The Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA or Act) and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual as a result of information exchanged between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. This review covers the implementation of the directions sent to 12 departments and agencies from their date of issuance, January 1, 2020, to the end of the previous calendar year, December 31, 2020. It was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under ACA.
This was the first ACA review to cover a full calendar year. Many of the reviewed departments noted that the pandemic impacted their information sharing activities, thus impacting the number of cases requiring further review as per the ACA. As such, NISIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.
As part of the review, NSIRA examined the case triage process of all twelve departments. NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be escalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.
In keeping with NSIRA’s 2020 Annual Report which emphasized the implementation of a “trust but verify” approach for assessing information provided over the course of a review, NSIRA continues to work on various verification strategies with the Canadian intelligence community. However, due to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, implementation of verification processes was not possible across all twelve departments which fall under the ACA. Notwithstanding, the information provided by departments has been independently verified by NSIRA through documentation analysis and meetings with department subject matter experts, as warranted. Further work is underway to continue developing an access model for the independent verification of information relevant to ACA considerations.
The Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA or Act) and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual as a result of information exchanged between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. This review covers the implementation of the directions sent to 12 departments and agencies from their date of issuance, January 1, 2020, to the end of the previous calendar year, December 31, 2020. It was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under ACA.
This was the first ACA review to cover a full calendar year. Many of the reviewed departments noted that the pandemic impacted their information sharing activities, thus impacting the number of cases requiring further review as per the ACA. As such, NISIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.
While NSIRA was pleased with the considerable efforts made by many departments new to ACA in building their frameworks, Canada Boarder Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Safety did not finalize their policy frameworks in support of the Directions received under the ACA for the review period.
As part of the review, NSIRA examined the case triage process of all twelve departments. NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be escalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.
A case sent to both GAC and CSIS was reviewed by NSIRA for its implications under the ACA. While the information was ultimately not shared with the requesting foreign entity, nonetheless, NSIRA found that the risk of mistreatment was substantial and the decision should have been referred to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs as the accountable deputy minister for this request.
Mitigation measures used by departments were also reviewed this year, since they are an integral part in the information sharing process for departments. NSIRA observed that there are gaps in departments’ ability to verify whether a country or entity has actually complied with caveats or assurances because of the difficulty in tracking compliance to mitigation measures.
NSIRA believes that it is now in a position to conduct in-depth case study assessments of individual departments’ adherence to the ACA and Directions, irrespective of whether or not a department reported any cases to its deputy head. Finally, future reviews will follow up on the ongoing implementation of NSIRA’s past recommendations.
In keeping with NSIRA’s 2020 Annual Report which emphasized the implementation of a “trust but verify” approach for assessing information provided over the course of a review, NSIRA continues to work on various verification strategies with the Canadian intelligence community. However, due to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, implementation of verification processes was not possible across all twelve departments which fall under the ACA. Notwithstanding, the information provided by departments has been independently verified by NSIRA through documentation analysis and meetings with department subject matter experts, as warranted. Further work is underway to continue developing an access model for the independent verification of information relevant to ACA considerations.
Authorities
This review was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act, which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA or the Act).
Introduction
Review background
Departments and agencies in the Government of Canada routinely share information with a range of foreign entities. However such practices can sometimes bring into play a risk of mistreatment for individuals who are the subjects of these exchanges or other individuals. It is therefore incumbent upon the Government of Canada to evaluate and mitigate the risks that this sharing entails.
In 2011, the Government of Canada implemented a general framework for Addressing Risks of Mistreatment in Sharing Information with Foreign Entities. The aim of the framework was to establish a coherent approach across government when sharing with and receiving information from foreign entities. Following this, Ministerial Direction was issued to applicable departments in 2011 (Information Sharing with Foreign Entities), and then again in 2017 (Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities).
On July 13, 2019, the ACA came into force. The preamble of the Act recognizes Canada’s commitments with respect to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Canada’s international legal obligations on prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment. The Act also recognizes that information needs to be shared to enable the Government to fulfill its fundamental responsibility to protect Canada’s national security and the safety of Canadians.
On September 4, 2019, pursuant to section 3 of the ACA, the Governor in Council (GiC) issued written directions (Orders in Council (OiCs) or Directions) to the deputy heads of 12 departments and agencies. This added six new Canadian entities in addition to those that were already associated with the 2011 and 2017 Directions.
This report is NSIRA’s first full year assessment of the implementation of the Directions issued under ACA for the 2020 calendar year. The review builds upon two previous reviews conducted in respect of avoiding complicity in mistreatment. The first was in respect to the 2017 Ministerial Directions, while the second assessed the Directions issued under the ACA, but was limited to the four months from when the Directions were issued to the end of the 2019 calendar year.
ACA and Directions
The ACA and the Directions issued under its authority seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual due to the exchange of information between a Government of Canada department or agency and a foreign entity. The Act and the Directions also aim to limit the use of information received from a foreign entity that is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual.
Under the authority of subsection 3(1) of the Act, the Directions issued to the 12 departments and agencies are near identical in language and focus on the three aspects of handling information when interacting with a foreign entity: the disclosure of information, the requesting of information, and the use of any information received.
In regards to disclosure of information, the Directions state:
If the disclosure of information to a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that the Department officials do not disclose the information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.
With respect to requesting information, the Directions read as follows:
If the making of a request to a foreign entity for information would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that Department officials do not make the request for information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.
Lastly, as it relates to the use of information, the Directions provide:
The Deputy Head must ensure that information that is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity is not used by the Department (a) in any way that creates a substantial risk of further mistreatment; (b) as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding; or (c) in any way that deprives someone of their rights or freedoms, unless the Deputy Head or, in exceptional circumstances, a senior official designated by the Deputy Head determines that the use of the information is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant personal injury and authorizes the use accordingly.
The consideration of substantial risk figures prominently in subsection 3(1) of the Act as well as the Directions. In considering whether to disclose or request information, a department must determine whether a substantial risk is present and if so whether it can be mitigated. As noted in the previous reviews on information sharing, the ACA does not define “substantial risk”. Departments refer to a definition of this term as set out in the 2017 Ministerial Directions as a general starting point when conducting assessments under the ACA. The 2017 Ministerial Directions define substantial risk as:
‘Substantial risk’ is a personal, present and foreseeable risk of mistreatment that is real and is based on something more than mere theory or speculation. In most cases, the test of a substantial risk of mistreatment would be satisfied when it is more likely than not there would be mistreatment; however, in some cases, particularly where the risk if of severe harm, the standard of substantial risk may be satisfied at a lower level of probability.
Based on the outcome of these determinations, the decision may be to approve, deny, or elevate to the Deputy Head for his or her consideration. Substantial risk is also contemplated in the consideration of the use of information received from a foreign entity. If it is evaluated that the information was likely obtained from the mistreatment of an individual, the department is prohibited from using the information in any way that creates a substantial risk of further mistreatment.
Throughout the process to determine whether to disclose or use information, the Directions require that the accuracy, reliability, and limitations of use of all information being handled are appropriately described and characterized.
Additionally, reporting requirements are found at sections 7 and 8 of the Act as well as within the Directions. Among these requirements, the Minister responsible for the department must provide a copy of the department’s annual report in respect of the implementation of the Directions during the previous calendar year as soon as feasible to NSIRA, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICoP) and, if applicable, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Reporting requirements as articulated in the Directions oblige the reporting of decisions which were considered by the Deputy Head in regards to disclosure, requesting of information, or authorizing use of information that would deprive someone of their rights or freedoms be made as soon as feasible to the responsible Minister, NSIRA, and NSICoP.
Review Objectives and Methodology
The review period was January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020. The objectives of this review included:
Following-up on departments’ implementation of the directives received under the ACA;
Assessing departments’ operationalization of frameworks/processes that enable them to meet the obligations set out in the ACA and directives; and
Assessing coordination and consistency in implementation across applicable departments.
Additionally, NSIRA evaluated all twelve ACA member departments’ ‘case triage’ frameworks (i.e., the combination of policy assessment criteria and a pre-determined ‘escalation ladder’ for cases that require higher levels of managerial approvals). Refer to annexes B to M that provide additional details on each departments’ triage process. Finally, NSIRA reviewed the use and policies around departmental mitigation measures.
FINDINGS
Reporting and Framework Updates
As per the Act, all twelve departments fulfilled their obligations to report to their respective ministers and NSIRA on progress made in operationalizing frameworks and identifying cases escalated to the deputy head level.
Of the nine departments who had reported to NSIRA last year that they had finalized frameworks, all continued to refine assessment protocols over the 2020 review period. Based on submissions to NSIRA, TC has developed a corporate policy to highlight the department’s ACA-related requirements. However, CBSA and PS had yet to finalize their ACA policy. As a result, employees may not have adequate and up to date guidance on how to make determinations related to the ACA.
NSIRA Finding #1: NSIRA found that CBSA and PS did not finalize their policy frameworks in support of Directions received under the ACA over the review period.
Referrals to Deputy Head
The Directions specify that when departmental officials are unable to determine whether the risk of mistreatment arising from a disclosure of or request for information can be mitigated, the matter must be referred to the Deputy Head. The Directions also require the Deputy Head, or in exceptional circumstances a senior official designated by the Deputy Head, to determine the matter where the use of information that is likely to have been obtained through mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity would in any way deprive an individual of their rights or freedoms and the use of this information is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant injury. In 2020, no cases were escalated to the deputy head level. NSIRA sought clarification on the absence of cases referred; the most common reason provided by departments for this outcome was that cases were either mitigated before deputy head involvement and/or this was a result of an overall reduction in the number of foreign information exchanges generally due to the ongoing pandemic.
NSIRA Finding #2: NSIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.
Case Triage
Typically, when departments are making ACA applicability decisions, they employ varying “case triage” processes, that is, the combination of policy assessment criteria and a pre-determined ‘escalation ladder’ for cases that require higher levels of managerial assessment. NSIRA closely evaluated all twelve ‘case triage’ frameworks of the departments subject to the ACA (Refer to Annex B-M). In carrying out this work, NSIRA noted some issues in the implementation of triage systems; for example, there were instances of not having one designed and of information being outdated.
NSIRA observed that there were two main types of initial case triage processes: case-by-case, where the framework places the onus on the working level official to first make determinations based on policy assessment tools, relevant training, and individual experience; and country assessment rating, which emphasizes the initial use of a country-based risk level that may trigger case escalation. A country assessment rating is a representation of the assessed risk of mistreatment associated to a country, based on a number of criteria and often derived from a range of sources.
Initial Case Triage Category 1: Case-by-Case
All departments use working level officials to determine whether there is a risk of mistreatment. When a working level officials’ assessment is inconclusive as to whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists, they will defer the decision to a higher management authority. NSIRA has developed Figure 1 to illustrate this type of triage process where the working level official consults assessment tools at his or her disposal to determine whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists.
Initial Case Triage Category 2: Informed by Country Assessment Rating
CSIS, CSE, FINTRAC, and RCMP require working level officials to use country assessment ratings that may trigger case escalation. For example, NSIRA has developed Figure 2 to illustrate this type of triage process where country assessment ratings may trigger case escalation.
Case Escalation
In addition to the two categories of case triage frameworks identified above, all departments except for FINTRAC, PS, CSE and TC make use of internal consultation groups/senior decision making committees when cases are identified as requiring consultation/escalation (e.g. working groups and senior management committee secretariats). The following table illustrates the various consultation groups across departments that would make determinations related to the ACA.
The general purpose of consultation groups is to serve as a single point of contact for employees who require assistance in assessing foreign information sharing activities or interpreting policy and procedure. Senior decision making committees are responsible for making determinations on the information exchange. They are the final decision making authority prior to escalation to the deputy head. NSIRA observed that leveraging the overall expertise of these groups may assist officials in consistently applying assessment criteria, as well as provide greater oversight for information exchanges with foreign entities.
Consistency in Implementation Across Departments
Beginning with the 2017 Ministerial Directions on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities, it was required that departments maintain policies and procedures to assess the risks of information sharing relationships with foreign entities. While not specified in the Act or Directions, departments continue to implement country and entity assessments, a practice NSIRA has supported. NSIRA has previously raised concerns regarding the absence of unified and standardized approach to departments’ country assessments. The PCO-led community response to last year’s recommendation on this element stated in part that:
The information sharing activities of these organizations all serve either an intelligence, law enforcement, or administrative purpose with each carrying different risk profiles, privacy concerns, and legal authorities. Individual departments and agencies are responsible for establishing specific thresholds or triggers in their information sharing frameworks that are appropriate for their operational contexts. It is the view of the Government of Canada that applying the same threshold across all organizations for triggering, evaluating, and elevating cases is not necessarily practical nor essential to ensuring that each department or agency is operating in compliance with the Act.
In order to engage in the questions to which the divergence of thresholds gives rise, NSIRA asked departments to rank bi-lateral information exchanges with foreign partners in terms of volume, excluding exchanges with [***example of foreign entity information sharing***]. Nine of the twelve departments identified ███████ as a foreign exchange entity, a country which is widely recognized as having human rights concerns.
NSIRA then selected only those departments that initially utilize country assessment ratings as a triage method (i.e. FINTRAC, RCMP, CSIS and CSE). [***description of how departments determined foreign entity example***]. Nonetheless, in carrying out this analysis, NSIRA observed that all four departments relied on a combination of open source human rights reports and consultations with other departments. Additionally, RCMP, CSIS and CSE utilize classified intelligence sources.
However, although these departments utilize a similar approach when assessing a country, the assigned rating for ████ was not consistent. CSIS assigned █████████████; FINTRAC and RCMP assigned a [***description of department’s specific ratings***] ; and finally, CSE assigned a ██████ rating.
NISRA examined to what degree country ratings affected the level of approval required for an information exchange. Because CSE has assigned a rating of █████ when they receive a request from ████, a CSE official could require [***description of the factors used to determine the appropriate level process***] CSE acknowledged that its “human rights assessments do not necessarily correlate with the risk level assigned to an instance of sharing,” and nor do they “necessarily correlate to levels of approval or to restrictions to sharing.” [***description of the factors used to determine the appropriate level process***]
In contrast, according to their framework and methodology, an exchange with any one of the █████ authorities listed in the RCMP’s country and entity assessment list could result in an [***description of department’s specific ratings***] because █████ is associated with a country assessment rating. When an entity is yellow, the employee must consider whether or not there is a risk of mistreatment by looking at a list of criteria. If one or more of these criteria exist, the employee must send the case to a senior management committee. NSIRA observes that where the RCMP has a red country rating, the working level official must escalate to the senior management committee. Therefore, unlike CSE and CSIS, country ratings within the RCMP have direct impacts on approval levels.
NSIRA’s ACA report from last year recommended that departments should identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern. While PCO disagreed with this recommendation, NSIRA believes that there remain concerns regarding divergences in country and risk assessments.
NSIRA Finding #3: NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be scalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.
Following this review, NSIRA intends to further scrutinize the processes employed regarding ACA triage and decision making by reviewing GAC and RCMP.
A case study as provided for in Box 1 exemplifies the divergent nature on the evaluation of risk where two departments’ considered responding to an identical request made by a foreign entity.
Box 1: A divergent decision-making process
[***description of the case study***] The foreign entity provided this information to GAC and CSIS and requested confirmation [***description of the information sharing request***]
In considering whether to respond to this request, GAC determined that the human rights record of the country in question generally and of the foreign entity specifically making the request were of significant concern. GAC’s senior decision making committee, working under the presumption that the individual’s detention was ongoing, considered whether the disclosure of this information “would not substantially increase the detainee’s risk of mistreatment.” The senior decision making committee determined that confirmation of the individual’s previous employment status with GAC was permissible, subject to the determination of CSIS’s assessment.
Ultimately, the decision by CSIS was made by a DG-level executive and, as the foreign entity was listed by CSIS as a restricted partner, information was not shared.
The assessment by GAC’s senior decision-making committee is of concern. The Act and the Directions impose that departments consider whether disclosing or requesting information “would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment.” [***legal advice to department***]
NSIRA agrees with this interpretation of the law, but not with its implementation by GAC in this case. GAC’s position was that responding to the request “would not aggravate” the risk of mistreatment. However, NSIRA is of a different view. Regardless of the information sought, the human rights record of the foreign entity and of the foreign country was of significant concern, and GAC was operating under the presumption that the individual may have already been subjected to mistreatment. While GAC’s sharing could not have accounted for any mistreatment that could have occurred earlier, responding to the request given the facts of this case would have nonetheless resulted in a substantial risk of mistreatment. Therefore, this case should have been refered to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for consideration.
NSIRA also observes that this case was triaged at different levels within GAC and CSIS. In GAC’s triage process, the decision was made at the higher senior decision-making committee that disclosure was permissible. Comparatively, CSIS’s decision-making process was completed prior to reaching their senior-level committee and yielded the opposite result. The different levels of decision-making and different outcomes underscore a problematic inconsistency in how each organization considers the same information to be disclosed to the same foreign entity. Furthermore, while a department responsible for the information may consult with other departments as to whether disclosure of information is permissible, it cannot abdicate this responsibility and decision-making to another department.
NSIRA Finding #4: NSIRA found a procedural gap of concern in a case study involving the disclosure of information, even though information was ultimately not shared. The risk of mistreatment was substantial and the decision should have been referred to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs as the accountable deputy minister for this request.
Mitigation Measures
Use of Mitigation Measures
To decrease the risk of mistreatment, departments will employ mitigation measures such as caveats, assurances, sanitization, and redactions. The most common mitigation measures are caveats and assurances. Caveats are specific stipulations appended to information to limit or prohibit certain uses of information unless otherwise authorized by the issuing department. For example, any departments use a ‘third party’ caveat that restricts further dissemination of the information to other departments (domestic and foreign), unless the originating department is consulted on the request to share.
Assurances are not specific to a single information exchange; rather, these are agreements with foreign entities (whether formal or informal), which aim to help ensure that a particular foreign entity understands Canada’s position on human rights and that the entity, in turn, agrees to comply with this expected behaviour. For example, when formulating a risk mitigation strategy for an information exchange, departments will consider written or verbal assurances, who provided the assurance (i.e. working level official or agency head), and whether the assurance is considered credible and reliable.
Furthermore, CSIS, CSE, and GAC have highlighted a number of differences in the types of assurances sought, including a number of informal and formal methods. For example, verbal assurances, scheduled formal assurances, and ad-hoc written assurances can be sought by various levels.
In a related issue, NSIRA observed that there are [***description and an example of a Department’s ability to track compliance***] CSIS, GAC, and CSE indicated that there is ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ is not specific to the ACA but is nonetheless key ████████████ when exchanging information with the Government of Canada.
Given that no cases were escalated to the level of deputy head, departments’ lower-level use of mitigation strategies would have taken on considerable prominence in decision making. In a subsequent review, NSIRA intends to further investigate policies of mitigation measures pertaining to their use and tracking.
CONCLUSION
This review assessed departments’ implementation of the directives received under the ACA and their operationalization of frameworks to address ACA requirements.
NSIRA’s first review of departments’ implementation of the Act and Directions was limited to a four month period (September-December 2019). As such, this review constitutes the first examination of the ACA over the course of one full year. NSIRA believes that it is now in a position to conduct in-depth case study assessments of individual departments’ adherence to the ACA and Directions, irrespective of whether or not a department reported any cases to its deputy head. Additionally, future reviews will follow up on the ongoing implementation of NSIRA’s past recommendations.
Annex A: Findings
NSIRA Finding #1: NSIRA found that CBSA and PS did not finalize their policy frameworks in support of Directions received under the ACA over the review period.
NSIRA Finding #2: NSIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.
NSIRA Finding #3: NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be escalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.
NSIRA Finding #4: NSIRA found a procedural gap of concern in a case study involving the disclosure of information, even though information was ultimately not shared. The risk of mistreatment was substantial and the decision should have been referred to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs as the accountable deputy minister for this request.
Annex B: Canada Border Services Agency
Framework updates: In 2018, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) issued a high-level policy document in response to the 2017 MD. Since then, CBSA has drafted updated policies and procedures that have not yet been finalized.
Working Groups: CBSA Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment Working Group (ACMWG)
Senior Management Committee: Senior Management Risk Assessment Committee (SMRAC). This committee convenes on an as needed basis, to assess cases that have a potential for mistreatment.
[***description of CBSA’s decision making methodology***]
Country Assessment: In-house risk scoring template under development
Mitigation Measures: The CBSA is currently working to strengthen its formal framework/process for deciding whether substantial risk of mistreatment associated with a given request can be mitigated.
Annex C: Canada Revenue Agency
Framework Updates: The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) indicated that it did not make any changes to its framework since last year’s response. The department continues to refine its processes and has developed the Canada Revenue Agency Exchange of Information Procedures in the Context of Avoiding Complicity in the Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act.
[***departmental cabinet confidence***]
Working group: The CRA formed a Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) that developed a methodology to assess the human rights records of its information exchange partners, so that senior management can make informed assessments of the risk of mistreatment.
Canada has a large network of international partners with 94 tax treaties and 24 Tax Information Exchange Agreements. Canada is also a party to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAAC), which includes 144 signatories. These International Legal Agreements allow the CRA to exchange information on request, spontaneously and automatically. Each legal agreement includes secrecy provisions (caveats) that govern appropriate use and disclosure. In addition, members of the Global Forum (Global Forum) on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes are subject to peer reviews on a cyclical basis, including on Confidentiality and Data Safeguard .
Senior Management Committee: During the review period a senior committee was not in place, however there was a formal process to escalate reviews/risk assessment through the Director, Director General and ultimately the Assistant Commissioner of the Compliance Programs Branch (CPB) who is accountable for the administration of the ACA.
Additionally, in July 2021, the CRA established an ACA governance framework that includes the ACA Panel, a senior management consultative committee to support risk assessments, reporting, recommendations, and priorities. The panel currently consists of DGs and Directors within the CPB and the Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch. Also in July 2021, the CRA established an executive level committee to consider and develop recommendations on case specific engagements as well as issue identification and guidance. The committee consists of Directors across several directorates of the CRA that manage programs that are directly impacted by/reliant on exchange of information with other jurisdictions.
Triage: The initial assessment is done by a working level employee and requires, at minimum, director approval. The case may escalate to the DG and the AC and so on if there is doubt about risk mitigation.
In cases where risk was identified, there were challenges in conducting full assessments to determine if the risk was substantial, the CRA delayed disclosing the information until the full assessment could be completed. This was largely in part due to COVID-19. As such, files that normally would have been referred were temporarily put on hold and no action was taken during the review period.
The CRA informed NSIRA that funding from the November 2020 Fall Economic Statement was allocated to the creation of a dedicated risk assessment team. It is anticipated that the development and regular updating of country-level assessments and the preparation of individual-level risk assessments will transition to this new dedicated team housed within the CPB, in summer 2021.
The team will also be responsible for:
Creating and formalizing the framework for consulting with CRA senior management and other government departments and agencies;
Advising CRA officials who engage in exchange of information (EOI);
Identifying mitigation and other factors specific to the type of information that CRA exchanges and that would impact risk assessment;
Preparing annual and other reporting required under the Act and Directions;
Providing awareness and training sessions; and
Continuously improving documentation, policies, guidance, and procedures.
Country/Entity Assessments: Since January 2020, the CRA has completed their own set of mistreatment risk assessments for each potential information exchange, including the use of information received from the CRA’s information exchange partners in consultation with other Government of Canada partners. The CRA can only exchange information with another jurisdiction pursuant to a treaty, tax convention or other legal instrument that permits exchange of tax information.
The CRA uses a colour coded system to rate the risk related to a country: green; yellow; red. However, for specific or spontaneous exchanges of information, the CRA completes an analysis based on the specifics of the file to supplement the country specific risk assessment.
Mitigation Measures: Mitigation measures, including caveats (data safeguards and confidentiality provisions) are embedded in all legal instruments that govern and allow for all the CRA’s exchanges of information, while peer reviews of jurisdictions’ legal frameworks and administrative practices provide assurances of exchange partners’ compliance with international standards for exchange of tax information. According to CRA, all information exchanged during the review period were subject to these mitigation measures. Due to COVID19, and for the period under review, the CRA put on hold all exchanges where it was deemed there may be a residual potentially significant risk of mistreatment until a process and mitigation measures were in place, including to redact information. However, the CRA routinely redacted personal information where it would not impact the substance of the exchange for those mitigated risk exchanges that did proceed during this period.
Annex D: Communications Security Establishment
Framework Updates: No changes made to the framework in 2020. It is the same procedure as the last review period.
Working group: Based on the RFI, there are no working groups leveraged to assess the level of risk of mistreatment. The Mistreatment Risk Assessment Process follows a process that has been refined continuously since its inception in 2012. The higher the level of risk (low, medium, high, substantial), the higher approval authority required to exchange or use information.
Senior Management Committee: There is no Senior Management Committee. As explained above, CSE relies on an approval authority scale based on the level of risk (from low to substantial). Senior level officials are involved in the process when there are medium and high-risk cases, which require Director and Director General/Deputy Chief approval, respectively.
Triage: A CSE official performs an initial assessment by consulting the Mistreatment Risk Assessment (MRA), which considers equity concerns, geolocation and identity information, human rights assurances, risk of detention and a profile of the recipients’ human rights practices.
Low (For Low Risk Nations)
If the MRA indicates a low level of risk, the official will need Supervisor [***specific unit***], approval if they wish to proceed with the information exchange or use.
Low (For non-Low Risk Nations)
If the MRA indicates a low level of risk, the official will need Manager [***specific unit***], approval if they wish to proceed with the information exchange or use.
Medium
If the MRA indicates a medium level of risk, the official will need Director, Disclosure and Information Sharing approval if they wish to proceed with the information exchange or use.
High
If the MRA indicates a high level of risk, the official will need Director General, Policy Disclosure and Review or Deputy Chief, PolCom approval if they wish to proceed with the information exchange or use.
Substantial
If the MRA indicates a substantial level of risk, the official may not proceed with the information exchange or use.
Country Assessments: CSE establishes its own country assessments (which CSE refers to as Human Rights Assessments) by using information from OGDs, its own reporting, and open source information. Foreign entity arrangements are reviewed annually. These HRAs are part of CSE’s MRAs.
There are two types of MRAs: Annual and Case-by-case. Annual MRAs include foreign entities with whom CSE regularly exchanges information, [***description of the foreign entities with whom CSE exchanges information***] Caseby-case MRAs are conducted in response to particular requests. Case-by-case MRAs often concern individuals and information sharing activities. There are Abbreviated MRAs, which are a sub case-by-case MRA, and they are conducted for Limited Risk Nations. These nations are considered low risk by CSE.
When making MRAs, CSE does the following:
assesses the purpose of the information sharing;
verifies there are mistreatment risk management measures in existing information sharing arrangements;
reviews CSE’s internal records on the foreign entity under consideration;
consults other available Government of Canada assessments and reports related to the foreign entity;
assesses the anticipated effectiveness of risk mitigation measures; and
evaluates a foreign entity’s compliance with past assurances, based on available information.
CSE consults with GAC, DND, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence for some MRAs, usually case-by-case ones. CSE may also consult GAC for human rights-related advice in certain instances.
Mitigation Measures: CSE considers a number of mitigation factors, such as risk of detention, [***statement regarding information sharing obligations of partners***] caveats, formal assurances, and bilateral relationships. CSE’s principle mitigation measure is Second Party assurances. [***statement regarding information sharing obligations of partners***]
Identifying/Sensitizing: The DG, Policy Disclosure and Review or the DC PolCom review high-risk cases. 303 information-sharing requests were assessed for risk of mistreatment and 10 of them (3%) were referred to the Director, Disclosure & Information Sharing. For the 2020 review period, the Deputy Chief, Policy and Communications was responsible for ACA accountability and quality assurance.
Annex E: Canadian Security Intelligence Service
[***Info-graphic of CSIS’s Risk Assessment process***]
Framework Updates: While there were no changes during the 2020 review period, CSIS modified its procedure on January 2021. Most notably, cases will only be escalated to ISEC if the DG cannot determine if the substantial risk can be mitigated. In addition, CSIS merged the [***statement regarding internal process***] CSIS updated its human rights ‘Assurances’ procedures as a stand-alone policy. This policy requires CSIS Stations to seek assurances from [***statement regarding internal process***] coordination responsibilities for ISEC were moved to the ██████████. Through that, the █████ became ISEC’s Chair.
Triage: CSIS working-level officials do the initial assessment. This assessment requires the official to determine if one or more of the four risk criteria are met. These criteria are:
“Based on the available information about the foreign entity, if the information is disclosed or requested, is there a probability that the foreign entity will engage in torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment against an individual(s)?”
“If the information is disclosed or requested, is there a probability that the foreign entity will disseminate the information in an unauthorized manner to a 3rd party, which may result in torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment against an individual(s) by that 3rd party?”
“If the information is disclosed or requested, is there a probability that it may result in the extraordinary rendition of an individual(s) by the foreign entity which would lead to the individual(s) being tortured or subject to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment?
“If the information is disclosed or requested, is there a probability or an extrajudicial killing of an individual(s) by the foreign entity or other security entities within the country?”
Four scenarios could occur before a case lands at ISEC:
[***description of four possible scenarios and the assessment criteria used to determine risk mitigation and/or ecalation***]
Working Group: While there is a senior management committee, there is no working level group on the operations side.
Senior Management Committee: ISEC is CSIS’s senior-level review committee for foreign information sharing activities. It is composed of CSIS senior managers and representatives from DoJ and GAC. This committee is responsible to determine if a case poses a substantial risk and if it can be mitigated. If ISEC cannot determine if the substantial risk is mitigatable, the case is referred to the Director. Of note, GAC and DoJ are no longer voting members on ISEC but will continue to provide feedback and advice.
Country Assessments: CSIS conducts its own country assessments. Each information exchange arrangement with a foreign entity has its own Arrangement Profile (AP). APs include a summary of the human rights summary.
Mitigation Measures: CSIS relies on a few mitigation measures. First, CSIS widely uses ‘Form of Words’, which include caveats. Second, CSIS uses assurances and relies on standardized templates provided to foreign entities. CSIS may also tailor assurances to address specific concerns, such as extra-judicial killings.
Identifying/Sensitizing Information: ██████ is responsible for CSIS’s information sharing framework. [***name of a specific unit***] is responsible for official policy management. Concerned program areas are responsible for applying related polices and procedures for ACA-related activities.
Annex F: DFO
Framework Updates: Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) did not make any changes to last year’s approach.
Triage: The initial assessment is made by the person receiving the request for information sharing or who first comes into possession of information derived from a foreign source. Risk is determined on a case-by-case basis.
The sector-level analyst/officer does the initial assessment and relies on OGD assessments to determine the level of risk. They determine the level of risk in relation to the specific case and whether they assess that there is a substantial risk or not will impact the level of approval. If the analyst/officer does not think there is risk, the case may proceed. This, according to the decision screen and information received, does not require any manager or senior level approval.
If the analyst/officer believes or is unsure that there is a substantial risk, the senior-level Internal Review Committee (IRC) must seek DM approval.
Working Group: Internal Review Committee
Senior Management Committee: DFO employs the use of a decision screen and the IRC as demonstrated above. It is unclear whether DFO has developed guidance to help officials and management accurately and consistently determine the risk of mistreatment.
Country Assessments: DFO relies on country assessments conducted by GAC (as well as DFO legal services, RCMP and CSIS as needed) to make mistreatment risk determinations.
Mitigation measures: DFO indicated that it employs the use of caveats and assurances as necessary but has not yet had to seek such assurances. As such, there is no tracking mechanism in place. The Department is able to retroactively determine when, how, and why a decision was made through its record keeping system. A process is in place to record the details of each case, its evaluation process, and any resulting actions and decisions.
Annex G: Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces
Framework Updates: The Department of National Defence (DND) indicated that there were no changes to its framework since last year’s response.
Triage: The process of assessing risk is largely the same across all three forms of information sharing transactions. The process involves examining country human rights conditions, and researching specific partner entities, including any reports of mistreatment. Adverse information on a foreign partner is reviewed by the Defence Information Sharing Working Group (DISWG) and recommendations are made to the implicated L1s on how to manage information sharing activities (request, disclosure, or use). There are no differences in the types of mitigation measures employed across the three forms of information sharing. The primary governance document Release and Disclosure Officers (RDOs) and Release and Disclosure Authorities (RDAs) must adhere to is the CDI Interim Functional Directive: Information Sharing with Certain Foreign States and their Entities.
Working Group: The Defence Information Sharing Working Group (DISWG) is a working-level committee led by the Release and Disclosure Coordination Office (RDCO) within CFINTCOM that serves as an advisory body to operation Commanders regarding issues covered under the ACA. This Working Group exists as a platform for open dialogue related to information sharing arrangements and transactions. This group convenes monthly, or as required.
Senior Management Committee: The Defence Information Sharing Assessment Committee (DISAC) is chaired by the Chief of Defence Intelligence / Commander CFINTCOM . The DISAC’s primary object is to act as an advisory committee for the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff in support of their decision making regarding issues pertaining to the ACA.
Country Assessments: Currently, RDCO has established a list of low-risk countries that can be referred to by other L1s. Inclusion in this list indicates CDI’s confidence that sharing information with government entities of that foreign state can take place without a substantial risk of mistreatment. Moreover, RDCO has developed a draft methodology for Country Human Rights Profiles to classify countries as low, medium, or high risk but has only begun producing country human rights profiles on a few medium and high-risk countries and the methodology has not yet formally approved. These profiles will be used by other L1s in the development of specific Partner Entity Assessments and to inform the overall risk assessment of sharing information with foreign entities.
Information Management: There is no common shared system or repository for all RDOs. Information decisions are recorded by RDOs at the unit level. In some cases, all transactions are recorded using a spreadsheet and should include all details relating to the collection, retention, dissemination or destruction of the information, but the precise format will vary. CFINTCOM is working to standardize RDO logs across DND/CAF. From an information management perspective, there have been no changes since last year’s report. Records of discussion of all DISWG meetings are kept centrally within RDCO/CFINTCOM and it is possible to retroactively determine how and why a decision or recommendation was made.
Mitigation Measures: DND uses mitigation measures to reduce the risk of mistreatment. For example, DND uses measures such as the sanitization of information, the inclusion of caveats, and/or the seeking of assurances, including on low-risk cases in order to err on the side of caution.
Annex H: FINTRAC
Framework Updates: The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) did not make any changes to their framework for the 2020 review year.
Triage: Who does the initial assessment will depend on the risk level classification of the country. If it’s green, the intelligence analyst (IA) does the risk assessment. If it’s yellow, the IA’s team leader does the risk assessment. If it’s red, Senior Level does the risk assessment. Regardless of the determined risk level, Senior Level must ultimately approve or decline the information exchange/use.
Partnerships and Working Groups: FINTRAC makes use of external organizations, such as the Egmont group, to ensure that member organizations are adhering to global standards against mistreatment. If one of these groups is found to have breached their duty of care, and is expelled from the group, then FINTRAC will cease to exchange information until the matter has been rectified. FINTRAC enters Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) with nations who wish to exchange information with them. To do so, each nation is assessed using a variety of criteria to determine their risk rating and whether an MOU should be established.
FINTRAC also regularly participates in ISCG meetings alongside other departments.
Senior Management Committee: FINTRAC does not have a senior management committee to determine risk like other departments. Instead, they rely on senior management and the Director to make final decisions on cases.
Country Assessments: FINTRAC established its own country assessments. Establishing each country assessment involves gathering pertinent information on the human rights situation in the country and using indicators to assess the risk level of mistreatment of each country. During the development of the country assessment process, FINTRAC consulted with other agencies/government departments captured under the ACA.
The Manager of International Relationships is responsible for monitoring and assessing the human rights profile of countries with which FINTRAC shares an MOU.
Mitigation Measures: Caveats and assurances are established at the signing of an MOU and repeated whenever sharing information with any foreign entity. The sharing of information is not allowed without a signed MOU.
Annex I: Global Affairs Canada
Framework Updates: Global Affairs Canada (GAC) indicated that no changes to their framework was made during the current review period.
Triage: There is not one unified set of processes at GAC for determining whether information being used by the department is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity. If an official determines that information that he or she has received is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and that official still wants to use the information, they are instructed in their training to consult with their Program management at HQ. Should that manager be unable to make a determination on their own as to whether the use would comply with the Act, they will consult the relevant departmental policy group and the department’s Legal Services Unit.
Working Groups: The Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee Secretariat
Senior Management Committees: The Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC) meetings focuses on the following:
Has the information, the use of which is being sought, likely been derived from mistreatment?
What are the proposed measures to mitigate the risks? What is the likelihood of their success?
Consider the justifications for and proportionality of any potential involvement with the foreign state or entity that may result in mistreatment.
The MDCC Secretariat will create a record of decision and circulate it for comment by MDCC members. Once finalized, it will be kept by the Secretariat for future reporting. The MDCC Secretariat follows up with the requesting official for updates on the outcome of the situation and requests a final update from the requesting official once the situation is resolved. Currently the MDCC Secretariat consists of one person.
Country Assessments: Global Affairs Canada’s human rights reports provide an evidence-based overview of the human rights situation in a particular country, including significant human rights-related events, trends and developments and include a section focused on mistreatment. There are no scores for countries however, and it is up to the officials to assess the risk based on the information in the reports.
Mitigation Measures: The Legal Services Unit and/or Intelligence Policy and Programs division will provide guidance on the limitations and the prohibitions of the use of information obtained through mistreatment. They are also able to propose potential mitigation measures, such as sanitization of the information, if there is a risk of further mistreatment; of depriving someone of their rights or freedoms; or if the information could be used as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding.
Annex J: IRCC
Framework Updates: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) indicated that there were no changes to its procedures regarding the disclosure of information to foreign entities.
Triage: The initial assessment is done by the employee/officer receiving a request to disclose information. Officers are provided with a country assessment tool that provides a country-level risk assessment. If the country is listed as low-risk and the employee does not believe there are any risks of mistreatment, they may proceed with the exchange and record the details of that exchange (i.e., what information was exchanged; to which country, etc) into the Global Case Management System (GCMS). If the country is high-risk, or the officer believes that there is any risk of mistreatment and they wish to pursue with the case, then the officer is required to refer the case to IRM and Admissibility to assess the risk of the exchange.
