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Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s National Security Criminal Investigations: Notification Letter

Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s National Security Criminal Investigations


Notification Letter

Date of Publishing:

NSIRA’s Notification Letter

Dear Minister LeBlanc,

I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated a review of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) National Security Criminal Investigations.

This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of cabinet confidences.

NSIRA will review the RCMP’s national security program activities as they relate to national security criminal investigations. NSIRA expects to review the techniques used by the RCMP to investigate national security matters and how the RCMP establishes reasonable grounds to investigate. This will include a review of the RCMP’s decision-making and information sharing practices, as well as the policies and procedures utilized in the deconfliction with partners, particularly with Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). The review will assess the reasonableness, necessity, and efficacy of the RCMP’s exercise of its mandate in this area.

NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira- ossnr.gc.ca.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.

Sincerely,

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

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Review of the Passenger Protect Program and Secure Air Travel Act: Notification Letter

Review of the Passenger Protect Program and Secure Air Travel Act


Notification Letter

Date of Publishing:

NSIRA’s Letter to the Ministers

Dear Ministers,

I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated a review of Passenger Protect Program, within the context of its legislative framework, the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA).

This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of cabinet confidences.

NSIRA’s review will examine processes for listing or de-listing individuals under section 8 of the SATA, and related administrative recourse. The review may also consider how the SATA list is used to screen air passengers. As such, NSIRA will review activities carried out by the following departments and agencies: the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA); the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS); the Department of Justice (DoJ); Global Affairs Canada (GAC); Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC); Public Safety Canada; the Royal Canadian Mounted Policy (RCMP); and Transport Canada.

NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.

Sincerely,

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

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Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Mesures (Review of 2021): Backgrounder

Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (Review of 2021)


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

This report is NSIRA’s third annual review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Threat Reduction Measures (TRMs). The review covers CSIS’s TRM activities between January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021. As mandated by the NSIRA Act, NSIRA is required to review at least one aspect of CSIS’s TRM performance each year. Before NSIRA was created in 2019, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) reviewed CSIS’s TRM activities from 2016 to 2019.

In 2015, the Anti-Terrorism Act granted CSIS the authority to undertake TRMs. These are operational measures aimed at reducing threats to the security of Canada. TRMs may be taken in Canada or outside of Canada. TRMs are subject to limits outlined in the CSIS Act. The measures may limit a right or freedom guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) or may otherwise be contrary to Canadian law if authorized by a warrant issued by a Federal Court judge. TRM powers differ greatly from CSIS’s traditional mandate to collect and disseminate intelligence and, as such, the use of TRMs demands thorough and ongoing independent scrutiny.

NSIRA’s review of CSIS’s TRM activities in 2021 builds upon findings from earlier NSIRA and SIRC TRM reviews. These previous reviews identified concerns such as the inclusion of some individuals in TRMs without a rational link to the identified threat and CSIS’s need to improve record-keeping regarding TRM outcomes. In 2021, NSIRA observed that the use of TRM powers by CSIS followed similar trends to prior years. Notably, 2021 was the first year that TRMs involving Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism threats outnumbered those aimed at addressing Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism.

NSIRA found that CSIS met its obligations under the CSIS Actand the Charter. However, NSIRA found that improvements were needed in CSIS’s reporting procedures and made recommendations for improving legal risk assessments conducted for TRMs. Additionally, in one case, NSIRA identified that CSIS had not met its obligations under the 2015 Ministerial Direction for Operations and Accountability and the 2019 Ministerial Direction for Accountability issued by the Minister of Public Safety.

The findings and recommendations in this report highlight the importance of NSIRA’s independent scrutiny of TRM activities.

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Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2024: Notification Letter

Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2024


Notification Letter

Date of Publishing:

Subject:

Notification of NSIRA’s Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2024


Dear Ministers,

I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated a review of departmental implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) for 2024.

This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph subsection 8(2.2) and paragraph 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of cabinet confidences.  

We would also like to take this opportunity to remind you of the reporting requirements set out in the ACA: subsection 7(1) requires that deputy heads submit a report in respect of the implementation of ACA directions during the previous calendar year to the appropriate Minister before March 1; and subsection 8(1) requires that, as soon as feasible after receiving a report under section 7, the appropriate Minister provide a copy of it to NSIRA, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, and, if applicable, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

We request that these records be provided to the attention of The Honourable Marie Deschamps, NSIRA’s Chair, via the NSIRA Leadership Mailbox (leadership@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca) or CTSN.

NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.

Sincerely,

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Dist.

