Language selection

Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

Search

Category: CSE

Departmental Plan: 2026-2027

Departmental Plan: 2026-2027

Date of Publishing:

Results at a glance

This departmental plan details National Security and Intelligence Agency Secretariat’s (NSIRA Secretariat) priorities, plans, and associated costs for the upcoming three fiscal years.

These plans align with the priorities outlined in NSIRA’s Vision, mission, raison d’être and operating context.

Key priorities

NSIRA Secretariat identified the following five key priorities for 2026-27: 

  • Mandatory and high‑impact reviews are completed within statutory and calendar‑year timelines.
  • Review timelines become more predictable, with earlier identification and mitigation of schedule risks.
  • Clear, operationalized procedures for all phases of complaints involving the RCMP and CBSA in preparation for the coming into force of the PCRC Act, supported by a finalized MOU with the CRCC/PCRC.
  • Improved coordination with the CRCC/PCRC to support a smooth transition to the new complaint investigation regime, promoting procedural efficiency and timeliness.
  • NSIRA Secretariat sustains a stable, fully staffed, and skilled workforce across its review, operational, and legal functions to ensure timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations.

Comprehensive Expenditure Review 

As part of meeting this review’s targets, NSIRA Secretariat must plan the following spending reductions:

  • 2026-27: $ 1.3M
  • 2027-28: $ 1.8M
  • 2028-29: $ 2.7M

It is anticipated that these spending reductions will involve a decrease of approximately 12 full-time equivalents by 2028-29.

NSIRA Secretariat will achieve these reductions by doing the following:

  • Reducing operations and maintenances costs to the extent possible
  • Reducing the number of FTEs required to meet our remaining savings targets, recognizing the impact this may have on our ability to deliver on our mandate.

The figures in this departmental plan reflect these reductions.

Highlights for NSIRA Secretariat in 2026-27

The NSIRA Secretariat will focus on sustaining its ability to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations as it prepares for a more complex review environment. The organization’s priorities reflect the dual need to uphold statutory obligations while ensuring operational readiness for the coming into force of the Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC) Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

A central focus for the year will be ensuring that mandatory and high‑impact reviews are completed within statutory and calendar‑year timelines. This work directly supports NSIRA’s mandate to provide rigorous, independent review of national security and intelligence activities. To achieve this, the NSIRA Secretariat will intensify efforts to make review timelines more predictable, with improved early identification of risks and targeted mitigation strategies. Strengthening our internal planning and coordination practices and streamlining review processes will be essential to deliver high‑quality outputs within established timeframes.

At the same time, the NSIRA Secretariat will advance major initiatives to ensure the organization is fully prepared for the transition to the new complaint investigation regime created by the PCRC Act. This includes establishing clear, operationalized procedures for all phases of complaints involving the RCMP and CBSA, supported by the finalization of a revised Memorandum of Understanding with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC)/Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC). These foundational procedures will ensure NSIRA’s investigative processes are consistent, transparent, and aligned with the new legislative requirements.

Close collaboration with the CRCC/PCRC will be another priority. Enhanced coordination mechanisms will support a smooth transition to the new reality and promote procedural efficiency. Joint planning, information‑sharing protocols, and alignment of investigative expectations will help ensure operational readiness when the Act comes into force.

Across both the reviews and investigations programs, the NSIRA Secretariat will prioritize efforts to sustain a stable, fully staffed, and skilled workforce capable of meeting growing operational demands.

Collectively, these initiatives ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat is well positioned to support the Agency in fulfilling its statutory obligations, responding effectively to legislative change.

In 2026-27, total planned spending (including internal services) for NSIRA Secretariat is $18,438,436 and total planned full-time equivalent staff (including internal services) is 85.  

Summary of planned results

The following provides a summary of the results the department plans to achieve in 2026-27 under its main areas of activity, called “core responsibilities.”

Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations

The NSIRA Secretariat will strive to sustain its capacity to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations while preparing for the new complaint investigation mandate under the PCRC Act. To support readiness for the new complaints’ regime, the NSIRA Secretariat will establish clear procedures for handling RCMP and CBSA complaints and finalize a revised MOU with the CRCC/PCRC, ensuring efficient investigations and a smooth transition. A stable, skilled, and fully staffed workforce will remain central to meeting growing operational demands. Together, these efforts will enhance the Secretariat’s ability to support the Agency in meeting its investigative mandate and maintaining public trust as the national security and accountability landscape evolves.

Planned spending: $ 10,599,557

Planned human resources: 54

More information about National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations  can be found in the full plan.

For complete information on the NSIRA Secretariat’s total planned spending and human resources, read the Planned spending and human resources section of the full plan.

From the Executive Director

I am pleased to present the 2026–27 Departmental Plan for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat. This plan outlines the priorities that will guide our work as we continue to support the Agency in delivering rigorous, independent review that upholds accountability and strengthens public trust in Canada’s accountability framework.

The Secretariat’s role remains to provide the expertise, infrastructure, and operational support necessary for the Agency to effectively fulfill its mandate. In 2026–27, we will focus on maintaining our capacity to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations despite budget reductions. Predictable planning, stronger coordination, and streamlined internal processes will be used. Meeting statutory timelines for mandatory and high‑impact reviews will remain a core priority, as will improving our ability to anticipate and mitigate risks.

A significant area of work will involve preparing for evolving legislative responsibilities around the PCRC Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the CBSA. The Secretariat will continue to refine its procedures, documentation, and operational readiness to ensure that future complaint investigations are handled as consistently and transparently as expected by members of the public, and in alignment with the Agency’s mandate.

Our people remain central to our success. Sustaining a stable, skilled, and fully staffed workforce across all review, operational, and legal functions is essential to meeting increasing demands. This will prove challenging in the context of funding reductions affecting the Secretariat.

The coming period will bring both opportunities and operational pressures, including greater complexity in review work and a broader investigative landscape. At the same time, the Secretariat must navigate resource constraints arising from government‑wide expenditure reductions, which limit its flexibility at a moment when the scope and technical footprint of national security and intelligence activities continue to grow at great speed. The Secretariat will continue to strive to advance its work with professionalism, adaptability, and a strong commitment to sound stewardship.

I want to express my appreciation to the Secretariat’s employees for their remarkable dedication, expertise, and resolute commitment to strengthening Canada’s national security accountability framework. I encourage you to explore this plan to see how the NSIRA Secretariat will advance its work in support of the Agency’s mandate.

Charles Fugère
Executive Director
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat

Plans to deliver on core responsibilities and internal services

Core responsibilities and internal services:

  • Core responsibility 1: National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations
  • Internal services

Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations

Description

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat (NSIRA Secretariat) supports the Agency, which reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary. The NSIRA Secretariat also supports the Agency in investigating complaints from members of the public on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security related complaints. The NSIRA Secretariat’s support of the Agency contributes to strengthening accountability and enhancing public confidence in Government of Canada institutions.

Quality of life impacts

This core responsibility contributes to the “Good Governance” domain of the Quality of Life Framework for Canada and, more specifically, “Confidence in institutions”, “Discrimination and unfair treatment”, and “Resolution of serious legal problems”, through all the activities mentioned in the core responsibility description.

Indicators, results and targets

This section presents details on the department’s indicators, the actual results from the three most recently reported fiscal years, the targets and target dates for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations. Details are presented by departmental result.

Table 1: NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to inform Ministers and Canadians whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary.

Table 1 provides a summary of the target and actual results for each indicator associated with the results under National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations.
Indicator Actual Results Target Date to achieve
Percentage of all mandatory reviews undertaken under NSIRA’s direction that are completed within the calendar year 2022-23: 100%
2023-24:100%
2024-25:100% 		100% December 31, 2027
Average number of months to complete Secretariat activities in support of NSIRA reviews. 2022-23: NA*
2023-24: 20 months
2024-25: 16 months 		12 months March 31, 2027

* Data for the reporting year in question are not available. As the indicator was established after the reference period, no data collection had been undertaken. Consequently, no results can be reported for that fiscal year. Results will be available for subsequent fiscal years.

Table 2: NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to independently investigate national security-related complaints in a timely manner.

Table 2 provides a summary of the target and actual results for each indicator associated with the results under National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations.
Indicator Actual Results Target Date to achieve
Percentage of investigations completed within the NSIRA Secretariat service standards 2022-23: 100%
2023-24: 100%
2024-25: 100% 		100% March 31, 2027

Additional information on the detailed results and performance information  for the NSRIA Secretariat’s program inventory is available on GC InfoBase.

Plans to achieve results

The following section describes the planned results for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations in 2026-27.

NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to inform Ministers and Canadians whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary.

To uphold its mandate, NSIRA will continue to deliver independent, timely, and high‑quality reviews that strengthen accountability across Canada’s national security and intelligence community. The NSIRA Secretariat will support this work by sustaining strong performance against all legislated obligations. This includes enabling NSIRA to maintain a 100% completion rate of all mandatory reviews within the calendar year, as required under its mandate. The Secretariat will also ensure that all secretariat support activities for both mandatory and discretionary reviews are completed within an average timeframe of 12 months or less.

Results we plan to achieve
  • Mandatory and high‑impact reviews are completed within statutory and calendar‑year timelines.
  • Review timelines become more predictable, with earlier identification and mitigation of risks.
  • Reviews are delivered more consistently and efficiently due to standardized workflows and tools.
  • NSIRA sustains its mandated outputs and quality within existing resources.
  • Governance structures enable timely, transparent, and accountable decision‑making.
  • Risks related to workload, reviewee dependencies, and capacity are identified and mitigated effectively.
  • NSIRA maintains a stable, skilled workforce capable of delivering complex reviews.
  • Employee resilience supports continuity of operations during organizational and fiscal change.
  • Reviewers have strengthened competencies in methodology, analysis, and project delivery.
  • Workforce well‑being and effective change‑management support sustained organizational performance.

The NSIRA Secretariat will strengthen the operational foundation needed to support timely and independent investigations of national security‑related complaints. This includes modernizing NSIRA’s investigative procedures, streamlining processes to handle certain types of complaints more efficiently, and maintaining a skilled, multi‑disciplinary investigative workforce. The Secretariat will also work closely with partners to prepare for the new Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC) Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). including developing procedures for RCMP and CBSA‑related complaints and establishing required data‑reporting mechanisms. These efforts will help ensure that NSIRA continues to deliver fair, high‑quality complaint investigations.

Results we plan to achieve
  • Streamlined processes for addressing high‑volume or narrowly scoped complaint types, improving timeliness and overall investigative efficiency.
  • A maintained multi‑disciplinary investigative workforce with the expertise required to enhance the professionalization and quality of NSIRA’s complaint investigations.
  • Clear, operationalized procedures for all phases of complaints involving the RCMP and CBSA in preparation for the coming into force of the PCRC Act, supported by a finalized MOU with the Civilian Review and Complainants Commission (CRCC)/ Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC).
  • Effective mechanisms for aligning with the PCRC’s statutory obligation under the PCRC Act with respect to reporting race‑based and other demographic data on complaints, including those referred by the PCRC to NSIRA.
  • Contribution to Public Safety’s development of PCRC Act Regulations that reinforce institutional independence, create robust information sharing between NSIRA and PCRC and enhance the efficiency and timeliness of NSIRA’s investigative mandate.

Gender-based Analysis Plus

The NSIRA Secretariat will advance its commitment to integrating gender and diversity considerations by moving toward the implementation of its renewed GBA Plus Framework. Early implementation efforts will focus on strengthening foundational capacity in the area of data collection. This includes assessing current data practices, identifying relevant indicators, and exploring methods to enhance the collection and use of disaggregated data where appropriate. These efforts will help build the basis for more consistent monitoring and future reporting on the differential impacts of the Secretariat’s activities, supporting a more inclusive and evidence‑informed approach to oversight and review.

Planned resources to achieve results

Table 3: Planned resources to achieve results for National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations
Table 3 provides a summary of the planned spending and full-time equivalents required to achieve results.
Resource Planned
Spending $10,599,557
Full-time equivalents 54

Complete financial and human resources information for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat’s program inventory is available on GC InfoBase.

Program inventory

National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations is supported by the following programs:

  • National Security and Intelligence Activity Reviews and Complaints Investigations

Additional information related to the program inventory for the National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations is available on the Results page on GC InfoBase.

Summary of changes to reporting framework since last year

  • Revised departmental result: From “Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary” to “NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to inform Ministers and Canadians whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary”.
  • Revised departmental result indicator: From “All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis” to “Percentage of all mandatory reviews undertaken under NSIRA’s direction that are completed within the calendar year”.
  • Removed indicator: “Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year”.
  • Added indicator: “Average number of months to complete Secretariat activities in support of NSIRA reviews”.

Internal services

Description

Internal services are the services that are provided within a department so that it can meet its corporate obligations and deliver its programs. There are 9 categories of internal services:

  • management and oversight services
  • communications services
  • human resources management services
  • financial management services
  • information management services
  • information technology services
  • real property management services
  • materiel management services
  • acquisition management services

Plans to achieve results

This section presents details the department’s plans to achieve results and meet targets for internal services.

Internal Services enable the NSIRA Secretariat to operate effectively and uphold its commitment to transparency, integrity, and accountable governance. Through strong communications, prudent financial management, strategic HR practices, robust information governance, digital innovation, and strengthened risk management, these functions provide the foundational support needed to advance the Secretariat’s mandate and ensure excellence in service delivery.

Ensuring Effective Communications

Through proactive communication efforts, the Communications team plays a key role in promoting public trust and reinforcing NSIRA’s mission to serve as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians. The team will continue to support the Agency and Secretariat by providing strategic communications advice, producing both internal and external content, managing media relations, and enhancing NSIRA’s digital presence across the web and social media platforms. These efforts ensure that information reaches diverse audiences, aligning with NSIRA’s values.

Financial Management Services 

The NSIRA Secretariat will continue to take steps to ensure resources are deployed in the most effective and efficient manner possible, and its operations and administrative structures, tools, and processes continue to focus on supporting the delivery of its priorities. The NSIRA Secretariat will work to implement the newly developed the finance and procurement frameworks. We will work to adapt to the new reality created because of the Comprehensive Expenditure Review, ensuring expenditures are monitored diligently.

Strategic Human Resources Focus

Human resources (HR) management remains a critical enabler in helping the Secretariat achieve its organizational objectives, ensuring that investments in people translate into measurable improvements in performance, integrity and service quality.  The HR strategic focus emphasizes ensuring effective workforce management aligned with the Comprehensive Expenditure Review, while supporting the Secretariat in strengthening employee competencies and performance management practices. Ongoing efforts include implementing HR initiatives that reflect the NSIRA’s mission, vision, and values, and reinforcing a values-based culture across the organization. The Secretariat also continues to enhance organizational governance through the management of conflict of interest matters and the consistent application of high standards of values and ethics. Sustained prioritization of wellness programs and well-being initiatives continues to foster an engaged, healthy, and resilient workforce, an essential asset during periods of continuous change and uncertainty.

Strengthening Information Governance and Lifecycle Stewardship

The NSIRA Secretariat will fully implement its new Disposition Authority and strengthen its information management governance. The Secretariat will also enhance its use of IM technologies, ensuring compliance, improving access to information, and supporting more effective information handling across the organization. Additionally, the Secretariat will continue to pursue digitization initiatives, transforming paper-based records into digital formats to streamline access, management, and long-term preservation. These initiatives will provide a solid foundation for managing records and data assets while improving operational efficiency.

Accessibility Posture and Digital Innovation

The NSIRA Secretariat will continue strengthening its accessibility posture while digitally innovating its internal and external web platforms. The Secretariat will explore ways to visually showcase and highlight its work through these platforms, while also providing new ways to keep Canadians and the public informed and updated on the organization’s activities. It will also review its full Information Technology footprint to identify opportunities for improvements and efficiencies, while continuing to strengthen internal and external communications to support the department’s broader goals, enhance service delivery, foster collaboration, and optimize operations.

Strengthening Risk Management Frameworks

The NSIRA Secretariat will enhance its risk management capabilities by reviewing and updating security controls and policies to address gaps, eliminate outdated practices, and integrate emerging risks. This will be supported by comprehensive risk assessments alongside initiatives to foster a strong risk-aware culture where employees clearly understand their role in managing risks. A key priority will be investing in risk awareness and accountability training, equipping the NSIRA Secretariat with the knowledge and tools needed to identify and mitigate risks effectively. These actions will strengthen organizational resilience, safeguard critical assets, and ensure continuity in achieving departmental objectives.

Together, these Internal Services initiatives reinforce the Secretariat’s capacity to deliver credible oversight, maintain public trust, and adapt to emerging demands. By enhancing communication, governance, workforce capability, digital and information stewardship, and organizational resilience, they directly support the achievement of departmental results and strengthen NSIRA’s ability to serve Canadians effectively.

Planned resources to achieve results

Table 4: Planned resources to achieve results for internal services this year

Table 4 provides a summary of the planned spending and full-time equivalents required to achieve results.

Resource Planned
Spending $7,838,879
Full-time equivalents 31

Complete financial and human resources information for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat’s program inventory is available on GC InfoBase.

Planning for contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses

Government of Canada departments are to meet a target of awarding at least 5% of the total value of contracts to Indigenous businesses each year.

The NSIRA Secretariat achieved this goal in 24-25 and forecasts to continue to do so in the coming years.

Measures to meet the mandatory target include on-going training and awareness of the Indigenous Business Directory for cost centre managers as well as procurement staff.

Table 5: Percentage of contracts planned and awarded to Indigenous businesses

Table 5 presents the current, actual results with forecasted and planned results for the total percentage of contracts the department awarded to Indigenous businesses.

5% Reporting Field 2024–25 Actual Resul 2025–26 Forecasted Result 2023–24 Planned Result
Total percentage of contracts with Indigenous businesses 10% 5% 5%

Department-wide considerations

Key risks

The Secretariat’s primary organizational risk in 2026–27 stems from the resource constraints created by the Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER). These reductions intersect with growing operational demands, rising complexity in national security and intelligence activities, and an expanding investigative landscape. Together, these pressures reduce flexibility across core functions and heighten the risk that the Secretariat will be unable to sustain the same depth, breadth, and timeliness of support to the Agency. While internal efficiencies and strengthened financial oversight will help mitigate impacts, the CER creates structural pressures that will continue to influence operational performance throughout the planning period.

The resource constraints introduced by the CER also limit the Secretariat’s ability to invest in innovation, modernization, and process improvements that support high‑quality oversight. Enhancements to tools, methodologies, and practices normally essential in keeping pace with increasingly complex national security and intelligence activities will be more difficult to advance under current fiscal conditions. This constrains the Secretariat’s capacity to adopt new analytical techniques that are dependent on increased investments in technology. . As a result, the organization must balance its commitment to delivering timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations with reduced flexibility to modernize or introduce new approaches that enhance effectiveness over the longer term.

Resource limitations will directly affect the timeliness of investigations in 2026–27. This risk is amplified by the significant surge in complaints received in recent years, driven primarily by systemic delays in immigration application processes. The sharp increase in caseload volume requires substantial analytical, legal, and administrative effort, and under current resource conditions will create delays in addressing both existing and new complaints. Without the ability to supplement capacity, the Secretariat faces increased pressure in meeting expectations for timely access to justice and maintaining service standards in investigative work. In addition, the Agency and Secretariat are expected to absorb a significant additional workload arising from the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). This is expected to come into force in 2026-27. No additional resources were contemplated by the government for NSIRA in relation to this work.

Legal Services within the NSIRA Secretariat and to the Review Agency are provided in-house owing to the requirement for NSIRA to operate independently from Government. Moreover, the Department of Justice Canada (DOJ) does not readily accept to represent NSIRA or its Secretariat in litigation before the courts as the DOJ often finds itself in an adversarial position to NSIRA when it carries out its reviews and investigations and in litigation files. Given this operational reality, and as a micro-organization, the NSIRA Secretariat traditionally utilized contracts with external law firms for the provision of litigation services on an as needed basis. Our reduced O&M budget for FY 2026-27 means that no funding has been allocated for the external provision of litigation services. Litigation capacity will have to be absorbed in-house for both existing litigation matters, and any new litigation involving NSIRA or its Secretariat that may come before the courts–including litigation instituted by other federal government organizations against NSIRA or its Secretariat. This will represent a corresponding reduction in the capacity to provide advisory Legal Services in support of reviews, investigations and internal services, and thus impact delivery on core responsibilities.

Planned spending and human resources 

This section provides an overview of NSIRA Secretariat’s planned spending and human resources for the next three fiscal years and of planned spending for 2026-27 with actual spending from previous years.

Spending

This section presents an overview of the department’s planned expenditures from 2023-24 to 2028-29.

Budgetary performance summary

Table 6 Three-year spending summary for core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)

Table 6 Three-year spending summary for core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)

Table 6presents NSIRA Secretariat’s spending over the past three years to carry out its core responsibilities and for internal services. Amounts for the 2025–26 fiscal year are forecasted based on spending to date.

Core Responsibilities and Internal Services 2023-2024 Actual Expenditures 2024-25 Actual Expenditures 2025-2026 Forecast Spending
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations $9,110,398 $10,856,293/td> $10,916,634
Subtotal $9,110,398 $10,856,293 $10,916,634
Internal services $10,535,328 $7,983,206 $8,628,304
Total $19,645,726 $18,839,499 $19,544,937

Analysis of the past three years of spending

While planned spending appears to have increased from 2024-25 to 2025-26, it is likely, based on historical forecasting results, that the actuals for 2025-26 will come in similar to or lower than 2024-25 actuals.  The decrease from 2023-24 to 2024-25 is due to a large capital infrastructure project that was completed in 2023-24 so the inflated expenditures in internal services stopped in 2023-24. We are seeing a gradual increase in both ongoing O&M expenditures and particularly in salaries, due to the growth of the organization and the approach towards a steady state.

More financial information from previous years is available on the Finances section of GC Infobase.

Table 7 Planned three-year spending on core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)

Table7 presents NSIRA Secretariat’s planned spending over the next three years by core responsibilities and for internal services.

Core Responsibilities and Internal Services 2026–27 Planned Spending 2027–28 Planned Spending 2028–29 Planned Spending
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations $10,599,557 $10,293,901 $9,682,300
Subtotal $10,599,557 $10,293,901 $9,682,300
Internal services $7,838,879 $7,701,302 $7,456,666
Total $18,438,436 $17,995,203 $17,138,966
Analysis of the next three years of spending

Due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review that was undertaken in 2025-26, expenditures will decrease in the coming three fiscal years according to the prescribed targets from Treasury Board.

More detailed financial information on planned spending is available on the Finances section of GC Infobase.

Funding

This section provides an overview of the department’s voted and statutory funding for its core responsibilities and for internal services. For further information on funding authorities, consult the Government of Canada budgets and expenditures.

Graph 1: Approved funding (statutory and voted) over a six-year period

Graph 1 summarizes the department’s approved voted and statutory funding from 2023-24 to 2028-29.

Fiscal Year Total Voted Statutory
2023–24 $24,388,394 $22,633,165 $1,755,229
2024–25 $19,458,632 $17,857,264 $1,601,368
2025–26 $20,425,774 $18,517,997 $1,907,777
2026–27 $18,438,436 $16,389,075 $2,049,361
2027–28 $17,995,203 $15,962,458 $2,032,745
2028–29 $17,138,966 $15,274,167 $1,864,799

Analysis of statutory and voted funding over a six-year period

Due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review that was undertaken in 2025-26, funding will decrease in the coming three fiscal years according to the prescribed targets from Treasury Board.

For further information on NSIRA Secretariat’s departmental appropriations, consult the 2026-27 Main Estimates.

Future-oriented condensed statement of operations

The future-oriented condensed statement of operations provides an overview of NSIRA Secretariat’s operations for 2025-26 to 2026-27.

Table 8 Future-oriented condensed statement of operations for the year ended March 31, 2027 (dollars)

Table 8 summarizes the expenses and revenues which net to the cost of operations before government funding and transfers for 2025-26 to 2026-27. The forecast and planned amounts in this statement of operations were prepared on an accrual basis. The forecast and planned amounts presented in other sections of the Departmental Plan were prepared on an expenditure basis. Amounts may therefore differ.

Financial Information 2025–26 Forecast Results 2026–27 Planned Results Difference (Planned Results minus Forecasted)
Total expenses $22,205,341 $21,038,245 $1,167,095
Total revenues $0 $0 $0
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers $22,205,341 $21,038,245 $1,167,095

Analysis of forecasted and planned results

The decrease in expenses is due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review cuts.

A more detailed Future-Oriented Statement of Operations and associated Notes for 2026-27, including a reconciliation of the net cost of operations with the requested authorities, is available on NSIRA Secretariat’s website.

Human resources

This section presents an overview of the department’s actual and planned human resources from 2023-24 to 2028-29. 

Table 9: Actual human resources for core responsibilities and internal services

Table 9 shows a summary of human resources, in full-time equivalents, for NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for the previous three fiscal years. Human resources for the 2025–26 fiscal year are forecasted based on year to date. 

Core Responsibilities and Internal Services 2023–24 Actual Full-time Equivalents 2024–25 Actual Full-time Equivalents 2025–26 Forecasted Full-time Equivalents
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations 51 58 69
Subtotal 51 58 69
Internal services 24 29 31
Total 75 87 100

Analysis of human resources over the last three years

Over the last three fiscal years, the Secretariat’s full‑time equivalent (FTE) levels have remained relatively stable, reflecting steady workforce planning in support of its mandate. During this period, staffing levels were sustained through targeted recruitment and low turnover, allowing the organization to maintain core capacity while continuing to build specialized expertise in review, investigative, and corporate functions. Operational demands and caseload complexity continued to grow, underscoring the importance of sustaining a skilled and stable workforce. While staffing remained consistent through 2025–26, the Secretariat anticipates increased pressure on workforce levels beginning in 2026–27 as new fiscal constraints take effect.

Table 10: Human resources planning summary for core responsibilities and internal services

Table 10 shows information on human resources, in full-time equivalents, for each of NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services planned for the next three years.