Senior Management Committee: IRCC has the Avoiding Complicity Assessment Committee. The Committee is comprised of executives representing relevant policy, operations, legal and privacy branches within the Department. The purpose of the Committee is to reassess whether the circumstances of the case meet the “substantial risk” threshold, and to determine whether mitigations could be sufficiently imposed to allow for the disclosure. If the Committee is unable to unanimously determine if the risk can be mitigated, and there remains a need to disclose the information to the requesting foreign entity, then the case will be referred to the Deputy Minister for final decision.
Country Assessments: IRCC officers are instructed to refer to an initial country assessment tool when they are contemplating any disclosure or request for information from a foreign entity. This tool provides a general assessment of the country’s risk. If the country is identified as a high-risk country, then the officer is required to make a Consultation Request before disclosing, requesting or using information. If the country is identified as medium-risk, then it is recommended that the officer make a Consultation Request.
Mitigation Measures: Possible mitigation measures for a case where a substantial risk of mistreatment has been determined, if available, would be established in the Consultation Request assessment and, if necessary, in the Avoiding Complicity Assessment Committee’s recommendation. In either case, the mitigations will be manually recorded in the case file where they can be later recalled and noted in the Annual Report.
Annex K: Public Safety
Please note that the above flow charts are draft and have not yet been approved.
Framework Updates: Public Safety (PS) does not yet have a framework for deciding whether an exchange of information with a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. PS noted, however, that it has drafted a departmental policy to support the department’s implementation of the Directions but it has not yet been approved by senior management.
Triage: PS officials at the operational level are responsible for identifying whether the disclosure of or request for information would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. Prior to the disclosure of or request for information to/from a foreign entity, PS officials, as per the draft policy, are expected to:
review risk assessments and information sharing arrangements/agreements to determine risks;
identify mitigation measures as needed; and
seek DG approval for the disclosure or request; and the DG would determine whether the risk can or cannot be mitigated and whether the case should be referred to the DM for determination and decision.
PS officials at the operational level are responsible for identifying whether information for potential use was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual. As per the draft policy, prior to the use of information, PS officials are expected to:
conduct an assessment to determine if the information was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual, if not previously completed by PS officials or another government department, and mark it accordingly, based on DG-level determination;
assess and characterize the accuracy and reliability of the information; and,
advise their DG of the circumstance; and the DG would determine whether the information would be used as per section 3 of the Directions and refer the decision to the DM to determine if the use of information in any way that deprives someone their rights or freedoms is necessary to prevent the loss of life or significant personal injury.
For PS program areas where responsibilities for program delivery are shared among multiple Government of Canada departments, PS officials may use accuracy and reliability assessments conducted by another Government of Canada department for the express purpose of the specific information exchange. In these cases, and where PS does not have sufficient information (such as the source of the information) to conduct an assessment, it will require Government of Canada departments to attest to having conducted the assessment. This same principle applies risk assessments and assessments as to whether information was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual.
Working Group: The ISCG is the primary interdepartmental forum for supporting interdepartmental collaboration and information-sharing between members as they implement the Act and Directions and is regularly attended by all members.
PS participates in the ISCG in three ways as the:
chair, coordinator and PS policy lead;
area responsible for implementing the ACA;
legal counsel representative.
PS has also made progress with ISCG guidance. However, due to COVID-19, the ISCG was limited in its capacity to convene meetings.
Senior Management Committee: PS does not have a formal senior management committee to review high-risk cases. The Investigative Authorities and Accountability Policy (IAAP) unit supports program areas in the referral process to the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (SADM) of the National and Cyber Security Branch for further examination. Acting as a senior Public Safety official, the SADM is responsible for referring cases to the Deputy Minister if they are unable to determine whether the risk of mistreatment can be mitigated.
Country Assessments: PS currently does not have any country assessments completed and plans to use other department’s assessments, but as outlined in its draft policy, PS expects to conduct country and entity assessments as part of its annual risk assessment process. The risk assessment process will ensure that an agreement with the foreign entity is in place prior to information sharing exchanges; review risk and country assessments developed by portfolio agencies (e.g. CSIS) and other departments (e.g. GAC), and consider human rights reporting from non-government entities.
The IAAP will coordinate, on an annual basis, risk assessments. To do so, IAAP may, for example, review human rights reports developed by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), country assessments prepared by portfolio agencies (e.g. CSIS), human rights reporting from non-government entities and country/entity specific material.
Mitigation Measures: PS currently has developed a draft policy to address mitigation measures and caveats. The draft policy will provide guidance to officials on how to assess risk and apply mitigation measure, while also defining approval levels and country assessment responsibilities.
Once a risk of mistreatment has been identified, the PS official is required to undertake a risk mitigation assessment prior to requesting the information. Approved risk mitigation mechanisms include:
the caveating of information,
obtaining assurance and/or
disclosing a limited amount of the information.
The policy also outlines requirements regarding the use of congruent mitigation mechanisms to collectively reduce the risk.
Annex L: Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Framework Updates: There were no changes to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) framework in 2020. RCMP has undertaken a number of internal reviews of its information sharing framework and continues to refine and optimize its processes.
RCMP also noted that it was in its final stages of rolling out an online training course specifically tailored to the ACA.
Triage: The Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC) process may be initiated if and when an information exchange involves a country identified as high or medium risk. A low-risk case would only be sent if an official believes there is the potential for mistreatment.
All RCMP personnel are required to consider the risk of mistreatment before requesting, disclosing or using information and to engage the FIRAC process if there is a substantial risk identified to a specific individual(s) with a country of exchange.
An employee is almost always the one to perform the initial risk assessment. When an entity is green, the employee may exchange or use information without consulting FIRAC, unless they express doubts. When an entity is yellow, the employee must consider whether or not there is a substantial risk of mistreatment by looking at a list of criteria (similar to CSIS). If one or more of these criteria is present, the employee must send the case to FIRAC. If the entity is red, the employee must send the case to FIRAC for the initial assessment, unless no personal information is exchanged.
Working Group: Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG). Full-length LEAG assessments include classified information from other Federal departments and agencies. The FIRAC Portal was developed to allow RCMP employees to access the assessments, and to further support compliance with the directions.
Senior Management Committee: FIRAC was established to facilitate the systematic and consistent review of RCMP files to ensure information exchanges do not involve or result in the mistreatment of any person.
FIRAC holds the responsibility to determine if a substantial risk exists and in cases where a substantial risk of mistreatment exists, make a recommendation on whether the proposed mitigating measures are adequate to mitigate the risk.
FIRAC’s recommendations are made by the Chair, upon the advice of the Committee, to the appropriate Assistant Commissioner / Executive Director responsible for the operational area seeking to disclose, request or use the information.
FIRAC determines if the risk is mitigatable or not. If it is, the case goes to the Assistant Commissioner. If it is not, FIRAC declines the exchange or use of information.
Country Assessments: An in-house country assessment model has been completed.
Countries are listed in alphabetical order, along with any specific foreign entities (i.e. police forces, military units, etc.) that have been assessed. For each entity, the risk level (Red-High, Yellow-Medium, Green-Low) is provided, as are the specific crime types and conditions.
Mitigation Measures: The RCMP leverages existing MOU’s with specific partners to partially mitigate underlying risk, in particular where mutually agreed standards around human rights exist as well as having a good track record for respecting caveats. Similarly, officials work with Liaison Officers to identify any relevant assurances or strategies, factors or conditions that could mitigate the risk of mistreatment posed by the information exchange, request for information or use of information.
All mitigation measures used are tracked through the FIRAC by filling in a FIRAC Request Form. Noting which mitigations/caveats are used is a mandatory part of the process.
Annex M: Transport Canada
Does not have a departmental framework for assessing ACA considerations, outside of the Passenger Protect Program (PPP).
Changes: Transport Canada (TC) developed a corporate policy in September 2020 to highlight the department’s ACA-related requirements, roles and responsibilities and remains a participant in PS framework.
Triage: Relies on PS’ framework for the Passenger Protect Program.
Should they have any concerns about a request for information from a foreign partner they will consult with other agencies, such as CSIS or GAC.
Working Group: TC is a voting member of the PPP Advisory Group but does not have any responsibility for drafting case briefs. At each meeting of the PPP Advisory Group, TC has ensured that all other voting members have acknowledged TC’s SATA-legislated responsibility for sharing the List with domestic and foreign air carriers, and its associated responsibilities under the ACA.
Senior Management Committee: TC does not have any senior management committee in place to further review cases with a potential for mistreatment.
Country Assessments: Rely on other government departments.TC relies on assessments by other departments such as PS and GAC.
Mitigation measures: The framework was established by Public Safety (lead on PPP), with consultations with the PPP partners (RCMP, CSIS, CBSA). TC has worked with PS to integrate mitigation measures into the operating procedures and protocols of PPP partners.
Review of the CSIS-RCMP relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation – NSIRA recommendations and CSIS-RCMP responses
Responses
Review of the CSIS-RCMP relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation – NSIRA recommendations and CSIS-RCMP responses
CSIS-RCMP relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation (NSIRA 2019-04)
NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS invest the resources needed to develop a broader range of sources of information in order to prevent further serious damage to the reviewed investigation.
CSIS-RCMP Response: Due to the variety of factors inherent in each investigation, CSIS always considers how best to collect information and mitigate threats, drawing on a number of tools and resources – in accordance with the CSIS Act and ministerial direction – dependent on the situation.
NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS and the RCMP prioritize the deployment of usable and compatible secure communications systems in order to make regional de-confliction more efficient.
CSIS-RCMP Response: CSIS and the RCMP are prioritizing the deployment of compatible secure communication. The CSIS Director and the RCMP Commissioner approved the development of a CSISRCMP Secure Communications Strategy, the implementation of which is already underway.
NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS and the RCMP continue to prioritize the timely implementation of recommendations from the Operational Improvement Review (OIR) in order to help address the operational shortcomings reported by the OIR and further illustrated in this review.
CSIS-RCMP Response: CSIS and the RCMP remain committed to implementing the OIR recommendations as well as the implementation of One Vision 3.0.
The OIR resulted in 76 recommendations, some of which include enhanced collaboration and information sharing in national security investigations, additional training for national security personnel, as well as the improved handling and disclosure of sensitive and classified information. Significant effort has been undertaken to ensure recommendations are adopted and implemented within both organisations. Some of the early successes include pilot projects such as the Leads Pilot that has resulted in enhanced CSISRCMP de-confliction within national security areas of focus.
The RCMP and CSIS continue to be fully supportive of implementing these needed changes to our organisations. This work, and efforts of the broader community, will ensure that the Government of Canada has a strong foundation of enhanced collaboration and the best tools available to mitigate threats and ensure public safety. This complex work however, is ongoing and challenges remain, particularly as it relates to the issue of intelligence and evidence. These significant challenges will require a whole-ofgovernment approach in order to address.
NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS and the RCMP develop a properly resourced complimentary strategy to address the threat examined in this report. In accordance with the vision set out in the Operational Improvement Review, the strategy should consider the full range of tools available to both agencies.
CSIS-RCMP Response: CSIS and the RCMP coordinate and collaborate on national security threats and use strategies and resources best suited to individual operations.
As a result of the OIR, discussions between CSIS and the RCMP are more frequent and occur earlier in the process which has reduced the duplication of efforts between both of our agencies
The Considerations Matrix uses objective criteria to identify review topics in accordance with NSIRA’s core mandate and mission. The prioritization of reviews is informed by additional strategic factors, including resourcing, ongoing reviews, and public commitments.
Non-Discretionary Reviews and Reports
Annual
Canadian Security Intelligence Service's Threat Reduction Measures (TRM). NSIRA will review at least one aspect of CSIS's performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA). NSIRA will review the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA.
Security of Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). NSIRA will submit to the Minister of Public Safety a report respecting the disclosure of information under the SCIDA during the previous calendar year.
As Required
Ministerial Directions. NSIRA will review the implementation of significant aspects of every new or modified ministerial direction issued to CSIS, CSE, and any other organization if it relates to national security or intelligence.
Core Considerations for Discretionary Reviews
Referrals from Ministers. NSIRA may review any matter that relates to national security or intelligence that is referred to it by a minister of the Crown.
History repeats itself. Reviews of activities or programs with histories of non-compliance.
High-Risk. Reviews of activities where the impact of compliance issues are vast.
Circle Back. Reviews that follow up on findings or recommendations made by previous NSIRA reviews or emerging from NSIRA complaint investigations.
Rules of the Road. Reviews that examine significant changes in the legal landscape governing national security or intelligence organizations or activities.
Making Good. Reviews that fulfil a commitment or objective outlined in public fora, for example in NSIRA's Public Annual Report.
Following up. Reviews which address issue(s) raised during previous NSIRA reviews.
Wide Lens. Reviews with a focus on horizontal themes and/or topics pertaining to multiple organizations across the national security and intelligence landscape.
New and Novel. Reviews of activities or programs that NSIRA has yet to examine.
Happening Now. Reviews that examine current or emerging national security activities or issues.
Building Blocks. Reviews with links to previously completed reviews.
We're On It. Reviews that examine an issue or concern, or recommendation originating from another organization in the review or oversight community or concern matters of public controversy.
Working With Others. Reviews that involve cooperation with other review bodies, for example the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP.
Diversity. Reviews that relate to the government’s policies on anti-racism, equity, and inclusion.
Technology Considerations
Dual-Use. Reviews of activities involving technology(ies) that can be used for more than one purpose.
New and Novel. Reviews of activities involving technology(ies) that NSIRA has yet to examine.
Big Data. Reviews of activities involving data warehousing, bulk data and/or data analytics.
Artificial Intelligence & Algorithms. Reviews of activities involving automated decision-making.
Bycatch. Reviews of activities that may involve the collection of personal information from non-threat actors.
It is my pleasure to present the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) 2023–24 Departmental Plan. This report provides an overview of NSIRA’s planned activities, priorities, and targeted outcomes for the 2023–24 fiscal year.
Throughout NSIRA’s first three years of operation, we have grown our staff complement, developed expertise in alignment with our broad mandate, and completed numerous high-quality reviews and complaint investigations. NSIRA has also developed and revised the processes that guide work on both aspects of our mandate, with a view to continuously improving the quality of our final products.
In 2023–24, we will implement NSIRA’s renewed forward review plan, which will build upon and expand our subject matter expertise with respect to both the core security and intelligence agencies, and those which are newer to review. This includes further developing NSIRA’s capacity to review the technological elements of national security and intelligence activities.
Over the year ahead, NSIRA will establish new service standards for the investigation of complaints, while continuing to apply the existing rules of procedure. This will support timely and efficient investigations and promote access to justice for complainants.
Throughout the upcoming fiscal year, we will continue to focus on maintaining a safe and healthy workplace and prioritizing the well-being of our workforce. We will continue work to establish a permanent second site, place heightened emphasis on post-graduate recruitment, and continue to implement a flexible approach to hybrid work. In doing so, we will continue to advance departmental priorities related to diversity and inclusion, and to implement our agency accessibility plan.
My sincere thanks go to the staff and members of NSIRA, whose commitment and dedication to success will drive our organization forward over the coming year.
John Davies Executive Director
Plans at a glance
Over the coming year, NSIRA will continue its ambitious review agenda. This will include:
mandatory reviews related to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and Governor in Council directions under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act;
reviews prompted by previous reviews that identified high-risk activities or significant issues that require follow-up;
reviews of activities undertaken under the new authorities granted to government institutions under the National Security Act, 2017; and
reviews of activities where technology and the collection of data are central features.
NSIRA will also continue to expand its knowledge of departments and agencies not previously subject to expert review, including through the conduct of interagency reviews.
After an extensive consultation exercise with key stakeholders and the development of new rules of procedures in 2021, NSIRA will also focus on implementing its new model for investigating complaints. The agency’s goal is to continue enhancing access to justice for complainants and to ensure that NSIRA investigates complaints in a timely manner.
Employee development, health and well-being continue to be key to the agency’s success. NSIRA’s suite of initiatives to protect the physical and mental health of its employees will rely on up-to-date information from surveys and internal discussion groups. NSIRA will also continue to take action on broad federal public service objectives for pay and employment equity, as well as those relating to diversity, inclusion and accessibility.
For more information on NSIRA’s plans, see the “Core responsibilities: planned results and resources, and key risks” section of this plan.
Core responsibilities: planned results and resources, and key risks
This section contains information on the department’s planned results and resources for each of its core responsibilities. It also contains information on key risks related to achieving those results.
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Description
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. It investigates complaints from members of the public regarding activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), or the national security activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security-related complaints. This independent scrutiny contributes to the strengthening of the framework of accountability for national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions and supports public confidence in this regard.
Planning highlights
Reviews
In support of this outcome, NSIRA will continue to implement an ambitious review agenda in 2023–24. It will review the activities of CSIS and CSE to provide responsible ministers and the Canadian public with an informed assessment of these activities, including their lawfulness, reasonableness and necessity. NSIRA will also build on the knowledge it has acquired of departments and agencies, such as the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. Using that knowledge, NSIRA will ensure these organizations’ national security or intelligence activities are independently reviewed. NSIRA is committed to transcending the silos that have characterized national security review, and will “follow the thread” of an activity between agencies to ensure its assessments reflect the complex and interwoven approach Canada takes to national security.
NSIRA is committed to ensuring its review agenda remains responsive and topical. In 2023–24 in order to inform the upcoming review of the National Security Act, 2017, NSIRA will focus on the review of activities performed under authorities that were granted by virtue of this legislation. For CSIS, these include the collection and use of datasets, and the implementation of a framework for justifying activities that contravene the law that are carried out by designated employees under specific circumstances in the context of their duties and functions. For CSE, this will include the conduct of active and defensive cyber operations. Other NSIRA reviews that will contribute information in this regard are the annual reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act, of the Governor in Council directions under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, and of the use of measures by CSIS to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
NSIRA will continue to expand its knowledge of national security institutions by undertaking reviews in the areas of terrorist financing, foreign interference and cybersecurity. The agency will fully utilize its authorities to follow the thread of information across multiple organizations by undertaking reviews on CSIS-CSE collaboration, and the use of human sources by various departments and agencies.
Finally, NSIRA will focus on select reviews where the review of technology and data flows are central, including the collection and use of open-source intelligence at the Department of National Defence, the lifecycle of information collected under warrant by CSIS, and the retention practices of signals intelligence by CSE. NSIRA will be leveraging both internal and external technology expertise in conducting these reviews.
Outreach and collaboration
NSIRA will engage with community stakeholders to understand their concerns surrounding national security and intelligence activities. NSIRA will also continue to proactively publish unclassified versions of its reports throughout the year, as well as information on its plans and processes. The annual report will continue to summarize NSIRA’s review findings and recommendations in context, situating these elements within a broader discussion of key trends and challenges NSIRA has observed over the year.
In 2023–24, NSIRA will continue to draw on the close relationships it has established with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. The agency will coordinate its activities to ensure review is efficient and comprehensive, and avoids unnecessary duplication of effort.
NSIRA is also developing close ties to its international equivalents. It will continue its participation in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC) that brings together review agency representatives from Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, by hosting this annual conference in 2023. In addition, NSIRA will continue its working-level engagement with FIORC review bodies to discuss topics of common interest, such as the impacts of new technology, the investigation of complaints from the public and access to information in the possession of reviewed departments. NSIRA also intends to build on its recent efforts to foster new collaborative relationships with other international review bodies and civil society outside the Five Eyes.
Complaints investigations
In 2023–24, NSIRA will also continue to ensure institutions’ accountability and enhance public confidence by conducting consistent, and timely investigations into complaints related to national security and to denial of security clearances. The independent investigation of complaints plays a critical role in maintaining public confidence in Canada’s national security institutions.
NSIRA will apply its new rules of procedure, which were implemented in 2021, to promote accessibility, timeliness and efficiency in the investigation of complaints. This includes an informal resolution process that has proven successful in resolving complaints that do not need to proceed through the entire investigation process. Finally, NSIRA will establish new service standards for the investigation of complaints.
Gender-based analysis plus
In 2023–24, NSIRA will continue to implement its three-year action plan on human rights, accessibility, employment equity, diversity and inclusion. This plan was put into effect last fiscal year following a maturity assessment of NSIRA’s policies, programs and practices, and following the Call to Action from the Clerk of the Privy Council. It includes, among other things, incorporating a GBA+ lens into the design and implementation of policies and programs.
NSIRA’s renewed forward looking review plan is informed by considerations related to anti-racism, equity and inclusion. These considerations apply to the process of selecting reviews to undertake, as well as to the analysis that takes place within individual reviews. NSIRA reviews routinely take into account the potential for national security or intelligence activities to result in disparate outcomes for various communities and will continue to do so in the year ahead.
In the complaint investigations context, NSIRA will continue to work with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) to develop strategies for the collection, analysis and use of identity-based data. Following the completion of the first phase of a joint project, focus in the year ahead will be on consultations to determine how the public perceives the collection, analysis and use of identity-based data in relation to the NSIRA and CRCC mandate. This information will enable each agency to determine the best approach to developing and implementing an identity-based data strategy.
In 2023-24, NSIRA will begin to implement its inaugural accessibility plan, which outlines the steps that will be taken to increase accessibility, both within the organization and for Canadians more generally, over the next three years. NSIRA’s Diversity, Inclusion and Employment Equity Advisory Committee will also continue to work with management and staff to build a more equitable, diverse and inclusive workplace and workforce. This will include organizing discussions and learning events with all staff, and providing advice on policy and program design
Innovation
Some high impact innovations have enriched NSIRA’s approach to investigations and reviews in the areas of project architecture, quality assurance and the promotion of timeliness in its investigations. Some examples include a horizontal and tiered Quality Assurance Framework. This framework involves a form of ‘red teaming’, in which a panel of experts highlights the weaknesses of a project approach at critical junctures, with the goal of heading off problems before they happen This will ensure the review reflects the agency’s standards for independence, consistency, clarity, objectivity, and rigour. NSIRA is also adopting a matrix management approach to assembling review project teams that will ensure internal mobility and the development of horizontal expertise. NSIRA’s overall commitment is to refrain from a static approach to workflow and project management, and to embrace new methodologies and organizational principles when they best promote the production of review reports of exceptional quality.
Key risks
Some high impact innovations have enriched NSIRA’s approach to investigations and reviews in the areas of project architecture, quality assurance and the promotion of timeliness in its investigations. Some examples include a horizontal and tiered Quality Assurance Framework. This framework involves a form of ‘red teaming’, in which a panel of experts highlights the weaknesses of a project approach at critical junctures, with the goal of heading off problems before they happen This will ensure the review reflects the agency’s standards for independence, consistency, clarity, objectivity, and rigour. NSIRA is also adopting a matrix management approach to assembling review project teams that will ensure internal mobility and the development of horizontal expertise. NSIRA’s overall commitment is to refrain from a static approach to workflow and project management, and to embrace new methodologies and organizational principles when they best promote the production of review reports of exceptional quality.
Planned results for National Security and Intelligence Activity Reviews and Complaints Investigations
The following table shows, for National Security and Intelligence Activity Reviews and Complaints Investigations, the planned results, the result indicators, the targets and the target dates for 2023–24, and the actual results for the three most recent fiscal years for which actual results are available.
Departmental results
Departmental result indicator
Target
Date to achieve target
2019–20 actual result
2020–21 actual result
2021–22 actual result
Note: NSIRA was created on July 12, 2019. Actual results for 2019–20 and 2020–21 are not available because the new Departmental Results Framework in the changeover from the Security Intelligence Review Committee to NSIRA was being developed. This new framework is for measuring and reporting on results achieved starting in 2021–22. In 2022–23, NSIRA will finalize the development of service standards for how long it takes to complete its investigations; the results will be included in the next Departmental Results Report.
Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary
All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis
100% completion of mandatory reviews
December 2022
Not applicable (N/A)
N/A
100%
Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year
At least one national security or intelligence activity is reviewed in at least five departments or agencies annually
December 2022
N/A
N/A
100%
All Member-approved high priority national security or intelligence activities are reviewed over a three- year period
100% completion over three years; at least 33% completed each year
December 2022
N/A
N/A
33%
National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner
Percentage of investigations completed within NSIRA service standards
Between 90% and 100%
March 2024
N/A
N/A
N/A
The financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s program inventory is available on GC InfoBase.
Planned budgetary spending for National Security and Intelligence Activity Reviews and Complaints Investigations
The following table shows, for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations, budgetary spending for 2023–24, as well as planned spending for that year and for each of the next two fiscal years.
2023–24 budgetary spending (as indicated in Main Estimates)
2023–24 planned spending
2023–24 planned spending
2024–25 planned spending
10,807,324
10,807,324
10,807,324
10,806,338
Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s program inventory is available in the GC InfoBase.
Planned human resources for National Security and Intelligence Activity Reviews and Complaints Investigations
The following table shows, in full‑time equivalents, the human resources the department will need to fulfill this core responsibility for 2023–24 and for each of the next two fiscal years.
2023–24 planned full-time equivalents
2024–25 planned full-time equivalents
2025–26 planned full-time equivalents
69.0
69.0
69.0
Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s program inventory is available in the GC InfoBase.
Internal Services: planned results
Description
Internal services are the services that are provided within a department so that it can meet its corporate obligations and deliver its programs. There are 10 categories of internal services:
Management and Oversight Services
Communications Services
Legal Services
Human Resources Management Services
Financial Management Services
Information Management Services
Information Technology Services
Real Property Management Services
Materiel Management Services
Acquisition Management Services
Planning highlights
In 2023–24, NSIRA continue to take steps to ensure resources are deployed in the most effective and efficient manner possible and that its operational and administrative structures, tools and processes continue to enhance its ability to deliver on its priorities.
The tight labour market and the distinctive competencies required for NSIRA’s mandate will continue to shape NSIRA priorities in 2023–24, including employee development through seminars and increased participation in national and international forums, the use of internal centres of expertise, and improved leveraging of existing review and investigation information to accelerate and facilitate the acquisition of knowledge. NSIRA will also be able to benefit from recently released external recruitment and internal development programs undertaken within the organization.
The health and well-being of NSIRA employees is key to its success and to its ability to attract and retain talent and for the development of employees’ full potential. To that end, NSIRA has hired a dedicated resource to work with NSIRA’s Champions to accelerate the implementation of its diversity, inclusion, accessibility, mental health and employee development priorities. Using recent survey information and all staff meeting discussions, NSIRA is confident that it will be able to adapt its wellness initiatives to the need of its employees.
Lastly, the continuing impact of COVID-19 on the ability to source goods and services combined with the complexity of some projects has further delayed the completion of NSIRA’s accommodation, infrastructure and systems projects. These enabling investments are now projected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2023–24.
Planning for contracts awarded to Indigenous businesses
NSIRA is part of the final wave of departments and agencies that are to achieve the mandatory minimum target of contract awards to Indigenous businesses by 2024–25. Efforts are already well under way in support of the Government of Canada’s commitment that a mandatory minimum target of 5% of the total value of contracts is awarded to Indigenous businesses annually. NSIRA had planned to have 2% of total contract values awarded to Indigenous business in 2021–22 and achieved 3%. Measures undertaken within NSIRA to facilitate the achievement of the mandatory minimum target by 2024–25 include a commitment to process an increasing minimum number of contracts in each of the following three fiscal years as set-asides under the Procurement Strategy for Indigenous Business.
The following table shows the percentage of actual, forecasted and planned value for the target.
5% reporting field description
2021–22 actual % achieved
2022–23 forecasted % target
2023–24 planned % target
2024–25 planned % target
Total percentage of contracts with Indigenous businesses
3%
2%
3%
5%
Planned budgetary financial resources for Internal Services
The following table shows, for internal services, budgetary spending for 2023–24, as well as planned spending for that year and for each of the next two fiscal years.
2023–24 budgetary spending (as indicated in Main Estimates)
2023–24 planned spending
2024–25 planned spending
2025–26 planned spending
12,201,901
12,201,901
7,701,607
7,737,518
Planned human resources for Internal Services
The following table shows, in full‑time equivalents, the human resources the department will need to carry out its internal services for 2023–24 and for each of the next two fiscal years.
2023–24 planned full-time equivalents
2024–25 planned full-time equivalents
2025–26 planned full-time equivalents
31.0
31.0
31.0
Planned spending and human resources
This section provides an overview of the department’s planned spending and human resources for the next three fiscal years and compares planned spending for 2023–24 with actual spending for the current year and the previous year.
Planned spending
Departmental spending 2020–21 to 2025–26
The following graph presents planned (voted and statutory) spending over time.
Text version of Figure 1
Departmental spending trend graph
2020–21
2021–22
2022–23
2023–24
2024–25
2025–26
Statutory
962,186
1,176,321
1,360,985
1,755,229
1,755,229
1,756,977
Voted
11,289,189
16,113,433
19,348,025
21,253,996
16,753,702
16,786,929
Total
12,251,375
17,289.754
20,709.010
23,009,225
18,508,931
18,543,906
Fiscal years 2020–21 and 2021–22 show actual expenditures as reported in the Public Accounts, while 2022–23 presents the forecast for the current fiscal year. Fiscal years 2023–24 to 2025–26 present planned spending.
The 2021–22 spending of $17.3 million increased by $5.0 million (41%), compared with 2020–21. The increase is mainly explained by the cost of additional resources hired by NSIRA over that period, by an increase in professional services costs, and by the start of facilities fit-up and expansion projects. Forecast spending in 2022–23 is higher than 2021–22 spending by $3.4 million (20%), primarily due to continued growth in personnel and by investments in facilities, infrastructure and systems.
Spending is expected to increase by $2.3 million (11%) in 2023–24 compared with 2022–23. This planned increase is mainly due to a reprofile of funding to align with the timing of the conduct projects for facilities, infrastructure and systems that had been delayed by the pandemic. Spending is expected to decrease by $4.5 million (20%) in 2024–25, mainly due to the expected completion of the office expansion project in 2023–24. Spending in 2024–25 and 2025–26 is expected to remain relatively unchanged.
Budgetary planning summary for core responsibilities and Internal Services (dollars)
The following table shows information on spending for each of NSIRA’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for 2023–24 and other relevant fiscal years.
Core responsibilities and Internal Services
2020–21 actual expenditures
2021–22 actual expenditures
2022–23 forecast spending
2023–24 budgetary spending (as indicated in Main Estimates)
2023–24 planned spending
2024–25 planned spending
2025–26 planned spending
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
5,607,796
7,394,642
8,472,193
10,807,324
10,807,324
10,807,324
10,806,388
Subtotal
5,607,796
7,394,642
8,472,193
10,807,324
10,807,324
10,807,324
10,806,388
Internal Services
6,643,579
9,895,112
12,236,817
12,201,901
12,201,901
7,701,607
7,737,518
Total
12,251,375
17,289,754
20,709,010
23,009,225
23,009,225
18,508,931
18,543,906
The table illustrates how NSIRA continues to grow its capacity to deliver its mandate through recruitment and the implementation of several facilities, infrastructure and systems projects. Planned accommodation, infrastructure and systems project costs are expected be reduced significantly by 2024–25.
Planned human resources
The following table shows information on human resources, in full-time equivalents, for each of NSIRA’s core responsibilities and for its internal services for 2023–24 and the other relevant years.
Human resources planning summary for core responsibilities and Internal Services
Core responsibilities and Internal Services
2020–21 Actual full-time equivalents
2021–22 Actual full-time equivalents
2022–23 Forecast full-time equivalents
2023–24 Planned full-time equivalents
2024–25 Planned full-time equivalents
2025–26 Planned full-time equivalents
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
17.5
37.8
53.3
69.0
69.0
69.0
Subtotal
17.5
37.8
53.3
69.0
69.0
69.0
Internal Services
11.2
21.7
25.9
31.0
31.0
31.0
Total
28.7
59.5
79.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
With a tight labour market and the requirement for a significant portion of employees to work primarily from secure office space, recruitment continues to prove challenging. New recruitment and retention programs will help NSIRA in its ongoing efforts to be fully staffed.
Estimates by vote
Information on NSIRA’s organizational appropriations is available in the 2023–24 Main Estimates.
Future-oriented condensed statement of operations
The future‑oriented condensed statement of operations provides an overview of NSIRA’s operations for 2022–23 to 2023–24.
The forecast and planned amounts in this statement of operations were prepared on an accrual basis. The forecast and planned amounts presented in other sections of the Departmental Plan were prepared on an expenditure basis. Amounts may therefore differ.
A more detailed future‑oriented statement of operations and associated notes, including a reconciliation of the net cost of operations with the requested authorities, are available on NSIRA’s website.
Future-oriented condensed statement of operations for the year ending March 31, 2024 (dollars)
Financial information
2022–23 Forecast results
2023–24 Planned results
Difference (2023–24 planned results minus 2022–23 Forecast results)
Total expenses
18,549,572
23,599,775
5,050,203
Total revenues
–
–
–
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers
18,549,572
23,599,775
5,050,203
The difference between the 2023–24 planned results and 2022–23 forecast results is mostly explained by delayed planned accommodation, infrastructure and systems project costs.
Corporate Information
Organizational profile
Appropriate minister: The Right Honourable Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada Institutional head: John Davies, Executive Director Ministerial portfolio: Privy Council Office Enabling instrument:National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act Year of incorporation / commencement: 2019
Raison d’être, mandate and role: who we are and what we do
Information on NSIRA’s raison d’être, mandate and role is available on NSIRA’s website.
Operating context
Information on the operating context is available on NSIRA’s website.
Reporting framework
NSIRA’s approved departmental results framework and program inventory for 2023–24 are as follows
Text version of Figure 2
Core Responsibility: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Departmental Results Framework
Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary
Indicator: All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis
Internal Services
Indicator: Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year
Indicator: All Member-approved high priority national security or intelligence activities are reviewed over a three-year period
National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner
Indicator: Percentage of investigations completed within NSIRA service standards
Program Inventory
Program: National security and intelligence activity reviews and complaints investigations
Supporting information on the program inventory
Supporting information on planned expenditures, human resources and results related to NSIRA’s program inventory is available on GC InfoBase.
Supplementary information tables
The following supplementary information tables are available on NSIRA‘s website.
Gender-based analysis plus
Federal tax expenditures
NSIRA’s Departmental Plan does not include information on tax expenditures.
Tax expenditures are the responsibility of the Minister of Finance. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for government‑wide tax expenditures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures. This report provides detailed information on tax expenditures, including objectives, historical background and references to related federal spending programs, as well as evaluations, research papers and gender-based analysis plus.
Organizational contact information
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5W5
Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
budgetary expenditures(dépenses budgétaires)
Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, organizations or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.
core responsibility(responsabilité essentielle)
An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a core responsibility are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence.
Departmental Plan(plan ministériel)
A report on the plans and expected performance of an appropriated department over a 3‑year period. Departmental Plans are usually tabled in Parliament each spring.
departmental priority(priorité)
A plan or project that a department has chosen to focus and report on during the planning period. Priorities represent the things that are most important or what must be done first to support the achievement of the desired departmental results.
departmental result(résultat ministériel)
A consequence or outcome that a department seeks to achieve. A departmental result is often outside departments’ immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes.
departmental result indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel)
A quantitative measure of progress on a departmental result.
departmental results framework(cadre ministériel des résultats)
A framework that connects the department’s core responsibilities to its departmental results and departmental result indicators.
Departmental Results Report(rapport sur les résultats ministériels)
A report on a department’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.
experimentation(expérimentation)
The conducting of activities that seek to first explore, then test and compare the effects and impacts of policies and interventions in order to inform evidence-based decision-making, and improve outcomes for Canadians, by learning what works, for whom and in what circumstances. Experimentation is related to, but distinct from innovation (the trying of new things), because it involves a rigorous comparison of results. For example, using a new website to communicate with Canadians can be an innovation; systematically testing the new website against existing outreach tools or an old website to see which one leads to more engagement, is experimentation.
full‑time equivalent(équivalent temps plein)
A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person‑year charge against a departmental budget. For a particular position, the full‑time equivalent figure is the ratio of number of hours the person actually works divided by the standard number of hours set out in the person’s collective agreement.
gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus)(analyse comparative entre les sexes plus [ACS Plus])
An analytical process used to assess how diverse groups of women, men and gender-diverse people experience policies, programs and services based on multiple factors including race ethnicity, religion, age, and mental or physical disability.
For the purpose of the 2020–21 Departmental Results Report, those high-level themes outlining the government’s agenda in the 2019 Speech from the Throne, namely: Fighting climate change; Strengthening the Middle Class; Walking the road of reconciliation; Keeping Canadians safe and healthy; and Positioning Canada for success in an uncertain world.
horizontal initiative(initiative horizontale)
An initiative where two or more federal organizations are given funding to pursue a shared outcome, often linked to a government priority.
non‑budgetary expenditures(dépenses non budgétaires)
Net outlays and receipts related to loans, investments and advances, which change the composition of the financial assets of the Government of Canada.
performance (rendement)
What an organization did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the organization intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified.
performance indicator(indicateur de rendement)
A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an organization, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.
performance reporting(production de rapports sur le rendement)
The process of communicating evidence‑based performance information. Performance reporting supports decision making, accountability and transparency.
plan(plan)
The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how an organization intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally, a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead to the expected result.
planned spending(dépenses prévues)
For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts presented in Main Estimates.
A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports.
program(programme)
Individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels.
program inventory(répertoire des programmes)
Identifies all the department’s programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department’s core responsibilities and results.
result(résultat)
A consequence attributed, in part, to an organization, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single organization, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the organization’s influence.
statutory expenditures(dépenses législatives)
Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made.
target (cible)
A measurable performance or success level that an organization, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.
voted expenditures(dépenses votées)
Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an appropriation act. The vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.
Statement of Management Responsibility Including Internal Control over Financial Reporting
Responsibility for the integrity and objectivity of the accompanying financial statements for the year ended March 31, 2022, and all information contained in these financial statements rests with the management of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). These financial statements have been prepared by management using the Government of Canada’s accounting policies, which are based on Canadian public sector accounting standards.
Management is responsible for the integrity and objectivity of the information in these financial statements. Some of the information in the financial statements is based on management’s best estimates and judgment, and gives due consideration to materiality. To fulfill its accounting and reporting responsibilities, management maintains a set of accounts that provides a centralized record of the NSIRA’s financial transactions. Financial information submitted in the preparation of the Public Accounts of Canada, and included in the NSIRA’s Departmental Results Report, is consistent with these financial statements.
