This departmental plan details National Security and Intelligence Agency Secretariat’s (NSIRA Secretariat) priorities, plans, and associated costs for the upcoming three fiscal years.
NSIRA Secretariat identified the following five key priorities for 2026-27:
Mandatory and high‑impact reviews are completed within statutory and calendar‑year timelines.
Review timelines become more predictable, with earlier identification and mitigation of schedule risks.
Clear, operationalized procedures for all phases of complaints involving the RCMP and CBSA in preparation for the coming into force of the PCRC Act, supported by a finalized MOU with the CRCC/PCRC.
Improved coordination with the CRCC/PCRC to support a smooth transition to the new complaint investigation regime, promoting procedural efficiency and timeliness.
NSIRA Secretariat sustains a stable, fully staffed, and skilled workforce across its review, operational, and legal functions to ensure timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations.
Comprehensive Expenditure Review
As part of meeting this review’s targets, NSIRA Secretariat must plan the following spending reductions:
2026-27: $ 1.3M
2027-28: $ 1.8M
2028-29: $ 2.7M
It is anticipated that these spending reductions will involve a decrease of approximately 12 full-time equivalents by 2028-29.
NSIRA Secretariat will achieve these reductions by doing the following:
Reducing operations and maintenances costs to the extent possible
Reducing the number of FTEs required to meet our remaining savings targets, recognizing the impact this may have on our ability to deliver on our mandate.
The figures in this departmental plan reflect these reductions.
Highlights for NSIRA Secretariat in 2026-27
The NSIRA Secretariat will focus on sustaining its ability to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations as it prepares for a more complex review environment. The organization’s priorities reflect the dual need to uphold statutory obligations while ensuring operational readiness for the coming into force of the Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC) Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).
A central focus for the year will be ensuring that mandatory and high‑impact reviews are completed within statutory and calendar‑year timelines. This work directly supports NSIRA’s mandate to provide rigorous, independent review of national security and intelligence activities. To achieve this, the NSIRA Secretariat will intensify efforts to make review timelines more predictable, with improved early identification of risks and targeted mitigation strategies. Strengthening our internal planning and coordination practices and streamlining review processes will be essential to deliver high‑quality outputs within established timeframes.
At the same time, the NSIRA Secretariat will advance major initiatives to ensure the organization is fully prepared for the transition to the new complaint investigation regime created by the PCRC Act. This includes establishing clear, operationalized procedures for all phases of complaints involving the RCMP and CBSA, supported by the finalization of a revised Memorandum of Understanding with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC)/Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC). These foundational procedures will ensure NSIRA’s investigative processes are consistent, transparent, and aligned with the new legislative requirements.
Close collaboration with the CRCC/PCRC will be another priority. Enhanced coordination mechanisms will support a smooth transition to the new reality and promote procedural efficiency. Joint planning, information‑sharing protocols, and alignment of investigative expectations will help ensure operational readiness when the Act comes into force.
Across both the reviews and investigations programs, the NSIRA Secretariat will prioritize efforts to sustain a stable, fully staffed, and skilled workforce capable of meeting growing operational demands.
Collectively, these initiatives ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat is well positioned to support the Agency in fulfilling its statutory obligations, responding effectively to legislative change.
In 2026-27, total planned spending (including internal services) for NSIRA Secretariat is $18,438,436 and total planned full-time equivalent staff (including internal services) is 85.
Summary of planned results
The following provides a summary of the results the department plans to achieve in 2026-27 under its main areas of activity, called “core responsibilities.”
Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
The NSIRA Secretariat will strive to sustain its capacity to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations while preparing for the new complaint investigation mandate under the PCRC Act. To support readiness for the new complaints’ regime, the NSIRA Secretariat will establish clear procedures for handling RCMP and CBSA complaints and finalize a revised MOU with the CRCC/PCRC, ensuring efficient investigations and a smooth transition. A stable, skilled, and fully staffed workforce will remain central to meeting growing operational demands. Together, these efforts will enhance the Secretariat’s ability to support the Agency in meeting its investigative mandate and maintaining public trust as the national security and accountability landscape evolves.
I am pleased to present the 2026–27 Departmental Plan for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat. This plan outlines the priorities that will guide our work as we continue to support the Agency in delivering rigorous, independent review that upholds accountability and strengthens public trust in Canada’s accountability framework.
The Secretariat’s role remains to provide the expertise, infrastructure, and operational support necessary for the Agency to effectively fulfill its mandate. In 2026–27, we will focus on maintaining our capacity to deliver timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations despite budget reductions. Predictable planning, stronger coordination, and streamlined internal processes will be used. Meeting statutory timelines for mandatory and high‑impact reviews will remain a core priority, as will improving our ability to anticipate and mitigate risks.
A significant area of work will involve preparing for evolving legislative responsibilities around the PCRC Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the CBSA. The Secretariat will continue to refine its procedures, documentation, and operational readiness to ensure that future complaint investigations are handled as consistently and transparently as expected by members of the public, and in alignment with the Agency’s mandate.
Our people remain central to our success. Sustaining a stable, skilled, and fully staffed workforce across all review, operational, and legal functions is essential to meeting increasing demands. This will prove challenging in the context of funding reductions affecting the Secretariat.
The coming period will bring both opportunities and operational pressures, including greater complexity in review work and a broader investigative landscape. At the same time, the Secretariat must navigate resource constraints arising from government‑wide expenditure reductions, which limit its flexibility at a moment when the scope and technical footprint of national security and intelligence activities continue to grow at great speed. The Secretariat will continue to strive to advance its work with professionalism, adaptability, and a strong commitment to sound stewardship.
I want to express my appreciation to the Secretariat’s employees for their remarkable dedication, expertise, and resolute commitment to strengthening Canada’s national security accountability framework. I encourage you to explore this plan to see how the NSIRA Secretariat will advance its work in support of the Agency’s mandate.
Charles Fugère Executive Director National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat
Plans to deliver on core responsibilities and internal services
Core responsibilities and internal services:
Core responsibility 1: National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations
Internal services
Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Description
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat (NSIRA Secretariat) supports the Agency, which reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary. The NSIRA Secretariat also supports the Agency in investigating complaints from members of the public on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security related complaints. The NSIRA Secretariat’s support of the Agency contributes to strengthening accountability and enhancing public confidence in Government of Canada institutions.
Quality of life impacts
This core responsibility contributes to the “Good Governance” domain of the Quality of Life Framework for Canada and, more specifically, “Confidence in institutions”, “Discrimination and unfair treatment”, and “Resolution of serious legal problems”, through all the activities mentioned in the core responsibility description.
Indicators, results and targets
This section presents details on the department’s indicators, the actual results from the three most recently reported fiscal years, the targets and target dates for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations. Details are presented by departmental result.
Table 1: NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to inform Ministers and Canadians whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary.
Table 1 provides a summary of the target and actual results for each indicator associated with the results under National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations.
Indicator
Actual Results
Target
Date to achieve
Percentage of all mandatory reviews undertaken under NSIRA’s direction that are completed within the calendar year
2022-23: 100%
2023-24:100%
2024-25:100%
100%
December 31, 2027
Average number of months to complete Secretariat activities in support of NSIRA reviews.
* Data for the reporting year in question are not available. As the indicator was established after the reference period, no data collection had been undertaken. Consequently, no results can be reported for that fiscal year. Results will be available for subsequent fiscal years.
Table 2: NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to independently investigate national security-related complaints in a timely manner.
Table 2 provides a summary of the target and actual results for each indicator associated with the results under National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations.
Indicator
Actual Results
Target
Date to achieve
Percentage of investigations completed within the NSIRA Secretariat service standards
The following section describes the planned results for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations in 2026-27.
NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to inform Ministers and Canadians whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary.
To uphold its mandate, NSIRA will continue to deliver independent, timely, and high‑quality reviews that strengthen accountability across Canada’s national security and intelligence community. The NSIRA Secretariat will support this work by sustaining strong performance against all legislated obligations. This includes enabling NSIRA to maintain a 100% completion rate of all mandatory reviews within the calendar year, as required under its mandate. The Secretariat will also ensure that all secretariat support activities for both mandatory and discretionary reviews are completed within an average timeframe of 12 months or less.
Results we plan to achieve
Mandatory and high‑impact reviews are completed within statutory and calendar‑year timelines.
Review timelines become more predictable, with earlier identification and mitigation of risks.
Reviews are delivered more consistently and efficiently due to standardized workflows and tools.
NSIRA sustains its mandated outputs and quality within existing resources.
Governance structures enable timely, transparent, and accountable decision‑making.
Risks related to workload, reviewee dependencies, and capacity are identified and mitigated effectively.
NSIRA maintains a stable, skilled workforce capable of delivering complex reviews.
Employee resilience supports continuity of operations during organizational and fiscal change.
Reviewers have strengthened competencies in methodology, analysis, and project delivery.
Workforce well‑being and effective change‑management support sustained organizational performance.
NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to independently investigate national security-related complaints in a timely manner
The NSIRA Secretariat will strengthen the operational foundation needed to support timely and independent investigations of national security‑related complaints. This includes modernizing NSIRA’s investigative procedures, streamlining processes to handle certain types of complaints more efficiently, and maintaining a skilled, multi‑disciplinary investigative workforce. The Secretariat will also work closely with partners to prepare for the new Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC) Act and the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). including developing procedures for RCMP and CBSA‑related complaints and establishing required data‑reporting mechanisms. These efforts will help ensure that NSIRA continues to deliver fair, high‑quality complaint investigations.
Results we plan to achieve
Streamlined processes for addressing high‑volume or narrowly scoped complaint types, improving timeliness and overall investigative efficiency.
A maintained multi‑disciplinary investigative workforce with the expertise required to enhance the professionalization and quality of NSIRA’s complaint investigations.
Clear, operationalized procedures for all phases of complaints involving the RCMP and CBSA in preparation for the coming into force of the PCRC Act, supported by a finalized MOU with the Civilian Review and Complainants Commission (CRCC)/ Public Complaints and Review Commission (PCRC).
Effective mechanisms for aligning with the PCRC’s statutory obligation under the PCRC Act with respect to reporting race‑based and other demographic data on complaints, including those referred by the PCRC to NSIRA.
Contribution to Public Safety’s development of PCRC Act Regulations that reinforce institutional independence, create robust information sharing between NSIRA and PCRC and enhance the efficiency and timeliness of NSIRA’s investigative mandate.
Gender-based Analysis Plus
The NSIRA Secretariat will advance its commitment to integrating gender and diversity considerations by moving toward the implementation of its renewed GBA Plus Framework. Early implementation efforts will focus on strengthening foundational capacity in the area of data collection. This includes assessing current data practices, identifying relevant indicators, and exploring methods to enhance the collection and use of disaggregated data where appropriate. These efforts will help build the basis for more consistent monitoring and future reporting on the differential impacts of the Secretariat’s activities, supporting a more inclusive and evidence‑informed approach to oversight and review.
Planned resources to achieve results
Table 3: Planned resources to achieve results for National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations
Table 3 provides a summary of the planned spending and full-time equivalents required to achieve results.
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations is supported by the following programs:
National Security and Intelligence Activity Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Additional information related to the program inventory for the National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations is available on the Results page on GC InfoBase.
Summary of changes to reporting framework since last year
Revised departmental result: From “Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary” to “NSIRA has the necessary operational and administrative support to inform Ministers and Canadians whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary”.
Revised departmental result indicator: From “All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis” to “Percentage of all mandatory reviews undertaken under NSIRA’s direction that are completed within the calendar year”.
Removed indicator: “Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year”.
Added indicator: “Average number of months to complete Secretariat activities in support of NSIRA reviews”.
Internal services
Description
Internal services are the services that are provided within a department so that it can meet its corporate obligations and deliver its programs. There are 9 categories of internal services:
management and oversight services
communications services
human resources management services
financial management services
information management services
information technology services
real property management services
materiel management services
acquisition management services
Plans to achieve results
This section presents details the department’s plans to achieve results and meet targets for internal services.
Internal Services enable the NSIRA Secretariat to operate effectively and uphold its commitment to transparency, integrity, and accountable governance. Through strong communications, prudent financial management, strategic HR practices, robust information governance, digital innovation, and strengthened risk management, these functions provide the foundational support needed to advance the Secretariat’s mandate and ensure excellence in service delivery.
Ensuring Effective Communications
Through proactive communication efforts, the Communications team plays a key role in promoting public trust and reinforcing NSIRA’s mission to serve as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians. The team will continue to support the Agency and Secretariat by providing strategic communications advice, producing both internal and external content, managing media relations, and enhancing NSIRA’s digital presence across the web and social media platforms. These efforts ensure that information reaches diverse audiences, aligning with NSIRA’s values.
Financial Management Services
The NSIRA Secretariat will continue to take steps to ensure resources are deployed in the most effective and efficient manner possible, and its operations and administrative structures, tools, and processes continue to focus on supporting the delivery of its priorities. The NSIRA Secretariat will work to implement the newly developed the finance and procurement frameworks. We will work to adapt to the new reality created because of the Comprehensive Expenditure Review, ensuring expenditures are monitored diligently.
Strategic Human Resources Focus
Human resources (HR) management remains a critical enabler in helping the Secretariat achieve its organizational objectives, ensuring that investments in people translate into measurable improvements in performance, integrity and service quality. The HR strategic focus emphasizes ensuring effective workforce management aligned with the Comprehensive Expenditure Review, while supporting the Secretariat in strengthening employee competencies and performance management practices. Ongoing efforts include implementing HR initiatives that reflect the NSIRA’s mission, vision, and values, and reinforcing a values-based culture across the organization. The Secretariat also continues to enhance organizational governance through the management of conflict of interest matters and the consistent application of high standards of values and ethics. Sustained prioritization of wellness programs and well-being initiatives continues to foster an engaged, healthy, and resilient workforce, an essential asset during periods of continuous change and uncertainty.
Strengthening Information Governance and Lifecycle Stewardship
The NSIRA Secretariat will fully implement its new Disposition Authority and strengthen its information management governance. The Secretariat will also enhance its use of IM technologies, ensuring compliance, improving access to information, and supporting more effective information handling across the organization. Additionally, the Secretariat will continue to pursue digitization initiatives, transforming paper-based records into digital formats to streamline access, management, and long-term preservation. These initiatives will provide a solid foundation for managing records and data assets while improving operational efficiency.
Accessibility Posture and Digital Innovation
The NSIRA Secretariat will continue strengthening its accessibility posture while digitally innovating its internal and external web platforms. The Secretariat will explore ways to visually showcase and highlight its work through these platforms, while also providing new ways to keep Canadians and the public informed and updated on the organization’s activities. It will also review its full Information Technology footprint to identify opportunities for improvements and efficiencies, while continuing to strengthen internal and external communications to support the department’s broader goals, enhance service delivery, foster collaboration, and optimize operations.
Strengthening Risk Management Frameworks
The NSIRA Secretariat will enhance its risk management capabilities by reviewing and updating security controls and policies to address gaps, eliminate outdated practices, and integrate emerging risks. This will be supported by comprehensive risk assessments alongside initiatives to foster a strong risk-aware culture where employees clearly understand their role in managing risks. A key priority will be investing in risk awareness and accountability training, equipping the NSIRA Secretariat with the knowledge and tools needed to identify and mitigate risks effectively. These actions will strengthen organizational resilience, safeguard critical assets, and ensure continuity in achieving departmental objectives.
Together, these Internal Services initiatives reinforce the Secretariat’s capacity to deliver credible oversight, maintain public trust, and adapt to emerging demands. By enhancing communication, governance, workforce capability, digital and information stewardship, and organizational resilience, they directly support the achievement of departmental results and strengthen NSIRA’s ability to serve Canadians effectively.
Planned resources to achieve results
Table 4: Planned resources to achieve results for internal services this year
Table 4 provides a summary of the planned spending and full-time equivalents required to achieve results.
Planning for contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses
Government of Canada departments are to meet a target of awarding at least 5% of the total value of contracts to Indigenous businesses each year.
The NSIRA Secretariat achieved this goal in 24-25 and forecasts to continue to do so in the coming years.
Measures to meet the mandatory target include on-going training and awareness of the Indigenous Business Directory for cost centre managers as well as procurement staff.
Table 5: Percentage of contracts planned and awarded to Indigenous businesses
Table 5 presents the current, actual results with forecasted and planned results for the total percentage of contracts the department awarded to Indigenous businesses.
5% Reporting Field
2024–25 Actual Resul
2025–26 Forecasted Result
2023–24 Planned Result
Total percentage of contracts with Indigenous businesses
10%
5%
5%
Department-wide considerations
Key risks
The Secretariat’s primary organizational risk in 2026–27 stems from the resource constraints created by the Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER). These reductions intersect with growing operational demands, rising complexity in national security and intelligence activities, and an expanding investigative landscape. Together, these pressures reduce flexibility across core functions and heighten the risk that the Secretariat will be unable to sustain the same depth, breadth, and timeliness of support to the Agency. While internal efficiencies and strengthened financial oversight will help mitigate impacts, the CER creates structural pressures that will continue to influence operational performance throughout the planning period.
The resource constraints introduced by the CER also limit the Secretariat’s ability to invest in innovation, modernization, and process improvements that support high‑quality oversight. Enhancements to tools, methodologies, and practices normally essential in keeping pace with increasingly complex national security and intelligence activities will be more difficult to advance under current fiscal conditions. This constrains the Secretariat’s capacity to adopt new analytical techniques that are dependent on increased investments in technology. . As a result, the organization must balance its commitment to delivering timely, high‑quality reviews and independent complaint investigations with reduced flexibility to modernize or introduce new approaches that enhance effectiveness over the longer term.
Resource limitations will directly affect the timeliness of investigations in 2026–27. This risk is amplified by the significant surge in complaints received in recent years, driven primarily by systemic delays in immigration application processes. The sharp increase in caseload volume requires substantial analytical, legal, and administrative effort, and under current resource conditions will create delays in addressing both existing and new complaints. Without the ability to supplement capacity, the Secretariat faces increased pressure in meeting expectations for timely access to justice and maintaining service standards in investigative work. In addition, the Agency and Secretariat are expected to absorb a significant additional workload arising from the responsibility to investigate national security related complaints against the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). This is expected to come into force in 2026-27. No additional resources were contemplated by the government for NSIRA in relation to this work.
Legal Services within the NSIRA Secretariat and to the Review Agency are provided in-house owing to the requirement for NSIRA to operate independently from Government. Moreover, the Department of Justice Canada (DOJ) does not readily accept to represent NSIRA or its Secretariat in litigation before the courts as the DOJ often finds itself in an adversarial position to NSIRA when it carries out its reviews and investigations and in litigation files. Given this operational reality, and as a micro-organization, the NSIRA Secretariat traditionally utilized contracts with external law firms for the provision of litigation services on an as needed basis. Our reduced O&M budget for FY 2026-27 means that no funding has been allocated for the external provision of litigation services. Litigation capacity will have to be absorbed in-house for both existing litigation matters, and any new litigation involving NSIRA or its Secretariat that may come before the courts–including litigation instituted by other federal government organizations against NSIRA or its Secretariat. This will represent a corresponding reduction in the capacity to provide advisory Legal Services in support of reviews, investigations and internal services, and thus impact delivery on core responsibilities.
Planned spending and human resources
This section provides an overview of NSIRA Secretariat’s planned spending and human resources for the next three fiscal years and of planned spending for 2026-27 with actual spending from previous years.
Spending
This section presents an overview of the department’s planned expenditures from 2023-24 to 2028-29.
Budgetary performance summary
Table 6 Three-year spending summary for core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)
Table 6 Three-year spending summary for core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)
Table 6presents NSIRA Secretariat’s spending over the past three years to carry out its core responsibilities and for internal services. Amounts for the 2025–26 fiscal year are forecasted based on spending to date.
Core Responsibilities and Internal Services
2023-2024 Actual Expenditures
2024-25 Actual Expenditures
2025-2026 Forecast Spending
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations
$9,110,398
$10,856,293/td>
$10,916,634
Subtotal
$9,110,398
$10,856,293
$10,916,634
Internal services
$10,535,328
$7,983,206
$8,628,304
Total
$19,645,726
$18,839,499
$19,544,937
Analysis of the past three years of spending
While planned spending appears to have increased from 2024-25 to 2025-26, it is likely, based on historical forecasting results, that the actuals for 2025-26 will come in similar to or lower than 2024-25 actuals. The decrease from 2023-24 to 2024-25 is due to a large capital infrastructure project that was completed in 2023-24 so the inflated expenditures in internal services stopped in 2023-24. We are seeing a gradual increase in both ongoing O&M expenditures and particularly in salaries, due to the growth of the organization and the approach towards a steady state.
Table 7 Planned three-year spending on core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)
Table7 presents NSIRA Secretariat’s planned spending over the next three years by core responsibilities and for internal services.
Core Responsibilities and Internal Services
2026–27 Planned Spending
2027–28 Planned Spending
2028–29 Planned Spending
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations
$10,599,557
$10,293,901
$9,682,300
Subtotal
$10,599,557
$10,293,901
$9,682,300
Internal services
$7,838,879
$7,701,302
$7,456,666
Total
$18,438,436
$17,995,203
$17,138,966
Analysis of the next three years of spending
Due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review that was undertaken in 2025-26, expenditures will decrease in the coming three fiscal years according to the prescribed targets from Treasury Board.
This section provides an overview of the department’s voted and statutory funding for its core responsibilities and for internal services. For further information on funding authorities, consult the Government of Canada budgets and expenditures.
Graph 1: Approved funding (statutory and voted) over a six-year period
Graph 1 summarizes the department’s approved voted and statutory funding from 2023-24 to 2028-29.
Fiscal Year
Total
Voted
Statutory
2023–24
$24,388,394
$22,633,165
$1,755,229
2024–25
$19,458,632
$17,857,264
$1,601,368
2025–26
$20,425,774
$18,517,997
$1,907,777
2026–27
$18,438,436
$16,389,075
$2,049,361
2027–28
$17,995,203
$15,962,458
$2,032,745
2028–29
$17,138,966
$15,274,167
$1,864,799
Analysis of statutory and voted funding over a six-year period
Due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review that was undertaken in 2025-26, funding will decrease in the coming three fiscal years according to the prescribed targets from Treasury Board.
For further information on NSIRA Secretariat’s departmental appropriations, consult the 2026-27 Main Estimates.
Future-oriented condensed statement of operations
The future-oriented condensed statement of operations provides an overview of NSIRA Secretariat’s operations for 2025-26 to 2026-27.
Table 8 Future-oriented condensed statement of operations for the year ended March 31, 2027 (dollars)
Table 8 summarizes the expenses and revenues which net to the cost of operations before government funding and transfers for 2025-26 to 2026-27. The forecast and planned amounts in this statement of operations were prepared on an accrual basis. The forecast and planned amounts presented in other sections of the Departmental Plan were prepared on an expenditure basis. Amounts may therefore differ.
Financial Information
2025–26 Forecast Results
2026–27 Planned Results
Difference (Planned Results minus Forecasted)
Total expenses
$22,205,341
$21,038,245
$1,167,095
Total revenues
$0
$0
$0
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers
$22,205,341
$21,038,245
$1,167,095
Analysis of forecasted and planned results
The decrease in expenses is due to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review cuts.
This section presents an overview of the department’s actual and planned human resources from 2023-24 to 2028-29.
Table 9: Actual human resources for core responsibilities and internal services
Table 9 shows a summary of human resources, in full-time equivalents, for NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for the previous three fiscal years. Human resources for the 2025–26 fiscal year are forecasted based on year to date.
Core Responsibilities and Internal Services
2023–24 Actual Full-time Equivalents
2024–25 Actual Full-time Equivalents
2025–26 Forecasted Full-time Equivalents
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations
51
58
69
Subtotal
51
58
69
Internal services
24
29
31
Total
75
87
100
Analysis of human resources over the last three years
Over the last three fiscal years, the Secretariat’s full‑time equivalent (FTE) levels have remained relatively stable, reflecting steady workforce planning in support of its mandate. During this period, staffing levels were sustained through targeted recruitment and low turnover, allowing the organization to maintain core capacity while continuing to build specialized expertise in review, investigative, and corporate functions. Operational demands and caseload complexity continued to grow, underscoring the importance of sustaining a skilled and stable workforce. While staffing remained consistent through 2025–26, the Secretariat anticipates increased pressure on workforce levels beginning in 2026–27 as new fiscal constraints take effect.
Table 10: Human resources planning summary for core responsibilities and internal services
Table 10 shows information on human resources, in full-time equivalents, for each of NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services planned for the next three years.
Core Responsibilities and Internal Services
2026–27 Planned Full-time Equivalents
2027–28 Planned Full-time Equivalents
2028–29 Planned Full-time Equivalents
National security and intelligence reviews and complaints investigations
54
54
54
Subtotal
54
54
54
Internal services
31
31
31
Total
85
85
85
Analysis of human resources for the next three years
In the context of the Comprehensive Expenditure Request (CER), the organization was required to undertake a review of its planned workforce levels in order to meet externally established financial targets. As a result, certain positions will be abolished and reductions to the overall size of the workforce will be implemented. These measures will be applied in the first year of the planning horizon (2026–27) to comply with the required expenditure levels and to stabilize planned full-time equivalent levels in subsequent years. The organization continues to manage these impacts while maintaining its core capacity to deliver on its mandate.
Federal tax expenditures
NSIRA Secretariat’s Departmental Plan does not include information on tax expenditures.
The tax system can be used to achieve public policy objectives through the application of special measures such as low tax rates, exemptions, deductions, deferrals and credits. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for these measures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures.
This report also provides detailed background information on tax expenditures, including descriptions, objectives, historical information and references to related federal spending programs as well as evaluations and GBA Plus of tax expenditures.
Corporate information
Departmental profile
Appropriate minister(s): The Right Honourable Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada
Institutional head: Charles Fugère, Executive Director
Ministerial portfolio: Privy Council Office
Enabling instrument(s): National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act
Year of incorporation / commencement: 2019
Departmental contact information
Mailing address:
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat P.O. Box 2430, Station B
Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
budgetary expenditures(dépenses budgétaires)
Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, organizations or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.
core responsibility(responsabilité essentielle)
An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a core responsibility are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence.
Departmental Plan(plan ministériel)
A report on the plans and expected performance of an appropriated department over a 3year period. Departmental Plans are usually tabled in Parliament each spring.
departmental result(résultat ministériel)
A consequence or outcome that a department seeks to achieve. A departmental result is often outside departments’ immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes.
departmental result indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel)
A quantitative measure of progress on a departmental result.
departmental results framework(cadre ministériel des résultats)
A framework that connects the department’s core responsibilities to its departmental results and departmental result indicators.
Departmental Results Report(rapport sur les résultats ministériels)
A report on a department’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.
full‑time equivalent(équivalent temps plein)
A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person‑year charge against a departmental budget. For a particular position, the full‑time equivalent figure is the ratio of number of hours the person actually works divided by the standard number of hours set out in the person’s collective agreement.
gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus)(analyse comparative entre les sexes plus [ACS Plus])
Is an analytical tool used to support the development of responsive and inclusive policies, programs, and other initiatives. GBA Plus is a process for understanding who is impacted by the issue or opportunity being addressed by the initiative; identifying how the initiative could be tailored to meet diverse needs of the people most impacted; and anticipating and mitigating any barriers to accessing or benefitting from the initiative. GBA Plus is an intersectional analysis that goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences to consider other factors, such as age, disability, education, ethnicity, economic status, geography (including rurality), language, race, religion, and sexual orientation.
Using GBA Plus involves taking a gender- and diversity-sensitive approach to our work. Considering all intersecting identity factors as part of GBA Plus, not only sex and gender, is a Government of Canada commitment.
government priorities(priorités gouvernementales)
For the purpose of the 2026-27 Departmental Plan, government priorities are the high-level themes outlining the government’s agenda in the most recent 2025 Speech from the Throne.
horizontal initiative(initiative horizontale)
An initiative where two or more federal departments are given funding to pursue a shared outcome, often linked to a government priority.
Indigenous business (entreprise autochtones)
Requirements for verifying Indigenous businesses for the purposes of the departmental result report are available through the Indigenous Services Canada Mandatory minimum 5% Indigenous procurement target website.
non‑budgetary expenditures(dépenses non budgétaires)
Non-budgetary authorities that comprise assets and liabilities transactions for loans, investments and advances, or specified purpose accounts, that have been established under specific statutes or under non-statutory authorities in the Estimates and elsewhere. Non-budgetary transactions are those expenditures and receipts related to the government’s financial claims on, and obligations to, outside parties. These consist of transactions in loans, investments and advances; in cash and accounts receivable; in public money received or collected for specified purposes; and in all other assets and liabilities. Other assets and liabilities, not specifically defined in G to P authority codes are to be recorded to an R authority code, which is the residual authority code for all other assets and liabilities.
performance (rendement)
What a department did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the department intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified.
performance indicator(indicateur de rendement)
A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an organization, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.
plan(plan)
The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how a department intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally, a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead to the expected result.
planned spending(dépenses prévues)
For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts presented in Main Estimates.
A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports.
program(programme)
Individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels.
program inventory(répertoire des programmes)
Identifies all the department’s programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department’s core responsibilities and results.
result(résultat)
A consequence attributed, in part, to a department, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single department, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the department’s influence.
statutory expenditures(dépenses législatives)
Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made.
target (cible)
A measurable performance or success level that an organization, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.
voted expenditures(dépenses votées)
Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an appropriation act. The vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.
Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces
FINTRAC
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
GAC
Global Affairs Canada
GC
Government of Canada
IRCC
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
NSIRA
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
PHAC
Public Health Agency of Canada
PS
Public Safety Canada
RCMP
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCIDA
Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
TC
Transport Canada
Glossary of Terms
Contribution test
The first part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (paragraph 5(1)(a)).
Proportionality test
The second part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances (paragraph 5(1)(b)).
Executive Summary
This review assessed Government of Canada (GC) institutions’ compliance with the disclosure and record-keeping requirements of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) throughout 2024. The review also captured the volume of SCIDA disclosures and identified trends in its application across GC institutions over time.
NSIRA found that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) generally complied with their record-keeping obligations under the SCIDA.
Due to the substantial increase of nearly 300% in disclosures from IRCC to CSIS in 2024, NSIRA focused its review primarily on these two institutions.
During the review period, IRCC and CSIS implemented a tiered request and disclosure process which reduced the amount of third-party information disclosed by IRCC, contributing to enhanced compliance with the SCIDA. However, NSIRA found instances when the information provided to IRCC by CSIS was limited and hampered IRCC’s ability to fulfill its obligations as a disclosing institution to satisfy itself that the information disclosed is in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada.
In addition, NSIRA found that IRCC lacked a formal policy governing the disclosure of information about minors.
NSIRA found that CSE, in three of its requests for information under the SCIDA, provided IRCC with more information than was relevant to its disclosures.
NSIRA made four recommendations designed to ensure that institutions minimize the privacy impact to individuals in their requests and disclosures under the SCIDA.
With regard to the SCIDA’s requirement in subsection 5.1(1) that recipient institutions destroy or return unnecessary personal information, NSIRA found that CSIS may not have complied in its retention of one disclosure containing erroneous personal information.
1. Introduction
Authority
This review was conducted under the authority of paragraphs 8(1)(a), 8(1)(b), and subsection 39(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (“NSIRA Act”).
In accordance with section 39 of the NSIRA Act, this review fulfills NSIRA’s requirement to submit an annual report to the Minister of Public Safety regarding disclosures made under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA, or the Act) in the preceding calendar year.
Scope
The objective of this review was to assess Government of Canada (GC) institutions’ compliance with the SCIDA’s disclosure and record-keeping requirements in 2024. The review also tracked the volume of SCIDA disclosures, analyzed usage patterns across institutions and over time, and examined how GC institutions employed information-sharing agreements.
The review’s assessment of compliance was limited to GC institutions that disclosed or received information under the SCIDA in 2024: the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
Methodology
The review was primarily based on records provided to NSIRA by disclosing and recipient institutions under subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA. It was supplemented by an examination of the institutions’ SCIDA policies and procedures, as well as their responses to related information requests.
NSIRA assessed administrative and substantive compliance with the SCIDA’s record-keeping requirements for all disclosures made by CBSA, CSE, GAC, and the RCMP. With respect to disclosures from IRCC to CSIS, NSIRA reviewed a random representative sample of 250 disclosures.
Review Statements
The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA rights of timely access to any information in the possession or under the control of a department (except for Cabinet confidences) and to receive from the department any documents and explanations NSIRA deems necessary. NSIRA monitors cooperation with access requests, including the completeness and accuracy of disclosures, which inform its overall assessment of a department’s responsiveness in each review.
CBSA, CSE, CSIS, GAC, and the RCMP met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness during this review. IRCC only partially met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness, given extended delays in IRCC’s responses to requests for information.
2. Background
The SCIDA provides an explicit, stand-alone authority to disclose information between GC institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine its security. Its stated purpose is to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.
Section 9 of the SCIDA prescribes record-keeping obligations for all institutions who disclose or receive information under the Act. Subsection 9(3) requires that these records be provided to NSIRA within 30 days after the end of each calendar year.
Subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA authorizes GC institutions to disclose information—subject to any prohibitions or restrictions in other legislation or regulations—to designated recipient institutions if the disclosing institution is satisfied that (a) the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (the “contribution test”); and (b) the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances (the “proportionality test”).
Subsection 5(2) requires disclosing institutions to, at the time of the disclosure, also provide information regarding the disclosure’s accuracy and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained.
When a GC institution receives information under the Act, subsection 5.1(1) requires that the institution destroy or return any unnecessary personal information as soon as feasible after receiving it.
The SCIDA’s guiding principles reinforce the notion that effective and responsible disclosure of information protects Canada and Canadians. Of note, subsection 4(c) suggests that GC institutions enter into an information-sharing arrangement when they regularly disclose information to the same recipient.
In 2024, GC institutions made a total of 900 disclosures under the SCIDA (see Table 1). The number of disclosures increased 235% overall since 2023.
Table 1: Number of SCIDA disclosures made in 2024, by disclosing and recipient institution [all disclosures (proactive disclosures)]
Designated Recipient Institutions
Disclosing Institution
CBSA
CFIA
CNSC
CRA
CSE
CSIS
DND/CAF
Finance
FINTRAC
GAC
Health
IRCC
PHAC
PSC
RCMP
TC
TOTAL (proactive)
CBSA
–
–
–
–
–
(2)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
(2)
–
(4)
GAC
–
–
–
–
(1)
41
(12)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
7
(2)
–
49
(15)
IRCC
–
–
–
–
76
770
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
(1)
–
847
(1)
TOTAL (proactive)
–
–
–
–
77
(1)
813
(14)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
10
(5)
–
900
(20)
This substantial increase in records was primarily driven by IRCC’s disclosures to CSIS, which grew nearly 300% from 194 in 2023 to 770 in 2024. IRCC previously disclosed similar information to CSIS under the Privacy Act, whereas now the SCIDA is the primary mechanism for CSIS to obtain immigration information. CSIS also credits the increase in disclosures to enhanced collaboration with IRCC aimed at improving operational staff awareness and understanding of the SCIDA regime.
As observed in prior years, institutions predominantly made disclosures following a request. Only 2% of disclosures were sent proactively by the disclosing institution.
Section 9 of the SCIDA establishes record-keeping obligations for both disclosing and recipient institutions. These requirements are designed to promote accountability and transparency by mandating the documentation of essential information, including descriptions of the disclosed or received data, the individuals involved, relevant dates, and the legal basis for the disclosure. Institutions are also required to record whether the information was destroyed or returned.
NSIRA’s analysis of records submitted by CSIS and IRCC revealed several minor discrepancies in record-keeping. These discrepancies can be attributed to duplicated, amended, and cancelled requests from CSIS. For example, in some cases, follow-up questions from CSIS regarding disclosures it had received were recorded by IRCC as a different request.
In addition, IRCC assigned sequential file numbers for a number of requests that were sent in 2024 but not processed until 2025. These disclosures were included in the record-keeping logs submitted to NSIRA. IRCC explained that, moving forward, it will only assign file numbers to requests that are completed in the current calendar year to minimize confusion.
IRCC also noted that it has committed to sharing its record-keeping log with CSIS on a quarterly basis to address potential discrepancies early. Clear and effective communication between disclosing and recipient institutions is vital to accurate record-keeping and enables secure information management, legal compliance, and administrative precision.
In August 2023, CSE and IRCC signed an information sharing agreement (ISA) to formalize their regular information exchanges and facilitate compliance with the SCIDA. The primary purpose of IRCC disclosures to CSE under the SCIDA is to determine a subject of interest’s legal citizenship status and/or immigration status in Canada. These disclosures help to ensure CSE’s lawfulness, as its mandate prohibits the direction of operational activities at Canadians and persons in Canada.
In its requests, CSE provides an individual’s identifying information in order for IRCC to conduct a search in the relevant systems, primarily the Global Case Management System (GCMS). The GCMS holds all citizenship and immigration information of Canadian citizens, foreign nationals, and permanent residents. It includes any application submitted by individuals as well as information entered by immigration officers and/or other departments, such as the CBSA.
At minimum, CSE provides IRCC with an individual’s full name and date of birth in its request. When available, CSE may include additional identifying information such as an individual’s known or suspected nationality, place of birth, and phone number(s), among others. The ISA between CSE and IRCC contains a comprehensive list of all the information that CSE may provide to assist IRCC in producing accurate results.
In three different instances, however, NSIRA observed that CSE provided IRCC with additional personal information that was not identified in the ISA. CSE explained that all relevant details were disclosed to increase the likelihood of IRCC yielding results. IRCC confirmed to NSIRA that it could not, and has never, leveraged the specific personal information provided by CSE to conduct its searches.
The ISA does not formally prohibit CSE from sharing information outside of the parameters agreed upon with IRCC. Nevertheless, CSE should verify whether the information it shares is relevant to the disclosing institution to avoid unnecessary sharing of personal data.
In the spring of 2024, IRCC and CSIS developed a tiered process for sharing under the SCIDA and introduced the classification of SCIDA requests and disclosures into “basic” or “advanced”. In implementing this process, IRCC and CSIS also formally adopted three standardized templates: a request letter, a checklist, and a response form. The checklist and response forms, in particular, aim to guide IRCC analysts in providing only necessary information and were included in all disclosures.
At minimum, a basic disclosure contains biographic details from the past five years, such as citizenship or immigration information, marital status, and contact information. It may also include photographs, recent employment information, travel history, and physical characteristics.
Should CSIS require an extensive personal history and supporting documents, such as scanned immigration applications, the request becomes an advanced SCIDA disclosure requiring additional rationale. This type of disclosure often contains information from a longer period of time (past ten years or more).
Previously, in order to share even basic biographic information, IRCC would include a scanned copy of an individual’s most recent immigration application (e.g. a passport or visa application). As a result, a number of disclosures from early in the review year contained third party information, such as unredacted guarantor, emergency contact, or reference information. NSIRA observed that the tiered system reduced the number of instances where IRCC included third party information in a basic SCIDA disclosure, in part because scanned copies of applications were no longer included.
Typically, IRCC will redact references from passport applications in an advanced disclosure. Other types of third-party information are redacted on a case-by-case basis.
The disclosure process begins when IRCC receives a request letter from CSIS containing a standardized list of items agreed upon by both institutions. This approach allows CSIS to identify only the information necessary for its request, addressing previous issues with customized and inconsistent information lists. For example, CSIS may request biographic details, such as citizenship and passport information, but choose not to request contact information. Advanced request letters include an option to receive scanned copies of applications.