Core Responsibilities and Internal Services 2026–27 Planned Full-time Equivalents 2027–28 Planned Full-time Equivalents 2028–29 Planned Full-time Equivalents
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations 54 54 54
Subtotal 54 54 54
Internal services 31 31 31
Total 85 85 85

Analysis of human resources for the next three years

 In the context of the Comprehensive Expenditure Request (CER), the organization was required to undertake a review of its planned workforce levels in order to meet externally established financial targets. As a result, certain positions will be abolished and reductions to the overall size of the workforce will be implemented. These measures will be applied in the first year of the planning horizon (2026–27) to comply with the required expenditure levels and to stabilize planned full-time equivalent levels in subsequent years. The organization continues to manage these impacts while maintaining its core capacity to deliver on its mandate. 

Federal tax expenditures

NSIRA Secretariat’s Departmental Plan does not include information on tax expenditures.

The tax system can be used to achieve public policy objectives through the application of special measures such as low tax rates, exemptions, deductions, deferrals and credits. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for these measures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures.

This report also provides detailed background information on tax expenditures, including descriptions, objectives, historical information and references to related federal spending programs as well as evaluations and GBA Plus of tax expenditures.

Corporate information

Departmental profile

Appropriate minister(s): The Right Honourable Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada

Institutional head: Charles Fugère, Executive Director

Ministerial portfolio: Privy Council Office

Enabling instrument(s): National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act

Year of incorporation / commencement: 2019

Departmental contact information

Mailing address:

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat P.O. Box 2430, Station B

Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5W5

Email:  info@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Website(s): nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Appendix: definitions

appropriation (crédit)

Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

budgetary expenditures (dépenses budgétaires)

Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, organizations or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.

core responsibility (responsabilité essentielle)

An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a core responsibility are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence. 

Departmental Plan (plan ministériel)

A report on the plans and expected performance of an appropriated department over a 3year period. Departmental Plans are usually tabled in Parliament each spring. 

departmental result (résultat ministériel)

A consequence or outcome that a department seeks to achieve. A departmental result is often outside departments’ immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes. 

departmental result indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel)

A quantitative measure of progress on a departmental result.

departmental results framework (cadre ministériel des résultats)

A framework that connects the department’s core responsibilities to its departmental results and departmental result indicators.

Departmental Results Report (rapport sur les résultats ministériels)

A report on a department’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.

full‑time equivalent (équivalent temps plein)

A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person‑year charge against a departmental budget. For a particular position, the full‑time equivalent figure is the ratio of number of hours the person actually works divided by the standard number of hours set out in the person’s collective agreement.

gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus) (analyse comparative entre les sexes plus [ACS Plus])

Is an analytical tool used to support the development of responsive and inclusive policies, programs, and other initiatives. GBA Plus is a process for understanding who is impacted by the issue or opportunity being addressed by the initiative; identifying how the initiative could be tailored to meet diverse needs of the people most impacted; and anticipating and mitigating any barriers to accessing or benefitting from the initiative. GBA Plus is an intersectional analysis that goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences to consider other factors, such as age, disability, education, ethnicity, economic status, geography (including rurality), language, race, religion, and sexual orientation. 

Using GBA Plus involves taking a gender- and diversity-sensitive approach to our work. Considering all intersecting identity factors as part of GBA Plus, not only sex and gender, is a Government of Canada commitment. 

government priorities (priorités gouvernementales)

For the purpose of the 2026-27 Departmental Plan, government priorities are the high-level themes outlining the government’s agenda in the most recent 2025 Speech from the Throne.    

horizontal initiative (initiative horizontale)

An initiative where two or more federal departments are given funding to pursue a shared outcome, often linked to a government priority.  

Indigenous business (entreprise autochtones) 

Requirements for verifying Indigenous businesses for the purposes of the departmental result report are available through the Indigenous Services Canada Mandatory minimum 5% Indigenous procurement target website.

non‑budgetary expenditures (dépenses non budgétaires)

Non-budgetary authorities that comprise assets and liabilities transactions for loans, investments and advances, or specified purpose accounts, that have been established under specific statutes or under non-statutory authorities in the Estimates and elsewhere. Non-budgetary transactions are those expenditures and receipts related to the government’s financial claims on, and obligations to, outside parties. These consist of transactions in loans, investments and advances; in cash and accounts receivable; in public money received or collected for specified purposes; and in all other assets and liabilities. Other assets and liabilities, not specifically defined in G to P authority codes are to be recorded to an R authority code, which is the residual authority code for all other assets and liabilities.

performance (rendement)

What a department did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the department intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified. 

performance indicator (indicateur de rendement)

A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an organization, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.

plan (plan)

The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how a department intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally, a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead to the expected result. 

planned spending (dépenses prévues)

For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts presented in Main Estimates. 

A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports.

program (programme)

Individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels. 

program inventory (répertoire des programmes)

Identifies all the department’s programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department’s core responsibilities and results.

result (résultat)

A consequence attributed, in part, to a department, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single department, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the department’s influence. 

statutory expenditures (dépenses législatives)

Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made. 

target (cible)

A measurable performance or success level that an organization, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.

voted expenditures (dépenses votées)

Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an appropriation act. The vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2024: Report

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2024

Report

Date of Publishing:

List of Acronyms

CBSA Canada Border Services Agency
CFIA Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CRA Canada Revenue Agency
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DND/CAF Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces
FINTRAC Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
GAC Global Affairs Canada
GC Government of Canada
IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
NSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
PHAC Public Health Agency of Canada
PS Public Safety Canada
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCIDA Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
TC Transport Canada

Glossary of Terms

Contribution test The first part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (paragraph 5(1)(a)).
Proportionality test The second part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances (paragraph 5(1)(b)).

Executive Summary

This review assessed Government of Canada (GC) institutions’ compliance with the disclosure and record-keeping requirements of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) throughout 2024. The review also captured the volume of SCIDA disclosures and identified trends in its application across GC institutions over time.

NSIRA found that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) generally complied with their record-keeping obligations under the SCIDA.

Due to the substantial increase of nearly 300% in disclosures from IRCC to CSIS in 2024, NSIRA focused its review primarily on these two institutions.

During the review period, IRCC and CSIS implemented a tiered request and disclosure process which reduced the amount of third-party information disclosed by IRCC, contributing to enhanced compliance with the SCIDA. However, NSIRA found instances when the information provided to IRCC by CSIS was limited and hampered IRCC’s ability to fulfill its obligations as a disclosing institution to satisfy itself that the information disclosed is in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada.

In addition, NSIRA found that IRCC lacked a formal policy governing the disclosure of information about minors.

NSIRA found that CSE, in three of its requests for information under the SCIDA, provided IRCC with more information than was relevant to its disclosures.

NSIRA made four recommendations designed to ensure that institutions minimize the privacy impact to individuals in their requests and disclosures under the SCIDA.

With regard to the SCIDA’s requirement in subsection 5.1(1) that recipient institutions destroy or return unnecessary personal information, NSIRA found that CSIS may not have complied in its retention of one disclosure containing erroneous personal information.

1. Introduction

Authority

This review was conducted under the authority of paragraphs 8(1)(a), 8(1)(b), and subsection 39(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (“NSIRA Act”).

In accordance with section 39 of the NSIRA Act, this review fulfills NSIRA’s requirement to submit an annual report to the Minister of Public Safety regarding disclosures made under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA, or the Act) in the preceding calendar year.

Scope

The objective of this review was to assess Government of Canada (GC) institutions’ compliance with the SCIDA’s disclosure and record-keeping requirements in 2024. The review also tracked the volume of SCIDA disclosures, analyzed usage patterns across institutions and over time, and examined how GC institutions employed information-sharing agreements.

The review’s assessment of compliance was limited to GC institutions that disclosed or received information under the SCIDA in 2024: the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

Methodology

The review was primarily based on records provided to NSIRA by disclosing and recipient institutions under subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA. It was supplemented by an examination of the institutions’ SCIDA policies and procedures, as well as their responses to related information requests.

NSIRA assessed administrative and substantive compliance with the SCIDA’s record-keeping requirements for all disclosures made by CBSA, CSE, GAC, and the RCMP. With respect to disclosures from IRCC to CSIS, NSIRA reviewed a random representative sample of 250 disclosures.

Review Statements

The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA rights of timely access to any information in the possession or under the control of a department (except for Cabinet confidences) and to receive from the department any documents and explanations NSIRA deems necessary. NSIRA monitors cooperation with access requests, including the completeness and accuracy of disclosures, which inform its overall assessment of a department’s responsiveness in each review.

CBSA, CSE, CSIS, GAC, and the RCMP met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness during this review. IRCC only partially met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness, given extended delays in IRCC’s responses to requests for information.

2. Background

The SCIDA provides an explicit, stand-alone authority to disclose information between GC institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine its security. Its stated purpose is to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.

Section 9 of the SCIDA prescribes record-keeping obligations for all institutions who disclose or receive information under the Act. Subsection 9(3) requires that these records be provided to NSIRA within 30 days after the end of each calendar year.

Subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA authorizes GC institutions to disclose information—subject to any prohibitions or restrictions in other legislation or regulations—to designated recipient institutions if the disclosing institution is satisfied that (a) the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (the “contribution test”); and (b) the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances (the “proportionality test”).

Subsection 5(2) requires disclosing institutions to, at the time of the disclosure, also provide information regarding the disclosure’s accuracy and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained.

When a GC institution receives information under the Act, subsection 5.1(1) requires that the institution destroy or return any unnecessary personal information as soon as feasible after receiving it.

The SCIDA’s guiding principles reinforce the notion that effective and responsible disclosure of information protects Canada and Canadians. Of note, subsection 4(c) suggests that GC institutions enter into an information-sharing arrangement when they regularly disclose information to the same recipient.

3. Findings, Analysis, and recommendations

Volume and Nature of Disclosures

Finding 1.  NSIRA found that IRCC’s disclosures to CSIS under the SCIDA increased significantly in 2024.

In 2024, GC institutions made a total of 900 disclosures under the SCIDA (see Table 1). The number of disclosures increased 235% overall since 2023.

Table 1: Number of SCIDA disclosures made in 2024, by disclosing and recipient institution [all disclosures (proactive disclosures)]

  Designated Recipient Institutions
Disclosing Institution CBSA CFIA CNSC CRA CSE CSIS DND/CAF Finance FINTRAC GAC Health IRCC PHAC PSC RCMP TC TOTAL (proactive)
CBSA – – – – – (2) – – – – – – – – (2) – (4)
GAC – – – – (1) 41
(12)		 – – – – – – – – 7
(2)		 – 49
(15)
IRCC – – – – 76 770 – – – – – – – – (1) – 847
(1)
TOTAL (proactive) – – – – 77
(1)		 813
(14)		 – – – – – – – – 10
(5)		 – 900
(20)

This substantial increase in records was primarily driven by IRCC’s disclosures to CSIS, which grew nearly 300% from 194 in 2023 to 770 in 2024. IRCC previously disclosed similar information to CSIS under the Privacy Act, whereas now the SCIDA is the primary mechanism for CSIS to obtain immigration information. CSIS also credits the increase in disclosures to enhanced collaboration with IRCC aimed at improving operational staff awareness and understanding of the SCIDA regime.

As observed in prior years, institutions predominantly made disclosures following a request. Only 2% of disclosures were sent proactively by the disclosing institution.

Record Keeping Requirements – Section 9

Finding 2.  NSIRA found that, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, every institution that disclosed or received information pursuant to the SCIDA in 2024 generally complied with its record-keeping obligations under section 9.

Section 9 of the SCIDA establishes record-keeping obligations for both disclosing and recipient institutions. These requirements are designed to promote accountability and transparency by mandating the documentation of essential information, including descriptions of the disclosed or received data, the individuals involved, relevant dates, and the legal basis for the disclosure. Institutions are also required to record whether the information was destroyed or returned.

NSIRA’s analysis of records submitted by CSIS and IRCC revealed several minor discrepancies in record-keeping. These discrepancies can be attributed to duplicated, amended, and cancelled requests from CSIS. For example, in some cases, follow-up questions from CSIS regarding disclosures it had received were recorded by IRCC as a different request.

In addition, IRCC assigned sequential file numbers for a number of requests that were sent in 2024 but not processed until 2025. These disclosures were included in the record-keeping logs submitted to NSIRA. IRCC explained that, moving forward, it will only assign file numbers to requests that are completed in the current calendar year to minimize confusion.

IRCC also noted that it has committed to sharing its record-keeping log with CSIS on a quarterly basis to address potential discrepancies early. Clear and effective communication between disclosing and recipient institutions is vital to accurate record-keeping and enables secure information management, legal compliance, and administrative precision.

Information Sharing Agreements – Subsection 4(c)

Finding 3.  NSIRA found that CSE provided IRCC with more information than necessary in three of its requests for disclosure under the SCIDA.

In August 2023, CSE and IRCC signed an information sharing agreement (ISA) to formalize their regular information exchanges and facilitate compliance with the SCIDA. The primary purpose of IRCC disclosures to CSE under the SCIDA is to determine a subject of interest’s legal citizenship status and/or immigration status in Canada. These disclosures help to ensure CSE’s lawfulness, as its mandate prohibits the direction of operational activities at Canadians and persons in Canada.

In its requests, CSE provides an individual’s identifying information in order for IRCC to conduct a search in the relevant systems, primarily the Global Case Management System (GCMS). The GCMS holds all citizenship and immigration information of Canadian citizens, foreign nationals, and permanent residents. It includes any application submitted by individuals as well as information entered by immigration officers and/or other departments, such as the CBSA.

At minimum, CSE provides IRCC with an individual’s full name and date of birth in its request. When available, CSE may include additional identifying information such as an individual’s known or suspected nationality, place of birth, and phone number(s), among others. The ISA between CSE and IRCC contains a comprehensive list of all the information that CSE may provide to assist IRCC in producing accurate results.

In three different instances, however, NSIRA observed that CSE provided IRCC with additional personal information that was not identified in the ISA. CSE explained that all relevant details were disclosed to increase the likelihood of IRCC yielding results. IRCC confirmed to NSIRA that it could not, and has never, leveraged the specific personal information provided by CSE to conduct its searches.

The ISA does not formally prohibit CSE from sharing information outside of the parameters agreed upon with IRCC. Nevertheless, CSE should verify whether the information it shares is relevant to the disclosing institution to avoid unnecessary sharing of personal data.

Recommendation 1.  NSIRA recommends that CSE limit the sharing of information when requesting a disclosure under the SCIDA to only that which IRCC has identified as relevant to its information holdings.

Disclosure of Information Requirements – Section 5

Finding 4.  NSIRA found that IRCC and CSIS’s implementation of a tiered request and disclosure process reduced the amount of third-party information disclosed by IRCC, which contributed to enhanced compliance with the SCIDA.

In the spring of 2024, IRCC and CSIS developed a tiered process for sharing under the SCIDA and introduced the classification of SCIDA requests and disclosures into “basic” or “advanced”. In implementing this process, IRCC and CSIS also formally adopted three standardized templates: a request letter, a checklist, and a response form. The checklist and response forms, in particular, aim to guide IRCC analysts in providing only necessary information and were included in all disclosures.

At minimum, a basic disclosure contains biographic details from the past five years, such as citizenship or immigration information, marital status, and contact information. It may also include photographs, recent employment information, travel history, and physical characteristics.

Should CSIS require an extensive personal history and supporting documents, such as scanned immigration applications, the request becomes an advanced SCIDA disclosure requiring additional rationale. This type of disclosure often contains information from a longer period of time (past ten years or more).

Previously, in order to share even basic biographic information, IRCC would include a scanned copy of an individual’s most recent immigration application (e.g. a passport or visa application). As a result, a number of disclosures from early in the review year contained third party information, such as unredacted guarantor, emergency contact, or reference information. NSIRA observed that the tiered system reduced the number of instances where IRCC included third party information in a basic SCIDA disclosure, in part because scanned copies of applications were no longer included.

Typically, IRCC will redact references from passport applications in an advanced disclosure. Other types of third-party information are redacted on a case-by-case basis.

The disclosure process begins when IRCC receives a request letter from CSIS containing a standardized list of items agreed upon by both institutions. This approach allows CSIS to identify only the information necessary for its request, addressing previous issues with customized and inconsistent information lists. For example, CSIS may request biographic details, such as citizenship and passport information, but choose not to request contact information. Advanced request letters include an option to receive scanned copies of applications.

Throughout 2024, the request letter, checklist, and response form evolved to meet the needs of IRCC and CSIS. NSIRA observed that new types of commonly requested information that had been previously absent from the request letter would be added as needed. In addition, IRCC combined the checklist and response form to reduce its administrative burden. The tiered process enabled IRCC to manage the increase in disclosures while limiting the amount of third-party information shared.

Importantly, IRCC’s decision to use a response checklist and form indicates an iterative process that improved the operational efficiency and legal compliance of both institutions under the SCIDA. Specific response times are prioritized into the following three categories: urgent life-threatening requests, priority operational requests, and routine requests. IRCC intends to prioritize requests from other institutions under the SCIDA in a similar manner.

The disclosures below briefly illustrate how the tiered process improved IRCC’s minimization of personal information in disclosures under the SCIDA. The first case represents a typical disclosure prior to the tiered system, while the second and third disclosures occurred after its introduction.

Disclosure 1

CSIS sent a letter to IRCC requesting the disclosure of information about a foreign individual under investigation relating to a particular institution. The request was to include records from the past five years.

Without a system to limit what information was shared, IRCC disclosed all available scanned copies of the individual’s study permit, work permit, permanent residence, and temporary resident visa applications. All documents provided in the disclosure were without redactions and included third party, minor, and financial information.

Disclosure 2

CSIS requested a basic SCIDA disclosure from IRCC for information relating to individuals affiliated with a particular foreign entity. In its justification, CSIS noted that the foreign entity and any individuals identified were of “national security interest” in relation to a CSIS investigation.

As this was a basic request, IRCC took steps towards limiting the disclosure by providing CSIS with a chart containing only the name, place and date of birth, status or immigration history, and the nature of affiliation. In email correspondence, IRCC stated that should CSIS require additional details or would like to request an advanced SCIDA for any or all of the individuals implicated, it would be required to include an additional detailed rationale.

Disclosure 3

CSIS requested an advanced disclosure from IRCC for information relating to several individuals with the justification that it had “reasonable grounds to believe” the subjects may have been in contact with “known members” of a foreign intelligence service. CSIS continued to justify its reasoning in detail, providing IRCC with a substantial amount of contextual information about the foreign entity in question and how the information it requested would contribute to its investigation.

CSIS also requested scanned copies of all documents in its request. IRCC disclosed nearly all categories of information requested by CSIS. In the checklist attached to the disclosure, IRCC stated that it had redacted third party information as well as other records that were irrelevant to CSIS’s request.

When compared to the first case, the delineation of basic and advanced disclosures under the SCIDA prevented the over sharing of personal information by IRCC in the second case without further justification. Despite CSIS’s expanded justification in the third case, IRCC did not include all the information in its holdings on the identified subjects because not everything was relevant.

Contribution and Proportionality Tests – Section 5(1)

Finding 5.  NSIRA found instances when the information provided to IRCC by CSIS was limited and hampered IRCC’s ability to fulfill its obligation as a disclosing institution to satisfy itself that the information disclosed is in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada.

SCIDA disclosures made under section 5(1) require IRCC to satisfy itself of two specific criteria. First, IRCC must satisfy itself that the disclosure will contribute to CSIS’s exercise of its jurisdiction in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. Second, IRCC must satisfy itself that the disclosure will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. If IRCC is satisfied in both instances, it “may” make a disclosure. The onus is on the disclosing institution to assure itself that the information it discloses will contribute in the requisite sense.

While CSIS may not be required to share detailed information about its investigations, programs, or activities with IRCC, it needs to provide enough information in a request so that IRCC can responsibly exercise its discretion. A succinct high-level explanation of the link between the information sought and CSIS’s national security jurisdiction and responsibilities may be enough. However, disclosing institutions can seek clarification by requiring a more specific articulation of the activity that undermines the security of Canada that the request relates to.

In the majority of basic requests reviewed by NSIRA, CSIS elected to use scant phrasing in its justifications, such as “Subject is of national security interest in relation to the Service’s investigation of” the threat in question. In contrast, NSIRA observed other basic requests where CSIS demonstrated how the requested information would contribute to its investigations in a clear and descriptive manner in its justification. As a matter of course, advanced requests almost always contained robust justifications.

Inconsistencies in the description of the undermining activity in CSIS’s basic request letters did not often prompt IRCC to seek further clarification. In practice, IRCC maintained an institutional understanding that CSIS would only request information that will contribute to its mandate. NSIRA did not observe that IRCC conducted independent assessments based on a structured framework or consistent criteria.

IRCC has stated that it redacts any information it deems irrelevant in its disclosures to ensure that only pertinent details are disclosed. Particularly for advanced and bulk requests, IRCC was not always satisfied with CSIS’s justifications. NSIRA observed that IRCC either required additional rationale, disclosed less information than had been requested, or redacted unnecessary third-party information.

The absence of detailed justifications in SCIDA requests risks compromising compliance with paragraph 5(1)(b). Consequently, recipient institutions should provide disclosing institutions with the necessary information and rationale to satisfy the disclosing institution’s contribution threshold. A sufficient analysis of the activity that undermines the security of Canada requires that IRCC have knowledge of those circumstances.

The recommendation below echoes those from NSIRA’s 2024 review of the SCIDA, namely that IRCC should not automatically accept, without an independent assessment, a recipient institution’s request. The review also recommended that IRCC disclose only the minimum information reasonably necessary to protect individuals’ privacy in the circumstances and comply with the legal standards of the SCIDA.

Recommendation 2.  NSIRA recommends that IRCC seek clarification from requesting institutions, as needed, to ensure it has all relevant information necessary to fulfill its obligations as a disclosing institution under the SCIDA, before making a disclosure.

Finding 6.  NSIRA found that IRCC did not have a policy governing the disclosure of information concerning minors under the SCIDA.

In 2024, IRCC indicated that it had received an increase in requests for disclosures regarding minors and engaged with CSIS to ensure their privacy. IRCC’s existing SCIDA policy, however, does not address the treatment of minors in disclosures under the regime.

NSIRA observed that IRCC was inconsistent in its approach to disclosing information about minors and did not redact information appropriately in several disclosures reviewed. In at least one instance, IRCC stated that it had redacted a minor’s information. However, NSIRA observed that IRCC had done so inconsistently, leaving the minor’s name, date of birth, and national identification number unredacted elsewhere in the same disclosure. In other disclosures, IRCC either redacted information about a minor in full or chose not to make the disclosure at all.

The care attendant to a minor’s privacy rights in other areas of the law (as seen in, among others, the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and various international conventions) indicates that minors may also attract a heightened privacy expectation in a national security context. Children under 16, for example, may not have a choice in submitting applications for passports which are completed on their behalf by a parent or guardian.

Recommendation 3.  NSIRA recommends that IRCC institute a policy on the disclosure of information related to minors that recognizes their distinct privacy interests.

Requirement to Destroy or Return – Subsection 5.1(1)

Finding 7.  NSIRA found that CSIS may not have complied with subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA when it retained one disclosure containing personal information that was not necessary for exercising its jurisdiction.

Subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA requires, as soon as feasible, the destruction or return of any personal information received under section 5 of the Act that is not necessary for a department to fulfill their lawful responsibilities related to national security. CSIS is excluded from this requirement by subsection 5.1(3) when a disclosure is retained pursuant to the performance of its duties and functions under section 12 of the CSIS Act.

In 2024, CSIS was the only institution to identify disclosures containing information that was destroyed or returned under subsection 5.1(1): three were deemed non-reportable, one was incorrect (wrong subject), and one had been disclosed by IRCC before CSIS could cancel the request, although it was not disseminated.

Separately, NSIRA identified one disclosure where CSIS retained personal information about the wrong individual. In early 2024, CSIS sent a letter to IRCC requesting a foreign citizen’s current and past applications for the past five years. As the request was made before the tiered process had been implemented, IRCC’s disclosure was extensive and included full visa and work permit applications, as well as unredacted familial and financial information.

Shortly following receipt of the disclosure, CSIS assessed that the individual implicated was not the subject of the request. Despite the requirement to destroy the information, CSIS retained it in its entirety for “reference purposes.” When asked, CSIS confirmed the disclosure should not have been retained “in its totality and possibly at all” and that the matter had been referred to its internal compliance section.

To the extent that it is strictly necessary, section 12 of the CSIS Act allows CSIS to collect, analyse and retain on activities constituting threats to the security of Canada. However, as CSIS did not claim that this information was retained pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act, and thus was not strictly necessary to keep, the exception at 5.1(3) of the SCIDA did not apply and CSIS was required to destroy or return the information pursuant to 5.1(1).

Recommendation 4.  NSIRA recommends that CSIS destroy all personal information in one disclosure that was not necessary for exercising its jurisdiction.

4. Conclusion

This review marks the sixth year that NSIRA has examined GC institutions’ compliance with the SCIDA. NSIRA concluded that, within the disclosures reviewed, institutions generally adhered to the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record-keeping.

NSIRA noted important improvements that streamlined the request and disclosure process between IRCC and CSIS and enhanced compliance. However, NSIRA observed risks with IRCC’s application of the substantive requirements under paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA.

NSIRA also identified possible non-compliance with subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA owing to CSIS’s retention of personal information that it had identified as unnecessary.

NSIRA’s recommendations in this review are designed to assist both recipient and disclosing institutions in adhering to the SCIDA’s privacy standards while effectively supporting national security and lawful mandates.