Management is also responsible for maintaining an effective system of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) designed to provide reasonable assurance that financial information is reliable, that assets are safeguarded and that transactions are properly authorized and recorded in accordance with the Financial Administration Act and other applicable legislation, regulations, authorities and policies.
Management seeks to ensure the objectivity and integrity of data in its financial statements through careful selection, training and development of qualified staff; through organizational arrangements that provide appropriate divisions of responsibility; through communication programs aimed at ensuring that regulations, policies, standards, and managerial authorities are understood throughout the NSIRA and through conducting an annual risk-based assessment of the effectiveness of the system of ICFR.
The system of ICFR is designed to mitigate risks to a reasonable level based on an ongoing process to identify key risks, to assess effectiveness of associated key controls, and to make any necessary adjustments.
A risk-based assessment of the system of ICFR for the year ended March 31, 2022 was completed in accordance with the Treasury Board Policy on Financial Management and the results and action plans are summarized in the annex.
The financial statements of the National Security and Intelligence Agency have not been audited.
The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.
Statement of Change in Departmental Net Debt (Unaudited)
For the Year Ended March 31(in thousands of dollars)
2022
2021
(Restated Note 11)
Net cost of operations after government funding and transfers
(2,361)
(1,095)
Change due to tangible capital assets
Acquisition of tangible capital assets
3,114
1,352
Amortization of tangible capital assets
(528)
(171)
Total change due to tangible capital assets
2,586
1,181
Change due to prepaid expenses
(22)
(17)
Net increase (decrease) in departmental net debt
203
69
Departmental net debt – Beginning of year
472
403
Departmental net debt – End of year
675
472
The accompanying notes form an integral part of these financial statements.
Statement of Cash Flows (Unaudited)
For the Year Ended March 31 (in thousands of dollars)
2022
2021
(Restated Note 11)
Operating activities
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers
16,165
11,663
Non-cash items:
–
–
Amortization of tangible capital assets
(528)
(171)
Services provided without charge by other government departments (Note 9a)
(1,242)
(1,007)
Transfer of overpayments
15
60
Variations in Statement of Financial Position:
–
–
Increase (decrease) in accounts receivable and advances
5
542
Increase (decrease) in prepaid expenses
(22)
(17)
Decrease (increase) in accounts payable and accrued liabilities
299
41
Decrease (increase) in vacation pay and compensatory leave
(341)
108
Decrease (increase) in future employee benefits
88
(170)
Cash used in operating activities
14,439
11,049
Capital investing activities
–
–
Acquisitions of tangible capital assets (Note 7)
3,114
1,352
Cash used in capital investing activities
3,114
1,353
Net cash provided by Government of Canada
17,553
12,401
Notes to the Financial Statements (Unaudited)
1. Authority and objectives
The agency was established, effective July 12, 2019 under the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act).
The agency is a division of the federal public administration as set out in column 1 of Schedule I.1 of the Financial Administration Act and reports to Parliament through the Prime Minister.
The mandate of the agency is to review all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. The agency also investigates public complaints regarding key national security agencies and activities.
To achieve its strategic outcome and deliver results for Canadians, NSIRA articulates its plans and priorities based on the core responsibility and program inventory included below:
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. It investigates complaints from members of the public regarding activities of CSIS, CSE or the national security activities of the RCMP, as well as certain other national security-related complaints. This independent scrutiny contributes to the strengthening of the framework of accountability for national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions and supports public confidence in this regard.
Internal Services
Internal support services are groups of related activities and resources that are administered to support the needs of programs and other corporate obligations of an organization. These groups are: Management and Oversight Services; Communications Services; Legal Services; Human Resources Management Services; Financial Management Services; Information Management Services; Information Technology Services; Real Property Services; Materiel Services; Acquisition Services; and Other Administrative Services. Internal Services include only those activities and resources that apply across an organization and not to those provided specifically to a program.
2. Summary of significant accounting policies
These financial statements are prepared using NSIRA’s accounting policies stated below, which are based on Canadian public sector accounting standards. The presentation and results using the stated accounting policies do not result in any significant differences from Canadian public sector accounting standards.
Significant accounting policies are as follows:
(a) Parliamentary authorities
NSIRA is financed by the Government of Canada through Parliamentary authorities. Financial reporting of authorities provided to NSIRA do not parallel financial reporting according to generally accepted accounting principles since authorities are primarily based on cash flow requirements. Consequently, items recognized in the Statement of Operations and Departmental Net Financial Position and in the Statement of Financial Position are not necessarily the same as those provided through authorities from Parliament. Note 3 provides a reconciliation between the bases of reporting. The planned results amounts in the ”Expenses” and ”Revenues” sections of the Statement of Operations and Departmental Net Financial Position are the amounts reported in the Future-Oriented Statement of Operations included in the 2021-2022 Departmental Plan. The planned results amounts in the “Government funding and transfers” section of the Statement of Operations and Departmental Net Financial Position and in the Statement of Change in Departmental Net Debt were prepared for internal management purposes and have not been previously published.
(b) Net cash provided by Government of Canada
NSIRA operates within the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF), which is administered by the Receiver General for Canada. All cash received by NSIRA is deposited to the CRF, and all cash disbursements made by NSIRA are paid from the CRF. The net cash provided by Government is the difference between all cash receipts and all cash disbursements, including transactions between departments of the Government.
(c) Amounts due from or to the CRF
Amounts due from or to the CRF are the result of timing differences at year-end between when a transaction affects authorities and when it is processed through the CRF. Amounts due from the CRF represent the net amount of cash that NSIRA is entitled to draw from the CRF without further authorities to discharge its liabilities.
(d) Expenses
Vacation pay and compensatory leave are accrued as the benefits are earned by employees under their respective terms of employment.
Services provided without charge by other government departments for accommodation, employer contributions to the health and dental insurance plans and workers’ compensation are recorded as operating expenses at their carrying value.
(e) Employee future benefits
Pension benefits: Eligible employees participate in the Public Service Pension Plan, a pension plan administered by the Government. NSIRA’s contributions to the Plan are charged to expenses in the year incurred and represent the total departmental obligation to the Plan. NSIRA’s responsibility with regard to the Plan is limited to its contributions. Actuarial surpluses or deficiencies are recognized in the financial statements of the Government of Canada, as the Plan’s sponsor.
Severance benefits: The accumulation of severance benefits for voluntary departures ceased for applicable employee groups. The remaining obligation for employees who did not withdraw benefits is calculated using information derived from the results of the actuarially determined liability for employee severance benefits for the Government as a whole.
(f) Accounts receivable
Accounts receivable are initially recorded at cost and when necessary, an allowance for valuation is recorded to reduce the carrying value of accounts receivable to amounts that approximate their net recoverable value.
(g) Non-financial assets
All tangible capital assets having an initial cost of $10,000 or more are recorded at their acquisition cost. Tangible capital assets do not include immovable assets located on reserves as defined in the Indian Act, works of art, museum collection and Crown land to which no acquisition cost is attributable; and intangible assets.
Inventories are valued at cost and are comprised of spare parts and supplies held for future program delivery and are not primarily intended for resale. Inventories that no longer have service potential are valued at the lower of cost or net realizable value.
(h) Measurement uncertainty
The preparation of these financial statements requires management to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported and disclosed amounts of assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses reported in the financial statements and accompanying notes at March 31. The estimates are based on facts and circumstances, historical experience, general economic conditions and reflect the Government’s best estimate of the related amount at the end of the reporting period. The most significant items where estimates are used are contingent liabilities, the liability for employee future benefits and the useful life of tangible capital assets. Actual results could significantly differ from those estimated. Management’s estimates are reviewed periodically and, as adjustments become necessary, they are recorded in the financial statements in the year they become known.
(i) Related party transactions
Related party transactions, other than inter-entity transactions, are recorded at the exchange amount.
Inter-entity transactions are transactions between commonly controlled entities. Inter-entity transactions, other than restructuring transactions, are recorded on a gross basis and are measured at the carrying amount, except for the following:
Services provided on a recovery basis are recognized as revenues and expenses on a gross basis and measured at the exchange amount.
Certain services received on a without charge basis are recorded for departmental financial statement purposes at the carrying amount.
3. Parliamentary authorities
NSIRA receives most of its funding through annual Parliamentary authorities. Items recognized in the Statement of Operations and Departmental Net Financial Position and the Statement of Financial Position in one year may be funded through Parliamentary authorities in prior, current or future years. Accordingly, NSIRA has different net results of operations for the year on a government funding basis than on an accrual accounting basis. The differences are reconciled in the following tables:
(a) Reconciliation of net cost of operations to current year authorities used
(in thousands of dollars)
2022
2021
(Restated Note 11)
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers
16,165
11,663
Adjustments for items affecting net cost of operations but not affecting authorities:
Amortization of tangible capital assets
(528)
(171)
Services provided without charge by other government departments
(1,242)
(1,007)
Increase / (decrease) in vacation pay and compensatory leave
(341)
109
Increase / (decrease) in employee future benefits
88
(170)
Refund of prior years’ expenditures
41
481
Total items affecting net cost of operations but not affecting authorities
(1,982)
759
Adjustments for items not affecting net cost of operations but affecting authorities
Acquisition of tangible capital assets
3,114
1,352
Amortization of tangible capital assets
(22)
(17)
Accounts receivable and advances
15
12
Total items not affecting net cost of operations but affecting authorities
3,107
1,347
Current year authorities used
17,290
12,251
(b) Authorities provided and used
(in thousands of dollars)
2022
2021
Authorities provided:
Vote 1 – Operating expenditures
30,851
22,592
Statutory amounts
1,176
962
Less:
Lapsed: Operating
(14,737)
(11,303)
Current year authorities used
17,290
12,251
4. Accounts payable and accrued liabilities
The following table presents details of NSIRA’s accounts payable and accrued liabilities.
(in thousands of dollars)
2022
2021
Accounts payable – Other government departments and agencies
436
444
Accounts payable – External parties
784
1,075
Total accounts payable
1,220
1,519
Total accounts payable and accrued liabilities
1,220
1,519
5. Employee future benefits
(a) Pension benefits
NSIRA’s employees participate in the Public Service Pension Plan (the ”Plan”), which is sponsored and administered by the Government of Canada. Pension benefits accrue up to a maximum period of 35 years at a rate of two percent per year of pensionable service, times the average of the best five consecutive years of earnings. The benefits are integrated with Canada/Québec Pension Plan benefits and they are indexed to inflation.
Both the employees and the Agency contribute to the cost of the Plan. Due to the amendment of the Public Service Superannuation Act following the implementation of provisions related to Economic Action Plan 2012, employee contributors have been divided into two groups – Group 1 related to existing plan members as of December 31, 2012 and Group 2 relates to members joining the Plan as of January 1, 2013. Each group has a distinct contribution rate.
The 2021-22 expense amounts to $1,072,922 ($877,610 in 2020-21). For Group 1 members, the expense represents approximately 1.01 times (1.01 times in 2020-21) the employee contributions and, for Group 2 members, approximately 1.00 times (1.00 times in 2020-21) the employee contributions.
NSIRA’s responsibility with regard to the Plan is limited to its contributions. Actuarial surpluses or deficiencies are recognized in the Consolidated Financial Statements of the Government of Canada, as the Plan’s sponsor.
(b) Severance benefits
Severance benefits provided to NSIRA’s employees were previously based on an employee’s eligibility, years of service and salary at termination of employment. However, since 2011 the accumulation of severance benefits for voluntary departures progressively ceased for substantially all employees. Employees subject to these changes were given the option to be paid the full or partial value of benefits earned to date or collect the full or remaining value of benefits upon departure from the public service. By March 31, 2018, substantially all settlements for immediate cash out were completed. Severance benefits are unfunded and, consequently, the outstanding obligation will be paid from future authorities.
The changes in the obligations during the year were as follows:
(in thousands of dollars)
2022
2021
Accrued benefit obligation – Beginning of year
316
146
Expense for the year
(7)
170
Benefits paid during the year
(81)
–
Accrued benefit obligation – End of year
228
316
6. Accounts receivable and advances
The following table presents details of NSIRA’s accounts receivable and advances balances:
2022
2021
Receivables – Other government departments and agencies
546
581
Receivables – External parties
60
51
Employee advances
31
–
Net accounts receivable
637
632
7. Tangible capital assets
Amortization of tangible capital assets is done on a straight-line basis over the estimated useful life of the asset as follows:
Asset Class
Amortization Period
Informatics hardware
3 to 10 years
Other equipment
3 to 30 years
Leasehold improvements
Over the useful life of the improvement or the lease term, whichever is shorter
Assets under construction
once in service, in accordance with asset type
(in thousands of dollars)
Cost
Accumulated Amortization
Net Book Value
(1) Adjustments include assets under construction that were transferred to the other categories upon completion of the assets.
Capital Asset Class
Opening Balance
Acquisitions
Adjustments (1)
Disposal and Write- Offs
Closing Balance
Opening Balance
Amortization
Adjustments (1)
Disposals and Write- Offs
Closing Balance
2022
2021
Restated (Note 11)
Informatics hardware
279
56
–
–
335
189
78
–
–
267
68
90
Other equipment
1,095
29
–
–
1,124
306
115
–
–
421
703
789
Leasehold improvements
–
136
869
–
1,005
–
335
–
–
335
670
–
Assets under construction
1,269
2,893
(869)
–
3,293
–
–
–
–
–
3,293
1,129
Total
2,643
3,114
–
–
5,757
495
528
–
–
1,023
4,734
2,148
8. Contractual obligations
The nature of the NSIRA’s activities may result in some large multi-year contracts and obligations whereby NSRIA will be obligated to make future payments in order to carry out its programs or when the services/goods are received. Significant contractual obligations that can be reasonably estimated are summarized as follows:
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028 and subsequent
Total
Professional and special services
2,257
418
–
–
–
–
2,615
Repair and maintenance
3,886
–
–
–
–
–
3,886
Rental
117
–
–
–
–
–
117
Transportation and communications
89
–
–
–
–
–
89
Total
6,349
418
–
–
–
–
6,767
9. Related party transactions
NSIRA is related as a result of common ownership to all government departments, agencies, and Crown corporations. Related parties also include individuals who are members of key management personnel or close family members of those individuals, and entities controlled by, or under shared control of, a member of key management personnel or a close family member of that individual.
NSIRA enters into transactions with these entities in the normal course of business and on normal trade terms.
During the year, NSIRA received common services which were obtained without charge for other government departments as disclosed below.
(a) Common services provided without charge by other government departments
During the year, the NSIRA received services without charge from certain common service organizations, related to accommodation and the employer’s contribution to the health and dental insurance plans. These services provided without charge have been recorded at the carrying value in NSIRA’s Statement of Operations and Departmental Net Financial Position as follows:
(in thousands of dollars)
2022
2021
Accommodation
486
451
Employer’s contribution to the health and dental insurance plans
756
556
Total
1,242
1,007
The Government has centralized some of its administrative activities for efficiency, cost-effectiveness purposes and economic delivery of programs to the public. As a result, the Government uses central agencies and common service organizations so that one department performs services for all other departments and agencies without charge. The costs of these services, such as the payroll and cheque issuance services provided by Public Services and Procurement Canada and audit services provided by the Office of the Auditor General are not included in the Department’s Statement of Operations and Departmental Net Financial Position.
(b) Other transactions with other government departments and agencies
2022
2021
Expenses
6,844
5,595
10. Segmented information
Presentation by segment is based on the Department’s core responsibility. The presentation by segment is based on the same accounting policies as described in the Summary of significant accounting policies in Note 2. The following table presents the expenses incurred and revenues generated for the main core responsibilities, by major object of expense and by major type of revenue. The segment results for the period are as follows:
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Internal Services
2022
2021
Expenses
Salaries and employee benefits
7,638
2,644
10,282
7,995
Professional and special services
231
3,239
3,470
1,845
Accommodation
–
505
505
451
Transportation and communications
30
183
213
88
Information
23
46
69
192
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
4
350
354
864
Repair and maintenance
–
3,091
3,091
1,258
Amortization of tangible capital assets
–
528
528
171
Rental
–
130
130
152
Utilities, materials and supplies
4
26
30
8
Other
430
(2,937)
(2,507)
(1,361)
Total expenses
8,360
7,805
16,165
11,663
Net cost from continuing operations
8,360
7,805
16,165
11,663
11. Adjustments to prior year’s results
As a result of a review, NSIRA identified minor rounding discrepancies. These changes have been applied retroactively and comparative information for 2020-21 has been restated. The effect of these adjustments is presented in the table below.
2021
(As previously stated)
Effect of the adjustment
2021
(Restated)
Statement of Financial Position
Tangible capital assets
7,638
2,644
10,282
Total non-financial assets
231
3,239
3,470
Departmental net financial position
–
505
505
Statement of Operations and Departmental Net Financial Position
Internal Services
30
183
213
Total Expenses
23
46
69
Net cost of operations after government funding and transfers
4
350
354
Departmental net financial position – End of year
–
3,091
3,091
Statement of Change in Departmental Net Debt
Net cost of operations after government funding and transfers
–
528
528
Acquisition of tangible capital assets
–
130
130
Total change due to tangible capital assets
4
26
30
Statement of Cash Flow
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers
430
(2,937)
(2,507)
Cash used in operating activities
8,360
7,805
16,165
Acquisitions of tangible capital assets
8,360
7,805
16,165
Note 3(a) – Parliamentary authorities
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers
11,662
1
11,663
Acquisition of tangible capital assets
1,353
(1)
1,352
Total items not affecting net cost of operations but affecting authorities
1,348
(1)
1,347
Note 7 – Tangible capital assets
Assets under construction – Net Book Value
430
(1)
(2,507)
Total – Net Book Value
8,360
(1)
16,165
Note 10 – Segmented Information
Salaries and employee benefits
7,994
1
7,995
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
694
170
864
Other
(1,191)
(170)
(1,361)
Total Expenses
11,662
1
11,663
Net cost from continuing operations
11,662
1
11,663
Annex to the Statement of Management Responsibility Including Internal Control over Financial Reporting for Fiscal Year 2021-22 (unaudited)
1. Introduction
This document provides summary information on measures taken by the National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to maintain an effective system of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) including information on internal control management, assessment results and related action plans.
Detailed information on NSIRA authority, mandate, and programs can be found in our Departmental Plan for the 2021 to 2022 fiscal year and our Departmental Results Report for the 2021 to 2022 fiscal year.
2. Departmental system of internal control over financial reporting
2.1 Internal Control Management
NSIRA has implemented a rigourous governance and accountability structure to support the oversight of its system of internal control, which includes:
organizational accountability structures as they relate to internal control management to support sound financial management, including the roles and responsibilities of senior departmental managers for control management in their areas of responsibility
values and ethics
ongoing communication and training on statutory requirements, and policies and procedures for sound financial management and control
monitoring of, and regular updates to, internal control management, as well as the provision of related assessment results and action plans to the deputy head and senior departmental management
NSIRA recognizes the importance of setting the tone from the top to help ensure that staff at all levels understand their roles in maintaining effective financial systems of ICFR and are well equipped to exercise these responsibilities effectively
2.2 Service Arrangements relevant to financial statements
NSIRA relies on other organizations for the processing of certain transactions that are recorded in its financial statements, and relies on these service providers to ensure an adequate system of ICFR is maintained over services provided to NSIRA.
Common Arrangements:
Public Services and Procurement Canada, which administers the payment of salaries and the procurement of goods and services, and provides accommodation services
Shared Services Canada, which provides IT infrastructure services
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, which provides information on public service insurance and centrally administers payment of the employer’s share of contributions toward statutory employee benefit plans
Readers of this annex may refer to the annexes of the above-noted departments for a greater understanding of the systems of internal control over financial reporting related to these specific services.
Specific Arrangements:
Prior to fiscal 2021-22, in accordance to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two organizations, NSIRA relied on the Privy Council Office (PCO) for the performance of financial services, including relevant control measures. Effective, April 1, 2021, NSIRA entered into a new MOU with PCO, which reflected a shift whereby NSIRA would work towards financial services self-sufficiency, by fiscal 2022-23 (including a transition period over fiscal 2021-22).
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat provides the agency with a SAP financial system platform to capture and report all financial transactions and a PeopleSoft human resources system platform to manage pay and leave transactions
3. Departmental assessments results during fiscal year 2021-22
Progress during the 2021-22 fiscal year
NSIRA’s management team has maintained a system of internal control that ensures that financial information is understandable, relevant, reliable and comparable in concert with the PCO’s support as per the MOU. Progress is disclosed in the Annex of PCO’s Statement of Management Responsibility.
New or significantly amended key controls
In the current fiscal year, there were no new or significantly amended key controls in existing processes that required reassessment. No significant adjustments were required.
On-going monitoring program
In the current fiscal year, NSIRA’s leveraged PCO’s rotational on-going monitoring plan disclosed in the Annex of PCO’s statement of management responsibility. Starting in fiscal 2022-23 NSIRA will establish its own rotational monitoring plan. See Departmental action plan below for additional information.
4. Departmental action plan
NSIRA’s risk-based monitoring plan over the next 3 fiscal years is shown in the following table.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) marked its second full year of operation in 2021–22, and we continued to build institutional processes and systems throughout the period with the goal of putting the organization on a solid long-term footing.
We refined our review processes, with an emphasis on generating high-quality reviews by establishing interdisciplinary teams that incorporate subject-matter, legal and technological expertise. Throughout the year, we expanded our institutional understanding of the various departments and agencies that make up Canada’s security and intelligence community, and reviewed activities that had not previously been subject to independent scrutiny. We also developed a consistent way to assess the timeliness of departmental responses to support public reporting and transparency.
In 2021–22, we implemented new Rules of Procedure for our complaints investigation process that were based on a major consultation and reform in the year prior. These new rules are aimed at enhancing efficiency in the process, as well as access to justice for complainants. Our work on both reviews and complaints investigations was informed by our network of like-minded review and complaints investigation bodies, as well as our network of Canadian and international academics and civil society organizations.
We continued our practice of proactively redacting and releasing review reports on our website. As stated in the past, we consider this type of transparency vital to the development of an enhanced culture of accountability among departments and agencies involved in national security and intelligence activities.
We achieved much throughout the year despite the ongoing pandemic, thanks to the hard work of our talented and dedicated staff. I would like to thank our employees for their commitment during this period, and for the energy and enthusiasm that they bring to the continued growth of our organization.
John Davies Executive Director National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
Results at a glance
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) began operating in 2019 as a new independent accountability mechanism in Canada. Its broad review and investigations mandate covers the national security and intelligence activities of departments and agencies across the federal government. The agency’s total actual spending in 2021–22 amounted to $17,289,754 and its total actual full-time equivalents were 74.
For a significant part of the fiscal year, the pandemic required NSIRA staff to work remotely, limiting its access to classified materials that are critical to NSIRA’s work. To adjust, NSIRA revised its review plans and used innovative approaches to continue to advance its work. This included implementing strict rotating schedules to enable limited office access for classified work to continue safely and using videoconference technology where possible. This allowed NSIRA to fulfill its statutory obligations and uphold its commitments to Canadians. Despite the restrictions, NSIRA was able to enhance its scrutiny of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities.
Below are some of NSIRA’s achievements in 2021–22.
Review
NSIRA’s review of national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions ensures that ministers and Canadians are informed about whether these activities were lawful, reasonable and necessary.
During 2021–22, NSIRA completed and approved 10 reviews, including six dedicated to reviewing the activities of a specific department or agency and four interdepartmental reviews that involved more than a dozen departments and agencies. This helped to extend both the breadth and depth of NSIRA’s knowledge and experience.
NSIRA continued to develop and improve its review framework. With the creation of its Technology Directorate, for example, NSIRA boosted its capacity to do technical review. The review framework now embeds legal and technological experts in the review process at the outset of reviews and outlines a clear process to promote consistency across subject areas.
Complaint investigations
NSIRA independently investigates national security and intelligence–related complaints from members of the public and strives to do so in a timely manner.
In fiscal year 2021–22, NSIRA completed two complaints investigations and issued two final reports. NSIRA also received 58 referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission, pursuant to subsection 45(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, substantially increasing its inventory of complaint files. This high-volume caseload affected NSIRA’s overall management of its cases.
In 2021, NSIRA also finalized its major reform and modernization of its complaints investigation process, aimed at streamlining the procedural steps and promoting access to justice for self-represented complainants.
Reporting and transparency
During the reporting period, NSIRA remained committed to publishing redacted and depersonalized investigation reports to promote and enhance transparency in its investigations as set out in its January 2021 policy statement. NSIRA also turned its attention to examining appropriate ways to release declassified and depersonalized final complaints investigations reports, and consulted with parties to the complaint investigations.
For more information on NSIRA’s plans, priorities and results achieved, see the “Results: what we achieved” section of this report.
Results: what we achieved
Core responsibility
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Description:
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. It investigates complaints from members of the public regarding activities of CSIS, CSE or the national security activities of the RCMP, as well as certain other national security-related complaints. This independent scrutiny contributes to the strengthening of the framework of accountability for national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions and supports public confidence in this regard.
Results:
In 2021–22, NSIRA delivered on its mandate by completing reviews on federal departments and agencies involved in a wide array of national security and intelligence activities, and efficiently supported agency members in conducting several complaints investigations using a revised and improved process.
Review of national security and intelligence activities
NSIRA completed 10 national security and intelligence reviews over the course of 2021–22. Six reviews focused on an individual department or agency, while four reviews were interdepartmental by design. Organizations whose activities were the subject of specific reviews included:
Canadian Security Intelligence Service — two reviews
Communications Security Establishment — two reviews
Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces — two reviews
The four interdepartmental reviews were by design were:
Rebuilding Trust: Reforming the CSIS Warrant and Justice Legal Advisory Processes
Study of the Government of Canada’s Use of Biometrics in the Border Continuum
the annual review of disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
the annual review of the implementation of directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act
Six of NSIRA’s reviews resulted in recommendations to ministers on issues related to compliance and governance. One review did not result in any recommendations but had four findings. The three other reviews helped NSIRA gain a better baseline understanding of certain organizations or activities, which will help guide future reviews. As a result of NSIRA’s unclassified and publicly released reviews, as well as its annual reporting, NSIRA contributes to increased confidence among Canadians in the independent review of national security and intelligence activities carried out by Government of Canada institutions.
During the reporting period, NSIRA continued to refine its review framework to promote high quality and rigour in its work, and to ensure consistency in the way it executes reviews. This framework provides systematic guidance on NSIRA’s process and approach, and embeds legal and technological expertise in reviews from the outset. NSIRA also developed new guidelines to assess the timeliness of reviewee responses to requests for information during the review process, and will comment both privately and publicly on the outcomes. As it improves its processes, NSIRA’s aim continues to be to produce the most consistent, objective and rigorous reviews possible.
In 2021–22, NSIRA established a Technology Directorate to enhance review by incorporating the capability to examine the use and implementation of technology by security and intelligence agencies in Canada. In the coming year, NSIRA will increase the number of employees working in the Technology Directorate as it takes an increasingly active and significant role. The directorate will also lead the first technology-focused reviews of the lifecycle of CSIS information collected by technical capabilities pursuant to a Federal Court warrant.
Investigation of national security and intelligence–related complaints
During the reporting period, NSIRA continued to adapt in conducting its complaints investigations by finding procedural efficiencies and using innovative approaches whenever possible. This included proceeding in writing for certain investigative steps and using videoconference technology for case management conferences, hearings and investigative interviews. Some departments and agencies were slow to respond to requests for information and evidence, in part due to challenges inherent to the COVID-19 pandemic, which delayed NSIRA’s investigations. Consequently, in several ongoing matters, NSIRA granted adjournments and extensions of deadlines for procedural steps, including the filing of submissions and evidentiary material. The reasons provided for the adjournments and requests for extensions not only were pandemic related but also included issues surrounding the availability of witnesses and shortage of resources of federal government parties. In addition, NSIRA had to ask for further information in response to incomplete initial disclosures in more than one investigation, also creating delays.
In 2021–22, NSIRA completed two complaints investigations and issued two final reports. Ministers, complainants and the public were informed of the conclusions of investigations of national security and intelligence–related complaints. NSIRA also dealt with a substantial increase in its inventory of complaint files as a result of 58 complaints referred by the Canadian Human Rights Commission to NSIRA in April and June 2021, pursuant to subsection 45(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. This high-volume caseload impacted NSIRA’s overall management of its cases.
In 2021, NSIRA completed its investigation process reform initiative after extensive consultation with stakeholders in the public and private sectors. In July 2021, NSIRA launched its new investigative process, which included the implementation of new Rules of Procedure to enhance efficiency in NSIRA’s investigation mandate and provide greater access to justice for self-represented complainants.
Lastly, NSIRA will finalize in 2022–23 the service standards for how long it takes to complete its investigations. The results will be included in the next Departmental Results Report.
Gender-based analysis plus
Building from naming a Champion and establishing a committee to take action against systemic employment equity, diversity and inclusion issues in 2020, NSIRA continued to work hard to create a culture of inclusion. At an individual level, the agency held staff discussions on anti-racism and themes related to diversity. In response to the Call to Action from the Clerk of the Privy Council, NSIRA completed a maturity assessment of its policies, programs and practices related to human rights, accessibility, employment equity, diversity and inclusion, and developed a three-year action plan to guide its efforts.
When reviewing national security and intelligence activities, NSIRA analysts are prompted to examines these activities’ potential for resulting in unequal outcomes for visible minority groups. For instance, among last year’s reviews, the Study of the Government of Canada’s Use of Biometrics in the Border Continuum examined the approach of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and of the Canada Border Services Agency to preventing bias and discrimination against some groups of people in the use of biometrics by these agencies.
In terms of investigations, complainants file with NSIRA pursuant to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act and the Rules of Procedure. Following the practices and procedures systematically in all complaint matters ensures a non-discriminatory process.
Furthermore, NSIRA and another review body are finalizing a study on how to systematically collect, analyze and use race-based and other demographic data in the complaints investigation process. This study draws on academic expertise to provide NSIRA insight into: whether significant racial disparities exist among civilian complainants; whether racial differences exist with respect to the types of complaints made against members of national security organizations based on different groups; the frequency of complaints that include allegations of racial or other forms of bias; and whether complaints investigation outcomes vary by racial group. NSIRA also aims to use the study results to improve public awareness and understanding of its investigation process, as well as to guide the development of NSIRA’s outreach and public engagement priorities
Experimentation
Given NSIRA’s functions and responsibilities, the agency did not engage in any program-related experimentation activities.
Key risks
Timely access to information, and the ability to verify that it has been provided with all relevant information, are paramount to the successful execution of NSIRA’s review and complaints investigation mandates. During the reporting period, departments and agencies delayed unnecessarily in providing NSIRA information and, in some reviews, NSIRA had to ask for additional information because of incomplete initial disclosures. NSIRA eventually received all relevant information from responding government departments and agencies for its investigations. NSIRA will continue to seek direct access to systems to ensure a high degree of confidence, reliability and independence in its work. During the reporting period, NSIRA also developed clear guidelines for assessing the timeliness and responsiveness of departments and agencies for its reviews, including remedial steps to be taken to respond to delays.
Physical distancing protocols and lockdowns required by the COVID-19 pandemic limited NSIRA employees’ access to classified physical and electronic documents in 2021–22. Flexible measures that follow current public health conditions mitigate the impact of the pandemic on NSIRA’s ability to deliver on its mandate in a timely way.
The pandemic also complicated the recruitment, onboarding and training of new review staff. NSIRA mitigated these impacts by increasing and adapting its office space, investing in communications technology, and implementing novel approaches to recruitment and onboarding.
Results achieved
The following table shows, for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations, the results achieved, the performance indicators, the targets and the target dates for 2021–22, and the actual results for the three most recent fiscal years for which actual results are available.
Departmental results
Performance indicators
Target
Date to achieve target
2019-20 actual results
2020-21 actual results
2021-22 actual results
Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary
All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis
100% completion of mandatory reviews
2021-22
Not applicable (N/A)
N/A
100%
Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year
At least one national security or intelligence activity is reviewed in at least five departments or agencies annually
2021-22
N/A
N/A
100%
All Member-approved high priority national security or intelligence activities are reviewed over a three- year period
100% completion over three years; at least 33% completed each year
2021-22
N/A
N/A
33%
National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner
Percentage of investigations completed within NSIRA service standards
90%
2022-23
N/A
N/A
N/A
Note: NSIRA was created on July 12, 2019. Actual results for 2019–20 and 2020–21 are not available because the new Departmental Results Framework in the changeover from the Security Intelligence Review Committee to NSIRA was being developed. This new framework is for measuring and reporting on results achieved starting in 2021–22. In 2022–23, NSIRA will finalize the development of service standards for how long it takes to complete its investigations; the results will be included in the next Departmental Results Report.
Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s Program Inventory is available in GC InfoBase.
Budgetary financial resources (dollars)
The following table shows, for National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations, budgetary spending for 2021–22, as well as actual spending for that year.
2021–22 Main Estimates
2021–22 Planned spending
2021–22 Total authorities available for use
2021–22 Actual spending (authorities used)
2021–22 Difference (Actual spending minus Planned spending)
12,047,835
12,047,835
11,688,292
7,394,642
(4,653,193)
Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s Program Inventory is available in GC InfoBase.
The variance between planned and actual spending is mainly due to recruitment challenges.
Human resources (full-time equivalents)
The following table shows, in full‑time equivalents, the human resources the department needed to fulfill this core responsibility for 2021–22.
2021–22 Planned full-time equivalents
2021–22 Actual full-time equivalents
2021–22 Difference (Actual full-time equivalents minus Planned full-time equivalents)
69
52
(17)
Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s Program Inventory is available in GC InfoBase.
Internal Services
Description
Internal services are those groups of related activities and resources that the federal government considers to be services in support of programs and/or required to meet corporate obligations of an organization. Internal services refers to the activities and resources of the 10 distinct service categories that support program delivery in the organization, regardless of the internal services delivery model in a department. The 10 service categories are:
Acquisition Management Services
Communication Services
Financial Management Services
Human Resources Management Services
Information Management Services
Information Technology Services
Legal Services
Material Management Services
Management and Oversight Services
Real Property Management Services
Results
The pandemic continued to have an impact on NSIRA operations and activities throughout the year. The NSIRA Secretariat’s first priority was the safety of the agency’s employees and, as a result, it responded quickly to lockdowns by communicating COVID-19 working protocols and implementing its own vaccination policy following the Government of Canada call for mandatory vaccination for its public service employees. Furthermore, NSIRA recognized that a modern and flexible approach to work was necessary for the conduct of its mandated activities during the pandemic. As a result, NSIRA developed an evergreen COVID-19 guide where employees and managers could turn for up-to-date references on COVID-19 and on flexible work arrangements.
In light of the current and planned growth in personnel and the pandemic physical distancing requirements, NSIRA’s success depended on increasing its access to secure office space to conduct work of a classified nature. In 2021, NSIRA was able to increase its footprint by opening a temporary office site. At the same time, the plans for a permanent NSIRA site were also completed; construction of additional secure office space began in April 2022.
During the fiscal year, NSIRA focused on assessing gaps in its security and information management practices. The conduct of an agency security governance and controls assessment led to the approval and implementation of the Agency Security Plan recommendations in September 2021. NSIRA also published a policy on information management to ensure that roles, responsibilities and expectations regarding information management were defined, communicated, understood and adhered to throughout the organization. Since information and information management are critical in the conduct of NSIRA’s mandate, the agency developed a new classification plan, established information retention plans and developed strategies for the destruction, storage, digitization, transport and transfer of information.
Budgetary financial resources (dollars)
The following table shows, for internal services, budgetary spending for 2021–22, as well as spending for that year.
2021–22 Main Estimates
2021–22 Planned spending
2021–22 Total authorities available for use
2021–22 Actual spending (authorities used)
2021–22 Difference (Actual spending minus Planned spending)
18,147,084
18,147,084
20,338,994
9,895,112
(8,251,972)
The difference of $8.3 million between planned and actual spending is mainly explained by the impacts of the pandemic on NSIRA’s ability to progress with its facilities fit-up and expansion plans, as well as on its planned spending on internal services infrastructure and systems.
Human resources (full-time equivalents)
The following table shows, in full‑time equivalents, the human resources the department needed to carry out its internal services for 2021–22.
2021–22 Planned full-time equivalents
2021–22 Actual full-time equivalents
2021–22 Difference (Actual full-time equivalents minus Planned full-time equivalents)
31
22
(9)
Spending and human resources
Spending
Spending 2019–20 to 2024–25
The following graph presents planned (voted and statutory spending) over time.
Text version of Figure 1
Departmental spending trend graph
2019-20
2020-21
2021-22
2022-23
2023-24
2024-25
Statutory
371,057
962,186
1,176,321
1,704,632
1,704,632
1,727,668
Voted
5,254,250
11,289,189
16,113,433
24,423,008
16,731,355
16,731,061
Total
0
5,625,250
12,251,375
30,194,919
26,127,640
18,435,987
The graph illustrates NSIRA’s spending trends over a six-year period from 2019–20 to 2024–25. Fiscal years 2019–20 to 2021–22 reflect actual expenditures as reported in the Public Accounts. Fiscal years 2022–23 to 2024–25 represent planned spending.
The increase in spending from 2019–20 to 2021–22 is mainly explained by the cost of additional resources hired by NSIRA over that period, by an increase in professional services costs, and by the start of facilities fit-up and expansion.
The overall difference between actual spending in 2021–22 and planned spending in 2022–23 is due to lower spending than planned on payroll and on facilities fit-up and expansion in 2021–22 as a result of the pandemic.
The difference between the peaks in spending authorities in 2022–23 and 2023–24 with the levelling of authorities in 2024–25 is due to the sunsetting of funding earmarked for the completion of facilities fit-up and expansion.
Budgetary performance summary for core responsibilities and internal services (dollars)
The “Budgetary performance summary for core responsibilities and internal services” tablepresents the budgetary financial resources allocated for NSIRA’s core responsibilities and for internal services.
Core responsibilities and Internal Services
2021-22 Main Estimates
2021-22 Planned spending
2022-23 Planned spending
2023-24 Planned spending
2021-22 Total authorities available for use
2019-20 Actual spending (authorities used)
2020-21 Actual spending (authorities used)
2021-22 Actual spending (authorities used)
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
12,047,935
12,047,835
10,740,923
10,744,262
11,688,292
3,009,066
5,607,796
7,394,642
Subtotal
12,047,835
12,047,835
10,740,923
10,744,262
11,688,292
3,009,066
5,607,796
7,394,642
Internal Services
18,147,084
18,147,084
15,386,717
7,691,725
20,338,994
2,616,241
6,643,579
9,895,112
Total
30,194,919
30,194,919
26,127,640
18,435,987
32,027,286
5,625,307
12,251,375
17,289,754
Human resources
The “Human resources summary for core responsibilities and internal services” table presents the full-time equivalents (FTEs) allocated to each of NSIRA’s core responsibilities and to internal services.
Human resources summary for core responsibilities and internal services
Core responsibilities and Internal Services
2019-20 Actual full-time equivalents
2020-21 Actual full-time equivalents
2021-22 Planned full-time equivalents
2021-22 Actual full-time equivalents
2022-23 Planned full-time equivalents
2023-24 Planned full-time equivalents
National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Appropriate minister: The Right Honourable Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada Institutional head: John Davies, Executive Director Ministerial portfolio: Privy Council Office Enabling instrument:National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act Year of incorporation / commencement: 2019
Raison d’être, mandate and role: who we are and what we do
“Raison d’être, mandate and role: who we are and what we do” is available on NSIRA‘s website.
Operating context
Information on the operating context is available on NSIRA’s website.
Reporting framework
NSIRA’s Departmental Results Framework, with accompanying results and indicators, were under development in 2020–21. Additional information on key performance measures are included in the 2021–22 Departmental Plan.
Text version of Figure 2
Core Responsibility: National Security and Intelligence Reviews and Complaints Investigations
Departmental Results Framework
Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable and necessary
Indicator: All mandatory reviews are completed on an annual basis
Internal Services
Indicator: Reviews of national security or intelligence activities of at least five departments or agencies are conducted each year
Indicator: All Member-approved high priority national security or intelligence activities are reviewed over a three-year period
National security-related complaints are independently investigated in a timely manner
Indicator: Percentage of investigations completed within NSIRA service standards
Program Inventory
Program: National security and intelligence activity reviews and complaints investigations
Supporting information on the program inventory
Financial, human resources and performance information for NSIRA’s Program Inventory is available in GC InfoBase.
Supplementary information tables
The following supplementary information table is available on NSIRA’s website:
Gender-based analysis plus
Federal tax expenditures
The tax system can be used to achieve public policy objectives through the application of special measures such as low tax rates, exemptions, deductions, deferrals and credits. The Department of Finance Canada publishes cost estimates and projections for these measures each year in the Report on Federal Tax Expenditures. This report also provides detailed background information on tax expenditures, including descriptions, objectives, historical information and references to related federal spending programs. The tax measures presented in this report are the responsibility of the Minister of Finance.
Organizational contact information
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5W5
Appendix: definitions
appropriation(crédit)
Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
budgetary expenditures(dépenses budgétaires)
Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, organizations or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.
core responsibility(responsabilité essentielle)
An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a core responsibility are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence.
Departmental Plan(plan ministériel)
A report on the plans and expected performance of an appropriated department over a 3‑year period. Departmental Plans are usually tabled in Parliament each spring.
departmental priority(priorité)
A plan or project that a department has chosen to focus and report on during the planning period. Priorities represent the things that are most important or what must be done first to support the achievement of the desired departmental results.
departmental result(résultat ministériel)
A consequence or outcome that a department seeks to achieve. A departmental result is often outside departments’ immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes.
departmental result indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel)
A quantitative measure of progress on a departmental result.
departmental results framework(cadre ministériel des résultats)
A framework that connects the department’s core responsibilities to its departmental results and departmental result indicators.
Departmental Results Report(rapport sur les résultats ministériels)
A report on a department’s actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.
experimentation(expérimentation)
The conducting of activities that seek to first explore, then test and compare the effects and impacts of policies and interventions in order to inform evidence-based decision-making, and improve outcomes for Canadians, by learning what works, for whom and in what circumstances. Experimentation is related to, but distinct from innovation (the trying of new things), because it involves a rigorous comparison of results. For example, using a new website to communicate with Canadians can be an innovation; systematically testing the new website against existing outreach tools or an old website to see which one leads to more engagement, is experimentation.
full‑time equivalent(équivalent temps plein)
A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person‑year charge against a departmental budget. For a particular position, the full‑time equivalent figure is the ratio of number of hours the person actually works divided by the standard number of hours set out in the person’s collective agreement.
gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus)(analyse comparative entre les sexes plus [ACS Plus])
An analytical process used to assess how diverse groups of women, men and gender-diverse people experience policies, programs and services based on multiple factors including race ethnicity, religion, age, and mental or physical disability.
For the purpose of the 2020–21 Departmental Results Report, those high-level themes outlining the government’s agenda in the 2019 Speech from the Throne, namely: Fighting climate change; Strengthening the Middle Class; Walking the road of reconciliation; Keeping Canadians safe and healthy; and Positioning Canada for success in an uncertain world.
horizontal initiative(initiative horizontale)
An initiative where two or more federal organizations are given funding to pursue a shared outcome, often linked to a government priority.
non‑budgetary expenditures(dépenses non budgétaires)
Net outlays and receipts related to loans, investments and advances, which change the composition of the financial assets of the Government of Canada.
performance (rendement)
What an organization did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the organization intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified.
performance indicator(indicateur de rendement)
A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an organization, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.
performance reporting(production de rapports sur le rendement)
The process of communicating evidence‑based performance information. Performance reporting supports decision making, accountability and transparency.
plan(plan)
The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how an organization intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally, a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead to the expected result.
planned spending(dépenses prévues)
For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts presented in Main Estimates.
A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports.
program(programme)
Individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels.
program inventory(répertoire des programmes)
Identifies all the department’s programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department’s core responsibilities and results.
result(résultat)
A consequence attributed, in part, to an organization, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single organization, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the organization’s influence.
statutory expenditures(dépenses législatives)
Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made.
target (cible)
A measurable performance or success level that an organization, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.
voted expenditures(dépenses votées)
Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an appropriation act. The vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.
The Access to Information Act gives Canadian citizens and permanent residents, as well as any person or corporation present in Canada, a right of access to information contained in government records, subject to certain specific and limited exceptions.
Section 94(1) of the Act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the Act within the institution and to submit the report to Parliament. In addition, section 20 of the Service Fees Act requires institutions to report on all statutory fees processed during the reporting period.
This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled in accordance with Section 94 of the Access to Information Act, and section 20 of the Service Fees Act, describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat in administering these Acts during the period April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022.
If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:
Access to Information and Privacy Office National Security and Intelligence Review Agency P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5 Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca
Who we are
Established in July 2019, NSIRA is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.
The NSIRA Secretariat assists the Review Agency in fulfilling its mandate.
Mandate
NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities.
Reviews
NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.
NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.
Investigations
NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:
any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.
Access to Information and Privacy Office
NSIRA’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.
For the reporting period, the NSIRA ATIP office consisted of:
1 full-time ATIP Coordinator
1 part-time ATIP Consultant
1 full-time Senior Director, who managed the ATIP office in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Senior Director of Corporate Services
NSIRA Legal Services supported the ATIP team on an as required basis.
The main activities of the ATIP Coordinator included:
monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
processing requests under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat respected the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments.
preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and
representing the NSIRA Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.
To assist the ATIP Office in meeting its legislative obligations, NSIRA relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter points of contact from all its branches.
Delegation Order
The Executive Director, as the Head of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat and pursuant to s.95(1) of the ATIA, is responsible for the implementation of the ATIA for NSIRA. Through the most recent NSIRA delegation order, the Executive Director has designated the ATIP Coordinator and ATIP Officer to perform the powers, duties, functions, or administrative tasks pertaining to the ATIA. These functions have limited delegation of authority under the Act and the Privacy Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The recently amended ATIA delegation orders can be found in Appendix A.
Performance and Statistical Overview
Performance in Processing Access Requests
During the reporting period, the number of access requests received by NSIRA increased by 1300% (14) compared to the previous year (1). The Agency also managed one request that was pending from previous years, bringing the total number of cases to 15. Of these, NSIRA closed 5 requests in 2021- 22, and 10 were carried over to the next reporting period.
NSIRA’s responses to many requests required intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations. In 2021-22, NSIRA’s on-time response rate decreased to 80% from 100% in the previous reporting year.
Consultations
NSIRA was consulted on 12 requests this fiscal year, compared to 7 in the previous reporting period. NSIRA closed 11 consultations and carried over one into 2022-2023.
Requests Treated Informally
In 2021-2022, NSIRA responded to 7 informal requests for records previously released under the ATIA process. This is an increase from no informal requests in 2020-2021. NSIRA responded to all 7 requests within 30 days of the request.
Complaints and Investigations of Access Requests
Subsection 30(1) of the Act describes how the Office of the Information Commissioner receives and investigates complaints from individuals regarding the processing of requests under the Act. NSIRA received one new complaint during the reporting period and worked closely with the Office of the Information Commissioner to resolve the complaint. This complaint concerned NSIRA’s delay in providing a response to a request before the established legislative deadline. NSIRA’s delay was largely due to extended external consultations; however, the complaint was closed as “well-founded” in 2022-2023 reporting period.
Access to Information Act fees for the Purposes of the Service Fees Act
In accordance with the Interim Directive on the Administration of the ATIA, issued on May 5, 2016, and the changes to the ATIA that came into force on June 21, 2019, NSIRA waived or refunded all fees prescribed by the Act and Regulations during the reporting period.
Training
In 2021–22, the ATIP office provided orientation sessions to new and current employees. In all, 3 separate sessions on access and privacy legislation were provided to 60 employees.
Privacy policies, guidelines, procedures and initiatives
NSIRA did not revise policies, guidelines, or procedures related to the Access to Information Act—or implement new ones—during the reporting period.
Monitoring processing time
Request processing times are monitored through the Access Pro software dashboard. The ATIP Coordinator notifies the Executive Director and suggests a course of action should any legislative timelines for responding to an ATIA request appear to be at risk.
Appendix A: Delegation Order
Access to Information Act Designation Order
The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.
Privacy Act Designation Order
The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act*, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.
Appendix B: 2019-2020 Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act
Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
Reporting period: 2019-04-01 – 2020-03-31
Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act
1.1 Number of Requests
Number of Requests
Received during reporting period
14
Outstanding from previous reporting period
0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period
1
Total
15
Closed during reporting period
5
Carried over to next reporting period
10
Carried over within legislated timeline
9
Carried over beyond legislated timeline
1
1.2 Sources of requests
Source
Number of Requests
Media
4
Academia
0
Business (private sector)
0
Organization
0
Public
10
Decline to Identify
0
Total
14
1.3 Channels of requests
Source
Number of Requests
Online
12
E-mail
1
Mail
1
In person
0
Phone
0
Fax
0
Total
14
Section 2: Informal requests
2.1 Number of informal requests
Number of Requests
Received during reporting period
7
Outstanding from previous reporting periods
0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period
0
Total
7
Closed during reporting period
7
Carried over to next reporting period
0
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source
Number of Requests
Online
7
E-Mail
0
Mail
0
In person
0
Phone
0
Fax
0
Total
7
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days
16 to 30 Days
31 to 60 Days
61 to 120 Days
121 to 180 Days
181 to 365 Days
More than 365 Days
Total
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
7
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed
101-500 Pages Processed
501-1000 Pages Processed
1001-5000 Pages Processed
More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.5 Pages re-released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed
101-500 Pages Processed
501-1000 Pages Processed
1001-5000 Pages Processed
More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
7
121
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Section 3: Applications to the Information Commissioner on Declining to Act on Requests
Number of Requests
Outstanding from previous reporting period
0
Sent during reporting period
0
Total
0
Approved by the Information Commissioner during reporting period
0
Declined by the Information Commissioner during reporting period
0
Withdrawn during reporting period
0
Carried over to next reporting period
0
Section 4: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period
4.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 Days
16 to 30 Days
31 to 60 Days
61 to 120 Days
121 to 180 Days
181 to 365 Days
More Than 365 Days
Total
All disclosed
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Disclosed in part
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
3
All exempted
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
All excluded
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
No records exist
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
Request transferred
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Request abandoned
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Neither confirmed nor denied
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Decline to act with the approval of the Information Commisioner
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
2
2
1
0
0
0
0
5
4.2 Exemptions
Section
Numbers of Requests
13(1)(a)
0
13(1)(b)
0
13(1)(c)
0
13(1)(d)
0
13(1)(e)
0
14
0
14(a)
0
14(b)
0
15(1) – I. A. *
0
15(1) – Def. *
2
15(1) – S.A. *
0
16(1)(a)(i)
0
16(1)(a)(ii)
0
16(1)(a)(iii)
0
16(1)(b)
1
16(1)(c)
2
16(1)(d)
0
16(2)
0
16(2)(a)
0
16(2)(b)
0
16(2)(c)
0
16(3)
0
16.1(1)(a)
0
16.1(1)(b)
0
16.1(1)(c)
0
16.1(1)(d)
0
16.2(1)
0
16.3
0
16.31
0
16.4(1)(a)
0
16.4(1)(b)
0
16.5
0
16.6
0
17
0
18(a)
0
18(b)
0
18(c)
0
18(d)
0
18.1(1)(a)
0
18.1(1)(b)
0
18.1(1)(c)
0
18.1(1)(d)
0
19(1)
2
20(1)(a)
0
20(1)(b)
0
20(1)(b.1)
0
20(1)(c)
0
20(1)(d)
0
20.1
0
20.2
0
20.4
0
21(1)(a)
1
21(1)(b)
0
21(1)(c)
0
21(1)(d)
0
22
0
22.1(1)
0
23
2
23.1
0
24(1)
1
26
0
* I.A.: International Affairs * Def.: Defence of Canada * S.A.: Subversive Activities
4.3 Exclusions
Section
Numbers of Requests
68(a)
0
68(b)
0
68(c)
0
68.1
0
68.2(a)
0
68.2(b)
0
69(1)
0
69(1)(a)
0
69(1)(b)
0
69(1)(c)
0
69(1)(d)
0
69(1)(e)
0
69(1)(f)
0
69(1)(g) re (a)
0
69(1)(g) re (b)
0
69(1)(g) re (c)
0
69(1)(g) re (d)
0
69(1)(g) re (e)
0
69(1)(g) re (f)
0
69.1(1)
0
4.4 Format of information released
Paper
Electronic
Other
E-record
Data set
Video
Audio
2
1
0
0
0
0
4.5 Complexity
4.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed
Number of Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
63
63
3
4.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition
Less Than 100 Pages Processed
101-500 Pages Processed
501-1000 Pages Processed
1001-5000 Pages Processed
More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
All disclosed
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Disclosed in part
3
63
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
All exempted
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
All excluded
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Request abandoned
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Neither confirmed nor denied
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Declined to act with the approval of the information Commissioner
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
3
63
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed
Number of Minutes Disclosed
Number of Requests
0
0
0
4.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition
Less Than 60 Minutes Processed
60 – 120 Minutes Processed
More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests
Minutes Processed
Number of Requests
Minutes Processed
Number of Requests
Minutes Processed
All disclosed
0
0
0
0
0
0
Disclosed in part
0
0
0
0
0
0
All exempted
0
0
0
0
0
0
All excluded
0
0
0
0
0
0
Request abandoned
0
0
0
0
0
0
Neither confirmed nor denied
0
0
0
0
0
0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed
Number of Minutes Disclosed
Number of Requests
0
0
0
4.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition
Less Than 60 Minutes Processed
60 – 120 Minutes Processed
More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests
Minutes Processed
Number of Requests
Minutes Processed
Number of Requests
Minutes Processed
All disclosed
0
0
0
0
0
0
Disclosed in part
0
0
0
0
0
0
All exempted
0
0
0
0
0
0
All excluded
0
0
0
0
0
0
Request abandoned
0
0
0
0
0
0
Neither confirmed nor denied
0
0
0
0
0
0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition
Consultation Required
Legal Advice Sought
Other
Total
All disclosed
0
0
0
0
Disclosed in part
2
0
0
2
All exempted
0
0
0
0
All excluded
0
0
0
0
Request abandoned
0
0
0
0
Neither confirmed nor denied
0
0
0
0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner
0
0
0
0
Total
2
0
0
2
4.6 Closed requests
4.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines
4
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%)
80
4.7 Deemed refusals
4.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines
Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload
External Consultation
Internal Consultation
Other
1
0
0
1
0
4.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines
Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken
Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken
Total
1 to 15 Days
1
0
1
16 to 30 Days
0
0
0
31 to 60 Days
0
1
0
61 to 120 Days
0
0
0
121 to 180 Days
0
0
0
181 to 365 Days
0
0
0
More than 365 Days
0
0
0
Total
1
0
1
4.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests
Accepted
Refused
Total
English to French
0
0
0
French to English
0
0
0
Total
0
0
0
Section 5: Extensions
5.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Disposition of Requests Where an Extension Was taken
9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload
9(1)(b) Consultation
Section 69
Other
All disclosed
0
0
0
Disclosed in part
0
0
0
All exempted
0
0
0
All excluded
0
0
0
Request abandoned
No records exist
0
0
0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner
0
0
0
Total
0
0
0
5.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions
9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload
9(1)(b) Consultation
Section 69
Other
30 days or less
0
0
0
31 to 60 days
0
0
0
61 to 120 days
0
0
0
121 to 180 days
0
0
0
181 to 365 days
0
0
0
365 days or more
0
0
0
Total
0
0
0
Section 6: Fees
Fee Type
Fee Collected
Fee Waived
Fee Refunded
Number of Requests
Amount
Number of Requests
Amount
Number of Requests
Amount
Application
0
$0.00
14
$0.00
0
$0.00
Other fees
0
$0.00
0
$0.00
0
$0.00
Total
0
$0.00
14
$0.00
0
$0.00
Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations
7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations
Other Government of Canada Institutions
Number of Pages to Review
Other Organizations
Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period
12
143
0
0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period
0
0
0
0
Total
12
143
0
0
Closed during the reporting period
11
123
0
0
Carried over within regotiated timelines
1
20
0
0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines
0
0
0
0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation
Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days
16 to 30 Days
31 to 60 Days
61 to 120 Days
121 to 180 Days
181 to 365 Days
More Than 365 Days
Total
Disclose entirely
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Disclose in part
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Exempt entirely
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Exclude entirely
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Consult other institution
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Other
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences
8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days
Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed
101-500 Pages Processed
501-1000 Pages Processed
1001-5000 Pages Processed
More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
1 to 15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16 to 30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
31 to 60
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
61 to 120
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
121 to 180
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
181 to 365
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
More than 365
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days
Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed
101-500 Pages Processed
501-1000 Pages Processed
1001-5000 Pages Processed
More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
Number of Requests
Pages Disclosed
1 to 15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16 to 30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
31 to 60
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
61 to 120
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
121 to 180
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
181 to 365
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
More than 365
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Section 9: Investigations and Reports of finding
9.1 Investigations
Section 32 Notice of intention to investigate
Subsection 30(5) Ceased to investigate
Section 35 Formal Representations
0
0
1
9.2 Investigations and Reports of finding
Section 37(1) Initial Reports
Section 37(2) Final Reports
Received
Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner
Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner
Received
Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner
Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner
0
0
0
0
0
0
Section 10: Court Action
10.1 Court actions on complaints
Section 41
Complainant (1)
Institution (2)
Third Party (3)
Privacy Commissioner (4)
Total
0
0
0
0
0
10.2 Court actions on third party notifications under paragraph 28(1)(b)
Section 44 – under paragraph 28(1)(b)
0
Section 11: Resources Related to the Access to Information Act
11.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures
Amount
Salaries
$24,082
Overtime
$0
Goods and Services
$0
Professional services contracts
$0
Other
$0
Total
$24,082
11.2 Human Resources
Resources
Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees
0.300
Part-time and casual employees
0.000
Regional Staff
0.000
Consultants and agency personnel
0.000
Students
0.000
Total
0.300
Note: Enter values to three decimal places.
Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act
Section 1: Capacity to Receive Requests under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act
Number of weeks
Able to receive requests by mail
52
Able to receive requests by email
52
Able to receive requests through the digital request service
52
Section 2: Capacity to Process Records under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act
2.1 Number of weeks your institution was able to process paper records in different classification levels
No capacity
Partial Capacity
Full capacity
Total
Unclassified Paper Records
0
0
52
52
Protected B Paper Records
0
0
52
52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records
0
0
52
52
2.2 Number of weeks your institution was able to process electronic records in different classification levels
Ottawa, Ontario, October 7, 2022 – The third Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) was tabled in Parliament today, October 7, 2022.
NSIRA’s 2021 Annual Report focuses on our progress and activities in our second full year of operation. During this time, we pursued the reform of our processes and methods for doing review and investigations, both of which helped us improve the consistency and efficiency of our work.
This report highlights key findings and recommendations. The report also presents our intention to use future annual reports to publicly assess and track the implementation of previous recommendations, in accordance with our continued commitment to transparency and public engagement. Review highlights include:
Four reviews of important areas of CSIS activities, notably CSIS threat reduction measures (TRMs) and technical capabilities, as well as the manner in which CSIS seeks and receives legal service from de Department of Justice and prepares and executes the warrants it needs to collect information. An annual compliance review of CSIS’s activities was also completed;
CSE activities, notably CSE’s governance framework that guides the conduct of active and defensive cyber operations, internal information sharing, and CSE disclosures of Canadian-identifying information (CII);
DND/CAF Defense Intelligence Enterprise and a follow-up review of the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit;
Two specifically mandated multi-departmental reviews with respect to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act and sharing of information within the federal government under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act; and,
One multi-departmental review relating to the collection and use of biometrics in the “border continuum”.
In 2021, NSIRA saw its complaints investigation caseload increase significantly as a result of 58 complaints referred to NSIRA by the Canadian Human Rights Commission pursuant to subsection 45(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. NSIRA also completed its investigation process reform initiative after consultation with multiple stakeholders. NSIRA investigations under this new model are already showing improved efficiency.
NSIRA’s 2021 Annual Report also discusses our organization’s underlining goals and values, and highlights how the organization continued to grow in size and capacity throughout the year, and sought to enhance its technical and subject-matter expertise.
On behalf of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, it is my pleasure to present you with our third annual report. Consistent with subsection 38(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, the report includes information about our activities in 2021, as well as our findings and recommendations.
In accordance with paragraph 52(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, our report was prepared after consultation with relevant deputy heads, in an effort to ensure that it does not contain information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, nation al defence or international relations, or is information that is subject to solicitor-client privilege, the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, or to litigation privilege.
Yours sincerely,
The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair // National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
Message from the members
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is pursuing its mission of enhancing accountability for national security and intelligence activities in Canada. In 2021, our agency continued to grow in size and improved its ability to fully take advantage of its broad review and investigations mandate covering the national security and intelligence activities of departments and agencies across the federal government.
It is our pleasure to present to you our third annual report in which we discuss our progress and activities in our second full year of operation. Despite the recurrent challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and delays caused by a cyber incident, we completed a wide array of reviews and investigations, and continued improving our processes across the agency. Indeed, we pursued the reform of our processes and methods for doing reviews and investigations, both of which helped us to improve the consistency and efficiency of our work tremendously. These reforms, in conjunction with our growing experience, have allowed us to implement and deliver on our review plan. All of this was made possible by the development of a much stronger corporate policy framework backed by a corporate group that really cares about service delivery and the health of the agency.
In accordance with our continued commitment to transparency and public engagement, this report will present our intention to use future annual reports to publicly assess and track the implementation of previous recommendations. In the same spirit of holding us and the reviewed organizations accountable, we also formalized standards that will allow us to assess the timeliness of responses. It is our hope that these initiatives, in addition to the stringent verification process to assess our confidence in each review that we are currently developing, will inspire confidence and trust in our recommendations and findings.
We would like to thank the staff of NSIRA’s Secretariat for their efforts, patience and resilience throughout this challenging year and we hope you share our enthusiasm for what we can accomplish in the year ahead.
Marie Deschamps Craig Forcese Ian Holloway Faisal Mirza Marie-Lucie Morin
Executive Summary
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) marked its second full year in operation in 2021. With the agency’s broad jurisdiction under the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), it reviewed and investigated national security and intelligence matters relating to not only the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), but also several federal departments and agencies, including:
the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF);
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP);
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC);
the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA);
Transport Canada; and
all departments and agencies engaging in national security and intelligence activities in the context of NSIRA’s yearly reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act.
In 2021, NSIRA continued to grow in capacity and sought to enhance its technical and subject-matter expertise.
Review highlights
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Over the course of 2021, NSIRA completed four reviews that strengthened its knowledge of important areas of CSIS activity:
a review of the cultural, governance and systemic issues arising in the context of the manner in which CSIS seeks and receives legal services from the Department of Justice and prepares and executes the warrants it needs to collect information;
a survey of CSIS’s suite of technical capabilities, along with its associated governancestructure, and areas of interest or concern to which NSIRA may return in future reviews;
the second annual review of CSIS’s Threat Reductions Measures (TRMs) that expandson findings from the previous review by examining a larger number of TRMs; and
an annual compliance review of CSIS’s activities.
Communications Security Establishment
In 2021, NSIRA completed two reviews of CSE activities, and directed CSE to conduct one departmental study:
a review of CSE’s governance framework that guides the conduct of active and defensive cyber operations, including whether CSE appropriately considered its legal obligations and the foreign policy impacts of operations;
a review focused on internal information sharing within CSE between the foreign intelligence aspect and the cybersecurity and information assurance aspect of its mandate; and
a departmental study on whether CSE disclosures of Canadian-identifying information were conducted in a manner that complies with the Communications Security Establishment Act, and were essential to international affairs, defence, security or cybersecurity.
Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
In 2021, NSIRA completed two reviews of the DND/CAF:
a scoping exercise to gain foundational knowledge of the Defence Intelligence Enterprise, where a significant part of intelligence functions of the DND/CAF are located; and
a follow-up review on the previous year’s examination of the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit, with emphasis on operational collection and privacy practices.
Multi-departmental reviews
NSIRA conducted two specifically mandated multi-departmental reviews in 2021:
a review of directions issued with respect to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act; and
a review of information sharing within the federal government under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act.
NSIRA also completed a multi-departmental review under its general mandate to review any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence:
to map the collection and use of biometrics across several federal government departments and agencies in security and intelligence activities related to international travel and immigration, that is, the “border continuum.”
Complaints investigations
In 2021, NSIRA saw its complaints investigation caseload increase significantly as a result of 58 complaints referred to NSIRA by the Canadian Human Rights Commission pursuant to subsection 45(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.
Further, the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to delays in NSIRA’s investigations by reducingparties’ responsiveness in providing access to information and evidence.
In 2021, NSIRA completed its investigation process reform initiative after consultation with multiple stakeholders. NSIRA investigations under this new model are already showing improved efficiency.
Introduction
1.1 Who we are
Established in July 2019, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities. Prior to NSIRA’s creation, several gaps existed in Canada’s national security accountability framework. Notably, NSIRA’s predecessor review bodies did not have the ability to collaborate or share their classified information but were each limited to conducting reviews for their specified department or agency.
By contrast, NSIRA has the authority to review any Government of Canada national security or intelligence activity in an integrated manner. As noted in the 2019 annual report, with NSIRA’s expanded role, Canada now has one of the most extensive systems for independent review of national security.
1.2 Mandate
NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities. Annex B contains a financial and administrative overview of NSIRA.
Reviews
NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice.
Further, NSIRA reviews any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA. Annex C contains summaries of the reviews completed in 2021.
NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.
Reviews of CSIS and CSE will always remain a core part of NSIRA’s work since the entire focus of these organizations is to address national security and intelligence matters. Unlike its predecessor review bodies, however, NSIRA has an all-encompassing review mandate. NSIRA will thus continue to prioritize and examine how other departments engaging in national security and intelligence activities meet their obligations. NSIRA reviews help keep Parliament and Canadians informed about the lawfulness and reasonableness of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities.
Investigations
In addition to its review mandate, NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security- or intelligence-related complaints. This duty is outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, and involves investigating complaints about:
the activities of CSIS or CSE;
decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances; and
ministerial reports under the Citizenship Act that recommend denying certain citizenship applications.
This mandate also includes investigating national security-related complaints referred to NSIRA by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (the RCMP’s own complaints mechanism) and the Canadian Human Rights Commission.
Reviews
2.1 Canadian Security Intelligence Service reviews
Overview
NSIRA has a mandate to review any Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) activity. The NSIRA Act requires NSIRA to submit a classified annual report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness on CSIS activities each year, including information related to CSIS’s compliance with the law and applicable ministerial directions, and the reasonableness and necessity of the exercise of CSIS’s powers.
In 2021, NSIRA completed four reviews of CSIS, summarized below. NSIRA also began two more reviews: one of CSIS’s Justification Framework and the other of CSIS’s Dataset Regime. Several other ongoing NSIRA reviews contain a CSIS component.
Review arising from the Federal Court’s decision in 2020 FC 616, Rebuilding Trust: Reforming the CSIS Warrant and Department of Justice Legal Advisory Processes
In a 2020 decision (2020 FC 616), the Federal Court recommended that a “comprehensive external review be initiated to fully identify systemic, governance and cultural shortcomings and failures that resulted in CSIS engaging in operational activity that it has conceded was illegal and the resultant breach of candour.” Based on that recommendation, the Minister of Public Safety and Minister of Justice referred the review to NSIRA pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(c) of the NSIRA Act. Acting on this reference and relying on its own jurisdiction, NSIRA therefore reviewed the manner in which CSIS seeks and receives legal services from the Department of Justice and prepares and executes the warrants it needs to collect information.
This review found an intelligence service and its counsel who struggle to organize themselves in a manner that enables them to meet their legal obligations, including to the Federal Court. NSIRA also found a failure at CSIS to fully and sustainably professionalize the warrant application process as a specialized trade requiring training, experience and investment. This review also demonstrated the need to transform the relationship between CSIS and its legal counsel.
This review was led by NSIRA members Marie Deschamps and Craig Forcese. One or both members were directly involved in every aspect of the review including review process management, briefings, interviews and document review. This included dozens of confidential interviews with Department of Justice and CSIS employees whose perspectives were essential for “ground-truthing” the knowledge NSIRA had gained from documents and formal briefings.
In organizing these interviews, NSIRA ensured robust representation covering the range of functions in the warrant and legal advice giving processes. The interviews raised issues and concerns that would have otherwise been unavailable to NSIRA. This assisted NSIRA in making recommendations on governance, systemic and cultural issues that contribute to inefficiencies threatening the ability of CSIS and the Department of Justice to fulfil their mandates.
NSIRA heard repeated concerns from interviewees that these problems put at risk the ability of the intelligence service to meet the mandate Parliament has assigned to it. Addressing these challenges urgently is in the public interest. Though CSIS and the Department of Justice have made improvements, difficulties are still evident.
NSIRA grouped its findings and recommendations into three overarching areas:
the Department of Justice’s provision of legal advice;
CSIS’s and the Department of Justice’s management of the warrant acquisition process; and investment in people.
The Department of Justice’s provision of legal advice
CSIS operates in often rapidly evolving and legally challenging environments. Timely, nimble and actionable legal advice is critical. The Department of Justice provides CSIS with legal advice on national security matters via the National Security Litigation and Advisory Group (NSLAG). This review highlighted factors that prevent NSLAG from providing CSIS with the legal advice it needs.
The Department of Justice has employed a centralized “one voice” model for delivering its legal services. The one voice model reflects a desire for uniform and consistent legal advice delivered on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada. Although the premise for the one voice approach is sound, NSIRA found that NSLAG struggled to provide timely, responsive and useful legal advice in the CSIS context. The way the Department of Justice provides advice has often not been responsive to CSIS operations. For example, NSLAG presents its advice as a legal risk assessment using the Department of Justice-wide Legal Risk Management grid. This grid uses a colour-coded risk rating that can be compared to a “traffic light” system: a green risk rating represents a low legal risk to CSIS, a red risk rating represents a high legal risk, and, more ambiguously, a yellow risk rating represents an intermediate legal risk. Yellow light responses are reportedly the most common and the most frustrating for CSIS, especially when unaccompanied by discussions on how to mitigate the risk, the inclusion of which NSIRA heard is not currently common practice.
Therefore, some at CSIS perceive the Department of Justice as presenting a roadblock because of its bureaucracy, its perceived operational illiteracy and its unhelpful approach to communicating legal advice.
However, the problems with timely, responsive and useful legal advice do not stem from the Department of Justice alone. NSIRA heard that CSIS has not always shared all relevant information with the Department of Justice, prompting a degree of mistrust. The internal process for requesting legal advice at CSIS also contributes to delays and lack of relevance. The advice that sometimes comes back to operational investigators at CSIS filtered through bureaucratic hierarchies may be of limited relevance.
NSIRA heard that the laborious advice-seeking and -receiving process has sometimes caused [discussion of detrimental effects on and risks to operations].
CSIS and the Department of Justice often operate in a situation of legal doubt because of lack of clarity in the law. Clarifying legal standards often requires judicial case law. However, an unwieldy warrant process, discussed below, makes that prospect more difficult.
The Department of Justice is aware of the need for change. Broad, recent initiatives include the Vision Project, which promises client-centric strategic partnerships. New procedures have been implemented at NSLAG to address internal silos between advisory and litigation counsel, and to improve training, improve access to legal advice and facilitate consistent legal opinions. NSLAG also appears to recognize the desire for a different approach to providing legal advice, including moving toward legal advice that promotes collaborative and iterative engagement with CSIS in order to achieve its operational goals, within the bounds of the law. However, as of fall 2021, it did not appear that CSIS and the Department of Justice had systematically put this model into effect.
To facilitate proper advice-giving, CSIS needs to provide NSLAG with all the facts, and to engage NSLAG early on, at the operational level. Earlier and ongoing involvement throughout the stages of an investigation or operation would enable counsel to provide informal legal nudges that allow CSIS to course-correct before too much time has been spent. A more iterative process of incorporating legal advice over the full course of an operation could address the reported challenge of operations halted due to untimely or ambiguous legal advice.
Management of the warrant process
CSIS organizes the process of seeking a warrant around a system of internal preparation and approvals before proceeding to the statutory step of seeking ministerial approval of the warrant application. A number of legal concepts and expectations enter into the warrant process, including the “duty of candour” owed to the Court.
The Federal Court duty of candour concerns fit into two categories: disclosure of information material to the credibility of the sources who supply information used in the application; and disclosure of information material to matters of potential concern about the broader context of the warrant and how it will be executed.
Despite past attempts at reforms, the current warrant process adopted by CSIS and supported by the Department of Justice has repeatedly failed to meet these candour obligations. Many reforms appear to have contributed to the bureaucratic complexity of the warrant process, without addressing candour issues.
CSIS has especially struggled to ensure that all information material to the credibility of sources is properly included in warrant applications. NSIRA heard repeatedly that CSIS officers involved in the early stages of preparing warrant applications do not clearly understand the legal expectations surrounding the duty of candour. Deficient information management systems related to human sources at CSIS have also resulted in important omissions, violating duty of candour obligations. These challenges produce what NSIRA calls the “recurring omissions” problem.
In 2019, CSIS sought to professionalize affiant work by creating an Affiant Unit. CSIS’s establishment of the Affiant Unit is a critical development and, properly resourced and staffed, it would be well positioned to respond to long-standing problems with the duty of candour. However, when created, the Affiant Unit was placed [Name of Branch]. [Name] has a broad mandate that does not align with the Affiant Unit’s functions in preparing legally robust warrant applications. This governance anomaly may explain the Affiant Unit’s present administrative and human resource challenges. The Affiant Unit’s sustainability is in question, and indeed NSIRA heard that the unit could currently be described as being in a state of crisis. CSIS has not supported the unit with resources commensurate with the importance of this unit in fulfilling CSIS’s mission.
Warrants counsel at NSLAG have several key roles in the warrant application process and are intimately implicated in ensuring adherence to the duty of candour. Fostering a strong, collaborative and productive relationship with CSIS is key. Morale among NSLAG warrants counsel may have suffered in light of the recent Federal Court decision that prompted this review. With recent staffing increases, it appears that NSLAG currently has the requisite complement to manage the number of annual warrant applications expected from CSIS, but recruitment challenges remain an ongoing issue. NSLAG should be staffed to ensure that CSIS’s operations are not stalled due to the lack of availability of warrants counsel.
The warrant application process is meant to be strengthened through a review of the near- final affidavit by an “independent counsel” (IC) – in practice, a lawyer drawn from the Department of Justice’s National Security Group. The role was originally envisioned as performing a rigorous challenge of the warrant application. However, the primary role of the IC appears to be more clerical than substantive, designed to cite check rather than assertively perform a devil’s advocate function.
NSIRA believes that the presence of a rigorous challenge function performed by a knowledgeable, adequately supported lawyer distant from the warrant application is valuable and necessary. However, NSIRA proposes that the current IC model be abandoned in favour of a challenge function performed at Public Safety Canada, whose precise role is that of oversight of the CSIS warrant application process.
Working with the Public Safety Canada unit charged with warrant review, an experienced and specialized warrant counsel could perform a genuine challenge role to the warrant, analogous to the role a defence lawyer would play were warrants subject to an adversarial process. NSIRA believes that a testing review of this sort will help forestall duty of candour shortcomings stemming from a failure to disclose fully information material to matters of potential concern about the broader context of the warrant and how it will be executed.
Once a judge issues a warrant, CSIS may execute the warrant. That execution must comply with the scope and terms of the warrant. However, the CSIS regional warrant coordinators have not received sufficient training to enable the contents of warrants to be translated into advice on proper execution.
Investment in people
Concern about inadequate training at CSIS was a recurring theme in this review. This concern was noted in internal CSIS documents. CSIS acknowledges that it is currently not a learning organization and does not have a learning culture. There are too few training opportunities required to sustain a modern professional intelligence service operating in a complex environment.