Throughout 2024, the request letter, checklist, and response form evolved to meet the needs of IRCC and CSIS. NSIRA observed that new types of commonly requested information that had been previously absent from the request letter would be added as needed. In addition, IRCC combined the checklist and response form to reduce its administrative burden. The tiered process enabled IRCC to manage the increase in disclosures while limiting the amount of third-party information shared.
Importantly, IRCC’s decision to use a response checklist and form indicates an iterative process that improved the operational efficiency and legal compliance of both institutions under the SCIDA. Specific response times are prioritized into the following three categories: urgent life-threatening requests, priority operational requests, and routine requests. IRCC intends to prioritize requests from other institutions under the SCIDA in a similar manner.
The disclosures below briefly illustrate how the tiered process improved IRCC’s minimization of personal information in disclosures under the SCIDA. The first case represents a typical disclosure prior to the tiered system, while the second and third disclosures occurred after its introduction.
CSIS sent a letter to IRCC requesting the disclosure of information about a foreign individual under investigation relating to a particular institution. The request was to include records from the past five years.
Without a system to limit what information was shared, IRCC disclosed all available scanned copies of the individual’s study permit, work permit, permanent residence, and temporary resident visa applications. All documents provided in the disclosure were without redactions and included third party, minor, and financial information.
CSIS requested a basic SCIDA disclosure from IRCC for information relating to individuals affiliated with a particular foreign entity. In its justification, CSIS noted that the foreign entity and any individuals identified were of “national security interest” in relation to a CSIS investigation.
As this was a basic request, IRCC took steps towards limiting the disclosure by providing CSIS with a chart containing only the name, place and date of birth, status or immigration history, and the nature of affiliation. In email correspondence, IRCC stated that should CSIS require additional details or would like to request an advanced SCIDA for any or all of the individuals implicated, it would be required to include an additional detailed rationale.
CSIS requested an advanced disclosure from IRCC for information relating to several individuals with the justification that it had “reasonable grounds to believe” the subjects may have been in contact with “known members” of a foreign intelligence service. CSIS continued to justify its reasoning in detail, providing IRCC with a substantial amount of contextual information about the foreign entity in question and how the information it requested would contribute to its investigation.
CSIS also requested scanned copies of all documents in its request. IRCC disclosed nearly all categories of information requested by CSIS. In the checklist attached to the disclosure, IRCC stated that it had redacted third party information as well as other records that were irrelevant to CSIS’s request.
When compared to the first case, the delineation of basic and advanced disclosures under the SCIDA prevented the over sharing of personal information by IRCC in the second case without further justification. Despite CSIS’s expanded justification in the third case, IRCC did not include all the information in its holdings on the identified subjects because not everything was relevant.
SCIDA disclosures made under section 5(1) require IRCC to satisfy itself of two specific criteria. First, IRCC must satisfy itself that the disclosure will contribute to CSIS’s exercise of its jurisdiction in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. Second, IRCC must satisfy itself that the disclosure will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. If IRCC is satisfied in both instances, it “may” make a disclosure. The onus is on the disclosing institution to assure itself that the information it discloses will contribute in the requisite sense.
While CSIS may not be required to share detailed information about its investigations, programs, or activities with IRCC, it needs to provide enough information in a request so that IRCC can responsibly exercise its discretion. A succinct high-level explanation of the link between the information sought and CSIS’s national security jurisdiction and responsibilities may be enough. However, disclosing institutions can seek clarification by requiring a more specific articulation of the activity that undermines the security of Canada that the request relates to.
In the majority of basic requests reviewed by NSIRA, CSIS elected to use scant phrasing in its justifications, such as “Subject is of national security interest in relation to the Service’s investigation of” the threat in question. In contrast, NSIRA observed other basic requests where CSIS demonstrated how the requested information would contribute to its investigations in a clear and descriptive manner in its justification. As a matter of course, advanced requests almost always contained robust justifications.
Inconsistencies in the description of the undermining activity in CSIS’s basic request letters did not often prompt IRCC to seek further clarification. In practice, IRCC maintained an institutional understanding that CSIS would only request information that will contribute to its mandate. NSIRA did not observe that IRCC conducted independent assessments based on a structured framework or consistent criteria.
IRCC has stated that it redacts any information it deems irrelevant in its disclosures to ensure that only pertinent details are disclosed. Particularly for advanced and bulk requests, IRCC was not always satisfied with CSIS’s justifications. NSIRA observed that IRCC either required additional rationale, disclosed less information than had been requested, or redacted unnecessary third-party information.
The absence of detailed justifications in SCIDA requests risks compromising compliance with paragraph 5(1)(b). Consequently, recipient institutions should provide disclosing institutions with the necessary information and rationale to satisfy the disclosing institution’s contribution threshold. A sufficient analysis of the activity that undermines the security of Canada requires that IRCC have knowledge of those circumstances.
In 2024, IRCC indicated that it had received an increase in requests for disclosures regarding minors and engaged with CSIS to ensure their privacy. IRCC’s existing SCIDA policy, however, does not address the treatment of minors in disclosures under the regime.
NSIRA observed that IRCC was inconsistent in its approach to disclosing information about minors and did not redact information appropriately in several disclosures reviewed. In at least one instance, IRCC stated that it had redacted a minor’s information. However, NSIRA observed that IRCC had done so inconsistently, leaving the minor’s name, date of birth, and national identification number unredacted elsewhere in the same disclosure. In other disclosures, IRCC either redacted information about a minor in full or chose not to make the disclosure at all.
The care attendant to a minor’s privacy rights in other areas of the law (as seen in, among others, the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and various international conventions) indicates that minors may also attract a heightened privacy expectation in a national security context. Children under 16, for example, may not have a choice in submitting applications for passports which are completed on their behalf by a parent or guardian.
Subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA requires, as soon as feasible, the destruction or return of any personal information received under section 5 of the Act that is not necessary for a department to fulfill their lawful responsibilities related to national security. CSIS is excluded from this requirement by subsection 5.1(3) when a disclosure is retained pursuant to the performance of its duties and functions under section 12 of the CSIS Act.
In 2024, CSIS was the only institution to identify disclosures containing information that was destroyed or returned under subsection 5.1(1): three were deemed non-reportable, one was incorrect (wrong subject), and one had been disclosed by IRCC before CSIS could cancel the request, although it was not disseminated.
Shortly following receipt of the disclosure, CSIS assessed that the individual implicated was not the subject of the request. Despite the requirement to destroy the information, CSIS retained it in its entirety for “reference purposes.” When asked, CSIS confirmed the disclosure should not have been retained “in its totality and possibly at all” and that the matter had been referred to its internal compliance section.
To the extent that it is strictly necessary, section 12 of the CSIS Act allows CSIS to collect, analyse and retain on activities constituting threats to the security of Canada. However, as CSIS did not claim that this information was retained pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act, and thus was not strictly necessary to keep, the exception at 5.1(3) of the SCIDA did not apply and CSIS was required to destroy or return the information pursuant to 5.1(1).
This review marks the sixth year that NSIRA has examined GC institutions’ compliance with the SCIDA. NSIRA concluded that, within the disclosures reviewed, institutions generally adhered to the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record-keeping.
NSIRA noted important improvements that streamlined the request and disclosure process between IRCC and CSIS and enhanced compliance. However, NSIRA observed risks with IRCC’s application of the substantive requirements under paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA.
NSIRA also identified possible non-compliance with subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA owing to CSIS’s retention of personal information that it had identified as unnecessary.
NSIRA’s recommendations in this review are designed to assist both recipient and disclosing institutions in adhering to the SCIDA’s privacy standards while effectively supporting national security and lawful mandates.
Annex A. Historical SCIDA Disclosures
Disclosing Institution
Designated Recipient Institutions under the SCIDA, Schedule 3
CBSA
CFIA
CNSC
CRA
CSE
CSIS
DND/CAF
Finance
FINTRAC
GAC
Health
IRCC
PHAC
PS
RCMP
TC
TOTAL
2023
CBSA
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
2 (2)
–
2 (2)
GAC
–
–
–
–
1 (1)
10 (0)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
15 (1)
RCC
–
–
–
–
58 (0)
194 (7)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
252 (7)
TOTAL
–
–
–
–
59 (1)
204 (7)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
6 (2)
–
269 (10)
2022
CBSA
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
4
–
4
GAC
–
–
–
–
–
39
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
12
–
53
IRCC
–
–
–
–
59
56
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
115
RCMP
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
–
–
1
TOTAL
–
–
–
–
59
95
2
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
16
–
173
2021
DND/CAF
–
–
–
–
–
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
2
GAC
–
–
–
–
–
41
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
2
–
44
IRCC
–
–
–
–
68
79
–
–
–
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
149
TOTAL
–
–
–
–
68
122
–
–
–
2
–
1
–
–
2
–
195
2020
CBSA
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
3
–
4
GAC
–
–
–
–
1
25
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
13
–
40
IRCC
–
–
–
–
60
61
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
37
1
159
RCMP
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
3
–
5
–
–
–
9
TC
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
2
–
2
Other
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1
TOTAL
–
–
–
–
61
88
1
–
–
3
–
6
–
–
55
1
215
2019
CBSA
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
2
–
3
GAC
–
–
–
–
–
23
–
–
–
–
–
3
–
1
15
–
42
IRCC
–
–
–
–
5
17
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
36
–
59
RCMP
–
–
–
4
–
–
–
–
1
3
–
1
–
–
–
–
9
TC
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1
–
1
TOTAL
–
–
–
4
5
41
1
–
1
3
–
4
–
1
54
–
114
Annex B. Findings and Recommendations
NSIRA made the following findings and recommendations in this review:
Volume and Trend Analysis
Finding 1. NSIRA found that IRCC’s disclosures to CSIS under the SCIDA increased significantly in 2024.
Record Keeping Requirements – Section 9
Finding 2. NSIRA found that, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, every institution that disclosed or received information pursuant to the SCIDA in 2024 generally complied with its record-keeping obligations under section 9.
Information Sharing Agreements – Subsection 4(c)
Finding 3. NSIRA found that CSE provided IRCC with more information than necessary in three of its requests for disclosure under the SCIDA.
Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that CSE limit the sharing of information when requesting a disclosure under the SCIDA to only that which IRCC has identified as relevant to its information holdings.
Disclosure of Information Requirements – Section 5
Finding 4. NSIRA found that IRCC and CSIS’s implementation of a tiered request and disclosure process reduced the amount of third-party information disclosed by IRCC, which contributed to enhanced compliance with the SCIDA.
Finding 5. NSIRA found instances when the information provided to IRCC by CSIS was limited and hampered IRCC’s ability to fulfill its obligation as a disclosing institution to satisfy itself that the information disclosed is in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada.
Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that IRCC seek clarification from requesting institutions, as needed, to ensure it has all relevant information necessary to fulfill its obligations as a disclosing institution under the SCIDA, before making a disclosure.
Finding 6. NSIRA found that IRCC did not have a policy governing the disclosure of information concerning minors under the SCIDA.
Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that IRCC institute a policy on the disclosure of information related to minors that recognizes their distinct privacy interests.
Requirement to Destroy or Return – Subsection 5.1(1)
Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS may not have complied with subsection 5.1(1) of the SCIDA when it retained one disclosure containing personal information that was not necessary for exercising its jurisdiction.
Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that CSIS destroy all personal information in one disclosure that was not necessary for exercising its jurisdiction.
This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards: GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2025–2026 Main Estimates.
This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament. Established in July 2019, NSIRA reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary. The Agency also investigates complaints from members of the public on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security-related complaints, independently and in a timely manner.
The NSIRA Secretariat supports the Agency in the delivery of its mandate. Independent scrutiny contributes to strengthening the accountability framework for national security and intelligence activities and to enhancing public confidence. Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable, and necessary.
This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the secretariat’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the secretariat, consistent with the 2025–2026 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special-purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.
The authority of Parliament is required before money can be spent by the government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authorities for specific purposes.
The Secretariat uses the full accrual method of accounting to prepare and present its annual financial statements that are part of the departmental results reporting process. However, the spending authorities voted by Parliament remain on an expenditure basis.
Highlights of the fiscal quarter and fiscal year-to-date results
This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended December 31, 2025.
NSIRA Secretariat spent approximately 65% of its authorities by the end of the third quarter, compared with 63% in the same quarter of 2024–2025 (see graph 1).
Graph 1: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q3 2025–2026 and Q3 2024–2025 (in millions of dollars)
Text version of Figure 1
Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q3 2025–2026 and Q3 2024–2025 (in millions of dollars)
2025-26
2024-25
Total Authorities
$20.4
$20.5
Q3 Expenditures
$3.8
$4.2
Year-to-Date Expenditures
$13.3
$13.0
Significant changes to authorities
As of December 31, 2025, Parliament had approved $20.4 million in total authorities for use by NSIRA Secretariat for 2025–2026 compared with $20.5 million as of December 31, 2024, for a net decrease of $0.1 million or 0.5% (see graph 2).
Graph 2: Variance in authorities as of December 31, 2025 (in millions of dollars)
Text version of Figure 2
Variance in authorities as of December 31, 2025 (in millions of dollars)
Fiscal year 2024-25 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2025
Fiscal year 2025-26 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2026
Vote 1 – Operating
18.9
18.5
Statutory
1.6
1.9
Total budgetary authorities
20.5
20.4
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
The decrease of $0.1 million in authorities is mostly explained by a decrease in total carry-forward from the previous year.
Significant changes to quarter expenditures
The third quarter expenditures totalled $3.8 million for a decrease of $0.4 million when compared with $4.2 million spent during the same period in 2024–2025. Table 1 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Table 1: Departmental budgetary expenditures by Standard Object (unaudited)
Fiscal year 2025-2026 (in thousands of dollars)
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2025-2026: expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2025
Fiscal year 2024-2025: expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2024
Variance $
Variance %
Personnel
3,470
3,584
(114)
(3%)
Transportation and communications
90
131
(41)
(31%)
Information
5
15
(10)
(67%)
Professional and special services
242
437
(195)
(45%)
Rentals
13
40
(27)
(68%)
Repair and maintenance
5
27
(22)
(81%)
Utilities, materials, and supplies
0
(11)
11
(100%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
0
0
(0)
(0%)
Other subsidies and payments
20
15
(15)
(100%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures
3,825
4,238
(413)
(10%)
Professional and special services
The decrease of $195,000 is due to a decrease in use of several contractors.
Rentals
The decrease of $27,000 is due to the decommissioning of a rental building.
Repair and maintenance
The decrease of $22,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.
Utilities, materials and supplies
The decrease of $11,000 is explained by the faster clearing of the acquisition card suspense account in 2025-26.
Other subsidies and payments
The decrease of $15,000 is explained by a decrease in the recovery of salary overpayments.
Significant changes to year-to-date expenditures
The year-to-date expenditures totalled $13.3 million for an increase of $0.3 million (2%) when compared with $13.0 million spent during the same period in 2024-2025. Table 2 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Table 2: Departmental budgetary expenditures by Standard Object (unaudited) (continued)
Fiscal year 2025-2026 (in thousands of dollars)
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of
dollars)
Fiscal year 2025-26: year-to-date expenditures as of December 31, 2025
Fiscal year 2024-25: year-to-date expenditures as of December 31, 2024
Variance $
Variance %
Personnel
11,213
10,448
765
7%
Transportation and communications
164
266
(102)
(38%)
Information
20
28
(8)
(29%)
Professional and special services
1,858
2,026
(168)
(8%)
Rentals
38
82
(44)
(54%)
Repair and maintenance
27
67
(40)
(60%)
Utilities, materials and supplies
15
29
(14)
(48%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
0
20
(20)
(100%)
Other subsidies and payments
4
56
(52)
(93%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures
13,339
13,022
317
2%
Personnel
The increase in Personnel of $765,000 is due to an increase in both FTEs and average salary per FTE.
Transportation and communications
The decrease of $102,000 is mainly due to a reduction in travel and relocation across the Secretariat.
Rentals
The decrease of $44,000 is attributed to the decommissioning of a rental building, and the timing of invoicing for our HR system.
Repair and maintenance
The decrease of $40,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
The decrease of $20,000 is mainly explained by one-time equipment purchases in 2024-2025.
Other subsidies and payments
The decrease of $52,000 is explained by an overall decrease in the recovery of salary overpayments.
Risks and uncertainties
The funding received to offset pay increases was insufficient to cover such increases and as a result, NSIRA Secretariat will be required to reduce its overall staffing level to remain within budget. Reductions in staffing could cause a reduction in the number of reviews and investigations the Secretariat is able to produce on a yearly basis.
NSIRA Secretariat is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner and continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls.
Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA Secretariat’s approach and timelines for the execution of its mandated activities.
Significant changes in relation to operations, personnel and programs
There has been one new Governor-in-Council appointment during the third quarter, Mr. Yves Côté.
Approved by senior officials:
Charles Fugère Executive Director
Martyn Turcotte Chief Financial Officer
Appendix
Statement of authorities (Unaudited)
Fiscal year 2025-2026 and 2024-2025 (in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2025-2026
Fiscal year 2024–25
Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2026
(note 1)
Used during the quarter ended December 31, 2025
Year to date used at quarter-end
Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2025
(note 1)
Used during the quarter ended December 31, 2024
Year to date used at quarter-end
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures
18,522
3,347
11,908
18,856
3,838
11,821
Budgetary statutory authorities
Contributions to employee benefit plans
1,908
477
1,431
1,601
400
1,201
Total budgetary authorities (note 2)
20,430
3,824
13,339
20,457
4,238
13,022
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Departmental budgetary expenditures by standard object (unaudited)
Fiscal year 2025-2026 and 2024-2025 (in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2025-2026
Fiscal year 2024–25
Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2026 (note 1)
Expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2025
Year-to-date used at quarter-end
Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2025
Expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2024
Year-to-date used at quarter-end
Expenditures
Personnel
14,377
3,469
11,213
14,211
3,584
10,448
Transportation and communications
497
90
164
685
131
266
Information
42
5
20
76
15
28
Professional and special services
4,994
242
1,858
4,617
437
2,026
Rentals
281
13
38
309
40
82
Repair and maintenance
72
5
27
436
27
67
Utilities, materials, and supplies
74
0
15
58
(11)
29
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
93
0
0
65
0
20
Other subsidies and payments
0
0
4
0
15
56
Total gross budgetary expenditures
(note 2)
20,430
3,824
13,340
20,457
4,238
13,022
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Ottawa, Ontario, December 4, 2025 – The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) 2024 Annual Report has been tabled in Parliament.
The report outlines NSIRA’s key achievements and progress, showcasing how the organization has played a vital role in shaping the national security and intelligence review landscape. Through its work, NSIRA fosters public trust, upholds democratic oversight, and safeguards the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.
2024 Review Highlights
In 2024, NSIRA completed nine reviews, including the Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference. Given its public interest, NSIRA determined that the report and its conclusions should be released to Parliament. As such, this review resulted in NSIRA’s first special report tabled under section 40 of the NSIRA Act.
Other key reviews in 2024 included:
Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Human Source Program: Part of a three-part series examining how federal agencies manage and use human sources in national security operations.
The Lifecycle of CSIS’s Warranted Information: Assessed the entire lifecycle of warranted information, from the moment it is collected through processing, analysis, use, storage, and eventual retention or disposal.
Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Accountability Mechanisms: Stemming from a Ministerial referral, NSIRA examined whether CSIS and the Department of Public Safety were effectively supporting Ministerial responsibility.
As of publication of the Annual Report, five of the nine reviews completed in 2024 have been published. Other reviews from 2024 are, as are unpublished reviews from previous years, undergoing processes in relation to redaction of potentially injurious information. NSIRA continues to advance all review reports submitted to the Minister, with additional publications expected upon completion of the redaction processes.
Recommendations, Redactions and Access
In 2024, NSIRA introduced dedicated follow-up cycles to evaluate how departments implement its recommendations. Work is underway to develop new internal tracking tools and protocols to improve awareness, follow-up, and public communications about institutional responses and progress.
While NSIRA has observed encouraging progress in the timeliness and completeness of responses from several reviewees, the Agency and Secretariat have faced ongoing challenges. Tensions persist regarding institutional resistance to NSIRA’s access rights, inconsistent disclosures in response to requests for information, and overbroad or unsubstantiated demands for redactions in access-to-information consultations.
NSIRA is exploring options to provide better real-time public visibility into these challenges to support greater departmental accountability.
2024 Complaints Investigations
From January 1 to December 31, 2024, NSIRA received 79 new complaints, including 67 related to CSIS. Of these, 52 (66%) involved delays in immigration and citizenship security screening. Under sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA, and CSIS advised that the time required can vary based on several factors. As shown in the statistics in the report, many complaints were resolved informally once CSIS completed its screening and issued a letter confirming that its advice had been provided to the requesting department.
NSIRA closed a total of 22 investigations in 2024, with 34 carried into 2025.
Strategic Direction
NSIRA finalized its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, setting clear priorities for the next three years. The plan reaffirms NSIRA’s core values — Independence, Professionalism, Transparency, and Inclusiveness — and serves as a foundation for continuous improvement.
The Agency continues to closely collaborate with domestic and international partners to strengthen its review and investigative capabilities. NSIRA aspires to be a globally recognized centre of excellence and a hub for a professional community dedicated to national security accountability.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA, Review Agency) is pleased to present its 2024 Annual Report, highlighting key achievements, progress, and our direction for coming years.
2024 Key Highlights
In 2024, NSIRA observed a notable increase in the number of complaint investigations linked to immigration security screening delays.
Additionally, NSIRA has released its first Section 40 public interest report this year, marking an important milestone in its mandate. This report underscores NSIRA’s dedication to transparency and accountability in national security matters.
NSIRA’s 2024–2027 Strategic Plan
After five years of operation, NSIRA has developed its triennial strategic plan for 2024-2027, which will guide the Review Agency’s efforts in the coming years. The strategic plan focuses on NSIRA’s commitment to enhancing review; investigating complaints in a timely, fair, and efficient manner; fostering transparency; and strengthening public trust in NSIRA’s rigorous, fully independent review approach to Canada’s national security and intelligence activities.
NSIRA’s Role on the International Stage
NSIRA continues to strengthen its international partnerships, ensuring its work remains informed by, and a contributor to, global best practices in review. By engaging with international counterparts, NSIRA positions Canada as an active leader in upholding democratic values on the global stage.
We would like to thank the staff of NSIRA’s Secretariat for their expertise, efforts and resilience throughout this ambitious year and for their innovation, energy and commitment for the year ahead.
Marie Deschamps Colleen Swords Craig Forcese Matthew Cassar Foluke Laosebikan Jim Chu
Executive summary
Without specialized national security review, much security service conduct would be immunized from scrutiny by reason of national security secrecy. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA)’s raison d’être is to ensure that there is no such immunity. NSIRA has two mandates: conducting national security reviews of security or intelligence activities and conducting investigations of complaints from the public brought against a subset of national security and intelligence services.
In five years of existence, NSIRA has become a robust and professional reviewbody that conducts reviews and investigates public complaints, which reflect thehighest standards and core values of Canadian society: democracy, transparencyand the rule of law.
This 2024 Annual Report outlines the multiple spheres of activity through which NSIRA has contributed meaningfully to shaping the landscape of national security and intelligence review. This work is central to strengthening public trust, ensuring democratic oversight, and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.
Reviews
The Reviews section of this report provides a summary of each of the nine review reports that were approved by Members during 2024, including the Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, which resulted in NSIRA’s first special report tabled under section 40 of the NSIRA Act, where NSIRA determined that releasing the report and its conclusions to Parliament was in the public interest. The review reports that NSIRA presented to the relevant departments and agencies in 2024 contain 67 findings and 45 recommendations.
Complaint Investigations
During the last five months of 2024, NSIRA observed a significant increase of public complaints against CSIS, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening which resulted in NSIRA ingesting an unprecedented number of new complaints.
NSIRA in Context
1.1 About NSIRA
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA, the Review Agency) is an independent entity that reviews and investigates public complaints related to national security or intelligence activities to assess their lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity. NSIRA may have up to seven Members, supported by a Secretariat with expertise in law, technology and national security, and led by an Executive Director appointed by the Governor-in-Council.
NSIRA has two mandates: reviewing Government of Canada national security or intelligence activities and investigating public complaints related to those activities.
NSIRA’s approach in managing its review process is innovative. Review teams are comprised of individuals with diverse skill sets. They execute reviews under the direction of a designated NSIRA member and relevant Secretariat management personnel. Similarly, NSIRA’s model for investigations of complaints relies on an NSIRA Member serving in a quasi-judicial investigative role, supported by legal, registry, and research staff.
1.2 NSIRA’s Vision and Mission
1.3 Unique Functions of NSIRA
NSIRA holds a unique and pivotal position within Canada’s national security accountability framework. With a mandate spanning the entire federal government, NSIRA can review any national security or intelligence activity, irrespective of the department or agency involved. This extensive jurisdiction enables NSIRA to carry out comprehensive, integrated, in-depth reviews of sensitive operations.
NSIRA also functions as a complaint investigation body, primarily examining national security-related allegations against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) closely related to national security, and denials of security clearance by federal departments. These public complaints often involve serious allegations, and NSIRA’s capacity to address them enhances access to justice and the protection of individual rights.
With access to classified and legally privileged information, NSIRA is uniquely equipped to examine whether national security powers are exercised incompliance with Canadian law.
1.4 NSIRA’s Domestic Partnerships
As part of Canada’s national security and intelligence accountability framework, NSIRA and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) serve complementary yet distinct roles. While both play crucial roles in ensuring accountability, they differ in structure and mandate.
NSICOP is a committee of parliamentarians and focuses its reviews on the effectiveness of the national security and intelligence agencies. It is impacted by events such as elections or dissolutions. NSICOP’s makeup makes it uniquely well positioned to examine both the efficacy of the national security and intelligence community, in particular, its legal frameworks, and broad strategic trends across the national security landscape.
NSIRA operates year-round and maintains consistent engagement regardless of the Parliamentary schedule. Its mandate is to focus on the legality and legal compliance of national security and intelligence activities through in-depth reviews that dig down vertically into the operational events conducted on the ground. To deliver on its mandate to investigate complaints, NSIRA’s continuous operations are essential to ensuring that investigations are conducted without delay.
NSIRA and NSICOP both enhance transparency and accountability in national security via their distinct mandates, which ensures a complete approach to independent review. They actively coordinate efforts and avoid duplication. The respective secretariats have established a strong working relationship. Together, NSICOP and NSIRA form a complementary system supporting democratic accountability and continuous legal scrutiny.
NSIRA is committed to working within a system of partnerships with key actors. It is part of a larger network of federal review and accountability bodies and regularly engages with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). These collaborations are about best practices, ensuring aligned mandates, minimizing redundancy, and reinforcing a broader framework of transparency.
1.5 Sustaining an Independent Review Body
NSIRA’s independence is the cornerstone of its credibility and effectiveness as a national security review body. Operating independently from the executive branch, NSIRA conducts impartial and expert reviews of Canada’s most sensitive security and intelligence activities. This institutional autonomy is not just a privilege, it is an attitudinal necessity and a responsibility that NSIRA takes seriously. It’s vital for preserving the integrity of its operations and cultivating public trust.
The NSIRA Act grants access to all information held by reviewed departments, including classified and legally protected information, except for Cabinet confidences. This access allows NSIRA to independently review the legality, necessity, and proportionality of government actions.
NSIRA’s reports, findings, and recommendations are not subject to any editorial control from the prime minister or any other minister, nor are they subject to any editorial control from senior officials. This approach preserves NSIRA’s voice and commitment to transparency and accountability.
To uphold this independence, NSIRA invests in secure digital systems, enhances internal governance, and develops expertise through targeted hiring and training. These initiatives improve the professionalism and integrity of NSIRA’s work.
1.6 Protecting Democracy and Freedoms
NSIRA ensures Canada’s national security activities align with the rule of law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enhancing public confidence in Canada’s national security framework. NSIRA’s role is vital in upholding a national security system based on legality and democratic accountability.
In 2024, NSIRA’s reviews tackled foreign interference, bulk data, and technology-enabled intelligence activities. NSIRA’s findings led to recommendations to keep these powers within legal and ethical limits. By reviewing the extraordinary powers of the national security community, NSIRA plays a vital role in preserving the integrity of the rule of law in Canada.
1.7 Transparency and Engagement
Transparency is a core value at NSIRA, shaping how the Review Agency conducts its work. Increasing public understanding of NSIRA’s work and its findings and recommendations is a fundamental value of the organization. NSIRA aims to ensure that Parliamentarians, media, civil society, academia, and the broader Canadian public remain engaged in its work, enabling them to form their independent views on national security or intelligence issues and to hold government accountable.
In the challenging context of national security operations, absolute public transparency could unfortunately provide adversaries and threat actors with information that might harm Canada’s security interests, as well as those of its allies. NSIRA applies a rigorous balanced approach to release as much information as possible about its work in its commitment to transparency and openness, while safeguarding genuinely injurious national security information.
In 2024, NSIRA enhanced its public reporting efforts by announcing on social media each time a report was submitted to a Minister and by informing the public that reports can be accessed under the Access to Information Act. NSIRA also began publishing backgrounders to provide Canadians with greater clarity on the context of its reviews. As part of its commitment to openness, the Agency launched an updated and more accessible website.
Additionally, in 2024, NSIRA expanded its outreach initiatives to enhance public awareness and understanding of its mandate. NSIRA hosted new events with civil society, media, and academia. These initiatives aimed to deepen the understanding of NSIRA’s role and to foster informed dialogue about NSIRA’s work.
1.8 NSIRA’s Role on the World Stage
NSIRA’s partnerships extend beyond Canada’s borders through its active role in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC). As a permanent member, NSIRA actively collaborates with review agencies from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, fostering robust collaboration and knowledge exchange.
NSIRA has established strong partnerships with European counterparts, including agencies involved in the Intelligence Oversight Working Group made up of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These partnerships transcend routine collaboration, enabling collective learning on review methodologies and facilitating coordinated knowledge exchange on the development of international review best practices.
NSIRA has also been an active collaborator in some initiatives led by certain United Nations divisions that aim to improve global partnerships in the review and oversight sector. This has led to engagement with new international partners, delivery on online training modules, and new contributions to global standards in review.
Through these international engagements, NSIRA plays an active role in shaping a global community of practice that promotes the values of rigorous independent review of national security or intelligence activities.
Highlights on Key Initiatives
2.1 Reviewee Responsiveness
Access to information is fundamental to NSIRA’s ability to conduct effective reviews and investigations. In 2024, NSIRA observed encouraging progress in the responsiveness of several reviewees, particularly regarding the timeliness and completeness of their responses.
Despite these improvements, frustrations persist: overbroad, unsubstantiated or excessive demands for redactions in access to information consultations a reoccurring in every file, inconsistent disclosures in response to requests for information are routine, institutional resistance to NSIRA’s access rights occurs, and outdated departmental information systems at times impede NSIRA’s ability to conduct its work. NSIRA raises these issues with senior departmental officials and escalates to the Minister when necessary, with mixed results. While responsiveness performance varies across departments, it is fair to say that the status quo is one where process challenges regularly challenge NSIRA’s ability to deliver on its mandate. NSIRA is looking at ways to provide better real-time public awareness of its responsiveness challenges so that relevant departments can be held accountable.
2.2 Follow-Up on Recommendations
Monitoring the execution of recommendations is pivotal to NSIRA’s commitment to facilitate systemic improvement. In 2024, NSIRA strengthened its follow-up practices by initiating dedicated review cycles designed to evaluate the implementation of prior recommendations. The timeliness and comprehensiveness of recommendation responses differ among departments and agencies.
To facilitate this endeavour, NSIRA is in the process of developing internal tracking tools and protocols to assist in ensuring more consistent awareness, follow-up, and public communications about institutional responses and progress on NSIRA’s recommendations. NSIRA will continue to make advances in the years to come on this significant initiative.
2.3 Investigations: Volume Increase and Streamlining Processes
In 2024, NSIRA addressed a surge of CSIS-related complaints from the public tied to delays in immigration and citizenship screening. More than half of the new complaints related to such delays. Several of those new complaints resulted in informal resolutions.
NSIRA advanced initiatives to improve and streamline its investigative processes and procedures, as detailed in this report’s Complaint Investigations section.
2.4 Three-Year Strategic Plan
In 2024, NSIRA finalized its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, setting a clear direction for its priorities over the next three years. The plan reaffirms NSIRA’s core values —Independence, Professionalism, Transparency, and Inclusiveness — and serves as a foundation for continuous improvement. It positions both NSIRA and its Secretariat to deliver effective, forward-looking review and investigations of public complaints. NSIRA aims to maintain the highest standards by focusing on contemporary issues, applying rigorous methodologies, delivering on its mandates with impartiality and efficiency, and continuing to modernize NSIRA’s processes and leverage new technologies to accomplish improved outcomes for Canadians.
To support NSIRA’s mission, the strategic plan invests in sustainable corporate infrastructure. This includes fostering a culture of continuous learning and maintaining high standards in information management, security, and human resources. The NSIRA Secretariat strives to be an agile and efficient workplace that attracts and retains top talent.
NSIRA also emphasizes its continued collaboration with domestic and international partners to strengthen its review and investigative capabilities. NSIRA aspires to be a globally recognized centre of excellence and a hub for a professional community dedicated to national security accountability. Through this strategic vision, NSIRA reaffirms its role as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians in an evolving security landscape.
2.5 New Offices Built to High Standards
Between 2021 and 2024, NSIRA’s Secretariat led the planning, development, and delivery of a new office space for its staff. This complex undertaking involved meeting the highest standards of security, functionality, and design, all while supporting NSIRA’s growing operational needs. Despite tight timelines and evolving requirements, the Secretariat successfully transitioned into the new space efficiently, securely, and with minimal disruption to NSIRA’s core mandate.
Reviews
3.1 Overview
NSIRA’s review mandate is outlined in subsection 8(1) NSIRA Act and includes reviewing national security or intelligence activities of CSE and CSIS, as well as those of any other federal departments and agencies.
The review reports presented in 2024 to the relevant departments and agencies contain 67 findings, and NSIRA issued 45 recommendations.
Table 1 lists the reviews that gave rise to the reports produced and submitted to the responsible minister(s) by NSIRA, in 2024.
Table 1. NSIRA review activities during 2024
Review
Department(s)
Status**
22-07—Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Lifecycle of Warranted Information
21-20—Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Human
Source Program
RCMP
Published
22-12—Public Safety and Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Accountability Mechanisms
CSIS, GAC, PS,
DOJ
Published
23-11—Review of FederalInstitutions’ Disclosures
of Information under the Security of Canada
Information Disclosure Act in 2023
PS, CSE, CSIS,
GAC, RCMP, CBSA,
IRCC
Published
24-03—Review of Departmental Implementation of
the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign
Entities Act for 2023
CBSA, CSIS, CSE,
DND/CAF, GAC,
RCMP
Submitted
23-07—Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence
on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign
Interference, 20218-2023
CSIS, RCMP, GAC,
CSE, PS, PCO
Published
**Status as of the writing of this report. A review is marked as “Submitted” when the review report has been approved by NSIRA members and sent to the relevant minister(s).
3.2 CSIS Reviews
22-07—Review of the Lifecycle of CSIS’s Warranted Information
NSIRA examined CSIS’s lifecycle management of data resulting from a specific and novel technical capability used to execute a Federal Court warrant. NSIRA inspected CSIS’s primary collection and processing system to directly observe how data was collected, processed, and managed.
CSIS introduced heightened non-compliance risks when deploying the technical capability with inadequate operational policies and procedures, inadequate data stewardship practices, and inadequate technical systems to handle the resulting data. Consequently, CSIS retained information without a clearly articulated authority.
CSIS did not consult with Public Safety Canada as required by the Ministerial Direction prior to using the novel technology under review. CSIS’s failure to consult may not have been in compliance with the CSIS Act. CSIS mischaracterized the novel technology as an extension of an existing CSIS technology and failed to inform Public Safety Canada in a timely manner. CSIS did not advise the Federal Court of this novel technology.
These shortcomings raised concerns about CSIS’s readiness to assess, prepare for and deploy other novel technologies.
Findings
Recommendations
Reviewee’s Response
[*Technology*] as a Novel Technology
Finding 1. NSIRA found that [*technology*] are a novel technology within CSIS’s suite of technical capabilities.
Finding 2. NSIRA found that [*technology*] introduce a significant expansion of collection capabilities and operational risks.
Finding 3. NSIRA found that CSIS does not have adequate policies and procedures to manage its [*technology*] program.
Finding 4. NSIRA found CSIS did not consult Public Safety Canada in a timely manner regarding its planned use of [*technology*] contrary to the Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service on Accountability issued pursuant to section 6(2) of the CSIS Act. Moreover, CSIS may not be in compliance with section 7(1)(b) of the CSIS Act, which requires the Director to consult with the Deputy Minister when required pursuant to Ministerial Direction.
Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that CSIS establish and maintain adequate policies and procedures to manage its [*technology*] program.
Agree
Data Lifecycle Management
Finding 5. NSIRA found that CSIS incorrectly labelled some data collected during [*operation*] and no quality assurance or compliance process detected this prior to NSIRA’s technical inspection.
Finding 6. NSIRA found that CSIS retained collected information without clearly articulating the authority for its retention.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that CSIS does not adequately consider data stewardship requirements accruing from new collection activities, which introduces heightened non-compliance risks.
Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize investing in technical processes and systems that can assess, ingest, label, use, and destroy data in compliance with its legal obligations.
Agree
Risk Assessment Practices
Finding 8. NSIRA found that CSIS relies on the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to operationalize the 2019 Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on Accountability. However, the 2020 Framework does not fully capture the requirements of the 2019 Ministerial Direction.
Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service be revised to fully align with the 2019 Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on Accountability.
Agree
Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that the definition of “novel technique or technology” in the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service be revised to err on the side of inclusivity.
Agree
Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that CSIS ensure risk assessments performed throughout the lifecycle of new technologies and techniques are rigorous, documented and comprehensive in their scope.
Agree
Operational Technology Review Committee (OTRC)
Finding 9. NSIRA found that the creation of the Operational Technology Review Committee was an important step forward in CSIS’s management of new technologies and techniques.
Recommendation 6. NSIRA recommends that, as part of its ongoing development, the Operational Technology Review Committee refine its processes to:
consider data lifecycle requirements;
reference a definition of “novel technology” that has been agreed upon with Public Safety Canada as part of a revised Framework;
include a requirement to consult Public Safety Canada on plans or proposals to seek or develop novel techniques and technologies;
define how risk is assessed;
better document its technical, legal, foreign policy and reputational risks assessments.
Agree
Execution of Warranted Powers
Finding 10. NSIRA found that, in [*operation*], CSIS intended to [*specific operation details*] beyond warranted targets at a [*location].
Recommendation 7. NSIRA recommends that language in the [*warrant type*] Warrant more clearly describe the breadth and limitations of what constitutes incidental collection.
Partially Agree
Recommendation 8. NSIRA recommends that CSIS specify the warrant authority in the operational planning documents in support of [*sensitive info*] to be sought in the operation.
Agree
Regulations
Finding 11. NSIRA found that CSIS’s [*use of technology*] may not be in compliance with [*specific*] Regulations.
Duty of Candour
Finding 12. NSIRA found that CSIS did not advise the Court prior to using [*technology*] in the execution of warranted powers.
Recommendation 9. NSIRA recommends that the classified version of this report be shared with the Federal Court.
Partially Agree
23-05—Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities (ARSCA-CSIS)
In 2024, NSIRA launched a process called the Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities (ARSCA-CSIS). This review covers a range of operational categories which are either routinely communicated to NSIRA by CSIS under a standalone statutory obligation or are of unique interest to NSIRA due to high legal risks or findings of prior reviews. In previous years, NSIRA conducted annual reviews of CSIS Activities that were primarily focused on NSIRA’s requirement to report annually to the Minister of Public Safety. However, these reviews did not culminate in a final report with findings and recommendations issued pursuant to section 34 of the NSIRA Act. The work completed this year as part of the ARSCA-CSIS is being captured in a final report with findings and recommendations, thereby aligning with NSIRA’s other thematic reviews. The report, which starting this year will be completed annually, will also contain the results of NSIRA’s efforts in reviewing an aspect of the CSIS Threat Reduction Regime. The ARSCA-CSIS report that will provide a high level overview of CSIS activities during the 2024 calendar year has been completed in 2025. Its findings and recommendations will appear in NSIRA’s public annual report for the calendar year 2025.
3.3 CSE Reviews
23-02—Annual Review of Select CSE Activities (ARSCA-CSE)
In 2024, NSIRA launched a process called the Annual Review of Select CSE Activities (ARSCA-CSE). This review covers a range of operational categories which are either routinely communicated to NSIRA by CSE under a standalone statutory obligation, or are of unique interest to NSIRA due to high legal risks or findings of prior reviews. In previous years, NSIRA conducted Annual Reviews of CSE Activities that were primarily focused on NSIRA’s requirement to report annually to the Minister of National Defence. However, these reviews did not culminate in a final report with findings and recommendations issued pursuant to section 34 of the NSIRA Act. The work completed this year as part of the ARSCA-CSE is being captured in a final report with findings and recommendations, thereby aligning with NSIRA’s other thematic reviews. The ARSCA-CSE report that will provide a high level overview of CSE activities during the 2024 calendar year has been completed in 2025. Its findings and recommendations will appear in NSIRA’s public annual report for the calendar year 2025.
23-10—CSE’s Equities Management Framework
NSIRA review of CSE’s Equities Management Framework (EMF) resulted in ten findings and seven recommendations that relate to two areas of concern, as well as several shortcomings related to governance and practices. However, at the time of writing, the full report remains heavily classified. As such, more information regarding this review, along with the related findings and recommendations, will be made available at a later date.
3.4 Other Department Reviews
21-20—RCMP’s Human Source Program
This review was conducted alongside reviews of similar programs at the Canada Border Services Agency and the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces.
NSIRA’s review focused on three areas: risk management, duty of care to human sources, and ministerial direction accountability. NSIRA found that risk assessments were inconsistently applied, leading to varied assessments on source suitability. The RCMP was overly reliant on confidentiality promises and failed to fully consider risks to sources. Risk assessments often prioritized investigative outcomes over the safety of informants and lacked proper documentation.
Additionally, NSIRA found that the RCMP did not exercise the required “special care” when sources operated in sensitive sectors. There were no mechanisms to assess the cumulative impact of such operations. Anecdotal evidence suggested these practices negatively affected both investigations and Canadian society. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.
Findings
Recommendations
Reviewee’s Response
Policy Implementation
Finding 1. NSIRA found that
the RCMP’s dated human
source policy does not provide
a sufficient framework for the
consistent application of the
Source Development Unit
methodology in the proactive
recruitment of human sources.
Recommendation 1. NSIRA
recommends that the RCMP update
its human source policy to include,
at a minimum:
a centralized framework that
requires the Human Source
Program policy centre to
establish:
clear thresholds and
guidance on the appropriate
criteria for the use of
proactive recruitment
methods in national security
investigations,
strong oversight and
accountability by monitoring
and tracking policy
compliance; and
entrenched methodology
principles, including for the conduct of a standardized
approach to the assessment of
risk to human sources in all
national security investigations.
Policy Governance — Risk Assessment
Finding 2. NSIRA found that
the risk assessment for agents
is adequate because it is
comprehensive and details
the management of risk as a
shared responsibility involving
multiple independent
stakeholders.
Findings 3. The risk
assessment framework for
confidential informants is
inadequate. The current
assessments of risk:
are not well
documented and as
such do not provide
adequate or reliable
information to
decision-makers; and
are primarily focused
on operational security
and risk to the
investigation, as
opposed to risk to the
confidential
informants.
Recommendation 2. NSIRA
recommends that the RCMP revise
its risk assessment framework for
confidential informants to require
officers to consider all applicable
risks to the confidential informant,
and to aggregate and document
those risks, thereby providing for a
full accounting.
Agents — Duty of Care and Informed Consent
Finding 4. RCMP’s discharge
of its duty of care toward
agents is satisfactory because
the current process:
considers a wide range of
risks;
ensures that
obligations for
informed consent are
met;
accounts for risk
mitigation measures;
provides for
administrative
interviews; and
includes independent
third party
assessments.
Recommendation 3. NSIRA
recommends that the RCMP adjust
the parameters for the conduct of
agent interviews so that agent
feedback is more descriptive
concerning their experience; and
documented with greater
frequency.
Confidential Informants — Duty of Care and Informed
Consent
Finding 5. NSIRA found that
the RCMP over relies on the
promise of confidentiality and
does not adequately consider
the risk to confidential
informants.
Recommendation 4. NSIRA
recommends that the RCMP
improve its risk assessment
framework for confidential
informants. At a minimum, the
framework should:
consider the safety of the
confidential informant;
consider the particular
circumstances of the
confidential informant;
aggregate information that
allows for the detection of
outstanding vulnerabilities; and
provide for consent from the
confidential informant that is considerate of the risks
involved.
Recommendation 5. NSIRA
recommends that RCMP lower the
threshold to conduct administrative
interviews so they are conducted
with greater regularity and with a
greater proportion of confidential
informants.
Ministerial Direction — National Security Investigations in
Sensitive Sectors
Finding 6. NSIRA found that
the RCMP has not
demonstrated special care in
its national security
investigations in sensitive
sectors, contrary to
obligations under the
Ministerial Direction —
National Security
Investigations in Sensitive
Sectors.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that
the RCMP has an inadequate
framework to ensure the
appreciation of the cumulative
impact of national security
investigations in Canadian
Fundamental Institutions
Recommendation 6. NSIRA
recommends that the RCMP create
a specialized Sensitive Sector Unit
that is responsible for monitoring
and aggregating information on the
RCMP’s activities as they relate to
Canadian Fundamental Institutions,
assessing the impact of these
activities on the community, and
conduct long-term analysis of the
cumulative effects.
3.5 Multi-Departmental Reviews
22-12— Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Accountability Mechanisms (CSIS, GAC, PS, DOJ)
Following a September 2022 referral by the former Minister of Public Safety (PS), NSIRA reviewed whether CSIS’s risk assessment model, Ministerial Direction, and information-sharing mechanisms supported the Minister’s discharge of their responsibilities for CSIS.
Directions to CSIS coming from political level actors—rather than the Minister or the CSIS Director—during an active operation created unnecessary danger for the CSIS team and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation.
CSIS and PS failed to provide timely and accurate information to the Minister, which may result from PS’s dependence on CSIS to identify and receive relevant information. This would inhibit PS’s ability to prepare independent advice to the Minister.
Certain Ministerial Directions to CSIS are subject to inconsistent and contradictory interpretation, which affects their implementation. The report raises a number of issues with the pillars of risk evaluated: operational, legal, foreign policy, and reputational.
Ultimately, the Minister of Public Safety may not be consistently supported and briefed about pertinent CSIS operations, which raises concerns about the possible erosion of ministerial accountability for the CSIS.
Findings
Recommendations
Reviewee’s Response
Accountability and Consequences for Halting the
Operation [*codename*]
Finding 1. NSIRA found
that a decision was made
to halt an active CSIS
operation overseas that
was not made by the CSIS
Director under section 6(1) of the CSIS Act, and for
which there is no written
record of a direction
comingfrom the Minister
of Public Safety under
sections 6(1) or 6(2) of the
CSIS Act.
Recommendation 1. NSIRA
Recommends that whenever there is a
decision affecting an active CSIS
operation, which is not made by the
Director of CSIS or their delegates, it
must come as a direction from the Minister of Public Safety under
section 6(1) of the CSIS Act and should
be accompanied by a written record in
keeping with section 6(2).
Agree
Finding 2. NSIRA found
that [*political-level
actors*] halted an active
operation, creating
unnecessary danger for the
CSIS team [**], and
caused harm to Canada’s
international reputation.
Responsibility for Briefing the Minister About [*codename*]
Findings 3. NSIRA found
that Public Safety and CSIS
failed in their responsibility
to provide timely and
accurate information to
the Minister of Public
Safety about [**] human
source [**] operation.
Public Safety’s Role in Relation to CSIS
Finding 4. NSIRA found
that Public Safety willingly
remains dependent on
CSIS to identify and
receive relevant
information, which inhibits Public Safety’s ability to
prepare independent
advice to the Minister
about the activities and
operations of CSIS.
Recommendation 2. NSIRA
recommends that the Minister of Public
Safety take action to ensure that the
Deputy Minister obtains any information
required to fulfill their responsibility to
provide independent advice to the Minister about the activities and
operations of CSIS.
Partially Agree
Ministerial Direction to CSIS
Findings 5. NSIRA found
that multiple Ministerial
Directions to CSIS are
subject to inconsistent and
contradictory
interpretation by those
responsible for their
implementation.
Recommendation 3. NSIRA
recommends that the Minister of Public
Safety consolidate ministerialdirections
into clear, concise and harmonized
instruments that are derived from
meaningful consultation among those
responsible for their implementation.
Agree
Findings 6. NSIRA found
that when preparing
Ministerial Directions to
CSIS, Public Safety
insufficiently consulted
with Global Affairs Canada
and CSIS.
CSIS’s Risk Assessment Process
Finding 7. NSIRA found
that CSIS’s risk
assessment process has
evolved to become the
central mechanism for
planning operations and
managing associated risks,
and, while it is generally
effective, it lacks clear guidance to employees on
when risk should be
reassessed as operations
evolve.
Legal Pillar
Findings 8. NSIRA found
that legal advice is often
absent from the final risk
assessment record for
CSIS operations.
Recommendation 4. NSIRA
recommends that CSIS, in consultation
with the Department of Justice and
Global Affairs Canada, ensure that legal
risk assessments are comprehensive
and memorialized in writing.
Agree
Findings 9. NSIRA found
that the scope of legal
considerations within legal
risk assessment is underinclusive.
Foreign Policy Pillar
Finding 10. NSIRA found
that Global Affairs Canada
and CSIS do not have a
shared vision with respect
to the role of Global Affairs
Canada in the foreign
policy risk assessment.
Recommendation 5. NSIRA
recommends that any pending changes
to CSIS’s risk assessment process
maintain a robust consultation and
information sharing mechanism between
Global Affairs Canada and CSIS.
Agree
Reputational Pillar
Finding 11. NSIRA found
that Public Safety is not
adequately contributing to
the preparation of reputational risk
assessments.
Recommendation 6. NSIRA
recommends that Public Safety and CSIS
develop a more robust consultation
mechanism for reputational risk
assessment for CSIS operational activities, and that these assessments
account for the risk of discreditingthe
Government of Canada.
Partially Agree
23-11— Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2023 (PS, CSE, CSIS, GAC, RCMP, CBSA, IRCC)
The purpose of this review was to determine whether Government of Canada (GC) institutions complied with the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in 2023. For the first time in SCIDA’s history, NSIRA has found full compliance with the Act, but NSIRA made seven recommendations to mitigate the risks of non-compliance.
Albeit compliant with the SCIDA, some IRCC disclosures presented a risk of non-compliance with SCIDA’s contribution and proportionality tests. The disclosing institution must be satisfied that both tests are met before making a disclosure under the SCIDA. Yet, four disclosures raised concerns with regard to the amount of personal information that IRCC disclosed.
At times, CSIS request letters were unclear, which hindered IRCC’s effort to conclude that the disclosure was authorized. The departments are required to provide information on the accuracy and reliability of the manner the disclosed information was obtained. However, NSIRA found that IRCC provided template statements on accuracy and reliability that were not always relevant.
CBSA’s record of disclosure form contradicts the SCIDA by suggesting that the provision of information on accuracy and reliability is optional.
Findings
Recommendations
Reviewee’s Response
Record Keeping Requirements — Section 9
Finding 1. NSIRA found that every
institution that disclosed or
received information pursuant to
SCIDA in 2023 complied with their
record keeping obligations under
section 9, but some records were
inaccurate or imprecise.
Contribution and Proportionality Tests — Subsection 5(1)
Finding 2. NSIRA found, within the
sample of disclosures reviewed
that disclosing institutions
demonstrated they had satisfied
themselves under the contribution
and proportionality tests in
compliance with subsection 5(1)
of the SCIDA.
Recommendation 1. NSIRA
recommends that disclosing
institutions explicitly address the
requirements of both
paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the
records that they prepare under
paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA.
Agree
Finding 3. NSIRA found that IRCC
did not, in one instance,
independently consider whether
its disclosure related to activities
that fell under the SCIDA
exception for advocacy, protest, or
dissent. Instead, IRCC satisfied
itself of the SCIDA’s contribution
test based on assumptions about
how CSIS assessed activities that
undermine the security of Canada.
Recommendation 2. NSIRA
recommends that IRCC amend their
SCIDA policy to underscore that IRCC
must independently assess whether
the disclosure is authorized. This
assessment should consider whether
the activity amounts to one of the
exceptions to the SCIDA’s definition
of activities that undermine the
security of Canada.
Agree
Finding 4. NSIRA found that,
throughout the course of 2023,
IRCC improved the rigour of its
proportionality assessments
regarding disclosure of passport information. However, NSIRA
identified three instances where
IRCC disclosed visa information
without applying the same
rigorous approach, which risked
disclosing more personal
information than reasonably
necessary in the circumstances.
Recommendation 3. NSIRA
recommends that IRCC apply an
iterative approach to its
proportionality assessments, with a
view to disclosing only the minimum information reasonably necessary in
the circumstances to enable the
recipient institution to further their
investigation.
Agree
Finding 5. NSIRA found that CSIS
requests to IRCC used
inconsistent terminology and were
often unclear about the
relationship between the subject
of the request and its
investigation. At times, this lack of
clear communication hindered
IRCC’s efforts to satisfy itself that
the disclosure was authorized
underthe SCIDA.
Recommendation 4. NSIRA
recommends that CSIS use
consistent terminology, and be clear
about the nature of the link that has
been established between the
subject of a request and its
investigation, to assist IRCC in
satisfying itself of the proportionality
test.
Agree
Reliability and Accuracy Statement — Subsection 5(2)
Finding 6. NSIRA found that
disclosing institutions provided
information regarding the
accuracy of the information and
reliability of the manner in which it
was obtained in relation to all
disclosures. However, CBSA made
one verbal disclosure that did not
include an explicit statement on
accuracy and reliability.
Recommendation 5. NSIRA
recommends that institutions avoid
disclosures whenever
possible. When they must occur,
verbal disclosures should explicitly
convey the requisite information on
accuracy and reliability.
Agree
Finding 7. NSIRA found that
CBSA’s record of disclosure form contradicts the SCIDA by allowing
officials to opt out of providing
information regarding accuracy
and reliability.
Recommendation 6. NSIRA
recommends that CBSA harmonize its record of disclosure form with the
SCIDA, to convey the mandatory
nature of providing information on
accuracy and reliability at the time of
the disclosure.
Agree
Finding 8. NSIRA found that IRCC
used “templated” language to
describe the disclosure’s accuracy
and reliability that was not always
relevant or specific to the
circumstances of the disclosure.
Recommendation 7. NSIRA
recommends that IRCC tailor its
statements on accuracy and
reliability as to ensure that each
disclosure’s statement is specific to
the circumstances of the case.
Agree
Information Sharing Agreement — Subsection 4(c)
Finding 9. NSIRA found that
disclosures between IRCC and
CSE that occurred following the
enactment of their new
information sharing agreement
were compliant with both the
SCIDA and their information¬
sharing agreement.
24-03—Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2023: Mitigation and Armed Conflict (CBSA, CSIS, CSE, DND/CAF, GAC, RCMP)
This review assessed departments’ compliance with the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and their implementation of the ACA’s associated directions (ACA Directions) during the 2023 calendar year. It focused on how departments mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with foreign entities.
NSIRA reviewed a number of cases concerning disclosures to foreign entities engaged in armed conflict and considered how armed conflict affected departments’ ability to mitigate.
Three departments that shared with foreign entities engaged in armed conflict may not have been compliant with the ACA Directions.
A foreign country’s involvement in armed conflict created challenges for departments in meeting their mitigation obligations under the ACA Directions. NSIRA further observed challenges related to disclosures contemplated to serve humanitarian objectives. NSIRA noted that the circumstances of armed conflict left few options for departments pursuing humanitarian objectives to mitigate the risks resulting from sharing.
NSIRA directed departments to conduct a study of information-sharing with the foreign entities of countries engaged in armed conflict to analyze challenges incompliance with the ACA Directions and gaps in the ACA regime. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.
Findings
Recommendations
Reviewee’s Response
Finding 1. NSIRA found that, in
the cases examined, CSIS, GAC,
RCMP, and IRCC’s mitigation
determinations demonstrated
common deficiencies, including:
inadequate design of
mitigation measures to
address the specific risks of
mistreatment present;
insufficient assessment of
caveats and assurances for
clarity and reliability; and
improper incorporation of
external considerations into
the determinations of
whether a substantial risk of mistreatment could be
mitigated.
Finding 2. NSIRA found that, in
the case examined, CSIS may not
have been in compliance with the
ACA Directions, as they were
unlikely to have sufficiently
mitigated a substantial risk of
mistreatment when sharing
information with a foreign entity.
Specifically, CSIS:
relied upon caveats and
assurances that were
inadequately designed to
address the specific risks of
mistreatment present; and
did not resolve substantial
deficiencies that
undermined the reliability of
the caveats and assurances.
Finding 3. NSIRA found that, in
the case examined, GAC’s poor
record-keeping practices
impeded NSIRA’s ability to
determine their compliance with
the ACA Directions.
Finding 4. NSIRA found that, in
the case examined, the RCMP
may not have been in compliance
with the ACA Directions, as they
were unlikely to have sufficiently
mitigated a substantial risk of
mistreatment when sharing
information with a foreign entity.
Specifically, the RCMP relied
upon caveats that were
inadequately designed to
address the specific risks of
mistreatment present.
Finding 5. NSIRA found that, in
the case examined, IRCC may
not have been in compliance with
the ACA Directions, as they were
unlikely to have sufficiently
mitigated a substantial risk of
mistreatment when sharing
information with a foreign entity.
Specifically, IRCC relied upon
measures that were inadequately
designed to address the specific
risks of mistreatment present.
Finding 6. NSIRA found that
many of DND/CAF’s mitigation
practices served to provide
decision-makers with
information necessaryto
determine whether a substantial
risk of mistreatment could be
mitigated.
Recommendation 1. NSIRA
recommends that departmental ACA
risk assessments include thorough
mitigation plans wherever a
substantial risk of mistreatment is
identified. These plans should:
consider whether all mitigation
measures proposed, taken
globally, adequately address the
specific risks alive in the case at
issue and are capable of
sufficiently lesseningthose risks;
evaluate the reliability of any
caveats and assurances
proposed and weigh histories of compliance according to their
quality;
exclude any external
considerations that are not
relevant to the question of
mitigation, including the risk of
not sharing, and strategic or
reputational considerations; and
include a plan to monitor for
indications of mistreatment and
adherence to caveats and
assurances following an
information exchange.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that a
foreign country’s involvement in
armed conflict created
challenges for departments in
meeting their mitigation obligations under the ACA
Directions when seekingto share
information with that country’s
entities.
Recommendation 2. NSIRA
recommends that officials clearly
document how each identified risk
was mitigated prior to disclosing
information to foreign entities.
Finding 8. NSIRA found that the
practicalrealities of compliance
with the ACA Directions can, in
certain circumstances, create a
dilemma for departments
seeking to share for humanitarian
purposes.
23-07—Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, 2018-2023 (CSIS, RCMP, GAC, CSE, PS, PCO)
This review evaluated processes regarding how collected information was shared and escalated to relevant decision-makers, and indicated that there were significant disagreements in the national security and intelligence community as to whether, when, and how to share relevant information.
Three basic schisms existed: CSIS struggled to reconcile competing imperatives given the unique sensitivities of political foreign interference; the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP) Panel were geared toward broad, systematic interference and therefore could not adequately address riding-by-riding interference. PCO and CSIS analysts produced overviews of what they considered to be PRC foreign interference activities, but which the Prime Minister’s National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) saw as recounting standard diplomatic activity.
This challenging situation prompts us to ask how to address the so-called grey zone whereby political foreign interference may stand in close proximity to typical political or diplomatic activity. NSIRA saw evidence of this challenge across the activities under review. NSIRA’s eight recommendations address these deficiencies. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.
Findings
Recommendations
Reviewee’s Response
CSIS’s Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence
on PRC Foreign Interference
in the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections
Finding 1. NSIRA found that
CSIS’s dissemination of
intelligence on political foreign
interference during the 43rd
and 44th federal elections was
inconsistent. Specifically, in
certain instances:
the rationale for decisions
regarding whether, when,
and how to disseminate
intelligence was not clear,
directly affectingthe flow
of information; and
the threat posed by
politicalforeign
interference activities was
not clearly communicated
by CSIS.
Finding 2. NSIRA found that
CSIS’s dissemination and use
of intelligence on political
foreign interference were impacted by the concern that
such actions could interfere, or
be seen to interfere, in the
democratic process.
Finding 3. NSIRA found that
CSIS often elected to provide
verbal briefings as opposed to
written products in
disseminating intelligence on
political foreign interference
duringelections.
Finding 4. NSIRA found that
there was a disconnect within
CSIS between a region and
National Headquarters as to
whether reporting on political
foreign interference was
subject to higher thresholds of
confidence, corroboration and
contextualization for
dissemination.
Recommendation 1. NSIRA
recommends that CSIS develop,
in consultation with relevant
government stakeholders, a
comprehensive policy governing
its engagement with threats
related to political foreign
interference. This policy should:
make explicit CSIS’s
thresholds and practices for
the communication and
dissemination of intelligence
regarding political foreign
interference. This would
include the relevant levels of
confidence, corroboration,
contextualization and
characterization necessary
for intelligence to be
reported;
clearly articulate CSIS’s risk
tolerance for taking action against threats of political
foreign interference;
establish clear approval and
notification processes
(including external
consultations) for all
activities related to
counteringpolitical foreign
interference;
make clear any special
requirements or procedures
that would apply during
election/writ periods, as
necessary, including in
particular procedures for the
timely dissemination of
intelligence about political
foreign interference; and
consider best practices from
international partners (in
particular the Five Eyes)
regarding investigating and
reporting about political
foreign interference.
The SITE Task Force and the CEIPP Panel
Finding 5. NSIRA found that the
SITE Task Force and the CEIPP
Panel were not adequately
designed to address
traditional, human-based
foreign interference.
Specifically:
the SITE Task Force
focuses on threat activities
duringthe election period,
but traditional foreign interference also occurs
between elections;
Findings Recommendations Reviewee’s
Response
Global Affairs Canada’s
representation on the SITE
Task Force focused on
online foreign interference
activities; and
the CEIPP Panel’s high
threshold for a public
announcement is unlikely
to be triggered by
traditional foreign
interference, which
typically targets specific
ridings.
Recommendation 2. NSIRA
recommends that the SITE Task
Force align its priorities with the
threat landscape, including
threats which occur outside of the
immediate election period.
Recommendation 3. NSIRA
recommends that Global Affairs
Canada (GAC) and the Privy
Council Office ensure that GAC’s
representation on the SITE Task
Force leverages the department’s
capacity to analyze and address
traditional, human-based foreign
interference, in addition to the
online remit of the Rapid
Response Mechanism Team.
Recommendation 4. NSIRA
recommends that the Privy
Council Office empower the
CEIPP Panel to develop additional
strategies to address the full
threat landscape during election
periods, including when threats
manifest in specific ridings.
The Flow of Intelligence on PRC Foreign
Interference
Finding 6. NSIRA found that the
limited distribution of some
CSIS and CSE intelligence to
senior officials only reduced
the ability of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police,
Global Affairs Canada, and the
Privy Council Office to
incorporate that intelligence
into their analysis.
Finding 7. NSIRA found that
CSIS and Public Safety did not
have a system for tracking who
received and read specific
intelligence products, creating
unacceptable gaps in
accountability.
Recommendation 5. NSIRA
recommends that, as a basic
accountability mechanism, CSIS
and Public Safety rigorously track
and document who has received
intelligence products. In the case
of highly sensitive and urgent
intelligence, this should include
documenting who has read
intelligence products.
Finding 8. NSIRA found that
the dissemination of
intelligence on political foreign
interference from 2018 to
2023 suffered from multiple
issues. Specifically:
intelligence consumers did
not always understand the
significance of the
intelligence they received
nor how to integrate it into
their policy analysis and
decision-making;
there was disagreement
between intelligence units
and senior public servants
as to whether activities
described in specific
intelligence products
constituted foreign
interference or legitimate
diplomatic activity.
Recommendation 6. NSIRA
recommends that Public Safety
Canada, Global Affairs Canada,
the Privy Council Office, and other
regular consumers of intelligence,
enhance intelligence literacy
within their departments.
Finding 9. NSIRA found that
there was disagreement
between senior public servants
and the NSIA as to whether
intelligence assessments
should be shared with the
political executive. Ultimately,
the NSIA’s interventions
resulted in two products not
reaching the political
executive, includingthe Prime
Minister.
Recommendation 7. NSIRA
recommends that the security
and intelligence community
develop a common, working
understanding of political foreign
interference.
Finding 10. NSIRA found that
the NSIA’s role in decisions
regarding the dissemination of
CSIS intelligence products is
unclear.
Recommendation 8. NSIRA
recommends that the role of the
National Security and Intelligence
Advisor to the Prime Minister,
including with respect to
decisions regarding the
dissemination of intelligence, be
described in a legal instrument.
Complaint Investigations
4.1 Overview
NSIRA is responsible for investigating complaints from members of the public related to national security. These investigations are carried out with consistency, fairness, and timeliness.
NSIRA’s jurisdiction covers complaints regarding activities conducted by CSIS or CSE, national security-related complaints against the RCMP, complaints in relations to security clearance denials and, referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) or under the Citizenship Act.
In 2024, NSIRA continued to investigate a wide range of complaints from previous years, successfully bringing several to a conclusion. NSIRA also initiated many new investigations, including with respect to a large increase in public complaints against CSIS regarding immigration and citizenship security screening, as detailed further below.
Finally, NSIRA continues to implement several initiatives aimed at enhancing and streamlining its processes and procedures.
Increase of complaints against CSIS regarding delays in immigration or citizenship security screening
From August to December 2024, NSIRA observed a significant increase of complaints against CSIS filed pursuant to section 16 of the NSIRA Act, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening. Out of 79 complaints received pursuant to s.16 of the NSIRA Act in 2024, 52 (66%) related to such delays. Of note, under ss. 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA regarding immigration or citizenship applicants. CSIS has advised NSIRA that the time it takes to provide security advice is influenced by several factors, including the prioritization of files, resource limitations, and priorities established by the Government of Canada, such as special immigration measures and humanitarian initiatives in response to crises around the world.
As depicted by the statistics found at the end of the current section, several of these complaints have resulted in informal resolutions. More specifically, upon completion of CSIS’s security screening of a complainant’s citizenship or immigration application, CSIS provides a letter that can be shared with the complainant which indicates that the advice has been provided to the requesting client, and that CSIS’s role is now complete. The complainant may then elect to continue with their complaint or informally resolve it.
4.2 Ongoing Initiatives
NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure govern the process for complaint investigations. While respecting the classified nature of the proceedings, they ensure that parties have the fullest opportunity to participate and make representations, and that all proceedings are conducted as informally and expeditiously as possible.
In 2024, NSIRA continued its internal review of the Rules of Procedure to identify issues and develop proposals for future revisions. The review aims to ensure that all investigations remain accessible, efficient, and procedurally fair.
Specifically, NSIRA also created a new rule on accessibility and accommodations. The rule will enable NSIRA to meet its commitment to identify, remove, and prevent barriers to accessibility to the greatest extent possible. This will help to ensure that those with disabilities can continue to fully participate in the complaint investigation process.
NSIRA also began developing another new rule to create a streamlined process for simplified investigations of non-complex complaints.
4.3 Investigation Report Summaries
Final Reports Issued
Harassment allegations against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(NSIRA File 07-407-13)
The Complainant alleged that RCMP members had shown up unannounced and without a warrant at their home. The Complainant alleged harassment by the said RCMP members during that unexpected visit. The RCMP members went to the Complainant’s home following an anonymous report, according to which the Complainant had made threats against the Prime Minister.
The interaction between the RCMP members and the Complainant was filmed by the bodycam worn by a municipal police officer. The video was submitted as evidence by the RMCP in the NSIRA investigation.
Following a review of the documentary evidence submitted by the RCMP and the Complainant, as well as an investigative interview with the latter, NSIRA found that under the implicit invitation provided by Common Law, the RCMP members had the right to go unannounced and without a warrant to the Complainant’s house to have a discussion with the said Complainant. The purpose of the RCMP members ’visit was to determine whether the Complainant posed a threat to the public and to the Prime Minister, not to substantiate any accusations against the said Complainant or to make an arrest.
NSIRA also found that the RCMP members had not harassed the Complainant during the interaction.
NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated.
Allegations against the Department of National Defence for denial of Top Secret security clearance and revocation of reliability status
(NSIRA File 07-404-30)
The Complainant alleged that, based on their voluntary disclosure during security interviews, they were denied a Top Secret security clearance and had their reliability status revoked, which resulted in their release from the Canadian Forces. NSIRA found that it had no jurisdiction to make findings and recommendations regarding revocation of reliability status and confined its discussion to matters implicating the security clearance decision only.
The Complainant alleged that the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff’s (VCDS) security clearance decision was flawed for several reasons, including that the Complainant’s sexuality influenced the VCDS decision; the VCDS did not take into account the Complainant’s mental health situation and failed to inquire about amental health nexus in their case and provide accommodation; the decision did not meet DND’s security screening standards; the decision was inconsistent with the recommendation offered by the Complainant’s commanding officer; and the decision did not acknowledge a number of considerations that might mitigate the seriousness of the adverse information against the Complainant.
NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. Specifically, NSIRA found that the VCDS decision was not motivated by a concern or consideration of the Complainant’s sexuality or sexual orientation; that in the circumstances, no duty to accommodate was triggered for the purposes of the VCDS decision based on the Complainants mental health situation; that were unsubstantiated the allegations that the VCDS failed to meet security screening standards and that DND failed to properly review the surrounding circumstances; that the assertion that the VCDS decision was improper because it was inconsistent with the Complainant’s commanding officer’s recommendation was unsubstantiated; and that the Complainant’s other allegations, including those with respect to considerations that might mitigate the seriousness of the adverse information against them, did not individually or collectively render the decision unreasonable. In addition, NSIRA found no violation of procedural fairness.
However, NSIRA observed that certain exculpatory information was excluded from the Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) before the decision-maker and recommended that this practice be rectified in the future. However, this omission did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness in the circumstances.
Allegations against CSIS for racial profiling, interrogation and harassment, information-sharing with foreign agencies, travel difficulties, and citizenship issues
(NSIRA File 07-403-05)
The Complainant alleged that CSIS had been racially profiling them; that CSIS agents harassed and interrogated them on multiple occasions; that CSIS shared information about them with foreign countries, leading to them having travel difficulties; that CSIS was responsible for their travel difficulties; and that CSIS put their citizenship application on hold.
SIRC took jurisdiction of this complaint in 2018, and when NSIRA came into force in2019, this investigation was deemed to be continued before NSIRA.
In the investigative report, NSIRA provided clarity on the standard of review in section 16 complaints — namely, that NSIRA is charged with making findings and recommendations with respect to legality, reasonableness, and necessity in the exercise of CSIS’s powers. In gauging reasonableness and necessity, the Member adopted an objective standard: would a reasonable person charged with exercising CSIS’s mandates and apprised fully of the facts, as were available to CSIS, conclude that CSIS’s exercise of its powers was necessary and proportional?
On the facts of this investigation, NSIRA found that the allegations were unsubstantiated, but made several recommendations. The recommendations addressed observations concerning how CSIS manages the aftermath of section 12 investigations and the circumstances in which CSIS should retract or correct information that it shared with foreign agencies.
Allegations against CSIS for conspiracy, electronic surveillance, travel difficulties, information sharing, and unlawful conduct
(NSIRA File 07-403-69)
The Complainant alleged that CSIS directed an unlawful seizure of their property in 2011; unlawfully shared information with Canadian and foreign authorities; conspired with government departments; harassed, surveilled, targeted, and intercepted their phone calls; acted unlawfully and breached their human or Charter rights. In addition, the Complainant alleged that they had issues reentering Canada after the impugned seizure took place due to CSIS’s activities. NSIRA found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
Allegations against CSE for breach of consent and procedural fairness as part of security screening and hiring processes
(NSIRA File 07-406-04)
The Complainant alleged that, as part of their security screening and hiring processes at CSE, CSE breached their consent and procedural fairness; squandered government resources; failed to use approved security screening tools that have been approved by TBS and undergone the required Privacy Impact Assessment; received verbal disclosures or slander from the Complainant’s former employer regarding their character; harassed them; denied them a security clearance; and cited suitability concerns as a technique to circumvent NSIRA’s jurisdiction under section 18 of the NSIRA Act with respect to complaints related to denials of security clearances.
NSIRA concluded that the Complainant’s first allegation that CSE had breached their consent, and more specifically that CSE improperly used information the Complainant disclosed during their security interview for human resources and suitability purposes, was supported. The consent form signed by the Complainant in preparation for the security interview only contemplated the collection of information for the purpose of obtaining a security clearance. The evidence before NSIRA revealed that the Complainant was not advised prior to the security interview that the information collected could have been subsequently used for other purposes, including to assess their suitability for employment. Accordingly, NSIRA found that CSE had not complied with section 7 of the Privacy Act.
With respect to the Complainant’s remaining allegations against CSE, NSIRA found that they were unsubstantiated by the evidence.
In its Final Report, NSIRA issued two recommendations:
That CSE review the consent form that is presented to and signed by candidates prior to a security interview as part of the security screening process, and amend it accordingly; and
That CSE consider undertaking a Privacy Impact Assessment of its security interview questionnaire if one has not been conducted yet.
Allegations against CSIS for racism/racial profiling, harassment, slander, information-sharing with foreign agencies, travel difficulties
(NSIRA File 07-403-12)
The Complainant alleged that CSIS subjected them to harassment, racial profiling, and slander. The Complainant suggests that they were targeted because of their racial or ethnic background, legitimate political opinions, and due to their work as a confidential police informant. They suggested that, due to CSIS’s conduct, they had social, psychological and financial hardship, and difficulty travelling.
SIRC took jurisdiction of this complaint in January 2019, and when NSIRA came into force in July 2019, this investigation was deemed to be continued before NSIRA.
NSIRA found the Complainant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. Specifically, it found that CSIS did not unlawfully investigate the Complainant or engage in racial profiling; did not target the Complainant because of their activities as a confidential police informant; did not slander or defame the Complainant, damage their reputation or sabotage their relationships; did not harass the Complainant or conduct interviews with them in an unlawful or unreasonable manner; did not unlawfully or unreasonably share information about the Complainant with foreign agencies or collude with them to interfere with their travel; did not breach the Complainant’s privacy rights under the Charter; and did not unlawfully retain personal information.
4.4 Other Outcomes
Allegations against CSIS’s role in delaying security assessment regarding immigration or citizenship applications
A number of Complainants filed complaints against CSIS alleging that CSIS caused a significant delay in providing security screening advice for their immigration or citizenship applications. CSIS provided letters to NSIRA that could be shared with the Complainants advising them that CSIS had provided its advice to the requesting client and that CSIS’s role in the security screening process was complete. As the Complainants’ main allegations against CSIS were in relation to the delay in the security screening, NSIRA inquired with the Complainants as to whether they wished to resolve their complaints in light of the update received. In the above-referenced files, the Complainants informed NSIRA that they did not wish to proceed with an investigation into their respective complaints against CSIS. As such, the matters were informally resolved in accordance with Rule 10.10 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure or withdrawn.
Deemed abandonment of complaint against a government department for denial of security clearance resulting rescinded job offer
(NSIRA File 07-404-25)
The Complainant alleged that, after being offered employment by a Government of Canada department conditional upon obtaining a Reliability and Secret clearance, they were denied said clearance because of a residency issue. The Complainant alleged that this was an inaccurate application of clearance policies, and that the employment offer was rescinded after the Complainant indicated that they would pursue the matter further.
NSIRA found the complaint to be deemed abandoned according to Rule 15.02 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure, following its reasonable attempts to communicate with the Complainant who refrained from participating in the process.
Informal resolution of a complaint regarding the denial of a security clearance
(NSIRA File 07-404-37)
The Complainant alleged that they were denied employment with an agency in the Government of Canada due to the denial of the required Top Secret security clearance. The Complaint alleged that the decision was based on inaccurate information and that the agency disregarded exculpatory information that the Complainant provided to correct the inaccuracies. The Complainant also alleged that they had a pending Secret security clearance application with another department that was unreasonably delayed.
Following an informal resolution meeting facilitated by NSIRA and attended by the Complainant and responding government agency, the parties asked NSIRA to place the investigation into abeyance pending the outcome of the Complainant’s Secret security clearance application. NSIRA granted the request. The Complainant subsequently informed NSIRA that they received their Secret security clearance and no longer wished to proceed with the complaint. NSIRA accepted the informal resolution.
4.5 Statistics on Complaint Investigations
January 1–December 31, 2024
INTAKE INQUIRIES
142
New complaints filed
79
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act),
section 16, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS)
complaints
NSIRA Act, section 19, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
referred complaints
10
Citizenship Act, section 19
0
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals)
0
Decision on jurisdiction to investigate
Accepted
Declined
Withdrawn
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints
22
10
7
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints
0
3
0
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances
0
2
0
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints
3
2
0
Total
25
17
7
Active investigations as of December 31, 2024
34
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints
23
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints
0
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances
4
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints
7
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals)
0
Informal resolution in progress as of December 31, 2024
2
NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints)
2
NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints)
0
NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances)
0
NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints)
0
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals)
0
Total investigations closed
22
Abandoned
Final Report
Resolved Informally
Withdrawn
NSIRA Act, section 16, (CSIS complaints)
0
3
14
0
NSIRA Act, section 17, (CSE complaints)
0
1
0
0
NSIRA Act, section 18, (security clearances)
1
1
1
0
NSIRA Act, section 19, (RCMP referred complaints)
0
1
0
0
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals)
0
0
0
0
Total
1
6
15
0
Investigations carried to the next calendar year
34
NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints)
23
NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints)
NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances)
4
NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints)
7
Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals)
0
Looking Ahead
5.1 Advancing NSIRA’s Vision
NSIRA’s vision — an accountable, transparent, and effective national security and intelligence community that upholds the rule of law — has guided every aspect of the Review Agency’s work in 2024. Through expanded transparency initiatives, timely public reporting, and continuous methodological refinement, NSIRA has demonstrated its commitment to achieving this vision. Whether through public-facing communications, the release of unclassified/redacted materials, or the ongoing enhancement of its website, NSIRA has remained focused on building public trust.
With the finalization of its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, NSIRA has established a clear framework for advancing its mandate in the years ahead. The coming year will focus on strengthening the Review Agency’s core activities by enhancing review capacity and output, deepening subject-matter expertise, and expanding on the agility of complaint investigations.
Guided by its strategic priorities, NSIRA will place greater emphasis on proactive engagement. This includes increased outreach to the media, academic, civil society, parliamentarians, and domestic oversight bodies such as Agents of Parliament. NSIRA also aims to strengthen its relationships with international counterparts to continue sharing best practices and contribute to global efforts in national security accountability. These initiatives will support NSIRA’s continued evolution as a modern, transparent, and effective review body well positioned to meet the challenges of 2025 and beyond.
Annexes
Annex A: Abbreviations
Abbreviations and Full Names
Abbreviation
Full Name
ACA
Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act
ARSCA-CSE
Annual Review of Select CSE Activities
ARSCA-CSIS
Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities
CAF
Canadian Armed Forces
CBSA
Canada Border Services Agency
CEIPP
Critical Election Incident Public Protocol
CHRC
Canadian Human Rights Commission
CSE
Communications Security Establishment
CSIS
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DND
Department of National Defence
FIORC
Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council
GAC
Global Affairs Canada
IRCC
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
NSICOP
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
NSIRA
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
OPC
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
PCO
Privy Council Office
PS
Public Safety
RCMP
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCIDA
Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
SIGINT
Signals Intelligence
SITE
Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections
TRA
Threat and risk assessment
TRM
Threat reduction measure
VCDS
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Sigle/acronyme
Dénomination
AMC
Affaires mondiales Canada
ASFC
Agence des services frontaliers du Canada
BCP
Bureau du Conseil privé
CCDP
Commission canadienne des droits de la personne
CPSNR
Comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le
renseignement
CPVPC
Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée du Canada
CSERCC
Conseil de surveillance et d’examen du renseignement de la
Collectivité des cinq
CST
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
EACAC-CST
Examen annuel de certaines activités du CST
EACAS-SCRS
Examen annuel de certaines activités du SCRS
EMR
Évaluation de la menace et des risques
FAC
Forces armées canadiennes
GRC
Gendarmerie royale du Canada
IRCC
Immigration, Réfugiés et Citoyenneté Canada
LCISC
Loi sur la communication d’information ayant trait à la sécurité du
Canada
LECCMTIEE
Loi visant à éviter la complicité dans les cas de mauvais
traitements infligés par des entités étrangères
MDN
Ministère de la Défense nationale
MJ
Ministère de la Justice
MRM
Mesure de réduction de la menace
MSRE
Menace en matière de sécurité et de renseignements visant les
élections
OSSNR
Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité
nationale et de renseignement
PPIEM
Protocole public en cas d’incident électoral majeur
The statistics and data below are provided as per NSIRA’s historical practice of including general data received annually from CSIS and CSE. NSIRA has not independently verified or assessed the numbers. Starting next year, such statistical data will be reproduced with the value added of NSIRA analysis and commentary as part of the summaries of the ARSCA-CSIS and ARSCA-CSE review reports.
CSIS Statistics and Data
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Total Warrant Applications
24
15
31
28
30
28
Total Warrants issued by the Court
23
15
31
28
30
27
New Warrants
9
2
13
6
9
5
Replacements
12
8
14
14
10
13
Supplemental
2
5
4
8
11
9
Total Denied Warrants
1
0
0
0
0
1
Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Note: The warrant statistics found here represent the total number of warrant
applications made to the Federal Court, independent of the actual number of warrants granted in each
application or the number of individuals who were the subject of warrants.
Total Number of Approved and Executed Threat Reduction Measures 2019-2024
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Approved TRMs
24
11
23
16
14
11
Executed TRMs
19
8
17
12
19
15
Warranted TRMs
0
0
0
0
0
1
Source: CSIS (NSIRA independently verified these numbers)
Total Number of CSIS Targets, 2019-2024
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Number of Targets
467
360
352
340
323
389
Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verified these numbers)
Evaluation and Retention of Publicly Available, Canadian, and Foreign Datasets by CSIS, 2019-2024
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Publicly Available Datasets
Evaluated
9
6
4
4
2
2
Retained
9
6
2
4
2
2
Canadian Datasets
Evaluated
0
0
2
0
1
0
Retained
0
0
0
2
0
0
Foreign Datasets
Evaluated
10
0
0
2
1
2
Retained
0
1
1
1
3
4
Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verify this information).
Note: Datasets collected and evaluated in one year may receive ministerial, judicial or
other authorization in subsequent years. In addition, datasets may be retained for multiple years as
per the CSIS Act.
Authorizations, Commissions, and Directions Under CSIS’s Justification Framework, 2019-2024
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Commissions by employees
1
39
51
61
47
34
Authorizations
49
147
178
172
172
175
Directions to Commit
15
84
116
131
116
128
Emergency Designations
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: CSIS
Total Number of Non-Compliance Incidents Processed by CSIS, 2019-2024
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Processed incidents
Administrative
–
53
64
42
48
54
Operational
40
19
21
17
31
28
Total
53
99
85
59
79
82
Breakdown of Non-compliance (all categories counted)
Canadian Law
–
–
1
2
4
5
CSIS Act
–
–
–
–
–
3
Charter
–
–
6
5
15
14
Warrant Conditions
–
–
6
3
11
13
CSIS Governance
–
–
8
15
27
25
Source: CSIS
Note: According to CSIS, each compliance instance was factored in all the categories in
which it was non-compliant. As a result, the sum of instances may exceed the total number.
Ministerial Authorizations
Name of ministerial authorization
Enabling section of CSE Act
Number of Authorizations Issued in 2024
Foreign Intelligence Authorization
26(1)
3
Cybersecurity Authorization for Federal and Non-Federal Infrastructures
27(1) and 27(2)
4
Defensive Cyberoperations Authorization
29(1)
1
Active Cyberoperations Authorization
30(1)
3
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Ministerial authorizations issued in 2024
Ministerial Orders
Name of ministerial order
Enabling section of CSE Act
Designating Recipients of Canadian
Identifying Information Used, Analyzed or
Retained Under a Foreign Intelligence
Authorization
43
Designating Recipients of Information
Relatingto a Canadian or Person in
Canada Acquired, Used or Analyzed Under
the Cybersecurity and Information
Assurance Aspects of the CSE Mandate
44
Designating Electronic Information and
Information Infrastructures of Importance
to the Government of Canada
21
Designating Electronic Information and
Information Infrastructures of Ukraine as of
Importance to the Government of Canada
21
Designating Electronic Information and
Information Infrastructures of Latvia as of
Importance to the Government of Canada
21
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Ministerial authorizations issued in 2024
Canadian Identifying Information
Type of request
Number of requests
received
Government of
Canada requests
909
Five Eyes requests
78
Non-Five Eyes
requests
6
Total
993
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Requests for disclosure of Canadian IdentifyingInformation related to Fl, 2024
Disclosure type
Number of requests
Victim notifications
2,221
Disclosure to partners
9
Total
2,230
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Disclosures of Canadian IdentifyingInformation related to Cybersecurity, 2024
Privacy Incidents
Type of incident
2024
Privacy incidents
75
Second-party privacy incidents
44
Non-privacy compliance incidents
13
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Privacy and non-privacy compliance incidents related to CSE’s Fl mandate, 2024
Type of incident
2024
Privacy incidents
31
Non-privacy compliance incidents
9
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Privacy and non-privacy compliance incidents related to CSE’s Cybersecurity mandate,
2024
Technical and Operational Assistance
Received
Approved
Denied
Cancelled
48
49
2
2
Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)
Requests for technical and operational assistance, 2024.
This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards, GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2025–2026 Main Estimates
This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament. Established in July 2019, NSIRA reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary. The Agency also investigates complaints from members of the public on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security-related complaints, independently and in a timely manner.
The NSIRA Secretariat supports the Agency in the delivery of its mandate. Independent scrutiny contributes to strengthening the accountability framework for national security and intelligence activities and to enhancing public confidence. Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable, and necessary.
This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the agency’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the agency, consistent with the 2025–2026 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special-purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.
The authority of Parliament is required before money can be spent by the government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authorities for specific purposes.
The Department uses the full accrual method of accounting to prepare and present its annual departmental financial statements that are part of the departmental results reporting process. However, the spending authorities voted by Parliament remain on an expenditure basis.
Highlights of the fiscal quarter and fiscal year-to-date results
This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended September 30, 2025.
NSIRA Secretariat spent approximately 47% of its authorities by the end of the second quarter, compared with 45% in the same quarter of 2024–2025 (see graph 1).
Graph 1: Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q2 2025–2026 and Q2 2024–2025 (in millions of dollars)
Text version of Figure 1
Comparison of total authorities and total net budgetary expenditures, Q2 2025–2026 and Q2 2024–2025 (in millions of dollars)
2025-26
2024-25
Total Authorities
$20.4
$19.5
Q2 Expenditures
$5.1
$5.3
Year-to-Date Expenditures
$9.5
$8.8
Significant changes to authorities
As of September 30, 2025, Parliament had approved $20.4 million in total authorities for use by NSIRA Secretariat for 2025–2026 compared with $19.5 million as of September 30, 2024, for a net increase of $0.9 million or 4.6% (see graph 2).
Graph 2: Variance in authorities as of September 30, 2025 (in millions of dollars)
Text version of Figure 2
Variance in authorities as of September 30, 2025 (in millions of dollars)
Fiscal year 2024-25 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2025
Fiscal year 2025-26 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2026
Vote 1 – Operating
17.9
19.5
Statutory
1.6
1.9
Total budgetary authorities
19.5
20.4
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
The increase of $0.9 million in authorities is mostly explained by salary top-ups from Treasury Board Secretariat for updated collective bargaining agreements.
Significant changes to quarter expenditures
The second quarter expenditures totalled $5.1 million for a decrease of $0.2 million when compared with $5.3 million spent during the same period in 2024–2025. Table 1 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Table 1: Departmental budgetary expenditures by Standard Object (unaudited)
Fiscal year 2025-2026 (in thousands of dollars)
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2025-2026: expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2025
Fiscal year 2024-2025: expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2024
Variance $
Variance %
Personnel
3,674
3,856
(182)
(5%)
Transportation and communications
28
77
(49)
(64%)
Information
15
7
8
114%
Professional and special services
1,346
1,320
26
2%
Rentals
24
17
7
41%
Repair and maintenance
6
37
(31)
(84%)
Utilities, materials, and supplies
11
12
(1)
(8%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
0
8
(8)
(100%)
Other subsidies and payments
2
(38)
40
(105%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures
5,106
5,296
(190)
(4%)
Transportation and communications
The decrease of $49,000 is due to a reduction in travel and relocation across the department.
Repair and maintenance
The decrease of $31,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.
Other subsidies and payments
The increase of $40,000 is explained by a increase in the recovery of salary overpayments.
Significant changes to year-to-date expenditures
The year-to-date expenditures totalled $9.5 million for an increase of $0.7 million (8%) when compared with $8.8 million spent during the same period in 2024-2025. Table 2 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Table 2: Departmental budgetary expenditures by Standard Object (unaudited) (continued)
Fiscal year 2025-2026 (in thousands of dollars)
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of
dollars)
Fiscal year 2025-26: year-to-date expenditures as of September 30, 2025
Fiscal year 2024-25: year-to-date expenditures as of September 30, 2024
Variance $
Variance %
Personnel
7,744
6,864
880
13%
Transportation and communications
74
135
(61)
(45%)
Information
15
13
2
15%
Professional and special services
1,616
1,589
27
2%
Rentals
25
42
(17)
(40%)
Repair and maintenance
22
40
(18)
(45%)
Utilities, materials and supplies
15
40
(25)
(63%)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
0
20
(20)
(100%)
Other subsidies and payments
4
41
(37)
(90%)
Total gross budgetary expenditures
9,515
8,784
731
8%
Personnel
The increase in Personnel of $880,000 is due to an increase in both FTEs and average salary per FTE.
Transportation and communications
The decrease of $61,000 is mainly due to a reduction in travel and relocation across the department.
Rentals
The decrease of $17,000 is attributed to the decommissioning of a rental building, and the timing of invoicing for our HR system.
Repair and maintenance
The decrease of $18,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.
Utilities, materials and supplies
The decrease of $25,000 is due to faster acquisition card reconciliation, resulting in a decrease in the MasterCard suspense account.
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
The decrease of $20,000 is mainly explained by one-time equipment purchases in 2024-2025.
Other subsidies and payments
The decrease of $37,000 is explained by an overall decrease in the recovery of salary overpayments.
Risks and uncertainties
The funding received to offset pay increases was insufficient to cover such increases and as a result, NSIRA Secretariat will be required to reduce its overall staffing level to remain within budget. Reductions in staffing could cause a reduction in the number of reviews and investigations the Secretariat is able to produce on a yearly basis.
NSIRA Secretariat is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner and continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls.
Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA Secretariat’s approach and timelines for the execution of its mandated activities.
Significant changes in relation to operations, personnel and programs
There have been no changes to the NSIRA Secretariat Program.
Approved by senior officials:
Charles Fugère Executive Director
Martyn Turcotte Chief Financial Officer
Appendix
Statement of authorities (Unaudited)
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2025-2026
Fiscal year 2024–25
Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2026
(note 1)
Used during the quarter ended September 30, 2025
Year to date used at quarter-end
Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2025
(note 1)
Used during the quarter ended September 30, 2024
Year to date used at quarter-end
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures
18,522
4,629
8,561
17,857
4,895
7,983
Budgetary statutory authorities
Contributions to employee benefit plans
1,908
477
954
1,601
401
801
Total budgetary authorities (note 2)
20,430
5,106
9,515
19,458
5,296
8,784
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Departmental budgetary expenditures by standard object (unaudited)
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2025-2026
Fiscal year 2024–25
Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2026 (note 1)
Expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2025
Year-to-date used at quarter-end
Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2025
Expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2024
Year-to-date used at quarter-end
Expenditures
Personnel
14,377
3,674
7,744
13,205
3,856
6,864
Transportation and communications
497
28
74
685
77
135
Information
42
15
15
76
7
13
Professional and special services
4,994
1,346
1,616
4,624
1,320
1,589
Rentals
281
24
25
309
17
42
Repair and maintenance
72
11
15
436
37
40
Utilities, materials, and supplies
74
11
15
58
12
40
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
93
0
0
65
8
20
Other subsidies and payments
0
2
4
0
(38)
41
Total gross budgetary expenditures
(note 2)
20,430
5,106
9,515
19,458
5,296
8,784
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
This departmental results report details NSIRA Secretariat’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results outlined in its 2024–25 Departmental Plan.
NSIRA Secretariat identified the following key priorities for 2024-25:
Complete all mandatory reviews such as those required under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, the review of threat reduction measures, and any newly issued or significantly amended ministerial directions.
Maintain a consistent and thorough review process for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). This will ensure ongoing scrutiny of their activities for reasonableness, necessity and compliance with the law.
Meet or exceed NSIRA’s established service standards for the timely, fair, and transparent investigation of complaints. Continuously refine investigative processes to enhance responsiveness and procedural clarity.
Provide detailed and timely reporting on disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). This supports accountability, transparency, and the appropriate sharing of information within the federal security and intelligence community.
Successfully transition into NSIRA’s purpose-built facilities, ensuring secure and efficient operations, as well as improved management of classified information in alignment with Government of Canada security standards.
Enhance collaboration with domestic and international review bodies and Agents of Parliament through partnerships, joint activities, and knowledge sharing to strengthen NSIRA’s global review and investigation functions.
Highlights for NSIRA Secretariat in 2024-25
Total actual spending (including internal services): $18,839,589
Total full-time equivalent staff (including internal services): 87
For complete information on NSIRA Secretariat’s total spending and human resources, read the Spending and human resources section of its full departmental results report.
Summary of results
The following provides a summary of the results the department achieved in 2024-25 under its main areas of activity, called “core responsibilities.”
Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Actual spending: $10,856,293
Actual full-time equivalent staff: 58
Ministers and Canadians are informed about the lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity of national security and intelligence activities undertaken by the Government of Canada institutions.
In the 2024–25 fiscal year, the NSIRA Secretariat supported NSIRA’s mandate by completing all legislated reviews. These included reviews of Governor in Council directions under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, a focused examination of a CSIS threat reduction measure, and reviews of new or significantly amended ministerial directions. NSIRA also reported on disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act.
The NSIRA Secretariat supported NSIRA in completing of 8 (eight) national security and intelligence reviews over the 2024-25 fiscal year. A total of 13 (thirteen) Government of Canada organizations were subject to review and 7 (seven) Ministers received one or more of the NSIRA reports approved by members in the same fiscal year.
Results achieved:
6 section 34 ministerial reports
3 section 35 non-compliance reports
1 section 39 report on disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
For more information on how Ministers and Canadians are informed about the lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity of national security and intelligence activities conducted by the Government of Canada institutions, refer to the ‘Results – what we achieved” section of the departmental results report.
National security related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner
The NSIRA Secretariat achieved a 100% success rate in meeting the service standards developed in the previous year.. The Secretariat enhanced its investigative methods to improve speed, fairness, and transparency, resolving numerous formal investigations and informal complaints. This effort strengthened NSIRA’s role in providing accessible and impartial remedies for individuals. NSIRA’s efficiency improved by completing five formal investigations and resolving twelve complaints informally.
For more information on the NSIRA Secretariat’s National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations read the ‘Results – what we achieved” section of its departmental results report.
From the Executive Director
I am pleased to present the Departmental Results Report for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Secretariat for the fiscal year 2024-25. This year, the Secretariat met its objectives by supporting NSIRA in conducting thorough and meaningful reviews, while maintaining the timeliness of complaint investigations. We have built on our past achievements, significantly increasing our capacity and expertise across all areas of our operations.
In 2024-25, the NSIRA Secretariat conducted numerous national security and intelligence reviews, producing high-quality expert reports. These included ministerial reports, compliance reports, and annual reports for tabling in Parliament. The reviews covered various Government of Canada agencies and were shared with senior government officials.
Our outreach and collaboration initiatives have strengthened NSIRA’s domestic and international partnerships, reinforcing relationships with Canadian review bodies, Agents of Parliament, and various international counterparts. The Secretariat was pivotal in hosting several key partners and facilitating the exchange of best practices. This year, we also deepened our connections with European partners and participated in international oversight and review activities.
Concerning complaint investigations, the NSIRA Secretariat has continued to support the agency in enhancing our investigative processes, prioritizing timeliness, efficiency, and transparency. This focus has allowed us to ensure investigations are conducted fairly and promptly, leading to increased efficiency and resulting in numerous formal investigations and informal resolutions. The ongoing implementation of our service standards for investigative processes has proven to be highly successful.
Operationally, the NSIRA Secretariat reached a significant milestone by successfully moving into a purpose-built facility. This transition has enhanced NSIRA’s security and capacity, enabling more effective operations and the management of classified information in accordance with Government of Canada standards. The move ensured continuity of operations while reinforcing NSIRA’s resilience and modernization.
I would like to sincerely thank all NSIRA Secretariat employees for their steadfast dedication and commitment to our mission. Their efforts ensure that our work upholds the highest standards, and that Government of Canada security and intelligence activities are independently reviewed for legal compliance, reasonableness and necessity through expert scrutiny and assessment.
Results: what we achieved
Core responsibilities and internal services
Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints
Internal services
Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
In this section
Description
Quality of life impacts
Progress on results
Details on results
Key risks
Resources required to achieve results
Program inventory
Description
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. It investigates complaints from members of the public regarding activities of CSIS, CSE or the national security activities of the RCMP, as well as certain other national security-related complaints. This independent scrutiny contributes to the strengthening of the framework of accountability for national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions and supports public confidence in this regard.
Quality of life impacts
NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibility relates most closely to the indicator ‘confidence in institutions’, within the ‘democracy and institutions’ subdomain and under the overarching domain of ‘good governance’.
Progress on results
This section details the department’s performance against its targets for each departmental result under Core responsibility 1: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations.
Table 1: Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary
Table 1 shows the target, the date to achieve the target and the actual result for each indicator under
Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by
Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary in the last three fiscal years.
Departmental Result Indicator
Target
Date to achieve target
Actual Results
All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis
100% completion of mandatory reviews
December 2022
2022–23: 100%
2023–24: 100%
2024–25: 100%
Reviews of national security or
intelligence activities of at least
five departments or agencies are
conducted each year
At least one national
security or intelligence
activity is reviewed in
at least five
departments or
agencies annually
December 2022
2022–23: 100%
2023–24: 100%
2024–25: 100%
All Member-approved high
priority national security or
intelligence activities are
reviewed over a three-year
period
100% completion over
three years; at least
33% completed each
year
December 2022
2022–23: 33%
2023–24: 33%
2024–25: 33%
Table 2: National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner
Table 2 shows the target, the date to achieve the target and actual result for each indicator under
National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner in the last three
fiscal years.
Departmental Result Indicator
Target
Date to achieve target
Actual Results
Percentage of investigations
completed within NSIRA service
standards
90% – 100%
March 2024
2022–23: N/A
2023–24: 100%
2024–25: 100%
Note: The NSIRA Secretariat was created on July 12, 2019. Actual results for 2022-23 are not available because the new Departmental Results Framework in the changeover from the Security Intelligence Review Committee to the NSIRA Secretariat was being developed. This new framework is for measuring and reporting on results achieved starting in 2023-24.
The following section describes the results for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations in 2024–25 compared with the planned results set out in NSIRA Secretariat’s departmental plan for the year.
Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary
Results achieved
NSIRA Secretariat supported NSIRA in completing of 8 (eight) national security and intelligence reviews during the 2024-25 fiscal year. A total of 13 (thirteen) Government of Canada organizations were reviewed and 7 (seven) Ministers received one or more of the NSIRA reports that were approved by members during this fiscal year.
6 section 34 ministerial reports
3 section 35 non-compliance reports
1 section 39 report on disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
Four of the eight reviews completed this year included multiple Government of Canada organizations by design. These four multi-organization reviews were:
The annual review of disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)
The annual review of the implementation of directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA)
Review of Communications Security Establishment (CSE)’s Equities Management Framework
Review of the Passenger Protect Program and Secure Air Travel Act
The department and agencies covered in these multi-organizational reviews were: Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), Department of Justice Canada (JUS), Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Public Safety Canada (PS), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Transport Canada (TC).
Four of the eight reviews also focused on individual topics involving specific Government of Canada organization: CSE – one review; CSIS – one review; RCMP – one review; and CRA – one review.
During the reporting period, the Secretariat made significant progress in developing and implementing policies and procedures to support the NSIRA review mandate. This included creating more refined planning and analytic tools to facilitate the review process. Additionally, NSIRA Secretariat staff promoted transparency and accountability by working with CSE, CSIS, GAC, PCO, PS, RCMP, CBSA, DFO, DND/CAF, FINTRAC, CRA, TBS, IRCC and TC to release several reports through the Access to Information regime which were later published on the NSIRA website.
National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner
Results achieved
In the 2024-25 fiscal year, the NSIRA Secretariat continued to develop and refine the processes underpinning the fulfillment of its investigation mandate. The investigative process has emphasized increased timeliness, efficiency, and transparency to enhance the relevance of the process for complainants.
The volume of investigative activities remained high and included an increase in complaints against CSIS with respect to delays in security assessments related to immigration applications.
Over the past year, NSIRA Secretariat stabilized its investigative processes for complaints by implementing procedures that ensure the investigations are conducted fairly, timely and transparently. With the normalization of work environments following the easing of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, NSIRA investigations have become more efficient. NSIRA completed five formal investigations and issued final reports in those cases, while twelve complaint matters were resolved informally.
As of April 1, 2023, the NSIRA Secretariat implemented service standards for investigating complaints. These standards set internal time limits for key investigative steps for each type of complaint, under normal circumstances, while also specifying conditions under which those time limits do not apply. Developing these service standards includes tracking and collecting data to assess whether the NSIRA Secretariat is meeting its standards. In 2024-25, the Secretariat achieved 100% success rate in meeting these standards.
Outreach and collaboration
During 2024–25, outreach, engagement, and strategic collaboration remained central to the support offered by the Secretariat to NSIRA. Staff consistently connected with domestic review partners, such as the Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC). These efforts focused on enhancing coordination and minimizing overlapping review activities, ultimately promoting more streamlined and effective review within the security and intelligence fields.
New collaborative ties were also formed with several Agents of Parliament, broadening NSIRA’s network of accountability partners within Canada’s governance system. NSIRA collaborated with the Lobbying Commissioner of Canada, Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner of Canada, Auditor General of Canada, Information Commissioner of Canada, and Privacy Commissioner of Canada. During these meetings a host of discussions ensued that include strategic communications and engagement; optimizing the organizational structure; recruitment; advocating for reform of enabling legislation, and resources for Members as public office holders under the Conflict of Interest Act.
The agency continued its international efforts with main partners, such as the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC), the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, to facilitate the sharing of best practices and operational knowledge.
The Secretariat Staff effectively facilitated NSIRA’s involvement in the 2024 FIORC Conference in Canberra, Australia. Furthermore, NSIRA enhanced its connections with European oversight organizations through participation in the European Intelligence Oversight Conference and the Intelligence Oversight Working Group. This key platform unites European review and accountability agencies.
Public transparency was a central focus all year. The Secretariat facilitated the prompt development and publication of NSIRA’s Public Annual Report, the primary way NSIRA communicates its activities to Canadians. It also issued more frequent unclassified backgrounders about NSIRA’s reports, encouraging continuous public engagement and enhancing transparency.
Key risks
Effective review requires timely and complete responses to NSIRA’s requests for information and access to departmental systems and information holdings that align with the requirements of each review. Mutual respect is also essential in this process. During the reviews completed in 2024-25, Government of Canada organizations met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness most of the time. While these reviews demonstrated new or expanded direct access to four organizations systems and information, they also identified two areas where NSIRA did not achieve the required access to comprehensively, methodically, and efficiently deliver its mandate. In other cases where NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness were only partially met, the issues often related to the timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information. At times, these responsiveness and access issues contributed to delays in the progress of reviews.
A particular challenge for the Secretariat in fulfilling its core duties is the procedural variability in NSIRA’s quasi-judicial investigations. The independence of NSIRA members and the complexity of complaints can lead to unpredictable timelines and lengths of investigations. To address this, the Secretariat’s service standards are based on well-defined steps that can only be completed once the full evidentiary record— including both documents and oral testimony—is provided to NSIRA. By linking performance metrics to the availability of crucial information, the Secretariat ensures that changes in investigation duration do not compromise the integrity or accountability of its service.
Resources required to achieve results
Table 3: Snapshot of resources required for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Table 3 provides a summary of the planned and actual spending and full-time equivalents required to
achieve results.
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations is supported by the following programs:
National security and intelligence activity reviews and complaints investigations
Additional information related to the program inventory for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations is available on the Results page on GC InfoBase .
Internal services
In this section
Description
Progress on results
Resources required to achieve results
Contracts awarded to Indigenous business
Description
Internal services refer to the activities and resources that support a department in its work to meet its corporate obligations and deliver its programs. The 9 categories of internal services are:
Management and Oversight Services
Communications Services
Human Resources Management
Financial Management
Information Management
Information Technology
Real Property
Materiel
Acquisitions
Progress on results
This section presents details on how the department performed to achieve results and meet targets for internal services.
During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat focused on optimizing its resources by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations. The administrative structures, tools, and processes were aligned to support achieving key priorities. Several new tools were introduced and integrated into the forecasting cycle to strengthen financial planning and oversight, improving budget managers’ abilities to plan and forecast more accurately.
The Secretariat acknowledges the importance of being an inclusive, healthy, and flexible employer. The organization has implemented initiatives to foster a respectful, diverse, and adaptable work environment to support this commitment. These initiatives enhanced mental health and well-being support and flexible work arrangements. Additionally, the Secretariat continues to invest in training on unconscious bias, workplace civility and respect, and accessibility. Through these efforts, we strive to cultivate a workplace culture where all employees feel valued, supported, and empowered to contribute to the organization’s mission.
In collaboration with PSPC, RCMP and CSE, the NSIRA Secretariat completed a two-year construction project, expanding its footprint with the addition of approx. 50 workstations with an occupancy date of August 2024. The facilities team will continue the work on the management action plan associated with the Accessibility Canada Act, specifically on the built environment.
For the 2024–25 fiscal year, the NSIRA Secretariat launched a renewal of its Information Management (IM) policy suite, which includes creating supporting procedures, standards, and directives. It is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2025–26.
The Secretariat continued collaborating with Library and Archives Canada (LAC) to obtain its Disposition Authorization, essential for establishing proper lifecycle management for the Secretariat’s records. This work is ongoing and anticipated to be completed in fall 2025.
As part of its digital modernization efforts, the Secretariat successfully completed the full implementation of GCdocs in fall 2024. Since then, the focus has shifted to optimizing its use through targeted training and engagement activities. Multiple sessions have been conducted for staff to enhance user proficiency and ensure compliance with information management best practices.
Resources required to achieve results
Table 4: Resources required to achieve results for internal services this year
Table 4 provides a summary of the planned and actual spending and full-time equivalents required to achieve results.
Government of Canada departments are required to award at least 5% of the total value of contracts to Indigenous businesses every year.
NSIRA Secretariat results for 2024-25:
Table 5: Total value of contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses
As shown in Table 5, NSIRA Secretariat awarded 10 % of the total value of all contracts to Indigenous businesses for the fiscal year.
Contracting performance indicators
2024-25 Results
Total value of contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses² (A)
$103,351
Total value of contracts awarded to Indigenous and non‑Indigenous businesses³ (B)
$989,486
Value of exceptions approved by deputy head (C)
$0
Proportion of contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses [A / (B−C) × 100]
10 %
“Contract” is a binding agreement for the procurement of a good, service, or construction and does not
include
real property leases. It includes contract amendments and contracts entered into by means of acquisition cards
of
more than $10,000.00.
For the purposes of the minimum 5% target, the data in this table reflects how Indigenous Services Canada
(ISC)
defines “Indigenous business” as either:
owned and operated by Elders, band and tribal councils
registered on a modern treaty beneficiary business list.
The calculation of the % amount includes $88,366 awarded to subcontracts.
In its 2025–26 Departmental Plan, NSIRA secretariat estimated that it would award 5 % of the total value of its contracts to Indigenous businesses by the end of 2024–25. Actual results were 10% of all contracts were awarded to indigenous businesses – the highest percentage achieved to date, signifying the on-going commitment to this initiative.
Spending and human resources
In this section
Spending
Funding
Financial statement highlights
Human resources
Spending
This section presents an overview of the department’s actual and planned expenditures from 2022–23 to 2027–28.
Refocusing Government Spending
While not officially part of this spending reduction exercise, to respect the spirit of this exercise, NSIRA Secretariat undertook the following measures in 2024-25.
considering the need for contractors, and
identifying work that can be done in-house or deferred, if required.
Budgetary performance summary
Table 6: Actual three-year spending on core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)
Table 6 shows the money that NSIRA Secretariat spent in each of the past three years on its core responsibilities and on internal services.
Core responsibilities and internal services
2024–25 Main Estimates
2024–25 total authorities available for use
Actual spending over three years (authorities used)
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
The spending increase in internal services in 2023–24 and 2024–25 reflects expenditures related to a construction project carried out during this two-year period. The increase over the three-year time period in National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations is mostly a result of increasing numbers of FTEs and rising salary costs.
This section provides an overview of the department’s voted and statutory funding for its core responsibilities and for internal services. Consult the Government of Canada budgets and expenditures for further information on funding authorities.
Graph 1: Approved funding (statutory and voted) over a six-year period
Text version of Figure 1
Graph 1 summarizes the department’s approved voted and statutory funding from
2022-23 to 2027-28.
Fiscal year
Statutory
Voted
Total
2022-23
$1,300,166
$16,988,980
$18,289,147
2023-24
$1,755,229
$21,253,996
$23,009,225
2024-25
$1,764,845
$16,810,265
$18,575,110
2025-26
$1,748,047
$17,697,005
$19,445,052
2026-27
$1,751,989
$17,720,195
$19,472,184
2027-28
$1,751,989
$17,720,195
$19,472,184
Analysis of statutory and voted funding over a six-year period
Funding is expected to remain constant over the next 3 years.
Consult the Public Accounts of Canada for further information on NSIRA Secretariat’s departmental voted and statutory expenditures.
Financial statement highlights
Please see NSIRA Secretariat’s Financial Statements (Unaudited) for the Year Ended March 31, 2025.
Table 8: Condensed Statement of Operations (unaudited or audited) for the year ended March 31, 2025 (dollars)
Table 8 summarizes the expenses and revenues for 2024–25 which net to the cost of operations before government funding and transfers.
Financial information
2024–25 actual results
2023–24 actual results
Difference (2024-25 minus 2023-24)
Total expenses
$20,799
$18,223
$2,576
Total revenues
$0
$0
$0
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers
Table 9: Condensed Statement of Operations (unaudited or audited) for 2023-24 and 2024-25 (dollars)
Table 9 summarizes actual expenses and revenues and shows the net cost of operations before government funding and transfers.
Financial information
2024–25 actual results
2023–24 actual results
Difference (2024-25 minus 2023-24)
Total expenses
$20,799
$18,223
$2,576
Total revenues
$0
$0
$0
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers
$20,799
$18,223
$2,576
Table 10 Condensed Statement of Financial Position (unaudited or audited) as of March 31, 2025 (dollars)
Table 10 provides a brief snapshot of the amounts the department owes or must spend (liabilities) and its available resources (assets), which helps to indicate its ability to carry out programs and services.
Financial information
Actual fiscal year (2024–25)
Previous fiscal year (2023–24)
Difference (2024–25 minus 2023–24)
Total net liabilities
$2,461
$2,376
$85
Total net financial assets
$1,634
$1,779
-$145
Departmental net debt
$827
$597
$230
Total non-financial assets
$7,155
$7,392
-$237
Departmental net financial position
$6,328
$6,795
-$467
Human resources
This section presents an overview of the department’s actual and planned human resources from 2022–23 to 2027–28.
Table 11: Actual human resources for core responsibilities and internal services
Table 11 shows a summary in full-time equivalents of human resources for NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for the previous three fiscal years.
Core responsibilities and internal services
2022–23 actual FTEs
2023–24 actual FTEs
2024–25 actual FTEs
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
53
51
58
Subtotal
53
51
58
Internal services
25
24
29
Total
78
75
87
Analysis of human resources over the last three years
Over the past three fiscal years, the human resources levels at the Secretariat have experienced modest fluctuations, followed by notable growth. In 2022–23, the organization reported 78 full-time equivalents (FTEs), which slightly decreased to 75 in 2023–24, primarily due to attrition and staffing delays. However, in 2024–25, the total FTEs rose to 87—signifying a significant increase that reflects a decline in employee turnover and successful recruitment to previously vacant positions. This increase in staffing has enhanced the Secretariat’s capacity to fulfill its mandate, both in its core responsibilities and in internal services, thereby reinforcing organizational stability and operational effectiveness.
Table 12: Human resources planning summary for core responsibilities and internal services
Table 12 shows the planned full-time equivalents for each of NSIRA Secretariat’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for the next three years. Human resources for the current fiscal year are forecast based on year to date.
Core responsibilities and internal services
2025–26 planned full-time equivalents
2026–27 planned full-time equivalents
2027–28 planned full-time equivalents
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
69
69
69
Subtotal
69
69
69
Internal services
31
31
31
Total
100
100
100
FTE count to remain constant across the board
Supplementary information tables
The following supplementary information tables are available on NSIRA Secretariat’s website:
Gender-based Analysis Plus
NSIRA remains committed to integrating Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus) into its governance and operations. In 2024-25 NSIRA advanced internal awareness through training and policy development to ensure equity, diversity, and inclusion considerations inform both its internal practices and its external functions. As part of these efforts, a fact sheet on Inclusive Recruitment was shared to support more equitable hiring practices, and work is underway to update the Pay Equity Plan. These efforts support NSIRA’s broader commitment to fair, evidence-based accountability in the national security and intelligence accountability landscape.
Federal tax expenditures
The tax system can be used to achieve public policy objectives through the application of special measures such as low tax rates, exemptions, deductions, deferrals and credits. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for these measures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures. This report also provides detailed background information on tax expenditures, including descriptions, objectives, historical information and references to related federal spending programs as well as evaluations and GBA Plus of tax expenditures.
Corporate information
Departmental profile
Appropriate minister(s): The Right Honourable Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada
Institutional head: Charles Fugère, Executive Director
The tax system can be used to achieve public policy objectives through the application of special measures such as low tax rates, exemptions, deductions, deferrals and credits. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for these measures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures. This report also provides detailed background information on tax expenditures, including descriptions, objectives, historical information and references to related federal spending programs as well as evaluations and GBA Plus of tax expenditures.
Definitions
appropriation (crédit)
Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
budgetary expenditures (dépenses budgétaires)
Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, departments or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.
core responsibility (responsabilité essentielle)
An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a core responsibility are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence.
Departmental Plan (plan ministériel)
A report on the plans and expected performance of an appropriated department over a 3year period. Departmental Plans are usually tabled in Parliament each spring.
departmental priority (priorité)
A plan or project that a department has chosen to focus and report on during the planning period. Priorities represent the things that are most important or what must be done first to support the achievement of the desired departmental results.
departmental result (résultat ministériel)
A consequence or outcome that a department seeks to achieve. A departmental result is often outside departments’ immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes.
departmental result indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel)
A quantitative measure of progress on a departmental result.
departmental results framework (cadre ministériel des résultats)
A framework that connects the department’s core responsibilities to its departmental results and departmental result indicators.
Departmental Results Report (rapport sur les résultats ministériels)
A report on a department’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.
Full-time equivalent (équivalent temps plein)
A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person-year charge against a departmental budget. For a particular position, the full-time equivalent figure is the ratio of number of hours the person actually works divided by the standard number of hours set out in the person’s collective agreement.
gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus) (analyse comparative entre les sexes plus [ACS Plus])
An analytical tool used to assess support the development of responsive and inclusive how different groups of women, men and gender-diverse people experience policies, programs and policies, programs, and other initiatives. GBA Plus is a process for understanding who is impacted by the issue or opportunity being addressed by the initiative; identifying how the initiative could be tailored to meet diverse needs of the people most impacted; and anticipating and mitigating any barriers to accessing or benefitting from the initiative. GBA Plus is an intersectional analysis that goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences to consider other factors, such as age, disability, education, ethnicity, economic status, geography (including rurality), language, race, religion, and sexual orientation.
An initiative where two or more federal departments are given funding to pursue a shared outcome, often linked to a government priority.
non‑budgetary expenditures (dépenses non budgétaires)
Net outlays and receipts related to loans, investments and advances, which change the composition of the financial assets of the Government of Canada.
performance (rendement)
What a department did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the department intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified.
performance indicator (indicateur de rendement)
A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an department, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.
plan (plan)
The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how a department intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally, a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead to the expected result.
planned spending (dépenses prévues)
For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts presented in Main Estimates.
A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports.
program (programme)
Individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels.
program inventory (répertoire des programmes)
Identifies all the department’s programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department’s core responsibilities and results.
result (résultat)
A consequence attributed, in part, to an department, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single department, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the department’s influence.
Indigenous business (entreprise autochtones)
For the purpose of the Directive on the Management of Procurement Appendix E: Mandatory Procedures for Contracts Awarded to Indigenous Businesses and the Government of Canada’s commitment that a mandatory minimum target of 5% of the total value of contracts is awarded to Indigenous businesses, a department that meets the definition and requirements as defined by the Indigenous Business Directory.
statutory expenditures (dépenses législatives)
Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made.
target (cible)
A measurable performance or success level that a department, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.
voted expenditures (dépenses votées)
Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an appropriation act. The vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.