Annex A. Historical SCIDA Disclosures

Disclosing Institution Designated Recipient Institutions under the SCIDA, Schedule 3
CBSA CFIA CNSC CRA CSE CSIS DND/CAF Finance FINTRAC GAC Health IRCC PHAC PS RCMP TC TOTAL
2023
CBSA – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 2 (2) – 2 (2)
GAC – – – – 1 (1) 10 (0) – – – – – – – – – – 15 (1)
RCC – – – – 58 (0) 194 (7) – – – – – – – – – – 252 (7)
TOTAL – – – – 59 (1) 204 (7) – – – – – – – – 6 (2) – 269 (10)
2022
CBSA – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 4 – 4
GAC – – – – – 39 2 – – – – – – – 12 – 53
IRCC – – – – 59 56 – – – – – – – – – – 115
RCMP – – – – – – – – – – – 1 – – – – 1
TOTAL – – – – 59 95 2 – – – – 1 – – 16 – 173
2021
DND/CAF – – – – – 2 – – – – – – – – – – 2
GAC – – – – – 41 – – – – – 1 – – 2 – 44
IRCC – – – – 68 79 – – – 2 – – – – – – 149
TOTAL – – – – 68 122 – – – 2 – 1 – – 2 – 195
2020
CBSA – – – – – 1 – – – – – – – – 3 – 4
GAC – – – – 1 25 – – – – – 1 – – 13 – 40
IRCC – – – – 60 61 – – – – – – – – 37 1 159
RCMP – – – – – – – 1 – – 3 – 5 – – – 9
TC – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 2 – 2
Other – – – – – 1 – – – – – – – – – – 1
TOTAL – – – – 61 88 1 – – 3 – 6 – – 55 1 215
2019
CBSA – – – – – 1 – – – – – – – – 2 – 3
GAC – – – – – 23 – – – – – 3 – 1 15 – 42
IRCC – – – – 5 17 1 – – – – – – – 36 – 59
RCMP – – – 4 – – – – 1 3 – 1 – – – – 9
TC – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 – 1
TOTAL – – – 4 5 41 1 – 1 3 – 4 – 1 54 – 114

Annex B. Findings and Recommendations

NSIRA made the following findings and recommendations in this review:

Volume and Trend Analysis

Finding 1. NSIRA found that IRCC’s disclosures to CSIS under the SCIDA increased significantly in 2024.

Record Keeping Requirements – Section 9

Finding 2. NSIRA found that, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, every institution that disclosed or received information pursuant to the SCIDA in 2024 generally complied with its record-keeping obligations under section 9.

Information Sharing Agreements – Subsection 4(c)

Finding 3. NSIRA found that CSE provided IRCC with more information than necessary in three of its requests for disclosure under the SCIDA.

Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that CSE limit the sharing of information when requesting a disclosure under the SCIDA to only that which IRCC has identified as relevant to its information holdings.

Disclosure of Information Requirements – Section 5

Finding 4. NSIRA found that IRCC and CSIS’s implementation of a tiered request and disclosure process reduced the amount of third-party information disclosed by IRCC, which contributed to enhanced compliance with the SCIDA.

Finding 5. NSIRA found instances when the information provided to IRCC by CSIS was limited and hampered IRCC’s ability to fulfill its obligation as a disclosing institution to satisfy itself that the information disclosed is in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada.

Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that IRCC seek clarification from requesting institutions, as needed, to ensure it has all relevant information necessary to fulfill its obligations as a disclosing institution under the SCIDA, before making a disclosure.

Finding 6. NSIRA found that IRCC did not have a policy governing the disclosure of information concerning minors under the SCIDA.

Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that IRCC institute a policy on the disclosure of information related to minors that recognizes their distinct privacy interests.

Requirement to Destroy or Return – Subsection 5.1(1)

Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS may not have complied with subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA when it retained one disclosure containing personal information that was not necessary for exercising its jurisdiction.

Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that CSIS destroy all personal information in one disclosure that was not necessary for exercising its jurisdiction.

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

Quarterly Report: For the quarter ended December 31, 2025

Quarterly Report: For the quarter ended December 31, 2025

Date of Publishing:

Introduction

This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards: GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2025–2026 Main Estimates.

This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament. Established in July 2019, NSIRA reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary. The Agency also investigates complaints from members of the public on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security-related complaints, independently and in a timely manner.

The NSIRA Secretariat supports the Agency in the delivery of its mandate. Independent scrutiny contributes to strengthening the accountability framework for national security and intelligence activities and to enhancing public confidence. Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable, and necessary.

A summary description of NSIRA’s program activities can be found in Part II of the Main Estimates. Information on NSIRA’s mandate can be found on its website.

Basis of presentation

This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the secretariat’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the secretariat, consistent with the 2025–2026 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special-purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.

The authority of Parliament is required before money can be spent by the government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authorities for specific purposes.

The Secretariat uses the full accrual method of accounting to prepare and present its annual financial statements that are part of the departmental results reporting process. However, the spending authorities voted by Parliament remain on an expenditure basis.

Highlights of the fiscal quarter and fiscal year-to-date results

This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended December 31, 2025.

NSIRA Secretariat spent approximately 65% of its authorities by the end of the third quarter, compared with 63% in the same quarter of 2024–2025 (see graph 1).

Graph 1: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q3 2025–2026 and Q3 2024–2025 (in millions of dollars)

Graph 1: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q3 2025–26 and Q3 2024–25 - Text version to follow
Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q3 2025–2026 and Q3 2024–2025 (in millions of dollars)
  2025-26 2024-25
Total Authorities $20.4 $20.5
Q3 Expenditures $3.8 $4.2
Year-to-Date Expenditures $13.3 $13.0

Significant changes to authorities

As of December 31, 2025, Parliament had approved $20.4 million in total authorities for use by NSIRA Secretariat for 2025–2026 compared with $20.5 million as of December 31, 2024, for a net decrease of $0.1 million or 0.5% (see graph 2).

Graph 2: Variance in authorities as of December 31, 2025 (in millions of dollars)

Graph 2: Variance in authorities as at December 31, 2025 (in millions of dollars)
Variance in authorities as of December 31, 2025 (in millions of dollars)
  Fiscal year 2024-25 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2025 Fiscal year 2025-26 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2026
Vote 1 – Operating 18.9 18.5
Statutory 1.6 1.9
Total budgetary authorities 20.5 20.4

*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*

The decrease of $0.1 million in authorities is mostly explained by a decrease in total carry-forward from the previous year.

Significant changes to quarter expenditures

The third quarter expenditures totalled $3.8 million for a decrease of $0.4 million when compared with $4.2 million spent during the same period in 2024–2025. Table 1 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.

Table 1: Departmental budgetary expenditures by Standard Object (unaudited)

Fiscal year 2025-2026 (in thousands of dollars)
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) Fiscal year 2025-2026: expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2025 Fiscal year 2024-2025: expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2024 Variance $ Variance %
Personnel 3,470 3,584 (114) (3%)
Transportation and communications 90 131 (41) (31%)
Information 5 15 (10) (67%)
Professional and special services 242 437 (195) (45%)
Rentals 13 40 (27) (68%)
Repair and maintenance 5 27 (22) (81%)
Utilities, materials, and supplies 0 (11) 11 (100%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 0 0 (0) (0%)
Other subsidies and payments 20 15 (15) (100%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures 3,825 4,238 (413) (10%)

Professional and special services

The decrease of $195,000 is due to a decrease in use of several contractors.

Rentals

The decrease of $27,000 is due to the decommissioning of a rental building.

Repair and maintenance

The decrease of $22,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.

Utilities, materials and supplies

The decrease of $11,000 is explained by the faster clearing of the acquisition card suspense account in 2025-26.

Other subsidies and payments

The decrease of $15,000 is explained by a decrease in the recovery of salary overpayments.

Significant changes to year-to-date expenditures

The year-to-date expenditures totalled $13.3 million for an increase of $0.3 million (2%) when compared with $13.0 million spent during the same period in 2024-2025. Table 2 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.

Table 2: Departmental budgetary expenditures by Standard Object (unaudited) (continued)

Fiscal year 2025-2026 (in thousands of dollars)
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) Fiscal year 2025-26: year-to-date expenditures as of December 31, 2025 Fiscal year 2024-25: year-to-date expenditures as of December 31, 2024 Variance $ Variance %
Personnel 11,213 10,448 765 7%
Transportation and communications 164 266 (102) (38%)
Information 20 28 (8) (29%)
Professional and special services 1,858 2,026 (168) (8%)
Rentals 38 82 (44) (54%)
Repair and maintenance 27 67 (40) (60%)
Utilities, materials and supplies 15 29 (14) (48%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 0 20 (20) (100%)
Other subsidies and payments 4 56 (52) (93%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures 13,339 13,022 317 2%

Personnel

The increase in Personnel of $765,000 is due to an increase in both FTEs and average salary per FTE.

Transportation and communications

The decrease of $102,000 is mainly due to a reduction in travel and relocation across the Secretariat.

Rentals

The decrease of $44,000 is attributed to the decommissioning of a rental building, and the timing of invoicing for our HR system.

Repair and maintenance

The decrease of $40,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.

Acquisition of machinery and equipment

The decrease of $20,000 is mainly explained by one-time equipment purchases in 2024-2025.

Other subsidies and payments

The decrease of $52,000 is explained by an overall decrease in the recovery of salary overpayments.

Risks and uncertainties

The funding received to offset pay increases was insufficient to cover such increases and as a result, NSIRA Secretariat will be required to reduce its overall staffing level to remain within budget. Reductions in staffing could cause a reduction in the number of reviews and investigations the Secretariat is able to produce on a yearly basis.

NSIRA Secretariat is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner and continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls.

Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA Secretariat’s approach and timelines for the execution of its mandated activities.

Significant changes in relation to operations, personnel and programs

There has been one new Governor-in-Council appointment during the third quarter, Mr. Yves Côté.

Approved by senior officials:

Charles Fugère
Executive Director

Martyn Turcotte
Chief Financial Officer

Appendix

Statement of authorities (Unaudited)

Fiscal year 2025-2026 and 2024-2025 (in thousands of dollars)

  Fiscal year 2025-2026 Fiscal year 2024–25
  Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2026 (note 1) Used during the quarter ended December 31, 2025 Year to date used at quarter-end Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2025 (note 1) Used during the quarter ended December 31, 2024 Year to date used at quarter-end
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures 18,522 3,347 11,908 18,856 3,838 11,821
Budgetary statutory authorities
Contributions to employee benefit plans 1,908 477 1,431 1,601 400 1,201
Total budgetary authorities (note 2) 20,430 3,824 13,339 20,457 4,238 13,022

Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.

Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Departmental budgetary expenditures by standard object (unaudited)

Fiscal year 2025-2026 and 2024-2025 (in thousands of dollars)

  Fiscal year 2025-2026 Fiscal year 2024–25
  Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2026 (note 1) Expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2025 Year-to-date used at quarter-end Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2025 Expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2024 Year-to-date used at quarter-end
Expenditures
Personnel 14,377 3,469 11,213 14,211 3,584 10,448
Transportation and communications 497 90 164 685 131 266
Information 42 5 20 76 15 28
Professional and special services 4,994 242 1,858 4,617 437 2,026
Rentals 281 13 38 309 40 82
Repair and maintenance 72 5 27 436 27 67
Utilities, materials, and supplies 74 0 15 58 (11) 29
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 93 0 0 65 0 20
Other subsidies and payments 0 0 4 0 15 56
Total gross budgetary expenditures
(note 2)		 20,430 3,824 13,340 20,457 4,238 13,022

Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.

Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

Accessibility Plan 2026-2028

Accessibility Plan 2026-2028

Date of Publishing:

From the Executive Director

I am pleased to share the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat’s Accessibility Plan 2026-2028. This plan builds on the progress made since the publication of the NSIRA Secretariat’s inaugural accessibility plan and reaffirms our continued commitment to fostering an organization that is inclusive, equitable, and accessible to all.

Accessibility remains a shared responsibility and an ongoing process of learning, collaboration, and improvement. This new plan outlines the concrete steps we will take over the next three years to identify, remove, and prevent barriers across our workplaces, programs, policies, practices and services. Where barriers cannot be removed immediately, we will take action to mitigate them and ensure accessibility principles are embedded in our daily practices and decision-making.

The development of this plan was guided by consultations with NSIRA Secretariat employees, including persons with disabilities, as well as input from subject matter experts and functional leads across key operational areas. Their insights have been invaluable in shaping our understanding of the barriers that exist and the opportunities to strengthen accessibility across the organization.

Accessibility remains an important part of the NSIRA Secretariat’s broader vision of accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness. Through the actions outlined in this plan, we are taking important steps toward ensuring that every member of our workforce–and every Canadian who engages with the NSIRA Secretariat–can participate fully and meaningfully in our work.

Charles Fugère

Executive Director

General

The Executive Director of the NSIRA Secretariat, who is the deputy head and employer, leads the Secretariat that supports the Review Agency in the fulfillment of its mandate under the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act. The Secretariat will monitor feedback to evaluate progress and to determine its future accessibility plans.

In compliance with the requirements of the Accessible Canada Act (“ACA”) and the Accessible Canada Regulations, this plan is available on NSIRA’s website, which is used to communicate with the public.  

To request a copy of the accessibility plan or a description of the feedback process in an alternate format, or to provide feedback about NSIRA’s accessibility plan and any barriers encountered in dealing with NSIRA, please contact the undersigned by mail, telephone, or e-mail. 

Senior Advisor, Wellness Initiatives

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat
P.O. Box 2430, Station “B”
Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5

Telephone: 1-833-890-0293
Email: accessible@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Executive Summary

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat is committed to building an accessible organization—one where persons with disabilities can participate fully and equitably in all aspects of its work. The Accessibility Plan (2026-2028) outlines the steps the NSIRA Secretariat will take over the next three years to identify, remove and prevent barriers to accessibility across its programs, policies, practices, operations, and workplaces.

Accessibility is not a one-time achievement, but an ongoing effort that requires continuous attention and collaboration. Where barriers cannot be immediately removed, the NSIRA Secretariat will take proactive steps to mitigate them while building awareness, strengthening inclusive practices, and embedding accessibility into everyday processes and decision-making.

This work aligns directly with NSIRA’s Strategic Plan, which promotes innovation, professional growth, retention, and wellbeing, and reaffirms leadership’s commitment to a workforce that reflects Canada’s diversity. By integrating accessibility into this broader framework, the NSIRA Secretariat seeks to ensure that accessibility principles are considered in all activities—from recruitment and training to publications and stakeholder engagement.

Since publishing its inaugural Accessibility Plan in 2022, the NSIRA Secretariat has made measurable progress in several areas, including improving the accessibility of its websites, publications and complaints processes; reviewing its physical office spaces; and increasing internal capacity through training and guidance These efforts were informed by the results of an initial barrier assessment, ongoing consultations with staff (including persons with disabilities), and feedback from subject matter experts across key operational areas.

The 2026-2028 Accessibility Plan builds on that foundation. It reflects feedback gathered through targeted questionnaires and consultations with leads in Employment, Built Environment, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), Communications, and other core areas, as well las input from persons with disabilities. The barriers identified largely relate to awareness, training, and the need to embed accessibility into standard practices such as staffing, publications, and policy development.

Guided by principles of the Accessible Canada Act, this plan outlines concrete actions to address those barriers and to strengthen accessibility across the NSIRA Secretariat’s work environment and service delivery. It reaffirms our ongoing commitment to creating an organization where everyone can participate meaningfully and equitably.

Context

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent and external review body that reports to Parliament. NSIRA reviews Government of Canada national security or intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable and necessary, and reports accordingly. NSIRA investigates complaints from members of the public regarding activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as decisions by deputy heads to deny or revoke a security clearance. In addition, NSIRA investigates complaints that are closely related to national security referred by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (CRCC), matters referred by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) and certain reports made to NSIRA under the Citizenship Act. This independent scrutiny contributes to strengthening the framework of accountability for national security or intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions and supports public confidence in this regard.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat is a separate agency identified in Schedule V of the Financial Administration Act(FAA)and is not a part of the core public administration. Treasury Board of Canadapolicies with respect to financial management, procurement, communications, information management and technology, amongst others, apply to the NSIRA Secretariat. With respect to human resources, the Executive Director is the employer, whose authorities are derived from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (sections 42 through 48) and subsection 12(2) of the FAA. 

Under the ACA and the Accessible Canada Regulations, federally regulated entities are required to publish an initial accessibility plan, establish a process for receiving and responding to feedback, and report annually on progress. An updated accessibility plan must be published every three years. The NSIRA Secretariat’s first accessibility plan was published in 2022. This updated plan outlines the Secretariat’s ongoing and future efforts to remove barriers and advance accessibility in all aspects of its operations.

Consultations

The NSIRA Secretariat developed this Accessibility Plan (2026–2028) using consultation input from employees, including persons with disabilities, and internal subject matter experts. Conducted between 2023 and early 2025 in accordance with the Accessible Canada Act, these consultations identified barriers, reviewed progress under the 2022–2025 plan, and set priorities for the next cycle.

Consultation Approach

Consultations included organization-wide staff outreach, targeted engagement with employees who self-identified as having a disability and focus groups with internal experts across the Act’s priority areas. Input was gathered through accessible surveys, written submissions, and virtual discussions.

External Perspectives

In addition to internal consultations, the NSIRA Secretariat sought input from external individuals through voluntary post-staffing process surveys and through the accessibility feedback form available on its public website. These mechanisms provide opportunities for members of the public to share experiences or identify barriers encountered when interacting with the organization.

Results

Consultations confirmed progress in areas such as training, communications, and accessible information technology, while highlighting the need for continued awareness, leadership engagement, and the integration of accessibility into staffing and policy development. Participant input directly informed the actions and priorities outlined in this plan.

Ongoing Commitment to Engagement

The NSIRA Secretariat recognizes that meaningful consultation with persons with disabilities is central to the Accessible Canada Act. Consultation and feedback opportunities are available year-round by phone, email, mail, or through an online form, with alternate formats and anonymous submissions accepted.

All feedback is reviewed to identify barriers and inform continuous improvement. Future engagement efforts will broaden outreach and include collaboration through interdepartmental committees and working groups to share best practices.

The Secretariat also recognizes the need to strengthen its efforts to actively engage persons with disabilities in future consultations. To support this, the organization will continue to explore opportunities to collaborate with external networks and organizations representing persons with disabilities, ensuring that future plans are informed by diverse lived experiences and expertise.

Feedback and consultation remain key to strengthening accessibility across all areas of the Secretariat’s work.

Priority Areas and Action Planned

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat is committed to identifying and addressing accessibility barriers across all aspects of its operations. This Accessibility Plan addresses the seven key priority areas identified in the Accessible Canada Act, ensuring comprehensive coverage of accessibility requirements for employees, stakeholders, and the public.

For each priority area, the plan highlights actions over the next three years that are expected to have the greatest practical impact in removing obstacles, enhancing accessibility, and promoting equitable participation. These actions were informed by consultations, internal subject matter expertise, and an assessment of operational realities, while aiming for accessibility and inclusivity for all employees, stakeholders, and the public.  

The following sections detail the priority areas and the concrete steps the NSIRA Secretariat will take to ensure accessibility and inclusion in our workplace, communications, services, and beyond.

1. Employment

The NSIRA Secretariat is committed to ensuring accessibility in recruitment, retention, and the career advancement for persons with disabilities. While formal processes for requesting accommodations are in place, recent Public Service Employee Survey (PSES) results suggest a possible barrier related to stigma. Between 2022 and 2024, the percentage of employees who reported feeling comfortable requesting accommodation measures from their immediate supervisor decreased from 94% to 88%. This shift indicates that some employees may hesitate to seek accommodations due to concerns about stigma or negative perceptions.

The 2026-2028 plan emphasizes accessible and inclusive employment processes throughout the employee lifecycle. In addition to strengthening recruitment, onboarding, and career development practices, particular attention will be given to reducing stigma that may discourage employees from requesting accommodations. Actions will focus on strengthening awareness, promoting available tools such as the Accessibility Passport, and fostering a culture where accommodation requests are normalized and fully supported.

To advance these objectives, the Secretariat will take the following actions;

a) Continue improving accessible recruitment and hiring:

Staffing processes and job postings will continue to clearly communicate accessibility and accommodations. Processes will be regularly reviewed to ensure that no steps disadvantage or prevent persons with disabilities from applying, participating, or being evaluated. Appropriate accommodation measures will be available as needed throughout the staffing lifecycle. By embedding accessibility throughout recruitment, the process helps signal that accommodations are a standard and supported part of employment.

b) Sustain and enhance workplace accommodations:

A dedicated email box will remain available to simplify the accommodation request process. Promotion of the Workplace Accessibility Passport will continue, making it easier for employees to document and communicate their accommodation needs. Options to modernize how accommodation requests are tracked and managed will be explored to improve timeliness and ensure continuous support, so that accommodations can be promptly addressed by any member of the Human Resources (HR) team. These measures help normalize the process and reduce stigma by demonstrating organizational commitment to accommodations as a routine and supported practice.

c) Strengthen accessibility awareness:

Training and awareness will continue across three key areas;

  1. Staffing: Hiring managers and staff involved in recruitment will receive ongoing guidance on inclusive hiring practices and the consistent application of accommodation measures.
  2. Onboarding: Accessibility and inclusion topics will remain a core part of onboarding for all staff, with targeted session for managers and subject matter experts.
  3. Communications and reminders: Accessibility considerations will be embedded in internal communications and onboarding materials, with regular reminders about available tools and resources that support workplace inclusion, including clear guidance on how to report accessibility issues or request support.

By strengthening knowledge and confidence across these areas, the organization helps reduce potential stigma around requesting accommodations and fosters a consistent, organization-wide approach to supporting accessibility and inclusion.

d) Embed accessibility in HR policies and practices:

New or revised HR and organizational policies will be developed with accessibility in mind, ensuring they reflect barrier-free principles from the outset. This approach reinforces a culture where accessibility and accommodation are understood as integral, not exceptional, aspects of workplace practices. Through these measures, the NSIRA Secretariat will continue building a more inclusive workplace and advancing accessibility throughout the employment experience.

Together, these measures help address the stigma that may discourage employees from requesting accommodations by normalizing accessibility as a standard and supported practice. Through sustained effort, the Secretariat will continue fostering a workplace where employees feel safe and confident seeking the support they need.

2. Built Environment 

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat operates from secured office space in the National Capital Region. Employees work on-site and/or remotely, depending on operational requirements. Hearings, investigative interviews, and inter-organizational meetings are often conducted in person, making physical accessibility a critical consideration.

In supporting Canada’s independent expert review body for national security and intelligence activities, the NSIRA Secretariat operates within secured areas and must respect strict security protocols. These requirements, while essential to safeguarding classified information, create unique accessibility challenges. For example, personal medical or assistive devices (e.g., heart monitors, hearing aids, glucose monitors) must be reviewed and approved by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), which can cause delays and postpone the full availability of adaptive equipment or full accommodation for an individual. Similarly, Bluetooth-enabled devices and some electronics cannot be brought into secure spaces at all. In addition, as a tenant rather than a building owner, the NSIRA Secretariat often relies on coordination with partner departments to address building-related barriers. Together, these factors mean that some barriers cannot be fully removed and must instead be mitigated through planning and accommodations.

Some of these barriers were also identified in the NSIRA Secretariat’s 2022 Accessibility Plan. While steps have been taken to mitigate them – such as installing automatic door openers at all main entrances – challenges remain. Heavy doors to private or individual office spaces continue to pose difficulties for persons with reduced mobility, and other issues persist.

Based on recent reviews and the use of Accessibility Checklists, the following barriers have been identified. One of these, related to emergency evacuation procedures, was identified earlier in 2025 and subsequently resolved in November, prior to finalizing this Accessibility Plan.

  • Heavy doors to private offices and hoteling stations
    Some doors remain difficult to open for persons with reduced mobility or those using a wheelchair.
  • Lack of accessible signage
    Boardroom, offices, and shared spaces are not consistently equipped with signage that meets accessibility standards.
  • Emergency evacuation procedures (resolved in 2025)
    A gap was identified in that the evacuation assistance process had not yet been formally launched or fully communicated. As a result, individuals who may require support during an evacuation may not have known what steps to take or how to obtain assistance. This process was officially launched in November 2025 and is now being implemented and communicated across the organization.

In 2026–2028, efforts will be focused on addressing these barriers and ensuring that all employees and visitors can navigate the physical workplace safely and equitably. These efforts will include;

a) Facilitate timely access to assistive and adaptive tools:

Work will continue with security and building management teams to collaborate on identifying opportunities to streamline approval processes for personal medical and assistive devices, reducing delays when entering secure areas. The Secretariat will also strengthen relationships with both organizations that face similar security requirements and small departments and agencies to share best practices and identify ways to improve or expedite accessibility-related processes. At the same time, the inventory of pre-approved adaptive tools (e.g., vertical mice, split keyboards) will be maintained and expanded to ensure employees and visitors can access necessary supports without delay.

b) Finalize and communicate accessible emergency procedures:

With the formal launch of the enhanced evacuation assistance process in November 2025, the Secretariat will now focus on ensuring that all employees understand the procedures and know how support will be provided during an evacuation. Clear, accessible communication materials will be developed and shared so that individuals who may require assistance are aware of the steps to take, the supports available to them, and the roles and responsibilities of designed personnel. Ongoing monitoring will help ensure the process is applied consistently and remains responsive to employee needs.

c) Improve accessibility of interior office doors:

To reduce barriers caused by heavy doors to individual offices and hoteling stations, the NSIRA Secretariat will work with building management to explore solutions such as installing mechanisms that support accessibility for persons with reduced mobility.

d) Enhance accessible signage:

Consistent with Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) guidance, the NSIRA Secretariat will refrain from modifying current signage until Accessibility Standards Canada (ASC) completes the standards-development process. The Secretariat will monitor the publication of final standards, expected in 2027, and prepare to update signage in boardrooms, offices, and shared spaces. This will ensure alignment with government-wide standards as appropriate and support consistent, accessible wayfinding for employees and visitors.

e) Embed accessibility into training and ongoing guidance:

Accessibility guidance will remain a key part of the mandatory security onboarding, ensuring new employees understand how to navigate secured office spaces with assistive devices, access restricted areas, and request support when barriers are encountered. Annual reminders and guidance will also be provided to all staff on how to identify and address building-related accessibility issues, reinforcing awareness and responsiveness.