  • The Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence
  • The Honourable Dominic LeBlanc, Minister of Finance and Intergovernmental Affairs
  • The Honourable Diane Lebouthillier, Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard
  • The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • The Honourable Marc Miller, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
  • The Honourable Élisabeth Brière, Minister of National Revenue
  • The Honourable David J. McGuinty, Minister of Public Safety
  • The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of Transport and Internal Trade

CC.

  • General M.A.J. Jennie Carignan, Chief of the Defence Staff
  • Stefanie Beck, Deputy Minister, National Defence
  • Sarah Paquet, Director and Chief Executive Officer, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
  • Annette Gibbons, Deputy Minister, Fisheries and Oceans Canada
  • David Morrison, Deputy Minister, Foreign Affairs
  • Dr. Harpreet S. Kochhar, Deputy Minister, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
  • Bob Hamilton, Commissioner, Canada Revenue Agency
  • Erin O’Gorman, President, Canada Border Services Agency
  • Daniel Rogers, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
  • Caroline Xavier, Chief, Communications Security Establishment
  • Mike Duheme, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
  • Tricia Geddes, Deputy Minister, Public Safety Canada
  • Arun Thangaraj, Deputy Minister, Transport Canada
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Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces’s Open source intelligence Activities: Notification Letter

Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces’s Open source intelligence Activities


Notification Letter

Table of Contents

Date of Publishing:

Notification Letter

Dear Minister Blair,

I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated a review of the Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces’ Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Activities.

This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of Cabinet confidences.  

NSIRA will review the reasonableness, necessity, and compliance with applicable legislation, ministerial direction, internal policies, directives, orders, regulations, guidance, and doctrine of DND/CAF’s open-source intelligence activities.

NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.

Sincerely, 

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.

Chair // National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

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Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s Operational Support to Regional Investigations: Cancellation Letter

Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s Operational Support to Regional Investigations


Cancellation Letter

Date of Online Publishing:

Date of Submission:

June 7, 2024

Termination Letter to the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Dear Mr. Vigneault,

On March 7, 2024, NSIRA initiated a review of CSIS’s governance of regional specialized operational support units as well as of the adequacy and accessibility of the Service’s internal complaints process. NSIRA has taken the decision to terminate this review.

As the review was progressing through the scoping phase, NSIRA was informed of multiple ongoing litigation cases on matters related to the same issues NSIRA was planning to examine. The litigation landscape is multifaceted and evolving. Additionally, NSIRA does not currently have explicit statutory protections to provide certainty that its work will not be disclosed, and its personnel and members not compelled to participate in related proceedings. Accordingly, NSIRA decided to terminate its work on this review.

The decision to terminate the review was not taken lightly as NSIRA had already identified issues of concern and had begun planning the review methodology. An important component of NSIRA’s information gathering process included conducting interviews with CSIS employees. NSIRA’s independence includes a statutory right to determine its own procedures in the exercise of its powers or the performance its duties and functions. When confidential interviews are contemplated, NSIRA conducts them in the way it deems appropriate for the objectives of a review.

At the same time, NSIRA is mindful of the context, more specifically, the integrity of reviewees operations and parallel issues. In the case of this file, the current and potential future litigation landscape made this part of the methodology difficult to plan and execute and factored greatly into the decision to terminate the review.

On behalf of NSIRA, we thank your employees for the provision of preliminary documents and for holding briefings with the NSIRA review team.

As stated to your Minister in separate correspondence, NSIRA’s inability to proceed with this important review highlights the urgency and necessity of legislative reforms intended to be a part of the three-year review of the National Security Act, 2017.

Sincerely,

Charles Fugère
Senior General Counsel and Acting Executive Director, National Security and
Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat

Termination Letter to the Public Safety Minister

Dear Minister LeBlanc,

On March 7, 2024, NSIRA initiated a review of CSIS’s governance of regional specialized operational support units as well as of the adequacy and accessibility of the CSIS’s internal complaints process. NSIRA has taken the decision to terminate this review.

As the review was progressing through the scoping phase, NSIRA was informed of multiple ongoing litigation cases on the matters related to the very issues NSIRA was needing to examine. The litigation landscape is multifaceted and evolving. Additionally, NSIRA does not currently have explicit statutory protections to provide certainty that its work will not be disclosed and its personnel and members compelled to participate in related legal proceedings. This statutory gap also creates uncertainty around information that needed to be collected from anticipated confidential interviews. Accordingly, NSIRA decided not to proceed with the review and terminate its work on this matter effective immediately.

The decision to terminate the review was not taken lightly as NSIRA had already identified issues of concern. NSIRA’s inability to proceed with this pertinent review highlights the urgency and necessity of legislative reforms intended to be a part three-year review of the National Security Act, 2017.

NSIRA looks forward to taking part in the three-year review discussions of the National Security Act, 2017, and proposing the amendments required.

Sincerely,

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

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Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2024: Notification Letter

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2024


Notification Letter

Table of Contents

Date of Publishing:

Notification Letter

Dear Ministers,

I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated its annual review of Government of Canada institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) for 2024.

This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) and subsection 39(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of cabinet confidences.  

NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

We would also like to take this opportunity to remind departments of their obligation, under subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA, to provide NSIRA with copies of records prepared under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) of that Act to NSIRA within 30 days after the end of the calendar year; that is, by January 30, 2025.

We request that these records be provided to the attention of The Honourable Marie Deschamps, NSIRA’s Chair, via the NSIRA Leadership Mailbox (leadership@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca) or CTSN.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.

Sincerely,

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.

Chair // National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

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Annual reports

Annual Reports

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Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2022: Backgrounder

Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2022


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

Having its origin in the recommendations of Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and the directions issued under its authority seek to avoid risks of Canadian complicity in torture or other forms of mistreatment. They do so by putting limits on Government of Canada information sharing with foreign entities such as states and non-governmental organizations.  

The directions prohibit Government of Canada departments from disclosing information to – or requesting information from – foreign entities if doing so would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of any individual by any foreign entity. The directions also limit how departments may use information that is likely to have been obtained through mistreatment. Collectively, the ACA regime codifies Canadian values and commitments under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Criminal Code, and international law in respect of protecting rights and prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment. 

NSIRA is required to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA. To date, such directions have been issued to the Deputy Heads of twelve departments and agencies. NSIRA’s annual review of ACA implementation ensures that the Government of Canada remains accountable for the information that it shares with foreign partners, and respects related Canadian values and commitments. While the ACA separately requires each department to report publicly and to their Minister on ACA implementation each year, NSIRA’s horizontal review mandate offers unique insights into the consistency of this implementation and corresponding decision-making government wide. 

NSIRA’s ACA review for 2022 focused on how departments assess mistreatment risk in the context of their information sharing with foreign entities. NSIRA pursued this focus because departmental compliance with the directions depends on whether departments are accurately identifying which information exchanges may engage a substantial risk of mistreatment. If departments under-assess the level of risk involved in an exchange or over-assess the impact of mitigations to reduce this risk, they will not trigger the ACA’s embedded mechanisms for accountability and transparency. These mechanisms include referring certain high-risk cases to Deputy Heads as well as onward reporting to NSIRA. 

NSIRA found major inconsistencies in how different Government of Canada departments assessed the mistreatment risk posed by different countries. Indeed, NSIRA even identified some instances where different departments concurrently assessed the same country as presenting low, medium, and high mistreatment risk. NSIRA also found that departments often attributed an unjustifiably high weight to proposed risk mitigations and, in some cases, incorrectly incorporated mitigations within their initial assessments of countries’ baseline risk.  

Such methodological deficiencies, as well as a lack of checks and balances in the risk assessment process, may lead departments to systematically under-assess the risks involved in contemplated information exchanges. The net effect is that, when it does not adhere to the substance of the directions under the ACA, the Government of Canada risks exchanging information contrary to the directions’ prohibitions. 

As part of a suite of recommendations designed to address this risk, NSIRA reaffirmed its 2019 recommendation for the Government of Canada to develop a unified set of risk assessments for ACA purposes. In every ACA review since 2019, NSIRA has maintained its position that human rights risks within a given country should be assessed consistently across government. Doing so would avoid the unnecessary drain on resources caused by each department independently assessing risk and eliminate opportunities for discrepant outcomes. 

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Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022: Backgrounder

Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

ISSN: 2817-7525

This report presents findings and recommendations made in NSIRA’s annual review of disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)It was tabled in Parliament by the Minister of Public Safety, as required under subsection 39(2) of the NSIRA Act, on November 1st, 2023.

The SCIDA provides an explicit, stand-alone authority to disclose information between Government of Canada institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine its security. Its stated purpose is to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.

This report provides an overview of the SCIDA’s use in 2022. In doing so, it:

  • documents the volume and nature of information disclosures made under the SCIDA;
  • assesses compliance with the SCIDA; and
  • highlights patterns in the SCIDA’s use across Government of Canada institutions and over time.

The report contains six recommendations designed to increase standardization across the Government of Canada in a manner that is consistent with institutions’ demonstrated best practices and the SCIDA’s guiding principles.

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