Conclusions
This report concluded with observations on cross-cutting cultural and governance challenges that stem, at least in part, from challenges characterizing the provision of legal advice and the warrant process. NSIRA divides these broad, cross-cutting phenomena into two categories: morale and attitudes; and performing the mission.
Low morale at CSIS was a common theme throughout this review. The systemic problems in the warrant application process are likely one cause of this problem: morale is affected when a warrant acquisition system repeatedly prevents CSIS officers from performing their mandated duties and is the source of regular reputational crises stemming from failures to meet the duty of candour.
Meanwhile, a failure to correct problems with the warrant process impairs CSIS’s and the Department of Justice’s abilities to fulfil their mandates. The Department of Justice must go from being perceived as a roadblock to a frank and forthright advisor fully attuned to operational objectives.
Within CSIS, the warrant application process was sometimes likened to winning a lottery — not because the Federal Court declines to issue warrants, but because of the resources required to prepare and complete the application. The current, laborious warrant application process is preventing some collection activities from moving forward.
In sum, this review was sparked by a compliance failure in a duty of candour matter. It concludes that repeated failures in this area are both caused by, and cause, deep-seated cultural and governance patterns. This vicious cycle has compounded the challenges of reform in the warrant acquisition process.
Cherry-picked or paper-based reforms that mask without addressing the overarching systemic, cultural, and governance challenges will suffer the fate of prior reforms: the problems will continue.
NSIRA intends to launch a follow-up review within two years that will measure progress at CSIS, the Department of Justice and Public Safety Canada in resolving the systemic problem with the warrant process addressed by this review. Moreover, in other regular reviews implicating warrants, NSIRA will document recurrences of systemic problems. In the meantime, since this review originated with a decision of the Federal Court, it is vital that the Minister and CSIS share it in its full form with the designated judges of that court. NSIRA’s full redacted report can be read on its website.4
Response to NSIRA’s recommendations
NSIRA’s recommendations, the management response of CSIS, Public Safety Canada and the Department of Justice, and other details about this review are found in Annex D of this report.
Study of CSIS Technical Capabilities
Canada’s national security threat landscape is constantly evolving and changes in technology present CSIS with a variety of new investigative opportunities. Consequently, CSIS must develop and acquire new technical capabilities, as well as adapt (repurpose) existing tools to support its mandated collection activities. This process presents potential compliance risk, as CSIS’s existing governance and legal frameworks may not capture the new deployment or adaptation of these technical capabilities. Furthermore, certain personnel and supporting legal counsel may not fully understand how these tools are used operationally, impacting their ability to advise whether or not CSIS has the legal and policy framework required to support use of the technology. These risks require NSIRA to maintain up-to-date knowledge of CSIS’s technical capabilities and related warrant powers.
NSIRA’s survey of CSIS technical capabilities offers a first step in this endeavour by surveying CSIS’s suite of capabilities, along with its associated governance structure, and identifying areas of interest or concern to which NSIRA may return in future reviews.
Reality of the risks
NSIRA’s review of CSIS’s use of a geolocation tool found that the lack of “developed policies and procedures around the assessment of new and emerging collection technologies” directly contributed to the risk that CSIS had breached section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms while testing the tool.
– NSIRA Study 2018-05
The full range of technical capabilities CSIS currently employs in support of its intelligence collection operations was examined. NSIRA reviewed relevant policy and legal frameworks as communicated by CSIS but did not conduct an independent verification or audit of the claims or activities themselves. NSIRA also examined the tripartite information/knowledge sharing and support nexus that exists between CSIS’s operational branches, technological branches and CSIS’s Department of Justice counsel with regard to the deployment of capabilities in support of operations.
In addition to the foundational knowledge NSIRA gained of CSIS’s technical capabilities, NSIRA made several observations identifying areas of interest for possible future reviews. For example, NSIRA noted, and CSIS agreed, that the main policy suite related to the use of technical capabilities is outdated and under revision, though the timeline for completing this task is unclear.
In the interim, the policy suite is buttressed as required by directives from senior leadership and other relevant policies and practices. The lack of up-to-date policies and procedures may result in heightened compliance risks, an issue of interest to future NSIRA reviews.
In addition, CSIS is currently reworking the framework it uses to assess compliance and risk in this area. CSIS indicated that greater efficiencies in addressing stakeholder needs and compliance gaps could be achieved through new initiatives such as the creation of the Operational Technology Review Committee, which was created in May 2021. This committee’s objective is to review all new technologies used to collect intelligence and existing technologies that will be used in a new or different manner. The creation of the Operational Technology Review Committee suggests a positive step toward mitigating the risk of compliance breaches related to the deployment of technologies in support of operations. Most obviously, it presents a forum in which potential risks can be proactively identified and mitigated. The evolving nature of how compliance is monitored in relation to technical capabilities will be of interest to NSIRA moving forward.
Further questions exist regarding how CSIS monitors the operational value of technical capabilities. CSIS needs to strengthen its performance metrics program with regard to its deployment of technologies in support of operations. A performance measurement regime, currently under development, will become an important feature of the governance framework, with attendant compliance implications for possible future NSIRA reviews.
Overall, it will be important for NSIRA to remain up to date with respect to the technical aspects of CSIS intelligence collection operations, particularly given the speed with which technology and associated technical capabilities evolve.
As part of this effort, it may be possible to leverage existing reporting requirements already undertaken by CSIS. For example, Section 3 of the Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Accountability (September 10, 2019) requires CSIS to inform the Minister of Public Safety of operational activities in which “a novel authority, technique or technology is used.” These notifications could provide NSIRA with ongoing and up-to-date knowledge of CSIS’s capability suite and how/when technologies are deployed operationally. Furthermore, sharing the notifications would bolster CSIS’s efforts toward proactive transparency, which are in line with commitments to provide explanatory briefings to the Federal Court on new technologies used in warranted operations.
NSIRA has recommended that the full, unredacted, version of this technical survey be shared with the designated judges of the Federal Court.
Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Activities: A Focus on Information Disclosure to External Parties
Under the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, CSIS was granted the authority to undertake threat reduction measures (TRMs). NSIRA is required to review, annually, at least one aspect of CSIS’s performance in the use of its threat reduction powers. NSIRA recognizes that CSIS’s threat reduction powers can be an effective tool to diminish a national security threat; however, these powers also command heightened responsibility, given their nature and ability to profoundly impact, not only the subject of a given TRM, but others potentially captured by its scope.
This year, NSIRA produced its second annual review of CSIS’s TRMs. This review sought to expand on findings from the previous review by examining a larger number of TRMs, wherein CSIS disclosed information to external parties, and in doing so, provided the external party the opportunity to take action, at their discretion and pursuant to their authorities, to reduce identified threats. This review studied the characteristics of these particular TRMs but focused its examination on the extent to which CSIS appropriately identified, documented and considered any plausible adverse impacts that these measures could have on affected individuals.
NSIRA observed that several different kinds of external parties were involved in the TRMs. These external parties had varied levers of control through which they could take action to reduce a threat.
NSIRA found that CSIS’s documentation of the information disclosed to external parties as part of TRMs was inconsistent and, at times, lacked clarity and specificity. NSIRA also found that CSIS did not systematically identify or document the authorities or abilities of external parties to take action, or the plausible adverse impacts of the TRM. NSIRA also found that CSIS did not always document the outcomes of a specific TRM, or the actions taken by external parties to reduce a threat.
Without robust documentation, CSIS is neither capable of assessing the efficacy of its measures nor appreciating the full impact of its actions related to these measures.
NSIRA recommended that when a TRM involves the disclosure of information to external parties, CSIS should clearly identify and document the scope and breadth of information that will be disclosed as part of the proposed measure. NSIRA recommended that CSIS should also fully identify, document and consider the authority and ability of the external party to take specific action to reduce a threat, as well as the plausible adverse impacts of the measure. Beyond recommending that CSIS comply with its record-keeping policies, NSIRA recommended that CSIS amend its TRM policy to include a requirement to systematically document the outcomes of TRMs, including actions taken by external parties. This practice should inform post-action assessments and future decision-making.
In addition, NSIRA found that the current assessment framework employed as part of the TRM approval process is overly narrow and does not sufficiently consider the full impact of CSIS TRMs. NSIRA recommended that CSIS consider plausible adverse impacts resulting not only from CSIS disclosures of information, but also from the actions of external parties as part of TRMs.
The variety of impacts observed in this year’s review, combined with the gaps identified in CSIS’s understanding and assessment of these impacts, highlights the salience of a number of NSIRA’s recommendations made in 2020. NSIRA reiterated its 2020 recommendation that CSIS consider more comprehensively the plausible adverse impacts of these types of measures on the affected individuals, even when they are carried out by the external party and not CSIS. These impacts should be considered not only when assessing the reasonableness and proportionality of a proposed measure, but also when determining whether a warrant is required.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act) is clear that when a proposed TRM would limit a right or freedom protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or would otherwise be contrary to Canadian law, CSIS must seek a judicial warrant. NSIRA fundamentally disagrees with CSIS’s understanding of and approach to the legal analysis of determining whether a warrant is required for proposed TRMs. In 2020, CSIS responded to this recommendation by stating, “the Department of Justice will consider this recommendation and factor it into its work related to TRMs under the CSIS Act.”
Going forward, NSIRA recommended that CSIS seeks a warrant when a proposed TRM could infringe on an individual’s Charter rights, or where it would otherwise be contrary to Canadian law, regardless of whether the activity would be conducted by CSIS directly, or via an external party to whom CSIS discloses information.
NSIRA was able to use its direct access to CSIS information repositories to confirm information that it needed to verify and pursue necessary additional inquiries. For that reason, NSIRA has a high level of confidence in the information used to complete this review. NSIRA would also like to recognize CSIS’s timeliness in responding to NSIRA’s requests for information throughout the course of this review.
Response to NSIRA’s recommendations
NSIRA’s recommendations, the management response of CSIS and other details about this review are found in Annex D of this report.
NSIRA’s annual review of CSIS activities
In accordance with the CSIS Act, CSIS is required to provide information to NSIRA on specific activities. In response, NSIRA has developed a process to examine this information throughout the year and highlight any significant observations as part of NSIRA’s annual reporting obligations to the Minister of Public Safety. This process aims to keep NSIRA informed of key CSIS activities so that it can identify emerging issues and compliance gaps in a timely manner, and plan reviews and annual reporting obligations. Furthermore, this process facilitates additional scrutiny of these activities, as necessary, to assess for compliance, reasonableness and necessity.
In 2021, NSIRA formalized this process and initiated an annual review pursuant to its review mandate (paragraph 8(1)(a) of the NSIRA Act). To enhance transparency, NSIRA requested additional categories of information from CSIS, including approved warrant applications, compliance reports, internal audits and evaluations, and communications between CSIS and the Federal Court and CSIS and the Minister of Public Safety. These additional categories sought to ensure that NSIRA has the benefit of specific policy and governance information beyond that which CSIS is legislatively required to provide.
NSIRA found that CSIS met its legislated reporting requirements; however, these requirements do not always translate into information that can be used for assessments by NSIRA. Notably, CSIS did not provide information on the additional categories of activities requested by NSIRA. Conversations to address these gaps will continue in 2022.
In 2022, NSIRA will continue its review of CSIS activities with the support of the information from CSIS as required under the CSIS Act and the NSIRA Act.
Statistics
NSIRA requested that CSIS provide for publication statistics and data about public interest and compliance-related aspects of its activities. NSIRA is of the opinion that the following statistics will provide the public with information related to the scope and breadth of CSIS operations, as well as display the evolution of activities from year to year.
Warrant applications
Section 21 of the CSIS Act authorizes CSIS to make an application to a judge for a warrant if CSIS believes, on reasonable grounds, that more intrusive powers are required to investigate a particular threat to the security of Canada. Warrants may be used by CSIS, for example, to intercept communications, enter a location, and/or obtain information, records or documents. Each individual warrant application could include multiple individuals or request the use of multiple intrusive powers.
NSIRA is aware that difficulties with the warrant acquisition process within CSIS persist. NSIRA’s Review on Rebuilding Trust: Reforming the CSIS Warrant and Justice Legal Advisory Process found that the current warrant process continues to be overly burdensome, despite attempts at reform. The review found a failure at CSIS to professionalize the warrant application process fully and sustainably. The lack of clear accountability and clear communication combined with excessive complexity have contributed to the problems facing this process. The review made a number of findings and recommendations related to systemic problems with CSIS’s warrant process.
Section 21 warrant applications made by CSIS, 2018 to 2021
2018
2019
2020
2021
Approved warrants Total
24
23
15
31
New warrant
10
9
2
13
Replacements
11
12
8
14
Supplemental
3
2
5
4
Denied total
0
1
0
0
Threat reduction measures (TRMs)
Section 12.1 of the CSIS Act authorizes CSIS to take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, within or outside Canada. CSIS is authorized to seek a judicial warrant if it believes that certain intrusive measures (outlined in subsection 21 (1.1) of the CSIS Act) are required to reduce the threat. To date, CSIS has sought no judicial authorizations to undertake warranted TRMs.
NSIRA’s first two reviews of CSIS’s use of threat reduction measures found that CSIS did not sufficiently consider the full impact of the measure as part of the approval process for these activities. More specifically, these impacts were not explicitly considered when determining whether a warrant may be required. As already noted, NSIRA expects that when CSIS is proposing a TRM where an individual’s Charter rights would be limited or the TRM would otherwise be contrary to Canadian law, whether CSIS is undertaking the TRM directly or whether it will be executed by an external party, CSIS will seek a warrant to authorize the TRM.
Threat reduction measures approved, executed by CSIS and warranted, 2015 to 2021
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Approved TRMs
10
8
15
23
24
11
23
Executed
10
8
13
17
19
8
17
Warranted TRMs
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
CSIS targets
CSIS is mandated to investigate threats to the security of Canada, including espionage; foreign-influenced activities; political, religious or ideologically motivated violence; and subversion. Section 12 of the CSIS Act sets out criteria permitting CSIS to investigate an individual, group or entity for matters related to these threats. Sub jects of a CSIS investigation, whether they be individuals or groups, are called “targets.”
CSIS targets, 2018 to 2021
2018
2019
2020
2021
Number of targets
430
467
360
352
Datasets
Data analytics is a key investigative tool for CSIS, providing it with the capacity to make connections and identify trends that are not possible through traditional methods of investigations. The National Security Act, 2017, which was passed by Parliament in June 2019, gave CSIS a suite of new powers including a legal framework for the collection, retention and use of datasets. The framework authorizes CSIS to collect datasets (sub- divided into Canadian, foreign and publicly available datasets) that have the ability to assist CSIS in the performance of its duties and functions. It also establishes safeguards for the protection of Canadian rights and freedoms, including privacy rights. These protections include enhanced requirements for ministerial accountability. Depending on the type of dataset, CSIS must meet different requirements before it is able to use the dataset.
The CSIS Act also requires CSIS to keep NSIRA apprised of certain dataset-related activities. Reports prepared following the handling of datasets are to be provided to NSIRA, under certain conditions and within reasonable timeframes. While CSIS is not required to advise NSIRA of judicial authorizations or ministerial approvals for the collection of Canadian and foreign datasets, CSIS has been proactively keeping NSIRA apprised of these activities.
While this new framework has provided opportunities to execute CSIS’s mandate to investigate threats, CSIS noted in its 2020 Public Annual Report that the current legislative framework is not without its challenges. NISRA is currently reviewing CSIS’s implementation of its dataset regime. The results of this review will inform Parliament’s review of the National Security Act, 2017.
Datasets evaluated by CSIS, approved or denied by the Federal Court or Intelligence Commissioner, and retained by CSIS, 2019 to 2021
2019
2020
2021
Publicly available datasets
Evaluated
8
11
4
Retained
8
11
215
Canadian datasets
Evaluated
10
0
2
Retained by CSIS
0
0
016
Denied by the Federal Court
0
0
0
Foreign datasets
Evaluated
8
0
0
Retained by CSIS
0
1
117
Denied by Minister
0
0
0
Denied by IntelligenceCommissioner
0
0
0
Justification Framework
The National Security Act, 2017, also created a legal justification framework for CSIS’s intelligence collection operations. The framework establishes a limited justification for CSIS employees, and persons acting at their direction, to carry out activities that would otherwise constitute offences under Canadian law. CSIS’s Justification Framework is modelled on those already in place for Canadian law enforcement. The Justification Framework provides needed clarity to CSIS, and to Canadians, as to what CSIS may lawfully do in the course of its activities. It recognizes that it is in the public interest to ensure that CSIS employees can effectively carry out its intelligence collection duties and functions, including by engaging in otherwise unlawful acts or omissions, in the public interest and in accordance with the rule of law. The types of otherwise unlawful acts and omissions that are authorized by the Justification Framework are determined by the Minister and approved by the Intelligence Commissioner. There remain limitations to what activities can be undertaken, and nothing in the Justification Framework permits the commission of an act or omission that would infringe a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter.
According to subsection 20.1 (2) of the CSIS Act, employees must be designated by the Minister of Public Safety in order to be covered under the Justification Framework while committing or directing an otherwise unlawful act or omission. Designated employees are CSIS employees who require the Justification Framework as a part of their duties and functions. Designated employees are justified in committing an act or omission themselves (commissions by employees) and they may direct another person to commit an act or omission (directions to commit) as a part of their duties and functions. NSIRA is currently reviewing CSIS’s implementation of the Justification Framework. The results of this review will inform Parliament’s review of the National Security Act, 2017.
Authorizations, commissions and directions under the Justification Framework, 2019 to 2021
2019
2020
2021
Authorizations
83
147
178
Commissions by employees
17
39
51
Directions to commit
32
84
116
Emergency designations
0
0
0
Compliance
CSIS’s internal operational compliance program leads and manages overall compliance within CSIS. The objective of this unit is to promote a “culture of compliance” within CSIS by investing in information technology (IT) to support the process around warrants, designing an approach for reporting and assessing potential non-compliance incidents, embedding experts in operational branches to provide timely advice and guidance, and producing internal policies and procedures for employees. This program is the centre for processing all instances of potential non-compliance related to operational activities.
NSIRA’s knowledge of CSIS operational non-compliance and associated violations of the Charter is limited to what is contained in the CSIS Director’s Annual Report on Operations to the Minister of Public Safety. NSIRA notes with interest that CSIS reports Charter violations as operational non-compliance. NSIRA will continue to monitor closely instances of non- compliance that relate to Canadian law and the Charter, and to work with CSIS to improve transparency around these activities.
Non-compliance incidents processed by CSIS, 2019 to 2021
2019
2020
2021
Processed compliance incidents19
53
99
85
Administrative
53
64
Operational
4020
19
21
Canadian law
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
6
Warrant conditions
6
CSIS governance
8
CSIS review plan
In 2022, NSIRA is commencing or conducting five reviews exclusively focused on CSIS, one review focused on CSIS and CSE operational collaboration (See 2022 CSE review plan, below), one focused on threat management by CSIS and the RCMP of ideologically motivated violent extremism, and a number of interagency reviews that contain a CSIS component.
In addition to NSIRA’s three legally mandated reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act, the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act and CSIS’s TRMs, NSIRA has initiated or is planning the following CSIS reviews:
Justification Framework
This review will assess the implementation of CSIS’s new Justification Framework for activities that would otherwise be unlawful, authorized under the National Security Act, 2017.
Datasets
This review will examine the implementation of CSIS’s dataset regime following the coming into force of the National Security Act, 2017.
CSIS Cover Program
This review would be the first review of CSIS Cover Operations. It will survey the full range of CSIS cover activities and concentrate on building foundational knowledge to allow NSIRA to select specific activities for detailed review in future years.
Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism
This is a joint CSIS-RCMP review of their respective and joint threat management of ideologically motivated violent extremism. The core of the review will be the interplay between CSIS and the RCMP in the context of ideologically motivatedviolent extremism, and an assessment of whether activities complied with the law, applicable ministerial directions, operational policies, and whether activitieswere necessary and reasonable.
Beyond 2022, NSIRA intends to explore reviews of CSIS on topics including, but not limited to:
the lifecycle of warranted information;
CSIS’s section 16 mandate;
“Strictly Necessary” retention policies; and
CSIS’s Internal Compliance Framework.
Access to CSIS information
Throughout 2021, NSIRA faced differing levels of access and responsiveness in relation to CSIS. COVID-19 related restrictions resulted in considerable delays with receiving requested information and briefings and impeded direct access to NSIRA’s dedicated office space within CSIS Headquarters.
In response to NSIRA’s requests for information, CSIS was transparent in its ability to respond and communicate anticipated delays. When access and staffing levels were no longer restricted, CSIS responses to formal and informal requests related to the Study of Technical Capabilities and the TRM review were timely and complete, and briefings were well administered and provided the requested information.
As mentioned above, throughout 2021, NSIRA did not have consistent access to its dedicated office space within CSIS Headquarters, which is used by NSIRA review, legal and investigation staff. As a result, NSIRA’s direct access to CSIS’s information systems was notably limited. NSIRA was provided various temporary accommodations within CSIS headquarters during this time.
CSIS was able to continue to provide NSIRA members access to its regional offices across Canada throughout 2021, however. This access supported NSIRA members not based in the National Capital Region, whose work often requires secure facilities where they can safely and securely access information relevant to reviews and investigations. NSIRA greatly appreciates the willingness and efforts of CSIS and its regional colleagues in this regard.
2.2 Communications Security Establishment reviews
Overview
NSIRA has the mandate to review any activity conducted by CSE. NSIRA must also submit a classified annual report to the Minister of National Defence on CSE activities, including information related to CSE’s compliance with the law and applicable ministerial directions, and NSIRA’s assessment of the reasonableness and necessity of the exercise of CSE’s powers.
In 2021, NSIRA completed two reviews of CSE, and directed CSE to conduct one departmental study, all of which are summarized below. NSIRA also began five new reviews focused on CSE’s activities that are scheduled for completion in 2022 (see 2022 CSE Review Plan, below). Furthermore, CSE is implicated in other NSIRA multi-departmental reviews, such as the legally mandated annual reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA), the results of which are described below (see Multi-departmental Reviews).
Although the pandemic and other priorities precluded NSIRA from advancing its previous commitments to redacting, translating and publishing reviews of the former Office of the CSE Commissioner, NSIRA remains committed to releasing this material, resources permitting.
Review of CSE’s Governance of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations
The Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act) provides CSE with the authority to conduct active cyber operations (ACOs) and defensive cyber operations (DCOs). As defined by the CSE Act, an ACO is designed to “degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.” A DCO helps protect Canadian federal government systems, or systems deemed by the Minister of National Defence to be important to Canada against foreign cyber threats. ACOs and DCOs are authorized by ministerial authorizations and, due to the potential impact on Canadian foreign policy, require the Minister of Foreign Affairs to consent to an ACO ministerial authorization or be consulted on a DCO ministerial authorization.
In this review, NSIRA assessed the governance framework that guides the conduct of ACOs and DCOs, and whether CSE appropriately considered its legal obligations and the foreign policy impacts of operations. NSIRA analyzed policies and procedures, governance and operational documentation, and correspondence within and between CSE and GAC. The review scope included the earliest available materials pertaining to ACOs and DCOs and ended concurrently with the validity period of the first ACO and DCO ministerial authorizations (2019–2020).
NSIRA incorporated GAC into this review, given the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the ACO and DCO governance structure. As a result, NSIRA gained an understanding of the governance and accountability structures in place for these activities by obtaining unique perspectives from the two departments on their respective roles and responsibilities.
The novelty of these powers required CSE to develop new mechanisms and processes while also considering new legal authorities and boundaries. NSIRA found that both CSE and GAC made considerable efforts in building the ACO and DCO governance structure. In this context, NSIRA has found that some aspects of the governance of ACOs and DCOs could be improved by making them more transparent and clearer.
Specifically, NSIRA found that CSE could improve the level of detail provided to all parties involved in the decision-making and governance of ACOs and DCOs, within documents such as the ministerial authorizations authorizing these activities and the operational plans that are in place to govern their execution. Additionally, NSIRA also identified several gaps that CSE and GAC need to address, and recommended improvements relating to:
engaging other departments to ensure an operation’s alignment with broader
Government of Canada priorities;
demarcating an ACO from a pre-emptive DCO;
assessing each operation’s compliance with international law; and
communicating with each other any newly acquired information that is relevant to the risk level of an operation.
The gaps observed by NSIRA, if left unaddressed, could carry risks. For instance, the broad and generalized nature of the classes of activities, techniques and targets comprising ACOs and DCOs could capture unintended higher-risk activities and targets. Additionally, given the difference in the required engagement of GAC in ACOs and DCOs, misclassifying what is truly an ACO as a pre-emptive DCO could result in a heightened risk to Canada’s international relations through the insufficient engagement of GAC.
While this review focused on the governance structures at play in relation to ACOs and DCOs, of even greater importance is how these structures are implemented and followed in practice. NSIRA made several observations about the information contained within the governance documents developed to date and will subsequently assess how they are put into practice as part of NSIRA’s forthcoming review focused on the operations themselves.
Response to NSIRA’s recommendations
NSIRA’s recommendations and other details about this review are found in Annex D of this report.
Review of Information Sharing across Aspects of CSE’s Mandate
This review examined CSE’s legal authority for sharing information obtained in the course of one aspect of its mandate for the purposes of fulfilling another aspect of its mandate. Specifically, the review focused on internal information sharing within CSE between the foreign intelligence aspect and the cybersecurity and information assurance (cybersecurity) aspect of CSE’s mandate.
NSIRA examined whether CSE’s internal sharing of information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada (IRTC) is consistent with the Privacy Act, which limits how collected personal information can be used by a federal institution, and the CSE Act, which applies to CSE’s incidental collection and use of IRTC. NSIRA concluded that from the descriptions of the aspects in sections 16 and 17 of the CSE Act, sometimes information acquired under one aspect can be used for the same, or a consistent purpose, as another. This would satisfy Privacy Act requirements for sharing information internally. However, this principle cannot simply be assumed to apply as the purposes of the aspects differ within the CSE Act. CSE must conduct case-by-case compliance analysis that considers the purpose of the collection and sharing.
NSIRA considers it necessary for the Chief of CSE’s application for a ministerial authorization to fully inform the Minister of National Defence of how IRTC might be used and analyzed by CSE, including the sharing of IRTC to another aspect, and for what purpose. With one exception, the Chief’s applications for the period of review appropriately informed the Minister that retained IRTC might be used to support a different aspect. Moreover, the foreign intelligence applications appropriately informed the Minister how CSE assessed “essentiality” for IRTC collected under the foreign intelligence aspect.
Under CSE policy, an assessment of IRTC’s relevance, essentiality or necessity to each aspect is required for sharing information across the aspects. CSE policy offers definitions and criteria for assessing and applying these thresholds to the information. NSIRA found that CSE’s policy framework with regards to the internal sharing of information between the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity aspects of the mandate is compliant with the CSE Act.
Response to NSIRA’s recommendations
NSIRA’s recommendations, CSE’s management response and other details about this review are found in Annex D of this report.
CSE Departmental Study on Disclosures of Canadian Identifying Information
Following a 2020 review of CSE’s disclosures of Canadian identifying information (CII),21 NSIRA concluded that CSE’s implementation of its disclosure regime under the National Defence Act may not have been in compliance with the Privacy Act. On November 25, 2020, following the release of the review, NSIRA submitted a compliance report to the Minister of National Defence. NSIRA was of the opinion that CSE, as the custodian of incidentally collected CII, has the responsibility to assure itself and to document that both a collection and disclosure authority exist before sharing it with third-party recipients. NSIRA then directed CSE to conduct a departmental study of its disclosure of CII from August 1, 2019, to March 1, 2021.
The purpose of the departmental study was to ensure that disclosures of CII conducted by CSE were conducted in a manner that complies with the CSE Act, and that all disclosures of CII were essential to international affairs, defence, security or cybersecurity.
CSE provided the completed departmental study to the Minister of National Defence on October 8, 2021, with a copy to NSIRA, on November 1, 2021. NSIRA is satisfied that CSE provided a complete accounting of its disclosure regime for the requested period of review and provided a report that meets the objectives detailed in NSIRA’s terms of reference. In doing so, CSE defined its process for assessing and disclosing CII requests to Government of Canada and foreign clients under the CSE Act while also providing an update on relevant changes that have been made to its disclosure regime based on NSIRA’s recommendations from the last CII review.
The production of the departmental study also provided an opportunity for CSE to review the CII disclosure regime from CSE’s own perspective. This process provides NSIRA with a clearer understanding of how CSE manages its program and evaluates its relevant legal authorities. In addition to contributing to NSIRA’s current understanding of CSE’s disclosure regime, the study will also assist in identifying avenues of inquiry for the planned follow-up review of CII scheduled for 2023.
Statistics
To achieve greater public accountability, NSIRA recommends that CSE publish statistics and data about public interest and compliance-related aspects of its activities. NSIRA is of the opinion that the following statistics will provide the public with information related to the scope and breadth of CSE operations, as well as display the evolution of activities from year to year.
Ministerial authorizations and ministerial orders
Ministerial authorizations are issued by the Minister of National Defence and authorize specific activities conducted by CSE pursuant to one of the aspects of the CSE mandate. The following table lists the ministerial authorizations issued between 2019 and 2021.
CSE ministerial authorizations, 2021
Type of ministerial authorization
Enabling section of the CSE Act
Number issued in 2019
Number issued in 2020
Number issued in 2021
Foreign intelligence
26(1)
3
3
3
Cybersecurity — federal and non- federal
27(1) and27(2)
2
1
2
Defensive cyber operations
29(1)
1
1
1
Active cyber operations
30(1)
1
1
2
Note: This table refers to ministerial authorizations that were issued in the given calendar years and may not necessarily reflect ministerial authorizations that were in effect at a given time. For example, if a ministerial authorization was issued in late 2020 and remained in effect in parts of 2021, it is counted above solely as a 2020 ministerial authorization.
Ministerial orders are issued by the Minister of National Defence and designate people or organizations with whom CSE can work and share information. For instance, a ministerial order designating non-federal information infrastructures as being of importance to the Government of Canada is required for CSE to carry out certain aspects of its cybersecurity and defensive cyber operations mandate. A ministerial order is also required to designate recipients of CII. The following table lists the three ministerial orders in effect in 2021.
CSE ministerial orders, 2021
Nameof ministerial order
In effect in 2021
Enabling section of the CSE Act
Designating electronic information and information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada
1
21(1)
Designating recipients of information relating to a Canadian or person in Canada acquired, used or analyzedunder the cybersecurity and information assurance aspects of the CSE mandate
1
44(1) and45
Designating recipients of Canadian identifying information used, analyzed or retained under a foreign intelligence authorization pursuant to section45 of the CSE Act
1
43 and 45
Foreign intelligence reporting
Pursuant to section 16 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to acquire information from or through the global information infrastructure, and to use, analyze and disseminate the information for the purpose of providing foreign intelligence in accordance with the Government of Canada’s intelligence priorities.
According to CSE, it released 3,050 foreign intelligence end-product reports to 1,627 clients across 28 departments or agencies of the Government of Canada in 2021.
Information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada
As discussed in NSIRA’s Review of Information Sharing Across Aspects of CSE’s Mandate, IRTC includes information about Canadians or persons in Canada that may be incidentally collected by CSE while conducting foreign intelligence or cybersecurity activities under the authority of a ministerial authorization. According to CSE policy, IRTC is any information recognized as having reference to a Canadian or person in Canada, regardless of whether that information could be used to identify that Canadian or person in Canada.
CSE was asked to release statistics or data about the regularity with which IRTC or “Canadian-collected information” is included in CSE’s end-product reporting. CSE responded that “as this type of information has not previously been disclosed publicly, CSE is carrying out an injury assessment to determine if information can be provided for publication.” CSE subsequently advised that “The impact assessment for disclosure of information requested … is a longer-term endeavour that is unlikely to be resolved in time for the 2021 NSIRA public annual report. Please consider [CSE’s response] as ‘no releasable information’ for the purpose of this year’s report.”
Canadian identifying information
CSE is prohibited from directing its activities at Canadians or persons in Canada. However, given the nature of the global information infrastructure and CSE’s collection methodologies, such information may be incidentally acquired by CSE. When used in CSE foreign intelligence reporting, incidentally collected information potentially identifying a Canadian or a person in Canada is suppressed in order to protect the privacy of the individual(s) in question. CSE may release unsuppressed CII to designated recipients when the recipients have the legal authority and operational justification to receive it and when it is essential to international affairs, defence or security (including cybersecurity).
The following table shows the number of requests CSE received for disclosure of CII in 2021.
Number of requests for disclosure of Canadian identifying information, 2021.
Type of request
Number
Government of Canada requests
741
Five Eyes27 requests
90
Non-Five Eyes requests
0
Total
831
CSE was also asked to release the number of instances where CII is suppressed in CSE foreign intelligence or cybersecurity reporting. CSE indicated that “as this type of information has not previously been disclosed publicly, CSE is carrying out an injury assessment to determine if information can be provided for publication.” CSE subsequently advised that “The impact assessment for disclosure of information requested … is a longer-term endeavour that is unlikely to be resolved in time for the 2021 NSIRA public annual report. Please consider [CSE’s response] as ‘no releasable information’ for the purpose of this year’s report.”
Privacy incidents and procedural errors
A privacy incident occurs when the privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada is put at risk in a manner that runs counter to, or is not provided for, in CSE’s policies. CSE tracks such incidents via its Privacy Incidents File, Second-party Privacy Incidents File and Minor Procedural Errors File.
The following table show the number of privacy incidents and procedural errors CSE tracked in 2021.
CSE privacy incidents and procedural errors, 2021
Type of incident
Number
Privacy incidents
96
Second-party privacy incidents
33
Minor procedural errors
18
Cybersecurity and information assurance
Pursuant to section 17 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to provide advice, guidance and services to help protect electronic information and information infrastructures of federal institutions, as well as non-federal entities which are designated by the Minister as being of importance to the Government of Canada.
CSE was asked to release statistics or data characterizing CSE’s activities related to the cybersecurity and information assurance aspect of its mandate. CSE responded that:
Generally, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security does not comment on specific cyber security incidents, nor do we confirm businesses or critical infrastructure partners that we work with or provide statistics on the number of reported incidents. Statistics on cyber incidents, including cybercrime, are predicated upon victims coming forward, which is not an accurate reflection of the Canadian environment.
CSE and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security work every day to defend Government of Canada systems from cyber attacks. On any given day, CSE’s dynamic defence capabilities block up to seven billion reconnaissance scans on these systems.
Defensive and active cyber operations
Pursuant to section 18 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to conduct DCOs to help protect electronic information and information infrastructures of federal institutions, as well as non- federal entities that are designated by the Minister of Defence as being of importance to the Government of Canada from hostile cyber attacks.
Pursuant to section 19 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to conduct ACOs against foreign individuals, states, organizations or terrorist groups as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.
CSE was asked to release the number of DCOs and ACOs approved during 2021. CSE responded that it is “not in a position to provide this information for publication by NSIRA, as doing so would be injurious to Canada’s international relations, national defence and national security.”
Technical and operational assistance
As part of the assistance aspect of CSE’s mandate, CSE receives Requests for Assistance from Canadian law enforcement and security agencies, as well as from the DND/CAF.
The following table shows the number of requests for assistance CSE received and acted on in 2020 and 2021.
CSE requests for assistance received and acted on, 2020 and 2021
Requests for assistance
2020
2021
Number received
24
35
Number acted on
23
32
2022 CSE review plan
In addition to NSIRA’s two legally mandated reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, both of which implicate CSE, NSIRA has initiated or is planning the following five reviews of CSE:
Review of CSE’s Internal Security Program (Safeguarding)
This review will examine how CSE safeguards its employees, information and assets. It will explore the ways in which CSE mitigates internal security risks through inquiries and investigations, and in particular, the use of the polygraph as a tool in the security screening process. This review will alsoassess CSE’s compliance with Treasury Board security policies and directives, as well as the adequacy of, adherence to and effectiveness of CSE’s internal processes used to address potential or actual security incidents, violations and breaches of security.
Review of Cybersecurity — Network-Based Solutions
This will be NSIRA’s first review focused on the cybersecurity and information assurance aspect of CSE’s mandate. It will explore the use of a specific tool: Network Based Solutions as outlined within the cybersecurity ministerial authorization.
Review of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations — Part 2 (Operations)
This review is the continuation of NSIRA’s examination of CSE’s active and defensive cyber operations conducted prior to July 30, 2021. The first review focused on the internal policies and procedures governing CSE’s use of active and defensive cyber operations. This review builds on NSIRA’s previous work and will focus on the implementation of these governance structures in actual operations.
Review of a Program under the Foreign Intelligence Mandate
This is a review of a classified program under the foreign intelligence aspect of CSE’s mandate. Thisprogram is authorized by a ministerial authorization, which also sets out its parameters.
Review of CSE-CSIS Operational Collaboration
This review will examine operational collaboration between CSE and CSIS, both under the assistance aspect of CSE’s mandate, but also as it relates to joint operational activities coordinated between them under each agency’s respective mandates.
Beyond 2022, NSIRA intends to review topics including, but not limited to:
a CSE collection program conducted under a ministerial authorization; and
CSE’s Equities Management Framework.
Access to CSE information
In its 2020 Public Annual Report, NSIRA noted that it was seeking to formalize CSE’s provision of specific categories of information on a regular basis, such as ministerial authorizations, orders and directives, which would be used to ensure compliance of activities and to inform the conclusions NSIRA provides in the annual classified report to the Minister of National Defence. NSIRA will commence this review, called the annual compliance review of CSE, in 2022. NSIRA is pleased to report that CSE has already begun the process of providing the requested information.
NSIRA also previously reported that a lack of comprehensive and independently verifiable access to CSE’s information repositories posed a significant challenge to NSIRA’s ability to review CSE’s activities. In 2021, this challenge persisted.
In 2021, NSIRA sought to develop direct access to CSE information repositories, further to NSIRA’s “trust but verify” review model. With the exception of dedicated office space, which NSIRA continues to utilize at CSE’s Headquarters, NSIRA and CSE have been unable to achieve a workable trust-but-verify model for any reviews of CSE to date, despite several proposals for test cases brought forward by NSIRA throughout the year. NSIRA remains committed to developing a greater degree of verifiable access to CSE information so as to ensure the robustness of its findings and recommendations and, in turn, provide greater transparency of CSE activities to Parliament and the Canadian public.
In lieu of direct access to CSE information repositories, NSIRA has to rely on CSE External Review staff to collect relevant information held by CSE on its behalf. CSE External Review organizes briefings by subject matter experts, solicits responses to specific questions, and coordinates searches by CSE staff through information repositories for documents and other materials relevant to reviews. NSIRA recognizes the work of CSE External Review staff and thanks them for their contribution to the work of review.
However, reliance on CSE to locate, collate and curate information for NSIRA is not a proper long-term alternative to direct access. Currently, and on receipt of a request for information, CSE conducts a lengthy process to locate and collect information, followed by an internal review of this information to determine relevance prior to releasing materials to NSIRA. CSE’s predetermination of relevance of information undercuts NSIRA’s authority to decide whether information relates to its reviews and contributes to significant delays in the provision of information to NSIRA. Furthermore, this process creates a burden on CSE staff to coordinate responses to NSIRA’s information requirements. This workload could be substantially reduced by allowing NSIRA to conduct its own searches in CSE’s information repositories. Concurrently, it would serve as an element of verification that could strengthen NSIRA’s confidence in the completeness of information reviewed.
Beyond the issues related to limitations on NSIRA’s ability to trust but verify are ongoing concerns related to CSE’s responsiveness. As mentioned above, significant delays in the provision of information continued to pose a disruptive challenge to all NSIRA reviews of CSE activities in 2021. Although the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted life everywhere, it alone could not account for the extent of delays experienced during 2021. The timely provision of information required for a review not only facilitates the work of NSIRA, but is a legal requirement to which NSIRA expects CSE to adhere.
The sole exception to NSIRA’s right of access to information under the control of CSE is a confidence of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, otherwise known as a Cabinet confidence. Information subject to the Privacy Act, or any other act of Parliament, for that matter, as well as highly classified or Exceptionally Controlled Information (ECI) must be made available to NSIRA in a timely manner, when it relates to a review. This was not always the case in 2021.
In light of the ongoing challenges to NSIRA reviews of CSE activities, NSIRA continues to be of the opinion that the only mechanism to ensure a high degree of confidence, reliability and independence in its work is to have direct access to information relevant to its reviews. One important way by which CSE can continue to increase the level of transparency for its activities is to facilitate greater direct access for external review. For NSIRA to be able to conduct its work with a high degree of confidence, it must be able to verify the accuracy and completeness of the information on which it bases its findings and recommendations. NSIRA will continue to work with CSE to identify ways it can begin to implement additional elements of NSIRA’s trust but verify methodology in a more comprehensive and meaningful manner.
2.3 Other government departments
Overview
Beyond CSIS and CSE, NSIRA initiated reviews of the following departments and agencies in 2021:
the Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF);
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP);
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC);
the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA); and
Transport Canada.
As well, through the annual reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, NSIRA has engaged with all departments and agencies that make up the Canadian national security and intelligence community.
The following sections outline reviews completed or initiated in 2021, by department or agency, as well as some planned future reviews.
Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
Study of the Defence Intelligence Enterprise of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
The purpose of this study was threefold. The primary objective focused on understanding the concept of the Defence Intelligence Enterprise (DIE), the umbrella under which DND/CAF conducts its intelligence activities. The second objective focused on developing an understanding of the compliance and oversight functions within the DIE, as well as the reporting of instances of non-compliance. Finally, the information gathered through the two primary objectives of this review provided NSIRA with prerequisite knowledge to help design future reviews.
Although comprising only a small percentage of the work of DND/CAF, the intelligence function is growing both in how DND/CAF perceives its importance, as well as in resource allocation. All of DND/CAF’s intelligence activities and structures fall within the DIE and without an understanding of this enterprise, NSIRA’s review plan would lack focus and organization. The DIE represents a large and complex structure with widely varied activities and functions. Successive reviews will build on NSIRA’s knowledge and experience, as well as developing the required expertise to proactively identify areas of future review. In addition, having a more complete understanding of the DIE will help NSIRA better situate DND/CAF in the broader security and intelligence community, so it can identify more opportunities for horizontal review activities.
This study also helped to highlight and identify some of the challenges NSIRA may face in reviewing DND/CAF moving forward. Notably, DND/CAF represents a large and complex structure with widely varied activities and functions. Reporting structures are complex. For example, DND senior management structures report directly to the Deputy Minister, CAF Commands report directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff, and some accountability structures require reporting to both. NSIRA also observed that information collection and storage procedures vary across the organization and that it has over 180 independent electronic repositories. The combination of these elements emphasizes the importance of maintaining strong working relationships with DND/CAF to help navigate access to timely information and assets. NSIRA is working closely with DND/CAF on how to overcome these challenges, including the possibility of providing detailed search strings and follow-up briefings to attest to the reliability, completeness and specificity of the provided documentation.
Review of the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit — Operational Collection and Privacy Practices
This review was a follow up to last year’s review of the Canadian Forces National Counter- Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU). This year’s review focused on how IT searches were used to support counter-intelligence investigations. NSIRA assessed whether IT searches and the collection of information in support of counter-intelligence investigations interfered with individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances.
Over the course of the review, NSIRA identified three areas of concern tied to the requests for, and conduct of, counter-intelligence internal IT network searches. These are arranged under the following categories: (1) CFNCIU’s search of a subject’s email, internet and removable device activity; (2) the CFNCIU checklist used to identify and restrict search parameters, and how applicable stakeholders define search parameters; and (3) the use acquired information to expand supplementary searches.
NSIRA believes that DND employees and CAF members have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using work computers for personal use. CFNCIU requires the assistance of police or security agencies to obtain search warrants or technical intercept services, under Level II and Level III investigations. NSIRA found that CFNCIU may be inappropriately relying on DND/CAF policies as lawful authority to interfere with a subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
NSIRA observed that information obtained by CFNCIU via the checklist has the potential to capture intimate and personal information that touches on a subject’s biographical core. NSIRA found that the checklist risks capturing information that is protected by section 8 of the Charter. NSIRA also found that DND/CAF is applying a definition of metadata that captures information that could be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
NSIRA observed that CFNCIU IT inquiries used broad search parameters, which may include information not relevant to the investigation. These parameters were applied as broad approvals with no specific internal controls or oversight at both the operational and working levels. Collection techniques, due in part to the limitations of IT audit tools and broad search parameters, resulted in a wide net being cast. NSIRA found that the investigative IT system practices observed in the context of CFNCIU’s counter-intelligence investigations have insufficient legal oversight to ensure that they are as minimally invasive as possible.
As a result of these findings, NSIRA recommended that DND/CAF suspend investigative IT system practices in the context of CFNCIU counter-intelligence investigations until a reasonable legal authority has been established. Once a reasonable legal authority has been established, DND/CAF should create a new policy framework that is reflective of the noted findings.
Response to NSIRA’s recommendations
NSIRA’s recommendations, DND/CAF’s management response and other details about this review are found in Annex D of this report.
Reviews planned or in progress
NSIRA has several reviews planned for DND/CAF and will conduct further work on two in 2022. The first one in progress is NSIRA’s review of DND/CAF’s human intelligence (HUMINT) program. This review will examine the entirety of the human source handling program used by DND/CAF.
Second, NSIRA is currently examining the domestic open-source collection activities of DND/CAF. More specifically, this review will take a closer look at legal authorities and the policy framework, program support and training, information and technology management systems, collection activities, intelligence production and dissemination, and oversight and accountability mechanisms.
Access to DND/CAF information
DND/CAF is the largest federal government department, both in terms of personnel (127,000 including regular and reserve forces) and number of physical locations occupied (42 in the National Capital Region alone). Given its domestic and international breadth, information collection and storage varies across the organization, with 180+ independent electronic repositories. NSIRA primarily accesses information through DND/CAF’s liaison body, the National Security and Intelligence Review and Oversight Coordination Secretariat (NSIROCS).
To help ensure that NSIRA receives timely and complete access to requested information, DND/CAF has formalized processes for responding to requests for information that includes a Level 1 (assistant deputy minister or equivalent) approval and attestation. Therefore, when NSIROCS receives a request for information, it coordinates with internal stakeholders to provide the requested information and submit it for Level 1 approval, after which the assistant deputy minister (or equivalent) provides a managerial attestation verifying the completeness and accuracy of the information provided.
NSIRA has also established direct access to specific DND/CAF IT systems for an ongoing review, and is working on a “proxy access” model for future reviews. Ultimately, the nature and scope of the review will dictate the access and verification model to be applied. NSIRA remains committed to working with NSIROCS to ensure that access and verification processes meet review requirements.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Reviews in progress or planned
NSIRA is currently working on three reviews focused exclusively on the RCMP. One of these reviews assesses the RCMP’s use of human sources in national security criminal investigations. Another review examines how the RCMP bypasses encryption when it intercepts private communications in national security criminal investigations. Lastly, NSIRA’S review of the Operational Research Unit of the RCMP will be examining the unit’s access to and use of security intelligence. The RCMP is also implicated in one multi- departmental review that is discussed below.
Access to RCMP information
NSIRA began reviewing the RCMP in 2020 and does not yet have direct access to the RCMP’s IT systems. The decentralized nature of the RCMP’s information holdings, COVID-19- related restrictions, and limitations resulting from other emergencies have resulted in delays in the RCMP providing NSIRA with requested information. NSIRA is committed to working with the RCMP’s National Security External Reviews and Compliance (NSERC) team to establish approaches for the timely provision of information.
In lieu of direct access to RCMP IT systems, NSIRA currently relies on the RCMP’s NSERC team to collect relevant information. NSIRA thanks the NSERC team for its contribution to the work of review but looks forward to working toward direct access to RCMP IT systems or alternate independent verification processes that provides NSIRA with independent confidence in the reliability and completeness of the information it has access to.
Canada Border Services Agency
In 2021, NSIRA completed its review of the Government of Canada’s use of biometrics in the border continuum that, while also examining IRCC and Transport Canada, had a strong CBSA component. The summary of this review can be found in the multi-departmental review section below.
NSIRA also made considerable progress on two CBSA -focused reviews. The first review is of air passenger targeting and examines the CBSA’s use of predictive analysis to identify inbound air travellers for further scrutiny in relation to national security threats. The second review assesses the CBSA’s use of confidential human sources, building on prior work in this area by National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
NSIRA is currently working on its first review of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). NSIRA will examine FINTRAC’s existing regime for sharing information with its domestic and international partners by looking at queries and disclosures to foreign financial intelligence units.
2.4 Multi-departmental reviews
Study of the Government of Canada’s Use of Biometrics in the Border Continuum
Biometrics play a fundamental role in the border continuum, which includes the screening of foreign nationals seeking admission to Canada and the identification of passengers travelling internationally by air. In the course of this review, NSIRA examined activities conducted by the CBSA, IRCC and Transport Canada. The review also extended to the RCMP, which plays a supporting role in one of the major IRCC-led programs using biometrics.
Biometrics are sensitive personal information. The identification of persons by virtue of their biological characteristics raises privacy and human rights concerns. There is public apprehension about the government’s use of biometric analysis, as reflected in discussions regarding the use of facial recognition technology and, relatedly, its possible disparate impact on marginalized groups. At the same time, identifying individuals entering the country — and consequently determining whether they have a right to enter, or what risks they might pose — serves a national security function. In this way, the use of biometrics requires an assessment of the balance between security and privacy.
The immediate objective of this review was to map the nature and scope of biometric activities occurring in this space. This included examining the collection, retention, use and disclosure of biometric information, as well as the legal authorities under which these activities occur. This review also considered the reasonableness and necessity of these activities, studying the accuracy and reliability of biometrics.
This review identified a set of observations linked to nine overarching themes:
Biometrics and national security. The centrality of national security as a justification for biometric activities has waned over time relative to other objectives, such as identity management and traveller facilitation. This makes it challenging to assess biometric activities in general as national security activities. Future NSIRA reviews may focus more narrowly on biometric activities that directly engage national security.
The steady-state activities. The steady-state biometric activities in the border continuum are generally well-supported by current legal authorities and are consistent with international practice.
Expanding use of biometrics over time. The use of biometrics in the border continuum has significantly expanded over the last three decades and is likely to continue expanding in the future. New biometric activities must be justified according to the necessity and proportionality of collecting and using biometrics for particular, intended objectives.
Pilot projects. Pilot projects and initiatives raise more concerns than do steady-state activities, as they risk being implemented without sufficient legal analysis or policy development. Despite the temporary or experimental nature of a project, NSIRA expects that departments will conduct the analysis necessary to ensure that legal authority is in place for the conduct of the activity, and that the attendant collection, use, retention and disclosure of personal information is well-governed by policy.
Evolving legal and societal norms. The public debate surrounding legal authorities questions whether existing standards and protections are sufficient for regulating biometric activities or whether new standards and protections are required. The border is, comparatively, a space in which greater intrusiveness is considered reasonable — but the boundaries of those justifications are not limitless, and will require careful calibration moving forward.
The dual use of biometrics. NSIRA observed several instances of possible dual use of biometric information in the activities examined in this report. Even where new uses of biometrics offer demonstrable benefits, new uses must be carefully considered to ensure their reasonableness and proportionality. In addition, all new uses must be justified and well-authorized in law. The principle of “purpose limitation” may be a way of guarding against dual use in the context of biometric activities.
Technical systems. There is significant overlap between the technical systems and databases used across the steady-state biometric activities. The overall architecture of the systems is complex, though not necessarily problematic.
Visibility into algorithms. Departments and agencies have limited ability to see how the algorithms they use for biometric analysis operate. Each department and agency did, however, demonstrate that performance metrics are known and tested, and that custom thresholds are used when appropriate.
Preventing bias and discrimination. IRCC and the CBSA have conducted preliminary analyses to explore how their biometric activities may impact diverse groups of people, though the implementation of possible mitigation strategies was not always apparent. In some contexts, technological advancements have helped to reduce, but not eliminate, differential impacts. More work remains in terms of mitigating differential impacts on segments of the population. At the same time, the departments and agencies under review have demonstrated their awareness of possible systemic inequalities and their commitment to addressing them.
Public debate about the government’s application of biometric technology will continue to evolve, driving change in the legal and regulatory frameworks associated with such activities. As such, continued scrutiny from NSIRA is warranted, particularly in those instances where the collection and use of biometric information is justified by explicit reference to national security outcomes.
Review of Federal Institutions’ Disclosures of Information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2020
In November 2021, NSIRA and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) completed a joint review of the 215 disclosures made under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) in 2020 — NSIRA’s first joint review with another review body.
SCIDA encourages and facilitates the sharing, or disclosure, of information within the federal government to protect against activities that undermine or threaten national security, subject to certain conditions. SCIDA permits disclosures of information where the disclosing federal institution satisfies itself that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient federal institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary. This is called the disclosure test.
The review found that 212 of the 215 disclosures (approximately 99%) appeared to meet both parts of the disclosure test. In the remaining three disclosures, the information appeared speculative, with no clear connection to activities that undermine the security of Canada. All three of the disclosures of concern were proactive disclosures by the RCMP. Of particular interest was the RCMP’s disclosure of the identities and biometric information about approximately 2,900 individuals to the CAF. NSI RA and the OPC recommended that the RCMP update its policies and practices to support compliance with the disclosure test, that the institution that received the disclosure of concern from the RCMP delete or return the information unless they can demonstrate a valid reason not to,and that any institution disclosing personal information about a large number of individuals (bulk disclosure) exercise heightened due diligence.
The records reviewed also highlighted one case of a verbal disclosure made to CSIS months prior to a formal SCIDA disclosure and without an apparent source of legal authority. NSIRA and the OPC recommended that institutions with national security expertise ensure that when they request personal information for national security purposes from other federal institutions, they make it clear that their request, in and of itself, does not constitute or confer authority on the other institution to disclose personal information.
Based on CSE’s and IRCC’s information-sharing patterns under SCIDA, NSIRA and the OPC recommended that these two institutions enter into an information-sharing arrangement, and that GAC and CSIS update their information-sharing arrangement to incorporate SCIDA’s guiding principles.
Finally, the review examined the federal government’s SCIDA policies. The review found that Public Safety Canada developed a SCIDA guide for federal institutions, led an interdepartmental working group, and provided training that included all 17 of the federal institutions listed in SCIDA. The review also found that 16 of the 17 federal institutions listed in SCIDA — the exception being the Canadian Food Inspection Agency — have policies to support compliance with SCIDA. NSIRA and the OPC recommended that the Canadian Food Inspection Agency develop a similar framework to implement a SCIDA policy.
Response to NSIRA’s recommendations
NSIRA’s recommendations, the management response of reviewees and other details about this review are found in Annex D of this report.
Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2020
The Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and directions issued according to the ACA seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual as a result of information exchanged between a department of the Government of Canada and a foreign entity. At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated. To do this, the ACA and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information.
This review covered the implementation of the directions sent to 12 departments and agencies from January 1, 2020, to the end of the calendar year, December 31, 2020. It was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act, which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA.
This was the first ACA review to cover a full calendar year. Many of the reviewed departments noted that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted their information-sharing activities, such as the number of cases requiring further review as per the ACA. As such, NSIRA found that from January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were issued to deputy heads in any department.
While NSIRA was pleased with the considerable efforts made by many departments new to the ACA in building their frameworks, the CBSA and Public Safety Canada had not finalized their policy frameworks in support of the directions received under the ACA within the review period.
Mitigation measures used by departments were also reviewed this time, since they are an integral part in the information-sharing process for departments.
NSIRA believes that it is now in a position to conduct in-depth case study assessments of individual departments’ adherence to the ACA and directions, irrespective of whether a department reported any cases to its deputy head. Finally, future reviews will follow up on the ongoing implementation of NSIRA’s past recommendations.
Reviews planned or in progress
In the future, NSIRA intends to continue to take advantage of its mandate to “review any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence” by pursuing more multi-departmental reviews and avoiding examinations in siloes. In addition to the mandated annual SCIDA and ACA reviews, NSIRA plans to work on two more reviews involving multiple departments. The first one is a review of how CSIS and the RCMP manage threats posed by ideologically motivated violent extremism. The second review will study the relationship between CSE and CSIS on operational activities.
2.5 Technology in review
Integration of technology in review
Traditionally associated with the systems and software responsible for the administrative support of an organization, IT plays an increasingly large role in the operational activities of Canada’s national security and intelligence community. By taking advantage of rapid advances in cutting-edge technologies, Canada’s security and intelligence community is operationalizing advancements in technology to a degree greater than ever before. Modern national security and intelligence agencies must not only use new technologies to enhance their respective mandates, but they also do so to keep abreast of new opportunities, as well as new threats.
These advancements happen quickly, are complex and are often unique to each institution. Furthermore, emerging technologies, while ostensibly developed for one purpose, often have unforeseen implications on civil liberties and privacy, especially when used in an intelligence or security capacity. It is essential for an accountability body like NSIRA to keep pace with the use of developing technologies in Canada’s national security and intelligence community to ensure that the organizations it is responsible to review are discharging their mandates lawfully, reasonably and appropriately.
The vision for NSIRA’s Technology Directorate is to enhance the review landscape to incorporate an appropriate focus on the use and implementation of technology by security and intelligence agencies in Canada. By extending its reach into the practical applications of technology, and by entrusting this new focus to an in-house team of engineers, computer scientists and experienced review professionals, NSIRA will be well placed to ensure that the departments and agencies are held accountable for the decisions they make in leveraging the various aspects of emerging technology.
The development of this capacity at NSIRA will also provide a unique opportunity to build a review model that will put us on equal footing within the Five Eyes and the international review community. Without dedicated in-house technology expertise, NSIRA’s work will not stay current with contemporary national security legal and compliance risks or issues.
To that effect, NSIRA’s Technology Directorate will:
lead the review of IT systems and cutting-edge technical advancements;
conduct independent technical investigations;
support assigned NSIRA members in the investigation of complaints against CSIS, CSE or the RCMP requiring technological expertise to assess the evidence;
produce reports explaining and interpreting sophisticated technical subjects;
assess the risk of a reviewed entity’s IT compliance with applicable laws and policy;
recommend IT system and data safeguards to minimize the risk of legal non- compliance;
lead the integration of technology themes into yearly NSIRA review plans; and leverage external expertise in the understanding and assessment of IT risks.
Future of technology in review
In 2022, NSIRA will continue to increase the number of employees working in the Technology Directorate as it takes an increasingly active and significant role. It will also lead the first technology-focused reviews of the lifecycle of CSIS information collected by technical capabilities pursuant to a Federal Court warrant. NSIRA is also scheduled to review CSE’s SIGINT retention practices in 2023.
In terms of important considerations for ongoing reviews, NSIRA Technology Directorate has identified the following three technology-related topics as priorities for consideration:
dual-use technologies;
data warehousing, bulk data and data analytics; and
automated decision-making.
As Canada’s security and intelligence community continues to grow its technical collection and analytic capacity, NSIRA must develop its own expertise in technical review in tandem. Over the next year, NSIRA intends to establish domestic and international partnerships and develop working relationships with academics, civil society and commercial leaders to ensure key technological issues factor into its approaches. NSIRA’s Technology Directorate will also support the NSIRA complaint investigations team to understand where and when technology advancements could be applied to NSIRA investigations.
2.6 Review policies and processes
Method for assessing timeliness
Guidelines for assessing timeliness in reviews
To ensure greater accountability and predictability, NSIRA will be using the following guidelines to assess the timeliness of reviewee responses to requests for information (RFIs) during the review process, and will comment both privately and publicly on the outcomes. Notably, NSIRA’s annual report will track timeliness each year. These guidelines provide clear, standardized expectations on this important aspect of the review process.
Standard request for information (RFI) timelines
Much of the information requested by NSIRA falls into two categories: “off-the-shelf,” readily available material, and material requiring additional work to compile. Off-the-shelf material may include items such as policy documents, ministerial directives, operational policies, legal opinions and standard operating procedures. Information that requires additional work to compile may include things such as material that requires data manipulation or explanations and material in certain specialized databases and emails. RFIs will clearly state which type of material they pertain to, and standard timelines of 15 or 30 days, respectively, will be provided for responses.
Non-standard RFI timelines
NSIRA may deem it necessary to provide longer response times for information requests, for example, when the review covers new subject matter, the request is expected to return a large amount of information or documentation, or the reviewee has other ongoing reviews or other operational considerations. Non-standard timelines are at NSIRA’s discretion and will be applied based on the judgment of the review team.
NSIRA recognizes that extraordinary factors and extenuating circumstances may affect responses to requests for information and documentation. To accommodate this, reviewees may present, with significant justification, an alternative RFI timeline to the one originally provided. This should be done on receipt and review of the request, if possible. The decision to grant an extension is made by the NSIRA review team, and other arrangements, such as providing the requested information in tranches, can be considered. Regardless, RFI’s will always have an associated response timeline attached to them. This timeline will determine whether subsequent remedial steps are required.
Remedial steps
NSIRA will implement a three-stage approach to engage reviewees when no response is received to an RFI within the associated timeline. When a deadline is missed with no satisfactory response, NSIRA will escalate its concerns progressively by sending a series of letters to the assistant deputy minister, deputy minister and, finally, the responsible minister.
The letters will be attached as an annex to the related review and will inform an overall assessment of timeliness of the reviewee in NSIRA’s public annual report. The above guidelines will also be reviewed annually and may be updated based on the outcome of their ongoing implementation to ensure they meet their objectives.
Implementation of recommendations
The key outcomes of the work flowing from NSIRA’s review mandate are typically captured and distilled in the recommendations NSIRA provides based on its findings. In most NSIRA reviews completed since its inception, NSIRA has issued recommendations to the departments and agencies under review. In turn, reviewees have provided responses to these recommendations, which may include a plan for implementation. With a little over two years since recommendations for the first NSIRA reviews were issued, NSIRA believes enough time has elapsed to begin seeing the results of the implementation of these recommendations reflected in reviewees’ activities and policies. Therefore, NSIRA will begin considering the most appropriate means to track and evaluate the implementation of the recommendations issued in past reviews.
NSIRA will discuss with agencies and departments that were reviewed how to evaluate the implementation of past recommendations. For example, if issues and challenges remain unaddressed, NSIRA may initiate follow-up reviews. NSIRA’s public annual report may also raise issues in the implementation of recommendations as needed.
Verification
As noted above, verification is a fundamental component of credible and professional independent review. NSIRA must be able to test the completeness or accuracy of information it may receive as a matter of course during every review. This component is key to NSIRA’s ability to assure its stakeholders that it has confidence in the information it receives during a review, and thereby in the findings and conclusions of the review.
During a review, NSIRA is entitled to receive all information it deems relevant, except for Cabinet confidences. This feature of the NSIRA Act is critical for the success of NSIRA’s mandate. For NSIRA to assure Parliament and Canadians that it has a high level of confidence in the information it receives, departments and agencies under review are expected to support processes that satisfy NSIRA’s requirement to independently verify the completeness and accuracy of information provided by the department or agency. For example:
provide NSIRA, in support of each review, an index of documents provided, and an indication as to whether any information has been altered or removed and why; and
include a record of how searches of information are conducted, including which search terms were used, and which databases were queried.
Reviewees should always expect an element of verification as a regular part of each review. In keeping with its commitment to transparency and methodological rigour, NSIRA reviews now contain a “confidence statement.” This statement reflects NSIRA’s ability to verify information during a review. The confidence statement also provides important additional context to the review, apprising readers of the extent to which NSIRA has been able to verify necessary or relevant information during the review, and whether its confidence was impacted as a result of this exercise.
Complaints investigations
3.1 Overview
In the course of the year, NSIRA continued to adapt in conducting its complaints investigations by using innovative approaches. This included the use of videoconference technology for its hearings and investigative interviews, as well as finding procedural efficiencies such as proceeding with some investigations in writing. In part due to challenges inherent to the COVID-19 pandemic, NSIRA experienced delays in its investigations stemming from reduced responsiveness in accessing information and evidence. Annex E contains statistics for NSIRA’s complaints investigations in 2021.
Advancing the investigations and obtaining evidence presented issues for both NSIRA and the federal government parties to investigations that were obligated to provide information to NSIRA. In several ongoing matters, NSIRA granted adjournments and extensions of deadlines for procedural steps, including the filing of submissions and evidentiary material. In addition to pandemic-related delays, NSIRA notes that federal government parties to investigations cited other reasons for their requests for extensions of deadlines to file material, such as issues related to availability of witnesses and shortage of resources. Furthermore, NSIRA had to ask for additional information in response to incomplete initial disclosures in more than one investigation, which also created delays.
As to NSIRA’s investigation caseload in 2021, NSIRA dealt with a continued substantial increase in its inventory of cases. This increase resulted from 58 complaints referred in April 2021 to NSIRA for investigation by the Canadian Human Rights Commission, pursuant to subsection 45(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. This high-volume caseload has impacted NSIRA’s overall management of its cases.
NSIRA has also been focusing on strengthening its program delivery by working on strategies for the collection, analysis and use of race-based and demographic data in the context of the complaints investigation process. Working closely with its partner, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, NSIRA has been developing strategies of common interest in improving procedures to take into account considerations of diversity and inclusion. The specific objective is to improve access to justice by improving awareness and understanding of the investigation process. The intent is also to document the different racial groups among civilian complainants and determine:
whether there are significant racial disparities;
whether there are racial differences with respect to the types of complaints made against national security organization members based on different groups;
the frequency of complaints that include allegations of racial or other forms of bias; and
whether complaint investigation outcomes vary by racial group.
Looking to the year ahead, NSIRA will analyze procedural data with respect to the timelines of its investigations in order to inform the establishment of new service standards, continuing its efforts to ensure efficiency and transparency in the process. NSIRA is mindful that service standards are based on time commitments in normal circumstances. As the public health situation with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic continues to improve, NSIRA looks forward to the cooperation of federal government parties in increasing their responsiveness to advance investigations. In light of NSIRA’s objective of developing service standards, it will be adopting a measured approach to requests for adjournments and extensions of deadlines, which will be permitted in exceptional circumstances. Also for the year ahead, NSIRA will continue to improve its website to promote accessibility to and relevance of processes in the investigation of complaints.
3.2 Status of complaints investigation process reform
In 2021, NSIRA completed its investigation process reform initiative after a complex consultation with multiple stakeholders. In July 2021, NSIRA launched its new process that included the implementation of its new rules of procedure, aiming to provide greater accessibility as well as greater efficiency in NSIRA’s investigation mandate. Investigations under this new model show early signs of efficiency in that NSIRA has set timelier dates for the conduct of investigative interviews.
3.3 Investigations
Final report summaries
Investigation Concerning Allegations Against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (1500-516)
Background
The Complainant filed a complaint against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) regarding its involvement in different incidents with airport authorities while the Complainant was travelling.
In addition, the Complainant alleged harassment, possible interference with employment opportunities, interference with a passport application, intercepting and reviewing mail, and disrupting personal relationships.
Investigation
During the investigation, the Complainant raised several separate incidents that led to the filing of their complaint. NSIRA reviewed the evidence before it to determine whether CSIS’s actions were reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances; whether CSIS’s actions constituted harassment; and whether it had acted lawfully.
NSIRA considered the evidence given by witnesses, the documentation submitted by the parties, as well as other relevant material made available during the course of the investigation of the complaint. NSIRA also heard evidence provided by the Complainant.
With respect to one specific incident in dealing with airport authorities while travelling, NSIRA heard evidence by witnesses regarding section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). Section 8 of the Charter provides that everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.
Conclusion
With respect to all allegations, NSIRA determined that the complaint is unsupported. However, concerning events related to CSIS participating in a Canada Border Services Agency search of the Complainant’s cell phone at an airport on one occasion, NSIRA found that CSIS breached section 8 of the Charter.
NSIRA concluded that CSIS did not take the Complainant’s privacy interests casually and did not deliberately disregard privacy considerations in relation to the search. The breach of section 8 of the Charter was not egregious and constituted an error in judgment.
Reopened Investigation Concerning Allegations Against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (1500-471)
Background
NSIRA issued a supplemental final report resulting from a reopened investigation that was concluded by its predecessor, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC).
The Complainant alleged that CSIS had violated his constitutional rights due to his race and religion as well as his refusal to work as a human source. He further alleged that CSIS agents were harassing him by stopping him in airports and following him. Lastly, the Complainant alleged that CSIS had disclosed false information to a foreign entity, which resulted in him being held for eight hours without food in a foreign country’s airport.
In SIRC’s final report, SIRC concluded that the Complainant’s allegations of discrimination and harassment were unsupported. SIRC also concluded that the actions of CSIS officials had violated section 12 of the CSIS Act, ministerial directions, policies and operational procedures, and that these actions resulted in adverse consequences for the Complainant.
NSIRA’s reopened investigation was strictly limited to two questions of law: (1) whether the reasonable grounds to suspect standard under section 12 of the CSIS Act must be met when CSIS makes initial inquiries of its operational holdings; and (2) whether CSIS was required to obtain an individual targeting authority against the Complainant.
Investigation
The investigation of the reopening was deemed to be continued before NSIRA pursuant to subsection 11(1) of the National Security Act. NSIRA considered the documentation submitted by the parties, including classified submissions and documents filed by CSIS. NSIRA also considered the submissions filed by the Complainant as well as any other relevant material made available during the course of the investigation of this reopening.
With respect to whether the reasonable grounds to suspect standard under section 12 of the CSIS Act must be met when CSIS makes initial inquiries of its operational holdings, CSIS conceded during the investigation that it requires reasonable grounds to suspect that activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada, as described in section 2 of the CSIS Act, to conduct such initial inquiries of its operational holdings.
On the facts of this case, NSIRA determined that SIRC had correctly found that CSIS did not possess objective facts about activities that met the requisite reasonable grounds to suspect standard.
With regard to whether CSIS was required to obtain an individual targeting authority against the Complainant, NSIRA concluded that SIRC’s findings of fact regarding the extent and manner in which CSIS investigated the Complainant would not be revisited by NSIRA. NSIRA found that SIRC’s conclusion that there is a point in the CSIS investigation where CSIS agents were specifically investigating the activities of the Complainant was unequivocal, and, therefore, it was clear that CSIS should have obtained an individual targeting authority against him, yet failed to do so.
Conclusion
NSIRA determined that SIRC’s report and the findings were affirmed.
Conclusion
In 2021, NSIRA delivered on its mandate by completing reviews on a wide array of federal departments and agencies involved in national security and intelligence activities. Similarly, despite the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic for complaints investigation proceedings and a large increase in its workload, NSIRA adapted its methods and continued its efforts to improve its program delivery.
NSIRA aims to increase its capacity to review technology and its practical use in national security and intelligence activities. The ongoing growth in NSIRA’s staff complement will also help the organization review a greater variety of national security and intelligence activities and continue to progress in its investigation of a large number of complaints.
NSIRA remains committed to engage with non-government stakeholders. NSIRA took note of feedback on its prior annual report and will continue to aim to improve its usefulness.
Once again, NSIRA members are very grateful for the excellent work of the Secretariat staff and their dedication to the organization’s mission of promoting greater accountability in the Canadian security and intelligence community and improving the confidence of Canadians in their oversight institutions.
The Government of Canada (GoC) uses biometrics to identify individuals with a level of confidence beyond what is possible absent such techniques.
Biometrics play a fundamental role in the border continuum, which includes the screening of foreign nationals seeking admission to Canada and the identification of passengers travelling internationally by air. In the course of this study, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) examined activities conducted by the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and Transport Canada (TC). The study also extended to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which plays a supporting role in one of the major IRCC-led programs in this area.
Biometrics are sensitive personal information. The identification of persons by virtue of their biological characteristics raises privacy and human rights concerns. There is public apprehension about the government’s use of biometric analysis, as reflected in discussions regarding the use of facial recognition technology and, relatedly, its possible disparate impact on marginalized groups. At the same time, identifying individuals entering the country – and consequently determining whether they have a right to enter, or what risks they might pose – serves a national security function. In this way, the use of biometrics requires an assessment of the balance between privacy and security.
This report informs, contextualizes, and contributes to this conversation by presenting NSIRA’s foundational study of the GoC’s biometric activities in the border continuum.
The Government of Canada (GoC) uses biometrics to identify individuals with a level of confidence beyond what is possible absent such techniques.
Biometrics play a fundamental role in the border continuum, which includes the screening of foreign nationals seeking admission to Canada and the identification of passengers travelling internationally by air. In the course of this study, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) examined activities conducted by the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and Transport Canada (TC). The study also extended to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which plays a supporting role in one of the major IRCC-led programs in this area.
Biometrics are sensitive personal information. The identification of persons by virtue of their biological characteristics raises privacy and human rights concerns. There is public apprehension about the government’s use of biometric analysis, as reflected in discussions regarding the use of facial recognition technology and, relatedly, its possible disparate impact on marginalized groups. At the same time, identifying individuals entering the country – and consequently determining whether they have a right to enter, or what risks they might pose – serves a national security function. In this way, the use of biometrics requires an assessment of the balance between privacy and security.
This report informs, contextualizes, and contributes to this conversation by presenting NSIRA’s foundational study of the GoC’s biometric activities in the border continuum.
The study identified a set of observations linked to nine overarching themes:
Biometrics and National Security. The centrality of national security as a justification for biometric activities has waned over time relative to other objectives, such as identity management and traveller facilitation. This makes it challenging to assess biometric activities in general as national security activities. Future NSIRA reviews may focus more narrowly on biometric activities that directly engage national security.
The Steady-State Activities. The steady-state biometric activities in the border continuum are generally well-supported by current legal authorities and are consistent with international practice.
Expanding Use of Biometrics over Time. The use of biometrics in the border continuum has significantly expanded over the last three decades, and is likely to continue expanding in the future. This trajectory is driven partly by advancing technological capabilities, partly by evolving challenges in identity management. It is reflected in other jurisdictions around the world. Exploiting the possibilities created by technological developments and keeping pace with other jurisdictions cannot justify the expanded use of biometrics in their own right. New biometric activities must be justified according to the necessity and proportionality of collecting and using biometrics for particular, intended objectives.
Pilot Projects. Pilot projects and initiatives raise more concerns than do steady-state activities, as they risk being implemented on an experimental basis, without sufficient legal analysis or policy development. These projects represent an area of continued interest for NSIRA. Despite the temporary or experimental nature of a project, NSIRA expects that departments will conduct the analysis necessary to ensure that legal authority is in place for the conduct of the activity, and that the attendant collection, use, retention and disclosure of personal information is well-governed by policy.
Evolving Legal and Societal Norms. The public debate surrounding legal authorities questions whether existing standards and protections are sufficient for regulating biometric activities or whether new standards and protections are required. The border is, comparatively, a space in which greater intrusiveness is considered reasonable – but the boundaries of those justifications are not limitless, and will require careful calibration moving forward.
The Dual-Use of Biometrics. NSIRA observed several instances of possible dual-use of biometric information in the activities examined in this report. Even where they pose demonstrable benefits, new uses of biometrics must be carefully considered to ensure their reasonableness and proportionality. In addition, all new uses must be justified and well-authorized in law. The principle of “purpose limitation” may be a way of guarding against unjustified dual-use in the context of biometric activities.
Technical Systems. There is significant overlap between the technical systems and databases used across the steady-state biometric activities. The overall architecture of this system – biometric collection, transmission, and storage in the course of the GoC’s activities in the border continuum – is complex, though not necessarily problematic.
Visibility into Algorithms. Departments and agencies have limited visibility into how the algorithms they use for biometric analysis operate. Each department and agency did, however, demonstrate that performance metrics are known and tested, and that custom thresholds are used when appropriate.
Preventing Bias and Discrimination. IRCC and CBSA have conducted preliminary analyses to explore how their biometric activities may impact diverse groups of people, though the implementation of possible mitigation strategies was not always apparent. In some contexts, technological advancements have helped to reduce, but not eliminate, differential impacts. More work remains in terms of mitigating differential impacts on segments of the population. At the same time, the departments and agencies under review have demonstrated their awareness of possible systemic inequalities and their commitment to addressing them.
These observations are intended to contribute to Canadians’ understanding of the complex and evolving use of biometrics in the border continuum, and to shape how NSIRA as an organization engages with this area in future work.
Public debate about the government’s application of biometric technology will continue to evolve, driving change in the legal and regulatory frameworks associated with such activities. As such, continued scrutiny from NSIRA is warranted, particularly in those instances where the collection and use of biometric information is justified by explicit reference to national security outcomes.
List of Acronyms
Glossary of Terms
2. Authorities
The National Security Review Agency (NSIRA) conducted this study under section 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act.
3. Introduction
Background
Biometrics enhance the government’s ability to know who you are. The measurement and analysis of unique biological characteristics – including, inter alia, fingerprints, iris patterns, and facial features – facilitates the identification of individuals to a level of confidence beyond what is possible absent the use of such techniques. Biometrics can be layered with traditional identifiers – such as name, date of birth, place of birth, gender etc. – to enhance the government’s identification process.
Knowing who you are – including verifying that you are who you claim to be – has benefits for national security. At the border, in particular, questions about identity are paramount: who has the right to enter the country, who does not, and who might pose a threat to the security of Canada and Canadians?
At the same time, the identification of persons by virtue of their biological characteristics raises acute privacy and human rights concerns. Biometrics are intrinsically personal information, and are largely immutable (i.e., they cannot be easily changed, as can passwords or other identifiers). There is public apprehension about the government’s use of biometric analysis, as reflected in discussions regarding the use of facial recognition technology and, relatedly, its possible disparate impact on marginalized groups. As biometric technology is increasingly integrated into public spaces, it will be important for government and for Canadians to consider the associated calibration of security, privacy, and human rights.
This report informs, contextualizes, and contributes to this conversation by presenting NSIRA’s foundational study of the Government of Canada (GoC)’s biometric activities in the border continuum, with a focus on activities relating to the screening of foreign nationals seeking admission to Canada and the identification of passengers travelling internationally by air. The immediate objective of the study was to map the biometric activities occurring in this space. This includes examining the collection, retention, use, and disclosure of biometric information, as well as the legal authorities under which said activities occur. The baseline for an informed public discussion is accurate information about which activities are being pursued by the GoC and whether/how they are authorized in law.
The study also considered the reasonableness and necessity of these activities, studying the accuracy and reliability of biometrics, including the possibility of discrimination on the basis of identity factors like race and gender; the proportionality of their collection, retention, use and disclosure; and the transparency with which the GoC discusses its use of biometrics and their contribution to national security.
NSIRA’s ability to look across departments and agencies and to make both specific and general observations – to examine the forest as well as the trees – was particularly valuable in assessing a wide and growing biometric landscape.
In addition to informing an important public conversation, the report’s broad treatment of biometric activities in the border continuum advances NSIRA’s work in two ways. First, it identifies several more narrow areas of interest or concern, to which NSIRA may return in future targeted reviews. Second, it defines a set of criteria against which NSIRA may review the GoC’s use of biometrics in national security and intelligence activities – both within and beyond the border continuum.
The Study
Scope
The border is distinct from other public settings. There are security imperatives that arise when individuals cross sovereign boundaries, such that the state is justified in taking measures not permissible in other contexts. While privacy rights and civil liberties do not disappear, expectations of privacy and of free movement are significantly lower. In considering the GoC’s biometric activities, therefore, it was practical to separate the border continuum from other settings; what might be overly intrusive in the latter may be justified in the former. Further, the border can serve as a testing ground for new biometric techniques and technologies, which then spread to other areas. If there are public concerns about biometric technology more generally, the border may serve as a harbinger of things to come and ought to be scrutinized accordingly.
In this study, we examine the collection, retention, use, and disclosure of biometric information and evaluate, where applicable, said activities against the criteria outlined below. We reviewed relevant policy and legal frameworks as communicated by departments and agencies, to inform our assessment of reasonableness and necessity, and to establish foundational knowledge that will inform future compliance assessments in the biometrics space. Our assessment of reasonableness and necessity was conducted at a high-level, reflecting on the themes, trends and issues manifest in considering the GoC’s biometric activities in the border continuum as a whole. We did not conduct independent verification or audit of the claims or activities themselves.
In the course of this study, NSIRA examined activities conducted by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and Transport Canada (TC). The study also extended to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which plays a supporting role in one of the major IRCC-led programs in the border continuum.
NSIRA also surveyed the history, and possible future, of biometric activities in the border continuum. The biometric landscape is not static, nor are practices in traveler facilitation and border security. Much of the public concern regarding biometrics (in particular over something like facial recognition technology) has to do with what lays just over the horizon, rather than simply any activity currently taking place. To this end, discussion of past activities, programs, and pilot projects illustrate the expansion of biometrics that has culminated in the present moment. Similarly, several pilot projects and initiatives known to be in development serve as examples of what may be to come. This wider lens contextualizes present activities and thus helps fulfill the broader objectives of the study.
Criteria
A set of basic criteria guided NSIRA’s assessment of the GoC’s present biometric activities in the border continuum:
Compliance. NSIRA examined the legislative and policy framework governing departments’ and agencies’ collection and use of biometrics. It examined the enabling legislation’s compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Privacy Act; considered the safeguards and features of the departments’ or agencies’ enabling statutes and regulations as applies to their biometric programs; and reviewed applicable departmental and Treasury Board policies.
Proportionality. Proportionality, in this context, weighs the government’s objectives in using biometrics against any impacts on individuals’ privacy or human rights. Generally speaking, NSIRA expects that any intrusions on the rights and freedoms of individuals be readily justifiable and offer important benefits to pressing and substantial objectives.
Accuracy. Because biometrics are fundamentally designed to identify individuals, it is important that they do so accurately, such that they can effectively contribute to the government’s objectives in a given activity/program. Biometric analysis (including the use of algorithms) is subject to error rates and false-matches that can have significant consequences for individuals. Relatedly, algorithms used for biometric analysis are susceptible to demographic performance variables which could give rise to bias or discrimination.
Transparency. In light of the GoC’s National Security Transparency Commitment of 2017, this criterion generally assessed the public transparency of biometric activities in the border continuum. It emphasized the availability of information regarding the type of biometrics collected and the connection of biometrics to GoC priorities, including national security.
Data Security. Given the sensitive nature of biometric information, protection of said data throughout the so-called “privacy lifecycle” (collection, storage, transmission, and destruction) is particularly important. As such, NSIRA assessed the policy frameworks of the activities under review for data security protections, such as encryption, access limitations, and privacy-by-design principles.
Collectively, these criteria informed NSIRA’s assessment of the lawfulness, reasonableness and necessity of the departments’ exercise of their powers as concerns the use of biometrics in Canada’s border continuum. Our observations highlight potential issues and areas of concern, which may serve as a basis for subsequent in-depth review of particular activities.
Methodology and Information Requirements
NSIRA received information from departments and agencies in the form of briefings, written responses, and documents. The latter included policies, procedures, project reports, technical studies, operational bulletins, manuals, correspondence, websites, and relevant legal opinions.
In addition to information obtained from departments and agencies, the nature of the study – dealing with a broad category of information widely used and heavily scrutinized across the globe – meant that a significant volume of open-source research was pertinent. As such, NSIRA examined media reports (both domestic and international), industry reports, academic research, think tank reports, government reports/documents from other jurisdictions, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organization research on biometrics and related technology. What emerged was a sense of the common standards, themes, risks, and even lexicon associated with biometrics, all of which helped inform NSIRA’s observations regarding the GoC’s biometric activities in the border continuum.
The Report
The body of the report is organized into three descriptive sections, presented in chronological order:
Biometrics Past: a discussion of the history and evolution of the use of biometrics in the border continuum, including relevant pilot projects and key expansions along the way;
Biometrics Present: a description of current, steady-state biometric activities; and,
Biometrics Future: a discussion of the role biometrics are likely to play in the border continuum moving forward, based on present trajectories.
The concluding section unpacks overarching themes and observations pertinent to the study objectives outlined above. While some of these observations are specific to a particular program or activity, others apply horizontally across various aspects of the study. The mélange reflects both the nature of a foundational study and the unique, crosscutting mandate that NSIRA enjoys. Our observations are intended to contribute to Canadians’ understanding of the complex and evolving use of biometrics in the border continuum, and to shape how NSIRA as an organization engages with this area in future work.
4. Biometrics Past
IRCC began collecting fingerprints from asylum claimants and deportees in 1993, partly as a consequence of the rise in global migration volumes following the end of the Cold War. Canada received 37,000 refugee protection claims in 1992, up from just a few thousand annually for the balance of the 1980s. The resulting pressure on the system led, in part, to the introduction of Bill C-86 in June 1992, which included several provisions designed to enhance the efficiency and integrity of Canada’s immigration and refugee system, among them the fingerprinting of asylum claimants and deportees. This provision generated public criticism, with the government eventually amending it to include the deletion of fingerprints if/when an individual became a Canadian citizen. Ultimately, the purpose of the collection was to introduce processing efficiency into the system and to enhance both fraud detection and fraud deterrence through rigorous identity management.
Over the subsequent years, the collection and use of biometrics in the border continuum has steadily expanded, such that nearly everyone entering Canada by air – whether a foreign national or Canadian citizen – now has their biometric information collected and/or analyzed in some way. How did we get from there to here? The present section addresses this question by describing the evolution of the GoC’s activities over time, highlighting key moments, programs, and projects that animate it along the way.
9/11
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dramatically altered Canada’s national security landscape. The 2001 budget reflected the new priorities of the day, with $7.7 billion over five years allocated to security measures, including $1 billion to immigration screening and enforcement and $1.2 billion to border security initiatives.
These outlays came on the heels of explicit recommendations from a parliamentary committee to, among other things, “modernize border management to accommodate future security and trade needs” and “test and implement […] advanced technologies in […] border processing operations.” The latter recommendation included the suggestion that “biometric technology in the form of fingerprint or retina scanners could […] be considered to identify individuals […] crossing the border.” The report also called for the reactivation and full implementation of the NEXUS program, which had been a cross-border travel pilot project between the US and Canada launched in November 2000 but suspended in the wake of the attacks.
The central plank of post-9/11 US-Canada border security cooperation, however, was the Smart Border Declaration, signed on December 12, 2001. Accompanied by a 30-point Action Plan, the declaration guided US and Canadian efforts to enhance border security. The very first item on the Action Plan was the introduction of “biometric identifiers”, calling for the two countries to “develop on an urgent basis common biometric identifiers in documentation such as permanent resident cards, NEXUS, and other travel documents to ensure greater security.” Also of note were the provisions to expand information sharing in the visa and refugee/asylum context.
The two countries explicitly framed the Smart Border Action Plan as an effort to “develop a zone of confidence against terrorist activity”. In the US, the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (more widely known as the “9/11 Commission Report”) expressed this logic, calling for a “biometric screening system” that would encompass the entire border continuum, from passport and immigration application to arrival at ports of entry, along with information sharing between jurisdictions. Canada’s 2004 National Security Policy (NSP) similarly foregrounded biometrics in its chapter on border security. The NSP noted that Canada would “work toward a broader use of biometrics” and “examine how to use biometrics in [its] border and immigration systems to enhance the design and issuance processes of travel and proof-of-status documents and to validate the identity of travellers at [Canada’s] ports of entry.” For both countries, biometrics were seen as a means of identifying possible terrorists crossing the border. 9/11 had fused border security to national security, turning identity management – hitherto primarily associated with efficiencies and fraud – into a national security priority.
In Canada, the NSP set the basic outline of the GoC’s current steady-state biometric activities: facial recognition in the issuance and use of travel documents (Passport Program) and fingerprints and the validation of identity at ports of entry (Immigration Program). We return to these in Section 5.
In the balance of this section, we briefly describe the key biometric activities and programs adopted in the years following 9/11.
ePassport
Though standard in the document for decades, passport photographs were not considered “biometrics” until passports became machine-readable. The 2003 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) guidelines on ePassports, also commonly referred to as “biometric passports,” therefore mark the introduction of biometric identifiers to the document on the international stage. Canada committed to the ePassport in 2004, though actual implementation unfolded in stages over subsequent years, with the full rollout occurring in 2013. Hundreds of other jurisdictions adopted the ePassport during this period, gradually establishing it as an international recommended practice for official travel documents. Canada’s current iteration of the ePassport is discussed in paragraphs 95-112, below.
In addition to the “smart chip” embedded in the ePassport and containing the facial photograph, the government also pursued facial recognition in the passport application/issuance process. The first Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for what was then known as the “Facial Recognition Project” was crafted in 2003, though full implementation under the guise of the “Facial Recognition Solution” (FRS) did not occur until 2010. The system used facial recognition to help assess entitlement to a Canadian passport or other official Canadian travel document. The specific objectives of the program were: to detect fraud, support the authentication of identity, and prevent passport issuance to ineligible applicants. We discuss the current iteration of the FRS, which is a key component of the steady-state Passport Program, in paragraphs 95-112, below.
Temporary Resident Biometrics Program (TRBP) (2009-2018)
The “Temporary Resident Biometrics Program” (TRBP) – initiated in 2009 and operational by 2013 – marked a significant expansion of the collection of biometrics in the immigration context. Under the TRBP, biometrics (fingerprints and a digital photograph) were collected by IRCC (then-Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC]) as part of temporary resident applications from 30 nationalities. The fingerprints were screened “against fingerprint records of known criminals, past refugee claimants, persons previously deported, and previous immigration applicants” held by the GoC. Once the application was approved and the applicant arrived in Canada, the CBSA verified the biometrics ensuring that the person presenting was the same individual that had applied. In 2014, biometrics collection was expanded beyond temporary resident applications to include overseas refugee and resettlement applications.
According to the GoC, biometrics were adopted as a means to access more complete and accurate information, so as to inform admissibility decisions made under the Immigration and Refugees Protection Act (IRPA) regarding temporary resident applicants. The TRBP’s use of biometrics therefore supported identity management goals, with national security – the identification of individuals who might pose a security threat – constituting a supporting feature of the larger program.
Beyond the Border (2011) and Immigration Information Sharing (IIS) (2013-2016)
In 2011, Canada and the US issued the joint declaration Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness and its accompanying “Beyond the Border Action Plan”. The plan made a commitment to increase information sharing between the two countries. Canada and the US had shared immigration information on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis since 2003, but the process was labour intensive and consequently limited in volume.
The resulting program was the Immigration Information Sharing (IIS) initiative, which made it possible for Canadian and American authorities to systematically exchange immigration information on the basis of a biometric match between their respective immigration databases – a capability that became fully operational in August 2015. For example, all biometric-required applicants to Canada had their fingerprints systematically checked against US fingerprint holdings at the time of enrolment. In the event of a match, the US returned relevant immigration information (e.g. biographical information to confirm identity, the outcome of any previous immigration applications, etc.) to IRCC, to help inform decisions about admissibility. The arrangement was reciprocal, meaning the US similarly queried Canadian immigration fingerprint holdings, with Canada returning immigration information in the event of a match. As characterized by a 2015 implementation report, this capability helped to “counter identity fraud, strengthen identity management and provide valuable information to inform respective admissibility determinations.”
The IIS was, in many ways, the natural extension of TRBP. Whereas TRBP made it possible to screen an applicant’s biometrics against domestic databases, IIS extended this capability to US databases, thereby increasing the range of information obtainable through biometric querying.
Information-Sharing Pilot between CBSA and IRCC/CIC (2013-2016)
Beginning in 2013, a two-phase pilot project between CBSA and IRCC/CIC explored the benefits of leveraging facial recognition through information sharing. The impetus for the project was the experimental querying of 72 photographs of individuals wanted by the CBSA against IRCC/CIC’s passport database. The querying was intended to verify whether any passports had been issued to individuals subject to CBSA warrants for arrest under the IRPA (under genuine or false identities), thus helping protect the integrity of the passport system, while also facilitating enforcement of the IRPA. The CBSA and IRCC rely on sections 7, 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act for the use and disclosure of this information.
Using facial recognition, the one-to-many identification of these 72 individuals identified three individuals who had fraudulently acquired travel documents. On the strength of these results, the organizations drafted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in December 2013 to share photographs of 1,000 individuals wanted on active CBSA warrants and ran a one-to-many identification against the passport database using facial recognition. This time, 15 individuals were found to have submitted fraudulent passport applications.
In 2015, another round of the project was initiated under a subsequent MOU, raising the number of queries to 3,000 individuals. Also expanded was the scope of information that could be returned as a result of a positive match. Whereas the 2013 MOU only authorized the sharing of information related to document fraud, the 2015 MOU authorized the sharing of any derogatory information relevant to the enforcement of the IRPA. Appendix III of the Information Sharing Annex to the 2017 IRCC-CBSA MOU established this information sharing on a permanent basis.
Research into Facial Recognition
In addition to the expansion, refinement, and leveraging of biometric activities associated with passports and immigration, the GoC explored additional uses of biometrics, including facial recognition, through research into emerging technologies and pilot initiatives, testing possible applications in the border continuum.
Pilot and Research on Operational Video-based Evaluation of Infrastructure and Technology: Face Recognition in Video (PROVE-IT: FRiV) (2011-2013)
In 2011, CBSA led the “Pilot and Research on Operational Video-based Evaluation of Infrastructure and Technology: Face Recognition in Video” (PROVE-IT: FRiV) project. PROVE-IT: FRiV examined, in a lab setting, the possible use of live-capture facial recognition in a controlled environment, such as an airport. Researchers evaluated commercial products and tools available for this purpose, and determined that “face-based surveillance” was ready for live use in “in semi-constrained environments.”
Faces on the Move (FOTM) (2014-2017)
Building on the findings and results of PROVE-IT: FRiV, CBSA launched the “Faces on the Move” (FOTM) pilot project in 2014. FOTM involved the live video capture of the facial images of travellers as they passed through Toronto Pearson International Airport Terminal 3 for a six-month period between June 2016 and November 2016.
Project-specific video cameras were installed to capture facial images in the immigration arrivals area, primary inspection, and toward the exit following primary processing. Facial images were checked in real time using facial recognition against two image databases: a “control” watchlist comprised of 65 CBSA volunteers, and an “operational” watchlist of 4,860 previously deported individuals, generated by CBSA. The CBSA volunteers conducted over 1,200 test walkthroughs over the course of the six-month demonstration. At the same time, approximately 15,000 to 20,000 travellers per day were screened against the operational watchlist, of which forty-seven were correctly detected by the system. All records of personal information were to be destroyed at the end of the project, save those that served an administrative purpose, which would be retained for two years following the date of their last use in keeping with section 6(1) of the Privacy Act and section 4(1)(a) of the Privacy Regulations.
The immediate purpose of FOTM was to raise the technology readiness level of facial recognition to the point of being ready for live, real-time implementation in a controlled environment. Further objectives included the establishment of privacy and security protocols governing the deployment of facial recognition and the development of Canadian industry offerings in the facial recognition space through partnership with CBSA and access to the CBSA’s operational environment (i.e. the border). Longer-term strategic goals included promoting the “efficient flow of people across Canada’s borders” and addressing “evolving threats to public safety at or before the border…while respecting Canadian values including the right to privacy.” Ultimately, FOTM was couched as a building block toward future applications of facial recognition in the border continuum and “similar security scenarios (transportation facilities, shopping malls, stadiums, mass public events).” The lessons from FOTM were to inform a “roadmap” for the use of “science and technology […] for face surveillance, specifically at the border.”
According to the project’s final report, FOTM experienced several policy challenges, “including concept of operation, deployment constraints, public notification, data security, data retention/purging rules, and legality of enforcement based on face recognition and privacy issues.” These and other challenges were likely to “influence face surveillance future deployments and/or technology road maps.” Nonetheless, it recognized that the combination of advancing capabilities and relaxing public resistance to facial recognition technology “will drive the need for continual investment in both the science and the application of face recognition based surveillance.”
Prior to the demonstration period, a PIA conducted for FOTM in consultation with the OPC had brought additional issues to light. This resulted in certain changes to the project, including dropping plans to use watchlist photographs from multiple government agencies and foregoing plans to advise enforcement agencies of a previously deported person’s presence if the individual was not intercepted by the CBSA before leaving the port of entry. The consultants’ final report for the project “recognized that should facial recognition be deployed for long-term, operational use, the PIA would have to be redone and updated to identify potential ongoing risks that did not affect the short-term FOTM project.” Furthermore, CBSA recognized that, were FOTM to become a permanent program, the use of facial recognition would require an update to its Policy on the Overt Use of Audio-Video Monitoring and Recording Technology, and to the description of the related CBSA Personal Information Bank57 (PIB), PPU 1104, which did not include “biometric information.”
Indeed, public signage and notice about the cameras was limited during the demonstration period. Signage at Terminal 3 of Toronto Pearson’s International airport stated that “[t]his area is under video surveillance,” but made no mention of facial recognition. Similarly, the November 19, 2012, version of the CBSA’s Privacy Notice on Video Monitoring and Recording, referred to in the PIA for FOTM, discloses that “[c]ameras may […] monitor the movement of travelers and goods from one point of CBSA operation to another, for example, from primary to secondary,” but does not provide notice of a facial recognition capability. These lacunae in the notice provisions appear to have been acknowledged in the final report on FOTM, however, which notes that the machine learning component “may require an extension to the current [privacy and security] protocols.”
To date, FOTM or similar use of facial recognition has not been adopted as an ongoing activity. Other operational priorities, including the deployment of Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs) at select airports, took precedence at the time the project was completed, and CBSA has not indicated plans to revive FOTM. The technology for FOTM was removed from the airport at the end of the pilot.
The CBSA relied on its powers of examination under sections 15-18 of IRPA to authorize the FOTM project, explaining that “[t]hese sections require all persons seeking entry to Canada to submit to an examination of their persons and documents” and “allow for the presentation of photographic evidence of an applicant’s identity.” Indeed, section 15(3) of IRPA authorizes “an officer [to] … examine any person carried by [a means of transportation bringing persons to Canada],” and to examine “any record or document respecting that person.” Section 16 of IRPA further specifies that “[a] person who makes an application must answer truthfully all questions put to them for the purpose of the examination and must produce [at this examination] a visa and all relevant evidence and documents that the officer reasonably requires.” In the case of a foreign national, this evidence includes “photographic and fingerprint evidence.” The CBSA did not request legal assessment from the Department of Justice (DOJ) as to whether these authorities would support the FOTM pilot program.
The CBSA’s reliance on these general powers of examination to conduct facial recognition on travelers as they make their way to the point of processing is of concern to NSIRA. The legislative authorities relied on by the CBSA presume an overt interaction between the traveler and CBSA officials, and the knowing presentation by travelers of their individual documents, fingerprints and photographs during their examination. NSIRA is not satisfied that sections 15-18 of the IRPA provide clear authority for the collection of travellers’ facial biometrics, particularly prior to – and away from – the point of formal examination. NSIRA is of the opinion that further legal advice would be required in order to ensure that the use of facial recognition in Canadian airports (or elsewhere at the border) is well-founded in the CBSA’s legislative authorities.
Moreover, with respect to the pilot’s compliance with section 8 of the Charter, the CBSA explained that a legal opinion from the Department of Justice (DOJ) was not required because “no information [was] being collected above and beyond the CBSA’s current use of CCTV technology.” The pilot used “the existing surveillance infrastructure” and “did not introduce any additional (audio or video) at ports of entry.” As such, the CBSA was of the opinion that FOTM did not engage privacy or other concerns that would necessitate legal consultation.
As described in paragraph 39, however, project documents indicate that new cameras were installed for the demonstration period. Moreover, these arguments under-value the effects of facial recognition technology on individuals’ privacy. The important fact is not the installation or absence of new cameras, but rather their ability to conduct facial recognition. This new aspect of what is being collected arguably changes the subject-matter of the search. As the OPC has recommended, PIAs (and, in NSIRA’s view, assessments of lawful authority) should be renewed when new technologies are used, in order to ensure that the subject-matter of the search – and its privacy implications – are well-understood. Notices should also be updated to ensure that the use of facial recognition is clearly made known to the public, unless operational imperatives justify a lower degree of transparency.
The deployment of such technology, whether on a short-term or long-term basis, must be carefully studied and be fully supported by legal authority and a sound policy framework. The FOTM demonstrated genuine benefits for the execution of the CBSA’s duties at the border, specifically the identification of individuals of concern. Individuals previously deported for inadmissibility are known to attempt re-entry into Canada under assumed or false identities. The 47 “real hits” during the six-month demonstration window of FOTM attest to this fact. As noted in other contexts, of course, national security is one among many interests supported through better identity management. Further, findings of inadmissibility on security grounds (s. 34 of the IRPA) constitute a comparatively small portion of overall inadmissibility decisions. At the same time, rare events can have extreme consequences. National security cases are, by their nature, infrequent but serious.
FASTER-PrivBio Project (2015-2017)
FASTER-PrivBio was a ‘proof of concept’ project that developed a prototype mobile application that facilitated the application and approval of electronic travel authorizations (eTAs). It was led by IRCC in conjunction with CBSA and other partners (including the University of Ottawa and Ryerson University). The application captured a digital photograph (selfie), extracted the digital photograph contained in the ePassport chip, compared the two using facial recognition (one-to-one comparison), and validated the authenticity of the travel document. Upon successful enrolment, the application would then create a ‘client token’ facilitating movement through the travel continuum for low-risk travellers. The project incorporated a ‘Privacy-by-Design’ framework, with a specific emphasis on addressing the privacy concerns raised by the use of biometrics.
Two basic security benefits were envisioned: first, the facilitation of low-risk travellers would allow resources and attention to be applied elsewhere, including toward higher-risk travellers in manual processing. Second, the application would automatically check enrolled travellers against CBSA, IRCC and other applicable (e.g. International Criminal Police Organization [INTERPOL]) biographic watchlists, thereby identifying individuals of concern. This latter function, however, would largely replicate existing screening in the eTA process.
The project closed in 2017 having successfully demonstrated its intended deliverables. Its key takeaways included the viability of mobile (smartphone-based) biometric credentials (including adequate data security protections, according to project participants), compatibility with ePassports and related IRCC systems and infrastructure, and the robust identity verifications possible through such a system. The next phase of the project was to work toward live implementation, set to occur under the “Chain-of-Trust” (CoT) initiative. CoT development continues at present and is covered in Section 6, paragraphs 151-155, below.
Biometrics Expansion Project (2015-2020)
Initiated in 2015, the Biometrics Expansion Project (BEP), as its name suggests, marked another significant increase in the collection of biometrics in the immigration stream. Building on the TRBP, the BEP expanded the collection of biometrics to all persons (unless exempted) making a claim, application or request under the IRPA. The BEP incorporated the IIS initiative and extended automated immigration information sharing, including through biometric querying, to other international partners in the Migration 5 (M5) group, which comprises the immigration agencies of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The BEP also broadened the capacity for fingerprint verification at Canadian ports of entry (POE) through the introduction of automated Systematic Fingerprint Verification (SFV) at eight international airports (see paragraph 73) and the addition of discretionary fingerprint verification at secondary inspection at an additional 11 airports and 40 land POE.
The BEP closed in 2020 and the biometric activities it established were transferred to steady-state operations. As such, the activities described here are addressed in Section 5, paragraphs 63-94, below.
Assessing Biometrics Past
This section surveyed the development of biometric activities in the border continuum over the past several decades, highlighting key moments, programs, and pilots along the way. Taken collectively, several themes emerge.
First, the GoC’s collection and use of biometrics has steadily expanded. In the immigration context, for example, what began with deportees and asylum claimants in 1993 culminated in 2018 with all persons (unless exempted) making a claim, application or request under IRPA.
Second, the commitments and priorities established in the wake of the 9/11 attacks spurred the adoption of biometrics in the early part of the millennium, setting the foundation for the basic architecture of biometric activities in the border continuum today. In this context, the rationale for biometric adoption was national security. Identifying individuals meant possibly identifying terrorists.
Third, identifying individuals is also (and increasingly) about broader identity management. For CBSA and IRCC, biometrics contribute to overall organizational goals, not just national security objectives. As the immediacy of 9/11 receded, broader identity management became a relatively larger part of the rationale for collecting and using biometrics. This shift reflected a more balanced logic for biometric adoption, embracing their overall utility rather than emphasizing the smaller – though important – national security subset.
Fourth, as biometric activities have expanded, so too has the overlap and/or shared responsibility between organizations in their design and implementation: between government departments/agencies (e.g. IRCC and CBSA); between jurisdictions (e.g. Canada and the US, and Canada and other international partners); and between the public and private sector (as the GoC engages industry partners). Such closer cooperation may have implications for individuals’ privacy rights, for possible future uses of biometrics, and also underscores the importance of sound data security across these various institutions.
Fifth, traveller facilitation has emerged as another force behind biometric adoption, to improve efficiency at the border and to reflect evolving societal norms about the use of technology. As the FASTER-PrivBIO project suggests, the development of new biometric activities takes for granted traveller familiarity with digital devices. At the same time, individuals are likely to be more comfortable adopting relatively intrusive technologies when they do so voluntarily and consensually. This tension – between expectations of convenience and expectations of privacy – is likely to shape public dialogue over biometrics moving forward.
Sixth, and related to the above, the expansion of biometrics has coincided with a growing emphasis on privacy and privacy protections. Many of the pilots and projects described in this section explicitly addressed such concerns, including by adopting so-called “Privacy-by-Design” principles, which are intended to proactively protect personal information. This dynamic reflects the development, over time, of the wider understanding (whether on the part of government, industry, the legal community, or academia) as to the particular risks associated with the collection and use of biometrics. Some applications of biometric analysis – for example the facial recognition used in the FOTM project – carry more risks than others, and ought to be scrutinized accordingly.
5. Biometrics Present
This section focuses on the GoC’s steady-state biometric activities in the border continuum. The balance of the section examines the role of biometrics in the immigration and Passport programs, respectively. For each, we examine how biometrics serve program objectives (noting, as relevant, their collection, use, retention, and disclosure) and consider the criteria outlined in Section 3. The end of the section examines the process of “arriving into Canada”, which includes the analysis of traveller and NEXUS member biometrics by automated kiosks at Canadian airports. Throughout, we highlight the relevant national security considerations.
Immigration Program
IRCC is responsible for screening the admissibility of potential permanent and temporary residents coming to Canada. As part of this process (hereafter the “Immigration Program”), IRCC employs biometrics, in cooperation with CBSA and the RCMP. As IRCC characterized it to NSIRA, for biometrics in the Immigration Program: “IRCC collects, the RCMP stores, and the CBSA verifies.”
IRCC collects (all ten) fingerprints and a digital photograph in support of applications for temporary resident visas or status, work permits, study permits, temporary resident permits, and permanent residency, and in support of refugee and asylum claims. The collected biometrics are stored in two databases: photographs are stored in the IRCC’s Global Case Management System (GCMS) and fingerprints are stored in the RCMP’s Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). The digital photograph, while ICAO compliant, is not used for facial recognition and may not be of sufficient quality for that type of analysis. As such, we focus primarily on fingerprints in our description and analysis of activities.
Biometrics are collected and enrolled at multiple service points, both in Canada and abroad, with the vast majority (approximately 90%) occurring at Visa Application Centres (VACs). VACs are commercial service suppliers, managed by private companies, contracted by IRCC to deliver biometric enrolment overseas.
The collection phase is a sensitive juncture given the personal nature of biometric information. The primary concerns here relate to privacy and the security of biometric data. Media reports have highlighted concerns about VACs, questioning whether adequate privacy protection can be maintained given the central role of private contractors based outside of Canada. Possible links between the subcontractor administering Canada’s VAC in Beijing and Chinese security forces have also been scrutinized. Foreign governments have an interest in knowing who is applying to come to Canada – the information can be leveraged to monitor, suppress, harass, coerce, threaten or otherwise harm an individual. The possible interception or theft of biometric data is especially concerning, given its possible use in monitoring, surveillance, and identification.
IRCC has taken steps to ensure the flow of biometric information (including collection and transmission) at VACs is controlled. Contracts with VAC providers stipulate that they must abide by Canadian privacy laws. IRCC further states that oversight of VAC contractors occurs through audits and site reviews, conducted by Canadian officials, at VAC locations. All biometric information collected outside of Canada is said to be encrypted before being transmitted back to IRCC servers located in Canada (photographs in GCMS) and to the RCMP (fingerprints in the AFIS). Once successfully transmitted, IRCC states that the information is deleted from the point of collection.
Given the nature of operating in certain foreign jurisdictions, however, there remain challenges to securing the information provided by applicants at VACs. Some VACs are located in countries with national interests inimical to those of Canada – the national security consequences of security breaches at these VACs may therefore be particularly acute. While the scope of the present study precluded in-depth examination of the security arrangements at VACs, NSIRA may wish to revisit the issue at a later date.
In the border continuum, Canada leverages (or uses) the collected biometrics in three ways: for screening at enrolment (with any returned information informing decisions about an application), for verification upon arrival at a Canadian POE, and for ongoing assessment of admissibility (or immigration status) once an individual is present in Canada.
Screening at enrolment is automatic, and includes both domestic (Canadian) and foreign databases. For enrolment, IRCC or CBSA submits the collected fingerprints to the RCMP. Fingerprints and biographic information are then compared against the RCMP’s criminal and immigration fingerprint repositories (the latter includes fingerprints collected as part of previous applications). Fingerprints are also queried against the immigration databases of Canada’s M5 partners.
Information returned from domestic and foreign screening informs decisions on admissibility – including possible inadmissibility on IRPA s. 34 security grounds. Biometric immigration information sharing with the M5 partners includes sharing of derogatory alert codes. Information that indicates a potential national security concern may be referred to the Public Safety portfolio (including CSIS and CBSA) for additional security screening. While foreign screening also occurs using biographical information, biometrics confer the additional advantage of identifying matches to previous applications associated with different names and/or with discrepant biographical information.
Following the screening process, biometrics are used by the CBSA to verify the identity of enrolled foreign nationals arriving at a Canadian POE. This ensures – to a level of confidence beyond what is generally possible absent the use of biometric information – that the individual granted a visa or permit is the same individual entering Canada.
The mode of verification varies between POE. At eight international airports, Systematic Fingerprint Verification (SFV) occurs through Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs). PIKs are automated kiosks used to process travellers through customs and immigration at major Canadian airports (for more on the PIK see paragraphs 125-137, below). The PIK captures fingerprints and transmits biometrics to the RCMP for one-to-one matching against the traveller’s reference fingerprint in the RCMP database. Where SFV is not available, Border Services Officers (BSOs) verify identity by comparing the traveller’s enrolled photograph with the individual presenting in front of them, while fingerprint verification occurs on a discretionary basis at secondary inspection using CBSA’s LiveScan device.
Biometrics are also used to assess ongoing admissibility. That is, they serve as a means to connect individuals to information that could affect their immigration status and/or future immigration applications (for example interaction with law enforcement that might indicate inadmissibility).
The retention period for biometrics collected is partially contingent on the application’s outcome. For both temporary resident and permanent resident applications refused on the grounds of what the IRCC considers “serious inadmissibility” (sections 34-37 of the IRPA), biometrics are retained until the individual’s 100th birthday.
This extended retention period provides security benefits as biometrics can help identify an individual should they submit a subsequent application at any (realistic) point in the future, even if submitted under a different name. Extended retention also makes such identification possible for domestic and/or foreign partners with querying access to the immigration database. Should the individual receive a record suspension, criminal rehabilitation, or ministerial relief, the retention period reverts to the typical 15 years from the date of biometric enrolment. This caveat is important, as it realigns the retention of an individual’s biometrics beyond the resolution of the underlying circumstances which warranted the extended retention.
At the end of the retention period, biometric information is disposed of by IRCC according to disposition authorizations issued by Library and Archives Canada. With respect to fingerprints held by the RCMP, an automated electronic purge transaction request is transmitted by IRCC and a confirmation of the purge returned.
In 2021, IRCC discovered a privacy breach related to the retention of immigration fingerprints and photographs beyond their prescribed retention period. The information belonged to individuals who attained Canadian citizenship meaning that, according to IRCC biometric retention policy, fingerprints and photographs associated with their immigration file should have been deleted. IRCC notified the OPC in February 2021 about the issue, and notified affected clients, by email, in March 2021. A public notification was placed on the IRCC website.
The disclosure of biometric information raises privacy considerations and calls for attentive consideration of their subsequent use. Given that biometrics are personal information, the current legal framework requires that the GoC only use them for the purposes for which they were obtained (namely, determining an individual’s admissibility to enter, or remain in, Canada); for a use consistent with that purpose; or as otherwise authorized by law.
The automated querying that occurs between Canada and its M5 partners involves an anonymous biometric (fingerprint) search, with no identifying biographic information included; if a match is detected, relevant immigration information is returned; if there is no match, the receiving country sends a nil result. In either case, the receiving country is required to purge and not retain the fingerprint. The system is designed, ultimately, with the intention that no biographic and/or immigration information is exchanged unless both parties already possess the biometric in their databases – an important privacy protection measure. Further, the automated agreements specify that any information exchanged will pertain to third-party nationals only; that is, Canada will not send or receive information on Canadian citizens or, with the exception of asylum claims, permanent residents.
Less frequent case-by-case (or ad hoc) exchanges may result in the actual exchange of underlying biometric information (whether photographs or fingerprints) if the information is deemed, by the requesting party, relevant to enforcing that party’s immigration and citizenship laws. Such exchanges are subject to caveats regarding use, onward disclosure, and retention, which apply to any information disclosed (not just biometrics), but which are not legally binding on the participants. IRCC further indicated that ad hoc exchanges of biometric information may also occur with international partners beyond the M5, “with either the consent of the individual to whom the information pertains, or pursuant to section 8(2)(a) [i.e. the consistent use provision] of the Privacy Act.”
The primary sources of authority for the collection, use, and disclosure of biometric information in the Immigration Program are the IRPA and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR). Specifically, s.10.01 of the IRPA authorizes the collection of biometrics for the purposes of enrollment and verification pursuant to an application under the Act. Under s. 10.02 of IRPA, the Minister may issue regulations respecting the implementation of these processes, through the IRPR. The Regulations specify to whom the biometrics requirements apply, the type of biometrics at issue, and guide their collection, processing and verification. Section 16(1) of the IRPA requires that individuals making an application under the Act submit truthfully to examination and produce “relevant evidence and documents” while 16(2), which applies only to foreign nationals, specifies that such evidence includes “photographic and fingerprint evidence”. IRCC also cites s. 4 of the Privacy Act as authorizing their collection of biometrics, given that the information relates “directly to the administration of [IRCC’s] immigration programs.” They note further that, consistent with s. 7 of the Privacy Act, biometrics “will only be used for the purposes for which it was collected, or for a use consistent with that purpose.”
In terms of the IRCC’s disclosure of biometrics to international allies, s. 7 of the IRPA authorizes the Minister, with the approval of the Governor in Council, to enter into an agreement(s) with the government of a foreign state(s), for the purposes of the IRPA. Multiple such agreements are part of the IRPR, which cover Canada’s information sharing activities with each M5 partner including: the ‘Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for the Sharing of Visa and Immigration Information’; the ‘Annex Regarding the Sharing of Information on Asylum and Refugee Status Claims to the Statement of Mutual Understanding’; and the bilateral automated exchange arrangements with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. These agreements provide for the disclosure of biographic and biometric data between the parties to the extent “necessary, relevant and proportionate to achieve [the administration and enforcement of the parties’ citizenship and immigration laws].” Provisions in each agreement also govern the destruction of the information, the correction of previously disclosed information, and grant the Minister a discretion to refuse to disclose information detrimental to Canada’s national interests.
Such disclosures would also be consistent with s. 8(2)(f) of the Privacy Act, which allows for the disclosure of personal information under an agreement or arrangement between the Government of Canada and a foreign state, for the purpose of administering or enforcing its laws. Ad hoc exchanges with partners beyond the M5 are conducted pursuant to the consistent use provisions of s. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act.
Canadian law enforcement may also access fingerprints collected by IRCC during the immigration application process for law enforcement purposes. Section 13.11 of the IRPR allows the RCMP to use – or disclose to other law enforcement agencies in Canada – any biometric information and specified, related personal information for the purpose of establishing or verifying a person’s identity in order to prevent, investigate or prosecute an offence. This information may also be used to establish or verify the identity of a person whose identity cannot reasonably be otherwise established or verified because of a physical or mental condition or because of their death. In other words, when law enforcement agencies submit fingerprints collected in the course of its duties to the RCMP — or the RCMP itself verifies a fingerprint — both criminal and immigration repositories, containing the fingerprints of foreign nationals and permanent residents, are included in the search. Section 13.11(2) of the IRPR allows the following personal information to be used or disclosed: the individual’s fingerprints and the date on which they were taken; their surname and first name; their other names and aliases, if any, their date of birth, their gender, and any file number associated with the biometric information or related personal information.
Assessing the Immigration Program
Biometrics facilitate identity management in the Immigration Program. First, the enrolment of biometrics ties an application to an individual. Second, biometric querying screens applicants against domestic and foreign databases, with the information returned as part of these queries informing decision-making regarding their admissibility into Canada. Third, biometrics are verified upon arrival at a Canadian POE to ensure that the individual presenting is the one to whom a visa or permit has been granted. Finally, biometrics are retained for a specified period (varying between application streams) so as to both assess continuing admissibility (status) under the IRPA and allow foreign nationals to submit subsequent applications without having to re-enrol their biometrics.
National security benefits are a consequence of robust identity management. National security is a component of, rather than the sole impetus behind, the use of biometrics. Enrolling biometrics at the application stage serves as a potential deterrent to individuals who might otherwise apply for mala fide purposes. Biometric screening of domestic and foreign databases helps identify individuals who are inadmissible (including, potentially, for reasons of national security). Verifying biometrics upon arrival ensures that the individual authorized to enter and not an individual posing as that person is the individual who does enter. The retention of biometrics which includes the retention of biometrics tied to applications denied for reasons of national security allows for the ongoing assessment of admissibility under the IRPA (including s. 34) and facilitates the reciprocal querying of foreign databases. Without biometrics, such exchanges would rely on biographical information, which is more susceptible to fraud and/or error.
Unique to each individual and easily captured by digital technology, fingerprints are generally regarded as accurate and reliable means of identification. However, both CBSA and IRCC noted potential concerns in relation to Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+), which is an analytical process designed to assess how diverse groups of people may experience policies, programs and initiatives. Specifically, some groups have more difficulty than others having their fingerprints captured, including individuals working in certain trades (which may indicate lower socio-economic status) and women (due to a biological difference in finger ridges). Mitigation strategies at the collection stage included training for operators, and operational guidelines as well as a regulatory provision (R12.8 of the IRPR) that allow the application process to continue if fingerprint capture is not possible.
Similarly, research has shown that fingerprint-matching algorithms – such as those used during SFV – may be less accurate for certain ethnic, gender, age, and socio-economic groups. Examples include individuals of East Asian origin, women, those working in certain trades, and older individuals. These groups may be subject to higher error rates when their fingerprints are verified (e.g. compared to an existing fingerprint holding). Mitigation strategies identified by CBSA included hardware and software adjustments that would improve the ability of PIKs (the kiosks used for SFV) to capture and analyze fingerprints.
In terms of transparency, there is significant material available to the public regarding biometrics and the immigration application process. Much of this content is practical in nature, intended to guide prospective applicants in the provision of their biometric information. IRCC also explains the program benefits of using biometrics, including that they help facilitate entry into Canada, ensure that the person seeking entry is the same as the one who was granted a visa, permit, or permanent residence, and to help prevent the use of stolen, borrowed, or altered visas and/or permits to enter Canada. While national security justifications are provided, the emphasis is on service delivery and the broader imperatives of identity management.
Overall, fingerprints appear to be a reasonable, appropriate choice of biometric to use in the immigration system. They can be collected relatively easily, with little intrusion, and while they are reliable identifiers, they offer comparatively little extrinsic evidence about individuals’ lifestyles or personal choices. Moreover, they offer a vital inter-operability across domestic immigration and law enforcement systems, as well as with those of nearly all foreign jurisdictions. The privacy costs of relying on biometrics for immigration screening therefore appear to be reasonable and proportionate to the benefits they convey to the state and the integrity of its immigration system.
Once collected, the use of biometrics for screening and verification are proportionate to the objective of identity management. From a national security perspective, decisions about admissibility – who may and who may not enter the country – are fundamental. So, too, is the desire to prevent fraudulent entry. At the screening stage, biometrics are particularly helpful in linking information across databases – e.g. in connecting information about an individual held in domestic or foreign repositories. The ability to make such linkages even in the face of multiple names or biographical profiles – perhaps cultivated for mala fide purposes – is largely unique to biometrics as a class of information. Likewise, verification – confirming that an individual is who they say they are when presenting at the border – is significantly enhanced through biometric analysis.
The activities are not without risks, however. The availability of immigration biometrics to Canadian law enforcement, for example, has the potential to stigmatize the immigrant population by associating them with criminality. In 2015, the European Union’s EURODAC (European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database) was heavily criticized by civil rights groups for “criminalizing” asylum seekers by making their fingerprints available to European law enforcement agencies. While held in different repositories, immigration and criminal fingerprints exist within the same RCMP system, and both are searchable by law enforcement, including when attempting to identify latent fingerprints taken from crime scenes.
There are benefits to making immigration fingerprints available to law enforcement, most immediately in assisting police with the enforcement of Canadian criminal law and, consequently, in returning information to IRCC and CBSA which may be relevant for enforcing the IRPA. At the same time, if the fingerprints of all Canadian citizens were in the possession of the government and searchable by Canadian law enforcement, that too would benefit the enforcement of Canadian law, though few – if any – would consider such an arrangement proportionate or desirable. It is therefore legitimate to question whether the availability of immigration fingerprints – collected in the course of applying to come to Canada – to law enforcement is proportional in all circumstances, or whether it should be limited to certain serious offences.
Passport Program
The Passport Program, led by IRCC, is responsible for “issuing, refusing to issue, revoking, withholding, cancelling, recovering and providing instructions on the use of Canadian passports and other travel documents.” The program’s ultimate purpose is to enable the travel of eligible Canadian citizens, permanent residents, and refugees. Preventing individuals who are ineligible or not entitled to a passport from obtaining and travelling under official documents is the obverse of this goal. A subset of applicants will be ineligible for reasons related to national security. Established pursuant to the royal prerogative on passports, the Canadian Passport Order (CPO) constitutes the main legal framework for the issuance of regular and temporary passports by the Passport Program. It provides the authority for IRCC to collect and use personal information, including biometrics, for the processing of applications and determining an individual’s entitlement to a passport. IRCC maintains that this collection is consistent with s. 4 of the Privacy Act, given that collection relates directly to the administration of a lawfully authorized program.
Specifically with respect to biometrics, s. 8.1(1) of the CPO allows IRCC to convert an applicant’s photograph into a digital format and insert it on the electronic chip in the ePassport. Section 8.1(2) facilitates the use of the FRS by authorizing the conversion of the photograph into a biometric template “for the purpose of verifying the applicant’s identity, including nationality, and entitlement to obtain or remain in possession of a passport.” This provision similarly authorizes the use of the System Lookout-Facial Recognition System (SL-FRS) described below.
As with the Immigration Program, the full range of benefits associated with biometrics extend beyond national security outcomes. According to IRCC, the “use of biometrics in the Passport Program does not per se constitute a security and intelligence activity.” Rather, as in the immigration context, biometrics serve identity management, with potential national security benefits downstream of that broader ambit.
Two identical, printed facial photographs, meeting certain International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards, must be submitted as part of applications for all Canadian travel documents. According to IRCC, all application information is transmitted via secure systems, and all facial recognition data traffic is secured through encryption.
The collected photograph is used for two purposes. First, it is screened using facial recognition to help establish identity and inform an assessment of the applicant’s eligibility and entitlement to Canadian travel document services. Second, it is embedded in the document and used by border officials to validate the identity of the holder when crossing an international border.
The applicant’s digitized photograph is transferred to the Facial Recognition Solution (FRS) application. The FRS then converts the image into a biometric template using a proprietary algorithm and stores it in an accompanying database. If the application is linked to a previous application, such as renewals or the replacement of lost or stolen passports, one-to-one facial verification is performed against the applicants’ previous template(s). For both renewals and new applications, one-to-many facial identification is performed against existing templates (approximately 55 million, from previous applications) in the FRS database from adult (age 16+) applicants and photographs supplied as part of the Passport System Lookout (SL). The SL-FRS , as it is called, is effectively a watchlist comprised of individuals who are considered high-risk for identity fraud, including those known to have a history of using false identities or multiple aliases, or who have otherwise been identified by security partners – including CSIS and the RCMP – as high-risk for such behaviour. The precise criteria or circumstances for inclusion on the list are not clear, and appear to be highly discretionary. IRCC caveats, however, that “only a small number of IRCC Passport Program officers have the ability to add entries to the list.” The list has been in operation since February 2018, and currently includes fewer than 100 individuals.
According to IRCC, the use of the FRS protects the integrity of the Canadian passport. IRCC cites 2016 ICAO guidelines on security in the issuance of travel documents noting that the issuance phase – or the “beginning of the chain” – is becoming the primary target for fraud given “the rapid development of new technologies and new security techniques” which make forgery increasingly difficult, including, for example, the security features associated with the ePassport.
The authority to refuse passport applications for national security reasons lies with the Minister of Public Safety, as per the CPO. Biometric screening through FRS may inform that decision-making process by detecting identity fraud or flagging individuals from the SL-FRS. No such decisions are automatic; individuals on the SL-FRS may still be entitled to a passport or travel document following review.
Preventing fraud (whether through deterrence or detection) in the issuance of official travel documents offers clear national security benefits. The movement of mala fide actors across borders threatens both international and Canadian security. While identity fraud is committed for a host of reasons – including criminal, financial, or personal – the possibility that terrorism, espionage, or other national-security threats may involve the misuse of passports is well documented. Again, rare events can have significant consequences.
The second fundamental usage of the collected biometric is by way of the ePassport itself during the course of international travel. When the passport is issued, the facial photograph is both printed on the biographical page and embedded as a digital image on an electronic chip within the document.
The embedded digital photograph enables three-way verification between the image on the passport, the image on the chip, and the person presenting the passport. Certain countries – including Canada (see the discussion of the PIK in paragraphs 125-137, below) – leverage facial recognition technology for this purpose. The result is greater confidence in a) the integrity and authenticity of the document, and b) that the individual presenting the document is the individual to whom it was issued. The chip is digitally signed using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) techniques allowing for the verification of the document against the issuing country and to ensure that the data contained within has not been modified.
Photographs submitted as part of passport applications, as well as the biometric templates derived therefrom, are retained until an applicant has reached 100 years of age. IRCC assesses that this retention period is consistent with the practices of international partners (e.g., the United Kingdom and Australia), and balances, in their estimation, the need to issue secure, trusted travel documents with the requirements of the Privacy Act to retain personal information only for as long as necessary. Hard paper copies of the passport applications, including photographs, are retained for six weeks following conversion to digital format, and subsequently shredded.
The length of the retention period facilitates identity management as individuals renew their passports over the course of their lifetime. Each returning adult applicant (e.g. renewal, replacement, etc.) can be verified through the FRS against previous applications from the same individual. Similarly, one-to-many FRS screening includes templates from most adult applicants, maximizing the scope of detecting possible identity fraud.
IRCC discloses photographs and related biographic information collected by the Passport Program to other government departments (OGDs). Unlike in the Immigration Program, these disclosures are not systematic. Rather, they come in response to ad hoc requests from OGDs with criminal, national security, and intelligence mandates. The OGDs make the requests pursuant to their own legislation, and their scope is circumscribed by s. 4 of the Privacy Act. According to IRCC, the context of many of these requests is often the need for information regarding Canadians travelling abroad to engage in foreign conflicts or unlawful acts.
Such requests can involve confirmation or validation of biometric information provided by the OGD against passport records, or identifying individuals of security concern by processing a photograph provided by the OGD through the FRS. For example, the RCMP may identify a person of national security concern, but have only a photograph of the person (e.g. from their social media presence); CSIS may provide IRCC with a photograph of an individual they are investigating but cannot identify. Alternatively, the RCMP and CSIS may share photographs of known individuals with the IRCC. The purpose of these checks is to ensure the person has not obtained a passport under another identity. The IRCC states that, for the RCMP, the scenarios described herein may require the RCMP to obtain a Production Order, depending on the particular circumstances of the request.
In both cases, the IRCC converts the photograph provided by CSIS/RCMP into a biometric template and runs it through FRS. In the first instance, in the event of a possible match, the IRCC would return limited biographic and/or biometric information to the RCMP or CSIS to assist in confirming the person’s identity. In the second instance, the IRCC may validate the person’s previously known identity and confirm whether the person’s photograph is associated to any other identities logged by the Passport Program. The scope of information disclosed by the IRCC, in both cases, depends on the nature of the investigation and its authorities to disclose.
The IRCC discloses this information pursuant to s. 5 of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA), if applicable, or may rely on s. 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act in the case of specific requests. Section 5 of SCIDA allows the IRCC to disclose information to the RCMP, CSIS and other specified institutions where it is satisfied that the disclosure will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. To disclose under SCIDA, the IRCC must also be satisfied that the disclosure will not affect a person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. In contemplating such disclosures, the IRCC affirms that it first obtains sufficient details to ensure these conditions are met. In other instances, such as when the disclosure is to assist a law enforcement investigation, the IRCC may rely on s. 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act to provide specific investigative bodies with information they have requested in writing, for the purpose of enforcing Canadian law or carrying out a lawful investigation. Where a production order or warrant supports the OGD requests, section 8(2)(c) of the Privacy Act authorizes the disclosure of information for the purpose of complying with the warrant.
In addition to these disclosures to assist national security or law enforcement investigations, the IRCC may disclose information to the Department of Public Safety, where necessary to assist the Minister of Public Safety in rendering a decision under the CPO. Sections 10.1 and 11.1(2) of the CPO authorize the Minister of Public Safety to decide that a passport should not be issued, or that a current passport should be revoked or cancelled, when such action is necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorist act or protect the national security of Canada or a foreign state. By virtue of this authority, the IRCC may collect information on an ongoing basis to verify an individual’s continued entitlement to possess the document. The IRCC also relies on the CPO to disclose, to the Minister of Public Safety, information necessary to support his decision on such matters. In practical terms, this includes IRCC’s disclosure of the relevant passport application, including the digitized photo, to Public Safety. Section 5 of SCIDA and section 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act (on consistent use) further support these disclosures.
Assessing the Passport Program
A significant source of public concern regarding the use of facial recognition is the possibility that the technology will be inaccurate. In the passport context, false positive identification could lead to inconvenience and/or additional investigative attention for individuals. False negatives, by contrast, worry operators, as they potentially undermine the security benefits of the system.
The FRS has certain natural advantages with respect to accuracy. First, it predominately uses high-quality probe images (templates extracted from passport photographs taken according to ICAO specifications) and searches them against the same (a gallery populated by templates extracted from passport photographs). Exceptions are the images on the SL-FRS and images supplied by OGDs for checking against FRS, which may be of lesser quality. Second, the matching process is not time sensitive (as would be the case in a live environment such as a POE). Adjudication – triage, analysis, and investigation – of possible matches (one-to-many) or non-matches (one-to-one) can be conducted thoroughly before any decisions are made which affect individuals.
A related concern is that certain groups will be disproportionately affected by system inaccuracies. Extant research has demonstrated that age, gender, and ethnicity, among other factors, may influence the ability of a facial recognition system to accurately identify individuals, leading to possible bias and discrimination.
IRCC employs several mitigation measures. First, enrolled templates are stored in one of six separate galleries according to age (adults 16+ and children under the age of 16) and self-identified gender (male, female, or other). Age and gender are known to be confounding factors in facial recognition; separating the database into galleries according to these characteristics allows thresholds to be adjusted as necessary to improve the performance of the system.
In January 2021, IRCC completed an evaluation of a next generation algorithm for possible use in FRS. The results were favourable in terms of the accuracy observed in testing, and implementation of the new algorithm is set for 2021-22. Specifically, the new algorithm demonstrated superior performance in terms of age and gender disparity as compared to the algorithm currently in use. The new algorithm demonstrated improvement in matching photographs taken at lengthy time intervals (e.g. 15 years), which is directly relevant to passport renewals. The testing did not evaluate, however, the algorithm’s performance with respect to race and ethnicity.
IRCC provides public information regarding the use of facial recognition in the passport application process. The photograph guidelines posted on the IRCC website state that “The [ICAO] recommends that passport photos be taken with a neutral expression. This lets us use facial recognition systems to help prevent fraud.” Similarly, a Privacy Notice Statement is included on passport application forms, describing the collection, use, disclosure and retention of personal information, including biometrics.
The biometric embedded on the electronic chip in the ePassport does not constitute a significant risk or expansion beyond what was included in analog passports prior to the ePassport’s implementation. What is on the chip – the facial image and biographical information – is also on page 2 (the biographical page) of the physical document itself.
By contrast, the issuance process – including the use of FRS – directly implicates both biometric information and national security considerations. Preventing mala fide actors – including those posing a threat to national or international security – from obtaining bona fide travel documents warrants stringent processes and security measures during the issuance phase. At the same time, information collected and used in the context of the issuance process will impact all individuals – millions of Canadians and individuals living in Canada – who apply for a passport or other official travel document.
The key consideration is whether the privacy impact of the FRS is commensurate with the benefit to national security associated with its collection, use, retention, and disclosure of biometric information.
The OPC’s recent investigation into the RCMP’s use of facial recognition services supplied by the private firm Clearview-AI is worth considering in this context. In that case, the OPC found that the RCMP’s leveraging of biometric information collected by Clearview-AI from social media and other internet sources violated the Privacy Act because Clearview-AI’s collection of that information had been unlawful. More relevant for the present discussion, however, is the OPC’s characterization of the practical effect of law enforcement’s use of Clearview AI, which meant that “billions of people essentially found themselves in a ‘24/7’ police line-up.” That is, the existence of their biometric information in a database available to law enforcement meant they were subject to identification by law enforcement at any time.
In national security investigations, there may be different policy justifications, security benefits, and disclosure limitations that render use of the IRCC’s passport database proportionate. The disclosure of this information by the IRCC to the RCMP is also supported by law (see paragraph 111). The connection between passport biometrics and the investigations and activities of the RCMP, CSIS and CBSA remains a striking example, however, of the connections made possible by biometrics. Moving forward, NSIRA may wish to review these arrangements, to assess their reasonableness and necessity in terms of balancing individual interests (privacy, liberty, etc.) and the state’s security goals.
Arriving into Canada
The Passport and Immigration programs are the major programs governing Canada’s border continuum. Together, they help manage the processes by which individuals enter the country, largely by providing the documentation that makes international travel possible. Related to these larger programs is the actual process of arriving at a POE and going through Canadian customs and immigration. While the above discussions of both Immigration and Passport touched on these processes, this section discusses two additional activities that involve the analysis of biometric information to verify the identity of individuals arriving into Canada.
Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs)
Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs) are automated, self-serve kiosks present at ten major Canadian airports. The kiosks facilitate the immigration and customs process for international arrivals into Canada.
As discussed in relation to the Immigration Program, biometrically-enrolled foreign nationals are subject to biometric verification upon arrival into Canada. At airports equipped with Systematic Fingerprint Verification (SFV), this occurs through PIKs. Additionally, PIKs validate ePassports and help verify the identity of ePassport holders (including Canadians) using facial recognition (one-to-one matching) technology.
In 2019, PIKs processed 21,853,422 individuals, an average of 59,872 travellers per day. This means that most individuals – whether Canadian or foreign – arriving in Canada by air have their biometrics analyzed in some way (either as biometrically-enrolled foreign nationals, ePassport holders, or both). CBSA derives its authority to collect information from individuals as they arrive in Canada from s. 11 of the Customs Act and ss. 15 and 18(1) of the IRPA.
The PIK facilitates risk assessment by sending passport and biographical information to CBSA for processing in real time. CBSA uses the information to check the traveller against existing traveller processing systems. This includes the Interdiction and Border Alert System and the Integrated Customs Enforcement System.
According to CBSA, all information passes between the PIK and CBSA through an encrypted tunnel and is purged prior to the next traveller using the device.
The use of the facial photograph embedded on the ePassport’s electronic chip is for identity verification at the kiosk and during primary inspection. Facial recognition – or facial “matching” as it is called by CBSA in this context – occurs on a one-to-one basis by extracting the digital photograph from the chip and comparing it to a live photograph of the traveller captured by the kiosk. A match score is generated, based on the vendor’s proprietary algorithm, and the score is sent to the CBSA to determine whether it is above or below a pre-determined threshold. The result is printed on the PIK receipt. The CBSA itself defines the match/no-match threshold; it is not determined by, nor shared with, either the vendor or Airport Authorities.
The PIK receipt also includes the facial photograph taken by the kiosk. The traveller presents the receipt to a Border Services Officer (BSO); in the event of a no-match, the BSO may correct obvious non-technical errors (for example, one individual was photographed twice as part of a group of two travellers) through visual verification, ask additional questions, and/or refer the individual to secondary inspection on a discretionary basis.
The inclusion of the photograph on the receipt was a significant issue in the 2012 PIA conducted for the PIK project. CBSA justified the practice on the basis of efficiency (quicker processing by the BSO collecting receipts) and security (preventing receipt swapping prior to egress at primary inspection). The PIK receipt – including the printed photograph – is retained by CBSA for seven years. The OPC expressed concerns regarding this retention period given the presence of the traveller’s photograph. In essence, the retention of these photographs constitutes a database of (nearly) all travellers who enter Canada. While CBSA asserted that the photographs are not searchable nor used for facial recognition purposes, OPC noted the sensitivity of retaining biometric information in centralized databases and has urged CBSA to consider mitigation strategies.
The CBSA details the necessary specifications and requirements for PIKs, but relies on Airport Authorities to procure both the hardware and software (including the algorithm used for facial matching). This means that different versions exist at different airports across Canada. The accuracy of the facial matching process consequently varies between locations. The algorithms are proprietary, meaning CBSA does not have visibility into precisely how they operate, though it does have access to data on accuracy and performance through the US Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as well as from in-house performance testing.
In 2020, CBSA evaluated the performance of the four face-matching algorithms integrated in the three kiosk designs currently in use, and determined that opportunities existed to improve performance in certain airports by adjusting facial matching thresholds. The testing similarly examined issues of possible demographic bias. The results suggested that small discrepancies along the lines of gender (lower matching rates for females) and age (lower matching rates for younger and older) did exist in airports using a particular algorithm. Recommendations for mitigation included shifting vendors and/or setting gender-specific match thresholds, though the latter option was considered potentially problematic in terms of inviting higher false positive match rates.
Public reporting has expressed concern that higher facial matching error rates for certain ethnicities might result in more frequent referrals from PIKs to secondary inspection. It has been observed, for example, that rates of referral are higher for nationals from Iran and Jamaica, as compared to countries such as Iceland and Denmark. The CBSA indicated to NSIRA that no referrals to secondary inspection occur as a result of the facial matching process (i.e. there are no referral codes associated with facial matching leading from the PIK to secondary inspection). In practice, however, a failed match will lead to greater scrutiny as a BSO at primary inspection assesses the reason for the failed match. It is possible that discretionary referrals to secondary occur as a result; the CBSA does not track statistics associated with this scenario.
CBSA is aware of concern regarding possible bias associated with higher facial match error rates for certain ethnicities, and points to improvements in the overall accuracy of algorithms that will help close any gaps in performance across demographic categories. Further, CBSA notes that its “work in this area is nascent and is not yet conclusive with significant work still to be conducted.” Given the significance of the public interest and concern associated with possible bias, NSIRA encourages CBSA to continue its work in this area. In addition to technical solutions aimed at further closing identified gaps, an examination of the implications of facial matching errors on travellers might suggest policy solutions to mitigate any possible disparate impacts.
The PIK will continue to play an integral role in future applications of biometric technology at Canada’s international airports. As noted in the CBSA’s 2021-22 Departmental Plan, the agency is set to integrate the PIK into new applications of mobile technology with the aim of further streamlining the customs and immigrations arrival process.
NEXUS
NEXUS is a voluntary trusted traveller program intended to expedite border crossing between the US and Canada for preapproved, low-risk travelers (“NEXUS”). Section 11.1(1) of the Customs Act authorizes the Minister to administer such programs, by allowing him to authorize persons to present themselves at the border “in an alternative manner.” The program is jointly managed by CBSA and US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). As mentioned in Section 4, although NEXUS began as a pilot initiative prior to 9/11, it was expanded and implemented following the attacks with an eye toward robust identity verification and traveller facilitation in the context of enhanced border security.
In 2019, NEXUS underwent a “modernization” process, which saw the adoption of the PIK facialmatching model into NEXUS-dedicated kiosks for air arrivals, replacing iris scans with facial matching as the biometric modality for identity verification. In order to facilitate facial matching, CBSA collects the biometric from electronic passports, stores it in the NEXUS database, and uses the photograph to verify identity during travel. The process is similar to how the PIK operates in other traveller streams and produces roughly similar outcomes. The main difference here is that the photograph taken at the kiosk is matched against the traveller’s image in the NEXUS database. NEXUS’ purpose in using the passport photograph is the same as in the regular PIK process: to verify the individual’s identity prior to allowing them admission into Canada. NEXUS’ use of the passport photograph was preferred because the image provides better facial recognition matching (given that it was taken according to ICAO specifications) as compared to the membership photograph (taken by border services officers under varying conditions – light, background, distance, etc.). NEXUS participants are informed of the extraction of their passport photograph for facial matching purposes.
NEXUS’ voluntary nature, and the consistent purpose of using the passport photograph within NEXUS to facilitate identity verification and travel, renders this second use of the ePassport photograph reasonable in NSIRA’s view. The consistency of purpose between the programs also respects the norms and the requirements of sections 7 and 8 of the Privacy Act.
The use of the passport photograph for facial matching within NEXUS is nevertheless noteworthy as an example of when it has been beneficial to use an existing biometric in an additional program. The dual-use of biometrics in this case is relatively benign, but the dynamic which produced it – that is, the convenience, availability, and possible value-added (accuracy in identification) of existing biometric information – is likely to be common to scenarios which may be of more concern, as discussed below (see paragraphs 191-201, below).
6. Biometrics Future
We expect the landscape detailed in the preceding sections of this report to change significantly in the short-, medium-, and long-term. In this section, we highlight select projects and initiatives to illustrate how biometrics in the border continuum are likely to evolve, and to mark key points of consideration for Canadians – and NSIRA – as we move into this unfolding technological future.
The GoC has publicly committed to continued research, development, and deployment of biometric technologies in the border continuum. For instance, Budget 2021 allocates $656.1 million over five years (beginning in 2021-22) and $123.8 ongoing to the CBSA for the “modernization” of Canadian borders. CBSA “proposes to utilize new technologies, such as facial recognition and fingerprint verification” as part of such efforts.
The agency has announced the creation of an Office of Biometrics and Identity Management (OBIM) under a newly formed Biometrics Transformation Directorate (BTD) within the Chief Transformation Officer Branch (CTOB). CBSA indicated to NSIRA that the purpose of the BTD is to coordinate biometric initiatives (including design, implementation, and operation) across the agency. In addition to its coordination role, OBIM will act as a Centre of Expertise and focal point within CBSA for guidance on the appropriate use of biometrics. This will include developing and managing CBSA’s biometrics governance, risk and compliance framework. A June 2021 Notice of Proposed Procurement (NPP) solicited proposals from contractors for aid in establishing the OBIM and “to work with the [CBSA] in researching, planning for and rapidly developing a strategy and roadmap related to the use of Digital [sic] solutions enabled by supporting technologies in biometrics, in response to the COVID 19 situation and other operational priorities.” The proposal further specified that the successful contractor would aid in “the development of a comprehensive approach and plan to manage, evolve and adapt in using biometrics” to fulfill CBSA’s mandate and objectives. As part of this coordinating function, the OBIM will review current steady-state biometric activities and make recommendations where necessary for aligning them with overarching CBSA standards and objectives.
With respect to immigration, CBSA’s Departmental Plan 2021-22 commits to “explor[ing] measures to standardize the collection of biometric information on potentially inadmissible travellers to strengthen compliance verification at the border.” In July 2021, IRCC released a tender notice soliciting industry information regarding the procurement of a next generation Canadian Immigration Biometric Identification System (CIBIDS). The new system will “take advantage of the latest technologies […] to modernize [IRCC’s] biometric technology solution” and may include the “design and development of a new IRCC custom Biometric Collection Solution.”
“Next generation” development is occurring in the Passport Program as well, with “a new passport booklet, incorporating advancements in technology to enhance the document’s durability and security features” aimed, in part, at “alignment with documents issued by our Five Nations Passport Group partners.” Phased rollout of the new ePassport will occur between 2023 and 2024.
Passport issuance, similarly, is undergoing “modernization”, as part of an ongoing process initiated in 2013 to facilitate the transition of the Passport Program from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development to CIC (now IRCC). The Passport Program Modernization Initiative (PPMI) is a multi-year project that is scheduled to be completed in 2023. PPMI intends to streamline “all aspects of Passport Program operations” and “keep pace with evolving international passport issuance and identity management best practices.” The initiative also aims to systematize passport services across intake locations, and lay “the foundation for online passport services and automation to improve the service experience.”
In June 2020, IRCC issued an NPP for a “Passport Digital Services Project” that “will allow Canadians to apply online for passports, using a computer, tablet or mobile device, as a convenient alternative to mail-in or in-person service options.” The procured platform will transmit passport applications – including digital photographs – from individuals to IRCC. Media reporting in early 2021 indicated that IBM was selected as the successful bidder. The proposed system has generated privacy concerns, particularly with respect to transmitting biometric information (digital photographs) over a private platform. We can expect the tension illustrated here, between convenience and privacy, to be a key theme in public conversations surrounding new biometric activities in the coming years.
In this vein, CBSA’s Department Plan 2021-22 highlights several experimentation and innovation initiatives involving mobile technology (e.g. smartphones), including “explor[ing] digital identity concepts and opportunities to pilot digital identity in the travel continuum from a border management perspective.” Digital Identity refers to paper-less identification, whereby trusted and secure digital proof of one’s identity replaces traditional, physical documentation (e.g. passports, driver’s licenses, etc.).
A Digital Identity is typically linked to an individual through biometrics. ICAO’s first iteration (Type 1) Digital Travel Credential (DTC), for example, “binds” a traveller to their Digital Identity by way of the biometric embedded in the ePassport, limiting the need to produce the physical document during travel. The DTC is an international project that, while coordinated by ICAO, includes input from jurisdictions around the world and encompasses several future iterations (Types 2 and 3). IRCC and CBSA are currently members of ICAO’s New Technology Working Group (NTWG) and the NTWG’s Digital Travel Credentials (DTC) sub-group. Ultimately, the long-term vision of the DTC project is to replace physical passports with Digital Identity “tokens” (which would include the facial photograph from the ePassport) stored on mobile devices.
As discussed in Section 4, IRCC and CBSA’s FASTER-PrivBIO Project (2015-2017) also explored the use of identity “tokens,” stored in a mobile application, in the context of Electronic Travel Authorizations (ETAs). FASTER-PrivBIO closed in 2017, and “Phase II” of the project became the Chain-of-Trust (CoT) initiative, led by CBSA in collaboration with IRCC, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), the University of Ottawa, and industry partners.
CoT further explored the adoption of mobile technology in the eTA process, while also expanding to include other steps in the travel continuum. As described in CBSA’s Blueprint 2020 Report (published in December 2018):
[t]he Chain of Trust process would require travellers to download an app to their smartphone and create an account including a unique identifier built from their biometrics. At every stage of the trip – from flight reservation, to obtaining a boarding pass, to disembarking the plane – the traveller’s data would be collected and used to speed up the traveller’s passage. Just before landing, the traveller would create an e-declaration and digitally sign it using biometric facial verification. Upon arrival, cameras would match the biometric face to the traveller’s unique identifier.
The purpose of the process, ultimately, is to enhance risk assessment. Linking traveller information to traveller identity throughout the travel continuum (including by using facial recognition as an individual moves through the airport) facilitates the flow of low-risk travellers (including by minimizing touch-points with border control, a feature that will take on additional significance in the context of post-COVID 19 travel), while enhancing the detection of possible high-risk travellers.
In 2018, a simulated prototype demonstrated the basic features and process flow of the CoT to Canadian government officials. While the prototype project closed in 2019, the overarching CoT initiative continues, as per CBSA’s 2021-22 Departmental Plans, through the deployment of “small-scale minimum viable products to assess feasibility in a live environment and obtain user experience feedback.” The stated goal of CoT remains the streamlining of “traveller identification through the use of digital travel credentials and biometrics.” Notably, CoT is explicitly aligned with other international initiatives and projects, including ICAO’s DTC, reflecting the extent to which coordination exists in the broader ecosystem of biometric experimentation.
To be clear, the features of CoT described above do not reflect current practice at the border, nor do they represent commitments from CBSA (or any other GoC entity) regarding what the traveller experience will look like in the future. By the time the CoT, some version of it, or a new project operating in similar terrain, is implemented, the specifics of how biometrics verify identity or travellers move through the airport may have significantly changed. Nonetheless, the trend lines are apparent, as Digital Identity, mobile technology, and biometric verification converge on the traveller experience.
An additional example is the Known Traveller Digital Identity (KTDI) pilot project, led by Transport Canada (TC) in collaboration with the World Economic Forum (WEF), the government of the Netherlands, and commercial partners. In 2018, Canada announced its participation in the WEF’s broader KTDI vision and, in 2019, committed to a proof of concept pilot project which would operate between Canadian (Toronto-Pearson and Montreal-Trudeau) and Dutch (Amsterdam-Schiphol) airports on Air Canada and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines flights.237 This project may access required funding under Budget 2021, which proposes $105.3 million over five years to develop an approach to digital identity for air travellers.
KTDI will combine blockchain technology and facial recognition to “provide a seamless and secure air travel experience facilitated via a mobile application.” Travellers will have their facial photograph captured for one-to-one matching against their ePassport photograph at different touch points in the travel continuum (e.g. boarding and customs). They will be able to “push” their information (including their facial biometric) to relevant partners (e.g. airlines or Dutch or Canadian customs) at their own discretion, or revert to conventional identity verification (e.g. ePassport) at any time. While TC will interface with CBSA to conduct checks on ePassports at enrolment (to verify authenticity and ensure that the document is not lost or stolen) no passenger risk assessments will be conducted.
At the time of writing, the pilot is not yet live. The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted both the project’s timelines and its operational context. Originally, part of the rationale for KTDI was to accommodate increasing traveller volumes; although the pandemic has led to a decrease in travel volumes, it has also amplified the need for low-contact, ‘touchless’ travel. Indeed, the budget commitment noted in paragraph 156 was linked to the GoC’s investment in “safe air travel […] that limits transmission of COVID-19 and protects travellers.” For present purposes, the KTDI is important for what it suggests about the general trajectory of biometrics in the air travel and border continuum.
The Canadian KDTI pilot traces its origins to the broader KDTI vision articulated by the WEF. In the WEF’s KTDI concept, passports would effectively be replaced with digital credentials stored on mobile devices, while facial recognition-enabled gates (often referred to as smart gates or egates) would allow passengers to transit through airports from arrival to boarding to customs and exit with little to no interruptions. Other elements of the travel experience – for example hotel and car rentals, or shopping at duty free – would also be incorporated. Over time, travellers would compile a trail of interactions – or “attestations” – from various entities (border control, commercial entities) that cumulatively built trust in that individual. Risk profiles, supplemented by security screening, would help determine the level of scrutiny applied to a traveller by relevant authorities. Further, the Digital Identity “wallet” (encrypted mobile application) would include more than just passport information and biometrics, storing bank information, health records (including proof of vaccinations), educational degrees, credit scores, etc.
This broader vision is ambitious. The Canadian KTDI pilot – even as it evolves to reflect post-COVID priorities – is decidedly more circumspect in its aims. TC was clear in communications with NSIRA that the pilot (while including the WEF as a partner) is distinct from, and not beholden to, the broader WEF vision. Yet the sheer ambition of the latter indicates a probable trend in the future of international travel. As this report has demonstrated, the use of biometrics tends toward expansion over time. