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Annual Report on the Access to Information Act 2022–23

Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Access to Information Act gives Canadian citizens and permanent residents, as well as any person or corporation present in Canada, a right of access to information contained in government records, subject to certain specific and limited exceptions.

Section 94(1) of the Act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the Act within the institution and to submit the report to Parliament. In addition, section 20 of the Service Fees Act requires institutions to report on all statutory fees processed during the reporting period.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled in accordance with section 94 of the Access to Information Act and section 20 of the Service Fees Act, describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat in administering these Acts during the period of April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023.

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:

Access to Information and Privacy Office
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5
Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who we are

Established in July 2019, NSIRA is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.

The NSIRA Secretariat assists NSIRA in fulfilling its mandate. It is the NSIRA Secretariat, headed by an Executive Director, that is the government institution for the purposes of the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

Mandate

NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities. 

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.

Investigations

NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Access to Information and Privacy Office

NSIRA’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

For the reporting period, the NSIRA ATIP office consisted of:

  • 1 Full-time Access to Information Consultant;
  • 1 Part-time Privacy Consultant; and
  • 1 Full-time ATIP Manager who fulfilled the duties that would normally be carried out by an ATIP Coordinator, as well as managed the ATIP Office, in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Manager of Administrative Services for the Secretariat and Agency Members.

NSIRA Secretariat Corporate Legal Counsel and Senior General Counsel supported the ATIP office on an as required basis.

The ATIP Office is responsible for the following:

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
  • processing requests under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat respected the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments.
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and
  • representing the NSIRA Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

The NSIRA Secretariat was a party to a service agreement under section 96 of the Access to Information Act during the reporting period, pursuant to which it received administrative services from the Privy Council Office related to the tabling of the Access to Information Act annual report in Parliament. The NSIRA Secretariat was also a party to a service agreement under section 92 of the Act, pursuant to which it received ATIP Online services from the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.

The NSIRA Secretariat ensured that the following proactive publication legislative requirements were met during the reporting period with the assistance of its Finance team:

  • Travel expenses;
  • Hospitality expenses;
  • Reports tabled in Parliament; and
  • Contracts over $10,000.

To assist the ATIP Office in meeting its overall legislative obligations, the NSIRA Secretariat relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter points of contact from all its branches.

Delegation Order

The Executive Director, as the Head of the NSIRA Secretariat, is responsible for the administration of the Access to Information Act within the institution. Pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, the Executive Director has delegated the ATIP Manager and ATIP Officer – as well as persons acting in these positions – to perform powers, duties, and functions for the administration of the Act. These positions have limited delegation of authority under the Act and the Privacy Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The Access to Information Act Delegation Order can be found in Appendix A.

Performance 2022-2023

Performance in Processing Access Requests

During the reporting period, from April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023, the NSIRA Secretariat received 11 formal requests in addition to 10 requests that were outstanding from previous reporting periods, bringing the total number of requests to 21. Of these, the NSIRA Secretariat closed 15 requests in 2022-23, and 6 were carried over to the next reporting period. Five of the carried-over requests were received during the 2022-23 reporting period, of which two open requests are within the legislated timelines as of March 31, 2023, and four are beyond the legislated timelines, including one request that was received during the 2018-19 reporting period.

Statistical Reports for 2022-2023

The institution’s 2022-2023 Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Supplemental ATIP Statistical Report for 2022-2023 are found in Appendices B and C.

Extensions and Completion Time of Closed Requests

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat invoked extensions in processing 10 requests: 1 extension of 31 to 60 days, 3 extensions of 61 to 120 days, 2 extensions of 121 to 180 days, 2 extensions of 181 to 365 days, and 2 extensions of 365 days or more, all of which included extensions necessary to consult with third parties.

Of the requests completed during the reporting period,

  • 2 requests, or 13.33% of the requests completed, were disclosed in its entirety. 1 request completed within 16 to 30 days, and 1 request completed within 181 to 365 days.
  • 7 requests, or 46.66% of the requests completed, were disclosed in part. 3 requests completed within 61 to 120 days, 2 requests completed within 181 to 365 days, and 2 requests completed more than 365 days.
  • 2 requests, or 13.33% of the requests completed, were all exempted. 1 request completed within 1 to 15 days, and 1 request completed within 31 to 60 days.
  • 1 request, or 6.66% of the requests completed, resulted in no records. This request was completed within 16 to 30 days.
  • 1 request, or 6.66% of the requests completed was abandoned and completed within 1 to 15 days.
  • 2 requests, or 13.33% of the requests completed, were neither confirmed nor denied. 1 request completed within 16 to 30 days, and 1 request completed within 31 to 60 days.

The NSIRA Secretariat’s responses to many requests required intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations due to a significant portion of our information holdings consisting of sensitive and classified records created or originally received by other government institutions owing to NSIRA’s mandate. In 2022-23, the NSIRA Secretariat’s on-time response rate decreased extensively to 33% from 80% in the previous reporting year.

Consultations

The NSIRA Secretariat was consulted on 4 requests this fiscal year. All 4 requests were completed within 61 to 120 days. The NSIRA Secretariat closed all consultations and carried over none into 2023-2024.

Requests Treated Informally

In 2022-2023, the NSIRA Secretariat responded to 2 informal requests for records previously released under the Access to Information Act and carried over one into 2023-2024.

Impact of COVID-19 measures

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat was not affected by measures related to the COVID‑19 pandemic.

Complaints and Investigations of Access Requests

Subsection 30(1) of the Act describes how the Office of the Information Commissioner receives and investigates complaints from individuals regarding the processing of requests under the Act. The NSIRA Secretariat received three new complaints during the reporting period. One of these complaints was discontinued during the reporting period, while the other two complaints remained active on March 31, 2023.

Moreover, one complaint received in fiscal year 2021-2022 was closed as “well-founded” during this reporting period. This complaint concerned the NSIRA Secretariat’s delay in providing a fulsome response to a large request that was made to NSIRA’s predecessor, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), before the established legislative deadline. The delay was largely due to extended external consultations.

Training and Awareness

During the reporting period, access to information training requirements were identified for all NSIRA Secretariat employees, as well as for those with functional or delegated responsibility for the administration of the Access to Information Act, in accordance with the Directive on Access to Information Requests. The Canada School of Public Service course Access to Information and Privacy Fundamentals (COR502) was included as mandatory training in all employees’ training curriculum.

Privacy policies, guidelines, procedures and initiatives

The NSIRA Secretariat updated the Delegation Order during the reporting period. We also engaged with Library and Archives Canada on obtaining institution-specific disposition authorities, as we are currently operating under the former SIRC’s disposition authorities.

Proactive Publication under Part 2 of the ATIA

In accordance with paragraph 81(b) of the Access to Information Act, the NSIRA Secretariat is a government entity subject to the following proactive publication requirements:

  • Briefing materials (section 88)

During the reporting period, NSIRA Secretariat proactive publications were published on open.canada.ca.

Of the total proactive publication requirements that were due during the reporting period, 80% were published within the legislated timelines.

Initiatives and Projects to Improve Access to Information

The NSIRA Secretariat’s IT team began work to develop an ATIP software tool for our classified and unclassified systems. The NSIRA Secretariat also signed a memorandum of understanding with TBS to make full use of ATIP online and implemented the tool during the reporting period.

Summary of Key Issues and Actions Taken on Complaints

The NSIRA Secretariat hired a consultant to help process the large aforementioned access request made to its predecessor; a request that was subsequently the subject of a delay complaint made in FY 2021-2022 and deemed well-founded by the Information Commissioner during the reporting period. The NSIRA Secretariat took concrete action during the reporting period to comply with the Commissioner’s order to provide a fulsome response to the request “forthwith”, including but not limited to streamlining the consultation process with another government institution and disclosing additional records to the requestor.

Access to Information Act Fees for the Purposes of the Service Fees Act

The Service Fees Act requires a responsible authority to report annually to Parliament on the fees collected by the institution.

With respect to fees collected under the Access to Information Act, the information below is reported in accordance with the requirements of section 20 of the Service Fees Act.

  • Enabling authority: Access to Information Act
  • Fee payable: $5.00 application fee is the only fee charged for an ATI request
  • Total revenue: $30
  • $25
  • Cost of operating the program: $294,640

Monitoring Compliance

In order to meet legislative deadlines for access to information requests, deadlines for individual requests are strictly monitored by using MS Outlook reminders. The ATIP Manager organizes ad hoc meetings to discuss request-related activities (such as whether inter-institutional consultations are necessary), determine deadlines and ensure that all team members are informed of the status of files. At bi-weekly team meetings with the Senior General Counsel and Corporate Counsel, the ATIP Manager raises and discusses compliance with legislative and policy obligations. The Executive Director is also briefed on all ATIP compliance issues.

The NSIRA Secretariat has a document setting out the procedures to be followed in carrying out our monthly proactive disclosure, together with the associated expectations and timelines, in order to monitor the accuracy and completeness of the information proactively published under Part 2 of the Act.

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat also began assessing the feasibility of making information previously released under the Access to Information Act available on its public-facing website.

For contracts issued during the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat included a General Condition on Access to Information from Public Services and Procurement Canada’s Standard Acquisition Clauses and Conditions Manual.

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Access to Information Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Appendix B: 2022-2023 Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2022-04-01 – 2023-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 11
Outstanding from previous reporting period 9
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 1
Total 21
Closed during reporting period 15
Carried over to next reporting period 6
Carried over within legislated timeline 2
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 4
1.2 Sources of requests
Source Number of Requests
Media 0
Academia 0
Business (private sector) 0
Organization 0
Public 10
Decline to Identify 1
Total 11
1.3 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 10
E-mail 0
Mail 1
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 11

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 3
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 3
Closed during reporting period 2
Carried over to next reporting period 1
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 0
E-Mail 3
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 3
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
2 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 Pages re-released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Applications to the Information Commissioner on Declining to Act on Requests

  Number of Requests
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Sent during reporting period 0
Total 0
Approved by the Information Commissioner during reporting period 0
Declined by the Information Commissioner during reporting period 0
Withdrawn during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0

Section 4: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

4.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 7
All exempted 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Request transferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
Decline to act with the approval of the Information Commisioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 3 2 3 0 3 2 15
4.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
13(1)(a) 0
13(1)(b) 0
13(1)(c) 0
13(1)(d) 0
13(1)(e) 0
14 0
14(a) 0
14(b) 0
15(1) – I. A. * 0
15(1) – Def. * 5
15(1) – S.A. * 1
16(1)(a)(i) 3
16(1)(a)(ii) 0
16(1)(a)(iii) 0
16(1)(b) 1
16(1)(c) 4
16(1)(d) 0
16(2) 0
16(2)(a) 0
16(2)(b) 0
16(2)(c) 0
16(3) 0
16.1(1)(a) 0
16.1(1)(b) 0
16.1(1)(c) 0
16.1(1)(d) 0
16.2(1) 0
16.3 0
16.31 0
16.4(1)(a) 0
16.4(1)(b) 0
16.5 0
16.6 0
17 0
18(a) 0
18(b) 0
18(c) 0
18(d) 0
18.1(1)(a) 0
18.1(1)(b) 0
18.1(1)(c) 0
18.1(1)(d) 0
19(1) 2
20(1)(a) 0
20(1)(b) 0
20(1)(b.1) 0
20(1)(c) 0
20(1)(d) 0
20.1 0
20.2 0
20.4 0
21(1)(a) 0
21(1)(b) 0
21(1)(c) 0
21(1)(d) 0
22 0
22.1(1) 0
23 1
23.1 0
24(1) 1
26 0

* I.A.: International Affairs
* Def.: Defence of Canada
* S.A.: Subversive Activities

4.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
68(a) 0
68(b) 0
68(c) 0
68.1 0
68.2(a) 0
68.2(b) 0
69(1) 0
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69(1)(c) 0
69(1)(d) 0
69(1)(e) 0
69(1)(f) 0
69(1)(g) re (a) 0
69(1)(g) re (b) 0
69(1)(g) re (c) 0
69(1)(g) re (d) 0
69(1)(g) re (e) 0
69(1)(g) re (f) 0
69.1(1) 0
4.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
0 9 0 0 0 0
4.5 Complexity
4.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
856 856 14
4.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 1 7 1 322 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 6 247 1 280 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 12 254 2 602 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
4.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
4.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0
4.6 Closed requests
4.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 5
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 33.33333333
4.7 Deemed refusals
4.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
10 0 10 0 0
4.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 0 0 0
16 to 30 Days 0 0 0
31 to 60 Days 0 2 2
61 to 120 Days 0 3 3
121 to 180 Days 0 0 0
181 to 365 Days 0 3 3
More than 365 Days 0 2 2
Total 0 10 10
4.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 5: Extensions

5.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Disposition of Requests Where an Extension Was taken 9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(c) Third-Party Notice
Section 69 Other
All disclosed 0 0 2 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 7 0
All exempted 0 0 1 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0
No records exist 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 10 0
5.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(c) Third-Party Notice
Section 69 Other
30 days or less 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 days 0 0 1 0
61 to 120 days 0 0 3 0
121 to 180 days 0 0 2 0
181 to 365 days 0 0 2 0
365 days or more 0 0 2 0
Total 0 0 10 0

Section 6: Fees

Fee Type Fee Collected Fee Waived Fee Refunded
Number of Requests Amount Number of Requests Amount Number of Requests Amount
Application 0 $30.00 5 $0.00 0 $0.00
Other fees 0 $0.00 0 $0.00 0 $0.00
Total 6 $30.00 5 $0.00 0 $0.00

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 4 189 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 4 189 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 4 189 0 0
Carried over within negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4
7.3 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Investigations and Reports of finding

9.1 Investigations
Section 32 Notice of intention to investigate Subsection 30(5) Ceased to investigate Section 35 Formal Representations
3 0 0
9.2 Investigations and Reports of finding
Section 37(1) Initial Reports Section 37(2) Final Reports
Received Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner Received Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner
1 1 1 1 1 1

Section 10: Court Action

10.1 Court actions on complaints
Section 41
Complainant (1) Institution (2) Third Party (3) Privacy Commissioner (4) Total
0 0 0 0 0
10.2 Court actions on third party notifications under paragraph 28(1)(b)
Section 44 – under paragraph 28(1)(b)
0
11.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $100,000
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $194,640
Professional services contracts $194,640
Other $0
Total $294,640
11.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.000
Part-time and casual employees 1.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 1.000
Students 1.000
Total 3.000

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act

Section 1: Capacity to Receive Requests under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

  Number of weeks
Able to receive requests by mail 52
Able to receive requests by email 52
Able to receive requests through the digital request service 52

Section 2: Capacity to Process Records under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

2.1 Number of weeks your institution was able to process paper records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
2.2 Number of weeks your institution was able to process electronic records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52

Section 3: Open Requests and Complaints Under the Privacy Act

3.1 Number of open requests that are outstanding from previous reporting periods.

Fiscal Year Open Requests Were Received Open Requests that are Within Legislated Timelines as Open Requests that are Beyond Legislated Timelines as of March 31, 2023 Total
Received in 2022-23 2 3 5
Received in 2021-22 0 0 0
Received in 2020-21 0 0 0
Received in 2019-20 0 0 0
Received in 2018-19 0 1 1
Received in 2017-18 0 0 0
Received in 2016-17 0 0 0
Received in 2015-16 0 0 0
Received in 2014-15 0 0 0
Received in 2013-14 or earlier 0 0 0

3.2 Number of open complaints with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that are outstanding from previous reporting periods

Fiscal Year Open Complaints were received by institutions Open Requests that are Within Legislated Timelines as
Received in 2022-23 3
Received in 2021-22 0
Received in 2020-21 0
Received in 2019-20 0
Received in 2018-19 0
Received in 2017-18 0
Received in 2016-17 0
Received in 2015-16 0
Received in 2014-15 0
Received in 2013-14 or earlier 0
Total 3
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Date Modified:

Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2022-23

Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Privacy Act gives individuals the right to access information about themselves that is held by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat, subject to certain specific and limited exceptions. The Privacy Act also protects the privacy of individuals by giving them substantial control over the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information and by preventing others from having access to that information.

Section 72 of the act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the act within the institution and to submit the report to Parliament.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled in accordance with section 72 of the Privacy Act, describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat in administering the Act during the period of April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023.

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:

Access to Information and Privacy Office
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5
​Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who we are

Established in July 2019, NSIRA is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.

The NSIRA Secretariat assists NSIRA in fulfilling its mandate. It is the NSIRA Secretariat, headed by an Executive Director, that is the government institution for the purposes of the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act.

Mandate

The NSIRA Secretariat supports NSIRA in its dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities.

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.

Investigations

NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Access to Information and Privacy Office – Organizational Structure

NSIRA’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. For the reporting period, the NSIRA ATIP office consisted of:

  • 1 Full-time Access to Information Consultant;
  • 1 Part-time Privacy Consultant; and
  • 1 Full-time ATIP Manager who fulfilled the duties that would normally be carried out by an ATIP Coordinator, as well as managed the ATIP Office in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Manager of Administrative Services for the Secretariat and Agency Members.

NSIRA Secretariat Senior General Counsel and Corporate Counsel supported the ATIP Office on an as required basis.

The ATIP Office is responsible for the following:

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
  • processing requests under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat respected the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments.
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and
  • representing the NSIRA Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

The NSIRA Secretariat was a party to a service agreement under section 73.1 of the Privacy Act during the reporting period, pursuant to which it received administrative services from the Privy Council Office related to the tabling of the Privacy Act annual report in Parliament. The NSIRA Secretariat was also a party to a service agreement under section 71.1 of the Act, pursuant to which it received ATIP Online services from the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.

To assist the ATIP Office in meeting its overall legislative obligations, the NSIRA Secretariat relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter points of contact from all its branches.

Delegation Order

The Executive Director, as the Head of the NSIRA Secretariat, is responsible for the administration of the Privacy Act within the institution. Pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act, the Executive Director has delegated the ATIP Manager and ATIP Officer – as well as persons acting in these positions – to perform powers, duties, and functions for the administration of the Act. These positions have limited delegation of authority under the Act and the Access to Information Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The Privacy Act Delegation Order can be found in Appendix A.

Performance 2022-2023

Performance in Processing Privacy Requests

During the reporting period, from April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023, the NSIRA Secretariat received 12 formal requests. All 12 requests were completed during the reporting period. No requests were carried over from the previous reporting period.

Statistical Reports for 2022-2023

The institution’s 2022-2023 Statistical Report on the Privacy Act and Supplemental ATIP Statistical Report for 2022-2023 are found in Appendices B and C.

Extensions and Completion Time of Closed Requests

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat invoked extensions in processing 5 requests: 3 extensions of 31 to 60 days, and 2 extensions of 61 to 120 days, all of which included extensions necessary to consult with third parties.

Of the requests completed during the reporting period:

  • 1 request, or 8.33% of the requests completed, was disclosed in its entirety. This request was completed within 16 to 30 days.
  • 4 requests, or 33.33% of the requests completed, were disclosed in part. 1 request completed within 16 to 30 days, 2 requests completed within 31 to 60 days, and 1 request completed within 61 to 120 days.
  • 7 requests, or 58.33% of the requests completed, resulted in no records. 1 request completed within 1 to 15 days, 4 requests completed within 16 to 30 days, 1 request completed within 31 to 60 days, and 1 request completed within 61 to 120 days.

The NSIRA Secretariat’s responses to many requests required intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations. In 2022-23, the NSIRA Secretariat’s on-time response rate decreased to 58.33% from 71% in the previous reporting year.

Consultations

No consultations were received by the NSIRA Secretariat during the reporting period.

Impact of COVID-19 Measures

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat was not affected by measures related to the COVID‑19 pandemic.

Complaints and Investigations

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat received 9 privacy complaints, 2 of which were related to access. All 9 complaints remained active on March 31, 2023.

Moreover, one privacy breach-related investigation initiated by the Privacy Commissioner in fiscal year 2020-2021 continued during the reporting period and remained active on March 31, 2023.

Training and Awareness

During the reporting period, privacy training requirements were identified for all NSIRA Secretariat employees, as well as for those with functional or delegated responsibility for the administration of the Privacy Act, in accordance with the Directive on Personal Information Requests and Correction of Personal Information. The Canada School of Public Service course Access to Information and Privacy Fundamentals (COR502) was included as mandatory training in all employees’ training curriculum.

In addition, an all-staff lunch and learn session was held in August 2022 to provide employees with a debrief of the International Association of Privacy Professionals Privacy Conference.

Policies, Guidelines, and Procedures

The NSIRA Secretariat updated the Delegation Order during the reporting period and also established its internal Directive on Managing Security and Safety Events in March 2023, which provides for coordination with the ATIP Office and Office of Primary Interest when a security event involves a suspected or actual privacy breach.

Initiatives and Projects to Improve Privacy

The NSIRA Secretariat’s IT team began work to develop an ATIP software tool for our classified and unclassified systems. The NSIRA Secretariat also signed a memorandum of understanding with TBS to make full use of ATIP Online and implemented the tool during the reporting period.

Summary of Key Issues and Actions Taken on Complaints

As previously outlined, all 9 complaints received during the reporting period remained active on March 31, 2023. The NSIRA Secretariat meaningfully engaged with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner on all active investigations and disclosed additional records in 1 of the 2 access-related complaints.

Material Privacy Breaches

In the 2022-2023 reporting period, no material privacy breaches occurred.

Privacy Impact Assessments

The NSIRA Secretariat did not complete any PIAs in 2022-2023. During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat received feedback from TBS for its PIA on the creation of NSIRA — which had been submitted to TBS in FY 2021-2022 — and undertook revisions to the PIA. During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat also launched a PIA exercise pertaining to its investigations-related activities.

Public Interest Disclosures

No disclosures were made pursuant to paragraph 8(2)(m) of the Privacy Act during the reporting period.

Monitoring Compliance

In order to meet the legislative deadlines for privacy requests, deadlines for individual requests are strictly monitored by using MS Outlook reminders. The ATIP Manager organizes ad hoc meetings to discuss request-related activities (such as whether inter-institutional consultations are necessary), determine deadlines and ensure that all team members are informed of the status of files. At bi-weekly team meetings with the Senior General Counsel and Corporate Counsel, the ATIP Manager raises and discusses compliance with legislative and policy obligations. The Executive Director is also briefed on all ATIP compliance issues.

For contracts issued during the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat included a Standard Procurement Clause on the Handling of Personal Information or a Supplemental General Condition on Personal Information from Public Services and Procurement Canada’s Standard Acquisition Clauses and Conditions Manual.

Appendices

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Access to Information Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act*, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Appendix B: 2022-2023 Statistical Report on the Privacy Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2022-04-01 – 2023-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 12
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 12
Closed during reporting period 12
Carried over to next reporting period 0
Carried over within legislated timeline 0
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 0
1.2 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 10
E-mail 2
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 12

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 0
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 0
Closed during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 0
E-Mail 0
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 0
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

3.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Disclosed in part 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 4
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 1 4 1 1 0 0 0 7
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 6 3 2 0 0 0 12
3.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
18(2) 0
19(1)(a) 0
19(1)(b) 0
19(1)(c) 0
19(1)(d) 0
19(1)(e) 0
19(1)(f) 0
20 0
21 1
22(1)(a)(i) 3
22(1)(a)(ii) 0
22(1)(a)(iii) 0
22(1)(b) 4
22(1)(c) 0
22(2) 0
22.1 0
22.2 0
22.3 0
22.4 0
23(a) 0
23(b) 0
24(a) 0
24(b) 0
25 0
26 0
27 2
27.1 0
28 0
3.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69.1 0
70(1) 0
70(1)(a) 0
70(1(b) 0
70(1)(c) 0
70(1)(d) 0
70(1)(e) 0
70(1)(f) 0
70.1 0
3.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
0 5 0 0 0 0
3.5 Complexity
3.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
795 795 5
3.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 3 150 0 0 1 644 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4 151 0 0 1 644 0 0 0 0
3.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Assessment of Fees Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0
3.6 Closed requests
3.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 7
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 58.33333333
3.7 Deemed refusals
3.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
5 0 3 0 2
3.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 0 1 1
16 to 30 Days 1 0 1
31 to 60 Days 1 1 2
61 to 120 Days 1 0 1
121 to 180 Days 0 0 0
181 to 365 Days 0 0 0
More than 365 Days 0 0 0
Total 3 2 5
3.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 4: Disclosures Under Subsections 8(2) and 8(5)

Paragraph 8(2)(e) Paragraph 8(2)(m) Subsection 8(5) Total
0 0 0 0

Section 5: Requests for Correction of Personal Information and Notations

Disposition for Correction Requests Received Number
Notations attached 0
Requests for correction accepted 0
Total 0

Section 6: Extensions

6.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Number of requests where an extension was taken 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
3 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0
6.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
1 to 15 days 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0
16 to 30 days 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
31 days or greater               0
Total 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 0 0 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 0 0 0 0
Carried over within regotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7.3 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Complaints and Investigations Notices Received

Section 31 Section 33 Section 35 Court action Total
1 8 0 0 9

Section 10: Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and Personal Information Banks (PIBS)

10.1 Privacy Impact Assessments
Number of PIA(s) completed Number of PIAs modified
0 0
10.2 Institution-specific and Central Personal Information Banks
Personal Information Banks Active Created Terminated Modified
Institution-specific 0 0 0 0
Central 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0

Section 11: Privacy Breaches

11.1 Material Privacy Breaches reported
Number of material privacy breaches reported to TBS Number of material privacy breaches reported to OPC
0 0
11.2 Non-Material Privacy Breaches
Number of non-material privacy breaches
0
12.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $60,000
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $5,000
Professional services contracts $5,000
Other $0
Total $65,000
12.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.000
Part-time and casual employees 1.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 0.500
Students 0.000
Total 1.500

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act

Section 1: Capacity to Receive Requests under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

  Number of weeks
Able to receive requests by mail 52
Able to receive requests by email 52
Able to receive requests through the digital request service 52

Section 2: Capacity to Process Records under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

2.1 Number of weeks your institution was able to process paper records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
2.2 Number of weeks your institution was able to process electronic records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52

Section 3: Open Requests and Complaints Under the Privacy Act

3.1 Number of open requests that are outstanding from previous reporting periods.

Fiscal Year Open Requests Were Received Open Requests that are Within Legislated Timelines as Open Requests that are Beyond Legislated Timelines as of March 31, 2023 Total
Received in 2022-23 0 0 0
Received in 2021-22 0 0 0
Received in 2020-21 0 0 0
Received in 2019-20 0 0 0
Received in 2018-19 0 0 0
Received in 2017-18 0 0 0
Received in 2016-17 0 0 0
Received in 2015-16 0 0 0
Received in 2014-15 0 0 0
Received in 2013-14 or earlier 0 0 0

3.2 Number of open complaints with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that are outstanding from previous reporting periods

Fiscal Year Open Complaints were received by institutions Open Requests that are Within Legislated Timelines as
Received in 2022-23 9
Received in 2021-22 0
Received in 2020-21 0
Received in 2019-20 0
Received in 2018-19 0
Received in 2017-18 0
Received in 2016-17 0
Received in 2015-16 0
Received in 2014-15 0
Received in 2013-14 or earlier 0
Total 9

Section 4: Social Insurance Number

Has your institution begun a new collection or a new consistent use of the SIN in 2022-23?
No

Section 5: Universal Access under the Privacy Act

How many requests were received from confirmed foreign nationals outside of Canada in 2022-2023?
0
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Date Modified:

Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2020

Completed Reviews

Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2020


Backgrounder

The Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA or Act) and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual as a result of information exchanged between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. This review covers the implementation of the directions sent to 12 departments and agencies from their date of issuance, January 1, 2020, to the end of the previous calendar year, December 31, 2020. It was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under ACA.

This was the first ACA review to cover a full calendar year. Many of the reviewed departments noted that the pandemic impacted their information sharing activities, thus impacting the number of cases requiring further review as per the ACA. As such, NISIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

As part of the review, NSIRA examined the case triage process of all twelve departments. NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be escalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.

In keeping with NSIRA’s 2020 Annual Report which emphasized the implementation of a “trust but verify” approach for assessing information provided over the course of a review, NSIRA continues to work on various verification strategies with the Canadian intelligence community. However, due to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, implementation of verification processes was not possible across all twelve departments which fall under the ACA. Notwithstanding, the information provided by departments has been independently verified by NSIRA through documentation analysis and meetings with department subject matter experts, as warranted. Further work is underway to continue developing an access model for the independent verification of information relevant to ACA considerations.

Date of Publishing:

Executive Summary

The Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA or Act) and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual as a result of information exchanged between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. This review covers the implementation of the directions sent to 12 departments and agencies from their date of issuance, January 1, 2020, to the end of the previous calendar year, December 31, 2020. It was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under ACA.

This was the first ACA review to cover a full calendar year. Many of the reviewed departments noted that the pandemic impacted their information sharing activities, thus impacting the number of cases requiring further review as per the ACA. As such, NISIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

While NSIRA was pleased with the considerable efforts made by many departments new to ACA in building their frameworks, Canada Boarder Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Safety did not finalize their policy frameworks in support of the Directions received under the ACA for the review period.

As part of the review, NSIRA examined the case triage process of all twelve departments. NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be escalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.

A case sent to both GAC and CSIS was reviewed by NSIRA for its implications under the ACA. While the information was ultimately not shared with the requesting foreign entity, nonetheless, NSIRA found that the risk of mistreatment was substantial and the decision should have been referred to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs as the accountable deputy minister for this request.

Mitigation measures used by departments were also reviewed this year, since they are an integral part in the information sharing process for departments. NSIRA observed that there are gaps in departments’ ability to verify whether a country or entity has actually complied with caveats or assurances because of the difficulty in tracking compliance to mitigation measures.

NSIRA believes that it is now in a position to conduct in-depth case study assessments of individual departments’ adherence to the ACA and Directions, irrespective of whether or not a department reported any cases to its deputy head. Finally, future reviews will follow up on the ongoing implementation of NSIRA’s past recommendations.

In keeping with NSIRA’s 2020 Annual Report which emphasized the implementation of a “trust but verify” approach for assessing information provided over the course of a review, NSIRA continues to work on various verification strategies with the Canadian intelligence community. However, due to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, implementation of verification processes was not possible across all twelve departments which fall under the ACA. Notwithstanding, the information provided by departments has been independently verified by NSIRA through documentation analysis and meetings with department subject matter experts, as warranted. Further work is underway to continue developing an access model for the independent verification of information relevant to ACA considerations.

Authorities

This review was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act, which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA or the Act).

Introduction

Review background

Departments and agencies in the Government of Canada routinely share information with a range of foreign entities. However such practices can sometimes bring into play a risk of mistreatment for individuals who are the subjects of these exchanges or other individuals. It is therefore incumbent upon the Government of Canada to evaluate and mitigate the risks that this sharing entails.

In 2011, the Government of Canada implemented a general framework for Addressing Risks of Mistreatment in Sharing Information with Foreign Entities. The aim of the framework was to establish a coherent approach across government when sharing with and receiving information from foreign entities. Following this, Ministerial Direction was issued to applicable departments in 2011 (Information Sharing with Foreign Entities), and then again in 2017 (Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities).

On July 13, 2019, the ACA came into force. The preamble of the Act recognizes Canada’s commitments with respect to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Canada’s international legal obligations on prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment. The Act also recognizes that information needs to be shared to enable the Government to fulfill its fundamental responsibility to protect Canada’s national security and the safety of Canadians.

On September 4, 2019, pursuant to section 3 of the ACA, the Governor in Council (GiC) issued written directions (Orders in Council (OiCs) or Directions) to the deputy heads of 12 departments and agencies. This added six new Canadian entities in addition to those that were already associated with the 2011 and 2017 Directions.

This report is NSIRA’s first full year assessment of the implementation of the Directions issued under ACA for the 2020 calendar year. The review builds upon two previous reviews conducted in respect of avoiding complicity in mistreatment. The first was in respect to the 2017 Ministerial Directions, while the second assessed the Directions issued under the ACA, but was limited to the four months from when the Directions were issued to the end of the 2019 calendar year.

ACA and Directions

The ACA and the Directions issued under its authority seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual due to the exchange of information between a Government of Canada department or agency and a foreign entity. The Act and the Directions also aim to limit the use of information received from a foreign entity that is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual.

Under the authority of subsection 3(1) of the Act, the Directions issued to the 12 departments and agencies are near identical in language and focus on the three aspects of handling information when interacting with a foreign entity: the disclosure of information, the requesting of information, and the use of any information received.

In regards to disclosure of information, the Directions state:

If the disclosure of information to a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that the Department officials do not disclose the information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.

With respect to requesting information, the Directions read as follows:

If the making of a request to a foreign entity for information would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that Department officials do not make the request for information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.

Lastly, as it relates to the use of information, the Directions provide:

The Deputy Head must ensure that information that is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity is not used by the Department
(a) in any way that creates a substantial risk of further mistreatment;
(b) as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding; or
(c) in any way that deprives someone of their rights or freedoms, unless the Deputy Head or, in exceptional circumstances, a senior official designated by the Deputy Head determines that the use of the information is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant personal injury and authorizes the use accordingly.

The consideration of substantial risk figures prominently in subsection 3(1) of the Act as well as the Directions. In considering whether to disclose or request information, a department must determine whether a substantial risk is present and if so whether it can be mitigated. As noted in the previous reviews on information sharing, the ACA does not define “substantial risk”. Departments refer to a definition of this term as set out in the 2017 Ministerial Directions as a general starting point when conducting assessments under the ACA. The 2017 Ministerial Directions define substantial risk as:

‘Substantial risk’ is a personal, present and foreseeable risk of mistreatment that is real and is based on something more than mere theory or speculation. In most cases, the test of a substantial risk of mistreatment would be satisfied when it is more likely than not there would be mistreatment; however, in some cases, particularly where the risk if of severe harm, the standard of substantial risk may be satisfied at a lower level of probability.

Based on the outcome of these determinations, the decision may be to approve, deny, or elevate to the Deputy Head for his or her consideration. Substantial risk is also contemplated in the consideration of the use of information received from a foreign entity. If it is evaluated that the information was likely obtained from the mistreatment of an individual, the department is prohibited from using the information in any way that creates a substantial risk of further mistreatment.

Throughout the process to determine whether to disclose or use information, the Directions require that the accuracy, reliability, and limitations of use of all information being handled are appropriately described and characterized.

Additionally, reporting requirements are found at sections 7 and 8 of the Act as well as within the Directions. Among these requirements, the Minister responsible for the department must provide a copy of the department’s annual report in respect of the implementation of the Directions during the previous calendar year as soon as feasible to NSIRA, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICoP) and, if applicable, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Reporting requirements as articulated in the Directions oblige the reporting of decisions which were considered by the Deputy Head in regards to disclosure, requesting of information, or authorizing use of information that would deprive someone of their rights or freedoms be made as soon as feasible to the responsible Minister, NSIRA, and NSICoP.

Review Objectives and Methodology

The review period was January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020. The objectives of this review included:

  • Following-up on departments’ implementation of the directives received under the ACA;
  • Assessing departments’ operationalization of frameworks/processes that enable them to meet the obligations set out in the ACA and directives; and
  • Assessing coordination and consistency in implementation across applicable departments.

Additionally, NSIRA evaluated all twelve ACA member departments’ ‘case triage’ frameworks (i.e., the combination of policy assessment criteria and a pre-determined ‘escalation ladder’ for cases that require higher levels of managerial approvals). Refer to annexes B to M that provide additional details on each departments’ triage process. Finally, NSIRA reviewed the use and policies around departmental mitigation measures.

FINDINGS

Reporting and Framework Updates

As per the Act, all twelve departments fulfilled their obligations to report to their respective ministers and NSIRA on progress made in operationalizing frameworks and identifying cases escalated to the deputy head level.

Of the nine departments who had reported to NSIRA last year that they had finalized frameworks, all continued to refine assessment protocols over the 2020 review period. Based on submissions to NSIRA, TC has developed a corporate policy to highlight the department’s ACA-related requirements. However, CBSA and PS had yet to finalize their ACA policy. As a result, employees may not have adequate and up to date guidance on how to make determinations related to the ACA.

NSIRA Finding #1: NSIRA found that CBSA and PS did not finalize their policy frameworks in support of Directions received under the ACA over the review period.

Referrals to Deputy Head

The Directions specify that when departmental officials are unable to determine whether the risk of mistreatment arising from a disclosure of or request for information can be mitigated, the matter must be referred to the Deputy Head. The Directions also require the Deputy Head, or in exceptional circumstances a senior official designated by the Deputy Head, to determine the matter where the use of information that is likely to have been obtained through mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity would in any way deprive an individual of their rights or freedoms and the use of this information is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant injury. In 2020, no cases were escalated to the deputy head level. NSIRA sought clarification on the absence of cases referred; the most common reason provided by departments for this outcome was that cases were either mitigated before deputy head involvement and/or this was a result of an overall reduction in the number of foreign information exchanges generally due to the ongoing pandemic.

NSIRA Finding #2: NSIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

Case Triage

Typically, when departments are making ACA applicability decisions, they employ varying “case triage” processes, that is, the combination of policy assessment criteria and a pre-determined ‘escalation ladder’ for cases that require higher levels of managerial assessment. NSIRA closely evaluated all twelve ‘case triage’ frameworks of the departments subject to the ACA (Refer to Annex B-M). In carrying out this work, NSIRA noted some issues in the implementation of triage systems; for example, there were instances of not having one designed and of information being outdated.

NSIRA observed that there were two main types of initial case triage processes: case-by-case, where the framework places the onus on the working level official to first make determinations based on policy assessment tools, relevant training, and individual experience; and country assessment rating, which emphasizes the initial use of a country-based risk level that may trigger case escalation. A country assessment rating is a representation of the assessed risk of mistreatment associated to a country, based on a number of criteria and often derived from a range of sources.

Initial Case Triage Category 1: Case-by-Case

All departments use working level officials to determine whether there is a risk of mistreatment. When a working level officials’ assessment is inconclusive as to whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists, they will defer the decision to a higher management authority. NSIRA has developed Figure 1 to illustrate this type of triage process where the working level official consults assessment tools at his or her disposal to determine whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists.

Figure 1: Case by Case Triage Diagram

Initial Case Triage Category 2: Informed by Country Assessment Rating

CSIS, CSE, FINTRAC, and RCMP require working level officials to use country assessment ratings that may trigger case escalation. For example, NSIRA has developed Figure 2 to illustrate this type of triage process where country assessment ratings may trigger case escalation.

Case Escalation

In addition to the two categories of case triage frameworks identified above, all departments except for FINTRAC, PS, CSE and TC make use of internal consultation groups/senior decision making committees when cases are identified as requiring consultation/escalation (e.g. working groups and senior management committee secretariats). The following table illustrates the various consultation groups across departments that would make determinations related to the ACA.

The general purpose of consultation groups is to serve as a single point of contact for employees who require assistance in assessing foreign information sharing activities or interpreting policy and procedure. Senior decision making committees are responsible for making determinations on the information exchange. They are the final decision making authority prior to escalation to the deputy head. NSIRA observed that leveraging the overall expertise of these groups may assist officials in consistently applying assessment criteria, as well as provide greater oversight for information exchanges with foreign entities.

Consistency in Implementation Across Departments

Beginning with the 2017 Ministerial Directions on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities, it was required that departments maintain policies and procedures to assess the risks of information sharing relationships with foreign entities. While not specified in the Act or Directions, departments continue to implement country and entity assessments, a practice NSIRA has supported. NSIRA has previously raised concerns regarding the absence of unified and standardized approach to departments’ country assessments. The PCO-led community response to last year’s recommendation on this element stated in part that:

The information sharing activities of these organizations all serve either an intelligence, law enforcement, or administrative purpose with each carrying different risk profiles, privacy concerns, and legal authorities. Individual departments and agencies are responsible for establishing specific thresholds or triggers in their information sharing frameworks that are appropriate for their operational contexts. It is the view of the Government of Canada that applying the same threshold across all organizations for triggering, evaluating, and elevating cases is not necessarily practical nor essential to ensuring that each department or agency is operating in compliance with the Act.

In order to engage in the questions to which the divergence of thresholds gives rise, NSIRA asked departments to rank bi-lateral information exchanges with foreign partners in terms of volume, excluding exchanges with [***example of foreign entity information sharing***]. Nine of the twelve departments identified ███████ as a foreign exchange entity, a country which is widely recognized as having human rights concerns.

NSIRA then selected only those departments that initially utilize country assessment ratings as a triage method (i.e. FINTRAC, RCMP, CSIS and CSE). [***description of how departments determined foreign entity example***]. Nonetheless, in carrying out this analysis, NSIRA observed that all four departments relied on a combination of open source human rights reports and consultations with other departments. Additionally, RCMP, CSIS and CSE utilize classified intelligence sources.

However, although these departments utilize a similar approach when assessing a country, the assigned rating for ████ was not consistent. CSIS assigned █████████████; FINTRAC and RCMP assigned a [***description of department’s specific ratings***] ; and finally, CSE assigned a ██████ rating.

NISRA examined to what degree country ratings affected the level of approval required for an information exchange. Because CSE has assigned a rating of █████ when they receive a request from ████, a CSE official could require [***description of the factors used to determine the appropriate level process***] CSE acknowledged that its “human rights assessments do not necessarily correlate with the risk level assigned to an instance of sharing,” and nor do they “necessarily correlate to levels of approval or to restrictions to sharing.” [***description of the factors used to determine the appropriate level process***]

In contrast, according to their framework and methodology, an exchange with any one of the █████ authorities listed in the RCMP’s country and entity assessment list could result in an [***description of department’s specific ratings***] because █████ is associated with a country assessment rating. When an entity is yellow, the employee must consider whether or not there is a risk of mistreatment by looking at a list of criteria. If one or more of these criteria exist, the employee must send the case to a senior management committee. NSIRA observes that where the RCMP has a red country rating, the working level official must escalate to the senior management committee. Therefore, unlike CSE and CSIS, country ratings within the RCMP have direct impacts on approval levels.

NSIRA’s ACA report from last year recommended that departments should identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern. While PCO disagreed with this recommendation, NSIRA believes that there remain concerns regarding divergences in country and risk assessments.

NSIRA Finding #3: NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be scalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.

Following this review, NSIRA intends to further scrutinize the processes employed regarding ACA triage and decision making by reviewing GAC and RCMP.

A case study as provided for in Box 1 exemplifies the divergent nature on the evaluation of risk where two departments’ considered responding to an identical request made by a foreign entity.

Box 1: A divergent decision-making process

[***description of the case study***] The foreign entity provided this information to GAC and CSIS and requested confirmation [***description of the information sharing request***]

In considering whether to respond to this request, GAC determined that the human rights record of the country in question generally and of the foreign entity specifically making the request were of significant concern. GAC’s senior decision making committee, working under the presumption that the individual’s detention was ongoing, considered whether the disclosure of this information “would not substantially increase the detainee’s risk of mistreatment.” The senior decision making committee determined that confirmation of the individual’s previous employment status with GAC was permissible, subject to the determination of CSIS’s assessment.

Ultimately, the decision by CSIS was made by a DG-level executive and, as the foreign entity was listed by CSIS as a restricted partner, information was not shared.

The assessment by GAC’s senior decision-making committee is of concern. The Act and the Directions impose that departments consider whether disclosing or requesting information “would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment.” [***legal advice to department***]

NSIRA agrees with this interpretation of the law, but not with its implementation by GAC in this case. GAC’s position was that responding to the request “would not aggravate” the risk of mistreatment. However, NSIRA is of a different view. Regardless of the information sought, the human rights record of the foreign entity and of the foreign country was of significant concern, and GAC was operating under the presumption that the individual may have already been subjected to mistreatment. While GAC’s sharing could not have accounted for any mistreatment that could have occurred earlier, responding to the request given the facts of this case would have nonetheless resulted in a substantial risk of mistreatment. Therefore, this case should have been refered to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for consideration.

NSIRA also observes that this case was triaged at different levels within GAC and CSIS. In GAC’s triage process, the decision was made at the higher senior decision-making committee that disclosure was permissible. Comparatively, CSIS’s decision-making process was completed prior to reaching their senior-level committee and yielded the opposite result. The different levels of decision-making and different outcomes underscore a problematic inconsistency in how each organization considers the same information to be disclosed to the same foreign entity. Furthermore, while a department responsible for the information may consult with other departments as to whether disclosure of information is permissible, it cannot abdicate this responsibility and decision-making to another department.

NSIRA Finding #4: NSIRA found a procedural gap of concern in a case study involving the disclosure of information, even though information was ultimately not shared. The risk of mistreatment was substantial and the decision should have been referred to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs as the accountable deputy minister for this request.

Mitigation Measures

Use of Mitigation Measures

To decrease the risk of mistreatment, departments will employ mitigation measures such as caveats, assurances, sanitization, and redactions. The most common mitigation measures are caveats and assurances. Caveats are specific stipulations appended to information to limit or prohibit certain uses of information unless otherwise authorized by the issuing department. For example, any departments use a ‘third party’ caveat that restricts further dissemination of the information to other departments (domestic and foreign), unless the originating department is consulted on the request to share.

Assurances are not specific to a single information exchange; rather, these are agreements with foreign entities (whether formal or informal), which aim to help ensure that a particular foreign entity understands Canada’s position on human rights and that the entity, in turn, agrees to comply with this expected behaviour. For example, when formulating a risk mitigation strategy for an information exchange, departments will consider written or verbal assurances, who provided the assurance (i.e. working level official or agency head), and whether the assurance is considered credible and reliable.

Furthermore, CSIS, CSE, and GAC have highlighted a number of differences in the types of assurances sought, including a number of informal and formal methods. For example, verbal assurances, scheduled formal assurances, and ad-hoc written assurances can be sought by various levels.

In a related issue, NSIRA observed that there are [***description and an example of a Department’s ability to track compliance***] CSIS, GAC, and CSE indicated that there is ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ is not specific to the ACA but is nonetheless key ████████████ when exchanging information with the Government of Canada.

Given that no cases were escalated to the level of deputy head, departments’ lower-level use of mitigation strategies would have taken on considerable prominence in decision making. In a subsequent review, NSIRA intends to further investigate policies of mitigation measures pertaining to their use and tracking.

CONCLUSION

This review assessed departments’ implementation of the directives received under the ACA and their operationalization of frameworks to address ACA requirements.

NSIRA’s first review of departments’ implementation of the Act and Directions was limited to a four month period (September-December 2019). As such, this review constitutes the first examination of the ACA over the course of one full year. NSIRA believes that it is now in a position to conduct in-depth case study assessments of individual departments’ adherence to the ACA and Directions, irrespective of whether or not a department reported any cases to its deputy head. Additionally, future reviews will follow up on the ongoing implementation of NSIRA’s past recommendations.

Annex A: Findings

NSIRA Finding #1: NSIRA found that CBSA and PS did not finalize their policy frameworks in support of Directions received under the ACA over the review period.

NSIRA Finding #2: NSIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

NSIRA Finding #3: NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be escalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.

NSIRA Finding #4: NSIRA found a procedural gap of concern in a case study involving the disclosure of information, even though information was ultimately not shared. The risk of mistreatment was substantial and the decision should have been referred to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs as the accountable deputy minister for this request.

Annex B: Canada Border Services Agency

Annex B: Canada Border Services Agency Framework

Framework updates: In 2018, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) issued a high-level policy document in response to the 2017 MD. Since then, CBSA has drafted updated policies and procedures that have not yet been finalized.

Working Groups: CBSA Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment Working Group (ACMWG)

Senior Management Committee: Senior Management Risk Assessment Committee (SMRAC). This committee convenes on an as needed basis, to assess cases that have a potential for mistreatment.

[***description of CBSA’s decision making methodology***]

Country Assessment: In-house risk scoring template under development

Mitigation Measures: The CBSA is currently working to strengthen its formal framework/process for deciding whether substantial risk of mistreatment associated with a given request can be mitigated.

Annex C: Canada Revenue Agency

Annex C: Canada Revenue Agency Framework

Framework Updates: The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) indicated that it did not make any changes to its framework since last year’s response. The department continues to refine its processes and has developed the Canada Revenue Agency Exchange of Information Procedures in the Context of Avoiding Complicity in the Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act.

[***departmental cabinet confidence***]

Working group: The CRA formed a Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) that developed a methodology to assess the human rights records of its information exchange partners, so that senior management can make informed assessments of the risk of mistreatment.

Canada has a large network of international partners with 94 tax treaties and 24 Tax Information Exchange Agreements. Canada is also a party to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAAC), which includes 144 signatories. These International Legal Agreements allow the CRA to exchange information on request, spontaneously and automatically. Each legal agreement includes secrecy provisions (caveats) that govern appropriate use and disclosure. In addition, members of the Global Forum (Global Forum) on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes are subject to peer reviews on a cyclical basis, including on Confidentiality and Data Safeguard .

Senior Management Committee: During the review period a senior committee was not in place, however there was a formal process to escalate reviews/risk assessment through the Director, Director General and ultimately the Assistant Commissioner of the Compliance Programs Branch (CPB) who is accountable for the administration of the ACA.

Additionally, in July 2021, the CRA established an ACA governance framework that includes the ACA Panel, a senior management consultative committee to support risk assessments, reporting, recommendations, and priorities. The panel currently consists of DGs and Directors within the CPB and the Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch. Also in July 2021, the CRA established an executive level committee to consider and develop recommendations on case specific engagements as well as issue identification and guidance. The committee consists of Directors across several directorates of the CRA that manage programs that are directly impacted by/reliant on exchange of information with other jurisdictions.

Triage: The initial assessment is done by a working level employee and requires, at minimum, director approval. The case may escalate to the DG and the AC and so on if there is doubt about risk mitigation.

In cases where risk was identified, there were challenges in conducting full assessments to determine if the risk was substantial, the CRA delayed disclosing the information until the full assessment could be completed. This was largely in part due to COVID-19. As such, files that normally would have been referred were temporarily put on hold and no action was taken during the review period.

The CRA informed NSIRA that funding from the November 2020 Fall Economic Statement was allocated to the creation of a dedicated risk assessment team. It is anticipated that the development and regular updating of country-level assessments and the preparation of individual-level risk assessments will transition to this new dedicated team housed within the CPB, in summer 2021.

The team will also be responsible for:

  • Creating and formalizing the framework for consulting with CRA senior management and other government departments and agencies;
  • Advising CRA officials who engage in exchange of information (EOI);
  • Identifying mitigation and other factors specific to the type of information that CRA exchanges and that would impact risk assessment;
  • Preparing annual and other reporting required under the Act and Directions;
  • Providing awareness and training sessions; and
  • Continuously improving documentation, policies, guidance, and procedures.

Country/Entity Assessments: Since January 2020, the CRA has completed their own set of mistreatment risk assessments for each potential information exchange, including the use of information received from the CRA’s information exchange partners in consultation with other Government of Canada partners. The CRA can only exchange information with another jurisdiction pursuant to a treaty, tax convention or other legal instrument that permits exchange of tax information.

The CRA uses a colour coded system to rate the risk related to a country: green; yellow; red. However, for specific or spontaneous exchanges of information, the CRA completes an analysis based on the specifics of the file to supplement the country specific risk assessment.

Mitigation Measures: Mitigation measures, including caveats (data safeguards and confidentiality provisions) are embedded in all legal instruments that govern and allow for all the CRA’s exchanges of information, while peer reviews of jurisdictions’ legal frameworks and administrative practices provide assurances of exchange partners’ compliance with international standards for exchange of tax information. According to CRA, all information exchanged during the review period were subject to these mitigation measures. Due to COVID19, and for the period under review, the CRA put on hold all exchanges where it was deemed there may be a residual potentially significant risk of mistreatment until a process and mitigation measures were in place, including to redact information. However, the CRA routinely redacted personal information where it would not impact the substance of the exchange for those mitigated risk exchanges that did proceed during this period.

Annex D: Communications Security Establishment

Annex D: Communications Security Establishment Framework

Framework Updates: No changes made to the framework in 2020. It is the same procedure as the last review period.

Working group: Based on the RFI, there are no working groups leveraged to assess the level of risk of mistreatment. The Mistreatment Risk Assessment Process follows a process that has been refined continuously since its inception in 2012. The higher the level of risk (low, medium, high, substantial), the higher approval authority required to exchange or use information.

Senior Management Committee: There is no Senior Management Committee. As explained above, CSE relies on an approval authority scale based on the level of risk (from low to substantial). Senior level officials are involved in the process when there are medium and high-risk cases, which require Director and Director General/Deputy Chief approval, respectively.

Triage: A CSE official performs an initial assessment by consulting the Mistreatment Risk Assessment (MRA), which considers equity concerns, geolocation and identity information, human rights assurances, risk of detention and a profile of the recipients’ human rights practices.

Low (For Low Risk Nations)

If the MRA indicates a low level of risk, the official will need Supervisor [***specific unit***], approval if they wish to proceed with the information exchange or use.

Low (For non-Low Risk Nations)

If the MRA indicates a low level of risk, the official will need Manager [***specific unit***], approval if they wish to proceed with the information exchange or use.

Medium

If the MRA indicates a medium level of risk, the official will need Director, Disclosure and Information Sharing approval if they wish to proceed with the information exchange or use.

High

If the MRA indicates a high level of risk, the official will need Director General, Policy Disclosure and Review or Deputy Chief, PolCom approval if they wish to proceed with the information exchange or use.

Substantial

If the MRA indicates a substantial level of risk, the official may not proceed with the information exchange or use.

Country Assessments: CSE establishes its own country assessments (which CSE refers to as Human Rights Assessments) by using information from OGDs, its own reporting, and open source information. Foreign entity arrangements are reviewed annually. These HRAs are part of CSE’s MRAs.

There are two types of MRAs: Annual and Case-by-case. Annual MRAs include foreign entities with whom CSE regularly exchanges information, [***description of the foreign entities with whom CSE exchanges information***] Caseby-case MRAs are conducted in response to particular requests. Case-by-case MRAs often concern individuals and information sharing activities. There are Abbreviated MRAs, which are a sub case-by-case MRA, and they are conducted for Limited Risk Nations. These nations are considered low risk by CSE.

When making MRAs, CSE does the following:

  • assesses the purpose of the information sharing;
  • verifies there are mistreatment risk management measures in existing information sharing arrangements;
  • reviews CSE’s internal records on the foreign entity under consideration;
  • consults other available Government of Canada assessments and reports related to the foreign entity;
  • assesses the anticipated effectiveness of risk mitigation measures; and
  • evaluates a foreign entity’s compliance with past assurances, based on available information.

CSE consults with GAC, DND, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence for some MRAs, usually case-by-case ones. CSE may also consult GAC for human rights-related advice in certain instances.

Mitigation Measures: CSE considers a number of mitigation factors, such as risk of detention, [***statement regarding information sharing obligations of partners***] caveats, formal assurances, and bilateral relationships. CSE’s principle mitigation measure is Second Party assurances. [***statement regarding information sharing obligations of partners***]

Identifying/Sensitizing: The DG, Policy Disclosure and Review or the DC PolCom review high-risk cases. 303 information-sharing requests were assessed for risk of mistreatment and 10 of them (3%) were referred to the Director, Disclosure & Information Sharing. For the 2020 review period, the Deputy Chief, Policy and Communications was responsible for ACA accountability and quality assurance.

Annex E: Canadian Security Intelligence Service

[***Info-graphic of CSIS’s Risk Assessment process***]

Framework Updates: While there were no changes during the 2020 review period, CSIS modified its procedure on January 2021. Most notably, cases will only be escalated to ISEC if the DG cannot determine if the substantial risk can be mitigated. In addition, CSIS merged the [***statement regarding internal process***] CSIS updated its human rights ‘Assurances’ procedures as a stand-alone policy. This policy requires CSIS Stations to seek assurances from [***statement regarding internal process***] coordination responsibilities for ISEC were moved to the ██████████. Through that, the █████ became ISEC’s Chair.

Triage: CSIS working-level officials do the initial assessment. This assessment requires the official to determine if one or more of the four risk criteria are met. These criteria are:

  • “Based on the available information about the foreign entity, if the information is disclosed or requested, is there a probability that the foreign entity will engage in torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment against an individual(s)?”
  • “If the information is disclosed or requested, is there a probability that the foreign entity will disseminate the information in an unauthorized manner to a 3rd party, which may result in torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment against an individual(s) by that 3rd party?”
  • “If the information is disclosed or requested, is there a probability that it may result in the extraordinary rendition of an individual(s) by the foreign entity which would lead to the individual(s) being tortured or subject to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment?
  • “If the information is disclosed or requested, is there a probability or an extrajudicial killing of an individual(s) by the foreign entity or other security entities within the country?”

Four scenarios could occur before a case lands at ISEC:

[***description of four possible scenarios and the assessment criteria used to determine risk mitigation and/or ecalation***]

Working Group: While there is a senior management committee, there is no working level group on the operations side.

Senior Management Committee: ISEC is CSIS’s senior-level review committee for foreign information sharing activities. It is composed of CSIS senior managers and representatives from DoJ and GAC. This committee is responsible to determine if a case poses a substantial risk and if it can be mitigated. If ISEC cannot determine if the substantial risk is mitigatable, the case is referred to the Director. Of note, GAC and DoJ are no longer voting members on ISEC but will continue to provide feedback and advice.

Country Assessments: CSIS conducts its own country assessments. Each information exchange arrangement with a foreign entity has its own Arrangement Profile (AP). APs include a summary of the human rights summary.

Mitigation Measures: CSIS relies on a few mitigation measures. First, CSIS widely uses ‘Form of Words’, which include caveats. Second, CSIS uses assurances and relies on standardized templates provided to foreign entities. CSIS may also tailor assurances to address specific concerns, such as extra-judicial killings.

Identifying/Sensitizing Information: ██████ is responsible for CSIS’s information sharing framework. [***name of a specific unit***] is responsible for official policy management. Concerned program areas are responsible for applying related polices and procedures for ACA-related activities.

Annex F: DFO

Annex F: DFO Framework

Framework Updates: Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) did not make any changes to last year’s approach.

Triage: The initial assessment is made by the person receiving the request for information sharing or who first comes into possession of information derived from a foreign source. Risk is determined on a case-by-case basis.

The sector-level analyst/officer does the initial assessment and relies on OGD assessments to determine the level of risk. They determine the level of risk in relation to the specific case and whether they assess that there is a substantial risk or not will impact the level of approval. If the analyst/officer does not think there is risk, the case may proceed. This, according to the decision screen and information received, does not require any manager or senior level approval.

If the analyst/officer believes or is unsure that there is a substantial risk, the senior-level Internal Review Committee (IRC) must seek DM approval.

Working Group: Internal Review Committee

Senior Management Committee: DFO employs the use of a decision screen and the IRC as demonstrated above. It is unclear whether DFO has developed guidance to help officials and management accurately and consistently determine the risk of mistreatment.

Country Assessments: DFO relies on country assessments conducted by GAC (as well as DFO legal services, RCMP and CSIS as needed) to make mistreatment risk determinations.

Mitigation measures: DFO indicated that it employs the use of caveats and assurances as necessary but has not yet had to seek such assurances. As such, there is no tracking mechanism in place. The Department is able to retroactively determine when, how, and why a decision was made through its record keeping system. A process is in place to record the details of each case, its evaluation process, and any resulting actions and decisions.

Annex G: Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces

Annex G: Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces Framework

Framework Updates: The Department of National Defence (DND) indicated that there were no changes to its framework since last year’s response.

Triage: The process of assessing risk is largely the same across all three forms of information sharing transactions. The process involves examining country human rights conditions, and researching specific partner entities, including any reports of mistreatment. Adverse information on a foreign partner is reviewed by the Defence Information Sharing Working Group (DISWG) and recommendations are made to the implicated L1s on how to manage information sharing activities (request, disclosure, or use). There are no differences in the types of mitigation measures employed across the three forms of information sharing. The primary governance document Release and Disclosure Officers (RDOs) and Release and Disclosure Authorities (RDAs) must adhere to is the CDI Interim Functional Directive: Information Sharing with Certain Foreign States and their Entities.

Working Group: The Defence Information Sharing Working Group (DISWG) is a working-level committee led by the Release and Disclosure Coordination Office (RDCO) within CFINTCOM that serves as an advisory body to operation Commanders regarding issues covered under the ACA. This Working Group exists as a platform for open dialogue related to information sharing arrangements and transactions. This group convenes monthly, or as required.

Senior Management Committee: The Defence Information Sharing Assessment Committee (DISAC) is chaired by the Chief of Defence Intelligence / Commander CFINTCOM . The DISAC’s primary object is to act as an advisory committee for the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff in support of their decision making regarding issues pertaining to the ACA.

Country Assessments: Currently, RDCO has established a list of low-risk countries that can be referred to by other L1s. Inclusion in this list indicates CDI’s confidence that sharing information with government entities of that foreign state can take place without a substantial risk of mistreatment. Moreover, RDCO has developed a draft methodology for Country Human Rights Profiles to classify countries as low, medium, or high risk but has only begun producing country human rights profiles on a few medium and high-risk countries and the methodology has not yet formally approved. These profiles will be used by other L1s in the development of specific Partner Entity Assessments and to inform the overall risk assessment of sharing information with foreign entities.

Information Management: There is no common shared system or repository for all RDOs. Information decisions are recorded by RDOs at the unit level. In some cases, all transactions are recorded using a spreadsheet and should include all details relating to the collection, retention, dissemination or destruction of the information, but the precise format will vary. CFINTCOM is working to standardize RDO logs across DND/CAF. From an information management perspective, there have been no changes since last year’s report. Records of discussion of all DISWG meetings are kept centrally within RDCO/CFINTCOM and it is possible to retroactively determine how and why a decision or recommendation was made.

Mitigation Measures: DND uses mitigation measures to reduce the risk of mistreatment. For example, DND uses measures such as the sanitization of information, the inclusion of caveats, and/or the seeking of assurances, including on low-risk cases in order to err on the side of caution.

Annex H: FINTRAC

Annex H: FINTRAC Framework

Framework Updates: The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) did not make any changes to their framework for the 2020 review year.

Triage: Who does the initial assessment will depend on the risk level classification of the country. If it’s green, the intelligence analyst (IA) does the risk assessment. If it’s yellow, the IA’s team leader does the risk assessment. If it’s red, Senior Level does the risk assessment. Regardless of the determined risk level, Senior Level must ultimately approve or decline the information exchange/use.

Partnerships and Working Groups: FINTRAC makes use of external organizations, such as the Egmont group, to ensure that member organizations are adhering to global standards against mistreatment. If one of these groups is found to have breached their duty of care, and is expelled from the group, then FINTRAC will cease to exchange information until the matter has been rectified. FINTRAC enters Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) with nations who wish to exchange information with them. To do so, each nation is assessed using a variety of criteria to determine their risk rating and whether an MOU should be established.

FINTRAC also regularly participates in ISCG meetings alongside other departments.

Senior Management Committee: FINTRAC does not have a senior management committee to determine risk like other departments. Instead, they rely on senior management and the Director to make final decisions on cases.

Country Assessments: FINTRAC established its own country assessments. Establishing each country assessment involves gathering pertinent information on the human rights situation in the country and using indicators to assess the risk level of mistreatment of each country. During the development of the country assessment process, FINTRAC consulted with other agencies/government departments captured under the ACA.

The Manager of International Relationships is responsible for monitoring and assessing the human rights profile of countries with which FINTRAC shares an MOU.

Mitigation Measures: Caveats and assurances are established at the signing of an MOU and repeated whenever sharing information with any foreign entity. The sharing of information is not allowed without a signed MOU.

Annex I: Global Affairs Canada

Annex I: Global Affairs Canada Framework

Framework Updates: Global Affairs Canada (GAC) indicated that no changes to their framework was made during the current review period.

Triage: There is not one unified set of processes at GAC for determining whether information being used by the department is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity. If an official determines that information that he or she has received is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and that official still wants to use the information, they are instructed in their training to consult with their Program management at HQ. Should that manager be unable to make a determination on their own as to whether the use would comply with the Act, they will consult the relevant departmental policy group and the department’s Legal Services Unit.

Working Groups: The Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee Secretariat

Senior Management Committees: The Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC) meetings focuses on the following:

  • Has the information, the use of which is being sought, likely been derived from mistreatment?
  • What are the proposed measures to mitigate the risks? What is the likelihood of their success?
  • Consider the justifications for and proportionality of any potential involvement with the foreign state or entity that may result in mistreatment.

The MDCC Secretariat will create a record of decision and circulate it for comment by MDCC members. Once finalized, it will be kept by the Secretariat for future reporting. The MDCC Secretariat follows up with the requesting official for updates on the outcome of the situation and requests a final update from the requesting official once the situation is resolved. Currently the MDCC Secretariat consists of one person.

Country Assessments: Global Affairs Canada’s human rights reports provide an evidence-based overview of the human rights situation in a particular country, including significant human rights-related events, trends and developments and include a section focused on mistreatment. There are no scores for countries however, and it is up to the officials to assess the risk based on the information in the reports.

Mitigation Measures: The Legal Services Unit and/or Intelligence Policy and Programs division will provide guidance on the limitations and the prohibitions of the use of information obtained through mistreatment. They are also able to propose potential mitigation measures, such as sanitization of the information, if there is a risk of further mistreatment; of depriving someone of their rights or freedoms; or if the information could be used as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding.

Annex J: IRCC

Annex J: IRCC Framework

Framework Updates: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) indicated that there were no changes to its procedures regarding the disclosure of information to foreign entities.

Triage: The initial assessment is done by the employee/officer receiving a request to disclose information. Officers are provided with a country assessment tool that provides a country-level risk assessment. If the country is listed as low-risk and the employee does not believe there are any risks of mistreatment, they may proceed with the exchange and record the details of that exchange (i.e., what information was exchanged; to which country, etc) into the Global Case Management System (GCMS). If the country is high-risk, or the officer believes that there is any risk of mistreatment and they wish to pursue with the case, then the officer is required to refer the case to IRM and Admissibility to assess the risk of the exchange.

Senior Management Committee: IRCC has the Avoiding Complicity Assessment Committee. The Committee is comprised of executives representing relevant policy, operations, legal and privacy branches within the Department. The purpose of the Committee is to reassess whether the circumstances of the case meet the “substantial risk” threshold, and to determine whether mitigations could be sufficiently imposed to allow for the disclosure. If the Committee is unable to unanimously determine if the risk can be mitigated, and there remains a need to disclose the information to the requesting foreign entity, then the case will be referred to the Deputy Minister for final decision.

Country Assessments: IRCC officers are instructed to refer to an initial country assessment tool when they are contemplating any disclosure or request for information from a foreign entity. This tool provides a general assessment of the country’s risk. If the country is identified as a high-risk country, then the officer is required to make a Consultation Request before disclosing, requesting or using information. If the country is identified as medium-risk, then it is recommended that the officer make a Consultation Request.

Mitigation Measures: Possible mitigation measures for a case where a substantial risk of mistreatment has been determined, if available, would be established in the Consultation Request assessment and, if necessary, in the Avoiding Complicity Assessment Committee’s recommendation. In either case, the mitigations will be manually recorded in the case file where they can be later recalled and noted in the Annual Report.

Annex K: Public Safety

Annex K: Public Safety Framework
Annex K: Public Safety Framework Image 2

Please note that the above flow charts are draft and have not yet been approved.

Framework Updates: Public Safety (PS) does not yet have a framework for deciding whether an exchange of information with a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. PS noted, however, that it has drafted a departmental policy to support the department’s implementation of the Directions but it has not yet been approved by senior management.

Triage: PS officials at the operational level are responsible for identifying whether the disclosure of or request for information would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. Prior to the disclosure of or request for information to/from a foreign entity, PS officials, as per the draft policy, are expected to:

  • review risk assessments and information sharing arrangements/agreements to determine risks;
  • identify mitigation measures as needed; and
  • seek DG approval for the disclosure or request; and the DG would determine whether the risk can or cannot be mitigated and whether the case should be referred to the DM for determination and decision.
  • PS officials at the operational level are responsible for identifying whether information for potential use was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual. As per the draft policy, prior to the use of information, PS officials are expected to:
  • conduct an assessment to determine if the information was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual, if not previously completed by PS officials or another government department, and mark it accordingly, based on DG-level determination;
  • assess and characterize the accuracy and reliability of the information; and,
  • advise their DG of the circumstance; and the DG would determine whether the information would be used as per section 3 of the Directions and refer the decision to the DM to determine if the use of information in any way that deprives someone their rights or freedoms is necessary to prevent the loss of life or significant personal injury.

For PS program areas where responsibilities for program delivery are shared among multiple Government of Canada departments, PS officials may use accuracy and reliability assessments conducted by another Government of Canada department for the express purpose of the specific information exchange. In these cases, and where PS does not have sufficient information (such as the source of the information) to conduct an assessment, it will require Government of Canada departments to attest to having conducted the assessment. This same principle applies risk assessments and assessments as to whether information was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual.

Working Group: The ISCG is the primary interdepartmental forum for supporting interdepartmental collaboration and information-sharing between members as they implement the Act and Directions and is regularly attended by all members.

PS participates in the ISCG in three ways as the:

  1. chair, coordinator and PS policy lead;
  2. area responsible for implementing the ACA;
  3. legal counsel representative.

PS has also made progress with ISCG guidance. However, due to COVID-19, the ISCG was limited in its capacity to convene meetings.

Senior Management Committee: PS does not have a formal senior management committee to review high-risk cases. The Investigative Authorities and Accountability Policy (IAAP) unit supports program areas in the referral process to the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (SADM) of the National and Cyber Security Branch for further examination. Acting as a senior Public Safety official, the SADM is responsible for referring cases to the Deputy Minister if they are unable to determine whether the risk of mistreatment can be mitigated.

Country Assessments: PS currently does not have any country assessments completed and plans to use other department’s assessments, but as outlined in its draft policy, PS expects to conduct country and entity assessments as part of its annual risk assessment process. The risk assessment process will ensure that an agreement with the foreign entity is in place prior to information sharing exchanges; review risk and country assessments developed by portfolio agencies (e.g. CSIS) and other departments (e.g. GAC), and consider human rights reporting from non-government entities.

The IAAP will coordinate, on an annual basis, risk assessments. To do so, IAAP may, for example, review human rights reports developed by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), country assessments prepared by portfolio agencies (e.g. CSIS), human rights reporting from non-government entities and country/entity specific material.

Mitigation Measures: PS currently has developed a draft policy to address mitigation measures and caveats. The draft policy will provide guidance to officials on how to assess risk and apply mitigation measure, while also defining approval levels and country assessment responsibilities.

Once a risk of mistreatment has been identified, the PS official is required to undertake a risk mitigation assessment prior to requesting the information. Approved risk mitigation mechanisms include:

  • the caveating of information,
  • obtaining assurance and/or
  • disclosing a limited amount of the information.

The policy also outlines requirements regarding the use of congruent mitigation mechanisms to collectively reduce the risk.

Annex L: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Annex L: Royal Canadian Mounted Police Framework

Framework Updates: There were no changes to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) framework in 2020. RCMP has undertaken a number of internal reviews of its information sharing framework and continues to refine and optimize its processes.

RCMP also noted that it was in its final stages of rolling out an online training course specifically tailored to the ACA.

Triage: The Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC) process may be initiated if and when an information exchange involves a country identified as high or medium risk. A low-risk case would only be sent if an official believes there is the potential for mistreatment.

All RCMP personnel are required to consider the risk of mistreatment before requesting, disclosing or using information and to engage the FIRAC process if there is a substantial risk identified to a specific individual(s) with a country of exchange.

An employee is almost always the one to perform the initial risk assessment. When an entity is green, the employee may exchange or use information without consulting FIRAC, unless they express doubts. When an entity is yellow, the employee must consider whether or not there is a substantial risk of mistreatment by looking at a list of criteria (similar to CSIS). If one or more of these criteria is present, the employee must send the case to FIRAC. If the entity is red, the employee must send the case to FIRAC for the initial assessment, unless no personal information is exchanged.

Working Group: Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG). Full-length LEAG assessments include classified information from other Federal departments and agencies. The FIRAC Portal was developed to allow RCMP employees to access the assessments, and to further support compliance with the directions.

Senior Management Committee: FIRAC was established to facilitate the systematic and consistent review of RCMP files to ensure information exchanges do not involve or result in the mistreatment of any person.

FIRAC holds the responsibility to determine if a substantial risk exists and in cases where a substantial risk of mistreatment exists, make a recommendation on whether the proposed mitigating measures are adequate to mitigate the risk.

FIRAC’s recommendations are made by the Chair, upon the advice of the Committee, to the appropriate Assistant Commissioner / Executive Director responsible for the operational area seeking to disclose, request or use the information.

FIRAC determines if the risk is mitigatable or not. If it is, the case goes to the Assistant Commissioner. If it is not, FIRAC declines the exchange or use of information.

Country Assessments: An in-house country assessment model has been completed.

Countries are listed in alphabetical order, along with any specific foreign entities (i.e. police forces, military units, etc.) that have been assessed. For each entity, the risk level (Red-High, Yellow-Medium, Green-Low) is provided, as are the specific crime types and conditions.

Mitigation Measures: The RCMP leverages existing MOU’s with specific partners to partially mitigate underlying risk, in particular where mutually agreed standards around human rights exist as well as having a good track record for respecting caveats. Similarly, officials work with Liaison Officers to identify any relevant assurances or strategies, factors or conditions that could mitigate the risk of mistreatment posed by the information exchange, request for information or use of information.

All mitigation measures used are tracked through the FIRAC by filling in a FIRAC Request Form. Noting which mitigations/caveats are used is a mandatory part of the process.

Annex M: Transport Canada

Does not have a departmental framework for assessing ACA considerations, outside of the Passenger Protect Program (PPP).

Changes: Transport Canada (TC) developed a corporate policy in September 2020 to highlight the department’s ACA-related requirements, roles and responsibilities and remains a participant in PS framework.

Triage: Relies on PS’ framework for the Passenger Protect Program.

Should they have any concerns about a request for information from a foreign partner they will consult with other agencies, such as CSIS or GAC.

Working Group: TC is a voting member of the PPP Advisory Group but does not have any responsibility for drafting case briefs. At each meeting of the PPP Advisory Group, TC has ensured that all other voting members have acknowledged TC’s SATA-legislated responsibility for sharing the List with domestic and foreign air carriers, and its associated responsibilities under the ACA.

Senior Management Committee: TC does not have any senior management committee in place to further review cases with a potential for mistreatment.

Country Assessments: Rely on other government departments.TC relies on assessments by other departments such as PS and GAC.

Mitigation measures: The framework was established by Public Safety (lead on PPP), with consultations with the PPP partners (RCMP, CSIS, CBSA). TC has worked with PS to integrate mitigation measures into the operating procedures and protocols of PPP partners.

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Date Modified:

Annual Report on the Access to Information Act 2021–22

Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Access to Information Act gives Canadian citizens and permanent residents, as well as any person or corporation present in Canada, a right of access to information contained in government records, subject to certain specific and limited exceptions.

Section 94(1) of the Act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the Act within the institution and to submit the report to Parliament. In addition, section 20 of the Service Fees Act requires institutions to report on all statutory fees processed during the reporting period.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled in accordance with Section 94 of the Access to Information Act, and section 20 of the Service Fees Act, describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat in administering these Acts during the period April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022.

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:

Access to Information and Privacy Office
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5
Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who we are

Established in July 2019, NSIRA is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.

The NSIRA Secretariat assists the Review Agency in fulfilling its mandate.

Mandate

NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities. 

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.

Investigations

NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Access to Information and Privacy Office

NSIRA’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

For the reporting period, the NSIRA ATIP office consisted of:

  • 1 full-time ATIP Coordinator
  • 1 part-time ATIP Consultant
  • 1 full-time Senior Director, who managed the ATIP office in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Senior Director of Corporate Services

NSIRA Legal Services supported the ATIP team on an as required basis.

The main activities of the ATIP Coordinator included:

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
  • processing requests under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat respected the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments.
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and
  • representing the NSIRA Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

To assist the ATIP Office in meeting its legislative obligations, NSIRA relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter points of contact from all its branches.

Delegation Order

The Executive Director, as the Head of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat and pursuant to s.95(1) of the ATIA, is responsible for the implementation of the ATIA for NSIRA. Through the most recent NSIRA delegation order, the Executive Director has designated the ATIP Coordinator and ATIP Officer to perform the powers, duties, functions, or administrative tasks pertaining to the ATIA. These functions have limited delegation of authority under the Act and the Privacy Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The recently amended ATIA delegation orders can be found in Appendix A.

Performance and Statistical Overview

Performance in Processing Access Requests

During the reporting period, the number of access requests received by NSIRA increased by 1300% (14) compared to the previous year (1). The Agency also managed one request that was pending from previous years, bringing the total number of cases to 15. Of these, NSIRA closed 5 requests in 2021- 22, and 10 were carried over to the next reporting period.

NSIRA’s responses to many requests required intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations. In 2021-22, NSIRA’s on-time response rate decreased to 80% from 100% in the previous reporting year.

Consultations

NSIRA was consulted on 12 requests this fiscal year, compared to 7 in the previous reporting period. NSIRA closed 11 consultations and carried over one into 2022-2023.

Requests Treated Informally

In 2021-2022, NSIRA responded to 7 informal requests for records previously released under the ATIA process. This is an increase from no informal requests in 2020-2021. NSIRA responded to all 7 requests within 30 days of the request.

Complaints and Investigations of Access Requests

Subsection 30(1) of the Act describes how the Office of the Information Commissioner receives and investigates complaints from individuals regarding the processing of requests under the Act. NSIRA received one new complaint during the reporting period and worked closely with the Office of the Information Commissioner to resolve the complaint. This complaint concerned NSIRA’s delay in providing a response to a request before the established legislative deadline. NSIRA’s delay was largely due to extended external consultations; however, the complaint was closed as “well-founded” in 2022-2023 reporting period.

Access to Information Act fees for the Purposes of the Service Fees Act

In accordance with the Interim Directive on the Administration of the ATIA, issued on May 5, 2016, and the changes to the ATIA that came into force on June 21, 2019, NSIRA waived or refunded all fees prescribed by the Act and Regulations during the reporting period.

Training

In 2021–22, the ATIP office provided orientation sessions to new and current employees. In all, 3 separate sessions on access and privacy legislation were provided to 60 employees.

Privacy policies, guidelines, procedures and initiatives

NSIRA did not revise policies, guidelines, or procedures related to the Access to Information Act—or implement new ones—during the reporting period. 

Monitoring processing time

Request processing times are monitored through the Access Pro software dashboard. The ATIP Coordinator notifies the Executive Director and suggests a course of action should any legislative timelines for responding to an ATIA request appear to be at risk. 

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Access to Information Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act*, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Appendix B: 2019-2020 Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2019-04-01 – 2020-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 14
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 1
Total 15
Closed during reporting period 5
Carried over to next reporting period 10
Carried over within legislated timeline 9
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 1
1.2 Sources of requests
Source Number of Requests
Media 4
Academia 0
Business (private sector) 0
Organization 0
Public 10
Decline to Identify 0
Total 14
1.3 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 12
E-mail 1
Mail 1
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 14

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 7
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 7
Closed during reporting period 7
Carried over to next reporting period 0
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 7
E-Mail 0
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 7
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
0 7 0 0 0 0 0 7
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 Pages re-released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
7 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Applications to the Information Commissioner on Declining to Act on Requests

  Number of Requests
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Sent during reporting period 0
Total 0
Approved by the Information Commissioner during reporting period 0
Declined by the Information Commissioner during reporting period 0
Withdrawn during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0

Section 4: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

4.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Request transferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decline to act with the approval of the Information Commisioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 5
4.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
13(1)(a) 0
13(1)(b) 0
13(1)(c) 0
13(1)(d) 0
13(1)(e) 0
14 0
14(a) 0
14(b) 0
15(1) – I. A. * 0
15(1) – Def. * 2
15(1) – S.A. * 0
16(1)(a)(i) 0
16(1)(a)(ii) 0
16(1)(a)(iii) 0
16(1)(b) 1
16(1)(c) 2
16(1)(d) 0
16(2) 0
16(2)(a) 0
16(2)(b) 0
16(2)(c) 0
16(3) 0
16.1(1)(a) 0
16.1(1)(b) 0
16.1(1)(c) 0
16.1(1)(d) 0
16.2(1) 0
16.3 0
16.31 0
16.4(1)(a) 0
16.4(1)(b) 0
16.5 0
16.6 0
17 0
18(a) 0
18(b) 0
18(c) 0
18(d) 0
18.1(1)(a) 0
18.1(1)(b) 0
18.1(1)(c) 0
18.1(1)(d) 0
19(1) 2
20(1)(a) 0
20(1)(b) 0
20(1)(b.1) 0
20(1)(c) 0
20(1)(d) 0
20.1 0
20.2 0
20.4 0
21(1)(a) 1
21(1)(b) 0
21(1)(c) 0
21(1)(d) 0
22 0
22.1(1) 0
23 2
23.1 0
24(1) 1
26 0

* I.A.: International Affairs
* Def.: Defence of Canada
* S.A.: Subversive Activities

4.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
68(a) 0
68(b) 0
68(c) 0
68.1 0
68.2(a) 0
68.2(b) 0
69(1) 0
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69(1)(c) 0
69(1)(d) 0
69(1)(e) 0
69(1)(f) 0
69(1)(g) re (a) 0
69(1)(g) re (b) 0
69(1)(g) re (c) 0
69(1)(g) re (d) 0
69(1)(g) re (e) 0
69(1)(g) re (f) 0
69.1(1) 0
4.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
2 1 0 0 0 0
4.5 Complexity
4.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
63 63 3
4.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 3 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
4.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
4.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 2 0 0 2
All exempted 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0
Total 2 0 0 2
4.6 Closed requests
4.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 4
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 80
4.7 Deemed refusals
4.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
1 0 0 1 0
4.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 1 0 1
16 to 30 Days 0 0 0
31 to 60 Days 0 1 0
61 to 120 Days 0 0 0
121 to 180 Days 0 0 0
181 to 365 Days 0 0 0
More than 365 Days 0 0 0
Total 1 0 1
4.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 5: Extensions

5.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Disposition of Requests Where an Extension Was taken 9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload 9(1)(b) Consultation
Section 69 Other
All disclosed 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0
Request abandoned      
No records exist 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0
5.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload 9(1)(b) Consultation
Section 69 Other
30 days or less 0 0 0
31 to 60 days 0 0 0
61 to 120 days 0 0 0
121 to 180 days 0 0 0
181 to 365 days 0 0 0
365 days or more 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 6: Fees

Fee Type Fee Collected Fee Waived Fee Refunded
Number of Requests Amount Number of Requests Amount Number of Requests Amount
Application 0 $0.00 14 $0.00 0 $0.00
Other fees 0 $0.00 0 $0.00 0 $0.00
Total 0 $0.00 14 $0.00 0 $0.00

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 12 143 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 12 143 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 11 123 0 0
Carried over within regotiated timelines 1 20 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Investigations and Reports of finding

9.1 Investigations
Section 32 Notice of intention to investigate Subsection 30(5) Ceased to investigate Section 35 Formal Representations
0 0 1
9.2 Investigations and Reports of finding
Section 37(1) Initial Reports Section 37(2) Final Reports
Received Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner Received Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner
0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 10: Court Action

10.1 Court actions on complaints
Section 41
Complainant (1) Institution (2) Third Party (3) Privacy Commissioner (4) Total
0 0 0 0 0
10.2 Court actions on third party notifications under paragraph 28(1)(b)
Section 44 – under paragraph 28(1)(b)
0
11.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $24,082
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $0
Professional services contracts $0
Other $0
Total $24,082
11.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.300
Part-time and casual employees 0.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 0.000
Students 0.000
Total 0.300

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act

Section 1: Capacity to Receive Requests under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

  Number of weeks
Able to receive requests by mail 52
Able to receive requests by email 52
Able to receive requests through the digital request service 52

Section 2: Capacity to Process Records under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

2.1 Number of weeks your institution was able to process paper records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
2.2 Number of weeks your institution was able to process electronic records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
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Date Modified:

Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2021-22

Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Privacy Act gives individuals the right to access information about themselves that is held by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat, subject to certain specific and limited exceptions. The Privacy Act also protects the privacy of individuals by giving them substantial control over the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information and by preventing others from having access to that information.

Section 72 of the act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the act within the institution and to submit the report to Parliament.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled in accordance with Section 72 of the Privacy Act describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat in administering the Act during the period of April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022.

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:

Access to Information and Privacy Office
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5
​Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who we are

Established in July 2019, NSIRA is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.

The NSIRA Secretariat assists the Review Agency in fulfilling its mandate.

Mandate

NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities. 

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.

Investigations

NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Access to Information and Privacy Office

NSIRA’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. For the reporting period, the NSIRA ATIP office consisted of:

  • 1 full-time ATIP Coordinator
  • 1 part-time ATIP Consultant
  • 1 full-time Senior Director, who managed the ATIP office in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Senior Director of Corporate Services

NSIRA Legal Services supported the ATIP team on an as required basis.

The main activities of the ATIP Coordinator included:

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
  • processing requests under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat respected the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments.
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and
  • representing the NSIRA Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

To assist the ATIP Office in meeting its legislative obligations, NSIRA relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter points of contact from all its branches.

Delegation Order

The Executive Director, as the Head of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat and pursuant to s.95(1) of the ATIA, is responsible for the implementation of the ATIA for NSIRA. Through the most recent NSIRA delegation order, the Executive Director has designated the ATIP Coordinator and ATIP Officer to perform the powers, duties, functions, or administrative tasks pertaining to the ATIA. These functions have limited delegation of authority under the Act and the Privacy Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The recently amended ATIA delegation orders can be found in Appendix A.

Performance and Statistical Overview

Performance in Processing Access Requests

During the reporting period, the number of privacy requests received by NSIRA increased by 75% (7) compared to the previous year (4). All requests were completed in 2021-22, and no requests were carried over the next year.

NSIRA’s responses to most requests required intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations. In 2021-22, NSIRA’s on-time response rate decreased to 71% from 75% in the previous reporting year.

Consultations

NSIRA received one new consultation request from another government institution which was responded within 30 days of its receipt.

Corrections and Notations

For this reporting period, NSIRA did not receive any requests for corrections of personal information.

Complaints and Investigations of Privacy Requests

NSIRA did not receive any complaints pursuant to the Privacy Act during this reporting period. However, one investigation was initiated by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) concerning the cyber-attack discussed under the “Breaches” section below.

Training

In 2021–22, the ATIP office provided orientation sessions to new and current employees. In all, 3 separate sessions on access and privacy legislation were provided to 60 employees.

Policies, guidelines, procedures and initiatives

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat:

  • Initiated work on a Privacy Policy, a Privacy Protocol, and on a Privacy Breach Plan and Procedures; and
  • Submitted a request to the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) for the approval of changes respecting Personal Information Banks.

Monitoring processing time

Request processing times are monitored through the Access Pro software dashboard. The ATIP Coordinator notifies the Executive Director and suggests a course of action should any legislative timelines for responding to a Privacy Act request appear to be at risk.

Breaches

In March 2021, NSIRA was the victim of a cyber-attack on its public-facing network. As required by the TBS’ Directive on Privacy Practices, NSIRA reported the breach to the OPC and the TBS. Consistent with the Privacy Act, TBS requirements and advice from the OPC, the affected individuals were notified of the breach and how it could affect them.

Privacy Impact Assessments

NSIRA has completed a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) of its operations.

NSIRA is in the process of completing a PIA regarding its complaint investigation process.

Disclosure of Personal Information Under Section 8(2)

No disclosures were made pursuant to subsection 8(2) during the reporting period.

Appendices

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Access to Information Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act*, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Appendix B: 2021-2022 Statistical Report on the Privacy Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2021-04-01 – 2022-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 7
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 7
Closed during reporting period 7
Carried over to next reporting period 0
Carried over within legislated timeline 0
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 0
1.2 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 4
E-mail 3
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 7

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 0
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 0
Closed during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 0
E-Mail 0
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 0
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

3.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 4
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 7
3.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
18(2) 0
19(1)(a) 0
19(1)(b) 0
19(1)(c) 0
19(1)(d) 0
19(1)(e) 0
19(1)(f) 0
20 0
21 2
22(1)(a)(i) 0
22(1)(a)(ii) 0
22(1)(a)(iii) 0
22(1)(b) 1
22(1)(c) 0
22(2) 0
22.1 0
22.2 0
22.3 0
22.4 0
23(a) 0
23(b) 0
24(a) 0
24(b) 0
25 0
26 2
27 1
27.1 0
28 0
3.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69.1 0
70(1) 0
70(1)(a) 0
70(1(b) 0
70(1)(c) 0
70(1)(d) 0
70(1)(e) 0
70(1)(f) 0
70.1 0
3.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
1 2 0 0 0 0
3.5 Complexity
3.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
768 768 3
3.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 1 71 2 697 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 71 2 697 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Assessment of Fees Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 2 0 0 0 2
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 0 0 0 2
3.6 Closed requests
3.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 5
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 71.42857143
3.7 Deemed refusals
3.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
2 0 2 0 0
3.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 0 0 0
16 to 30 Days 0 2 2
31 to 60 Days 0 0 0
61 to 120 Days 0 0 0
121 to 180 Days 0 0 0
181 to 365 Days 0 0 0
More than 365 Days 0 0 0
Total 0 2 2
3.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 4: Disclosures Under Subsections 8(2) and 8(5)

Paragraph 8(2)(e) Paragraph 8(2)(m) Subsection 8(5) Total
0 0 0 0

Section 5: Requests for Correction of Personal Information and Notations

Disposition for Correction Requests Received Number
Notations attached 0
Requests for correction accepted 0
Total 0

Section 6: Extensions

6.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Number of requests where an extension was taken 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
6.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
1 to 15 days 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 days 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
31 days or greater             0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 1 52 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 1 52 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 1 52 0 0
Carried over within regotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
7.3 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Complaints and Investigations Notices Received

Section 31 Section 33 Section 35 Court action Total
0 0 0 0 0

Section 10: Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and Personal Information Banks (PIBS)

10.1 Privacy Impact Assessments
Number of PIA(s) completed Number of PIAs modified
1 0
10.2 Institution-specific and Central Personal Information Banks
Personal Information Banks Active Created Terminated Modified
Institution-specific 2 0 0 0
Central 0 0 0 0
Total 2 0 0 0

Section 11: Privacy Breaches

11.1 Material Privacy Breaches reported
Number of material privacy breaches reported to TBS Number of material privacy breaches reported to OPC
1 1
11.2 Non-Material Privacy Breaches
Number of non-material privacy breaches
0
12.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $24,082
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $0
Professional services contracts $97,006
Other $0
Total $121,088
12.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.300
Part-time and casual employees 0.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 0.500
Students 0.000
Total 0.800

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act

Section 1: Capacity to Receive Requests under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

  Number of weeks
Able to receive requests by mail 52
Able to receive requests by email 52
Able to receive requests through the digital request service 52

Section 2: Capacity to Process Records under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

2.1 Number of weeks your institution was able to process paper records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
2.2 Number of weeks your institution was able to process electronic records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
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Review of Departmental Frameworks for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities

Review Backgrounder

In 2019-2020, NSIRA conducted its first interdepartmental review on the implementation of the 2017 Ministerial Directions on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2017 MD). The review set out to build NSIRA’s knowledge of the information sharing process adopted by the six departments that received the 2017 MD.

NSIRA conducted a case study for each department that had operationalized the 2017 MD. NSIRA noted significant differences in the six departments’ implementation and operationalization of information sharing processes. NSIRA found that CSE, CSIS and the RCMP had implemented the 2017 MD; DND/CAF was implementing the final elements of the 2017 MD; GAC had not yet fully implemented the 2017 MD; and, the CBSA had not yet operationalized the 2017 MD.

NSIRA examined and found differences in how high-risk decision-making is removed from operational personnel who may have a vested interest in the sharing. CSE and the RCMP had the most independent processes; GAC removed high-risk decision-making from front line personnel, while CSIS and DND/CAF decision makers had a direct operational interest in sharing information. NSIRA recommended that Departments ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.

NSIRA also found a lack of standardization in information sharing risk assessments for both foreign countries and foreign entities. This issue has been noted in other NSIRA information sharing reviews.

In 2019, parliament passed the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, which in conjunction with the subsequent issued Orders in Council (OIC’s) codified many of the provisions of the 2017 MD and left the essential prohibitions and limits unchanged. Noteworthy, the six departments examined in this review are also the same departments for which there is an obligation to issue OICs pursuant to the Act. This review set out the foundation that has assisted and facilitated NSIRA’s subsequent mandated information sharing reviews.

Publishing this review aligns with NSIRA’s efforts at increasing transparency and being more accessible to Canadians through its work.

Date of Publishing:

1. Executive Summary

In 2011 and again in 2017, ministers issued direction (hereafter Ministerial Direction or MD) to a number of departments setting out how to manage the risks of mistreatment posed by the sharing of information with foreign entities. Most recently, Parliament passed the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA). In September 2019, direction under the ACMFEA was issued to twelve departments, six of which had never before received formal direction regarding information sharing with foreign entities.

This review set out to build NSIRA’s knowledge of the information sharing processes adopted by departments under the 2017 MD. The direction issued pursuant to the ACMFEA in September 2019 codified many provisions of the 2017 MD and left the essential prohibitions and limits unchanged. As such, this review provided a foundation that will expedite and facilitate NSIRA’s future information sharing reviews.

The review focused on the six departments that had received the 2017 MD: the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CSBA), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF).

Observations and Recommendations

Degrees of implementation vary across departments

NSIRA noted significant differences between the six departments with regard to the level of implementation of information sharing processes. In summary:

  • CSE, CSIS and the RCMP have implemented the 2017 MD.
  • DND/CAF is in the process of implementing final elements of the 2017 MD.
  • GAC has not yet fully implemented the 2017 MD.
  • In practice, CBSA has not yet operationalized the 2017 MD.

The concept of “substantial risk” of mistreatment is not defined

Like the 2017 MD, the ACMFEA and its associated direction prohibit information sharing that would result in a “substantial risk” of mistreatment. Neither the ACMFEA nor its direction include a definition of substantial risk, however, despite the centrality of this concept to the regime. A definition of substantial risk existed in both the 2011 and 2017 MD; its absence now raises concerns about its interpretation in future.

Recommendation: The definition of “substantial risk” should be codified in law or public direction.

Departments vary with respect to the independence of their decision-making

  • CSE and the RCMP have the most independent processes.
  • The information sharing processes implemented by GAC to date remove high- risk decision-making from “front line” personnel.
  • At CSIS and DND/CAF, decision-makers typically have a direct operational interest in the sharing of information.
  • CBSA has not yet operationalized its information sharing processes.

Recommendation: Departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.

Lack of standardized information sharing risk assessments

Under the 2017 MD, GAC, CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP all maintain their own sets of foreign country and/or entity profiles, while DND/CAF is currently developing its own as well. The existence of multiple different assessments is duplicative and unnecessary. It may also yield inconsistencies, as departments have at times come to quite different conclusions about foreign countries’ and entities’ human rights records and the associated risks of information sharing.

Recommendation: Departments should develop: (a) a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including a standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and (b) to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.

Benefits of internal information sharing process reviews

Finally, NSIRA noted that periodic internal reviews of information sharing policies and processes supported their successful functioning in the long term.

Recommendation: Departments should conduct periodic internal reviews of their policies and processes for sharing information with foreign entities in order to identify gaps and areas in need of improvement.

2. Authorities

This review was conducted under the authority of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), specifically paragraphs 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(b) as well as sections 9 and 11.

3. Introduction

Many departments and agencies in the Government of Canada routinely share information with foreign entities. Given that information sharing with entities in certain countries can result in a risk of mistreatment for individuals, it is incumbent upon the Government of Canada to evaluate and mitigate the risks that such sharing creates. This is particularly the case for information sharing related to national security and intelligence, where the information often relates to alleged participation in terrorism or other criminal activity.

Canada has made a number of binding commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading treatment or Punishment (CAT), and other international agreements. The prohibitions on mistreatment – including complicity in mistreatment – set out in these agreements are also considered to be customary international law. Some of Canada’s obligations have been incorporated into domestic law under section 269.1 of the Criminal Code.

In 2011 and again in 2017, ministers issued direction to a number of departments setting out how to manage the risks in information sharing with foreign entities. Most recently, Parliament passed Bill C-59, which included the ACMFEA. In September 2019, direction under the ACMFEA was issued to twelve departments, six of which had never before received formal direction regarding information sharing with foreign entities.

Subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act requires NSIRA to review annually every department’s implementation of the directions of the GiC issued under the ACMFEA. In 2020, the NSIRA will undertake its first such review. The purpose of the present review, however, was to build NSIRA’s knowledge and understanding of departments’ implementation of the 2017 MD. The direction issued pursuant to the ACMFEA in September 2019 codified many provisions of the 2017 MD and left the essential prohibitions and limits unchanged. As such, this review provided a valuable foundation that will expedite and facilitate NSIRA’s future information sharing reviews.

The review focused on the six departments that received the 2017 MD: CSIS, CSE, the RCMP, CBSA, GAC, and DND/CAF. NSIRA examined departments’ policies and processes as well as documents related to foreign arrangements. Where possible, NSIRA examined a single case study for each department in order to illustrate how information sharing works in practice. Given the high-level approach taken in this review, NSIRA opted to make a series of broad observations about the strengths and weaknesses of departments’ framework for information sharing with foreign entities, in the place of formal findings. Where NSIRA made recommendations, they were interdepartmental in scope.

This review focused on departmental policies and procedures for the disclosure and requesting of information involving a risk of mistreatment. It did not examine the use of information that may have been derived from mistreatment; NSIRA may review this topic in future.

4. Background

In 2011, the Government of Canada approved a general framework for “Addressing Risks of Mistreatment in Sharing Information with Foreign Entities”. The framework was the first multi-departmental set of instructions issued regarding information sharing and mistreatment. Its main aim was to establish a coherent and consistent approach across government when sharing information with foreign entities.

Later in 2011, a number of departments whose mandate related to national security and/or intelligence received Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (the 2011 MD). Specifically, the 2011 MD was issued to CSIS, CSE, CBSA, and the RCMP. The 2011 MD, which was eventually released under the Access to Information Act, was subject to extensive criticism from non-governmental organizations, civil liberties groups, and others including the Canadian Bar Association. The main critique was that the 2011 MD did not clearly prohibit the disclosure or requesting of information entailing a “substantial risk” of mistreatment, but rather permitted departments to weigh the value of the information against the risk of mistreatment.

In 2017, the 2011 MD was replaced by a new Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (the 2017 MD). The 2017 MD was received by CSIS, CSE, CBSA, and the RCMP – the departments that had received the 2011 MD – as well as by DND/CAF and GAC. The 2017 MD included numerous changes, but the most significant were clear prohibitions on the disclosure and requesting of information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment, as well as new limits on the use of information likely derived from mistreatment by a foreign entity. In addition, the new MD required departments to maintain policies and procedures to assess the risks of their information sharing relationships with foreign entities.

The 2017 MD further directed departments to cooperate in making assessments regarding foreign countries and entities. In response, Public Safety Canada (PS) established the Information Sharing Coordination Group (ISCG) comprised of PS and the six departments that had received the 2017 MD. The objective was to encourage interdepartmental discussions in support of a coordinated approach to the implementation of the MD.

On July 13, 2019, the ACMFEA came into force. The ACMFEA requires the GiC to issue direction to the six departments that had received the 2017 MD, and gives the GiC discretion to issue direction to other departments as well. On September 4, 2019, the GiC issued direction under the ACMFEA to twelve departments. In addition to the six mandatory departments, direction was issued to PS; the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC); Transport Canada; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC); the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA); and Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO). These six new departments have now also joined the PS-led ISCG.

In practice, the information sharing regime set out by the ACMFEA and the subsequent GiC direction closely resembles the 2017 MD. The fundamental limits on Canadian departments’ scope to share information remain unchanged. Notably, however, the new regime omits certain aspects of the 2017 MD. The ACMFEA and its associated direction lack the 2017 MD’s requirement that departments maintain policies and procedures for assessing the risks associated with foreign information sharing arrangements, in collaboration with other departments. More importantly, the new system omits a definition of the threshold of “substantial risk”. The ramifications of this are discussed below.

5. Observations and Recommendations

Reporting

One of the new obligations placed on departments in the 2017 MD was a requirement that they provide an annual report to their minister that included:

All of the departments that were issued the 2017 MD fulfilled their obligation to report to their respective ministers by producing a report in late 2018 or early 2019 discussing the first year of activity under the MD. At the time of writing, however, not all of the departments have issued a public report. As this was a foundational review, NSIRA did not critically evaluate the reports.

Department Report to Minister Public report Cases approved Cases denied
CBSA Provided Published 0 0
CSIS12 Provided Published 1 1
RCMP13 Provided Published 25 4
CSE14 Provided Published 1 0
DND/CAF Provided Not Published 0 0
GAC Provided Not Published 0 0

Implementation of the 2017 Ministerial Direction

When the 2017 MD was issued, departments that had already built information sharing policies and procedures under the 2011 MD found themselves at a significant advantage. CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP in particular were able to quickly adapt their existing systems to the 2017 MD. Accordingly, for departments that had not received the 2011 MD – or had not implemented it – the arrival of the 2017 MD proved more challenging.

CSE: NSIRA observes that CSE has fully implemented all of the elements of the 2017 MD. The MD’s requirements have been integrated directly into CSE’s operational policies and processes. A detailed overview of CSE’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex D.

RCMP: In response to the 2017 MD, the RCMP overhauled their information sharing framework and stood up a new Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG) that, amongst other things, assesses country human rights records and maintains a system for streaming information sharing requests according to risk. The RCMP is currently working to integrate these processes into their comprehensive operational manual. A detailed overview of the RCMP’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex E.

CSIS: Following the issuance of the 2017 MD, CSIS quickly updated their policies and procedures. In 2018, CSIS also created a new system to implement the MD’s requirement to restrict information sharing with foreign entities that engage in mistreatment, with three levels of restriction depending on the seriousness of the problem. CSIS has informed NSIRA that it is overhauling its current policies and procedures. A detailed overview of CSIS’s current information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex F.

DND/CAF: Although DND/CAF did not receive the 2011 MD, DND/CAF has had internal directives in place governing information sharing with foreign entities since 2010. The DND/CAF policy and process suite for information sharing was updated following the issuance of the 2017 MD to bring it into compliance with the new requirements. While DND/CAF vets partner forces, it does not yet have a fully developed system for assessing and managing the risks of sharing information with foreign entities. DND/CAF is, however, currently developing more extensive country risk profiles and a standardized assessment process that will be used to assess the risks of information sharing prior to establishing information sharing arrangements. A detailed overview of DND/CAF’s information sharing framework can be found at Annex G.

GAC: Following receipt of the 2017 MD, GAC established a new Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC) in December 2018. The MDCC’s objective is to review requests for information sharing that may engage the MD. This is the extent of GAC’s policies and processes pursuant to the MD, however. GAC lacks any policies or procedures setting out how employees are to assess instances of possible information sharing to ensure that all appropriate cases reach the MDCC. It is insufficient to merely inform employees that they are responsible for assessing a complex legal threshold – the concept of a “substantial risk” of mistreatment at the core of the 2011 and 2017 MD as well as the ACMFEA – without guidance as to how they should proceed. As such, NSIRA observes that GAC has not yet fully implemented the 2017 MD.

GAC (cont.): Of note, GAC produces human rights reports on countries that are widely used within government to assist in assessing the risks of sharing with foreign entities. Following the 2017 MD, GAC added a subsection specific to mistreatment to these reports. A detailed overview of GAC’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex H.

CBSA: In October 2018, CBSA issued a revised high-level policy document in response to the 2017 MD. The document did not include concrete processes for identifying and handling instances of information sharing involving a risk of mistreatment, however. CBSA employees thus lack effective guidance with which to discharge their responsibilities under the MD. CBSA also has no process for assessing the risks associated with specific foreign countries and entities, as required by the MD. CBSA has since drafted processes and additional policies, but they have not yet been finalized or invoked. Given these significant gaps, NSIRA observes that CBSA has not yet operationalized the 2017 MD. CBSA has informed NSIRA, however, that it intends to introduce significant improvements over the coming year. A detailed overview of CBSA’s information sharing framework can be found at Annex I.

Additional observations are included in the department-specific annexes referenced above. It should also be noted that NSIRA examined departmental policies and processes at a high level, and as such future reviews may make additional findings and recommendations regarding policies and processes. Moreover, a number of departments are in the process of revamping their information sharing practices, including in particular CSIS and DND/CAF.

In its survey of departments, NSIRA noted varying levels of rigour and consistency with regard to record keeping. Accurate and detailed records of deliberations and reasoning in support of decision-making related to information sharing with foreign entities are necessary to support accountability, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Vavilov. NSIRA may return to this subject in future years.

In June 2019, the RCMP conducted an internal review of the framework and policies in place for its information sharing policies and procedures. The review identified certain shortcomings with regard to policies, processes, training, and resourcing. Based on the draft provided, NSIRA observes that the review was candid and thorough. The review is currently being used to guide improvements. Periodic internal reviews – such as the one conducted by the RCMP – should be considered a best practice.

Recommendation no. 1: Departments should conduct periodic internal reviews of their policies and processes for sharing information with foreign entities in order to identify gaps and areas in need of improvement.

Independent Decision-Making

The concept of risk mitigation is key to the information sharing frameworks of departments. When information sharing would result in a substantial risk that an individual would be mistreated, the information can only be shared if the department takes measures to mitigate the risk of mistreatment such that the residual risk is no longer substantial. Much therefore depends on who, within departments, is authorized to make decisions regarding whether:

  • an instance of proposed information sharing would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment; and
  • the proposed mitigation measures are sufficient.

In looking at the various decision-making processes adopted by departments, NSIRA noted varying levels of independence from operational personnel. Of particular interest were processes where the individual making decisions has a direct operational interest in the sharing of the information, creating the potential for conflict between operational imperatives and departmental obligations to respect the MD.

At CSE, the complete Mistreatment Risk Assessment process is conducted by non-operational units. The centralization of information sharing decision-making in a single branch minimizes direct operational pressure while facilitating informed and objective decisions.

The RCMP process uses other mechanisms to ensure independent decision- making. Individual investigators, when they wish to share information, must consult a list of countries and types of information sharing that the RCMP has pre-determined as representing sufficient risk of mistreatment. If the proposed sharing matches the list, then the case is automatically referred to the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC). FIRAC comprises a range of senior officials from RCMP headquarters who are a step removed from the operational front-line. The RCMP’s system of referral to FIRAC based on clear criteria removes discretion from officers with a vested interest in the sharing of the information. These officers may not have a full understanding of the geopolitical context of the proposed information sharing and thus are not best-placed to assess whether a substantial risk of mistreatment would result.

GAC requests that Directors General and Heads of Mission refer all cases where proposed information sharing “presents the potential for substantial risk of mistreatment” to the MDCC. The decision as to whether the substantial risk can be mitigated is made centrally by the MDCC, which comprises senior officials from across the department as well as a legal representative. As noted above, however, GAC currently does not provide officials with guidance on how to determine whether the threshold for referral to the MDCC has been met.

Compared to CSE, GAC, and the RCMP, decision-making at CSIS and DND/CAF is much closer to operations. CSIS provides high-level guidance to desks on how to identify information sharing that may result in a substantial risk of mistreatment, but leaves final decision-making regarding whether the situation does in fact create a substantial risk, and whether the risk can be mitigated, to the Deputy Director General or the Director General of each branch. Only if CSIS has heavily restricted information sharing with the foreign entity in question – or else the branch is unsure whether the substantial risk can be mitigated – then the branch must refer the case to the Information Sharing Evaluation Committee (ISEC) for determination. As a result, most of CSIS’s information sharing decisions – even those involving a substantial risk of mistreatment – are made by officials with a direct operational stake in the outcome of the proposed information sharing.

Within DND/CAF, decisions regarding the sharing of information rest with officers within the military chain of command. NSIRA was informed that while routine information sharing is approved by designated lower-level officers in theatre, cases involving unusual circumstances, or where there is uncertainty as to whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists or can be mitigated, are elevated to senior levels. Once passed up the chain of command, senior officers receive advice from a range of officials at headquarters.

CBSA, at the present time, does not have processes to assess substantial risk or to make decisions regarding whether such risks can be mitigated. In practice, therefore, the onus currently rests on CBSA officers, acting without guidance, to identify cases that invoke the 2017 MD and to manage the associated risks. CBSA has drafted a procedure for cases where there is uncertainty as to whether a substantial risk of mistreatment can be mitigated, but it has not yet been implemented.

Recommendation no. 2: Departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.

Country Assessments

As noted above, a significant addition to the 2017 MD was the requirement that departments maintain policies and procedures to assess the risks of their information sharing relationships with foreign entities. Notably, the MD required departments to assess the human rights records of foreign countries generally and not just of specific foreign entities (i.e., police or intelligence services) within those countries. While the MD did not prohibit information sharing with foreign entities in countries with troubling human rights records, it implied that Canada’s relationships with such foreign entities could not be considered in isolation from the broader human rights environment in which these entities functioned.

In several instances, NSIRA noticed departments citing an absence of direct Government of Canada intelligence of mistreatment by a specific foreign entity in support of a proposed sharing of information, or else in support of a less restrictive information sharing policy towards the entity in question – despite ample reporting of systemic human rights abuses in the public domain. NSIRA observes that a lack of internal Government of Canada reporting of mistreatment by a specific foreign entity is not evidence that the entity does not engage in mistreatment. Departments must consider the full range of sources in assessing risk, including open sources such as the media and non-governmental organizations.

GAC, CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP all maintain their own sets of foreign country and/or entity profiles, while DND/CAF is currently developing its own as well. The existence of multiple different assessments is duplicative and unnecessary. and It may also yield significant inconsistencies, as departments have at times come to quite different conclusions about foreign countries’ and entities’ human rights records and the associated risks of information sharing. With the issuance of direction under the ACMFEA to twelve departments, this issue will likely grow. See Annex F for additional discussion of this point.

The ISCG seeks to guide departments in developing their human rights assessment processes by providing a forum to discuss best practices. PS informed NSIRA that the ISCG had not discussed plans to standardize these assessments.

Recommendation no. 3: Departments should develop:

  • a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including a standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and
  • to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.

The recommendation above does not preclude department-specific approaches to mitigating the risks of mistreatment. For instance, a department may be able to draw upon aspects of its relationship with a foreign entity to reduce the risk of mistreatment not available to other departments. These differences should not affect the initial determination of the underlying risk of mistreatment posed by information sharing with a foreign entity, however.

In India v. Badesha (2017), the Supreme Court of Canada recently provided guidance on contextual factors to be considered when assessing the reliability of assurances sought from foreign entities regarding mistreatment. Though not exhaustive, the decision provides departments with some guidance regarding the adequacy of assurances received.

Duty of Care

In reviewing GAC, NSIRA noted a tension between adherence to the 2017 MD and GAC’s duty of care with regard to the safety and security of mission staff abroad. Indeed, both cases of information sharing referred to the MDCC in 2019 involved threats to mission In one of the cases, information was shared with a foreign entity before the MDCC had had the chance to assess the risk of mistreatment. In this instance, the GAC official cited the need to protect the safety of mission staff (see Annex H).

NSIRA acknowledges the importance of mission security and the seriousness of the conundrums that can arise when the needs of mission security and GAC’s obligations with respect to information sharing collide. Yet the charged atmosphere of a mission under threat may not be the best venue for quick decision-making involving risks of mistreatment.

Substantial Risk

Like the 2017 MD, the ACMFEA and its associated direction prohibit information sharing that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment. Neither the ACMFEA nor its direction include a definition of “substantial risk”, however, despite the centrality of this concept to the regime. A definition of substantial risk existed in both the 2011 and 2017 MD; its absence now raises concerns about its interpretation in the future.

In consultation with other departments, PS is developing a policy document that includes the same definition of substantial risk that was found in the 2011 and 2017 MD. The document also contains guidance on other requirements contained in the 2017 MD but that were omitted from the ACMFEA and its direction. When asked by NSIRA, the six departments that had been subject to the 2017 MD all stated that they intended to continue abiding by the established definition of substantial risk. This is reassuring, and should limit the potential for inconsistency between departments. Nonetheless, such a crucial definition should not be left up to individual departments to determine.

Recommendation no. 4: The definition of “substantial risk” should be codified in law or public direction.

The definition of substantial risk in the 2017 MD requires that mistreatment be “foreseeable”. As described in Annex G, DND/CAF’s assessment of foreseeability encompasses a number of factors, but a key component is that the risk of mistreatment be a “causal consequence” of DND/CAF information sharing. NSIRA observes that DND/CAF’s interpretation of foreseeability runs the risk of narrowing the definition of substantial risk and therefore the application of the 2017 MD. Given the importance of a clear and consistent understanding of “substantial risk” across departments, in future years NSIRA may review the application of the “substantial risk” threshold by DND/CAF – and other departments – to information sharing with foreign entities.

A substantial risk of mistreatment is defined as existing in cases where mistreatment is more likely than not. The definition includes a qualifier, however, that the threshold may be met at lower level of probability “where the risk is of severe harm”. This reflects a larger point that the assessment of substantial risk is not intended to be a narrowly mechanistic process of balancing probabilities. The 2017 MD notes that the Government of Canada “has no interest in actions associated with the use of torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. Knowingly associating the Government of Canada with any of these actions would damage the credibility and effectiveness of any department or agency associated with them”. When interpreting the threshold of substantial risk, departments should always bear in mind the larger purpose of Canada’s framework for sharing information with foreign entities.

In order to give life to this framework, it is incumbent on departments, first, to ensure that their employees are trained to the point where they fully understand their legal obligations, and second, to establish clear and well-developed processes that foster and facilitate compliance in the broadest sense.

6. Conclusion

This review set out to build NSIRA’s knowledge of the information sharing processes adopted by departments under the 2017 MD. NSIRA noted significant differences between the six departments reviewed with respect to the level of implementation of information sharing processes. Processes also varied widely in terms of the level of independence of decision-making.

Although departmental information sharing frameworks will continue to evolve over time, this review will provide a baseline of comparison for future developments under the ACMFEA. The review also served to identify areas of potential concern that NSIRA may revisit in future years.

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Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Disclosures of Canadian Identifying Information – CSE responses

Responses

Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Disclosures of Canadian Identifying Information – CSE responses


CSE Management Response to NSIRA Review of 2018-2019 Disclosures of Canadian Identifying Information

NSIRA delivered its classified review to the Minister of National Defence in November 2020.

Throughout NSIRA’s review of CSE’s disclosure process, CSE responded to NSIRA requests in a timely manner and offered to provide additional context and briefings to NSIRA regarding CSE processes.

Importance of independent external review

CSE values independent, external review of our activities, and we remain committed to a positive and ongoing dialogue with NSIRA and other review and oversight bodies.

This oversight frameworks allows us to deliver our important mission of foreign intelligence, cyber security and foreign cyber operations in a way that demonstrates accountability, and that builds trust and confidence with Canadians.

CSE operates within a culture of compliance, grounded in our understanding of and commitment to our legal and policy regime, and evidenced by our record of self-reporting and addressing incidents and errors that may occur.

We appreciate NSIRA and their continued work to provide Canadians with greater insight and understanding of the important work that CSE does on a regular basis to keep Canadians safe.

We accept the recommendations aimed at improving our processes, yet are concerned that the overall conclusions do not fully appreciate CSE’s commitment to, and work on protection of privacy.

Canadian Identifying Information and CSE’s Commitment to Privacy

CSE is Canada’s national lead for foreign signals intelligence and cyber operations, and the national technical authority for cybersecurity. We provide critical foreign intelligence and cyber defence services for the Government of Canada (GC). Protecting Canadian information and the privacy of Canadians is an essential part of our mission.

CSE does not direct its foreign signals intelligence activities at Canadians or anyone in Canada. The CSE Act, however, recognizes that incidental collection of Canadian communications or Canadian information may occur even when targeting only foreign entities outside Canada. CSE takes very seriously our responsibility to protect Canadian privacy interests that may occur as a result of this incidental collection.

In the event that Canadian information is incidentally acquired in foreign signals intelligence collection, CSE may include obfuscated references to Canadian individuals or organizations in intelligence reporting if those references are essential to understand the foreign intelligence.

The obfuscation of this Canadian Identifying Information (CII) in reporting represents one of many layered privacy measures that are applied at different points in CSE’s end-to-end intelligence process. These include, among others, legal and policy training and on-site support for intelligence analysts, mandatory annual privacy tests for all operational employees, data tagging and auto-deletion, strict retention limits, specific handling guidelines, escalating approvals for reporting that includes CII, compliance spot checks, and separate vetting processes for disclosing obfuscated information and taking action on intelligence reporting.

Pursuant to the Privacy Act, government clients who receive CSE foreign intelligence reports may ask for obfuscated CII to be “disclosed” to them if that information relates directly to their department’s operating program or activities. Any disclosed CII is provided solely to inform their understanding of the foreign intelligence presented in the report. Government officials may not take action, share or otherwise use the CII disclosed to them under the disclosure process.

CSE continually refines its CII disclosure process. For example, to help support audit and review, CSE implemented a requirement for government clients to provide an operational justification to support their CII disclosure requests. It is important to note, however, that this is a matter of internal policy and that the Privacy Act does not require the documentation of legal authorities before information can be collected and disclosed.

Review Recommendations

CSE is committed to continuous improvement. We know that the recommendations from independent external review play an important role in that improvement. CSE has 25 years of experience working with the Office of the CSE Commissioner and now NSIRA to help improve our processes. We thank these review bodies for their work to help build trust and confidence with Canadians.

CSE continuously refines our privacy-protection measures, including those associated with the disclosure process. Improvements made over the past decade have been informed by the recommendations made by the CSE Commissioner as part of his annual reviews of CSE’s CII disclosures. Prior to NSIRA taking over review duties, CSE had accepted and implemented 95% of the recommendations made by the CSE Commissioner. Those not adopted were duplicative or overtaken by events such as new legislation. In his final 2018-2019 review, the Commissioner confirmed that CSE’s disclosures of CII complied with the law and were done in accordance with ministerial direction.

In this NSIRA review, as with previous CSE Commissioner reviews, we appreciate and have accepted the recommendations aimed at improving our internal policies and practices.

Given the overlap in this review period between the two bodies, certain NSIRA recommendations duplicate some presented in the CSE Commissioner’s reviews. As a result, we are pleased to note that many have already been implemented at this time; other NSIRA recommendations are in the process of being implemented.

Review Findings

Throughout this CII disclosure review, CSE provided extensive feedback and context to NSIRA, and sought clarification regarding the assessment criteria used to determine adequacy or inadequacy of specific records, the vast majority of which were deemed adequate by NSIRA. Without explaining the methodology used to support the findings, we are concerned that broad generalizations based on specific aspects of certain records within a single privacy measure may leave the reader with an incorrect impression about CSE’s overall commitment to privacy protections for Canadians.

CSE’s case-by-case process for disclosing CII to authorized GC recipients is part of robust and comprehensive internal measures that protect Canadians’ privacy. We balance the sharing of our intelligence with the privacy and safety of Canadians at all times. CSE disclosure analysts receive training and follow internal policies, guidelines and standard operating procedures to guide decision making.

While committed to implementing the recommended process improvements contained in the report, CSE remains concerned by NSIRA’s overall conclusions and characterization of the disclosure process and its role in the broader privacy framework, which we have expressed to NSIRA.

Referral to Attorney General of Canada

The Minister of National Defence submitted NSIRA’s classified report to the Attorney General of Canada in January 2021, supported by a comprehensive analysis of each record identified by NSIRA in its review.

The analysis supports the view that our activities, including applying protections for the privacy of Canadians, were conducted within a robust system of accountability, including compliance with the Privacy Act.

Additional Information

Top Secret-cleared and special intelligence-indoctrinated GC clients received thousands of foreign intelligence reports via CSE’s mandate under the CSE Act. These reports corresponded to Cabinet-approved intelligence priorities and were delivered to government clients who had both the authority to receive them and the ‘need to know’ their contents.

These reports reflect a wide range of intelligence requirements, from support to Canadian military operations, espionage, terrorism and kidnappings to geostrategic concerns, cyber threats, foreign interference and global crises, among others. While only a very small percentage of these reports contain obfuscated CII, the underlying Canadian information is often essential for GC officials to understand the context of the threat and its Canadian nexus.

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Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Disclosures of Canadian Identifying Information

Context

On November 25, 2020, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) presented the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Public Safety with a classified compliance report on its review of CSE’s disclosures of Canadian identifying information (CII). In this review, NSIRA found that the CII disclosure regime lacked rigour and that its implementation may not have been in compliance with the Privacy Act. Additionally, NSIRA found that the Federal Court may not have been adequately informed about key elements of CSE’s disclosures of CII collected on the authority of warrants issued in relation to section 16 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act. Given the findings of the review, NSIRA has published its unclassified summary of the compliance report.

In carrying out its foreign intelligence mandate, CSE may incidentally acquire information about Canadians or person(s) in Canada. CII is information that could be used to identify an individual, and is normally suppressed from reporting unless Government of Canada or foreign clients request these details and are able to demonstrate that they have operational justification and legal authority to receive it.

After a thorough review of CSE’s disclosures of CII, which also involved direct engagement with other Government of Canada departments that request CII, NSIRA made 6 findings and 11 recommendations. This unclassified summary provides an overview of the CII disclosure regime, and NSIRA’s observations related to the policies, procedures, training, and the legal authorities governing it.

Publishing this summary aligns with NSIRA’s efforts at increasing transparency and being more accessible to Canadians through its work. Looking forward, NSIRA will conduct future reviews of the CII disclosure regime to ensure that its recommendations are implemented in a way that will improve the CII disclosure program and that this program is compliant with the applicable legal framework.

As per section 8(1)(a) of the NSIRA Act, independent review of CSE’s activities is a statutory requirement for NSIRA. As such, NSIRA will continue to review CSE activities and report on compliance issues if they arise.

To learn more about NSIRA’ mandate, click here.

Date of Publishing:

Executive Summary

Subsequent to the collection of foreign signals intelligence by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), any incidentally collected Canadian identifying information (CII) is suppressed in CSE’s intelligence reporting to protect the privacy of Canadians and persons in Canada. However, the Government of Canada (GC) and foreign clients of such reports can request the details of this information if they have lawful authority and operational justification.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) conducted a review of CSE’s disclosures of CII to GC clients. In reviewing disclosures containing 2,351 Canadian identifiers over a five year period, NSIRA found that 28% of requests from all clients were not sufficiently justified to warrant the release of CII. . Nevertheless, during the period under review, CSE approved 99% of these requests for CII from its domestic clients. Given this and other findings related to CSE’s internal practices, NSIRA found that CSE’s implementation of its CII disclosure regime may not be in compliance with the Privacy Act.

Moreover, NSIRA found that CSE has released CII to GC clients from its technical and operational assistance to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in relation to section 16 of the CSIS Act, in a manner that was likely not communicated to the Federal Court by CSIS.

This report is a summary of the more detailed, classified report provided to the Minister of National Defence on November 25, 2020.

Introduction

The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) may incidentally acquire information about Canadians or persons in Canada in its collection of foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT). Canadian identifying information (CII) refers to any information that can identify an individual, ranging from names to email addresses and IP addresses. CII is suppressed in intelligence reports to protect the privacy of Canadians and persons in Canada. Government of Canada (GC) and foreign clients may subsequently request the details of this information if they have lawful authority and operational justification to collect it. This information sharing regime has been in place since the 2001 enactment of CSE’s powers under the National Defence Act, and has been previously reviewed by the Office of the CSE Commissioner (OCSEC)

Following a review of CSE’s disclosures of CII, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) concluded that CSE’s implementation of its disclosure regime may not be in compliance with the Privacy Act. Therefore, pursuant to subsection 35(1) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA submitted a compliance report to the Minister of National Defence on November 25, 2020.

CSE’s disclosure regime, in place for nearly two decades, is one of the most important national security information sharing structures in the federal government, surpassing the volume of disclosures processed through the information sharing mechanism under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). Unlike CSE’s disclosure regime, information sharing processes under SCIDA have recently undergone comprehensive scrutiny and debate both in Parliament and by the public as part of the deliberation of Bill C-59.

CSE’s work results in special responsibilities to protect the privacy of Canadians. In this context, NSIRA assessed CSE’s operational structures, policies, and processes to determine the rigour of the CII disclosure regime. NSIRA found serious problems with several aspects of the governance and implementation of CSE’s CII disclosure regime. NSIRA also found that CSE discloses information collected pursuant to the authority of Federal Court issued warrants as part of its assistance to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). NSIRA believes that although the Federal Court is aware of CSIS’ disclosure of CII, the Court may not have been fully informed about the parallel disclosure process taking place at CSE. In January 2021, CSIS provided the Federal Court with a copy of NSIRA’s full, classified review, excluding information protected by solicitor-client privilege.

Methodology

As part of its review, NSIRA examined a selected sample of CII disclosures and their associated intelligence reports – initially from July 1, 2018 to July 31, 2019, though the review period was later expanded to cover July 1, 2015 to July 31, 2019 for certain types of disclosures. Over that period, CSE received requests for 3,708 Canadian identifiers. NSIRA received information about the outcome of all of these requests. Additionally, NSIRA was able to closely review requests pertaining to 2,351 identifiers.

In all, NSIRA examined electronic records, correspondence, intelligence reports, legal opinions, policies, procedures, documents pertaining to judicial proceedings, Ministerial Authorizations, and Ministerial Directives of relevance to CSE’s CII disclosure regime. CSE also responded to NSIRA’s questions throughout the review.

While this began as a review of solely CSE, it became evident that NSIRA also needed to engage with CSE’s Government of Canada clients of CII. In the spirit of its legislation, NSIRA “followed the thread” by engaging with a range of federal departments, from recurring clients of CII, such as CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), to less frequent clients, such as Innovation Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED). Through this engagement, NSIRA was able to understand the lifecycle of CII disclosures, from their origin within intelligence reporting to their eventual use by Government of Canada clients.

NSIRA also assessed CSE’s disclosures of CII arising from its assistance to CSIS in relation to section 16 of the CSIS Act. When CSE assists CSIS in that context, it is bound by the applicable Federal Court warrants’ conditions. While CSIS’ disclosures were not the subject of this review, they helped contextualize the adherence of CSE’s section 16 CII disclosures with the conditions and principles on which the Court issued the relevant warrants.

NSIRA also reviewed CSIS affidavits to the Federal Court in relation to Canadian information acquired through section 16 warrants, which served as the basis for a recent decision issued on this program by the Court (reported as 2020 FC 697). Given this window into the parallel practices and policy requirements of CSIS, NSIRA had the opportunity to contextualize CSE’s disclosures of CII arising from section 16 collection in a way that was unprecedented for an external review body.

Based on the records provided by CSE, CSIS, and other federal government entities, NSIRA made several findings and recommendations to improve the governance of CSE’s CII disclosure regime and to bring to the attention of the Federal Court important aspects of CSE’s disclosures of information acquired in relation to section 16 of the CSIS Act.

For CSE to disclose Canadians’ personal information without their consent, both CSE and the CII recipient must comply with relevant legislation, which, for the period under review, consisted of the Privacy Act and the National Defence Act:

In assessing CSE’s disclosures, NSIRA applied a two-pronged test in line with the Privacy Act requirements: the institution holding the personal information must have a disclosure authority to disclose it to another institution, and the recipient institution must have a collection authority. These thresholds derive from existing Privacy Act jurisprudence. In other words:

  • CSE’s CII clients are required to meet the section 4 collection requirement of the Privacy Act by establishing a direct and immediate relationship (with no intermediary) between the information to be collected through a CII request and their operating programs or activities.
  • On CSE’s side, its disclosures of CII had to comply with section 8 of the Privacy Act, and the National Defence Act, which was the governing statute for CSE during the review period.
  • Because the disclosure authority within the National Defence Act required CSE to protect the privacy of Canadians, NSIRA assessed whether CSE evaluated each disclosure request rigorously on its own merits, including the operational justification provided by clients, to determine whether the requests were reasonable and whether the disclosure was appropriate under the Privacy Act regime.

CSE’s internal practices

NSIRA assessed CSE’s privacy protection measures for compliance with its legal responsibilities and Ministerial Direction. NSIRA assessed whether CSE’s CII disclosures are subject to a thorough, well-documented evaluation and approval process that demonstrates each disclosure’s compliance with legal and operational requirements. Specifically, NSIRA assessed whether CSE’s clients demonstrated their legal authority to collect CII, and did so in compliance with section 4 of the Privacy Act by showing a direct and immediate relationship between their mandated activities and the requested CII.

During the period under review, CSE received requests for 3,708 identifiers from 15 domestic departments, releasing 3,671 – which represents a release rate of 99%. This release rate was also reflected in the eventual sample of disclosures selected for detailed review by NSIRA. NSIRA expected to find disclosure requests of a consistently high quality commensurate with their near-absolute approval by CSE. Nevertheless, the findings below represent several areas in which NSIRA observed shortcomings.

Employee training and documentation requirements

CSE employees generally decide whether to release CII. NSIRA did not find evidence of written guidance or training to guide employees’ assessment of the substance of disclosure requests; instead, the training materials and procedures that employees receive primarily focus on the logistical processes to release CII.

In their assessment of CII requests, CSE personnel can take a range of actions, including conducting further research into a requesting department and its mandate or communicating with the requester to obtain clarity. NSIRA found that these actions are generally not documented for requests from domestic clients, and the approved disclosures only contain the requested CII without the reasons for approving the request. NSIRA was unable to confirm that CSE personnel were taking steps to communicate with a requestor to clarify incomplete or unclear disclosure requests.

While this is not a requirement in CSE’s policies for domestic requests, NSIRA observed detailed rationales provided by personnel responsible for approving and denying CII requests originating from foreign clients for CII. NSIRA believes CSE should require employees to document their assessment of requests from domestic clients, including the rationale for their approval.

In sum, NSIRA found that CSE’s employees do not receive sufficient written training and guidance on assessing the substance of disclosure requests and are not required to document mandatory actions and assessments they make when releasing CII. NSIRA recommended that CSE require, through procedures and policy, that employees document their decision-making and rationales and train them to assess the substance of disclosure requests in light of applicable legal obligations.

Management oversight

Certain types of disclosures are elevated for review and approval at a higher level within the organization. This is another process that lacked the appropriate documentation. Based on data compiled by NSIRA, all requests for CII reviewed at this level were approved, with no documentation of the rationale behind the decision to approve the remainder.

An internal monthly compliance check is conducted to confirm that releases of CII follow sufficient justification, that only the requested CII is released, and to determine whether any procedural errors have occurred. The compliance checks reviewed by NSIRA did not contain any analysis of the disclosure requests. While CSE explained that employees are informally coached if disclosures do not meet requirements, this is not documented within the compliance checks, which provide only statistical summaries of CII disclosures.

NSIRA found that personnel responsible for approving certain CII disclosures and conducting periodic compliance checks did not document their decision-making and assessment of requests. NSIRA recommended that similar to employees at the working level, CSE management must document their decision-making and rationales.

CSE’s assessment of CII disclosure requests

CSE’s CII disclosure request form requires that the requestor state an applicable legal authority for collecting the information. NSIRA observed requests where this information was not provided. In this context, NSIRA expected that CSE would follow up with requestors or assure itself through its own assessment that the requestor had the appropriate legal authority for collecting CII. NSIRA found no evidence that this process was taking place.

NSIRA used its ability to follow the thread of a disclosure and engaged some of CSE clients for CII regarding their legal authority to collect Canadians’ personal information. Where these departments had not indicated a legal authority to receive CII, NSIRA inquired directly with them about their legal authorities, receiving detailed legal assessments prepared in response to NSIRA’s questions. NSIRA found no documented evidence that CSE had similarly assured itself of the clients’ legal authorities at the time of disclosure.

As the custodian of incidentally collected CII, CSE has the responsibility to assure itself and document that both a collection and disclosure authority exist before sharing it with third party clients.

Next to a legal authority, the second key component of a disclosure request is the recipient’s operational justification for collecting the CII. A demonstrable operational nexus is required to justify a requester’s collection of CII in line with the Privacy Act regime.

NSIRA found that CSIS, the RCMP, and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) generally demonstrated a clear link between the intelligence reporting and associated CII to their mandated activities, with some exceptions. This was a result of the strong operational justifications provided proactively by these clients, and does not reflect a more rigorous process on CSE’s end. Disclosures to these departments comprised approximately half of NSIRA’s sample.

CSE has accepted operational justifications provided by these and other clients that NSIRA found to be inadequate. In these cases, the clients’ justifications pertained to CII that was not demonstrably related to their mandate or operations.

From the sample of all disclosures reviewed by NSIRA, we found 69% to be justified, 28% to be insufficiently justified to warrant the release of CII, 2% that could not be evaluated, and 1% that CSE denied. Nevertheless, within this sample, CSE had approved these disclosure requests at a 99% rate.

CSE also released additional personal information to clients beyond that which was requested and explained this to be a standard practice. For example, NSIRA observed cases where CSE disclosed Canadians’ names and other personal information even when the recipient only asked CSE for a company’s identity. NSIRA observed other types of scenarios where CSE disclosed more identifiers than requested.

In sum, NSIRA found that CSE has not sufficiently assessed the legal authorities invoked by its clients and recommended that CSE and these clients obtain legal advice from the Department of Justice to determine the extent of their legal authority to collect CII. NSIRA further found that CSE’s implementation of its CII disclosure regime may not have been in compliance with the Privacy Act framework and recommended that CSE cease disclosing CII to clients other than CSIS, RCMP, and CBSA until it addresses the findings and recommendations contained in NSIRA’s review.

CSE’s governance of the disclosure regime

Many of the systemic issues presented in NSIRA’s review arise from CSE’s CII disclosure regime governance. CSE develops its internal policies, procedures, and legal assessments to which its disclosure clients are generally not privy. CSE’s existing arrangements with its clients govern operational issues such as security standards, information handling and system access. However, at an institutional level, NSIRA has not found a consistent understanding among CSE’s CII disclosure clients of the legal requirements underlying this practice.

A more transparent governance structure would allow all parties to understand and formally acknowledge at an institutional level the legal and operational requirements behind disclosing and collecting CII. It is not sufficient for CSE to manage the regime with its clients not privy to the policies, procedures, and legal requirements that underlie it.

NSIRA found that CSE’s governance of the CII disclosure regime does not foster an environment where its clients can take equal responsibility for CII disclosures. NSIRA recommended that CSE work with the Department of Justice and the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat to establish Information Sharing Agreements with its regular domestic clients.

CSE’s disclosure of CII collected through its assistance to CSIS

Throughout the review, NSIRA encountered reporting and associated disclosures that pertained to activities of foreign persons within Canada. As CSE is prohibited from directing its activities at such persons, NSIRA submitted a series of questions and received briefings on the subject. NSIRA learned that CSE discloses CII collected as part of its assistance to CSIS in relation to section 16 of the CSIS Act.

Under section 16 of the CSIS Act, CSIS may assist the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence by collecting foreign intelligence within Canada in relation to Canada’s defence or international affairs. In turn, CSIS can apply to the Federal Court for a warrant, under section 21 of the CSIS Act, to obtain judicial authorization for intrusive collection powers in support of the section 16 investigation. Subsequently, CSIS may request CSE assistance if it does not have the tools or capacity to carry out this collection. CSE’s assistance takes the form of developing tools and techniques, intercepting target communications, decryption, report writing, and translation.

In its assistance to CSIS, CSE must respect the legal authorities and limitations imposed on CSIS by law and Federal Court warrants. In its documented requests for CSE assistance, CSIS does not explicitly request that CSE disclose the CII collected under warrant. Such disclosures are also absent from internal CSE plans that set out CSE’s support parameters. At the same time, both agencies insist that CSE can disclose such CII using its regular disclosure policies and procedures.

The practice of handling CII incidentally collected pursuant to section 16-related warrants has been the subject of ongoing treatment by the Federal Court. CSIS has described its own practices to the Court, including detailed summaries of how section 16 information is collected, its processing for intelligence reporting, and the rigorous disclosure regime associated with this reporting. CSIS also noted, in less detail and with omissions, some aspects of CSE’s parallel disclosure of CII collected through its assistance to CSIS under these warrants.

Overall, the stringent practices described by CSIS to the Court do not present a complete picture. For instance, CSIS’s limited distribution of section 16 intelligence reports and associated CII is not mirrored in CSE’s wider release of this information. Additionally, the senior approval levels that CSIS has in place for disclosing information about Canadian officials are also not reflected in CSE’s practices. In fact, CSE does not have a policy on how to treat Canadian officials’ information through its assistance mandate, and generally releases it at the working level. Further, CSE personnel are not generally aware that the information they are releasing originates from section 16 collection, and its associated Federal Court warrants and conditions. Moreover, CSIS has communicated to the Court that its own disclosure practice includes an assessment of a disclosure request by the operational branch responsible for the warrant, while CSE discloses such CII independent of CSIS operational branches.

In recent testimony before Parliament, CSE was asked how it operationalizes its assistance mandate. In its response, CSE stated that information collected under assistance is segregated, returned to CSIS, and belongs to CSIS, emphasizing that CSE effectively acts as an agent of CSIS in supporting section 16 activities. NSIRA is of the view that this is not a complete representation of the lifecycle of information collected by CSE in its assistance. By approving CSE’s section 16 intelligence reports, CSIS effectively releases ownership of this information to CSE, which was not conveyed to the Federal Court by CSIS in its affidavits detailing the reporting and use of section 16 information.

CSE’s treatment and dissemination of this information differs from the stringent standards communicated to the Court by CSIS, particularly when it pertains to Canadian public officials and other sensitive groups. NSIRA believes that fully describing the CII disclosure process during warrant applications is necessary to support the process of imposing any terms and conditions advisable in the public interest, as contemplated by paragraph 21(4)(f) of the CSIS Act.

Given the findings of the review, NSIRA recommended that the Federal Court be fully informed of CSE’s disclosure practices and that, in the interim, CSE cease disclosing CII incidentally collected under the authority of federal court warrants related to section 16 investigations.

Conclusion

NSIRA’s findings and observations over the course of this review indicate that CSE’s implementation of its disclosure regime may not be in compliance with its obligations under the Privacy Act. Throughout this review, CSE has defended practices that NSIRA believes do not reflect a commitment to rigorous implementation of the Privacy Act. Finally, CSE has released CII as part of its assistance to CSIS in a manner that contradicts the procedures communicated to the Federal Court.

Accordingly, NSIRA made a number of recommendations as outlined above, to improve the governance of CSE’s CII disclosure regime and to bring to the attention of the Federal Court important aspects of CSE’s disclosures of information acquired in relation to section 16 of the CSIS Act.

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Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019

Completed Reviews

Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019


Backgrounder

In 2011, the Government of Canada implemented a general framework for Addressing Risks of Mistreatment in Sharing Information with Foreign Entities. The framework aimed to establish a coherent and consistent approach across government when sharing and receiving information with Foreign Entities. Following this, Ministerial Direction was issued to applicable departments in 2011 on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities, and then again in 2017 on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities.

On July 13, 2019, the Avoiding Complicity Act came into force. This Act codifies and enshrines Canada’s commitments in respect to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Canada’s international legal obligations on prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment.

On September 4, 2019, pursuant to section 3 of the Act, the Governor in Council (GiC) issued written directions to the Deputy Heads of the following 12 departments and agencies: Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Public Safety Canada (PS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Transport Canada (TC).

The GiC issued directions focused on three aspects of handling information when interacting with a foreign entity: the disclosure of information, the requesting of information, and the use of any information received.

Pursuant to section 7 of the Act, every Deputy Head having received direction must, before March 1 of each year, submit to the appropriate Minister a report regarding the implementation of those directions during the previous calendar year. Following this, every Deputy Head must, as soon as feasible after submitting the report, make a version of it available to the public.

Date of Publishing:

Executive Summary

The Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (Avoiding Complicity Act or Act) and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual as a result of information exchanged between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated or not. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. This review covers the implementation of the directions sent to 12 departments and agencies from their date of issuance, September 4, 2019, to the end of the previous calendar year, December 31, 2019. It was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Act.

While this was the inaugural annual review under the NSIRA Act, it builds upon previous work in this area undertaken by NSIRA and its predecessor SIRC. NSIRA’s review on the 2017 Ministerial Direction on information sharing with Foreign Entities is an example. The results from this previous review were sent to applicable departments in July 2020. NSIRA is building upon this previous review and strongly supports the findings and recommendations within it. As of the date of this report, departmental responses have not been received regarding the recommendations provided in NSIRA’s July 2020 Ministerial Direction review.

(U) It was essential to ensure that both NSIRA and the departments being reviewed met their obligations under the Avoiding Complicity Act and the NSIRA Act. The approach used to gather information during a global pandemic was purposely designed for this first and unique review period.

To capture a complete view on the departmental implementation, NSIRA requested information that related directly to every department’s specific obligations under the Act and the directions. The responses and associated information captured departmental activities related to the Act during the review period, and what procedures, policies, tools, etc. (frameworks) were leveraged to support these activities. NSIRA believes that having a robust framework is an essential part of an effective implementation of the directions departments have received.

Beyond the specific requirements of implementation, the information provided by the departments also helped to identify gaps, considerations for best practices, and the work departments have undertaken since the review period to build and formalize their frameworks. This information and knowledge will help set up the foundation for future reviews and assist efforts on creating consistent implementation across departments. While many of the issues discussed in this report go beyond the specific requirements of the directions, their consideration is critical to the overall improvement of the implementation process and how departments ultimately support the Act. No case studies were undertaken for this review. However, the information gathered has helped establish a baseline for overarching issues the community is facing. Building on this, future reviews will begin to examine specific sharing framework challenges and questions and look closely at specific cases and departmental legal opinions to guide review findings.

While NSIRA was pleased with the considerable efforts made by many departments new to the Avoiding Complicity Act in building up their supporting frameworks, it was clear during this review that departments are employing very different approaches to guide their information handling activities. The responses received demonstrate various inconsistencies across the departments. Having a consistent and coordinated approach when addressing the concerns related the Act is not a requirement for implementation, however, NSIRA believes that there is value in such an approach. And while departments will always require unique aspects in their sharing frameworks to address the unique characteristics of their mandates and activities, to improve the implementation process, a goal all involved likely have, the identification and sharing of best practices is critical.

For example, determining the best means for having a unified approach when engaging with foreign entities of concern or ensuring that an information sharing activity is consistently evaluated for risk by all departments. The recommendations provided on these issues in this review capture what NSIRA believes to be important concerns and considerations for supporting and improving departmental implementation.

Additionally, as the directives received under the Act do not describe the specific means by which departments ‘implement’ them, it is incumbent on the community to ensure that they have sufficiently robust frameworks and programs in place to fully support an assertion of implementation. Therefore, the information gathered during this review went beyond a strict assessment of implementation, but also considered the aspects required to better support this implementation. Going forward, this approach will help establish the foundation for subsequent reviews. Drawing on the findings and concerns identified here, NSIRA will continue to consider aspects that will ultimately improve underlying frameworks, thereby supporting an improved implementation of the Act across the community.

Authorities

This review was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act, which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity Act.

Introduction

Focus of the Act

In the same spirit as the Ministerial Direction (MD) that preceded it, the Avoiding Complicity Act and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual due to the exchange of information between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. The Act also aims to limit the use of information received from a foreign entity that may have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual. While the previous MD guided the activities of a selection of Canada’s security and intelligence departments, the Act broadened this scope to capture all departments whose interactions with foreign entities included information exchanges where such a concern may apply.

The focus of the Act is to ensure departments take the necessary steps during their information sharing activities to avoid contributing in any way to the mistreatment of an individual. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. There is an expectation that each department will satisfy these requirements by leveraging departmentally established mechanisms and procedures, or frameworks that will allow each department to confidently demonstrate how it has responded to its responsibilities under the Act.

During the first year that the Act was in force, written directions using nearly identical language were sent to the Deputy Heads of 12 departments. In regard to disclosure, the directions read as follows:
“If the disclosure of information to a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that Department officials do not disclose the information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.”

With respect to requesting information, the directions state:
“If the making of a request to a foreign entity for information would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that Department officials do not make the request for information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.”

Lastly, as it relates to the use of information, the directions indicate:
“The Deputy Head must ensure that information that is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity is not used by the Department

  • (a) in any way that creates a substantial risk of further mistreatment;
  • (b) as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding; or
    (c) in any way that deprives someone of their rights or freedoms, unless the Deputy Head or, in exceptional circumstances, a senior official designated by the Deputy Head determines that the use of the information is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant personal injury and authorizes the use accordingly.”

At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated or not. This determination is done on a case-by-case basis. Each department is responsible for making these determinations as it applies to its activities. Following the outcome of a department’s determination of these important questions, cases may be approved, denied, or elevated to the Deputy Head for consideration. For the latter cases, this then results in additional reporting requirements for the Deputy Head. Throughout this process, there is also a requirement to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and limitations of use of all information being handled.

Review Objectives

After the Avoiding Complicity Act came into force in July 2019, the Governor in Council’s written directions were sent to each applicable department in September 2019. The period for this year’s review is September 4, 2019 to December 31, 2019. The short timeframe (approximately 4 months) associated with this year’s review means that departments are being assessed, in large part, on what they would already have had in place to address risks of mistreatment associated with information sharing, or what they were able to implement in a four-month window. NSIRA is cognizant that for the departments that were not previously subject to the 2017 MD on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities, the timeframe to implement the written directions was somewhat limited, as it would have been challenging to create and operationalize new procedures such that they would be reflected in the department’s activities during the period being reviewed.

While it was essential to ensure that both NSIRA and the departments being reviewed met their obligations, these challenges were kept in mind when evaluating the objectives for this first review. Given these considerations, the objectives of this year’s review were to determine whether:

  • departments had fully implemented the directions received under the Act in conformity with the obligations set out therein;
  • departments had established and operationalized frameworks that sufficiently enabled them to meet the obligations set out in the Act and directions; and,
  • there was consistency in implementation across applicable departments.

Methodology and assessment focus

To capture a complete view of the departmental implementation of the Act, NSIRA constructed a series of questions related directly to every department’s obligations under the Act and the directions. The responses and associated information captured what specific activities took place during the review period and what departmental frameworks were leveraged to adequately support these activities.

The information provided by the departments also helped to identify gaps, considerations for best practices, and the work departments have undertaken to build and formalize their frameworks to meet their obligations under the Act and directions. The information provided and the knowledge gained will help set up the foundation for future reviews and help create consistent implementation across departments.

The method used to gather information during a global pandemic was designed for this first and unique review period. We believe it allowed departments to quickly and efficiently indicate both whether the directions had been implemented, and what frameworks, processes, and policies had been leveraged or put in place.

Responses to many of the RFI questions were simply yes/no answers. Often, answers were dependent on what information handling activities took place with foreign entities by the department during the review period. As such, a number of questions could be returned with ‘not applicable’, and this was an acceptable response. Many of the questions were related to specific and easily defined requirements under the Act and its associated directions, e.g. ‘was a report submitted to the Minister?’ or ‘Did the Deputy Minister inform the applicable bodies of all their decision made under the act?’.

Other questions were designed to capture the details of the underlying processes that supported a department’s implementation, i.e. a department may indicate that they ensured no substantial risk of mistreatment was present in any of their information sharing activities, but how did they support this claim? Likewise, for an assertion that a possible substantial risk of mistreatment had been mitigated, what was in place that allowed a department to make this assertion? Therefore, this series of questions required sufficiently detailed responses to fully capture what a department had in place that allowed it to confidently state that it has met its implementation obligations under the Act and the issued directions.

Finally, a portion of the questions was intended to capture the level of uniformity in implementation across departments. This includes such things as country/entity assessments, triage practices, and record keeping. Much of this information will also help with recommendations going forward. This multi-faceted approach resulted in three main areas being evaluated to assess implementation for this review period and help set the groundwork for future reviews.

  • Departments have clear and comprehensive frameworks, policies, and guidelines such that they can demonstrate how they have fully implemented the directions under the Act.
  • All reporting requirements associated with both the Act and its applicable directions have been met.
  • Differences or gaps associate with areas such as country/entities assessments, record keeping, case triage, etc., such that consistent implementation across departments would be challenging.

Summary of the results table

The table in Annex A captures a summary of both the departmental responses to the implementation questions and NSIRA’s assessment regarding these responses. The assessment was based on the associated details provided by departments in the context of the specific information requested. As explained above, many of the responses were returned as not applicable (n/a). Since many implementation requirements are connected to specific activities, the absence of such activities would mean that the requirement does not come into play. The best example of this for the current review is the absence of any Deputy Minister level determinations. All 12 departments indicated that they did not have any cases referred to the Deputy Minister level for determination. All additional reporting requirements associated with this level of decision were not applicable and thus considered satisfied.

If a specific requirement was not met, it was flagged. The relatively few instances of this were connected with departments not meeting certain reporting obligations under the Act. In all cases, the department involved pre-identified these missing requirements and indicated that efforts were underway to address them.

The concerns and findings captured in the table (and others) are discussed subsequently. A concern was flagged in two situations: where there was an uncertainty associated with a department’s ability to support their implementation requirements; and cross-cutting issues related to general aspects of all of the frameworks described, both of which led to the findings and recommendations proposed.

Findings and Recommendations

Realities of Implementation for 2019

A challenge for departments for this first review was associated with one of the assessment items listed above, i.e. whether they had established frameworks to demonstrate how they supported the implementation of the directions they received.

With the Avoiding Complicity Act coming into force in July 2019, it was not feasible that departments would create and stand-up new frameworks for information exchanges in time for the period being reviewed. Although the Act did specify several Deputy Heads that were to receive directions, it only included those who received the previous 2017 MD. The remaining new departments received their directions in September 2019. Regardless of this two-month difference, each department would have been required to rely on, to some extent, existing procedures when handling information sharing with foreign entities during the review period.

This put the departments that had previously formalized policies and processes at an advantage when implementing the directions. For those departments who were not subject to the previous 2017 MD on information sharing, NSIRA considered how they leveraged and adjusted what was already in place to respond to their new responsibilities under the Act. What we then expected to see, for all departments, was what subsequent steps were taken during the review period and afterwards, to either adjust or create frameworks to better meet implementation requirements going forward. NSIRA noted that in response to questions on frameworks for handling information and mitigating risk, several of the departments new to the considerations of the Act provided extensive detail on their efforts and progress on building out their frameworks to support the directives. References to having these frameworks formalized over the subsequent year were also encouraging.

Finding no. 1: NSIRA found that several departments, new to the considerations of the Act, described considerable progress being made during the review period and afterwards to build out formalized frameworks to support implementation.

Importance of establishing operational framework

As discussed, having fully established operational frameworks in place for this review period may not have been feasible for the departments that did not previously have processes to support their activities. This, however, did not exempt a department from the requirements of implementation. Each department was still expected to leverage what it currently had in place to properly address the concerns associated with the Avoiding Complicity Act. Furthermore, there was a logical follow-on expectation that departments would take subsequent steps to build out formal frameworks to address any perceived gaps to support the implementation of the Act going forward if necessary.

After reviewing the responses received, NSIRA is concerned that departments with minimal information sharing activities taking place during their operations have yet to address the necessity of having a robust framework in place, regardless of how often that framework is leveraged. For example, although PS and TC may primarily act as facilitators or coordinators for information exchanges on specific programs, they are still interacting with foreign entities, and therefore are required to fully assess their interactions with a foreign entity in this regard.

If a department without a formal framework assesses that it has few or no cases associated with the Act, then it may believe it is adequately positioned to address any sharing concerns should they arise. This, however, is not the case. Even single instances of information exchange in which the concerns of the Act may apply require a framework to support it properly. In many cases, it will be the framework itself that properly identifies whether a sharing activity raises concerns under the Act. If there is no formal process in place, then this identification becomes problematic. Simply saying that there are no cases or activities associated with the Act is not sufficient. That determination can only be made after a sharing activity is scrutinized through the lens of a robust framework. Going forward, all departments who receive directions should demonstrate a formal framework that ensures all information sharing activities are adequately evaluated against the considerations of the Act.

Finding no. 2: NSIRA found that departments conducting minimal information exchanges with foreign entities have not yet fully addressed the importance of having an official information sharing framework in place.

Recommendation no. 1: NSIRA recommends that all departments in receipt of directions under the Act have an official framework that ensures they can fully support their implementation of the directions.

Community coordination and best practices

While departmental coordination and the sharing of best practices are not a requirement of the Avoiding Complicity Act or the directions, NSIRA considered such an approach’s value. What became clear during this first review was that every department employs a very different framework to guide their information sharing activities with foreign entities. This is to be expected to some extent, given the different mandates, sharing requirements, and areas of focus associated with each department. However, these differences are also a reflection of the independent, internal development that has taken place for the different frameworks being used. While the departments receiving directions under the Act do interact on this subject to some extent, to date, based on the responses provided, it appears that the majority of the work done by the departments to build supporting frameworks to address their responsibilities associated with the Act have been done so independently. There was little to no overlap with how departments described the various aspects of their frameworks, even amongst the departments subject to the earlier MD on this issue.

There would be value in departments collectively identifying the key aspects common or required in all information exchanges with foreign entities and then working together to craft best practices, irrespective of what a department currently has in place. This process should draw on all available resources to make this determination. Each department can then turn to their existing frameworks to consider where and how they can be adjusted to match this community-agreed upon ideal. This is not to say that aspects of what a department already has in place in their framework will not ultimately be seen as the best practice. Several departments do have robust sharing frameworks in place, and these will contribute significantly to this exercise. However, arriving at this determination independently will provide an additional level of confidence.

Department-specific challenges, of course, cannot be ignored. In fact, they will weigh in strongly on such a conversation. Departments share information under their mandates for various reasons, and this will mean that coordination on certain aspects of a sharing framework may not be possible. However, this needs to be evaluated. It is important that what already exists, or what is hard change, does not unduly influence what may be best. This approach will create uniformity (where possible) across the community and provide a starting point for ‘must haves’ for each department to evaluate their existing processes against.

The Public Safety Information Sharing Coordination Group (ISCG) was established to support departments on information sharing. As such, it is in an ideal position to help mitigate issues arising from the lack of coordination. Leading such efforts would build on the work already being done by this group. During recent discussions with NSIRA, the ISCG indicated that the tracking of lessons learned and the sharing of best practices was not yet routine. Going forward, there would be value in a more coordinated effort when departments are updating/changing their framework. Ensuring that this coordination takes place will require support and leadership by senior-level officials. This will help in sharing best practices once identified, and establish more consistent approaches across departments.

Finding no. 3: NSIRA found that the differences and variability in departmental frameworks demonstrate a previous lack of coordination across the community and a need to identify best practices.

Recommendation no. 2: NSIRA recommends that departments coordinate to identify best practices for all essential components of information sharing frameworks and that the ISCG is leveraged to ensure these practices are shared where possible across the community to support the implementation of the Act.

Framework application inconsistency

A series of questions in this review was related to aspects of consistency in how departments apply their frameworks. From this series, a comparison was made on how many times an information sharing/use event triggered an evaluation of any kind against the considerations of the Avoiding Complicity Act, versus how many of these triaged cases were elevated or referred up for decision. The results helped gauge two important aspects of a framework: One, the threshold requirements, i.e. how often a sharing activity triggers an evaluation of any kind; and two, the decision making power given to the operators who are initially handling these activities.

The feedback and the responses received demonstrate potential inconsistencies in both aspects across departments. For example, several departments indicated zero cases as being triaged/evaluated under the concerns of the Act during the review period, yet also specified that they are involved in regular information sharing or, specified that no information received from foreign entities was derived from mistreatment. These responses appear to be inconsistent as it would be problematic to participate in information sharing or to make such mistreatment determinations without the activity being evaluated on some level.

Other departments indicated a larger number of cases as initial triaged/evaluated, but also indicated that none of them were elevated in their decision making process for higher-level decisions. This would seem to suggest that all determinations were being made at the operational level. Such a result puts significant weight on the operator and the initial assessment tools they are leveraging if they are making all determinations independently. This reinforces the importance of a robust framework to help make these determinations, as previously indicated in Finding no. 2. As a result of these differences, potential challenges arise on accurately assessing the volume of cases being handled by departments, the tracking of those cases deemed to present a substantial risk, those which can be mitigated for, and those where the risk was not found to be substantial or even present.

These responses may result from how each department defines a ‘case’ or how it records a case, or they may be a result of differences in how a department’s decision-making process is leveraged. NSIRA’s concern is that these differences may indicate an inconsistency in application thresholds at different departments. As such, the following results were viewed as a potential issue based on the responses received:

  • if a department was involved in any kind for information exchange with a foreign entity during the review period, but did not indicate that any cases were formally triaged/evaluated; or
  • if there was a significant number of cases triaged, but none were elevated to a higher level for determination.

Such results do not necessarily indicate a problem as aspects of a framework may be able to account for this, however, looking further into how and why the department’s framework produced these outcomes is important. Future reviews will be able to do this. Consistent initial steps for information sharing activities, including triage/evaluation thresholds and documentation, are critical to the effective application of a framework, and ultimately to identifying best practices.

Finding no. 4: NSIRA found that there are inconsistencies in the application of existing sharing frameworks between departments, specifically concerning information evaluation thresholds, and decisions being elevated for senior level determinations,

Recommendation no. 3: NSIRA recommends that departments establish consistent thresholds for triggers in their information sharing frameworks, including initial evaluations against the concerns of the Act, when a case is to be elevated in the decision process, and how this is documented.

Country and entity assessments

A key recommendation of NSIRA’s previous review on information sharing related to the country/entity assessments being used by departments to inform their decision making process when sharing or using information with a foreign entity. While the use of country/entity assessments is not a required aspect of implementing the directions under the Act, NSIRA continues to support this tool as an important aspect of any sharing framework. In its previous review, NSIRA determined that having a firm grasp on the human rights situation, as well as any other pertinent information associated with a country/entity, was essential to making an informed decision on whether there should be concerns, caveats, or limitations when handling information with that country/entity. Moreover, having such information captured to ensure all departments consistently approach these countries/entities is critical. At the time of the previous review, the following recommendation was made:

  • a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including as standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and
  • to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.

It is important to note that there has been no formal response from departments on this previous recommendation as of the date of this report. Furthermore, during this report, two departments continue to raise concerns with NSIRA’s stance on this issue during the consultation process. While NSIRA continues to support this recommendation, as explained below, further discussions with departments on how to approach this matter may be warranted, specifically on the distinction between how this recommendation may apply to a foreign country/entity vs a specific foreign partner a department may be dealing with.

Based on the responses provided on this topic for the current review period, there is still inconsistency in this area. While almost all departments indicated that country/entity assessments were a standard part of their framework, the responses also indicate differences in which country assessments are used, how they are leveraged, and who is responsible for updating them. For example, several departments rely on their own in-house created assessments, while others leverage the assessments created by Global Affairs Canada and others. While departments who indicated that they are leveraging country/entity assessment tools in their process also indicated that these assessments captured human rights concerns, this has yet to be independently evaluated. NSIRA is concerned that these differences could result in different approaches/stances being taken by departments when dealing with the same foreign entity. While the country/entity assessments tools themselves are not necessarily in question, the fact that every department is not leveraging or does not have access to all useful or applicable information is.

NSIRA remains of the view that having a consistent stance on all countries and entities when implementing the requirements of the Act is important. Issues such as mistreatment and human rights should not be decided at a departmental level, but on a whole-of-government level. While mindful of classification levels, ensuring all departments have access to the same relevant information associated with a foreign country/entity is critical to making an informed decision. Due to the nature of their work, departments may be privy to unique information on a country/entity, some or all of which can be shared. This would lead to fully informed assessments that allow for a consistent approach when dealing with any country/entity. In addition to improving duplication of effort in this area by departments, NSIRA continues to see standardized country and entity assessments, which can be accessed and contributed to by all departments, as key to moving toward a more consistent and effective implementation of the Act across the community

Finding no. 5: NSIRA found a lack of unification and standardization in the country and entity assessments being leveraged by departments, resulting in inconsistencies in approach/stance by the community when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern related to the Act.

Recommendation no. 4: NSIRA recommends that departments identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach by departments when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern under the Act.

Conclusion

While aspects of implementation can be easily quantified and evaluated e.g. reporting requirements to a Minister, others, which support implementation are more difficult to measure, e.g.:

  • What does a sufficiently robust framework for assessing and mitigating risk when sharing with a foreign entity look like?
  • Does this depend on the specific requirements and activities of the department; or,
  • Are there steps that should always be involved when vetting a foreign entity under the considerations of the Act?

Measuring and weighing the answers to such questions is challenging. They are more nuanced, and can’t be as easily quantified. Regardless, they must be considered and addressed. Drawing on the considerations and concerns identified in this review will help departments to ask the questions that will improve their underlying frameworks with the following goals in mind:

  • To identify the essential/key elements that need to be a part of any framework for it to address the concerns associated with the Avoiding Complicity Act sufficiently; and,
  • To have all identified best practices implemented as consistently as possible across departments.

Future reviews will push towards these goals by seeking answers to those questions above. By looking more closely at specific case studies, departmental legal opinions, items of inconsistency, and the departmental frameworks that are already demonstrating best practices that should be shared. Ultimately the results of such efforts will contribute to improving the implementation of the Act across the community.

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National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Annual Report 2019

Backgrounder

The report focuses on NSIRA’s initial review work from July 2019 through December 2019, and also includes discussion of previously unreleased reviews by predecessor organizations, namely the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner (OCSEC). We discuss Canada’s complex, interwoven approach to national security through the cross-cutting themes of intelligence collection, safeguarding, information sharing, and intelligence informed actions.  Highlights include:

  • Legal issues regarding new technologies;
  • Ongoing concerns related to the duty of candour owed by CSIS to the Federal Court;
  • Issues concerning CSIS’s use of the polygraph;
  • CSE privacy protection practices; and,
  • Inconsistent approaches to how Canada avoids mistreatment when sharing information abroad.

NSIRA’s mandate also brings together the investigation of complaints related to national security made by members of the public. The report describes issues related to complaints from 2019, emphasizing our commitment to modernizing the complaints investigation process to ensure greater timeliness and accessibility. We also raise concerns concerning gaps in the current legal framework for “whistleblowing as it relates to the national security community.”

Our annual report discusses our organization’s underlining values, particularly our desire to be more accessible in our work, reach a broader audience, and have our review priorities and complaints process informed by engaging communities who feel they are affected by national security and intelligence activities.

 “We hope that our annual report will both inform Canadians as to how their national security agencies protect us and give them confidence that strong accountability and transparency mechanisms are in place and working as intended. We look forward to engaging Canadians on the report’s findings.”

–The Honourable Dr. Ian Holloway, P.C., C.D., Q.C. (NSIRA Interim Chair)—

Date of Publishing:

Dear Prime Minister,

On behalf of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, it is my pleasure to present you with our first annual report. Consistent with subsection 38(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, the report includes information about our activities in 2019, as well as our findings and recommendations. Pursuant to transitional provisions 12(1) and 12(2) of the National Security Act, 2017, this report also includes information that our predecessor organizations, the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, had not yet reported on publicly.

In accordance with paragraph 52(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, our report was prepared after consultation with the deputy heads concerned in an effort to ensure that it does not contain information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations, or is information that is subject to solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries or to litigation privilege.

Yours sincerely,

The Honourable Dr. Ian Holloway, P.C., C.D., Q.C.
Acting Chair
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Committee message

We are proud to present the first annual report of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) for work undertaken in 2019. Our enabling legislation requires us to present a report to Parliament each year with respect to our activities during the previous calendar year, including any reviews not yet made public by our predecessor organizations, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner. In doing so, our report discusses our activities within a framework that addresses the complex, multi-agency and interwoven approach to national security that exists in Canada.

We are primarily a retrospective body, meaning we generally look at activities that have already taken place and make conclusions regarding their compliance with the law and ministerial direction. We also examine the reasonableness and necessity of a department’s exercise of its powers. We are very conscious of the need for timely access to our findings by parliamentarians and all Canadians. NSIRA is committed to releasing redacted reviews as soon as possible after they are provided to the appropriate minister(s). We hope that our annual report will be a mechanism to reflect on broader trends and themes that cut across the full range of our work. We feel strongly that this approach is embedded in our mandate, and is supported by the government’s own push for greater transparency in national security.

Openness also means deepening the dialogue with Canadians on national security. We have broadened our exposure to a diverse set of viewpoints to ensure our review plan reflects the concerns and priorities of all Canadians. This is particularly important in the context of anti-racism movements that are taking place around the world. We hope that engagement with diverse communities will help our organization learn about how we can best contribute to the fight against racism and discrimination in the national security and intelligence field. Engagement with Canadian experts, with cultural communities and with civil society has already begun as we build our social media presence and our capacity to organize videoconferences and in-person meetings. We have met several stakeholders in Ottawa, Victoria, Toronto and Calgary — and more activities are planned in the year ahead. Internationally, we work with and share our experiences with parallel review bodies as a member of the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council, which is made up of our partners in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

We are mindful of the need to avoid overlap with other review bodies and to make the best use of resources within the national security community that are in place to facilitate our work. We know that for many departments and agencies, external review is a new endeavour that will take time to adjust to. We are very pleased with the level of cooperation and support we are seeing. We have developed and shared our three-year review plan, which we hope will clarify our work priorities and give the organizations that we will be reviewing time to adjust and prepare. Our legislation is unequivocal as to our access to information: we are entitled to timely access to anything that is in the possession or under the control of a department in relation to our reviews (except only Cabinet confidences). The integrity of our work demands this access. Our public reports will accordingly record any shortcomings in this regard. To avoid duplication and to enhance the quality of Canada’s system of national security accountability, we are committed to cooperating with other oversight and review bodies, including the Intelligence Commissioner’s Office, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP and the Office of the Auditor General of Canada.

NSIRA also brings together under one roof the investigation of complaints related to national security that are made by members of the public. We have a mandate to investigate complaints into the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment and national security-related activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Additionally, we can investigate complaints arising from an individual whose security clearance is denied or revoked, as well as referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission and certain matters under the Citizenship Act. We are confident that this consolidation of complaints investigations will help to ensure that Canadians’ national security-related grievances can be addressed with the greatest degree of consistency, quality and timeliness possible. A particular task we are undertaking over the next year is to improve the efficiency of the complaints process.

We would be remiss if we did not address the unique and challenging environment facing us all at this moment. The COVID-19 pandemic has had far-reaching consequences the world over that we are perhaps only beginning to understand. Throughout much of 2020, NSIRA staff have been working from home, with minimal access to the office and, therefore, minimal access to classified physical and electronic documents that must be kept within a secure space. We are very proud of the extraordinary work of our staff, who have kept momentum alive during this difficult period, and who continue to put measures in place to enhance our organizational adaptability. We also expect that organizations that are subject to our review and complaints investigations will continue to allocate personnel to these vital functions, and continue to prioritize national security accountability as they too adjust to an ever-changing situation.

At this time, we would like to express our gratitude to three NSIRA members whose terms concluded this year: the Honourable Pierre Blais, the Honourable L. Yves Fortier, and Murray Rankin, NSIRA’s first Chair. Their collegiality and leadership during a time of transition were greatly appreciated, and their contributions to national security accountability in Canada continue to be deeply felt.

We are honoured to have been chosen to be the first members of NSIRA. We are committed to providing meaningful findings and recommendations on the extent to which Canada’s national security community is complying with the law and on the necessity and reasonableness of its actions. We look forward to the challenge facing us in this increasingly complex environment.

The Honourable Dr. Ian Holloway, P.C., C.D., Q.C. (Acting Chair)
The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Professor Craig Forcese
The Honourable Marie-Lucie Morin, P.C., C.M.
The Honourable Pierre Blais, P.C. (Member until May 2020)
The Honourable L. Yves Fortier, P.C., C.C., O.Q., Q.C. (Member until October 2020)
Murray Rankin, Q.C. (Member and Chair until September 2020)

Executive summary

  • Information pertaining to the transition from the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), corporate milestones, organizational values and objectives, and other relevant elements, are briefly described in the introduction, and are supplemented with more detailed material in various annexes as well as on NSIRA’s website.
  • Review findings and themes discussed in this report reflect NSIRA’s work over the first several months of our mandate, beginning in July 2019. They also build on work done by SIRC and the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner (OCSEC), including reviews that these organizations had not yet released prior to the establishment of NSIRA. Summaries of these reviews are found in Annexes A and B. We discuss findings and themes in this report according to the “information continuum”: collection, safeguarding, sharing and action.
  • A key challenge for departments and agencies in Canada is to ensure that their use of new technology conforms to privacy laws and respects Canadians’ rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). NSIRA is aware of instances where an agency used technology in ways that exceeded legal authorities. Notably, one of NSIRA’s first reviews concerned the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) use of publicly available geolocation data. NSIRA concluded that CSIS’s use of this data without a warrant risked breaching section 8 of the Charter, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure. NSIRA submitted a report under section 35 of the NSIRA Act, to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness regarding the possible unlawful activity.
  • The report provides an overview of some longstanding issues with regard to the failure of CSIS to meet its duty of candour to the Federal Court, most recently in relation to its human source activities. Specifically, CSIS did not inform the Court that CSIS’s warrant applications were based on intelligence that had likely been collected by illegal means. The Court also observed failings with regard to the Department of Justice’s role in the situation. In response, the Government referred the matter to NSIRA for review under paragraph 8(1)(c) of the NSIRA Act. Over the next year, NSIRA will dedicate significant resources to a review stemming from this Federal Court decision.
  • NSIRA has prioritized safeguarding (i.e., how the government protects people, information and assets) as a review theme we will examine on a yearly basis. In our first year, NSIRA completed one safeguarding review of CSIS, and commenced another within the Department of National Defence (DND). Of note, our observations with regard to the polygraph (i.e., “lie detector test”) during the security clearance process, highlight a number of shortcomings, including:
    • CSIS was unable to justify the capacity of examiners — who are not medical practitioners — to ask medical-related questions of the examinees.
    • There were unequal outcomes or consequences for polygraph exams conducted on external applicants to CSIS vs. current employees.
  • This finding raises broader issues. Although the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Standard on Security Screening, created in 2014, cites the use of the polygraph as an appropriate tool for assessing candidates seeking an Enhanced Top Secret clearance, TBS was unable to provide any policy rationale for the use of this tool. NSIRA brought a number of shortcomings to the attention of TBS. The standard is currently under internal review at TBS, and we are awaiting the results.
  • NSIRA made several findings and corresponding recommendations for the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to improve its documentation, mitigation and privacy protection practices in relation to its Privacy Incidents File.
  • In 2019, NSIRA launched our first interagency review, an assessment of the implementation of the 2017 Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities by: the Canada Border Services Agency, CSE, CSIS, DND, Global Affairs Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. NSIRA found significant variation among the six departments and agencies in terms of their success in implementing the 2017 ministerial direction. While some departments or agencies, such as CSIS and CSE, had fairly advanced procedures for implementing the ministerial direction, the review highlighted some shortcomings. Some departments and agencies face challenges in operationalizing this direction. Some also face challenges in establishing decision-making mechanisms that are independent from the operational front line in cases where there is a risk of mistreatment. One of the key issues that NSIRA’s review identified was the inconsistent application of the “substantial risk of mistreatment” threshold across departments – under the 2017 directions and their successors, sharing is prohibited where there is a “substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity”. How departments and agencies assess this standard will be a future area of inquiry.
  • In 2020–21, NSIRA is modernizing the process for addressing complaints. Our goal will not change: to provide a just and efficient investigation and resolution of complaints. Two priorities will guide the modernization: access to justice for self-represented complainants, and the need for a broader spectrum of tools to streamline the resolution of complaints.
  • In previous correspondence to the Attorney General, NSIRA identified legislative gaps related to whistleblower protections in Canada’s national security community and the corresponding negative implications resulting from these gaps. In the interim, NSIRA will be implementing internal procedures to address concerns brought forward by members of the security and intelligence community.
  • In 2019, NSIRA launched a series of public engagements to increase awareness of our new organization, expand our network, and deepen our understanding of Canadians’ concerns relating to national security and intelligence activities. Over the coming year NSIRA intends to continue our outreach and engagement program, with a focus on four key areas: expanding our network to help us address issues related to new and emerging technologies (including artificial intelligence); broadening our dialogue with stakeholders to inform NSIRA’s future review priorities; building new relationships with community groups, in an effort to demystify the complaints investigation process; and scaling up recruitment efforts to ensure NSIRA continues to build an elite workforce with a diverse set of skills and backgrounds.
  • To enhance transparency, NSIRA also intends to proactively redact and release future NSIRA reports as they are approved throughout the year, rather than waiting for the release of our annual report to disclose our findings and recommendations. The organization is working with departments and agencies to ensure that this new approach is as timely and efficient as possible, and both protects vital national security and intelligence information, and provides the public with as much insight as possible into the results of NSIRA’s reviews.

Introduction

01. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) began operations July 12, 2019, as part of the transformation of Canada’s national security accountability framework. As a result, this inaugural annual report covers only a six-month period, from July to the end of the 2019 calendar year. During that time and continuing into 2020, NSIRA did a great deal of work to ensure the successful transition from the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), to a larger organization with a much broader mandate.

02. Because the NSIRA website provides detailed information relating to NSIRA’s mandate, the types of reviews undertaken, the process and lifecycle of a review, and the complaints investigation process, this report does not discuss these topics.

03. Instead, it focuses on NSIRA’s initial work on reviews, our complaints investigations, and our public engagement and transparency efforts. The emphasis on analysis of recent findings and trends in review draws on previously unreleased SIRC and Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner reviews going back to 2018 and 2019, respectively, as well as NSIRA reviews completed in the first several months of operation. Summaries of these individual reports are available in Annexes A and B.

04. Part 1 outlines our organizational values and NSIRA’s approach to building a new institution.

05. Part 2 provides detailed analysis of themes that cut across many of these reviews, drawing linkages and establishing a platform for future work.

06. Part 3 deals with our complaints investigations and briefly discusses themes from 2019 and priorities for the year ahead, with an emphasis on modernizing the complaints investigation process to ensure greater timeliness and accessibility. Summaries and statistics relating to complaints investigations are available in Annexes C and D.

07. Part 4 outlines NSIRA’s efforts and our vision in addressing engagement and transparency, which are key priorities for the organization.

08. Key accomplishments and ongoing priorities with respect to NSIRA’s corporate services, including measures taken to adapt to an expanded mandate, are detailed in Annex E. 

09. This is NSIRA’s first annual report, and we have structured it in a way that aims to be useful and engaging for the reader, while it serves its intended function, namely, to make an important contribution to Canadians’ dialogue on national security and intelligence issues. We are interested in feedback on how to make it as helpful and accessible as possible in achieving this aim.

Part 1: Institution building

10. The creation of NSIRA, following the proclamation of the National Security Act, 2017, represented a considerable step forward in the development of national security and intelligence accountability in Canada. Over the past two decades, national security and intelligence operations have become increasingly interconnected within the Government of Canada. This resulted in a number of departments and agencies that had not traditionally been part of the security and intelligence community now playing key roles in this area. However, review bodies’ powers did not evolve with the changing national security and intelligence landscape, and their ability to review agencies and make contributions remained compartmentalized.

11. NSIRA’s creation remedies these long-standing gaps in Canada’s national security architecture and significantly strengthens the framework for national security accountability. NSIRA has taken over the mandates of our predecessors to review the operations of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), respectively, but we also have an additional and novel mandate to review any activity in the federal government that relates to national security or intelligence. Alongside this expanded mandate, NSIRA has unfettered access to classified information in the possession or under the control of any department or agency (except Cabinet confidences). This allows NSIRA to break down the previously compartmentalized approach to review and accountability, and replace it with horizontal, in-depth interagency review. As such, Canada now has one of the world’s most extensive systems for independent review of national security in the world.

12. Since July 2019, the NSIRA Secretariat has focused on ensuring a successful and effective transition to a much larger organization with a much broader mandate. This included emphasis on the following: securing new accommodations; effective staffing and knowledge development; establishing strong working relationships with departments and agencies, as well as other Canadian review bodies; and delivering on our mandatory reporting requirements. NSIRA absorbed a staff complement from the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), who had expertise in review and complaints investigation related to CSIS. Sustained effort to recruit staff and build knowledge of the broader security and intelligence community will continue in the year ahead.

Review

13. In the early months of our mandate, NSIRA developed a three-year review plan. This plan will help develop a systematic approach to deciding what to review and how to set priorities. Besides helping to guide resource allocation and staffing decisions in the medium term, the review plan provides clarity to the departments and agencies we review and prevents overlap with other review bodies.

14. Part of the challenge inherent in NSIRA’s mandate is thinking differently about how to organize and undertake reviews. The interagency mandate allows for reviews to be planned and undertaken in a horizontal manner, involving several departments and agencies from the start. Similarly, NSIRA is also working in a horizontal manner internally, to incorporate legal and technical experts into reviews more systematically, so that considerations in these areas are built into reviews from the start.

15. Within this plan, in-depth review of CSIS and CSE remain organizational priorities. NSIRA is also developing foundational knowledge of national security and intelligence activities conducted in federal government institutions that have not traditionally been subject to review. Through a series of increasingly complex and in-depth reviews conducted over the upcoming years, NSIRA will seek to provide a holistic and detailed picture of activities, programs or key themes in the national security and intelligence community.

16. When conducting reviews, whether simple scoping exercises or more complex projects, NSIRA considers a number of elements to develop conclusions, findings and recommendations. These include the lawfulness, compliance with directives and policies, reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality of security and intelligence activities. These considerations help NSIRA ensure that Canadians are confident that national security and intelligence activities undertaken by the Government of Canada are thoroughly reviewed and assessed.

Complaints investigations

17. In addition to NSIRA’s review mandate, the organization has the responsibility to investigate national security-related complaints. This includes hearing complaints from the public regarding actions taken by CSIS and CSE, national security-related complaints regarding the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and complaints related to the revocation or denial of security clearances.

18. NSIRA acknowledges that the complaints investigation framework inherited from SIRC has been far too slow and too complex. An analysis of the number of complaints filed annually and the number outside NSIRA’s jurisdiction to investigate also reveals a clear knowledge gap with respect to NSIRA’s role in this regard. For these reasons, NSIRA has begun to reform the complaints process, including increasing access, timeliness and accountability.

NSIRA’s values

19. NSIRA inherited a number of values, practices and expertise from the review agencies that came before. Nonetheless, NSIRA is dedicated to undertaking our work in a new way — one that emphasizes outreach, engagement and transparency. As such, NSIRA has begun a comprehensive program of engagement with civil society, community groups, academics and others, based on a number of objectives including but not limited to:

  • informing NSIRA’s review plan;
  • raising awareness of and demystifying the complaints investigation process;
  • leveraging and creating communities of interest on key issues (for instance, on artificial intelligence); and
  • recruiting talented Canadians.

20. The new organization wants to break with previous practices that resulted in findings and recommendations being publicly reported only once per year. To increase transparency, NSIRA is committed to the release of unclassified versions of reviews as they become available after redaction and translation. By making our reviews available to the public, NSIRA hopes to increase transparency and accountability, and to open the door to extensive discussions and debate in the public sphere. Consequently, a priority is to draft reports that avoid classified information because the intent is to release them; this “write to release” approach will facilitate the redaction process, where necessary, and ensure more timely and effective release of information.

21. NSIRA is committed to:

  • openness and transparency, in an effort to better connect with Canadians;
  • methodological excellence to ensure the quality of our work; and
  • forward thinking and innovation, including how we consider the impacts of new technology and an ever-changing national security environment.

22. To achieve our numerous and complex objectives, NSIRA relies on a skilled and experienced workforce. As the organization grows, NSIRA will continue to recruit talented candidates that reflect Canada’s diverse and inclusive nature.

23. NSIRA understands the importance of organizational health and wellness as fundamental to success. The organization wishes to be an employer of choice that promotes and provides a healthy work environment. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has raised unprecedented challenges, NSIRA remains focused on further adapting to the sweeping changes brought by the pandemic. Ensuring the physical and mental health and wellness of our staff remains a cornerstone of the organization’s strategy as we develop creative ways to maintain effectiveness and efficiency while working in a distributed manner.

24. In addition to maintaining a broad expertise within the organization, NSIRA has been focusing on building a strong network of partnerships to help define our research priorities and deliver on our mandate. NSIRA has been working with other organizations within the Canadian review and accountability system, such as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), on issues of common interest to maximize both the effectiveness and efficiency of national security review agencies, while limiting duplication of efforts.

25. NSIRA made a great deal of progress in all aspects of our mandate throughout the first few months of operation in 2019. Many ambitious projects are under way for the year ahead, in order to progress on building an institution that is fit to play a broad and constructive role in Canada’s system for national security accountability.

Part 2: Review

Section I — The information continuum

This part outlines NSIRA’s framework for discussing findings and trends in review, and provides detailed analysis according to the four categories within this framework. This part does not go into detail about review methodology and prioritization. In short, as we expand our knowledge base of national security and intelligence activities across the Government of Canada, NSIRA aims to undertake increasingly complex reviews over the next three years.

27. Members of NSIRA are planning to proactively redact and publicly release full reviews, along with unclassified executive summaries, as they are approved and translated, rather than having to wait for the annual report to showcase the organization’s review work. This new practice opens up opportunities for the annual report to discuss and dissect lessons learned throughout the year in new and interesting ways. Rather than discussing the findings and recommendations of each review individually (or vertically), as had been done in the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner (OCSEC) annual reports, NSIRA will focus on the entire body of work horizontally, and ask what broad lessons, trends or themes emerge. NSIRA believes that this will allow for a more comprehensive analysis of findings and will help to develop more holistic and interconnected review planning.

28. The following discussion is organized according to what NSIRA calls the “information continuum.” This continuum is meant to reflect the lifecycle of information, from how it is collected and safeguarded, to how it is shared and, ultimately, how it is used to inform real-world actions undertaken for national security or intelligence purposes.

29. NSIRA acknowledges that the information continuum differs from the national security and intelligence information cycle. The continuum is not a unidirectional process, and all concepts mentioned in it are intertwined. However, we hope that presenting our findings within this framework will facilitate a reader’s understanding of key themes and priorities within the national security and intelligence environment. Future annual reports might adopt a different structure depending on the recommendations NSIRA receives and the information we wish to communicate.

Section II — Collection

30. Collection is the first step in the information continuum described in this report. It refers to all forms of information gathering by the Government of Canada’s departments and agencies that relates to national security or intelligence. It covers information that is gathered directly by these federal institutions, in Canada and abroad, as well as information received from other federal entities and other orders of government, such as information from provincial or municipal law enforcement. The receipt of information from foreign entities is also a form of collection, but given the special human rights considerations governing such activity, this report discusses this topic in the section on information sharing.

31. Departments and agencies collect information using a range of techniques. Some recruit human sources to collect information on the agency’s behalf. Others intercept telecommunications through a variety of technical means, such as wiretaps. Telecommunications, in this context, refers to both the gathering of communications content (e.g., intercepting a voice conversation or email) and metadata (e.g., telecommunications subscriber information or information related to Internet connections). Importantly, collection here refers to information that is gathered by Government of Canada institutions both covertly and overtly, and includes publicly available information. The distinction between what is publicly available and what is not has been controversial, and it is a subject that NSIRA will review in the future. Often, the information collected relates only to one person or a handful of people; in other instances, departments and agencies collect data in bulk.

32. Obviously, the collection of certain information by departments and agencies can intrude into the private affairs of Canadians. Indeed, of the many types of national security and intelligence activities that NSIRA is mandated to review, collection is the area with the most potential to impinge on the privacy rights of Canadians. Nonetheless, Canadians expect their private lives, communications and online activities to remain free from state surveillance unless the intrusion complies with the law (including, where required, pre-authorization by an independent judicial officer), and that the collection is reasonable, and goes no further than necessary to achieve a legitimate goal, such as the investigation of a criminal offence or the investigation of a threat to the security of Canada. For these reasons, scrutinizing the government’s collection of information will be a permanent area of focus for NSIRA.

Legal frameworks

33. The legal frameworks governing information collection by government departments and agencies are complex, and vary from department to department, and agency to agency. There are a few overarching principles, however. In simple terms, all departments and agencies are subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) and must ensure that their collection of information is “reasonable” under section 8 of the Charter, which protects against “unreasonable search and seizure” of their persons, property and information. This means that where state action intrudes on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the search must generally be pre-authorized by an independent judicial officer — typically a judge issuing a warrant. In limited circumstances, however, warrantless collection of information in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is permissible, so long as it is authorized by a law that is considered reasonable in striking an appropriate balance between privacy and the state interest being pursued, and the search is conducted reasonably.

34. In Canada, the police and other peace officers seek a number of different authorizations permitting intrusive searches and seizures that implicate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. These “lawful access” authorizations include search warrants, production orders to obtain documents or records, and warrants authorizing the interception of private communications. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) can seek warrants from the Federal Court authorizing the interception of any communication or the obtaining of any information, record, document or thing. The procedures followed for obtaining these authorizations vary depending on the statute governing the agency seeking it, and also depend on the search’s intrusiveness. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), for its part, collects information outside of Canada in accordance with its various mandates related to foreign intelligence and cybersecurity. Where those collection activities might otherwise contravene an act of Parliament or interfere with the reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or any person in Canada, CSE must obtain ministerial authorizations from the Minister of National Defence. Before they come into effect, CSE’s ministerial authorizations under its foreign intelligence mandate and its cybersecurity and information assurance mandate must be approved by the Intelligence Commissioner, who is a retired judge.

35. Regardless of the sensitivity of the information being collected, a department or agency must have a legal authority to collect it. Departments and agencies receive such legal authority from their enabling statutes (for example, the CSIS Act for CSIS; the CSE Act for CSE), as well as from common law powers, especially for the RCMP.

36. These statutes also set important limits, often by spelling out what information departments are permitted to collect, when and to what extent. For instance, CSE is prohibited from directing its collection against Canadians or persons in Canada. But it is not always possible to know in advance which information involves Canadians and which does not. As a result, CSE may sometimes collect information relating to Canadians and persons in Canada incidentally — that is, without deliberately seeking it. CSE must handle this information in accordance with the CSE Act and the ministerial authorizations that it has received from the Minister of National Defence.

Ministerial direction and policy

37. The collection of information by the Government of Canada is guided not only by the law, but also by a range of ministerial directions and internal policies. Ministerial direction represents the formal guidance issued by a minister to a department or agency. Though not a statutory instrument, a ministerial direction has a more robust legal status than mere departmental internal policy, and often serves to set out a minister’s expectations regarding how a department should function, and how it should interpret its legal powers. These directions are used, for example, to implement the Government of Canada’s Intelligence Priorities, which are periodically approved by Cabinet. The Intelligence Priorities set out those areas that the Government of Canada has identified as requiring the greatest need for information. Ministers then direct departments to allocate collection resources accordingly, although they must always remain within the scope of their legal collection mandates. When NSIRA reviews a collection activity related to national security or intelligence, we review not just compliance with the law, but also compliance with ministerial direction and internal policy.

Collection challenges

Technology and privacy

38. Criminals and those who pose a threat to national security are constantly adopting the latest technologies to shield their activities from scrutiny. This places pressure on investigative agencies, in Canada and abroad, to maintain their capacity to collect usable information. As a result, Canada’s national security and intelligence agencies must employ new technologies quickly to circumvent or get ahead of the capabilities of their subjects of investigation.

39. Unfortunately, many new technologies can be used in ways that erode privacy. The rise of the Internet and mobile communications means that individuals now generate far more information and metadata about themselves than in the past. At the same time, intelligence collectors are facing a progressive loss of direct access to private communications stemming from the increasing ubiquity of strong encryption. In part for these reasons, there has been heightened interest worldwide in the bulk collection of information and metadata in recent decades. This raw material is then sifted and analyzed to glean insights and patterns. For example, use of smartphones leaves digital traces that, particularly when assembled or later identified, can reveal contacts, patterns of movement and other intimate details. A key difference between bulk collection and more traditional techniques, such as wiretaps, is that the vast majority of the information collected relates to ordinary citizens who are not subjects of investigation. The risks that such techniques pose for personal privacy are clear.

40. A major challenge for departments and agencies in Canada is to ensure that their use of new technology conforms to privacy laws and respects Charter rights. Generally, this requires departments and agencies to engage the federal Department of Justice to obtain advice on the legal parameters that govern the use of the technology, and then to put in place a strong policy framework and obtain the necessary authorizations before beginning to use a new technology. Often this is exactly what happens. But NSIRA is also aware of instances where technology was used in ways that exceeded legal authorities. These are described below. Some of these examples are drawn from NSIRA’s reviews to date, while others are drawn from SIRC’s history of reviewing CSIS.

41. On a few occasions in recent years, CSIS used new collection techniques without first fully understanding and addressing their legal and policy implications. In these cases, legal and policy work lagged behind the operational imperative to maintain and improve collection capabilities. This risked — and at times compromised — the lawfulness of the collection activity and the privacy of Canadians. The first example is from an NSIRA review:

a) Geolocation: One of NSIRA’s first reviews concerned CSIS’s use of publicly available geolocation data. This review raised pressing questions regarding the use of data that is publicly available, but that nevertheless engages a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. NSIRA concluded that CSIS’s use of this data without a warrant risked breaching section 8 of the Charter, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure. NSIRA’s review examined the decision-making process that led CSIS to use this data without a warrant, and found that CSIS lacked the policies or procedures to ensure that before the data was used CSIS sought legal advice to avoid unlawful use of the data. On March 16, 2020, we submitted a report under section 35 of the NSIRA Act to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness describing the possible unlawful activity. Under section 35, NSIRA must refer to the relevant minister any national security or intelligence activity that might not be in compliance with the law. The minister is then required to forward the report to the Attorney General.

42. Other examples can be drawn from the period before NSIRA was created, which were reported by the former review bodies, SIRC and OCSEC:

a) CSIS metadata: A 2014 SIRC review assessed whether CSIS’s collection, use and retention of metadata collected under the authority of a Federal Court warrant was carried out lawfully and appropriately. At the time, CSIS warrants required any communications or metadata collected incidentally (i.e., not related to the subjects of the warrant) to be destroyed, unless certain conditions were met, including if there were reasonable grounds to believe that the information “may assist” in the investigation of a threat to the security of Canada. CSIS concluded that the words “may assist” established a low threshold, and accordingly retained and used the metadata, despite the data having been collected incidentally. SIRC was given no indication that CSIS had informed the Federal Court of the nature and scope of its activities. SIRC therefore recommended that CSIS make the Court aware of the extent of its retention and use of metadata collected under warrant. Alerted by SIRC’s recommendation, the Federal Court concluded in October 2016 that CSIS could not retain the information unless it was related to a threat to the security of Canada, because CSIS’s collection mandate in section 12 of the CSIS Act includes the qualifier that CSIS can collect information or intelligence only “to the extent that it is strictly necessary.” The Court found that CSIS’s authority to retain information was informed by this limit. Therefore, it held that CSIS had exceeded its lawful authority in retaining much of the metadata collected under warrant. The Court also found that CSIS had failed in its duty of candour to the Court. As discussed below, the question of retention of electronic “datasets” is a matter now more fully regulated by the CSIS Act, following amendments made by the National Security Act, 2017.

b) CSE metadata: Technological advances have created vast amounts of information in the digital realm. Agencies often turn to automation to apply privacy protection measures to large amounts of information efficiently. In 2013, CSE notified its previous review body, OCSEC, that metadata containing Canadian identity information had not been properly minimized by software. This software failure resulted in Canada’s Five Eyes allies receiving data that Canadian laws prohibit CSE from sharing. CSE suspended sharing certain types of metadata while it developed a solution to rectify this problem. Although this was the only instance in which CSE was found by OCSEC not to have complied with the law, related issues arose periodically, including the incomplete reporting on private communications. OCSEC found this to be the result of human and system error. Many of the observations raised historically by OCSEC centred on the interaction of human and technical elements involved in collection and subsequent reporting activities.

c) Datasets: In 2016, SIRC reviewed CSIS’s use of datasets. These datasets were not collected under the authority of a warrant. The review examined whether the collection of such datasets met the statutory test for collection by CSIS under section 12 of the CSIS Act, which is that information can be collected only to the extent “strictly necessary.” Most of the datasets were not directly related to national security threats. SIRC found that there was no comprehensive governance framework guiding the collection, retention and use of bulk datasets. There was also no requirement to assess the datasets to ensure that they met the requirement of being “strictly necessary” to advise the government on suspected threats. These events pushed CSIS to reconsider the legal underpinnings of its collection of datasets. Amendments to the CSIS Act included in the National Security Act, 2017, have since provided CSIS with an explicit authority to collect, retain and use datasets containing personal information that is not directly and immediately related to a threat to the security of Canada. As noted in the final SIRC certificate, pending the coming into force of the National Security Act, 2017, CSIS continued its dataset program despite the legal risks that had been identified.

43. These examples illustrate how the adoption of new collection technologies also poses a challenge for review bodies, who must equip themselves with the technical expertise needed to ensure that the implications of the technologies being deployed are fully understood. This is particularly important given that the use of many new technologies is a closely guarded secret and thus shielded from public scrutiny. As such, it is largely up to review and oversight bodies to scrutinize the use of these technologies. NSIRA’s plans to address this issue are set out in the section on “Future priorities.”

Candour

44. CSIS has struggled to overcome an institutional culture of secrecy that has contributed to failures to fully disclose certain activities and information to the Federal Court, to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and to review bodies. A lack of candour can be particularly problematic where it intersects with the use of new technology. The difference between collection that is lawful or unlawful often hinges on very specific details regarding the information that the technology will enable CSIS to collect. A key consideration is whether that information will reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of an individual. The breadth of the information collected and other details of its use can also affect a technology’s level of intrusiveness. It is thus vital that oversight and review bodies are made fully aware of departmental activities in order to fulfil their mandates. The broader the scrutiny of a new technology’s use, the more that its implications will be thoroughly considered.

45. Three times in recent years, the Federal Court has found that CSIS failed in its duty of candour toward the Court during warrant applications. In two of the three instances, CSIS omitted certain information regarding the use of technology to collect information. The omissions compromised the Court’s ability to properly exercise its judicial control function. Indeed, it is worth noting that the Court is not required to approve CSIS warrants, even if CSIS meets the basic statutory requirements. The Court must also be satisfied that the warrant powers are reasonable in light of all the circumstances, and must therefore be given all the information it needs to make this key assessment. The Court is also permitted to place any conditions on CSIS warrants that it considers to be in the public interest, and must therefore be able to appreciate the privacy implications of new technologies.

46. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness also plays an important role overseeing the activities of CSIS because of his or her statutory responsibilities related to the CSIS warrant process. Before CSIS can submit a warrant application to the Federal Court, the application must first be approved by the Minister. The Minister — and the officials in Public Safety Canada who advise the Minister — must therefore be provided with all relevant information. It is notable that the Minister has felt it necessary to issue ever-more precise and detailed direction to CSIS specifying that the organization must keep the Minister informed of its activities. The most recent example, the 2019 Ministerial Direction for Accountability, specified that CSIS must inform the Minister of activities “where a novel authority, technique, or technology, is used. This includes novel uses of existing authorities, techniques, or technologies.”

Human source activities

47. Most recently, CSIS failed to meet its duty of candour to the Court in relation to its human source activities. CSIS sometimes pays human sources to collect intelligence. Often, the access these sources have to valuable information is directly related to their personal involvement in terrorism or other threat activities. In paying these individuals for their information, CSIS runs the risk of violating the laws that prohibit paying any money or providing any other resources that support terrorism or other criminal activity. For years, CSIS relied on the doctrine of Crown immunity to provide a legal justification for its actions and to remain within the ambit of the rule of law. The law in Canada has evolved in recent decades, however, making the use of Crown immunity increasingly tenuous as a justification.

48. In 2015 and 2016, SIRC raised a number of questions regarding the legality of CSIS’s human source activities. Notably, SIRC recommended that CSIS obtain legal clarification regarding the continued viability of its reliance on Crown immunity. In response, CSIS obtained legal advice in early 2017 that concluded that Crown immunity could no longer be used to justify activities that would ordinarily be unlawful. This set off a chain of events inside government that culminated in the creation of a new statutory regime allowing CSIS to take actions that would otherwise be unlawful in the course of its human source operations. This new regime was introduced as part of Bill C-59, the National Security Act, 2017, which came into force in mid-2019. While Bill C-59 was before Parliament, however, CSIS decided to continue several human source operations, given their intelligence value, despite the fact that they seemed to violate the law. CSIS only decided to halt these activities in January 2019.

49. In March 2019, SIRC completed its certification of the 2017–18 annual report submitted by the Director of CSIS to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Prior to the National Security Act, 2017, SIRC was required to certify the lawfulness of the activities described in each of CSIS’s reports to the Minister. The 2017–18 report discussed CSIS’s continued reliance on Crown immunity in the context of its human source activities. SIRC reviewed the situation and concluded that CSIS had in fact been advised that Crown immunity could no longer be used as a legal defence. As a result, in its certificate, SIRC found that CSIS had knowingly broken the law. SIRC also made clear that although CSIS’s operations could have been important from the standpoint of national security, this in no way excused it from adhering to the rule of law. 

50. Starting in early 2018, the Federal Court began to question the legal basis of CSIS’s human source activities independently of SIRC. These questions led to a series of proceedings that culminated, as mentioned, in the Court finding CSIS to have breached its duty of candour to the Court. Specifically, CSIS did not inform the Court that CSIS’s warrant applications were based on intelligence likely collected by illegal means. The Court also observed certain failings with regard to the Department of Justice’s role in the situation. The Court recommended that there be a broader, independent review of the systemic, governance and cultural shortcomings and failures at CSIS and the Department of Justice that resulted in CSIS engaging in illegal activity and in the related breach of its duty of candour to the Court.

51. In response to the identified shortcomings, the government referred the matter to NSIRA for review under paragraph 8(1)(c) of the NSIRA Act. This review, conducted both at the request of the Minister and also under NSIRA’s autonomous review authority in section 8 of the Act, is now under way. Two members of NSIRA, the Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C., a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, and Professor Craig Forcese of the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa, are jointly leading the review.

52. These events are troubling. CSIS not only broke the law, but CSIS and its legal counsel also failed to disclose important matters to the Federal Court, which they were required to do. CSIS also failed to provide key legal opinions to SIRC, or else provided them many years too late, even though SIRC had a legal right to this information.

Future priorities

53. NSIRA’s review mandate has three principal parts: the review of CSIS, the review of CSE, and the review of the national security or intelligence activities of all other federal entities. The review of CSIS and CSE will always remain central to NSIRA’s mission, but over the coming years, NSIRA will systematically map and review other departments’ collection activities. In so doing, NSIRA will scrutinize collection activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. In other words, NSIRA will not only consider whether a department can collect information, but also whether it reasonably should do so in light of the department’s mandate and the implications for privacy.

54. In our reviews, NSIRA will emphasize scrutiny of a department’s or agency’s use of technology, and particularly new or emerging technologies that pose the greatest risks. NSIRA’s reviews will make recommendations with an eye to improving departmental processes to manage the legal and privacy risks associated with the use of technology. When relevant, NSIRA will examine departmental candour with ministers and oversight bodies, consistent with Canada’s broader system of accountability for national security and intelligence.

55. To achieve these goals, NSIRA will invest in building in-house technological expertise, through a combination of hiring technological experts, training and reaching out to the broader technological community. NSIRA will also collaborate with allied accountability bodies through a forum known as the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC). NSIRA will seek to stay current with regard to new and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, machine learning and quantum computing, and related concerns such as “big data.” Our goal is to be able to review departmental use of these technologies and their effects in a timely and effective manner.

56. NSIRA has also worked — and will continue to work — with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) on matters of joint concern to ensure that the broadest range of perspectives are brought to bear.

CSIS

57. Over the next year, much of NSIRA’s review scrutiny of CSIS will be dedicated to the review stemming from the Federal Court decision discussed above.

58. In addition, NSIRA will systematically map CSIS’s use of technology and its warrant powers. NSIRA will then undertake reviews of the technologies and powers that are deemed to pose the greatest risks. In this way, NSIRA will gain knowledge of CSIS’s most intrusive activities over time. NSIRA will also increase scrutiny of the warrant process in order to monitor CSIS’s candour to the Federal Court.

59. In addition, the National Security Act, 2017, gave CSIS a suite of new powers. NSIRA will review CSIS’s use of these powers in the coming years so as to help inform Parliament’s statutory review of the National Security Act, 2017, which will begin in 2022 or 2023. In particular, NSIRA will review CSIS’s use of datasets, including those that are publicly available, as well as the new justification regime for CSIS activities, that are undertaken in support of collection, which would otherwise be unlawful. NSIRA is also required each year to review at least one aspect of CSIS’s activities under its threat reduction mandate. This mandate authorizes CSIS to go beyond the collection of information in order to take active measures to “reduce” threats to the security of Canada. Over the coming years, NSIRA will take stock of CSIS’s use of these powers since they were acquired in 2015.

CSE

60. CSE uses a range of collection powers and technologies in its everyday operations. Over time, NSIRA intends to comprehensively review the full suite of collection techniques in place at CSE. NSIRA will start by focusing on certain collection techniques that are authorized under a ministerial authorization and comparing them to techniques that are authorized through other channels. As well, NSIRA will examine how CSE addresses incidentally intercepted information, especially the information of Canadians or persons in Canada, and how it decides whether to retain the information.

61. The rapid technological evolution in areas such as quantum computing, 5G and artificial intelligence will affect the work of CSE, perhaps more than any other federal entity. These technologies could also result in the collection of new information or the development of new collection techniques. Using our growing technical expertise in these areas, NSIRA will conduct both general and targeted reviews of the use of these technologies.

62. CSE has also received new powers in the National Security Act, 2017, including the ability to carry out defensive and offensive cyber operations. CSE cannot use these powers to collect information, separately from authorizations issued under its foreign intelligence or cybersecurity mandates. As CSE begins to conduct these operations, NSIRA will review them to ensure they are not being used for — or do not result in — the collection of information.

Other government departments

63. For entities other than CSIS and CSE, NSIRA’s initial reviews will build foundational knowledge of departments with significant collection programs. Of note, NSICOP has already reviewed the security and intelligence activities of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and of the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). These reviews identified certain areas of risk, including the use of what is termed “scenario-based targeting,” which is used to screen travellers entering the country, as well as the CBSA’s use of covert surveillance in Canada. NSIRA will build on NSICOP’s work with in-depth reviews of the collection activities of these departments and agencies.

64. NSIRA also intends to map collection through the rest of the federal national security and intelligence apparatus. In particular, NSIRA will explore the collection programs of the RCMP by looking in detail at the RCMP’s national security criminal investigation program, and by examining how the RCMP collects intelligence in support of those investigations. Throughout, NSIRA will be mindful of public concerns with respect to law enforcement, and pay due attention to the RCMP’s activities in sensitive sectors and to any appearance of bias.

65. Within the next three years, NSIRA will examine the collection activities of Global Affairs Canada (GAC). NSIRA will also map the collection and use of biometrics across the government in relation to its security and intelligence activities. This review will examine the collection and use of biometrics by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, the CBSA and Transport Canada in relation to their national security responsibilities and canvass the use of biometrics by CSIS and the RCMP in security intelligence and national security-related police investigations.

66. Among the novel and complex areas of collection that NSIRA will also review is the collection of financial intelligence. Financial intelligence is a core component of national security collection, especially in relation to terrorism. It is also central to large law enforcement intelligence operations, especially those that involve money laundering and terrorist financing. Canada’s financial intelligence centre of expertise and responsibility is the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). NSIRA will review FINTRAC’s activities and examine FINTRAC’s relationship with domestic partners.

67. Over the course of the next year, NSIRA will also conduct targeted reviews of DND/CAF. NSIRA has already begun to review the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit to determine how this unit conducts its counter-intelligence gathering activities and, in particular, how the unit’s activities correspond to legal and governance frameworks by focusing on cases of right-wing extremism. NSIRA will also review the Defence Intelligence Enterprise, to gain a general overview and to learn how it is positioned within DND/CAF governance frameworks and authorities. In light of recent media coverage, this review will focus on medical and open-source intelligence.

Medical intelligence and public health intelligence

68. Given the current COVID-19 pandemic, NSIRA will explore how the Government of Canada collects intelligence on medical issues or in relation to the health of Canadians. This is known as medical intelligence, or public health intelligence. At present, NSIRA does not have a firm understanding of what the government considers to be medical intelligence or the extent to which medical intelligence is used. To rectify this gap, NSIRA will review the Public Health Agency of Canada, as well as DND/CAF, whose American counterpart operates the National Center for Medical Intelligence. In Canada, medical issues are usually not part of the public discourse as to what should or should not constitute the government’s intelligence priorities. Medical intelligence will be a completely new area for NSIRA, and it is hoped that it will provoke a useful conversation in light of current events.

Section III — Safeguarding

69. Safeguarding refers to the protection of people, information and other government assets within the national security and intelligence portfolio. Information collected, analyzed and used within this community is often sensitive, either due to the sources and methods from which it is derived, or because of attendant legal protections.

70. There are real consequences when safeguarding measures fail. Should hostile actors like terrorists or foreign governments gain access to information on human sources, for example, this could put lives at risk. Likewise, if hostile actors learn details on electronic methods of collection, this could lead them to apply countermeasures, which could limit Canadian knowledge on key security and intelligence priorities. There is also reputational risk to the Canadian security and intelligence community if allies perceive that the sensitive information they share with Canada, in trust, is not being adequately protected. It is therefore incumbent on the government to ensure that such information is secured from exploitation, compromise or other unauthorized disclosure.

71. Several security breaches in recent years illustrate that the Canadian national security system has not been immune from the risks associated with “insider threats.” The first contemporary public reminder of this risk was the successful prosecution of Jeffrey Delisle. He was a Canadian Navy Sub-Lieutenant who, in 2007, began releasing classified information to the Russian government. On November 30, 2013, Qing Quentin Huang was arrested and charged with attempting to communicate safeguarded information to the Chinese embassy in Ottawa. Mr. Huang had been employed in a sector providing specialized services to the government. Last year, police laid charges against Cameron Ortis, a civilian executive within the RCMP, who was charged with leaking classified information to foreign entities. Both the Huang and Ortis cases remain before the courts.

Safeguarding policy and legal thresholds

72. Safeguarding is neither a legal term of art nor a precisely defined policy term. It encompasses several distinct elements clustered together due to their impact on the protection of people, information and assets. For this reason, the rules for safeguarding begin with the two main policy instruments that govern the management of security within the Government of Canada: the Policy on Government Security and the Directive on Security Management. These policy instruments outline the various requirements for organizations and employees to contribute to security in the workplace.

73. The Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) is the lead government agency responsible for setting the minimum standards, or safeguards, used to support these policy instruments, covering:

  • information and identity assurance;
  • individual security screening;
  • physical security;
  • information technology security;
  • emergency and business continuity management; and
  • government contracting.

74. Department- and agency-specific policies and procedures across the security and intelligence community — derived from the TBS standards — also set out additional security requirements. As important as it is to define what safeguarding is, it is equally important to understand what it is not. In this context, safeguarding does not refer to measures directed at persons who do not have access to sensitive government information or assets.

75. Employees in the security and intelligence community are also subject to liability for any violation of the provisions of the Security of Information Act (SOIA), which sets out various offences related to the handling of classified material. For instance, the SOIA defines “special operational information” as information that the Government of Canada is taking measures to safeguard.

76. One of the important objectives of the SOIA is to prohibit the unlawful disclosure of sensitive information. However, a mechanism allows for situations where an individual believes that the disclosure of such information is in the public interest — that is, whistleblowing — for example, in preventing public servants from committing a crime in the course of their duties. Whistleblowing protections guard against violations of public trust that erode the confidence of the public in the government’s practices. Whistleblowing protections give an individual a potential legitimate defence against prosecution under some offences in the SOIA.

77. Because the stakes can be high for disclosing safeguarded information, the SOIA outlines a series of preconditions that would enable an accused person to avoid criminal liability for such disclosures. If they are met, the Court will perform a balancing exercise to determine whether the disclosure was in the public interest. These preconditions include weighing factors like the extent or risk of harm created by the disclosure and the seriousness of the alleged offence. However, where the accused is alleging an offence has been committed (and except where disclosure of information is necessary to avoid grievous bodily harm or death), the judge may find the public interest favoured disclosure only where the accused first reported the wrongdoing. NSIRA is the final step in this reporting chain.

Safeguarding themes

78. The concept of safeguarding has an impact on NSIRA’s work in three crucial ways. First, as discussed above NSIRA has procedures for receiving reporting of wrongdoing by whistleblowers. Second, NSIRA must ensure that our members, employees and systems safeguard sensitive information, assets and people from compromise. Third, in both our review and complaint investigation activities, NSIRA plays a crucial role in assessing if the governance systems used to deter, detect and mitigate such risks are compliant, reasonable and necessary.

79. NSIRA has prioritized safeguarding as a review theme to be examined yearly. In selecting this as a review priority, we will help determine the extent to which the security and intelligence community is appropriately safeguarding its employees, information and assets, and will report on whether such practices are lawful, reasonable and necessary to reduce the identified risks. To this end, in our first year NSIRA completed one safeguarding review relating to CSIS, and started another within DND. The latter review was ongoing at the time of writing. When these two reviews are considered holistically along with available open-source information, broader observations can be made about safeguarding.

80. A key observation is the importance of maintaining security vigilance. Currently, the security system engages in high-intensity scrutiny at predetermined intervals — e.g., initial screening on hiring, five-year updates to security clearances, yearly employee security awareness week — and then periods between these intervals where security is less prominent. Moreover, if other priorities take precedence, the time between intervals could increase. In the case of Mr. Delisle, for instance, his Top Secret security clearance had lapsed and was not properly updated prior to his arrival at the government facility where he committed his crimes. Had proper clearance renewal standards been followed, his loyalty to Canada would have been assessed and other vulnerabilities scrutinized.

81. Another important observation is the essential role of clear, concise and updated policies in setting standards across the government. As already mentioned, TBS establishes the minimum security standards for government departments and agencies to follow. Gaps in these standards could create a domino effect, with each department and agency creating their own policies and procedures. Such gaps could lead not only to an absence of standardization across government, but also, in certain cases, to the unreasonable and unnecessary application of security practices.

The polygraph

82. A final observation relates to the government’s use of the polygraph for screening security and intelligence employees. Commonly referred to as a lie detector test, the polygraph is a technology that measures and records several physiological indicators such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration and skin conductivity while a person responds to a number of questions. “Deceptive” answers produce physiological responses that can, so it is alleged, be differentiated from those associated with “non-deceptive” answers.

83. The TBS Standard on Security Screening, created in 2014, cites the use of the polygraph as an appropriate tool, among others, for assessing candidates seeking an Enhanced Top Secret (ETS) clearance. CSIS, in conducting security assessments for its staff, uses the results of the polygraph as a determinative element when granting ETS clearances, rather than an instructive element, to be considered as part of a series of relevant factors. If an outside candidate, employee or individual contracting with the Government of Canada is denied a security clearance that is necessary to obtain or keep federal employment or a contract, the individual can make a complaint to NSIRA pursuant to section 18 of the NSIRA Act. If NSIRA’s jurisdiction is established, the complaint would be investigated by an NSIRA member. This could include, for example, a complaint where a CSIS employee was terminated solely because of the revocation of a security clearance, and the Deputy Head of CSIS could have based the decision to revoke the clearance on the results of a polygraph test. Given the highly invasive and controversial nature of this technology, NSIRA decided to examine the use of the polygraph within our latest safeguarding review of CSIS. We sought to determine the justifications for its use, and the extent to which such determinations are reasonable and necessary.

84. Several key observations were derived from this analysis. First, this tool can have profound negative impacts on an employee’s mental health if not used appropriately. Second, CSIS was unable justify the merits of examiners — who are not medical practitioners — to ask medical-related questions of the people they examine. Third, the outcomes or consequences for polygraph exams conducted on external applicants compared with CSIS employees differed. [ Text removed – As of November 20, 2020, NSIRA and CSIS could not agree on how all of the facts of this review should be presented in an unclassified, public document]. Essentially, a successful polygraph is a determinative factor for external applicants in obtaining an ETS clearance through CSIS. Fourth, CSIS requires policy clarity for cases where employees fail the polygraph examination. Finally, CSIS did not conduct a privacy impact assessment (PIA) for the use of the polygraph, despite a PIA being required by government policy when a department or agency is dealing with “personal information.”

85. These issues raised in the CSIS context are related to a much broader consideration: namely, the extent to which the government’s overarching policy document, the Standard on Security Screening, provides adequate guidance for departments and agencies when they implement this safeguarding measure. For example, this standard requires the use of the polygraph for all ETS clearances, but it is silent on any guidance on the implementation of this requirement, including the conditions for the reasonable use of the polygraph. Rather, such key considerations are left to the discretion of specific departments and agencies.

86. The OPC has also raised concerns with TBS as to how the polygraph examination is used as an enhanced screening requirement under the 2014 Standard on Security Screening. In July 2017 correspondence, for example, the OPC noted particular concerns surrounding its effectiveness, sensitivity and privacy implications, and the potential adverse consequences associated with polygraph examinations.

87. These contemporary observations are not new. In seven consecutive annual reports, ranging from 1985–86 to 1991–92, SIRC requested that CSIS stop using the polygraph. One of the key concerns raised by successive committees were SIRC’s “grave doubts” about the use of the technology, pointing to the fact that test results could be wrong 10% of the time or more. As well, Canadian courts have refused to admit the results of a polygraph as evidence in criminal trials. The Supreme Court of Canada has found that they are unreliable and risky, and would not assist the Court in determining a person’s guilt or innocence.

88. After consideration of the foregoing, on December 12, 2019, NSIRA sent a letter to TBS seeking access to the legal advice prepared for Treasury Board on how the polygraph complies with Canadian legal requirements, as well as a summary of the evidentiary basis used to establish the requirement for using the polygraph, and any assessments of how the use of the polygraph achieves its intended goal. The TBS response failed to answer NSIRA’s questions. However, the letter did acknowledge that the next round of security policy modifications was under way.

89. When SIRC recommended in 1985 that CSIS should cease using the polygraph, it was meant to allow the government time to reach definitive conclusions about whether this technique should be employed by Canadian agencies and, if so, under what circumstances and under what rules. SIRC requested what sound government policy instruments should always require: namely, that there are consistent approaches across government; that risks are managed; and that policies exhibit public service values such as probity, prudence, equity and transparency. NSIRA has not been provided with evidence that suggests that the use of the polygraph meets all of these policy requirements. To this end, future reviews will examine the polygraph’s use outside of CSIS, and based on the information assessed, NSIRA will make a definitive determination about the legality and utility of this instrument.

Future review priorities

90. NSIRA will conduct several reviews of safeguarding practices in the coming years, in an effort to ensure that we are covering as broad a spectrum as possible of security and intelligence community actors. These safeguarding reviews will allow NSIRA to remain involved in relevant key priorities of the field, such as legality, privacy, science-based tools and international best practices.

91. As an independent agency charged with assessing propriety and legality at the core of our mandate, we make our own assessment of the lawfulness of the actions of the security and intelligence community. This forms the basis for NSIRA findings, recommendations and reporting. To this end, NSIRA intends to maintain a strong focus on assessing the process for the input of expert legal advice. Within the context of specific reviews, NSIRA will review the Department of Justice’s role in providing legal analysis to security and intelligence stakeholders.

92. Considering the primacy of privacy in much of the information collected and used by the government in this field, another priority is the need to evaluate the government’s respect for privacy rights, regardless of the policy merits of the safeguarding measure. One of NSIRA’s fellow accountability organizations, the OPC, plays a key role in helping ensure government compliance with Canadian privacy legislation. NSIRA will continue to work collaboratively with the OPC on future safeguarding reviews.

93. In keeping with NSIRA’s mandate to assess the reasonableness and necessity of a department’s exercise of its powers, NSIRA intends to go beyond assessing whether safeguarding measures are legally sound and privacy compliant. NSIRA’s mandate includes reviewing for necessity and reasonableness. For any government to continue to build an adaptive security system, scientific evidence and data-driven analysis must inform which safeguarding tools and processes are necessary. Currently, NSIRA is concerned that there is an absence of transparent and defensible science underpinning policy decisions for selecting security measures. Therefore, our future reviews will include the examination of scientific justifications for specific safeguarding measures.

94. Finally, NSIRA will assess the potential for the government to further advance collaborative practices through additional outreach with foreign partners in allied countries. Although it is known that exchanges of this nature are routine within certain sectors of the security and intelligence community, another feature of these exchanges that should be examined is the extent to which these outreach and coordination efforts relate to safeguarding measures and the extent to which they help revitalize the government’s security posture. NSIRA’s reviews will also provide insight into this component of international best practices.

95. Five safeguarding reviews are planned over the coming years to ensure coverage of as broad a spectrum as possible of security and intelligence community actors. The first will address an aspect of security screening within GAC. The second safeguarding review will relate to CSE’s use of the polygraph for employee security screening; this will be in addition to the yearly reviews of CSE that routinely cover various cybersecurity initiatives used to protect government systems from exploitation. The third review will consider the use of biometrics across the Canadian government. The final two reviews will examine aspects of the RCMP (i.e., the division devoted to Operations Research within this police force, while the other will evaluate the security/safeguarding implications of the Ortis case, using the RCMP’s own internal reviews as a starting point for our analysis).

96. This series of reviews relating to safeguarding will help to provide Parliament and all Canadians with facts about the adequacy of security practices within the security and intelligence community, and ideally, help improve such safeguarding measures. Most importantly, NSIRA exists to ensure that whatever government security standards are ultimately created, they are tested through expert scrutiny and their application is reported on to encourage sustained public debate.

Section IV— Sharing

97. Departments and agencies complement the information they collect on their own with robust information sharing both domestically and internationally. Counter-terrorism, in particular, requires an integrated response, one that involves multiple departments and agencies, in Canada and internationally. Indeed, this is one of the lessons that has been learned post-9/11, but it comes with its own risks and a concomitant need for caution.

98. Information sharing in the security and intelligence community, however, is a broader issue than sharing information to prevent acts of terrorism. Departments share not only to prevent acts of terrorism, but also to counter espionage, foreign interference and the proliferation of restricted technologies. They also share information to advance Canada’s foreign policy and defence priorities. Moreover, they share information broadly — within the security and intelligence community; outside that community with other federal, provincial, municipal and private sector organizations; and with foreign partners.

99. Equally noteworthy is the impact of technology on information sharing. Departments are able not only to collect vast amounts of information, but also to share that information more quickly and easily than ever before. And the burgeoning field of data analytics encourages the sharing of information that can then be analyzed.

100. Against this backdrop, information sharing raises issues of privacy and potential mistreatment abroad, as well as the need to protect sensitive sources and methods when information is shared. These are important issues for Canadians and for policy-makers, and so they will be for NSIRA as well in our review work.

Legal framework for sharing

101. A complex legal framework governs departments’ information sharing. The Privacy Act is an overarching piece of legislation; it is not limited to issues pertaining to the sharing of personal information for national security purposes. The Act sets out specific rules regarding when and why federal government agencies are permitted to share personal information. More recently, Parliament also enacted the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA), discussed below.

102. In addition, agencies such as CSE, CSIS and the RCMP are subject to specific provisions in their governing statutes for sharing information. Departments can also share information for specific purposes under specific legislation. For example, under the Customs Act, CBSA officials can share customs information where that information is reasonably regarded by the official to be information relating to the national security or defence of Canada. Likewise, in certain circumstances, FINTRAC and law enforcement bodies receive and disclose financial information pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

103. Departments’ information sharing can also be shaped by international agreements and resolutions, as well as guidance from their respective ministers.

Information-sharing challenges

104. On the basis of three commissions of inquiry in the past 15 years — as well as numerous reviews by NSIRA’s predecessors OCSEC and SIRC — we can safely say that the key challenges of sharing information for national security purposes domestically and internationally are well documented.

105. Justice Major’s Commission of Inquiry into the bombing of Air India Flight 182 addressed several questions, including whether there was effective cooperation and sharing of information between CSIS and the RCMP. Ultimately, the inquiry concluded that the failure of domestic agencies to share information effectively contributed in a material way to the tragic downing of the Air India flight.

106. Since then, CSIS and the RCMP have taken steps to strengthen their information sharing and cooperation. The objective of a CSIS national security investigation is to provide security intelligence to the government; the RCMP collects evidence to be used in a judicial process. While collecting for these different purposes, the two agencies have a shared interest in protecting their respective sources and investigative techniques.

107. In national security investigations, intelligence agencies — most notably CSIS — can be reluctant to share information with the police. Police themselves might want to maintain a distance from intelligence information because it could eventually be subject to disclosure; disclosure disputes can delay or disrupt criminal prosecutions. From a public safety perspective, the limited sharing between intelligence and police agencies could be harmful. This was Justice Major’s central conclusion. It can complicate coordination and impede or delay the range of public safety actions available to the government. This is known as the “intelligence to evidence” dilemma.

108. To address this issue, CSIS and the RCMP have developed a One Vision framework. The framework seeks to enhance cooperation and streamline information sharing.

109. The intelligence to evidence issue was a key part of the country-wide national security consultations that the government undertook in 2016. Ultimately, the government did not bring forward any legislative amendments to specifically address this issue. During our first year, however, NSIRA heard from an external expert that CSIS and the RCMP continue to wrestle with this challenge. The two organizations are undertaking a thorough review to find ways they can remove unnecessary impediments to information sharing and facilitate successful enforcement. Given the importance of the CSIS-RCMP relationship, NSIRA has launched an in-depth case study, to be completed later in 2020, that examines this relationship.

Clear authority for sharing

110. Historically, departments wanting to share national security information regarding threats to Canadian citizens and interests have been concerned about the lack of an independent authority to do so. The Privacy Act’s “consistent use” provision can be used in the national security context where there is a reasonable and direct connection to the original purpose for which the information was obtained. However, this legislation is not specific to the national security context. Overall, it was believed that the complexity of the legal landscape was impeding the sharing of information with national security and intelligence agencies.

111. In response, the government passed the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act (SCISA) in 2015. It created a single legislative authority for federal government institutions to disclose information on an activity that “undermines the security of Canada.” The intent in doing so was to improve the effectiveness and timeliness of sharing threat-related information, including by departments and agencies that are outside the core security and intelligence community. In separate reviews of disclosures under SCISA, however, both SIRC and the OPC were critical of departments’ internal controls and record keeping.

112. The legislation was amended and renamed SCIDA as part of the National Security Act, 2017. Further, NSIRA now has a statutory requirement, pursuant to subsection 39(1) of the NSIRA Act, to conduct a review of disclosures made under SCIDA. To ensure robust review of these disclosures, and in keeping with the statutory authority to coordinate to avoid unnecessary duplication of work, NSIRA and the OPC have agreed to work together on these review efforts.

113. NSIRA is also looking beyond SCIDA to other aspects of the challenge of having clear authority to share information for national security purposes. In our first year, NSIRA has elected to conduct three reviews that feature CSE’s incidental collection and use of Canadian identity information, including disclosure of such information to departments. When sharing intelligence reports with other departments and agencies, CSE typically suppresses Canadian identity information, which is collected incidentally in the course of its foreign intelligence activities and its cybersecurity and information assurance activities. However, departments and agencies that can demonstrate they have the legal authority and operational justification to receive the Canadian identity information can submit to CSE a request for disclosure of the information. NSIRA expects to complete a review later in 2020 that focuses on the lawfulness and appropriateness of Canadian identity information disclosures, and a review that focuses on CSE’s ministerial authorizations and ministerial orders.

Review of CSE’s Privacy Incidents File

114. One review featuring Canadian identity information was NSIRA’s first completed review relating to CSE. The review examines CSE’s Privacy Incidents File, which records privacy incidents discovered by CSE. A privacy incident occurs when the privacy of a Canadian, or a person in Canada, is put at risk in a manner that runs counter to, or is not provided for, in CSE’s policies. The review of the Privacy Incidents File was an annual review conducted by OCSEC, CSE’s former independent review body. For this review, based on an examination of a selected sample of incidents reported in the Privacy Incidents File for the period of July 1, 2018, to July 31, 2019, NSIRA commended CSE’s timely response to reporting and mitigating privacy incidents. However, NSIRA made five additional findings and corresponding recommendations for CSE to improve its documentation, mitigation and privacy protection practices.

Sharing with international partners and the risk of mistreatment

115. Justice O’Connor’s inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar examined the circumstances under which a Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, was rendered to Syria and tortured. A key outcome of the inquiry was its conclusion that sharing inaccurate or non-caveated information with foreign partners can result in the mistreatment and torture of individuals, as it did with Mr. Arar.

116. The government responded by issuing a series of ministerial directions on information sharing with foreign partners, culminating in the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (Complicity Avoidance Act), which came into force in 2019 and required written direction be issued by the Governor in Council (GIC) to the deputy head of multiple departments and agencies. The GIC directions have codified the expectations of departments and agencies. In particular, there is now a clear prohibition for any sharing of information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. Additionally, they limit the use of any information that was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual.

117. Throughout its history, SIRC paid careful attention to CSIS’s information-sharing practices with foreign partners. It also specifically addressed the operationalization of the relevant ministerial direction. Its attention to these issues continued through 2018–19, through two separate reviews of CSIS foreign stations. The first of these reviews focused on the need for CSIS to institute and follow a rigorous decision-making process with respect to sharing information with foreign partners, supported by foreign arrangements anchored in thorough assessments of the human rights records of Canada’s foreign partners.

118. The second foreign station review also examined CSIS’s relationships with foreign partners within the geographic region encompassed by the station. In this case, all of the foreign partners are deemed high risk from a human rights perspective and, thus, restrictions have been placed on all foreign arrangements in the station’s area of responsibility.

119. One of NSIRA’s first reviews examined changes to CSIS’s procedures and policies on information sharing by means of a detailed examination of three cases, identified as high risk, that had been reviewed by CSIS’s Information Sharing Evaluation Committee. The review yielded two recommendations meant to ensure that decisions are made at a level commensurate with the assessment of risk, and that legal opinions are sought, as appropriate, to ensure compliance with the law and ministerial directions when sharing information with a foreign entity.

120. As part of our governing statute, NSIRA is now required to review departments’ implementation of GIC directions on information sharing with foreign partners under the Complicity Avoidance Act. To date, the GIC has issued these directions to 12 departments, including several that have never before received formal direction specific to information sharing with foreign partners.

121. To prepare for this new responsibility, NSIRA launched our first interagency review, an assessment of how six departments and agencies— the CBSA, CSE, CSIS, DND, GAC and the RCMP — were implementing the 2017 Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities, which was the basis of the direction under the Complicity Avoidance Act. The purpose of the review was also to provide a future roadmap for departments that, pursuant to the Complicity Avoidance Act, received this direction for the first time in 2019.

122. NSIRA found significant variation among the six departments and agencies in terms of their success in implementing the 2017 ministerial direction. Some, like CSE, have developed and rolled out comprehensive policy suites to guide their information sharing with foreign partners. Some departments face challenges in operationalizing this direction. Some also face challenges in establishing decision-making mechanisms that are independent from the operational front line in cases where there is a risk of mistreatment. One of the key issues that NSIRA’s review identified was the inconsistent application of the “substantial risk” threshold across departments and agencies. This will be an area of inquiry in the future.

Future priorities

123. NSIRA has a specific statutory requirement to review the implementation of GIC direction under the Complicity Avoidance Act, and to review disclosures under SCIDA. These reviews are annual requirements, reflecting the potential risks to Canadians when departments and agencies share under these respective statutory mandates. NSIRA will be attentive to those risks, including the potential risks to privacy posed by information sharing. At the same time, however, NSIRA intends to map and review the full range of information sharing in which departments engage — under different statutes and legal sources, as well as internationally and with one another, provincial and territorial agencies, and the private sector.

124. Over our first three years, NSIRA will begin to explore information sharing across the security and intelligence community. We will focus on key partnerships, and how departments and agencies collaborate in keeping Canadians safe and achieving Canada’s foreign policy and defence objectives. The scope of information sharing is broad, and NSIRA hopes to build our understanding of this issue over time.

125. NSIRA has begun a building block review of CSIS-RCMP collaboration and information sharing in relation to a particular investigation. One of the objectives of this review is to document the challenges that the two agencies face in relation to the intelligence to evidence dilemma.

126. NSIRA will examine other key partnerships within the security and intelligence community, including information sharing between CSIS and CBSA to prevent people or goods posing a threat to national security from crossing the border. We will also examine how CSE and CSIS collaborate to collect foreign intelligence that is useful for Canadian policy-makers.

127. NSIRA will also look at horizontal arrangements, and information sharing across different levels of government. For example, we will assess institutionalized measures to promote sharing and cooperation, such as in relation to Integrated National Security Enforcement Team investigations. These teams are led by the RCMP and include representatives from other federal agencies, as well as representatives from municipal police services and provincial police in the case of Ontario and Quebec. NSIRA will also look at information sharing outside of the counter-terrorism context, including how departments and agencies protect Canada’s economic security, beginning with actions under the Investment Canada Act and extending to include the full spectrum of tools at the government’s disposal.

128. NSIRA will examine information sharing with private sector organizations, such as information that the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security collects from organizations to prevent or mitigate cyber attacks by hostile state actors, or that chartered banks report to FINTRAC for investigating suspicious financial transactions.

129. Finally, NSIRA recognizes that in examining information sharing with foreign partners, we can see and understand only Canadian actions. NSIRA therefore participates in international fora such as FIORC, which brings together review bodies from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to stay up to date with (unclassified) trends internationally and to share best practices. Given the close relationship that exists among the Five Eyes intelligence agencies, information sharing has been a topic of discussion at FIORC. These discussions are one way for NSIRA to address the potential gap in accountability that exists with respect to international cooperation.

130. In sum, cooperation and information sharing among members of Canada’s security and intelligence community have always been essential features of Canada’s national security efforts. In practice, this means that there will be very little of NSIRA’s review work that will not include attention to information sharing in some form or another. NSIRA will be attentive to the risks of sharing, as well as the need for effective and timely sharing.

Section V— Action

131. “Actions” refer to any activities undertaken by a federal government department or agency to influence an outcome relating to national security or intelligence. Actions can also come as a result of intelligence collection and/or intelligence sharing. Intelligence is one aspect of the information and analysis that shape how actions are construed and implemented. The action itself, and the influence of intelligence, can be visible (overt) or invisible (covert) to Canadians. A visible action would eventually be known to the recipient, while the occurrence of an invisible action might never be known.

132. The former review bodies, SIRC and OCSEC, could conduct only agency-specific reviews of the key “collectors”: CSIS and CSE. Their reviews of national security activities tended to focus on collection, safeguarding and information sharing. This briefly changed when Parliament enacted the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, and SIRC began to undertake reviews of CSIS’s new mandate to reduce threats to the security of Canada. SIRC provided the only after-the-fact review of these extraordinary new powers. However, SIRC’s reviews remained confined to CSIS’s actions — a narrow subset of the broad array of national security-related actions taken every day across Canada’s security and intelligence community.

133. NSIRA’s mandate goes beyond intelligence and its collectors, extending to any national security-related activity of any department or agency. Our statutory authorities equip us with the power to review the full range of “action” activities. Such activities have rarely been subject to any form of independent review, and NSIRA is able to ensure that they now are.

134. The National Security Act, 2017, established clear mandates for the main intelligence collectors subject to review, CSIS and CSE, to act in certain circumstances against perceived national security threats. For CSIS, this new legislation updated its threat reduction mandate. For CSE, the Act established active cyber operations (ACO) and defensive cyber operations (DCO) as aspects of its mandate. These new authorities merely supplement the many existing authorities that enable over a dozen other federal security and intelligence departments and agencies to take actions relating to national security, making the “action” cluster of activities vast. For instance, actions within the security and intelligence community include the interception of people and goods at the border by the CBSA and criminal arrest (including, potentially, preventive detention) by the RCMP.

135. The range of actions within NSIRA’s mandate to review “any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence” is broad, and includes such actions as denying a person entry into Canada, revoking a Canadian’s passport, placing a person on the Secure Air Travel Act list (Canada’s “No Fly List”), disrupting a person’s affairs through a threat reduction measure, detaining an alleged terrorist or carrying out military actions in an armed conflict. Sometimes, a high-level strategic decision can also be an action activity, such as a policy choice on a national priority like securing the Arctic.

136. NSIRA’s reviews in this area overlap with other priority subject areas. We can review national security action activities that stem from intelligence collection, national security actions unrelated to intelligence collection, and national security actions that lead to intelligence collection. As an example of this last category, a CAF tactical raid during an overseas mission could yield new sources of intelligence that might then seed an NSIRA review in that area.

137. Due to the largely secretive nature of national security and intelligence actions, the effects and impacts are often unseen by the larger public. NSIRA is acutely conscious of concerns expressed during our outreach to civil society with how actions of the security and intelligence agencies might affect the lives of Canadians. This amplifies earlier concerns, primarily centred on privacy issues stemming from information collection and sharing. As a result, one of our key tenets is, to the extent possible, to bring transparency and accountability to our reviews of the actions of the security and intelligence community.

Past review observations

138. As mentioned, before the National Security Act, 2017, reviews did not typically extend to the realm of action activities. For this reason, NSIRA has only a modest archive of domestic review materials from which to extrapolate themes in action reviews. NSIRA’s current focus is to build on foundational reviews to derive key themes. This report discusses NSIRA’s approach to future review in the next section. Nevertheless, some themes have emerged from past reviews of CSIS’s threat reduction measures (TRMs) — which were the only action activities reviewed in the past.

139. From the introduction of its TRM mandate in 2015 to August 2020, CSIS has not sought a warrant from the Federal Court for TRM activities. When introduced, TRM powers raised legal questions and potential issues related to the Charter. The National Security Act, 2017, addressed many of these ambiguities, and enacted new provisions that strengthened Charter protections. NSIRA will closely monitor CSIS’s use of TRMs and review its assessments of when warrants are required for TRMs. NSIRA will also be attentive to how CSIS executes any TRM conducted under the authority of a warrant — and pay close attention to the extent of CSIS’s compliance with all court directions and conditions.

CSE

140. Other themes arising in our review of action activities stem from the widespread commentary within civil society relating to CSE’s new powers to conduct ACOs and DCOs. Prior to the National Security Act, 2017, CSE’s mandates limited the organization (primarily) to observation and collection. Now, under its ACO/DCO mandates, CSE can direct actions through the global information infrastructure at the activities of foreign individuals or foreign entities outside Canada. CSE can conduct ACO activities on or through the global information infrastructure to degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities or activities of entities as they relate to international affairs, defence or security. CSE can conduct DCO activities on or through the global information infrastructure to help protect the electronic information and information infrastructures of federal institutions or those designated as being important to the Government of Canada. These powers have equivalents among those available to Five Eyes partners. They also empower CSE to play a significant, but unprecedented, role in national security action activities.

141. Civil liberties groups have identified ACO/DCO activities as a principal concern with the National Security Act, 2017, and point specifically to the absence of independent oversight (that is, pre-authorization) of these activities. Under the current statutory regime, in order for CSE to lawfully conduct ACO/DCO, the Minister of National Defence must authorize all such activities. This authorization requires the Minister to conclude that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the activity is reasonable and proportionate, having regard to the nature of the objective to be achieved and the nature of the activities. Additionally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs must approve ACO activities and must be consulted on DCO activities.

142. Ministerial authorizations for ACO/DCO activities do not require the approval of the Intelligence Commissioner, which is not the case for foreign intelligence and cybersecurity activities. There is, therefore, no scrutiny by an arm’s-length, independent body of ACO/DCO authorizations prior to their approval. This is why NSIRA considers our reviews of ACO/DCO actions to be particularly important. Unlike in the case of CSIS TRMs, CSE has no statutory obligation to notify NSIRA when it undertakes ACO/DCO activities. NSIRA intends, however, to focus proactively on these activities.

143. Although legislation limits powers such as TRMs and ACO/DCO, these activities occur in secret. This is in contrast with other types of national security actions, such as arrests made by police, which are overt and can be challenged in open court. NSIRA considers the opacity of certain types of actions to warrant future reviews. The more secret the national security action, the more essential it is for NSIRA to conduct rigorous review.

Law enforcement

144. Prior to the enactment of the National Security Act, 2017, the RCMP’s national security-related activities were reviewed by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP. Those national security-related actions are now reviewed by NSIRA. The enactment of new offences — especially terrorism offences — and a focus on terrorism have drawn police into a greater national security role. Police investigate crime, and have a role in preventing its occurrence. In doing so, police might investigate, among other things, terrorism offences, while at the same time being involved in community-based programs directed at countering radicalization to violence. They can also engage in crime prevention or risk mitigation actions that do not lead to full prosecutions. The traditional tool for holding police accountable is the criminal justice system. For example, police conduct will be scrutinized during a criminal trial. However, accountability mechanisms are less robust where police pursue national security threat disruption strategies that are not challenged in the courts. Therefore, we believe that NSIRA’s review functions will become particularly important in these circumstances.

145. The CBSA’s scrutiny of people and goods crossing the border can be triggered by intelligence shared from domestic and foreign partners or derived from its own collection and assessment efforts. CBSA actions include searches at the border and the seizure or interdiction of goods, currency and people. These searches and the CBSA’s determination that a non-Canadian might be inadmissible can have implications for people’s liberty, privacy, freedom of movement and commercial interests. NSIRA’s task is to review the CBSA’s national security and intelligence activities in an effort, among other things, to ensure that it fully complies with its legal requirements. This is especially true as, at present, no independent body currently can hear public complaints against the CBSA.

Future priorities

146. In our reviews of action activities, NSIRA makes findings and recommendations on an organization’s compliance with the law and any applicable ministerial direction and the reasonableness and necessity of its exercise of its powers. NSIRA is in a unique position to assess the Government of Canada’s visible or invisible actions and to provide assurance to Canadians that their national security and intelligence agencies are accountable in order to protect Canada’s national security interests and defend the rights and freedoms of Canadians and people residing in Canada.

147. NSIRA’s strategic plan focuses on reviewing three types of action activities: operational actions, law enforcement actions and administrative actions, defined below. In each of the following categories, NSIRA has identified certain action activities of interest that we will scrutinize in future reviews. The items listed are not necessarily part of NSIRA’s review plan but serve to highlight the breadth of situations that fall within reviews of the “action” activities undertaken by the security and intelligence community.

  • Operational: covert action activities in direct support of a national security objective. Operational actions of interest to NSIRA include: CSE’s use of ACO/DCO, to be reviewed annually; CSIS TRMs, to be reviewed annually; and CAF’s operations in theatre and on the battlefield.
  • Law enforcement: covert or overt action activities to enforce laws, investigate crimes and make arrests. Law enforcement action activities on which NSIRA might concentrate, while being sensitive to the administration of justice and the concept of police independence in investigative decisions, include the CBSA’s targeting that leads to the identification and/or interception of high-risk people, goods and conveyances that pose a threat to the security of Canadians, and RCMP investigations that could lead to detention, arrest or prosecution.
  • Administrative: visible action activities taken in the act or process of administering a statutory power entrusted by Parliament to the federal government. Administrative action activities on which NSIRA might focus include: GAC’s implementation of foreign policy and trade sanctions; the Investment Canada Act reviews of investments that could be injurious to national security; the decision to add a person to the Secure Air Travel Act list under the Passenger Protect Program; and national security-related admissibility issues.

148. As NSIRA’s capacity to conduct reviews expands, we will compile a complete picture of the actions that national security and intelligence agencies take in exercising their mandates, and assess these actions for legal compliance, reasonableness and necessity.

Part 3: Complaints

Section I— NSIRA’s complaints investigation mandate

Under the NSIRA Act, one of NSIRA’s core functions is to investigate complaints in the following instances:

  • complaints with respect to an activity carried out by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or the Communications Security Establishment (CSE);
  • complaints referred by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (CRCC) with respect to an activity by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) that is closely related to national security; and
  • complaints regarding the denial or revocation of security clearances to federal government employees and contractors.

150. Through the National Security Act, 2017, NSIRA inherited the complaints functions of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and the Office of the CSE Commissioner, which investigated complaints related to CSIS and CSE, respectively. In addition, NSIRA absorbed responsibility for investigating national security-related complaints against the RCMP. NSIRA also inherited SIRC’s complaints investigation infrastructure, but it was evident early in our mandate that the SIRC model needed to be enhanced to provide more timely and efficient investigations. NSIRA has therefore begun to rework the Rules of Procedure and enhance the overall process. NSIRA has also worked collaboratively with the RCMP and the CRCC to effectively manage national security-related complaints against the RCMP.

Section II— Synopsis of trends and key themes

151. NSIRA has experienced an increase in the volume of complaints we receive, specifically complaints against CSIS, as well as complaints relating to security clearances. In comparison to the complaints statistics in the SIRC annual report for 2017–18 and statistics for 2018–19, NSIRA has seen an increase of 40% for newly opened complaint files. In particular, complaints against CSIS have doubled and security clearance complaints have increased by 30%. NSIRA did not investigate most of the recent complaints against CSIS because we concluded that they were not in NSIRA’s jurisdiction — they did not concern an activity carried out by CSIS, or NSIRA was satisfied that the complaints were trivial, frivolous or made in bad faith.

152. The majority of the complaints received relating to the alleged denial or revocation of a security clearance did not fall within NSIRA’s mandate. Rather, it turned out they were related to a complainant’s reliability status or enhanced reliability status. NSIRA may only investigate complaints relating to security clearances, not reliability status matters. Complaints relating to reliability status generally must be challenged on judicial review in the Federal Court. As a result, NSIRA investigated very few security clearance complaints. A lesson drawn from the past year is that departments and agencies should ensure that they provide clear and accurate information regarding an individual’s rights of review and redress, and correctly identify both the nature of the security status at issue and the body to whom the person may complain as a result of being denied that status. By the same token, NSIRA is taking steps to increase the public’s awareness of our mandate, while also ensuring that complainants are informed of their redress mechanisms early on so that their rights to seek a remedy are preserved.

153. With respect to security clearance complaints investigated both by NSIRA and SIRC, some of the key issues revolved around out-of-country background checks and cases in which there was insufficient information to grant an individual a security clearance. One of the lessons derived from these types of complaints is that departments must ensure that individuals receive a written notice informing them of the reasons for the decision, if that is possible in the circumstances (i.e., such disclosure is not prohibited under federal legislation). Going forward, NSIRA will continue to encourage the parties to make efforts to informally resolve complaints at the earliest opportunity.

Section III— Whistleblower protection

154. The Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) is whistleblowing legislation that offers federal public sector employees an external mechanism to report ethical breaches and to complain about reprisals that they believe they have suffered. The PSDPA, however, specifically excludes members of CSIS, CSE and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), as well as all people who wish to make a disclosure pertaining to special operational information. CSIS, CSE and the CAF have implemented internal mechanisms for disclosure of wrongdoing, pursuant to their requirements under the PSDPA. However, the current structure offers no external reporting mechanisms for disclosures that pertain to special operational information and/or for employees from CSIS, CSE or the CAF.

155. As discussed above, a “public interest defence” is available, in certain circumstances, to Canadian whistleblowers who are permanently bound to secrecy and who have been charged with certain offences under the Security of Information Act (SOIA). This defence is available only if the accused has followed the steps outlined in the SOIA before making the disclosure to the public. The SOIA identifies NSIRA as a forum in which, under certain conditions, this kind of disclosure of wrongdoing can be made. However, the SOIA does not describe how this process is meant to function procedurally nor does it articulate the role, if any, that NSIRA should play in accepting disclosures of wrongdoing from CSIS, CSE or CAF employees.

156. In previous correspondence to the Attorney General, NSIRA identified these legislative gaps and the negative implications for national security that can occur when democratic countries have deficient protocols for whistleblowing within their national security and intelligence communities. In the interim, NSIRA will be implementing internal procedures to address concerns brought forward by members of the security and intelligence community. If the concern brought to NSIRA is not within the scope of the public interest defence under section 15 of the SOIA, NSIRA can examine the matter if it relates to NSIRA’s review mandate, pursuant to subsection 8(1) of the NSIRA Act.

157. Canada’s threat environment and national security landscape require effective and robust protections for Canada’s national secrets and for the public servants who keep these secrets. Potential legislative amendments to enhance current whistleblowing protections for members of the security and intelligence community could include amendments to the SOIA, to the PSDPA or to the NSIRA Act. A key component of any legislative amendment would be external accountability and protections akin to those of the Office of the Integrity Commissioner under the PSDPA.

Section IV— Priorities for the year ahead

158. In 2020, NSIRA is modernizing the complaints process. NSIRA’s goal remains the just, efficient investigation and resolution of complaints. Modernization is needed to adapt to the changing complaints landscape. Two priorities will guide the modernization: access to justice for self-represented complainants and a broader spectrum of tools to streamline the resolution of complaints.

159. To this end, NSIRA is updating our website and revising our forms to provide clearer directions for potential complainants. We intend to place greater emphasis on explaining NSIRA’s jurisdiction, and how to file complaints, which should assist in a complaint starting in a timely fashion and in the correct forum. Further, the website will contain a guide for self-represented complainants, so they can better navigate each step of the process and have their complaint resolved in an appropriate way.

160. One size never fits all. Each complaint that NSIRA receives calls for a unique approach. As noted, we are currently updating our Rules of Procedure. The new rules will allow for greater flexibility, efficiency and transparency. Some of the changes under consideration are the following: a discussion of expectations with a complainant at the outset; a new process for quickly deciding jurisdiction; an interview with the complainant; more options for informal resolution; quick and standardized disclosure of information between the parties; and, a requirement for declassified file summaries and chronologies. NSIRA believes these changes will allow complaints investigations to proceed more quickly and in a more efficient manner.

Part 4: Engagement and transparency

As expressed in the National Security Act, 2017 preamble, “enhanced accountability and transparency are vital to ensuring public trust and confidence in Government of Canada institutions that carry out national security or intelligence activities.” Along with public engagement, these are core values for NSIRA and we consider each to be vital to ensuring that we fulfil our mandate. The benefits of public engagement have been underscored in recent years, including through the national security consultations undertaken by the government in 2016. Engagement with stakeholders during our first year of operation helped establish connections and relationships that we will build on in the years ahead. As outlined in this section, NSIRA has taken strong steps in our first year of operation to promote increased transparency of national security and intelligence activities. In addition to our own initiatives, NSIRA will continue to encourage departments and agencies to promote transparency of their activities, including in fulfilment of the National Security Transparency Commitment.

Section I— Engagement

162. In 2019, NSIRA launched a series of public engagements to increase awareness about the organization, to expand our network, and to deepen our understanding of Canadians’ concerns with respect to national security and intelligence activities. In 2019 and into 2020, we undertook engagement sessions throughout the country with various stakeholders, including academics, civil society, law enforcement and government organizations.

163. These sessions provided a valuable opportunity for NSIRA to hear from stakeholders about programs and issues that they recommended for NSIRA review, as well as the privacy and civil liberties risks they felt these programs presented. The uniformly positive feedback that NSIRA received from stakeholders demonstrated the value of these engagements.

164. Internationally, NSIRA continues to be actively involved with the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council, which allows NSIRA to: advance our knowledge of cross-cutting international themes in the area of national security and intelligence accountability; share priorities and compare best practices; collaborate on key issues of mutual interest; and promote coordinated review of issues of international importance.

165. Over the coming year NSIRA intends to continue our program of outreach and engagement. We will take advantage of opportunities to connect with stakeholders nationally and internationally via videoconference and, where possible, in person. In the year ahead, engagement will focus on four key areas:

  • expanding our network with respect to issues related to new and emerging technologies (including artificial intelligence), to better understand their use as well as the risks and opportunities they present from a national security accountability perspective;
  • broadening our dialogue with stakeholders to inform future review priorities;
  • building new relationships with community groups to demystify the complaints investigation process; and
  • scaling up recruitment efforts to ensure we continue to build an elite workforce with a diverse set of skills and backgrounds.

Section II— Transparency

166. NSIRA has taken a number of steps to increase openness and transparency related to our work and the work of the national security and intelligence community. We established a Twitter account early in our mandate, which we are using to share content, provide updates on our work and provide a platform for dialogue on security-related issues.

Redaction and writing for release

167. Over recent months, NSIRA has begun publishing reports from our predecessor organization, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), that had been redacted for release to individuals who had applied to see the reports through the Access to Information Act. Under the Access to Information Act, the reports only had to be made available to the applicant. To support transparency, NSIRA plans to gradually publish online redacted versions of all SIRC reviews, from 1985 to 2019, which involves more than 270 reports.

168. To complement this initiative, NSIRA also wishes to proactively redact and release future NSIRA reports as they are approved and translated throughout the year, rather than waiting for the release of our annual report to publicize our findings and recommendations. This aims to enhance the timeliness and relevance of NSIRA’s work to public discourse on national security and intelligence issues. It also means that we can devote more time and space in future annual reports to discussing and analyzing horizontal or thematic trends, rather than individual (or vertical) reviews or issues.

169. NSIRA is working with departments and agencies to ensure that this new approach takes place in such a way that vital national security and intelligence information is protected, while at the same time providing the public with as much insight as possible into the results of our reviews. On a case-by-case basis, relevant ministers will be offered an opportunity to raise concerns with respect to the release of specific reports.

170. To facilitate redaction efforts and release reports in an efficient and timely manner, NSIRA has committed to making efforts to “write for release.” This method includes writing as much as possible at an unclassified level, including unclassified executive summaries; clearly identifying within a report what portions contain classified information; and leaving classified information out of the body of the report where possible and, instead, including it in footnotes or annexes.

Conclusion

171. We are very proud of NSIRA’s achievements during our first five months of operation. We have an ambitious agenda for the year ahead, despite the constraints imposed by the pandemic. We have set in motion a review plan that covers multiple issues over the coming year and will involve numerous departments and agencies. We are in the midst of significantly overhauling our complaints investigation process, with the aim of making it more accessible for all. We will also expand our corporate infrastructure to facilitate our growth over the years ahead, including through the acquisition of additional office space and the hiring of talented new staff.

172. We look forward to deepening our relations with other review and oversight bodies in Canada and internationally, as well as with diverse stakeholder groups to ensure that our work is as effective and as meaningful as possible. On that note, we hope that this report is useful. We encourage all readers to tell us their thoughts on the format, the content, and any aspects that we can improve in the next iteration.

173. We are very grateful to our staff for continuing to achieve strong results despite the challenges that the ongoing pandemic has presented. We look forward to tackling the many challenges and opportunities that await us in the year ahead.

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