office ensure that GAC’s representation on the SITE Task Force leverages the department’s capacity to analyze and address traditional, human-based foreign interference, in addition to the online remit of the Rapid Response Mechanism Team. | |||||
| Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that the Privy Council Office empower the CEIPP Panel to develop additional strategies to address the full threat landscape during election periods, including when threats manifest in specific ridings. | |||||
| The Flow of Intelligence on PRC Foreign Interference | |||||
| Finding 6. NSIRA found that the limited distribution of some CSIS and CSE intelligence to senior officials only reduced the ability of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Global Affairs Canada, and the Privy Council Office to incorporate that intelligence into their analysis. | |||||
| Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS and Public Safety did not have a system for tracking who received and read specific intelligence products, creating unacceptable gaps in accountability. | Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that, as a basic accountability mechanism, CSIS and Public Safety rigorously track and document who has received intelligence products. In the case of highly sensitive and urgent intelligence, this should include documenting who has read intelligence products. | ||||
Finding 8. NSIRA found that
the dissemination of
intelligence on political foreign
interference from 2018 to
2023 suffered from multiple
issues. Specifically:
|
Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that Public Safety Canada, Global Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, and other regular consumers of intelligence, enhance intelligence literacy within their departments. | ||||
| Finding 9. NSIRA found that there was disagreement between senior public servants and the NSIA as to whether intelligence assessments should be shared with the political executive. Ultimately, the NSIA’s interventions resulted in two products not reaching the political executive, includingthe Prime Minister. | Recommendation 7. NSIRA recommends that the security and intelligence community develop a common, working understanding of political foreign interference. | ||||
| Finding 10. NSIRA found that the NSIA’s role in decisions regarding the dissemination of CSIS intelligence products is unclear. | Recommendation 8. NSIRA recommends that the role of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, including with respect to decisions regarding the dissemination of intelligence, be described in a legal instrument. | ||||
NSIRA is responsible for investigating complaints from members of the public related to national security. These investigations are carried out with consistency, fairness, and timeliness.
NSIRA’s jurisdiction covers complaints regarding activities conducted by CSIS or CSE, national security-related complaints against the RCMP, complaints in relations to security clearance denials and, referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) or under the Citizenship Act.
In 2024, NSIRA continued to investigate a wide range of complaints from previous years, successfully bringing several to a conclusion. NSIRA also initiated many new investigations, including with respect to a large increase in public complaints against CSIS regarding immigration and citizenship security screening, as detailed further below.
Finally, NSIRA continues to implement several initiatives aimed at enhancing and streamlining its processes and procedures.
From August to December 2024, NSIRA observed a significant increase of complaints against CSIS filed pursuant to section 16 of the NSIRA Act, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening. Out of 79 complaints received pursuant to s.16 of the NSIRA Act in 2024, 52 (66%) related to such delays. Of note, under ss. 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA regarding immigration or citizenship applicants. CSIS has advised NSIRA that the time it takes to provide security advice is influenced by several factors, including the prioritization of files, resource limitations, and priorities established by the Government of Canada, such as special immigration measures and humanitarian initiatives in response to crises around the world.
As depicted by the statistics found at the end of the current section, several of these complaints have resulted in informal resolutions. More specifically, upon completion of CSIS’s security screening of a complainant’s citizenship or immigration application, CSIS provides a letter that can be shared with the complainant which indicates that the advice has been provided to the requesting client, and that CSIS’s role is now complete. The complainant may then elect to continue with their complaint or informally resolve it.
NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure govern the process for complaint investigations. While respecting the classified nature of the proceedings, they ensure that parties have the fullest opportunity to participate and make representations, and that all proceedings are conducted as informally and expeditiously as possible.
In 2024, NSIRA continued its internal review of the Rules of Procedure to identify issues and develop proposals for future revisions. The review aims to ensure that all investigations remain accessible, efficient, and procedurally fair.
Specifically, NSIRA also created a new rule on accessibility and accommodations. The rule will enable NSIRA to meet its commitment to identify, remove, and prevent barriers to accessibility to the greatest extent possible. This will help to ensure that those with disabilities can continue to fully participate in the complaint investigation process.
NSIRA also began developing another new rule to create a streamlined process for simplified investigations of non-complex complaints.
Harassment allegations against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
The Complainant alleged that RCMP members had shown up unannounced and without a warrant at their home. The Complainant alleged harassment by the said RCMP members during that unexpected visit. The RCMP members went to the Complainant’s home following an anonymous report, according to which the Complainant had made threats against the Prime Minister.
The interaction between the RCMP members and the Complainant was filmed by the bodycam worn by a municipal police officer. The video was submitted as evidence by the RMCP in the NSIRA investigation.
Following a review of the documentary evidence submitted by the RCMP and the Complainant, as well as an investigative interview with the latter, NSIRA found that under the implicit invitation provided by Common Law, the RCMP members had the right to go unannounced and without a warrant to the Complainant’s house to have a discussion with the said Complainant. The purpose of the RCMP members ’visit was to determine whether the Complainant posed a threat to the public and to the Prime Minister, not to substantiate any accusations against the said Complainant or to make an arrest.
NSIRA also found that the RCMP members had not harassed the Complainant during the interaction.
NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated.
The Complainant alleged that, based on their voluntary disclosure during security interviews, they were denied a Top Secret security clearance and had their reliability status revoked, which resulted in their release from the Canadian Forces. NSIRA found that it had no jurisdiction to make findings and recommendations regarding revocation of reliability status and confined its discussion to matters implicating the security clearance decision only.
The Complainant alleged that the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff’s (VCDS) security clearance decision was flawed for several reasons, including that the Complainant’s sexuality influenced the VCDS decision; the VCDS did not take into account the Complainant’s mental health situation and failed to inquire about amental health nexus in their case and provide accommodation; the decision did not meet DND’s security screening standards; the decision was inconsistent with the recommendation offered by the Complainant’s commanding officer; and the decision did not acknowledge a number of considerations that might mitigate the seriousness of the adverse information against the Complainant.
NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. Specifically, NSIRA found that the VCDS decision was not motivated by a concern or consideration of the Complainant’s sexuality or sexual orientation; that in the circumstances, no duty to accommodate was triggered for the purposes of the VCDS decision based on the Complainants mental health situation; that were unsubstantiated the allegations that the VCDS failed to meet security screening standards and that DND failed to properly review the surrounding circumstances; that the assertion that the VCDS decision was improper because it was inconsistent with the Complainant’s commanding officer’s recommendation was unsubstantiated; and that the Complainant’s other allegations, including those with respect to considerations that might mitigate the seriousness of the adverse information against them, did not individually or collectively render the decision unreasonable. In addition, NSIRA found no violation of procedural fairness.
However, NSIRA observed that certain exculpatory information was excluded from the Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) before the decision-maker and recommended that this practice be rectified in the future. However, this omission did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness in the circumstances.
The Complainant alleged that CSIS had been racially profiling them; that CSIS agents harassed and interrogated them on multiple occasions; that CSIS shared information about them with foreign countries, leading to them having travel difficulties; that CSIS was responsible for their travel difficulties; and that CSIS put their citizenship application on hold.
SIRC took jurisdiction of this complaint in 2018, and when NSIRA came into force in2019, this investigation was deemed to be continued before NSIRA.
In the investigative report, NSIRA provided clarity on the standard of review in section 16 complaints — namely, that NSIRA is charged with making findings and recommendations with respect to legality, reasonableness, and necessity in the exercise of CSIS’s powers. In gauging reasonableness and necessity, the Member adopted an objective standard: would a reasonable person charged with exercising CSIS’s mandates and apprised fully of the facts, as were available to CSIS, conclude that CSIS’s exercise of its powers was necessary and proportional?
On the facts of this investigation, NSIRA found that the allegations were unsubstantiated, but made several recommendations. The recommendations addressed observations concerning how CSIS manages the aftermath of section 12 investigations and the circumstances in which CSIS should retract or correct information that it shared with foreign agencies.
The Complainant alleged that CSIS directed an unlawful seizure of their property in 2011; unlawfully shared information with Canadian and foreign authorities; conspired with government departments; harassed, surveilled, targeted, and intercepted their phone calls; acted unlawfully and breached their human or Charter rights. In addition, the Complainant alleged that they had issues reentering Canada after the impugned seizure took place due to CSIS’s activities. NSIRA found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
The Complainant alleged that, as part of their security screening and hiring processes at CSE, CSE breached their consent and procedural fairness; squandered government resources; failed to use approved security screening tools that have been approved by TBS and undergone the required Privacy Impact Assessment; received verbal disclosures or slander from the Complainant’s former employer regarding their character; harassed them; denied them a security clearance; and cited suitability concerns as a technique to circumvent NSIRA’s jurisdiction under section 18 of the NSIRA Act with respect to complaints related to denials of security clearances.
NSIRA concluded that the Complainant’s first allegation that CSE had breached their consent, and more specifically that CSE improperly used information the Complainant disclosed during their security interview for human resources and suitability purposes, was supported. The consent form signed by the Complainant in preparation for the security interview only contemplated the collection of information for the purpose of obtaining a security clearance. The evidence before NSIRA revealed that the Complainant was not advised prior to the security interview that the information collected could have been subsequently used for other purposes, including to assess their suitability for employment. Accordingly, NSIRA found that CSE had not complied with section 7 of the Privacy Act.
With respect to the Complainant’s remaining allegations against CSE, NSIRA found that they were unsubstantiated by the evidence.
In its Final Report, NSIRA issued two recommendations:
The Complainant alleged that CSIS subjected them to harassment, racial profiling, and slander. The Complainant suggests that they were targeted because of their racial or ethnic background, legitimate political opinions, and due to their work as a confidential police informant. They suggested that, due to CSIS’s conduct, they had social, psychological and financial hardship, and difficulty travelling.
SIRC took jurisdiction of this complaint in January 2019, and when NSIRA came into force in July 2019, this investigation was deemed to be continued before NSIRA.
NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. Specifically, it found that CSIS did not unlawfully investigate the Complainant or engage in racial profiling; did not target the Complainant because of their activities as a confidential police informant; did not slander or defame the Complainant, damage their reputation or sabotage their relationships; did not harass the Complainant or conduct interviews with them in an unlawful or unreasonable manner; did not unlawfully or unreasonably share information about the Complainant with foreign agencies or collude with them to interfere with their travel; did not breach the Complainant’s privacy rights under the Charter; and did not unlawfully retain personal information.
A number of Complainants filed complaints against CSIS alleging that CSIS caused a significant delay in providing security screening advice for their immigration or citizenship applications. CSIS provided letters to NSIRA that could be shared with the Complainants advising them that CSIS had provided its advice to the requesting client and that CSIS’s role in the security screening process was complete. As the Complainants’ main allegations against CSIS were in relation to the delay in the security screening, NSIRA inquired with the Complainants as to whether they wished to resolve their complaints in light of the update received. In the above-referenced files, the Complainants informed NSIRA that they did not wish to proceed with an investigation into their respective complaints against CSIS. As such, the matters were informally resolved in accordance with Rule 10.10 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure or withdrawn.
The Complainant alleged that, after being offered employment by a Government of Canada department conditional upon obtaining a Reliability and Secret clearance, they were denied said clearance because of a residency issue. The Complainant alleged that this was an inaccurate application of clearance policies, and that the employment offer was rescinded after the Complainant indicated that they would pursue the matter further.
NSIRA found the complaint to be deemed abandoned according to Rule 15.02 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure, following its reasonable attempts to communicate with the Complainant who refrained from participating in the process.
The Complainant alleged that they were denied employment with an agency in the Government of Canada due to the denial of the required Top Secret security clearance. The Complaint alleged that the decision was based on inaccurate information and that the agency disregarded exculpatory information that the Complainant provided to correct the inaccuracies. The Complainant also alleged that they had a pending Secret security clearance application with another department that was unreasonably delayed.
Following an informal resolution meeting facilitated by NSIRA and attended by the Complainant and responding government agency, the parties asked NSIRA to place the investigation into abeyance pending the outcome of the Complainant’s Secret security clearance application. NSIRA granted the request. The Complainant subsequently informed NSIRA that they received their Secret security clearance and no longer wished to proceed with the complaint. NSIRA accepted the informal resolution.
| INTAKE INQUIRIES | 142 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New complaints filed | 79 | ||||
| National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), section 16, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) complaints | 67 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 17, Communications Security Establishment (CSE) complaints | 2 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances | 0 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 19, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) referred complaints | 10 | ||||
| Citizenship Act, section 19 | 0 | ||||
| Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) | 0 | ||||
| Decision on jurisdiction to investigate | |||||
| Accepted | Declined | Withdrawn | |||
| NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints | 22 | 10 | 7 | ||
| NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints | 0 | 3 | 0 | ||
| NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances | 0 | 2 | 0 | ||
| NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints | 3 | 2 | 0 | ||
| Total | 25 | 17 | 7 | ||
| Active investigations as of December 31, 2024 | 34 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints | 23 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints | 0 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances | 4 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints | 7 | ||||
| Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) | 0 | ||||
| Informal resolution in progress as of December 31, 2024 | 2 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints) | 2 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints) | 0 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances) | 0 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints) | 0 | ||||
| Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) | 0 | ||||
| Total investigations closed | 22 | ||||
| Abandoned | Final Report | Resolved Informally | Withdrawn | ||
| NSIRA Act, section 16, (CSIS complaints) | 0 | 3 | 14 | 0 | |
| NSIRA Act, section 17, (CSE complaints) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| NSIRA Act, section 18, (security clearances) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | |
| NSIRA Act, section 19, (RCMP referred complaints) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Total | 1 | 6 | 15 | 0 | |
| Investigations carried to the next calendar year | 34 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints) | 23 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints) | |||||
| NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances) | 4 | ||||
| NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints) | 7 | ||||
| Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) | 0 | ||||
NSIRA’s vision — an accountable, transparent, and effective national security and intelligence community that upholds the rule of law — has guided every aspect of the Review Agency’s work in 2024. Through expanded transparency initiatives, timely public reporting, and continuous methodological refinement, NSIRA has demonstrated its commitment to achieving this vision. Whether through public-facing communications, the release of unclassified/redacted materials, or the ongoing enhancement of its website, NSIRA has remained focused on building public trust.
With the finalization of its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, NSIRA has established a clear framework for advancing its mandate in the years ahead. The coming year will focus on strengthening the Review Agency’s core activities by enhancing review capacity and output, deepening subject-matter expertise, and expanding on the agility of complaint investigations.
Guided by its strategic priorities, NSIRA will place greater emphasis on proactive engagement. This includes increased outreach to the media, academic, civil society, parliamentarians, and domestic oversight bodies such as Agents of Parliament. NSIRA also aims to strengthen its relationships with international counterparts to continue sharing best practices and contribute to global efforts in national security accountability. These initiatives will support NSIRA’s continued evolution as a modern, transparent, and effective review body well positioned to meet the challenges of 2025 and beyond.
| Abbreviation | Full Name |
|---|---|
| ACA | Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act |
| ARSCA-CSE | Annual Review of Select CSE Activities |
| ARSCA-CSIS | Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities |
| CAF | Canadian Armed Forces |
| CBSA | Canada Border Services Agency |
| CEIPP | Critical Election Incident Public Protocol |
| CHRC | Canadian Human Rights Commission |
| CSE | Communications Security Establishment |
| CSIS | Canadian Security Intelligence Service |
| DND | Department of National Defence |
| FIORC | Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council |
| GAC | Global Affairs Canada |
| IRCC | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada |
| NSICOP | National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians |
| NSIRA | National Security and Intelligence Review Agency |
| OPC | Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada |
| PCO | Privy Council Office |
| PS | Public Safety |
| RCMP | Royal Canadian Mounted Police |
| SCIDA | Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act |
| SIGINT | Signals Intelligence |
| SITE | Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections |
| TRA | Threat and risk assessment |
| TRM | Threat reduction measure |
| VCDS | Vice Chief of the Defence Staff |
| Sigle/acronyme | Dénomination |
|---|---|
| AMC | Affaires mondiales Canada |
| ASFC | Agence des services frontaliers du Canada |
| BCP | Bureau du Conseil privé |
| CCDP | Commission canadienne des droits de la personne |
| CPSNR | Comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le renseignement |
| CPVPC | Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée du Canada |
| CSERCC | Conseil de surveillance et d’examen du renseignement de la Collectivité des cinq |
| CST | Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications |
| EACAC-CST | Examen annuel de certaines activités du CST |
| EACAS-SCRS | Examen annuel de certaines activités du SCRS |
| EMR | Évaluation de la menace et des risques |
| FAC | Forces armées canadiennes |
| GRC | Gendarmerie royale du Canada |
| IRCC | Immigration, Réfugiés et Citoyenneté Canada |
| LCISC | Loi sur la communication d’information ayant trait à la sécurité du Canada |
| LECCMTIEE | Loi visant à éviter la complicité dans les cas de mauvais traitements infligés par des entités étrangères |
| MDN | Ministère de la Défense nationale |
| MJ | Ministère de la Justice |
| MRM | Mesure de réduction de la menace |
| MSRE | Menace en matière de sécurité et de renseignements visant les élections |
| OSSNR | Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement |
| PPIEM | Protocole public en cas d’incident électoral majeur |
| SCRS | Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité |
| SIGINT | Renseignement électromagnétique (Signals Intelligence) |
| SP | Sécurité publique |
| VCEMD | Vice-Chef d’état-major de la défense |
The statistics and data below are provided as per NSIRA’s historical practice of including general data received annually from CSIS and CSE. NSIRA has not independently verified or assessed the numbers. Starting next year, such statistical data will be reproduced with the value added of NSIRA analysis and commentary as part of the summaries of the ARSCA-CSIS and ARSCA-CSE review reports.
| 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Total Warrant Applications | 24 | 15 | 31 | 28 | 30 | 28 |
| Total Warrants issued by the Court | 23 | 15 | 31 | 28 | 30 | 27 |
| New Warrants | 9 | 2 | 13 | 6 | 9 | 5 |
| Replacements | 12 | 8 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 13 |
| Supplemental | 2 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 11 | 9 |
| Total Denied Warrants | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers) | ||||||
| Note: The warrant statistics found here represent the total number of warrant applications made to the Federal Court, independent of the actual number of warrants granted in each application or the number of individuals who were the subject of warrants. | ||||||
| 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Approved TRMs | 24 | 11 | 23 | 16 | 14 | 11 |
| Executed TRMs | 19 | 8 | 17 | 12 | 19 | 15 |
| Warranted TRMs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Source: CSIS (NSIRA independently verified these numbers) | ||||||
| 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Number of Targets | 467 | 360 | 352 | 340 | 323 | 389 |
| Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verified these numbers) | ||||||
| 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Publicly Available Datasets | ||||||
| Evaluated | 9 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Retained | 9 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Canadian Datasets | ||||||
| Evaluated | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Retained | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Foreign Datasets | ||||||
| Evaluated | 10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Retained | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verify this information). | ||||||
| Note: Datasets collected and evaluated in one year may receive ministerial, judicial or other authorization in subsequent years. In addition, datasets may be retained for multiple years as per the CSIS Act. | ||||||
| 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Commissions by employees | 1 | 39 | 51 | 61 | 47 | 34 |
| Authorizations | 49 | 147 | 178 | 172 | 172 | 175 |
| Directions to Commit | 15 | 84 | 116 | 131 | 116 | 128 |
| Emergency Designations | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Source: CSIS | ||||||
| 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Processed incidents | ||||||
| Administrative | – | 53 | 64 | 42 | 48 | 54 |
| Operational | 40 | 19 | 21 | 17 | 31 | 28 |
| Total | 53 | 99 | 85 | 59 | 79 | 82 |
| Breakdown of Non-compliance (all categories counted) | ||||||
| Canadian Law | – | – | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 |
| CSIS Act | – | – | – | – | – | 3 |
| Charter | – | – | 6 | 5 | 15 | 14 |
| Warrant Conditions | – | – | 6 | 3 | 11 | 13 |
| CSIS Governance | – | – | 8 | 15 | 27 | 25 |
| Source: CSIS | ||||||
| Note: According to CSIS, each compliance instance was factored in all the categories in which it was non-compliant. As a result, the sum of instances may exceed the total number. | ||||||
| Name of ministerial authorization | Enabling section of CSE Act | Number of Authorizations Issued in 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Foreign Intelligence Authorization | 26(1) | 3 |
| Cybersecurity Authorization for Federal and Non-Federal Infrastructures | 27(1) and 27(2) | 4 |
| Defensive Cyberoperations Authorization | 29(1) | 1 |
| Active Cyberoperations Authorization | 30(1) | 3 |
| Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Ministerial authorizations issued in 2024 |
||
| Name of ministerial order | Enabling section of CSE Act | |
|---|---|---|
| Designating Recipients of Canadian Identifying Information Used, Analyzed or Retained Under a Foreign Intelligence Authorization | 43 | |
| Designating Recipients of Information Relatingto a Canadian or Person in Canada Acquired, Used or Analyzed Under the Cybersecurity and Information Assurance Aspects of the CSE Mandate | 44 | |
| Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Importance to the Government of Canada | 21 | |
| Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Ukraine as of Importance to the Government of Canada | 21 | |
| Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Latvia as of Importance to the Government of Canada | 21 | |
| Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers) Ministerial authorizations issued in 2024 |
||
| Type of request | Number of requests received | |
|---|---|---|
| Government of Canada requests | 909 | |
| Five Eyes requests | 78 | |
| Non-Five Eyes requests | 6 | |
| Total | 993 | |
| Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers) Requests for disclosure of Canadian IdentifyingInformation related to Fl, 2024 |
||
| Disclosure type | Number of requests | |
|---|---|---|
| Victim notifications | 2,221 | |
| Disclosure to partners | 9 | |
| Total | 2,230 | |
| Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers) Disclosures of Canadian IdentifyingInformation related to Cybersecurity, 2024 |
||
| Type of incident | 2024 | |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy incidents | 75 | |
| Second-party privacy incidents | 44 | |
| Non-privacy compliance incidents | 13 | |
| Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers) Privacy and non-privacy compliance incidents related to CSE’s Fl mandate, 2024 |
||
| Type of incident | 2024 | |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy incidents | 31 | |
| Non-privacy compliance incidents | 9 | |
| Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers) Privacy and non-privacy compliance incidents related to CSE’s Cybersecurity mandate, 2024 |
||
| Received | Approved | Denied | Cancelled |
|---|---|---|---|
| 48 | 49 | 2 | 2 |
| Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers) Requests for technical and operational assistance, 2024. |
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