Through these actions, the NSIRA Secretariat will continue to improve the accessibility of its physical workspaces, working within the requirements and constraints of secured government facilities and the external processes on which it depends, and using mitigation strategies where full removal of barriers is not possible.

3. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 

The NSIRA Secretariat relies on digital tools and platforms to support internal operations and public engagement. The intranet and internet websites are key means of communication, while employees use secure networks, devices, and applications to carry out their responsibilities on-site and remotely.

Operating within a highly secured digital environment means that all systems must comply with strict IT and network protocols designed to protect classified information. While these measures are essential, they can create challenges in implementing or testing new accessibility tools and updates. Most IT services are also externally managed, requiring coordination and approval from partner departments before changes are made.

Since the release of the NSIRA Secretariat’s 2022 Accessibility Plan, meaningful progress has been achieved – particularly in improving the accessibility of the public website, which now aligns closely with Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) standards. However, accessibility gaps persist within internal systems and processes.

Based on recent reviews and input from subject matter experts in ICT, the following barriers have been identified;

  • Intranet accessibility gaps: The current intranet has not yet been updated to meet accessibility standards. Its renewal is a stated organizational priority for the upcoming fiscal year.
  • Limited capacity to deliver accessibility training: While resources exist, current staffing and workload constraints have limited the capacity to provide presentations or guidance on accessibility best practices.
  • Dependence on external ICT service providers: Because ICT procurement and implementation are largely managed by PCO, SSC and CSE, NSIRA Secretariat has limited ability to integrate accessibility considerations directly into these processes.

In 2026-2028, efforts will focus on addressing these barriers and ensuring that digital systems and services are accessible to both employees and the public. These efforts will include:

a) Integrate accessibility into intranet renewal:

Accessibility requirements will be built into the design and implementation of the new intranet from the outset. The Web Operations team will collaborate with IM, HR and external service partners to ensure employees can navigate and access key resources, including accessibility tools and guidance, without barriers.

b) Integrate accessibility considerations into ICT request:

Accessibility requirements will be incorporated into all ICT-related requests made to external service providers. ICT staff will request accessibility documentation for new tools, software, or equipment and verify known accessibility features before adoption. An internal checklist will support consistent review and documentation.

c) Strengthen capacity and collaboration on digital accessibility:

ICT staff will make efforts to contribute to accessibility-focused activities, including sharing guidance and participating in events such as National AccessAbility Week. The NSIRA Secretariat will strengthen relationships with accessibility and ICT teams in other small departments, agencies, and organizations working in secure environments to share best practices and explore ways to improve or accelerate accessibility-related processes.

d) Maintain and monitor digital accessibility compliance:

All new content on internal and external sites will continue to meet or exceed WCAG 2.1 standards. Regular reviews will assess the accessibility of existing digital content and systems, with adjustments made as needed to ensure continued compliance.

Through these efforts, the NSIRA Secretariat will continue to enhance the accessibility of its digital environment, balancing necessary security requirements with its commitment to equitable access for all employees and members of the public.

4. Communications other than ICT 

The NSIRA Secretariat communicates findings and recommendations to implicated departments, agencies, responsible ministers, and the public. Ensuring accessibility in all communications allows employees, stakeholders, and members of the public to access and engage with NSIRA’s work effectively.

While significant progress has been made in improving accessibility in publications, barriers remain in the consistency and application of accessible communication practices across the organization. The barriers identified include;

  • Inconsistent use of plain language in both internal and external communications
  • Limited awareness or training among staff on accessible communication principles and best practices.

In 2026-2028, efforts will focus in the following areas:

a) Embed accessibility in communication tools and policies:

Accessible communication principles will continue to be integrated into all communication guides, checklists, templates, and policies. This includes both internal and public-facing materials. Plain language and relevant accessibility standards will continue to be incorporated into the NSIRA Secretariat’s publishing practices and guidance materials, including  the Review Report Style Guide and other resources supporting external communications.

b) Strengthen awareness and training on accessible communication:

All staff will have access to awareness and learning opportunities on plain language and accessible document creation. Members of the Communications team will complete specialized training and help promote accessibility best practices across the Secretariat.

c) Develop and promote accessible communication resources:

Quick reference materials such as toolkits and checklists will be developed or promoted internally to support accessible writing and digital content creation. The Secretariat will leverage existing federal resources and aim to align, as appropriate with the Accessible Standards Canada Plain Language Standard that was published in October 2025.

d) Provide alternate formats and communication supports upon request:

Processes will be formalized to ensure alternate formats and supports – such as Braille, large print, audio, sign language interpretation, and captioning – are available for meetings, events, and publications. Partnerships with service providers, including Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC)’s Translation Bureau, will continue to support these services.

Through these measures, the NSIRA Secretariat will strengthen accessibility, clarity, and inclusiveness in all communications, ensuring that employees, partners, and members of the public can fully engage with its work.

5. Procurement of Goods, Services and Facilities 

The NSIRA Secretariat procures goods, services and facilities in accordance with the policies and processes established by Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS), and other key partners.

While no barriers were identified in the 2022–2025 Accessibility Plan, the Secretariat recognized the need to strengthen accessibility by design within its procurement practices. Since then, accessibility training has been provided to cost centre managers and procurement staff, and work has begun to develop templates and procedures that better integrate accessibility requirements.

Recent consultations identified areas where accessibility can be more consistently embedded across the procurement lifecycle. These include ensuring accessibility requirements are reflected in solicitation documents and contracts, that supplier compliance is assessed, and that post-delivery monitoring processes are in place.

In 2026–2028, efforts will focus on the following:

a) Embed accessibility across procurement tools and planning:

Standard templates, checklists, and procedures will be completed to ensure accessibility considerations are incorporated from the earliest stages of procurement planning through contract management. These tools will promote consistency and transparency in applying accessibility criteria across all acquisitions.

b) Strengthen monitoring and accountability:

Processes will be established to track accessibility commitments after contract award, ensuring goods and services continue to meet accessibility expectations. Lessons learned from each procurement will be documented to support continuous improvement.

c) Maintain accessibility awareness and training:

Procurement leads and cost centre managers will continue to receive training and guidance to reinforce awareness of accessibility requirements and evolving federal standards. This will help ensure accessibility remains a routine part of all purchasing decisions.

Through these actions, the NSIRA Secretariat will strengthen accessibility by design in procurement and ensure that all goods, services, and facilities support an inclusive and accessible work environment.

6. Design and Delivery of Programs and Services

An important part of the Review Agency’s mandate is to investigate complaints related to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) when closely related to national security, as well as complaints concerning the denial or revocation of security clearances. The Agency also reviews the national security and intelligence activities of CSIS, CSE, and all other federal departments and agencies with such responsibilities. In fulfilling this mandate, the NSIRA Secretariat interacts with members of the public as well as public servants, and must promote accessibility for all participants. Ensuring that persons with disabilities can participate fully in these complaint and review processes remains integral to the NSIRA Secretariat’s operations.

Amendments to the Rules of Procedure have clarified that complaint investigation participants may request accommodations and receive procedural assistance to address accessibility barriers, including support for persons with cognitive or other disabilities. Accessibility remains closely linked to progress in other areas, such as the built environment and information and communication technology (ICT).

Based on recent assessments and questionnaire feedback, the following barriers or opportunities were identified:

  • The absence of a formalized process for tracking accessibility-related requests creates a potential risk of gaps in ensuring timely or appropriate support for individuals with disabilities.
  • There is a need to enhance existing accessibility training to ensure employees feel fully confident in supporting participant’s diverse accessibility needs.

In 2026–2028, the NSIRA Secretariat will focus on the following:

a) Implement a process to track accessibility-related accommodations:

The Secretariat will formalize a system to record and monitor all accessibility-related requests made during the public complaints process. This process will support timely follow-up, help identify recurring accessibility needs and improve reporting on service delivery accessibility.

b) Provide targeted training for staff involved in operations:

Employees who regularly interact with persons outside of the NSIRA Secretariat—including complainants, members of the public, and public servants involved in review activities—will receive targeted training to strengthen awareness of accessibility principles and confidence in providing accommodations. The training will focus on inclusive communication, plain language, and the practical application of the duty to accommodate during interviews, briefings and correspondence. This will help ensure that all participants can engage fully in the Secretariat’s processes.

Through these measures, the NSIRA Secretariat will continue advancing accessibility in its operations, ensuring that its Programs and Services remain inclusive, responsive, and barrier-free for all participants.

7. Transportation 

The NSIRA Secretariat’s offices are located in Ottawa, where accessible transportation services are provided by OC Transpo and the Société de Transport de l’Outaouais. Designated accessible parking spaces are available at nearby lots.

While no barriers have been identified at the NSIRA Secretariat’s primary location, employees occasionally travel domestically and internationally for work-related meetings and activities. To support an accessible and inclusive workplace, accessibility considerations will continue to be integrated into travel planning and coordination.

In 2026-2028, efforts will focus on the following:

a) Integrate accessibility into travel planning and procedures:

The Secretariat will incorporate accessibility considerations into travel policies, guidance, and procedures. This will include identifying employees’ accessibility needs during the travel authorization process and ensuring that travel arrangements (such as flight bookings, airport assistance, or ground transportation) accommodate those needs.

b) Provide guidance and support for accessible travel:

Employees and managers will have access to clear guidance on planning and requesting accessible travel arrangements, both domestically and internationally. This will help ensure that employees with disabilities are supported before, during, and after travel, and that accessibility considerations are applied consistently across all travel requests.

Through these initiatives, the NSIRA Secretariat will promote accessible travel planning, ensuring that all employees can participate in work-related travel and activities.

Implementation, monitoring and reporting

To ensure accessibility remains a core priority, the ACA and the Accessible Canada Regulations require regulated entities to prepare and publish annual progress reports on the implementation of their accessibility plans. These progress reports must be developed in consultation with persons with disabilities and describe the consultation process, including how feedback was considered and incorporated.

The NSIRA Secretariat is committed to ongoing engagement with persons with disabilities and other stakeholders to continuously improve accessibility across its programs, services, and workplace. Feedback received through consultations, public inquiries, or other channels will be carefully reviewed and addressed to inform future actions and updates.

In accordance with the regulations, the NSIRA Secretariat will publish an updated accessibility plan every three years. The first plan was published in December 2022, and the second in December 2025. All accessibility plans and progress reports will be made publicly available to ensure transparency and accountability in advancing accessibility throughout the organization.

Through these measures, the NSIRA Secretariat strives to foster an inclusive and accessible environment for all Canadians, demonstrating a sustained commitment to removing barriers and enhancing equitable participation.

Glossary

Barrier: means anything—including anything physical, architectural, technological or attitudinal, anything that is based on information or communications or anything that is the result of a policy or a practice—that hinders the full and equal participation in society of persons with an impairment, including a physical, mental, intellectual, cognitive, learning, communication or sensory impairment or a functional limitation.

Disability: means any impairment, including a physical, mental, intellectual, cognitive, learning, communication or sensory impairment—or a functional limitation—whether permanent, temporary or episodic in nature, or evident or not, that, in interaction with a barrier, hinders a person’s full and equal participation in society.

Information and Communication Technology (ICT): is an extensional term for information technology (IT) that stresses the role of unified communications and the integration of telecommunications (telephone lines and wireless signals) and computers, as well as necessary enterprise software, middleware, storage and audiovisual, that enable users to access, store, transmit, understand and manipulate information.

Web Content Accessibility Guideline (WCAG): the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) are part of a series of web accessibility guidelines published by the Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI) of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the main international standards organization for the Internet. They are a set of recommendations for making Web content more accessible, primarily for people with disabilities.

References and resources

Accessible Canada Act (justice.gc.ca)

Accessible Canada Regulations (justice.gc.ca)

Accessibility Strategy for the Public Service of Canada – Canada.ca (also referred to as “Nothing Without Us”)

Canadian Human Rights Act (justice.gc.ca)

Canadian Human Rights Commission

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (justice.gc.ca)

Policy on Government Security- Canada.ca

Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG)

Meta data information

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, Accessibility Plan 2026 – 2028
Title in French: Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement, Plan sur l’accessibilité 2026 – 2028
Also available online: www.nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/accessibility-plan-2026-2028/
ISSN: 2817-1160, PS106-13E-PDF
Key title: Accessibility plan (National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)‏)
© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, 2022

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Annual Report 2024

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Annual Report 2024

Backgrounder

Ottawa, Ontario, December 4, 2025 – The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) 2024 Annual Report has been tabled in Parliament.

The report outlines NSIRA’s key achievements and progress, showcasing how the organization has played a vital role in shaping the national security and intelligence review landscape. Through its work, NSIRA fosters public trust, upholds democratic oversight, and safeguards the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.

2024 Review Highlights

In 2024, NSIRA completed nine reviews, including the Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference. Given its public interest, NSIRA determined that the report and its conclusions should be released to Parliament. As such, this review resulted in NSIRA’s first special report tabled under section 40 of the NSIRA Act.

Other key reviews in 2024 included:

  • Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Human Source Program: Part of a three-part series examining how federal agencies manage and use human sources in national security operations. 
  • The Lifecycle of CSIS’s Warranted Information: Assessed the entire lifecycle of warranted information, from the moment it is collected through processing, analysis, use, storage, and eventual retention or disposal.  
  • Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Accountability Mechanisms: Stemming from a Ministerial referral, NSIRA examined whether CSIS and the Department of Public Safety were effectively supporting Ministerial responsibility.

As of publication of the Annual Report, five of the nine reviews completed in 2024 have been published. Other reviews from 2024 are, as are unpublished reviews from previous years, undergoing processes in relation to redaction of potentially injurious information. NSIRA continues to advance all review reports submitted to the Minister, with additional publications expected upon completion of the redaction processes.

Recommendations, Redactions and Access

In 2024, NSIRA introduced dedicated follow-up cycles to evaluate how departments implement its recommendations. Work is underway to develop new internal tracking tools and protocols to improve awareness, follow-up, and public communications about institutional responses and progress.

While NSIRA has observed encouraging progress in the timeliness and completeness of responses from several reviewees, the Agency and Secretariat have faced ongoing challenges. Tensions persist regarding institutional resistance to NSIRA’s access rights, inconsistent disclosures in response to requests for information, and overbroad or unsubstantiated demands for redactions in access-to-information consultations.

NSIRA is exploring options to provide better real-time public visibility into these challenges to support greater departmental accountability.

2024 Complaints Investigations

From January 1 to December 31, 2024, NSIRA received 79 new complaints, including 67 related to CSIS. Of these, 52 (66%) involved delays in immigration and citizenship security screening. Under sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA, and CSIS advised that the time required can vary based on several factors. As shown in the statistics in the report, many complaints were resolved informally once CSIS completed its screening and issued a letter confirming that its advice had been provided to the requesting department.

NSIRA closed a total of 22 investigations in 2024, with 34 carried into 2025.

Strategic Direction

NSIRA finalized its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, setting clear priorities for the next three years. The plan reaffirms NSIRA’s core values — Independence, Professionalism, Transparency, and Inclusiveness — and serves as a foundation for continuous improvement.    

The Agency continues to closely collaborate with domestic and international partners to strengthen its review and investigative capabilities. NSIRA aspires to be a globally recognized centre of excellence and a hub for a professional community dedicated to national security accountability.

Date of Publishing:

Message from the members

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA, Review Agency) is pleased to present its 2024 Annual Report, highlighting key achievements, progress, and our direction for coming years.

2024 Key Highlights

In 2024, NSIRA observed a notable increase in the number of complaint investigations linked to immigration security screening delays.

Additionally, NSIRA has released its first Section 40 public interest report this year, marking an important milestone in its mandate. This report underscores NSIRA’s dedication to transparency and accountability in national security matters.

NSIRA’s 2024–2027 Strategic Plan

After five years of operation, NSIRA has developed its triennial strategic plan for 2024-2027, which will guide the Review Agency’s efforts in the coming years. The strategic plan focuses on NSIRA’s commitment to enhancing review; investigating complaints in a timely, fair, and efficient manner; fostering transparency; and strengthening public trust in NSIRA’s rigorous, fully independent review approach to Canada’s national security and intelligence activities.

NSIRA’s Role on the International Stage

NSIRA continues to strengthen its international partnerships, ensuring its work remains informed by, and a contributor to, global best practices in review. By engaging with international counterparts, NSIRA positions Canada as an active leader in upholding democratic values on the global stage.

We would like to thank the staff of NSIRA’s Secretariat for their expertise, efforts and resilience throughout this ambitious year and for their innovation, energy and commitment for the year ahead.

Marie Deschamps
Colleen Swords
Craig Forcese
Matthew Cassar
Foluke Laosebikan
Jim Chu

Executive summary

Without specialized national security review, much security service conduct would be immunized from scrutiny by reason of national security secrecy. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA)’s raison d’être is to ensure that there is no such immunity. NSIRA has two mandates: conducting national security reviews of security or intelligence activities and conducting investigations of complaints from the public brought against a subset of national security and intelligence services.

In five years of existence, NSIRA has become a robust and professional reviewbody that conducts reviews and investigates public complaints, which reflect thehighest standards and core values of Canadian society: democracy, transparencyand the rule of law.

This 2024 Annual Report outlines the multiple spheres of activity through which NSIRA has contributed meaningfully to shaping the landscape of national security and intelligence review. This work is central to strengthening public trust, ensuring democratic oversight, and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.

Reviews

The Reviews section of this report provides a summary of each of the nine review reports that were approved by Members during 2024, including the Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, which resulted in NSIRA’s first special report tabled under section 40 of the NSIRA Act, where NSIRA determined that releasing the report and its conclusions to Parliament was in the public interest. The review reports that NSIRA presented to the relevant departments and agencies in 2024 contain 67 findings and 45 recommendations.

Complaint Investigations

During the last five months of 2024, NSIRA observed a significant increase of public complaints against CSIS, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening which resulted in NSIRA ingesting an unprecedented number of new complaints.

NSIRA in Context

1.1 About NSIRA

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA, the Review Agency) is an independent entity that reviews and investigates public complaints related to national security or intelligence activities to assess their lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity. NSIRA may have up to seven Members, supported by a Secretariat with expertise in law, technology and national security, and led by an Executive Director appointed by the Governor-in-Council.

NSIRA has two mandates: reviewing Government of Canada national security or intelligence activities and investigating public complaints related to those activities.

NSIRA’s approach in managing its review process is innovative. Review teams are comprised of individuals with diverse skill sets. They execute reviews under the direction of a designated NSIRA member and relevant Secretariat management personnel. Similarly, NSIRA’s model for investigations of complaints relies on an NSIRA Member serving in a quasi-judicial investigative role, supported by legal, registry, and research staff.

1.2 NSIRA’s Vision and Mission

1.3 Unique Functions of NSIRA

NSIRA holds a unique and pivotal position within Canada’s national security accountability framework. With a mandate spanning the entire federal government, NSIRA can review any national security or intelligence activity, irrespective of the department or agency involved. This extensive jurisdiction enables NSIRA to carry out comprehensive, integrated, in-depth reviews of sensitive operations.

NSIRA also functions as a complaint investigation body, primarily examining national security-related allegations against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) closely related to national security, and denials of security clearance by federal departments. These public complaints often involve serious allegations, and NSIRA’s capacity to address them enhances access to justice and the protection of individual rights.

With access to classified and legally privileged information, NSIRA is uniquely equipped to examine whether national security powers are exercised incompliance with Canadian law.

1.4 NSIRA’s Domestic Partnerships

As part of Canada’s national security and intelligence accountability framework, NSIRA and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) serve complementary yet distinct roles. While both play crucial roles in ensuring accountability, they differ in structure and mandate.

NSICOP is a committee of parliamentarians and focuses its reviews on the effectiveness of the national security and intelligence agencies. It is impacted by events such as elections or dissolutions. NSICOP’s makeup makes it uniquely well positioned to examine both the efficacy of the national security and intelligence community, in particular, its legal frameworks, and broad strategic trends across the national security landscape.

NSIRA operates year-round and maintains consistent engagement regardless of the Parliamentary schedule. Its mandate is to focus on the legality and legal compliance of national security and intelligence activities through in-depth reviews that dig down vertically into the operational events conducted on the ground. To deliver on its mandate to investigate complaints, NSIRA’s continuous operations are essential to ensuring that investigations are conducted without delay.

NSIRA and NSICOP both enhance transparency and accountability in national security via their distinct mandates, which ensures a complete approach to independent review. They actively coordinate efforts and avoid duplication. The respective secretariats have established a strong working relationship. Together, NSICOP and NSIRA form a complementary system supporting democratic accountability and continuous legal scrutiny.

NSIRA is committed to working within a system of partnerships with key actors. It is part of a larger network of federal review and accountability bodies and regularly engages with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). These collaborations are about best practices, ensuring aligned mandates, minimizing redundancy, and reinforcing a broader framework of transparency.

1.5 Sustaining an Independent Review Body

NSIRA’s independence is the cornerstone of its credibility and effectiveness as a national security review body. Operating independently from the executive branch, NSIRA conducts impartial and expert reviews of Canada’s most sensitive security and intelligence activities. This institutional autonomy is not just a privilege, it is an attitudinal necessity and a responsibility that NSIRA takes seriously. It’s vital for preserving the integrity of its operations and cultivating public trust.

The NSIRA Act grants access to all information held by reviewed departments, including classified and legally protected information, except for Cabinet confidences. This access allows NSIRA to independently review the legality, necessity, and proportionality of government actions.

NSIRA’s reports, findings, and recommendations are not subject to any editorial control from the prime minister or any other minister, nor are they subject to any editorial control from senior officials. This approach preserves NSIRA’s voice and commitment to transparency and accountability.

To uphold this independence, NSIRA invests in secure digital systems, enhances internal governance, and develops expertise through targeted hiring and training. These initiatives improve the professionalism and integrity of NSIRA’s work.

1.6 Protecting Democracy and Freedoms

NSIRA ensures Canada’s national security activities align with the rule of law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enhancing public confidence in Canada’s national security framework. NSIRA’s role is vital in upholding a national security system based on legality and democratic accountability.

In 2024, NSIRA’s reviews tackled foreign interference, bulk data, and technology-enabled intelligence activities. NSIRA’s findings led to recommendations to keep these powers within legal and ethical limits. By reviewing the extraordinary powers of the national security community, NSIRA plays a vital role in preserving the integrity of the rule of law in Canada.

1.7 Transparency and Engagement

Transparency is a core value at NSIRA, shaping how the Review Agency conducts its work. Increasing public understanding of NSIRA’s work and its findings and recommendations is a fundamental value of the organization. NSIRA aims to ensure that Parliamentarians, media, civil society, academia, and the broader Canadian public remain engaged in its work, enabling them to form their independent views on national security or intelligence issues and to hold government accountable.

In the challenging context of national security operations, absolute public transparency could unfortunately provide adversaries and threat actors with information that might harm Canada’s security interests, as well as those of its allies. NSIRA applies a rigorous balanced approach to release as much information as possible about its work in its commitment to transparency and openness, while safeguarding genuinely injurious national security information.

In 2024, NSIRA enhanced its public reporting efforts by announcing on social media each time a report was submitted to a Minister and by informing the public that reports can be accessed under the Access to Information Act. NSIRA also began publishing backgrounders to provide Canadians with greater clarity on the context of its reviews. As part of its commitment to openness, the Agency launched an updated and more accessible website.

Additionally, in 2024, NSIRA expanded its outreach initiatives to enhance public awareness and understanding of its mandate. NSIRA hosted new events with civil society, media, and academia. These initiatives aimed to deepen the understanding of NSIRA’s role and to foster informed dialogue about NSIRA’s work.

1.8 NSIRA’s Role on the World Stage

NSIRA’s partnerships extend beyond Canada’s borders through its active role in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC). As a permanent member, NSIRA actively collaborates with review agencies from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, fostering robust collaboration and knowledge exchange.

NSIRA has established strong partnerships with European counterparts, including agencies involved in the Intelligence Oversight Working Group made up of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These partnerships transcend routine collaboration, enabling collective learning on review methodologies and facilitating coordinated knowledge exchange on the development of international review best practices.

NSIRA has also been an active collaborator in some initiatives led by certain United Nations divisions that aim to improve global partnerships in the review and oversight sector. This has led to engagement with new international partners, delivery on online training modules, and new contributions to global standards in review.

Through these international engagements, NSIRA plays an active role in shaping a global community of practice that promotes the values of rigorous independent review of national security or intelligence activities.

Highlights on Key Initiatives

2.1 Reviewee Responsiveness

Access to information is fundamental to NSIRA’s ability to conduct effective reviews and investigations. In 2024, NSIRA observed encouraging progress in the responsiveness of several reviewees, particularly regarding the timeliness and completeness of their responses.

Despite these improvements, frustrations persist: overbroad, unsubstantiated or excessive demands for redactions in access to information consultations a reoccurring in every file, inconsistent disclosures in response to requests for information are routine, institutional resistance to NSIRA’s access rights occurs, and outdated departmental information systems at times impede NSIRA’s ability to conduct its work. NSIRA raises these issues with senior departmental officials and escalates to the Minister when necessary, with mixed results. While responsiveness performance varies across departments, it is fair to say that the status quo is one where process challenges regularly challenge NSIRA’s ability to deliver on its mandate. NSIRA is looking at ways to provide better real-time public awareness of its responsiveness challenges so that relevant departments can be held accountable.

2.2 Follow-Up on Recommendations

Monitoring the execution of recommendations is pivotal to NSIRA’s commitment to facilitate systemic improvement. In 2024, NSIRA strengthened its follow-up practices by initiating dedicated review cycles designed to evaluate the implementation of prior recommendations. The timeliness and comprehensiveness of recommendation responses differ among departments and agencies.

To facilitate this endeavour, NSIRA is in the process of developing internal tracking tools and protocols to assist in ensuring more consistent awareness, follow-up, and public communications about institutional responses and progress on NSIRA’s recommendations. NSIRA will continue to make advances in the years to come on this significant initiative.

2.3 Investigations: Volume Increase and Streamlining Processes

In 2024, NSIRA addressed a surge of CSIS-related complaints from the public tied to delays in immigration and citizenship screening. More than half of the new complaints related to such delays. Several of those new complaints resulted in informal resolutions.

NSIRA advanced initiatives to improve and streamline its investigative processes and procedures, as detailed in this report’s Complaint Investigations section.

2.4 Three-Year Strategic Plan

In 2024, NSIRA finalized its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, setting a clear direction for its priorities over the next three years. The plan reaffirms NSIRA’s core values —Independence, Professionalism, Transparency, and Inclusiveness — and serves as a foundation for continuous improvement. It positions both NSIRA and its Secretariat to deliver effective, forward-looking review and investigations of public complaints. NSIRA aims to maintain the highest standards by focusing on contemporary issues, applying rigorous methodologies, delivering on its mandates with impartiality and efficiency, and continuing to modernize NSIRA’s processes and leverage new technologies to accomplish improved outcomes for Canadians.

To support NSIRA’s mission, the strategic plan invests in sustainable corporate infrastructure. This includes fostering a culture of continuous learning and maintaining high standards in information management, security, and human resources. The NSIRA Secretariat strives to be an agile and efficient workplace that attracts and retains top talent.

NSIRA also emphasizes its continued collaboration with domestic and international partners to strengthen its review and investigative capabilities. NSIRA aspires to be a globally recognized centre of excellence and a hub for a professional community dedicated to national security accountability. Through this strategic vision, NSIRA reaffirms its role as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians in an evolving security landscape.

2.5 New Offices Built to High Standards

Between 2021 and 2024, NSIRA’s Secretariat led the planning, development, and delivery of a new office space for its staff. This complex undertaking involved meeting the highest standards of security, functionality, and design, all while supporting NSIRA’s growing operational needs. Despite tight timelines and evolving requirements, the Secretariat successfully transitioned into the new space efficiently, securely, and with minimal disruption to NSIRA’s core mandate.

Reviews

3.1 Overview

NSIRA’s review mandate is outlined in subsection 8(1) NSIRA Act and includes reviewing national security or intelligence activities of CSE and CSIS, as well as those of any other federal departments and agencies.

The review reports presented in 2024 to the relevant departments and agencies contain 67 findings, and NSIRA issued 45 recommendations.

Table 1 lists the reviews that gave rise to the reports produced and submitted to the responsible minister(s) by NSIRA, in 2024.

Table 1. NSIRA review activities during 2024
Review Department(s) Status**
22-07—Canadian Security Intelligence Service Lifecycle of Warranted Information CSIS Published
23-05—Annual Review of Select CSIS activities CSIS Submitted
23-02—Annual Review of Select CSE Activities CSE Submitted
23-10—Communications Security Establishment’s Equities Management Framework CSE Submitted
21-20—Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Human Source Program RCMP Published
22-12—Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Accountability Mechanisms CSIS, GAC, PS, DOJ Published
23-11—Review of FederalInstitutions’ Disclosures of Information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2023 PS, CSE, CSIS, GAC, RCMP, CBSA, IRCC Published
24-03—Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2023 CBSA, CSIS, CSE, DND/CAF, GAC, RCMP Submitted
23-07—Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, 20218-2023 CSIS, RCMP, GAC, CSE, PS, PCO Published

**Status as of the writing of this report. A review is marked as “Submitted” when the review report has been approved by NSIRA members and sent to the relevant minister(s).

3.2 CSIS Reviews

22-07—Review of the Lifecycle of CSIS’s Warranted Information

NSIRA examined CSIS’s lifecycle management of data resulting from a specific and novel technical capability used to execute a Federal Court warrant. NSIRA inspected CSIS’s primary collection and processing system to directly observe how data was collected, processed, and managed.

CSIS introduced heightened non-compliance risks when deploying the technical capability with inadequate operational policies and procedures, inadequate data stewardship practices, and inadequate technical systems to handle the resulting data. Consequently, CSIS retained information without a clearly articulated authority.

CSIS did not consult with Public Safety Canada as required by the Ministerial Direction prior to using the novel technology under review. CSIS’s failure to consult may not have been in compliance with the CSIS Act. CSIS mischaracterized the novel technology as an extension of an existing CSIS technology and failed to inform Public Safety Canada in a timely manner. CSIS did not advise the Federal Court of this novel technology.

These shortcomings raised concerns about CSIS’s readiness to assess, prepare for and deploy other novel technologies.

Findings Recommendations Reviewee’s Response
[*Technology*] as a Novel Technology
Finding 1. NSIRA found that [*technology*] are a novel technology within CSIS’s suite of technical capabilities.
Finding 2. NSIRA found that [*technology*] introduce a significant expansion of collection capabilities and operational risks.
Finding 3. NSIRA found that CSIS does not have adequate policies and procedures to manage its [*technology*] program.
Finding 4. NSIRA found CSIS did not consult Public Safety Canada in a timely manner regarding its planned use of [*technology*] contrary to the Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service on Accountability issued pursuant to section 6(2) of the CSIS Act. Moreover, CSIS may not be in compliance with section 7(1)(b) of the CSIS Act, which requires the Director to consult with the Deputy Minister when required pursuant to Ministerial Direction. Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that CSIS establish and maintain adequate policies and procedures to manage its [*technology*] program. Agree
Data Lifecycle Management
Finding 5. NSIRA found that CSIS incorrectly labelled some data collected during [*operation*] and no quality assurance or compliance process detected this prior to NSIRA’s technical inspection.
Finding 6. NSIRA found that CSIS retained collected information without clearly articulating the authority for its retention.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS does not adequately consider data stewardship requirements accruing from new collection activities, which introduces heightened non-compliance risks. Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize investing in technical processes and systems that can assess, ingest, label, use, and destroy data in compliance with its legal obligations. Agree
Risk Assessment Practices
Finding 8. NSIRA found that CSIS relies on the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to operationalize the 2019 Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on Accountability. However, the 2020 Framework does not fully capture the requirements of the 2019 Ministerial Direction. Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service be revised to fully align with the 2019 Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on Accountability. Agree
Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that the definition of “novel technique or technology” in the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service be revised to err on the side of inclusivity. Agree
Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that CSIS ensure risk assessments performed throughout the lifecycle of new technologies and techniques are rigorous, documented and comprehensive in their scope. Agree
Operational Technology Review Committee (OTRC)
Finding 9. NSIRA found that the creation of the Operational Technology Review Committee was an important step forward in CSIS’s management of new technologies and techniques. Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that, as part of its ongoing development, the Operational Technology Review Committee refine its processes to:
  • consider data lifecycle requirements;
  • reference a definition of “novel technology” that has been agreed upon with Public Safety Canada as part of a revised Framework;
  • include a requirement to consult Public Safety Canada on plans or proposals to seek or develop novel techniques and technologies;
  • define how risk is assessed;
  • better document its technical, legal, foreign policy and reputational risks assessments.
 Agree
Execution of Warranted Powers
Finding 10. NSIRA found that, in [*operation*], CSIS intended to [*specific operation details*] beyond warranted targets at a [*location]. Recommendation 7. NSIRA recommends that language in the [*warrant type*] Warrant more clearly describe the breadth and limitations of what constitutes incidental collection. Partially Agree
Recommendation 8. NSIRA recommends that CSIS specify the warrant authority in the operational planning documents in support of [*sensitive info*] to be sought in the operation. Agree
Regulations
Finding 11. NSIRA found that CSIS’s [*use of technology*] may not be in compliance with [*specific*] Regulations.
Duty of Candour
Finding 12. NSIRA found that CSIS did not advise the Court prior to using [*technology*] in the execution of warranted powers. Recommendation 9. NSIRA recommends that the classified version of this report be shared with the Federal Court. Partially Agree

23-05—Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities (ARSCA-CSIS)

In 2024, NSIRA launched a process called the Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities (ARSCA-CSIS). This review covers a range of operational categories which are either routinely communicated to NSIRA by CSIS under a standalone statutory obligation or are of unique interest to NSIRA due to high legal risks or findings of prior reviews. In previous years, NSIRA conducted annual reviews of CSIS Activities that were primarily focused on NSIRA’s requirement to report annually to the Minister of Public Safety. However, these reviews did not culminate in a final report with findings and recommendations issued pursuant to section 34 of the NSIRA Act. The work completed this year as part of the ARSCA-CSIS is being captured in a final report with findings and recommendations, thereby aligning with NSIRA’s other thematic reviews. The report, which starting this year will be completed annually, will also contain the results of NSIRA’s efforts in reviewing an aspect of the CSIS Threat Reduction Regime. The ARSCA-CSIS report that will provide a high level overview of CSIS activities during the 2024 calendar year has been completed in 2025. Its findings and recommendations will appear in NSIRA’s public annual report for the calendar year 2025.

3.3 CSE Reviews

23-02—Annual Review of Select CSE Activities (ARSCA-CSE)

In 2024, NSIRA launched a process called the Annual Review of Select CSE Activities (ARSCA-CSE). This review covers a range of operational categories which are either routinely communicated to NSIRA by CSE under a standalone statutory obligation, or are of unique interest to NSIRA due to high legal risks or findings of prior reviews. In previous years, NSIRA conducted Annual Reviews of CSE Activities that were primarily focused on NSIRA’s requirement to report annually to the Minister of National Defence. However, these reviews did not culminate in a final report with findings and recommendations issued pursuant to section 34 of the NSIRA Act. The work completed this year as part of the ARSCA-CSE is being captured in a final report with findings and recommendations, thereby aligning with NSIRA’s other thematic reviews. The ARSCA-CSE report that will provide a high level overview of CSE activities during the 2024 calendar year has been completed in 2025. Its findings and recommendations will appear in NSIRA’s public annual report for the calendar year 2025.

23-10—CSE’s Equities Management Framework

NSIRA review of CSE’s Equities Management Framework (EMF) resulted in ten findings and seven recommendations that relate to two areas of concern, as well as several shortcomings related to governance and practices. However, at the time of writing, the full report remains heavily classified. As such, more information regarding this review, along with the related findings and recommendations, will be made available at a later date.

3.4 Other Department Reviews

21-20—RCMP’s Human Source Program

This review was conducted alongside reviews of similar programs at the Canada Border Services Agency and the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces.

NSIRA’s review focused on three areas: risk management, duty of care to human sources, and ministerial direction accountability. NSIRA found that risk assessments were inconsistently applied, leading to varied assessments on source suitability. The RCMP was overly reliant on confidentiality promises and failed to fully consider risks to sources. Risk assessments often prioritized investigative outcomes over the safety of informants and lacked proper documentation.

Additionally, NSIRA found that the RCMP did not exercise the required “special care” when sources operated in sensitive sectors. There were no mechanisms to assess the cumulative impact of such operations. Anecdotal evidence suggested these practices negatively affected both investigations and Canadian society. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.

Findings Recommendations Reviewee’s Response
Policy Implementation
Finding 1. NSIRA found that the RCMP’s dated human source policy does not provide a sufficient framework for the consistent application of the Source Development Unit methodology in the proactive recruitment of human sources. Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that the RCMP update its human source policy to include, at a minimum:
  • a centralized framework that requires the Human Source Program policy centre to establish:
    • clear thresholds and guidance on the appropriate criteria for the use of proactive recruitment methods in national security investigations,
    • strong oversight and accountability by monitoring and tracking policy compliance; and
  • entrenched methodology principles, including for the conduct of a standardized approach to the assessment of risk to human sources in all national security investigations.
Policy Governance — Risk Assessment
Finding 2. NSIRA found that the risk assessment for agents is adequate because it is comprehensive and details the management of risk as a shared responsibility involving multiple independent stakeholders.
Findings 3. The risk assessment framework for confidential informants is inadequate. The current assessments of risk:
  • are not well documented and as such do not provide adequate or reliable information to decision-makers; and
  • are primarily focused on operational security and risk to the investigation, as opposed to risk to the confidential informants.
 Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that the RCMP revise its risk assessment framework for confidential informants to require officers to consider all applicable risks to the confidential informant, and to aggregate and document those risks, thereby providing for a full accounting.
Agents — Duty of Care and Informed Consent
Finding 4. RCMP’s discharge of its duty of care toward agents is satisfactory because the current process:
  • considers a wide range of risks;
  • ensures that obligations for informed consent are met;
  • accounts for risk mitigation measures;
  • provides for administrative interviews; and
  • includes independent third party assessments.
 Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the RCMP adjust the parameters for the conduct of agent interviews so that agent feedback is more descriptive concerning their experience; and documented with greater frequency.
Confidential Informants — Duty of Care and Informed Consent
Finding 5. NSIRA found that the RCMP over relies on the promise of confidentiality and does not adequately consider the risk to confidential informants. Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that the RCMP improve its risk assessment framework for confidential informants. At a minimum, the framework should:
  • consider the safety of the confidential informant;
  • consider the particular circumstances of the confidential informant;
  • aggregate information that allows for the detection of outstanding vulnerabilities; and
  • provide for consent from the confidential informant that is considerate of the risks involved.
Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that RCMP lower the threshold to conduct administrative interviews so they are conducted with greater regularity and with a greater proportion of confidential informants.
Ministerial Direction — National Security Investigations in Sensitive Sectors
Finding 6. NSIRA found that the RCMP has not demonstrated special care in its national security investigations in sensitive sectors, contrary to obligations under the Ministerial Direction — National Security Investigations in Sensitive Sectors.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that the RCMP has an inadequate framework to ensure the appreciation of the cumulative impact of national security investigations in Canadian Fundamental Institutions Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that the RCMP create a specialized Sensitive Sector Unit that is responsible for monitoring and aggregating information on the RCMP’s activities as they relate to Canadian Fundamental Institutions, assessing the impact of these activities on the community, and conduct long-term analysis of the cumulative effects.

3.5 Multi-Departmental Reviews

22-12— Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Accountability Mechanisms (CSIS, GAC, PS, DOJ)

Following a September 2022 referral by the former Minister of Public Safety (PS), NSIRA reviewed whether CSIS’s risk assessment model, Ministerial Direction, and information-sharing mechanisms supported the Minister’s discharge of their responsibilities for CSIS.

Directions to CSIS coming from political level actors—rather than the Minister or the CSIS Director—during an active operation created unnecessary danger for the CSIS team and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation.

CSIS and PS failed to provide timely and accurate information to the Minister, which may result from PS’s dependence on CSIS to identify and receive relevant information. This would inhibit PS’s ability to prepare independent advice to the Minister.

Certain Ministerial Directions to CSIS are subject to inconsistent and contradictory interpretation, which affects their implementation. The report raises a number of issues with the pillars of risk evaluated: operational, legal, foreign policy, and reputational.

Ultimately, the Minister of Public Safety may not be consistently supported and briefed about pertinent CSIS operations, which raises concerns about the possible erosion of ministerial accountability for the CSIS.

Findings Recommendations Reviewee’s Response
Accountability and Consequences for Halting the Operation [*codename*]
Finding 1. NSIRA found that a decision was made to halt an active CSIS operation overseas that was not made by the CSIS Director under section 6(1) of the CSIS Act, and for which there is no written record of a direction comingfrom the Minister of Public Safety under sections 6(1) or 6(2) of the CSIS Act. Recommendation 1. NSIRA Recommends that whenever there is a decision affecting an active CSIS operation, which is not made by the Director of CSIS or their delegates, it must come as a direction from the Minister of Public Safety under section 6(1) of the CSIS Act and should be accompanied by a written record in keeping with section 6(2). Agree
Finding 2. NSIRA found that [*political-level actors*] halted an active operation, creating unnecessary danger for the CSIS team [**], and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation.
Responsibility for Briefing the Minister About [*codename*]
Findings 3. NSIRA found that Public Safety and CSIS failed in their responsibility to provide timely and accurate information to the Minister of Public Safety about [**] human source [**] operation.
Public Safety’s Role in Relation to CSIS
Finding 4. NSIRA found that Public Safety willingly remains dependent on CSIS to identify and receive relevant information, which inhibits Public Safety’s ability to prepare independent advice to the Minister about the activities and operations of CSIS. Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that the Minister of Public Safety take action to ensure that the Deputy Minister obtains any information required to fulfill their responsibility to provide independent advice to the Minister about the activities and operations of CSIS. Partially Agree
Ministerial Direction to CSIS
Findings 5. NSIRA found that multiple Ministerial Directions to CSIS are subject to inconsistent and contradictory interpretation by those responsible for their implementation. Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the Minister of Public Safety consolidate ministerialdirections into clear, concise and harmonized instruments that are derived from meaningful consultation among those responsible for their implementation. Agree
Findings 6. NSIRA found that when preparing Ministerial Directions to CSIS, Public Safety insufficiently consulted with Global Affairs Canada and CSIS.
CSIS’s Risk Assessment Process
Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS’s risk assessment process has evolved to become the central mechanism for planning operations and managing associated risks, and, while it is generally effective, it lacks clear guidance to employees on when risk should be reassessed as operations evolve.
Legal Pillar
Findings 8. NSIRA found that legal advice is often absent from the final risk assessment record for CSIS operations. Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that CSIS, in consultation with the Department of Justice and Global Affairs Canada, ensure that legal risk assessments are comprehensive and memorialized in writing. Agree
Findings 9. NSIRA found that the scope of legal considerations within legal risk assessment is underinclusive.
Foreign Policy Pillar
Finding 10. NSIRA found that Global Affairs Canada and CSIS do not have a shared vision with respect to the role of Global Affairs Canada in the foreign policy risk assessment. Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that any pending changes to CSIS’s risk assessment process maintain a robust consultation and information sharing mechanism between Global Affairs Canada and CSIS. Agree
Reputational Pillar
Finding 11. NSIRA found that Public Safety is not adequately contributing to the preparation of reputational risk assessments. Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that Public Safety and CSIS develop a more robust consultation mechanism for reputational risk assessment for CSIS operational activities, and that these assessments account for the risk of discreditingthe Government of Canada. Partially Agree

23-11— Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2023 (PS, CSE, CSIS, GAC, RCMP, CBSA, IRCC)

The purpose of this review was to determine whether Government of Canada (GC) institutions complied with the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in 2023. For the first time in SCIDA’s history, NSIRA has found full compliance with the Act, but NSIRA made seven recommendations to mitigate the risks of non-compliance.

Albeit compliant with the SCIDA, some IRCC disclosures presented a risk of non-compliance with SCIDA’s contribution and proportionality tests. The disclosing institution must be satisfied that both tests are met before making a disclosure under the SCIDA. Yet, four disclosures raised concerns with regard to the amount of personal information that IRCC disclosed.

At times, CSIS request letters were unclear, which hindered IRCC’s effort to conclude that the disclosure was authorized. The departments are required to provide information on the accuracy and reliability of the manner the disclosed information was obtained. However, NSIRA found that IRCC provided template statements on accuracy and reliability that were not always relevant.

CBSA’s record of disclosure form contradicts the SCIDA by suggesting that the provision of information on accuracy and reliability is optional.

Findings Recommendations Reviewee’s Response
Record Keeping Requirements — Section 9
Finding 1. NSIRA found that every institution that disclosed or received information pursuant to SCIDA in 2023 complied with their record keeping obligations under section 9, but some records were inaccurate or imprecise.
Contribution and Proportionality Tests — Subsection 5(1)
Finding 2. NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed that disclosing institutions demonstrated they had satisfied themselves under the contribution and proportionality tests in compliance with subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA. Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that disclosing institutions explicitly address the requirements of both paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the records that they prepare under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA. Agree
Finding 3. NSIRA found that IRCC did not, in one instance, independently consider whether its disclosure related to activities that fell under the SCIDA exception for advocacy, protest, or dissent. Instead, IRCC satisfied itself of the SCIDA’s contribution test based on assumptions about how CSIS assessed activities that undermine the security of Canada. Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that IRCC amend their SCIDA policy to underscore that IRCC must independently assess whether the disclosure is authorized. This assessment should consider whether the activity amounts to one of the exceptions to the SCIDA’s definition of activities that undermine the security of Canada. Agree
Finding 4. NSIRA found that, throughout the course of 2023, IRCC improved the rigour of its proportionality assessments regarding disclosure of passport information. However, NSIRA identified three instances where IRCC disclosed visa information without applying the same rigorous approach, which risked disclosing more personal information than reasonably necessary in the circumstances. Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that IRCC apply an iterative approach to its proportionality assessments, with a view to disclosing only the minimum information reasonably necessary in the circumstances to enable the recipient institution to further their investigation. Agree
Finding 5. NSIRA found that CSIS requests to IRCC used inconsistent terminology and were often unclear about the relationship between the subject of the request and its investigation. At times, this lack of clear communication hindered IRCC’s efforts to satisfy itself that the disclosure was authorized underthe SCIDA. Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that CSIS use consistent terminology, and be clear about the nature of the link that has been established between the subject of a request and its investigation, to assist IRCC in satisfying itself of the proportionality test. Agree
Reliability and Accuracy Statement — Subsection 5(2)
Finding 6. NSIRA found that disclosing institutions provided information regarding the accuracy of the information and reliability of the manner in which it was obtained in relation to all disclosures. However, CBSA made one verbal disclosure that did not include an explicit statement on accuracy and reliability. Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that institutions avoid disclosures whenever possible. When they must occur, verbal disclosures should explicitly convey the requisite information on accuracy and reliability. Agree
Finding 7. NSIRA found that CBSA’s record of disclosure form contradicts the SCIDA by allowing officials to opt out of providing information regarding accuracy and reliability. Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that CBSA harmonize its record of disclosure form with the SCIDA, to convey the mandatory nature of providing information on accuracy and reliability at the time of the disclosure. Agree
Finding 8. NSIRA found that IRCC used “templated” language to describe the disclosure’s accuracy and reliability that was not always relevant or specific to the circumstances of the disclosure. Recommendation 7. NSIRA recommends that IRCC tailor its statements on accuracy and reliability as to ensure that each disclosure’s statement is specific to the circumstances of the case. Agree
Information Sharing Agreement — Subsection 4(c)
Finding 9. NSIRA found that disclosures between IRCC and CSE that occurred following the enactment of their new information sharing agreement were compliant with both the SCIDA and their information¬ sharing agreement.

24-03—Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2023: Mitigation and Armed Conflict (CBSA, CSIS, CSE, DND/CAF, GAC, RCMP)

This review assessed departments’ compliance with the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and their implementation of the ACA’s associated directions (ACA Directions) during the 2023 calendar year. It focused on how departments mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with foreign entities.

NSIRA reviewed a number of cases concerning disclosures to foreign entities engaged in armed conflict and considered how armed conflict affected departments’ ability to mitigate.

Three departments that shared with foreign entities engaged in armed conflict may not have been compliant with the ACA Directions.

A foreign country’s involvement in armed conflict created challenges for departments in meeting their mitigation obligations under the ACA Directions. NSIRA further observed challenges related to disclosures contemplated to serve humanitarian objectives. NSIRA noted that the circumstances of armed conflict left few options for departments pursuing humanitarian objectives to mitigate the risks resulting from sharing.

NSIRA directed departments to conduct a study of information-sharing with the foreign entities of countries engaged in armed conflict to analyze challenges incompliance with the ACA Directions and gaps in the ACA regime. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.

Findings Recommendations Reviewee’s Response
Finding 1. NSIRA found that, in the cases examined, CSIS, GAC, RCMP, and IRCC’s mitigation determinations demonstrated common deficiencies, including:
  • inadequate design of mitigation measures to address the specific risks of mistreatment present;
  • insufficient assessment of caveats and assurances for clarity and reliability; and
  • improper incorporation of external considerations into the determinations of whether a substantial risk of mistreatment could be mitigated.
Finding 2. NSIRA found that, in the case examined, CSIS may not have been in compliance with the ACA Directions, as they were unlikely to have sufficiently mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with a foreign entity. Specifically, CSIS:
  • relied upon caveats and assurances that were inadequately designed to address the specific risks of mistreatment present; and
  • did not resolve substantial deficiencies that undermined the reliability of the caveats and assurances.

Finding 3. NSIRA found that, in the case examined, GAC’s poor record-keeping practices impeded NSIRA’s ability to determine their compliance with the ACA Directions.

Finding 4. NSIRA found that, in the case examined, the RCMP may not have been in compliance with the ACA Directions, as they were unlikely to have sufficiently mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with a foreign entity. Specifically, the RCMP relied upon caveats that were inadequately designed to address the specific risks of mistreatment present.

Finding 5. NSIRA found that, in the case examined, IRCC may not have been in compliance with the ACA Directions, as they were unlikely to have sufficiently mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with a foreign entity. Specifically, IRCC relied upon measures that were inadequately designed to address the specific risks of mistreatment present.

Finding 6. NSIRA found that many of DND/CAF’s mitigation practices served to provide decision-makers with information necessaryto determine whether a substantial risk of mistreatment could be mitigated.

 Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that departmental ACA risk assessments include thorough mitigation plans wherever a substantial risk of mistreatment is identified. These plans should:
  • consider whether all mitigation measures proposed, taken globally, adequately address the specific risks alive in the case at issue and are capable of sufficiently lesseningthose risks;
  • evaluate the reliability of any caveats and assurances proposed and weigh histories of compliance according to their quality;
  • exclude any external considerations that are not relevant to the question of mitigation, including the risk of not sharing, and strategic or reputational considerations; and
  • include a plan to monitor for indications of mistreatment and adherence to caveats and assurances following an information exchange.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that a foreign country’s involvement in armed conflict created challenges for departments in meeting their mitigation obligations under the ACA Directions when seekingto share information with that country’s entities. Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that officials clearly document how each identified risk was mitigated prior to disclosing information to foreign entities.
Finding 8. NSIRA found that the practicalrealities of compliance with the ACA Directions can, in certain circumstances, create a dilemma for departments seeking to share for humanitarian purposes.

23-07—Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, 2018-2023 (CSIS, RCMP, GAC, CSE, PS, PCO)

This review evaluated processes regarding how collected information was shared and escalated to relevant decision-makers, and indicated that there were significant disagreements in the national security and intelligence community as to whether, when, and how to share relevant information.

Three basic schisms existed: CSIS struggled to reconcile competing imperatives given the unique sensitivities of political foreign interference; the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP) Panel were geared toward broad, systematic interference and therefore could not adequately address riding-by-riding interference. PCO and CSIS analysts produced overviews of what they considered to be PRC foreign interference activities, but which the Prime Minister’s National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) saw as recounting standard diplomatic activity.

This challenging situation prompts us to ask how to address the so-called grey zone whereby political foreign interference may stand in close proximity to typical political or diplomatic activity. NSIRA saw evidence of this challenge across the activities under review. NSIRA’s eight recommendations address these deficiencies. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.

Findings Recommendations Reviewee’s Response
CSIS’s Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence on PRC Foreign Interference in the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections
Finding 1. NSIRA found that CSIS’s dissemination of intelligence on political foreign interference during the 43rd and 44th federal elections was inconsistent. Specifically, in certain instances:
  • the rationale for decisions regarding whether, when, and how to disseminate intelligence was not clear, directly affectingthe flow of information; and
  • the threat posed by politicalforeign interference activities was not clearly communicated by CSIS.
Finding 2. NSIRA found that CSIS’s dissemination and use of intelligence on political foreign interference were impacted by the concern that such actions could interfere, or be seen to interfere, in the democratic process.
Finding 3. NSIRA found that CSIS often elected to provide verbal briefings as opposed to written products in disseminating intelligence on political foreign interference duringelections.
Finding 4. NSIRA found that there was a disconnect within CSIS between a region and National Headquarters as to whether reporting on political foreign interference was subject to higher thresholds of confidence, corroboration and contextualization for dissemination. Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop, in consultation with relevant government stakeholders, a comprehensive policy governing its engagement with threats related to political foreign interference. This policy should:
  • make explicit CSIS’s thresholds and practices for the communication and dissemination of intelligence regarding political foreign interference. This would include the relevant levels of confidence, corroboration, contextualization and characterization necessary for intelligence to be reported;
  • clearly articulate CSIS’s risk tolerance for taking action against threats of political foreign interference;
  • establish clear approval and notification processes (including external consultations) for all activities related to counteringpolitical foreign interference;
  • make clear any special requirements or procedures that would apply during election/writ periods, as necessary, including in particular procedures for the timely dissemination of intelligence about political foreign interference; and
  • consider best practices from international partners (in particular the Five Eyes) regarding investigating and reporting about political foreign interference.
The SITE Task Force and the CEIPP Panel
Finding 5. NSIRA found that the SITE Task Force and the CEIPP Panel were not adequately designed to address traditional, human-based foreign interference. Specifically:
  • the SITE Task Force focuses on threat activities duringthe election period, but traditional foreign interference also occurs between elections; Findings Recommendations Reviewee’s Response
  • Global Affairs Canada’s representation on the SITE Task Force focused on online foreign interference activities; and
  • the CEIPP Panel’s high threshold for a public announcement is unlikely to be triggered by traditional foreign interference, which typically targets specific ridings.
 Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that the SITE Task Force align its priorities with the threat landscape, including threats which occur outside of the immediate election period.
Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and the Privy Council Office ensure that GAC’s representation on the SITE Task Force leverages the department’s capacity to analyze and address traditional, human-based foreign interference, in addition to the online remit of the Rapid Response Mechanism Team.
Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that the Privy Council Office empower the CEIPP Panel to develop additional strategies to address the full threat landscape during election periods, including when threats manifest in specific ridings.
The Flow of Intelligence on PRC Foreign Interference
Finding 6. NSIRA found that the limited distribution of some CSIS and CSE intelligence to senior officials only reduced the ability of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Global Affairs Canada, and the Privy Council Office to incorporate that intelligence into their analysis.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS and Public Safety did not have a system for tracking who received and read specific intelligence products, creating unacceptable gaps in accountability. Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that, as a basic accountability mechanism, CSIS and Public Safety rigorously track and document who has received intelligence products. In the case of highly sensitive and urgent intelligence, this should include documenting who has read intelligence products.
Finding 8. NSIRA found that the dissemination of intelligence on political foreign interference from 2018 to 2023 suffered from multiple issues. Specifically:
  • intelligence consumers did not always understand the significance of the intelligence they received nor how to integrate it into their policy analysis and decision-making;
  • there was disagreement between intelligence units and senior public servants as to whether activities described in specific intelligence products constituted foreign interference or legitimate diplomatic activity.
 Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that Public Safety Canada, Global Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, and other regular consumers of intelligence, enhance intelligence literacy within their departments.
Finding 9. NSIRA found that there was disagreement between senior public servants and the NSIA as to whether intelligence assessments should be shared with the political executive. Ultimately, the NSIA’s interventions resulted in two products not reaching the political executive, includingthe Prime Minister. Recommendation 7. NSIRA recommends that the security and intelligence community develop a common, working understanding of political foreign interference.
Finding 10. NSIRA found that the NSIA’s role in decisions regarding the dissemination of CSIS intelligence products is unclear. Recommendation 8. NSIRA recommends that the role of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, including with respect to decisions regarding the dissemination of intelligence, be described in a legal instrument.

Complaint Investigations

4.1 Overview

NSIRA is responsible for investigating complaints from members of the public related to national security. These investigations are carried out with consistency, fairness, and timeliness.

NSIRA’s jurisdiction covers complaints regarding activities conducted by CSIS or CSE, national security-related complaints against the RCMP, complaints in relations to security clearance denials and, referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) or under the Citizenship Act.

In 2024, NSIRA continued to investigate a wide range of complaints from previous years, successfully bringing several to a conclusion. NSIRA also initiated many new investigations, including with respect to a large increase in public complaints against CSIS regarding immigration and citizenship security screening, as detailed further below.

Finally, NSIRA continues to implement several initiatives aimed at enhancing and streamlining its processes and procedures.

Increase of complaints against CSIS regarding delays in immigration or citizenship security screening

From August to December 2024, NSIRA observed a significant increase of complaints against CSIS filed pursuant to section 16 of the NSIRA Act, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening. Out of 79 complaints received pursuant to s.16 of the NSIRA Act in 2024, 52 (66%) related to such delays. Of note, under ss. 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA regarding immigration or citizenship applicants. CSIS has advised NSIRA that the time it takes to provide security advice is influenced by several factors, including the prioritization of files, resource limitations, and priorities established by the Government of Canada, such as special immigration measures and humanitarian initiatives in response to crises around the world.

As depicted by the statistics found at the end of the current section, several of these complaints have resulted in informal resolutions. More specifically, upon completion of CSIS’s security screening of a complainant’s citizenship or immigration application, CSIS provides a letter that can be shared with the complainant which indicates that the advice has been provided to the requesting client, and that CSIS’s role is now complete. The complainant may then elect to continue with their complaint or informally resolve it.

4.2 Ongoing Initiatives

NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure govern the process for complaint investigations. While respecting the classified nature of the proceedings, they ensure that parties have the fullest opportunity to participate and make representations, and that all proceedings are conducted as informally and expeditiously as possible.

In 2024, NSIRA continued its internal review of the Rules of Procedure to identify issues and develop proposals for future revisions. The review aims to ensure that all investigations remain accessible, efficient, and procedurally fair.

Specifically, NSIRA also created a new rule on accessibility and accommodations. The rule will enable NSIRA to meet its commitment to identify, remove, and prevent barriers to accessibility to the greatest extent possible. This will help to ensure that those with disabilities can continue to fully participate in the complaint investigation process.

NSIRA also began developing another new rule to create a streamlined process for simplified investigations of non-complex complaints.

4.3 Investigation Report Summaries

Final Reports Issued

Harassment allegations against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

(NSIRA File 07-407-13)

The Complainant alleged that RCMP members had shown up unannounced and without a warrant at their home. The Complainant alleged harassment by the said RCMP members during that unexpected visit. The RCMP members went to the Complainant’s home following an anonymous report, according to which the Complainant had made threats against the Prime Minister.

The interaction between the RCMP members and the Complainant was filmed by the bodycam worn by a municipal police officer. The video was submitted as evidence by the RMCP in the NSIRA investigation.

Following a review of the documentary evidence submitted by the RCMP and the Complainant, as well as an investigative interview with the latter, NSIRA found that under the implicit invitation provided by Common Law, the RCMP members had the right to go unannounced and without a warrant to the Complainant’s house to have a discussion with the said Complainant. The purpose of the RCMP members ’visit was to determine whether the Complainant posed a threat to the public and to the Prime Minister, not to substantiate any accusations against the said Complainant or to make an arrest.

NSIRA also found that the RCMP members had not harassed the Complainant during the interaction.

NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated.

Allegations against the Department of National Defence for denial of Top Secret security clearance and revocation of reliability status

(NSIRA File 07-404-30)

The Complainant alleged that, based on their voluntary disclosure during security interviews, they were denied a Top Secret security clearance and had their reliability status revoked, which resulted in their release from the Canadian Forces. NSIRA found that it had no jurisdiction to make findings and recommendations regarding revocation of reliability status and confined its discussion to matters implicating the security clearance decision only.

The Complainant alleged that the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff’s (VCDS) security clearance decision was flawed for several reasons, including that the Complainant’s sexuality influenced the VCDS decision; the VCDS did not take into account the Complainant’s mental health situation and failed to inquire about amental health nexus in their case and provide accommodation; the decision did not meet DND’s security screening standards; the decision was inconsistent with the recommendation offered by the Complainant’s commanding officer; and the decision did not acknowledge a number of considerations that might mitigate the seriousness of the adverse information against the Complainant.

NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. Specifically, NSIRA found that the VCDS decision was not motivated by a concern or consideration of the Complainant’s sexuality or sexual orientation; that in the circumstances, no duty to accommodate was triggered for the purposes of the VCDS decision based on the Complainants mental health situation; that were unsubstantiated the allegations that the VCDS failed to meet security screening standards and that DND failed to properly review the surrounding circumstances; that the assertion that the VCDS decision was improper because it was inconsistent with the Complainant’s commanding officer’s recommendation was unsubstantiated; and that the Complainant’s other allegations, including those with respect to considerations that might mitigate the seriousness of the adverse information against them, did not individually or collectively render the decision unreasonable. In addition, NSIRA found no violation of procedural fairness.

However, NSIRA observed that certain exculpatory information was excluded from the Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) before the decision-maker and recommended that this practice be rectified in the future. However, this omission did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness in the circumstances.

Allegations against CSIS for racial profiling, interrogation and harassment, information-sharing with foreign agencies, travel difficulties, and citizenship issues

(NSIRA File 07-403-05)

The Complainant alleged that CSIS had been racially profiling them; that CSIS agents harassed and interrogated them on multiple occasions; that CSIS shared information about them with foreign countries, leading to them having travel difficulties; that CSIS was responsible for their travel difficulties; and that CSIS put their citizenship application on hold.

SIRC took jurisdiction of this complaint in 2018, and when NSIRA came into force in2019, this investigation was deemed to be continued before NSIRA.

In the investigative report, NSIRA provided clarity on the standard of review in section 16 complaints — namely, that NSIRA is charged with making findings and recommendations with respect to legality, reasonableness, and necessity in the exercise of CSIS’s powers. In gauging reasonableness and necessity, the Member adopted an objective standard: would a reasonable person charged with exercising CSIS’s mandates and apprised fully of the facts, as were available to CSIS, conclude that CSIS’s exercise of its powers was necessary and proportional?

On the facts of this investigation, NSIRA found that the allegations were unsubstantiated, but made several recommendations. The recommendations addressed observations concerning how CSIS manages the aftermath of section 12 investigations and the circumstances in which CSIS should retract or correct information that it shared with foreign agencies.

Allegations against CSIS for conspiracy, electronic surveillance, travel difficulties, information sharing, and unlawful conduct

(NSIRA File 07-403-69)

The Complainant alleged that CSIS directed an unlawful seizure of their property in 2011; unlawfully shared information with Canadian and foreign authorities; conspired with government departments; harassed, surveilled, targeted, and intercepted their phone calls; acted unlawfully and breached their human or Charter rights. In addition, the Complainant alleged that they had issues reentering Canada after the impugned seizure took place due to CSIS’s activities. NSIRA found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.

Allegations against CSE for breach of consent and procedural fairness as part of security screening and hiring processes

(NSIRA File 07-406-04)

The Complainant alleged that, as part of their security screening and hiring processes at CSE, CSE breached their consent and procedural fairness; squandered government resources; failed to use approved security screening tools that have been approved by TBS and undergone the required Privacy Impact Assessment; received verbal disclosures or slander from the Complainant’s former employer regarding their character; harassed them; denied them a security clearance; and cited suitability concerns as a technique to circumvent NSIRA’s jurisdiction under section 18 of the NSIRA Act with respect to complaints related to denials of security clearances.

NSIRA concluded that the Complainant’s first allegation that CSE had breached their consent, and more specifically that CSE improperly used information the Complainant disclosed during their security interview for human resources and suitability purposes, was supported. The consent form signed by the Complainant in preparation for the security interview only contemplated the collection of information for the purpose of obtaining a security clearance. The evidence before NSIRA revealed that the Complainant was not advised prior to the security interview that the information collected could have been subsequently used for other purposes, including to assess their suitability for employment. Accordingly, NSIRA found that CSE had not complied with section 7 of the Privacy Act.

With respect to the Complainant’s remaining allegations against CSE, NSIRA found that they were unsubstantiated by the evidence.

In its Final Report, NSIRA issued two recommendations:

  • That CSE review the consent form that is presented to and signed by candidates prior to a security interview as part of the security screening process, and amend it accordingly; and
  • That CSE consider undertaking a Privacy Impact Assessment of its security interview questionnaire if one has not been conducted yet.

Allegations against CSIS for racism/racial profiling, harassment, slander, information-sharing with foreign agencies, travel difficulties

(NSIRA File 07-403-12)

The Complainant alleged that CSIS subjected them to harassment, racial profiling, and slander. The Complainant suggests that they were targeted because of their racial or ethnic background, legitimate political opinions, and due to their work as a confidential police informant. They suggested that, due to CSIS’s conduct, they had social, psychological and financial hardship, and difficulty travelling.

SIRC took jurisdiction of this complaint in January 2019, and when NSIRA came into force in July 2019, this investigation was deemed to be continued before NSIRA.

NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. Specifically, it found that CSIS did not unlawfully investigate the Complainant or engage in racial profiling; did not target the Complainant because of their activities as a confidential police informant; did not slander or defame the Complainant, damage their reputation or sabotage their relationships; did not harass the Complainant or conduct interviews with them in an unlawful or unreasonable manner; did not unlawfully or unreasonably share information about the Complainant with foreign agencies or collude with them to interfere with their travel; did not breach the Complainant’s privacy rights under the Charter; and did not unlawfully retain personal information.

4.4 Other Outcomes

Allegations against CSIS’s role in delaying security assessment regarding immigration or citizenship applications

(NSIRA Files 07-403-98, 07-403-100, 07-403- 101, 07-403-105, 07-403-106, 07-403-110, 07-403-113, 07-403-118, 07-403-124, 07- 403-125, 07-403-126, 07-403-127, 07-403-129, 07-403-131, 07-403-132, 07-403-133, 07-403-135, 07-403-136, 07-403-151, 07-403-155)

A number of Complainants filed complaints against CSIS alleging that CSIS caused a significant delay in providing security screening advice for their immigration or citizenship applications. CSIS provided letters to NSIRA that could be shared with the Complainants advising them that CSIS had provided its advice to the requesting client and that CSIS’s role in the security screening process was complete. As the Complainants’ main allegations against CSIS were in relation to the delay in the security screening, NSIRA inquired with the Complainants as to whether they wished to resolve their complaints in light of the update received. In the above-referenced files, the Complainants informed NSIRA that they did not wish to proceed with an investigation into their respective complaints against CSIS. As such, the matters were informally resolved in accordance with Rule 10.10 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure or withdrawn.

Deemed abandonment of complaint against a government department for denial of security clearance resulting rescinded job offer

(NSIRA File 07-404-25)

The Complainant alleged that, after being offered employment by a Government of Canada department conditional upon obtaining a Reliability and Secret clearance, they were denied said clearance because of a residency issue. The Complainant alleged that this was an inaccurate application of clearance policies, and that the employment offer was rescinded after the Complainant indicated that they would pursue the matter further.

NSIRA found the complaint to be deemed abandoned according to Rule 15.02 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure, following its reasonable attempts to communicate with the Complainant who refrained from participating in the process.

Informal resolution of a complaint regarding the denial of a security clearance

(NSIRA File 07-404-37)

The Complainant alleged that they were denied employment with an agency in the Government of Canada due to the denial of the required Top Secret security clearance. The Complaint alleged that the decision was based on inaccurate information and that the agency disregarded exculpatory information that the Complainant provided to correct the inaccuracies. The Complainant also alleged that they had a pending Secret security clearance application with another department that was unreasonably delayed.

Following an informal resolution meeting facilitated by NSIRA and attended by the Complainant and responding government agency, the parties asked NSIRA to place the investigation into abeyance pending the outcome of the Complainant’s Secret security clearance application. NSIRA granted the request. The Complainant subsequently informed NSIRA that they received their Secret security clearance and no longer wished to proceed with the complaint. NSIRA accepted the informal resolution.

4.5 Statistics on Complaint Investigations

January 1–December 31, 2024
INTAKE INQUIRIES 142
New complaints filed 79
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), section 16, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) complaints 67
NSIRA Act, section 17, Communications Security Establishment (CSE) complaints 2
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances 0
NSIRA Act, section 19, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) referred complaints 10
Citizenship Act, section 19 0
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) 0
Decision on jurisdiction to investigate
  Accepted Declined Withdrawn
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints 22 10 7
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints 0 3 0
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances 0 2 0
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints 3 2 0
Total 25 17 7
Active investigations as of December 31, 2024 34
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints 23
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints 0
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances 4
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints 7
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) 0
Informal resolution in progress as of December 31, 2024 2
NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints) 2
NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints) 0
NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances) 0
NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints) 0
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) 0
Total investigations closed 22
  Abandoned Final Report Resolved Informally Withdrawn
NSIRA Act, section 16, (CSIS complaints) 0 3 14 0
NSIRA Act, section 17, (CSE complaints) 0 1 0 0
NSIRA Act, section 18, (security clearances) 1 1 1 0
NSIRA Act, section 19, (RCMP referred complaints) 0 1 0 0
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) 0 0 0 0
Total 1 6 15 0
Investigations carried to the next calendar year 34
NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints) 23
NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints)
NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances) 4
NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints) 7
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals) 0

Looking Ahead

5.1 Advancing NSIRA’s Vision

NSIRA’s vision — an accountable, transparent, and effective national security and intelligence community that upholds the rule of law — has guided every aspect of the Review Agency’s work in 2024. Through expanded transparency initiatives, timely public reporting, and continuous methodological refinement, NSIRA has demonstrated its commitment to achieving this vision. Whether through public-facing communications, the release of unclassified/redacted materials, or the ongoing enhancement of its website, NSIRA has remained focused on building public trust.

With the finalization of its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, NSIRA has established a clear framework for advancing its mandate in the years ahead. The coming year will focus on strengthening the Review Agency’s core activities by enhancing review capacity and output, deepening subject-matter expertise, and expanding on the agility of complaint investigations.

Guided by its strategic priorities, NSIRA will place greater emphasis on proactive engagement. This includes increased outreach to the media, academic, civil society, parliamentarians, and domestic oversight bodies such as Agents of Parliament. NSIRA also aims to strengthen its relationships with international counterparts to continue sharing best practices and contribute to global efforts in national security accountability. These initiatives will support NSIRA’s continued evolution as a modern, transparent, and effective review body well positioned to meet the challenges of 2025 and beyond.

Annexes

Annex A: Abbreviations

Abbreviations and Full Names
Abbreviation Full Name
ACA Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act
ARSCA-CSE Annual Review of Select CSE Activities
ARSCA-CSIS Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities
CAF Canadian Armed Forces
CBSA Canada Border Services Agency
CEIPP Critical Election Incident Public Protocol
CHRC Canadian Human Rights Commission
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DND Department of National Defence
FIORC Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council
GAC Global Affairs Canada
IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
NSICOP National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
NSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
OPC Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
PCO Privy Council Office
PS Public Safety
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCIDA Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SITE Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections
TRA Threat and risk assessment
TRM Threat reduction measure
VCDS Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Sigle/acronyme Dénomination
AMC Affaires mondiales Canada
ASFC Agence des services frontaliers du Canada
BCP Bureau du Conseil privé
CCDP Commission canadienne des droits de la personne
CPSNR Comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le renseignement
CPVPC Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée du Canada
CSERCC Conseil de surveillance et d’examen du renseignement de la Collectivité des cinq
CST Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
EACAC-CST Examen annuel de certaines activités du CST
EACAS-SCRS Examen annuel de certaines activités du SCRS
EMR Évaluation de la menace et des risques
FAC Forces armées canadiennes
GRC Gendarmerie royale du Canada
IRCC Immigration, Réfugiés et Citoyenneté Canada
LCISC Loi sur la communication d’information ayant trait à la sécurité du Canada
LECCMTIEE Loi visant à éviter la complicité dans les cas de mauvais traitements infligés par des entités étrangères
MDN Ministère de la Défense nationale
MJ Ministère de la Justice
MRM Mesure de réduction de la menace
MSRE Menace en matière de sécurité et de renseignements visant les élections
OSSNR Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement
PPIEM Protocole public en cas d’incident électoral majeur
SCRS Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité
SIGINT Renseignement électromagnétique (Signals Intelligence)
SP Sécurité publique
VCEMD Vice-Chef d’état-major de la défense

Annex B: Statistics and Data

The statistics and data below are provided as per NSIRA’s historical practice of including general data received annually from CSIS and CSE. NSIRA has not independently verified or assessed the numbers. Starting next year, such statistical data will be reproduced with the value added of NSIRA analysis and commentary as part of the summaries of the ARSCA-CSIS and ARSCA-CSE review reports.

CSIS Statistics and Data

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Total Warrant Applications 24 15 31 28 30 28
Total Warrants issued by the Court 23 15 31 28 30 27
New Warrants 9 2 13 6 9 5
Replacements 12 8 14 14 10 13
Supplemental 2 5 4 8 11 9
Total Denied Warrants 1 0 0 0 0 1
Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Note: The warrant statistics found here represent the total number of warrant applications made to the Federal Court, independent of the actual number of warrants granted in each application or the number of individuals who were the subject of warrants.
Total Number of Approved and Executed Threat Reduction Measures 2019-2024
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Approved TRMs 24 11 23 16 14 11
Executed TRMs 19 8 17 12 19 15
Warranted TRMs 0 0 0 0 0 1
Source: CSIS (NSIRA independently verified these numbers)
Total Number of CSIS Targets, 2019-2024
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Number of Targets 467 360 352 340 323 389
Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verified these numbers)
Evaluation and Retention of Publicly Available, Canadian, and Foreign Datasets by CSIS, 2019-2024
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Publicly Available Datasets
Evaluated 9 6 4 4 2 2
Retained 9 6 2 4 2 2
Canadian Datasets
Evaluated 0 0 2 0 1 0
Retained 0 0 0 2 0 0
Foreign Datasets
Evaluated 10 0 0 2 1 2
Retained 0 1 1 1 3 4
Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verify this information).
Note: Datasets collected and evaluated in one year may receive ministerial, judicial or other authorization in subsequent years. In addition, datasets may be retained for multiple years as per the CSIS Act.
Authorizations, Commissions, and Directions Under CSIS’s Justification Framework, 2019-2024
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Commissions by employees 1 39 51 61 47 34
Authorizations 49 147 178 172 172 175
Directions to Commit 15 84 116 131 116 128
Emergency Designations 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: CSIS
Total Number of Non-Compliance Incidents Processed by CSIS, 2019-2024
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Processed incidents
Administrative – 53 64 42 48 54
Operational 40 19 21 17 31 28
Total 53 99 85 59 79 82
Breakdown of Non-compliance (all categories counted)
Canadian Law – – 1 2 4 5
CSIS Act – – – – – 3
Charter – – 6 5 15 14
Warrant Conditions – – 6 3 11 13
CSIS Governance – – 8 15 27 25
Source: CSIS
Note: According to CSIS, each compliance instance was factored in all the categories in which it was non-compliant. As a result, the sum of instances may exceed the total number.
Ministerial Authorizations
Name of ministerial authorization Enabling section of CSE Act Number of Authorizations Issued in 2024
Foreign Intelligence Authorization 26(1) 3
Cybersecurity Authorization for Federal and Non-Federal Infrastructures 27(1) and 27(2) 4
Defensive Cyberoperations Authorization 29(1) 1
Active Cyberoperations Authorization 30(1) 3
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Ministerial authorizations issued in 2024
Ministerial Orders
Name of ministerial order Enabling section of CSE Act
Designating Recipients of Canadian Identifying Information Used, Analyzed or Retained Under a Foreign Intelligence Authorization 43
Designating Recipients of Information Relatingto a Canadian or Person in Canada Acquired, Used or Analyzed Under the Cybersecurity and Information Assurance Aspects of the CSE Mandate 44
Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Importance to the Government of Canada 21
Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Ukraine as of Importance to the Government of Canada 21
Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Latvia as of Importance to the Government of Canada 21
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Ministerial authorizations issued in 2024
Canadian Identifying Information
Type of request Number of requests received
Government of Canada requests 909
Five Eyes requests 78
Non-Five Eyes requests 6
Total 993
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Requests for disclosure of Canadian IdentifyingInformation related to Fl, 2024
Disclosure type Number of requests
Victim notifications 2,221
Disclosure to partners 9
Total 2,230
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Disclosures of Canadian IdentifyingInformation related to Cybersecurity, 2024
Privacy Incidents
Type of incident 2024
Privacy incidents 75
Second-party privacy incidents 44
Non-privacy compliance incidents 13
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Privacy and non-privacy compliance incidents related to CSE’s Fl mandate, 2024
Type of incident 2024
Privacy incidents 31
Non-privacy compliance incidents 9
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Privacy and non-privacy compliance incidents related to CSE’s Cybersecurity mandate, 2024
Technical and Operational Assistance
Received Approved Denied Cancelled
48 49 2 2
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Requests for technical and operational assistance, 2024.

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

Quarterly Report: For the quarter ended September 30, 2025

Quarterly Report: For the quarter ended September 30, 2025

Date of Publishing:

Introduction

This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards, GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2025–2026 Main Estimates

This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament. Established in July 2019, NSIRA reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary. The Agency also investigates complaints from members of the public on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security-related complaints, independently and in a timely manner.

The NSIRA Secretariat supports the Agency in the delivery of its mandate. Independent scrutiny contributes to strengthening the accountability framework for national security and intelligence activities and to enhancing public confidence. Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable, and necessary.

A summary description NSIRA’s program activities can be found in Part II of the Main Estimates.  Information on NSIRA’s mandate can be found on its website.

Basis of presentation

This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the agency’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the agency, consistent with the 2025–2026 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special-purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.

The authority of Parliament is required before money can be spent by the government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authorities for specific purposes.

The Department uses the full accrual method of accounting to prepare and present its annual departmental financial statements that are part of the departmental results reporting process. However, the spending authorities voted by Parliament remain on an expenditure basis.

Highlights of the fiscal quarter and fiscal year-to-date results

This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended September 30, 2025.

NSIRA Secretariat spent approximately 47% of its authorities by the end of the second quarter, compared with 45% in the same quarter of 2024–2025 (see graph 1).

Graph 1: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q2 2025–2026 and Q2 2024–2025 (in millions of dollars)

Graph 1: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q2 2024–25 and Q2 2023–24 - Text version to follow
Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q2 2025–2026 and Q2 2024–2025 (in millions of dollars)
  2025-26 2024-25
Total Authorities $20.4 $19.5
Q2 Expenditures $5.1 $5.3
Year-to-Date Expenditures $9.5 $8.8

Significant changes to authorities

As of September 30, 2025, Parliament had approved $20.4 million in total authorities for use by NSIRA Secretariat for 2025–2026 compared with $19.5 million as of September 30, 2024, for a net increase of $0.9 million or 4.6% (see graph 2).

Graph 2: Variance in authorities as of September 30, 2025 (in millions of dollars)

Graph 2: Variance in authorities as of September 30, 2024 - Text version to follow
Variance in authorities as of September 30, 2025 (in millions of dollars)
  Fiscal year 2024-25 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2025 Fiscal year 2025-26 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2026
Vote 1 – Operating 17.9 19.5
Statutory 1.6 1.9
Total budgetary authorities 19.5 20.4

*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*

The increase of $0.9 million in authorities is mostly explained by salary top-ups from Treasury Board Secretariat for updated collective bargaining agreements.

Significant changes to quarter expenditures

The second quarter expenditures totalled $5.1 million for a decrease of $0.2 million when compared with $5.3 million spent during the same period in 2024–2025.  Table 1 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.

Table 1: Departmental budgetary expenditures by Standard Object (unaudited)

Fiscal year 2025-2026 (in thousands of dollars)
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) Fiscal year 2025-2026: expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2025 Fiscal year 2024-2025: expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2024 Variance $ Variance %
Personnel 3,674 3,856 (182) (5%)
Transportation and communications 28 77 (49) (64%)
Information 15 7 8 114%
Professional and special services 1,346 1,320 26 2%
Rentals 24 17 7 41%
Repair and maintenance 6 37 (31) (84%)
Utilities, materials, and supplies 11 12 (1) (8%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 0 8 (8) (100%)
Other subsidies and payments 2 (38) 40 (105%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures 5,106 5,296 (190) (4%)

Transportation and communications

The decrease of $49,000 is due to a reduction in travel and relocation across the department.

Repair and maintenance

The decrease of $31,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.

Other subsidies and payments

The increase of $40,000 is explained by a increase in the recovery of salary overpayments.

Significant changes to year-to-date expenditures

The year-to-date expenditures totalled $9.5 million for an increase of $0.7 million (8%) when compared with $8.8 million spent during the same period in 2024-2025. Table 2 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.

Table 2: Departmental budgetary expenditures by Standard Object (unaudited) (continued)

Fiscal year 2025-2026 (in thousands of dollars)
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) Fiscal year 2025-26: year-to-date expenditures as of September 30, 2025 Fiscal year 2024-25: year-to-date expenditures as of September 30, 2024 Variance $ Variance %
Personnel 7,744 6,864 880 13%
Transportation and communications 74 135 (61) (45%)
Information 15 13 2 15%
Professional and special services 1,616 1,589 27 2%
Rentals 25 42 (17) (40%)
Repair and maintenance 22 40 (18) (45%)
Utilities, materials and supplies 15 40 (25) (63%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 0 20 (20) (100%)
Other subsidies and payments 4 41 (37) (90%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures 9,515 8,784 731 8%

Personnel

The increase in Personnel of $880,000 is due to an increase in both FTEs and average salary per FTE.

Transportation and communications

The decrease of $61,000 is mainly due to a reduction in travel and relocation across the department.

Rentals

The decrease of $17,000 is attributed to the decommissioning of a rental building, and the timing of invoicing for our HR system.

Repair and maintenance

The decrease of $18,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.

Utilities, materials and supplies

The decrease of $25,000 is due to faster acquisition card reconciliation, resulting in a decrease in the MasterCard suspense account.

Acquisition of machinery and equipment

The decrease of $20,000 is mainly explained by one-time equipment purchases in 2024-2025.

Other subsidies and payments

The decrease of $37,000 is explained by an overall decrease in the recovery of salary overpayments.

Risks and uncertainties

The funding received to offset pay increases was insufficient to cover such increases and as a result, NSIRA Secretariat will be required to reduce its overall staffing level to remain within budget. Reductions in staffing could cause a reduction in the number of reviews and investigations the Secretariat is able to produce on a yearly basis.

NSIRA Secretariat is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner and continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls.

Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA Secretariat’s approach and timelines for the execution of its mandated activities.

Significant changes in relation to operations, personnel and programs

There have been no changes to the NSIRA Secretariat Program.

Approved by senior officials:

Charles Fugère
Executive Director

Martyn Turcotte
Chief Financial Officer

Appendix

Statement of authorities (Unaudited)

(in thousands of dollars)

  Fiscal year 2025-2026 Fiscal year 2024–25
  Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2026 (note 1) Used during the quarter ended September 30, 2025 Year to date used at quarter-end Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2025 (note 1) Used during the quarter ended September 30, 2024 Year to date used at quarter-end
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures 18,522 4,629 8,561 17,857 4,895 7,983
Budgetary statutory authorities
Contributions to employee benefit plans 1,908 477 954 1,601 401 801
Total budgetary authorities (note 2) 20,430 5,106 9,515 19,458 5,296 8,784

Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.

Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Departmental budgetary expenditures by standard object (unaudited)

(in thousands of dollars)

  Fiscal year 2025-2026 Fiscal year 2024–25
  Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2026 (note 1) Expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2025 Year-to-date used at quarter-end Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2025 Expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2024 Year-to-date used at quarter-end
Expenditures
Personnel 14,377 3,674 7,744 13,205 3,856 6,864
Transportation and communications 497 28 74 685 77 135
Information 42 15 15 76 7 13
Professional and special services 4,994 1,346 1,616 4,624 1,320 1,589
Rentals 281 24 25 309 17 42
Repair and maintenance 72 11 15 436 37 40
Utilities, materials, and supplies 74 11 15 58 12 40
Acquisition of machinery and equipment 93 0 0 65 8 20
Other subsidies and payments 0 2 4 0 (38) 41
Total gross budgetary expenditures
(note 2)		 20,430 5,106 9,515 19,458 5,296 8,784

Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.

Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

Departmental Results Report: 2024-25

Departmental Results Report: 2024-25

Date of Publishing:

Results at a glance

This departmental results report details NSIRA Secretariat’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results outlined in its 2024–25 Departmental Plan.

Key priorities

NSIRA Secretariat identified the following key priorities for 2024-25:

  • Complete all mandatory reviews such as those required under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, the review of threat reduction measures, and any newly issued or significantly amended ministerial directions.
  • Maintain a consistent and thorough review process for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). This will ensure ongoing scrutiny of their activities for reasonableness, necessity and compliance with the law.
  • Meet or exceed NSIRA’s established service standards for the timely, fair, and transparent investigation of complaints. Continuously refine investigative processes to enhance responsiveness and procedural clarity.
  • Provide detailed and timely reporting on disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). This supports accountability, transparency, and the appropriate sharing of information within the federal security and intelligence community.
  • Successfully transition into NSIRA’s purpose-built facilities, ensuring secure and efficient operations, as well as improved management of classified information in alignment with Government of Canada security standards.
  • Enhance collaboration with domestic and international review bodies and Agents of Parliament through partnerships, joint activities, and knowledge sharing to strengthen NSIRA’s global review and investigation functions.

Highlights for NSIRA Secretariat in 2024-25

  • Total actual spending (including internal services): $18,839,589
  • Total full-time equivalent staff (including internal services): 87

For complete information on NSIRA Secretariat’s total spending and human resources, read the Spending and human resources section of its full departmental results report.

Summary of results

The following provides a summary of the results the department achieved in 2024-25 under its main areas of activity, called “core responsibilities.”

Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations

Actual spending: $10,856,293

Actual full-time equivalent staff: 58

Ministers and Canadians are informed about the lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity of national security and intelligence activities undertaken by the Government of Canada institutions.

In the 2024–25 fiscal year, the NSIRA Secretariat supported NSIRA’s mandate by completing all legislated reviews. These included reviews of Governor in Council directions under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, a focused examination of a CSIS threat reduction measure, and reviews of new or significantly amended ministerial directions. NSIRA also reported on disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act.

The NSIRA Secretariat supported NSIRA in completing of 8 (eight) national security and intelligence reviews over the 2024-25 fiscal year. A total of 13 (thirteen) Government of Canada organizations were subject to review and 7 (seven) Ministers received one or more of the NSIRA reports approved by members in the same fiscal year.

Results achieved:
  • 6 section 34 ministerial reports
  • 3 section 35 non-compliance reports
  • 1 section 39 report on disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act

For more information on how Ministers and Canadians are informed about the lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity of national security and intelligence activities conducted by the Government of Canada institutions, refer to the ‘Results – what we achieved” section of the departmental results report.

National security related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner

The NSIRA Secretariat achieved a 100% success rate in meeting the service standards developed in the previous year.. The Secretariat enhanced its investigative methods to improve speed, fairness, and transparency, resolving numerous formal investigations and informal complaints. This effort strengthened NSIRA’s role in providing accessible and impartial remedies for individuals. NSIRA’s efficiency improved by completing five formal investigations and resolving twelve complaints informally.

For more information on the NSIRA Secretariat’s National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations read the ‘Results – what we achieved” section of its departmental results report.

From the Executive Director

I am pleased to present the Departmental Results Report for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat for the fiscal year 2024-25. This year, the Secretariat met its objectives by supporting NSIRA in conducting thorough and meaningful reviews, while maintaining the timeliness of complaint investigations. We have built on our past achievements, significantly increasing our capacity and expertise across all areas of our operations.

In 2024-25, the NSIRA Secretariat conducted numerous national security and intelligence reviews, producing high-quality expert reports. These included ministerial reports, compliance reports, and annual reports for tabling in Parliament. The reviews covered various Government of Canada agencies and were shared with senior government officials.

Our outreach and collaboration initiatives have strengthened NSIRA’s domestic and international partnerships, reinforcing relationships with Canadian review bodies, Agents of Parliament, and various international counterparts. The Secretariat was pivotal in hosting several key partners and facilitating the exchange of best practices. This year, we also deepened our connections with European partners and participated in international oversight and review activities.

Concerning complaint investigations, the NSIRA Secretariat has continued to support the agency in enhancing our investigative processes, prioritizing timeliness, efficiency, and transparency. This focus has allowed us to ensure investigations are conducted fairly and promptly, leading to increased efficiency and resulting in numerous formal investigations and informal resolutions. The ongoing implementation of our service standards for investigative processes has proven to be highly successful.

Operationally, the NSIRA Secretariat reached a significant milestone by successfully moving into a purpose-built facility. This transition has enhanced NSIRA’s security and capacity, enabling more effective operations and the management of classified information in accordance with Government of Canada standards. The move ensured continuity of operations while reinforcing NSIRA’s resilience and modernization.

I would like to sincerely thank all NSIRA Secretariat employees for their steadfast dedication and commitment to our mission. Their efforts ensure that our work upholds the highest standards, and that Government of Canada security and intelligence activities are independently reviewed for legal compliance, reasonableness and necessity through expert scrutiny and assessment.

Results: what we achieved

Core responsibilities and internal services

  • Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints
  • Internal services

Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations

In this section

  • Description
  • Quality of life impacts
  • Progress on results
  • Details on results
  • Key risks
  • Resources required to achieve results
  • Program inventory

Description

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. It investigates complaints from members of the public regarding activities of CSIS, CSE or the national security activities of the RCMP, as well as certain other national security-related complaints. This independent scrutiny contributes to the strengthening of the framework of accountability for national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions and supports public confidence in this regard.

Quality of life impacts

NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibility relates most closely to the indicator ‘confidence in institutions’, within the ‘democracy and institutions’ subdomain and under the overarching domain of ‘good governance’.

Progress on results

This section details the department’s performance against its targets for each departmental result under Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations.

Table 1: Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary

Table 1 shows the target, the date to achieve the target and the actual result for each indicator under Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary in the last three fiscal years.
Departmental Result Indicator Target Date to achieve target Actual Results
All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis 100% completion of mandatory reviews December 2022 2022–23: 100%
2023–24: 100%
2024–25: 100%
Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year At least one national security or intelligence activity is reviewed in at least five departments or agencies annually December 2022 2022–23: 100%
2023–24: 100%
2024–25: 100%
All Member-approved high priority national security or intelligence activities are reviewed over a three-year period 100% completion over three years; at least 33% completed each year December 2022 2022–23: 33%
2023–24: 33%
2024–25: 33%

Table 2 shows the target, the date to achieve the target and actual result for each indicator under National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner in the last three fiscal years.
Departmental Result Indicator Target Date to achieve target Actual Results
Percentage of investigations completed within NSIRA service standards 90% – 100% March 2024 2022–23: N/A
2023–24: 100%
2024–25: 100%

Note: The NSIRA Secretariat was created on July 12, 2019. Actual results for 2022-23 are not available because the new Departmental Results Framework in the changeover from the Security Intelligence Review Committee to the NSIRA Secretariat was being developed. This new framework is for measuring and reporting on results achieved starting in 2023-24.

The Results section of the Infographic for NSIRA Secretariat on GC Infobase page  provides additional information on results and performance related to its program inventory.  

Details on results

The following section describes the results for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations in 2024–25 compared with the planned results set out in NSIRA Secretariat’s departmental plan for the year.  

Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary  

Results achieved

NSIRA Secretariat supported NSIRA in completing of 8 (eight) national security and intelligence reviews during the 2024-25 fiscal year. A total of 13 (thirteen) Government of Canada organizations were reviewed and 7 (seven) Ministers received one or more of the NSIRA reports that were approved by members during this fiscal year. 

  • 6 section 34 ministerial reports 
  • 3 section 35 non-compliance reports  
  • 1 section 39 report on disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act 

Four of the eight reviews completed this year included multiple Government of Canada organizations by design. These four multi-organization reviews were: 

  • The annual review of disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) 
  • The annual review of the implementation of directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) 
  • Review of Communications Security Establishment (CSE)’s Equities Management Framework 
  • Review of the Passenger Protect Program and Secure Air Travel Act 

The department and agencies covered in these multi-organizational reviews were:  Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), Department of Justice Canada (JUS), Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Public Safety Canada (PS), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Transport Canada (TC). 

Four of the eight reviews also focused on individual topics involving specific Government of Canada organization: CSE – one review; CSIS – one review; RCMP – one review; and CRA – one review. 

During the reporting period, the Secretariat made significant progress in developing and implementing policies and procedures to support the NSIRA review mandate. This included creating more refined planning and analytic tools to facilitate the review process. Additionally, NSIRA Secretariat staff promoted transparency and accountability by working with CSE, CSIS, GAC, PCO, PS, RCMP, CBSA, DFO, DND/CAF, FINTRAC, CRA, TBS, IRCC and TC to release several reports through the Access to Information regime which were later published on the NSIRA website. 

National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner

Results achieved

In the 2024-25 fiscal year, the NSIRA Secretariat continued to develop and refine the processes underpinning the fulfillment of its investigation mandate. The investigative process has emphasized increased timeliness, efficiency, and transparency to enhance the relevance of the process for complainants.

The volume of investigative activities remained high and included an increase in complaints against CSIS with respect to delays in security assessments related to immigration applications.

Over the past year, NSIRA Secretariat stabilized its investigative processes for complaints by implementing procedures that ensure the investigations are conducted fairly, timely and transparently. With the normalization of work environments following the easing of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, NSIRA investigations have become more efficient. NSIRA completed five formal investigations and issued final reports in those cases, while twelve complaint matters were resolved informally.

As of April 1, 2023, the NSIRA Secretariat implemented service standards for investigating complaints. These standards set internal time limits for key investigative steps for each type of complaint, under normal circumstances, while also specifying conditions under which those time limits do not apply. Developing these service standards includes tracking and collecting data to assess whether the NSIRA Secretariat is meeting its standards. In 2024-25, the Secretariat achieved 100% success rate in meeting these standards.

Outreach and collaboration

During 2024–25, outreach, engagement, and strategic collaboration remained central to the support offered by the Secretariat to NSIRA. Staff consistently connected with domestic review partners, such as the Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC). These efforts focused on enhancing coordination and minimizing overlapping review activities, ultimately promoting more streamlined and effective review within the security and intelligence fields.

New collaborative ties were also formed with several Agents of Parliament, broadening NSIRA’s network of accountability partners within Canada’s governance system. NSIRA collaborated with the Lobbying Commissioner of Canada, Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner of Canada, Auditor General of Canada, Information Commissioner of Canada, and Privacy Commissioner of Canada. During these meetings a host of discussions ensued that include strategic communications and engagement; optimizing the organizational structure; recruitment; advocating for reform of enabling legislation, and resources for Members as public office holders under the Conflict of Interest Act.

The agency continued its international efforts with main partners, such as the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC), the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, to facilitate the sharing of best practices and operational knowledge.

The Secretariat Staff effectively facilitated NSIRA’s involvement in the 2024 FIORC Conference in Canberra, Australia. Furthermore, NSIRA enhanced its connections with European oversight organizations through participation in the European Intelligence Oversight Conference and the Intelligence Oversight Working Group. This key platform unites European review and accountability agencies.

Public transparency was a central focus all year. The Secretariat facilitated the prompt development and publication of NSIRA’s Public Annual Report, the primary way NSIRA communicates its activities to Canadians. It also issued more frequent unclassified backgrounders about NSIRA’s reports, encouraging continuous public engagement and enhancing transparency.

Key risks

Effective review requires timely and complete responses to NSIRA’s requests for information and access to departmental systems and information holdings that align with the requirements of each review. Mutual respect is also essential in this process. During the reviews completed in 2024-25, Government of Canada organizations met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness most of the time. While these reviews demonstrated new or expanded direct access to four organizations systems and information, they also identified two areas where NSIRA did not achieve the required access to comprehensively, methodically, and efficiently deliver its mandate. In other cases where NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness were only partially met, the issues often related to the timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information. At times, these responsiveness and access issues contributed to delays in the progress of reviews.

A particular challenge for the Secretariat in fulfilling its core duties is the procedural variability in NSIRA’s quasi-judicial investigations. The independence of NSIRA members and the complexity of complaints can lead to unpredictable timelines and lengths of investigations. To address this, the Secretariat’s service standards are based on well-defined steps that can only be completed once the full evidentiary record— including both documents and oral testimony—is provided to NSIRA. By linking performance metrics to the availability of crucial information, the Secretariat ensures that changes in investigation duration do not compromise the integrity or accountability of its service.

Resources required to achieve results

Table 3: Snapshot of resources required for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations

Table 3 provides a summary of the planned and actual spending and full-time equivalents required to achieve results.
Resource Planned Actual
Spending $18,575,110 $18,839,589
Full-time equivalent 100 87

The Finances section of the Infographic for NSIRA Secretariat on GC Infobase page  and the People section of the Infographic for NSIRA Secretariat on GC Infobase page provide complete financial and human resources information related to its program inventory. 

Program inventory 

National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations is supported by the following programs:  

  • National security and intelligence activity reviews and complaints investigations

Additional information related to the program inventory for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations is available on the Results page on GC InfoBase . 

Internal services 

In this section 

  • Description
  • Progress on results
  • Resources required to achieve results
  • Contracts awarded to Indigenous business

Description 

Internal services refer to the activities and resources that support a department in its work to meet its corporate obligations and deliver its programs. The 9 categories of internal services are: 

  • Management and Oversight Services 
  • Communications Services 
  • Human Resources Management 
  • Financial Management  
  • Information Management  
  • Information Technology  
  • Real Property  
  • Materiel  
  • Acquisitions 

Progress on results

This section presents details on how the department performed to achieve results and meet targets for internal services.  

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat focused on optimizing its resources by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations. The administrative structures, tools, and processes were aligned to support achieving key priorities. Several new tools were introduced and integrated into the forecasting cycle to strengthen financial planning and oversight, improving budget managers’ abilities to plan and forecast more accurately. 

The Secretariat acknowledges the importance of being an inclusive, healthy, and flexible employer. The organization has implemented initiatives to foster a respectful, diverse, and adaptable work environment to support this commitment. These initiatives enhanced mental health and well-being support and flexible work arrangements. Additionally, the Secretariat continues to invest in training on unconscious bias, workplace civility and respect, and accessibility. Through these efforts, we strive to cultivate a workplace culture where all employees feel valued, supported, and empowered to contribute to the organization’s mission. 

In collaboration with PSPC, RCMP and CSE, the NSIRA Secretariat completed a two-year construction project, expanding its footprint with the addition of approx. 50 workstations with an occupancy date of August 2024. The facilities team will continue the work on the management action plan associated with the Accessibility Canada Act, specifically on the built environment. 

For the 2024–25 fiscal year, the NSIRA Secretariat launched a renewal of its Information Management (IM) policy suite, which includes creating supporting procedures, standards, and directives. It is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2025–26. 

The Secretariat continued collaborating with Library and Archives Canada (LAC) to obtain its Disposition Authorization, essential for establishing proper lifecycle management for the Secretariat’s records. This work is ongoing and anticipated to be completed in fall 2025. 

As part of its digital modernization efforts, the Secretariat successfully completed the full implementation of GCdocs in fall 2024. Since then, the focus has shifted to optimizing its use through targeted training and engagement activities. Multiple sessions have been conducted for staff to enhance user proficiency and ensure compliance with information management best practices. 

Resources required to achieve results 

Table 4: Resources required to achieve results for internal services this year

Table 4 provides a summary of the planned and actual spending and full-time equivalents required to achieve results.
Resource Planned Actual
Spending $7,722,123 $7,983,296
Full-time equivalents 31 29

The Finances section of the Infographic for NSIRA Secretariat on GC Infobase and the People section of the Infographic for NSIRA Secretariat on GC Infobase  provide complete financial and human resources information related to its program inventory. 

Contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses

Government of Canada departments are required to award at least 5% of the total value of contracts to Indigenous businesses every year.  

NSIRA Secretariat results for 2024-25:  

Table 5: Total value of contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses

As shown in Table 5, NSIRA Secretariat awarded 10 % of the total value of all contracts to Indigenous businesses for the fiscal year.
Contracting performance indicators 2024-25 Results
Total value of contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses² (A) $103,351
Total value of contracts awarded to Indigenous and non‑Indigenous businesses³ (B) $989,486
Value of exceptions approved by deputy head (C) $0
Proportion of contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses [A / (B−C) × 100] 10 %
  • “Contract” is a binding agreement for the procurement of a good, service, or construction and does not include real property leases. It includes contract amendments and contracts entered into by means of acquisition cards of more than $10,000.00.
  • For the purposes of the minimum 5% target, the data in this table reflects how Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) defines “Indigenous business” as either:
    • owned and operated by Elders, band and tribal councils
    • registered in the Indigenous Business Directory
    • registered on a modern treaty beneficiary business list.

The calculation of the % amount includes $88,366 awarded to subcontracts.

In its 2025–26 Departmental Plan, NSIRA secretariat estimated that it would award 5 % of the total value of its contracts to Indigenous businesses by the end of 2024–25. Actual results were 10% of all contracts were awarded to indigenous businesses – the highest percentage achieved to date, signifying the on-going commitment to this initiative. 

Spending and human resources 

In this section

  • Spending
  • Funding
  • Financial statement highlights
  • Human resources

Spending

This section presents an overview of the department’s actual and planned expenditures from 2022–23 to 2027–28.  

Refocusing Government Spending 

While not officially part of this spending reduction exercise, to respect the spirit of this exercise, NSIRA Secretariat undertook the following measures in 2024-25. 

  • considering the need for contractors, and  
  • identifying work that can be done in-house or deferred, if required. 

Budgetary performance summary

Table 6: Actual three-year spending on core responsibilities and internal services (dollars) 

Table 6 shows the money that NSIRA Secretariat spent in each of the past three years on its core responsibilities and on internal services.
Core responsibilities and internal services 2024–25 Main Estimates 2024–25 total authorities available for use Actual spending over three years (authorities used)
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations $10,740,188 $12,408,984 • 2022–23:$7,765,271
• 2023–24:$9,110,398
• 2024–25:$10,856,293
Subtotal $10,740,188 $12,408,984
Internal services $7,671,445 $8,285,127 • 2022–23:$10,532,876
• 2023–24:$10,535,328
• 2024–25:$7,983,296
Total $18,411,633 $20,694,110 • 2022-23 $18,298,147
• 2023-24 $19,645,726
• 2024-25 $18,839,589
Analysis of the past three years of spending

The spending increase in internal services in 2023–24 and 2024–25 reflects expenditures related to a construction project carried out during this two-year period. The increase over the three-year time period in National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations is mostly a result of increasing numbers of FTEs and rising salary costs.  

The Finances section of the Infographic for NSIRA Secretariat on GC Infobase  offers more financial information from previous years.  

Table 7: Planned three-year spending on core responsibilities and internal services (dollars) 

Table 7 shows NSIRA secretariat’s planned spending for each of the next three years on its core responsibilities and on internal services.
Core responsibilities and internal services 2025–26 planned spending 2026–27 planned spending 2027–28 planned spending
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations $11,280,435 $11,296,175 $11,296,175
Subtotal $11,280,435 $11,296,175 $11,296,175
Internal services $8,164,617 $8,176,009 $8,176,009
Total $19,445,052 $19,472,184 $19,472,184
Analysis of the next three years of spending

Spending is expected to remain consistent over the next 3 years. 

The Finances section of the Infographic for NSIRA Secretariat on GC Infobase  offers more detailed financial information related to future years.  

Funding

This section provides an overview of the department’s voted and statutory funding for its core responsibilities and for internal services. Consult the Government of Canada budgets and expenditures  for further information on funding authorities. 

Graph 1: Approved funding (statutory and voted) over a six-year period

Graph 1 summarizes the department’s approved voted and statutory funding from 2022-23 to 2027-28.
Fiscal year Statutory Voted Total
2022-23 $1,300,166 $16,988,980 $18,289,147
2023-24 $1,755,229 $21,253,996 $23,009,225
2024-25 $1,764,845 $16,810,265 $18,575,110
2025-26 $1,748,047 $17,697,005 $19,445,052
2026-27 $1,751,989 $17,720,195 $19,472,184
2027-28 $1,751,989 $17,720,195 $19,472,184
Analysis of statutory and voted funding over a six-year period

Funding is expected to remain constant over the next 3 years.

Consult the Public Accounts of Canada for further information on NSIRA Secretariat’s departmental voted and statutory expenditures.  

Financial statement highlights

Please see NSIRA Secretariat’s Financial Statements (Unaudited) for the Year Ended March 31, 2025. 

Table 8: Condensed Statement of Operations (unaudited or audited) for the year ended March 31, 2025 (dollars) 

Table 8 summarizes the expenses and revenues for 2024–25 which net to the cost of operations before government funding and transfers.
Financial information 2024–25 actual results 2023–24 actual results Difference (2024-25 minus 2023-24)
Total expenses $20,799 $18,223 $2,576
Total revenues $0 $0 $0
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers $20,799 $18,223 $2,576

The 2024–25 planned results information is provided in NSIRA Secretariat’s Future-Oriented Statement of Operations and Notes 2024–25.

Table 9: Condensed Statement of Operations (unaudited or audited) for 2023-24 and 2024-25 (dollars) 

Table 9 summarizes actual expenses and revenues and shows the net cost of operations before government funding and transfers.
Financial information 2024–25 actual results 2023–24 actual results Difference (2024-25 minus 2023-24)
Total expenses $20,799 $18,223 $2,576
Total revenues $0 $0 $0
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers $20,799 $18,223 $2,576

Table 10 Condensed Statement of Financial Position (unaudited or audited) as of March 31, 2025 (dollars)   

Table 10 provides a brief snapshot of the amounts the department owes or must spend (liabilities) and its available resources (assets), which helps to indicate its ability to carry out programs and services.
Financial information Actual fiscal year (2024–25) Previous fiscal year (2023–24) Difference (2024–25 minus 2023–24)
Total net liabilities $2,461 $2,376 $85
Total net financial assets $1,634 $1,779 -$145
Departmental net debt $827 $597 $230
Total non-financial assets $7,155 $7,392 -$237
Departmental net financial position $6,328 $6,795 -$467

Human resources

This section presents an overview of the department’s actual and planned human resources from 2022–23 to 2027–28.  

Table 11: Actual human resources for core responsibilities and internal services 

Table 11 shows a summary in full-time equivalents of human resources for NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for the previous three fiscal years.
Core responsibilities and internal services 2022–23 actual FTEs 2023–24 actual FTEs 2024–25 actual FTEs
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations 53 51 58
Subtotal 53 51 58
Internal services 25 24 29
Total 78 75 87
Analysis of human resources over the last three years

Over the past three fiscal years, the human resources levels at the Secretariat have experienced modest fluctuations, followed by notable growth. In 2022–23, the organization reported 78 full-time equivalents (FTEs), which slightly decreased to 75 in 2023–24, primarily due to attrition and staffing delays. However, in 2024–25, the total FTEs rose to 87—signifying a significant increase that reflects a decline in employee turnover and successful recruitment to previously vacant positions. This increase in staffing has enhanced the Secretariat’s capacity to fulfill its mandate, both in its core responsibilities and in internal services, thereby reinforcing organizational stability and operational effectiveness. 

Table 12: Human resources planning summary for core responsibilities and internal services 

Table 12 shows the planned full-time equivalents for each of NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for the next three years. Human resources for the current fiscal year are forecast based on year to date.
Core responsibilities and internal services 2025–26 planned full-time equivalents 2026–27 planned full-time equivalents 2027–28 planned full-time equivalents
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations 69 69 69
Subtotal 69 69 69
Internal services 31 31 31
Total 100 100 100

FTE count to remain constant across the board 

Supplementary information tables

The following supplementary information tables are available on NSIRA Secretariat’s website:

  • Gender-based Analysis Plus

NSIRA remains committed to integrating Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus) into its governance and operations. In 2024-25 NSIRA advanced internal awareness through training and policy development to ensure equity, diversity, and inclusion considerations inform both its internal practices and its external functions. As part of these efforts, a fact sheet on Inclusive Recruitment was shared to support more equitable hiring practices, and work is underway to update the Pay Equity Plan. These efforts support NSIRA’s broader commitment to fair, evidence-based accountability in the national security and intelligence accountability landscape.

Federal tax expenditures

The tax system can be used to achieve public policy objectives through the application of special measures such as low tax rates, exemptions, deductions, deferrals and credits. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for these measures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures. This report also provides detailed background information on tax expenditures, including descriptions, objectives, historical information and references to related federal spending programs as well as evaluations and GBA Plus of tax expenditures.

Corporate information

Departmental profile

Appropriate minister(s): The Right Honourable Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada 

Institutional head: Charles Fugère, Executive Director 

Ministerial portfolio: Privy Council Office 

Enabling instrument(s): National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act 

Year of incorporation / commencement: 2019 

Departmental contact information

Mailing address:

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat
P.O. Box 2430, Station B
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 5W5

Email: info@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Website(s): https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/

Federal tax expenditures

The tax system can be used to achieve public policy objectives through the application of special measures such as low tax rates, exemptions, deductions, deferrals and credits. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for these measures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures. This report also provides detailed background information on tax expenditures, including descriptions, objectives, historical information and references to related federal spending programs as well as evaluations and GBA Plus of tax expenditures. 

Definitions

appropriation (crédit)

Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

budgetary expenditures (dépenses budgétaires)

Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, departments or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.

core responsibility (responsabilité essentielle)  

An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a core responsibility are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence.

Departmental Plan (plan ministériel)

A report on the plans and expected performance of an appropriated department over a 3year period. Departmental Plans are usually tabled in Parliament each spring.

departmental priority (priorité)

A plan or project that a department has chosen to focus and report on during the planning period. Priorities represent the things that are most important or what must be done first to support the achievement of the desired departmental results.

departmental result (résultat ministériel)

A consequence or outcome that a department seeks to achieve. A departmental result is often outside departments’ immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes.

departmental result indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel)

A quantitative measure of progress on a departmental result.

departmental results framework (cadre ministériel des résultats)

A framework that connects the department’s core responsibilities to its departmental results and departmental result indicators.

Departmental Results Report (rapport sur les résultats ministériels)

A report on a department’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.

Full-time equivalent (équivalent temps plein)

A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person-year charge against a departmental budget. For a particular position, the full-time equivalent figure is the ratio of number of hours the person actually works divided by the standard number of hours set out in the person’s collective agreement.

gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus) (analyse comparative entre les sexes plus [ACS Plus])

An analytical tool used to assess support the development of responsive and inclusive how different groups of women, men and gender-diverse people experience policies, programs and policies, programs, and other initiatives. GBA Plus is a process for understanding who is impacted by the issue or opportunity being addressed by the initiative; identifying how the initiative could be tailored to meet diverse needs of the people most impacted; and anticipating and mitigating any barriers to accessing or benefitting from the initiative. GBA Plus is an intersectional analysis that goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences to consider other factors, such as age, disability, education, ethnicity, economic status, geography (including rurality), language, race, religion, and sexual orientation.

government-wide priorities (priorités pangouvernementales)

For the purpose of the 2022–23 Departmental Results Report, government-wide priorities are the high-level themes outlining the government’s agenda in the November 23, 2021, Speech from the Throne: building a healthier today and tomorrow; growing a more resilient economy; bolder climate action; fight harder for safer communities; standing up for diversity and inclusion; moving faster on the path to reconciliation; and fighting for a secure, just and equitable world.

horizontal initiative (initiative horizontale)

An initiative where two or more federal departments are given funding to pursue a shared outcome, often linked to a government priority.

non‑budgetary expenditures (dépenses non budgétaires)

Net outlays and receipts related to loans, investments and advances, which change the composition of the financial assets of the Government of Canada.

performance (rendement)

What a department did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the department intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified.

performance indicator (indicateur de rendement)

A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an department, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.

plan (plan)

The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how a department intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally, a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead to the expected result.

planned spending (dépenses prévues)

For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts presented in Main Estimates.

A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports.

program (programme)

Individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels.

program inventory (répertoire des programmes)

Identifies all the department’s programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department’s core responsibilities and results.

result (résultat)

A consequence attributed, in part, to an department, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single department, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the department’s influence.

Indigenous business (entreprise autochtones)

For the purpose of the Directive on the Management of Procurement Appendix E: Mandatory Procedures for Contracts Awarded to Indigenous Businesses and the Government of Canada’s commitment that a mandatory minimum target of 5% of the total value of contracts is awarded to Indigenous businesses, a department that meets the definition and requirements as defined by the Indigenous Business Directory. 

statutory expenditures (dépenses législatives)

Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made.

target (cible)

A measurable performance or success level that a department, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.

voted expenditures (dépenses votées)

Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an appropriation act. The vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.

Meta data information

Cat. Number: PS106-8E-PDF
ISSN: 2563-5174

© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, 2025

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2024-25

Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2024-25

Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Privacy Act (PA) gives individuals the right of access to information about themselves that is under the control of a government institution, subject to certain specific and limited exemptions and exclusions. The PA also protects the privacy of individuals by giving them substantial control over the collection, use and disclosure of their personal information, and by preventing others from having access to that information. 

Section 72 of the Privacy Act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the PA within the institution that is to be tabled in both Houses of Parliament.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled pursuant to section 72 of the Privacy Act, describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat (the Secretariat) in administering the Privacy Act during the period of April 1, 2024, to March 31, 2025 (the reporting period). 

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Privacy Act or the Access to Information Act, please direct your inquiries to the following: 

Access to Information and Privacy Office 
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat 
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” 
Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5  
Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who We Are

Established in July 2019, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities. 

The Secretariat assists NSIRA in fulfilling its mandate. It is the Secretariat, headed by an Executive Director, that is the government institution for the purposes of the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act (ATIA). 

Mandate

NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities. 

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA. 

NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate. 

Investigations

NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about: 

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances; 
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act; 
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act; and 
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Organizational Structure

The Secretariat’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, and procedures to ensure that the Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the PA and the ATIA. Since the last reporting period, the ATIP Office added and reclassified new personnel to assist with new policies implementation to comply with statutory requirements and increase of access requests to comply with statutory requirements under the PA and the ATIA. 

For the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office consisted of: 

  • One (1) full-time Director, in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Director of Communications and Administrative Services for the Secretariat and NSIRA Members;
  • One (1) full-time ATIP Senior Advisor;
  • One (1) full-time ATIP Coordinator;
  • One (1) part-time ATIP Student;
  • Two (2) part-time ATIP Consultants; and
  • When required, the ATIP Office was supported by one (1) full-time Senior Counsel, Internal Services.

The Secretariat’s ATIP Office is responsible for the following: 

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies; 
  • processing requests under both the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act; 
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the Secretariat respected the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act; 
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments. 
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and 
  • representing the Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act.

During the reporting period, the Secretariat was party to a service agreement under section 73.1 of the Privacy Act in which the Secretariat received administrative support from the Privy Council Office related to the tabling of this annual report in Parliament. The Secretariat was also party to a service agreement under section 71.1 of the Privacy Act, in which the Secretariat received ATIP Online services from the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 

To assist the Secretariat’s ATIP Office in meeting its overall legislative obligations, the Secretariat relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter experts from all divisions.

Delegation Order

As the Head of the Secretariat, the Executive Director is responsible for the administration of the PA within the institution. Pursuant to section 73 of the PA, the Executive Director has delegated the ATIP Director, the ATIP Senior Advisor, the ATIP Coordinator, as well as individuals acting in these positions to perform certain and specific powers, duties, and functions for the administration of the PA. These positions have limited delegation of authority under the PA and the Access to Information Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in October 2024. A copy of the Delegation Order can be found in Annex A. 

Performance 2024-2025

Performance in Processing Privacy Requests

During the reporting period from April 1, 2024, to March 31, 2025, the Secretariat received 23 formal access to information requests, in addition to 3 requests carried over from the previous reporting period, for a total of 26 requests. Of these, the ATIP Office closed 18 requests and processed approximately 203 pages. Eight (8) requests were carried over into the next reporting period, all of which remained within the legislated timelines. 

Statistical Reports for 2024-2025

The Secretariat’s 2024-2025 Statistical Report on the Privacy Act and Supplemental ATIP Statistical Report for 2024-2025 were both validated by the Treasury Board Secretariat in July 2025.

Extensions

During the reporting period, the ATIP Office invoked an extension while processing one (1) request under paragraph 15(a)(ii) of the Privacy Act within 0 to 15 days. Invoking extensions on this request was necessary to accurately review a significant amount of records received for this request.

Completion Time of Completed Requests 

Of the 18 requests completed during the reporting period: 

  • 1 request, or 5.5% of the requests completed, was disclosed in part. This request was completed within 31 to 60 days;
  • 10 requests, or 55.5% of the requests completed, were neither confirmed or denied. 5 requests were completed within 0 to 15 days, and 5 requests were completed within 16 to 30 days;
  • 6 requests, or 33.3% of the requests completed, resulted in no records. 4 requests were completed within 16 to 30 days, and 2 requests completed within 31 to 60 days; and 
  • 1 request, or 5.5% of the requests completed, was abandoned. This request was completed within 31 to 60 days. 

During the reporting period, the on-time response rate increased to 83.3% from 56% from the 2023-2024 reporting period. 

Consultations 

During the reporting period, the ATIP Office received one (1) consultation request from another government department, consisting of 2 pages. This one (1) consultation request was completed within 0 to 15 days.

Complaints and Investigations 

Subsection 29(1) of the PA describes how the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) receives and investigates complaints from individuals regarding the processing of requests under the PA. During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office was the subject of one new complaint, and one report of findings from the OPC, which determined that the complaint was “not well founded”. Additionally, we also received eight reports of findings and recommendations from complaints from previous reporting periods. 

Training and Awareness

The Secretariat took a customized approach to training subject matter experts on their legislative requirements, roles, and responsibilities. The Secretariat’s ATIP Office encouraged employees to take the ATIP training courses offered by the Canada School of Public Service. New employees were required to complete an online training session entitled Fundamentals of Access to Information and Privacy within six months of joining the Secretariat and in November 2024, an internal ATIP training session was held. 

To ensure in-depth training is taken by employees of the NSIRA Secretariat who have functional or delegated responsibility for the administration of the PA and Privacy Regulations, the Senior ATIP Advisor attended the 2024 Canadian Access and Privacy Association Conference, while the ATIP Director attended the International Association of Privacy Professionals Global Privacy Summit 2024. 

Policies, Guidelines, and Procedures 

During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office advanced several initiatives to enhance its efficiency. Notably, it finalized key documents including the Privacy Breach Plan and Procedures Manual, and the Privacy Protocol Template. In addition, the Secretariat established a formal Privacy Impact Assessment policy to strengthen privacy governance and compliance.

Initiatives and Projects to Improve Privacy 

During the reporting period, the Secretariat did not implement or continue any new initiatives or projects related to privacy.

Summary of Key Issues and Actions Taken on Complaints 

During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office engaged meaningfully with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner on 10 active complaints. One complaint was received during this reporting period, while the remaining nine were carried over from previous periods. All complaints were resolved, and reports of findings were issued by the OPC, each concluding that the complaints were “not well founded.” Additionally, the Secretariat received one recommendation related to its Privacy Impact Assessment, which was finalized and fully implemented. 

Material Privacy Breaches 

During the reporting period, no material privacy breaches occurred. 

Privacy Impact Assessments 

During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office modified one (1) Privacy Impact Assessment related to the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency. The updated assessment web summary can be accessed here. 

Public Interest Disclosures 

During the reporting period, no public interest disclosures occurred.

Monitoring Compliance 

Legislative deadlines for privacy requests were closely monitored through the use of multiple Microsoft Lists trackers. In collaboration with the ATIP Senior Advisor, the ATIP Director organized ad hoc meetings to review request-related activities, set deadlines, and ensure that all relevant personnel within the ATIP Office and, when applicable, across the Secretariat were informed of the status of requests. Additionally, the ATIP Office held weekly meetings to strategize on meeting upcoming deadlines and to ensure accurate administration of statutory requirements and policy instruments. Compliance with legislative and policy obligations was also regularly raised and discussed by the ATIP Director during bi-weekly team meetings with the Secretariat’s Executive Director (Deputy Head) and the Senior Counsel, Internal Services. 

Appendices

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act*, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

POSITION PROVISION OF THE PRIVACY ACT OR THE PRIVACY REGULATIONS
Executive Director
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat 		Privacy Act:
8(2)(j), 8(2)(m), 8(4), 8(5), 9(1), 9(4), 10, 14, 15, 16, 17(2)(b), 17(3)(b), 18(2), 19(1), 19(2), 20, 21, 22, 22.3, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 27.1, 28, 33(2), 35(4), 51(2)(b), 72(1), 72(4)
Privacy Regulations:
9, 11(2), 11(4), 13(1), 14
Director, Central Administration & ATIP
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat 		Privacy Act:
8(2)(j), 8(2)(m), 8(4), 8(5), 9(1), 9(4), 10, 14, 15, 16, 17(2)(b), 17(3)(b), 18(2), 19(1), 19(2), 20, 21, 22, 22.3, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 27.1, 28, 33(2), 35(4), 72(1), 72(4)
Privacy Regulations:
9, 11(2), 11(4), 13(1), 14
Senior Advisor, ATIP
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat 		Privacy Act:
8(4), 8(5), 9(1), 9(4), 10, 15, 16, 17(2)(b), 17(3)(b), 18(2), 35(4)
Privacy Regulations:
9, 11(2)
ATIP Coordinator
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat 		Privacy Act:
8(4), 8(5), 9(1), 9(4), 10, 15, 16, 17(2)(b), 17(3)(b), 18(2), 35(4)
Privacy Regulations:
9, 11(2)

Appendix B: 2024–2025 Statistical Report on the Privacy Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2024-04-01 – 2025-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Privacy Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 23
Outstanding from previous reporting period 3
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 26
Closed during reporting period 18
Carried over to next reporting period 8
Carried over within legislated timeline 8
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 0
1.2 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 19
E-mail 2
Mail 2
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 23

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 1
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 0
Closed during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 0
E-Mail 0
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 0
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

3.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
0 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 6
Request abandoned 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Neither confirmed nor denied 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 10
Total 5 9 4 0 0 0 0 18
3.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
18(2) 0
19(1)(a) 0
19(1)(b) 0
19(1)(c) 0
19(1)(d) 0
19(1)(e) 0
19(1)(f) 0
20 0
21 1
22(1)(a)(i) 0
22(1)(a)(ii) 0
22(1)(a)(iii) 0
22(1)(b) 0
22(1)(c) 0
22(2) 0
22.1 0
22.2 0
22.3 0
22.4 0
23(a) 0
23(b) 0
24(a) 0
24(b) 0
25 0
26 1
27 0
27.1 0
28 0
3.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69.1 0
70(1) 0
70(1)(a) 0
70(1(b) 0
70(1)(c) 0
70(1)(d) 0
70(1)(e) 0
70(1)(f) 0
70.1 0
3.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
0 1 0 0 0 0
3.5 Complexity
3.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
203 203 12
3.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper, e-record and dataset formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 1 203 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 11 0 1 203 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Assessment of Fees Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0
3.6 Closed requests
3.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 15
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 83.33333333
3.7 Deemed refusals
3.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
3 3 0 0 0
3.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 1 0 1
16 to 30 Days 1 1 1
31 to 60 Days 0 0 0
61 to 120 Days 0 0 0
121 to 180 Days 0 0 0
181 to 365 Days 0 0 0
More than 365 Days 0 0 0
Total 2 1 3
3.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 4: Disclosures Under Subsections 8(2) and 8(5)

Paragraph 8(2)(e) Paragraph 8(2)(m) Subsection 8(5) Total
0 0 0 0

Section 5: Requests for Correction of Personal Information and Notations

Disposition for Correction Requests Received Number
Notations attached 0
Requests for correction accepted 0
Total 0

Section 6: Extensions

6.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Number of requests where an extension was taken 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
6.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
1 to 15 days 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 days 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
31 days or greater               0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 1 2 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 1 2 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 1 2 0 0
Carried over within negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7.3 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Complaints and Investigations Notices Received

Section 31 Section 33 Section 35 Court action Total
1 0 9 0 10

Section 10: Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and Personal Information Banks (PIBS)

10.1 Privacy Impact Assessments
Number of PIA(s) completed Number of PIAs modified
0 1
10.2 Institution-specific and Central Personal Information Banks
Personal Information Banks Active Created Terminated Modified
Institution-specific 2 1 0 1
Central 0 0 0 0
Total 2 1 0 1

Section 11: Privacy Breaches

11.1 Material Privacy Breaches reported
Number of material privacy breaches reported to TBS Number of material privacy breaches reported to OPC
0 0
11.2 Non-Material Privacy Breaches
Number of non-material privacy breaches
0
12.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $90,000
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $12,420
Professional services contracts $12,420
Other $0
Total $102,420
12.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.000
Part-time and casual employees 2.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 1.000
Students 0.000
Total 3.000

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Annex C: Supplemental Statistical Report

Section 1: Requests Carried Over and Active Complaints Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Requests carried over to next reporting period, broken down by reporting period received
Reporting Period
Requests Carried Over
Were Received		 Requests Carried Over that are Beyond Legislated Timelines as of March 31, 2025 Total
Requests Carried Over that are
Within Legislated
Timelines as of
March 31, 2025		 Requests Carried Over that are
Beyond Legislated
Timelines as of
March 31, 2025
Received in 2024-25 6 56 62
Received in 2023-24 0 0 0
Received in 2022-23 0 0 0
Received in 2021-22 0 1 1
Received in 2020-21 0 0 0
Received in 2019-20 0 0 0
Received in 2018-19 0 0 0
Received in 2017-18 0 0 0
Received in 2016-17 0 0 0
Received in 2015-16 or earlier 0 0 0
Total 6 57 63
1.2 Active complaints with the Information Commissioner of Canada, broken down by reporting period received
Reporting Period Active Complaints Were Received by Institution Number of Active Complaints
Received in 2024-25 1
Received in 2023-24 0
Received in 2022-23 0
Received in 2021-22 0
Received in 2020-21 0
Received in 2019-20 0
Received in 2018-19 0
Received in 2017-18 0
Received in 2016-17 0
Received in 2015-16 or earlier 0
Total 1

Section 2: Requests Carried Over and Active Complaints Under the Privacy Act

2.1 Requests carried over to next reporting period, broken down by reporting period received
Reporting Period
Requests Carried Over
Were Received		 Requests Carried Over that are
Within Legislated
Timelines as of
March 31, 2025		 Requests Carried Over that are
Beyond Legislated
Timelines as of
March 31, 2025		 Total
Received in 2024-25 8 0 8
Received in 2023-24 0 0 0
Received in 2022-23 0 0 0
Received in 2021-22 0 0 0
Received in 2020-21 0 0 0
Received in 2019-20 0 0 0
Received in 2018-19 0 0 0
Received in 2017-18 0 0 0
Received in 2016-17 0 0 0
Received in 2015-16 or earlier 0 0 0
Total 8 0 8
2.2 Active complaints with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, broken down by reporting period received
Reporting Period Active Complaints Were Received by Institution Number of Active Complaints
Received in 2024-25 0
Received in 2023-24 0
Received in 2022-23 0
Received in 2021-22 0
Received in 2020-21 0
Received in 2019-20 0
Received in 2018-19 0
Received in 2017-18 0
Received in 2016-17 0
Received in 2015-16 or earlier 0
Total 0

Section 3: Social Insurance Number

Has your institution begun a new collection or a new consistent use of the SIN in 2024-25 No

Section 4: Universal Access under the Privacy Act

How many requests were received from foreign nationals outside of Canada in 2024-25 0

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

Technical Assurance Review (TAR) of a Specific Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Activity

Technical Assurance Review (TAR) of a Specific Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Activity

Last Updated:

Status:

Submitted

Review Number:

25-11

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified:

Review of a Specialized Program Under the Foreign Intelligence Aspect of CSE’s Mandate: Report

Review of a Specialized Program Under the Foreign Intelligence Aspect of CSE’s Mandate

Report

Table of Contents
  1. HTML Version Coming Soon

Date of Publishing:

HTML Version Coming Soon

Our team is working on an HTML version of this content to enhance usability and compatibility across devices. We aim to make it available in the near future. Thank you for your patience!

Share this page

No endorsement of any products or services is expressed or implied.

Share this page
Date Modified: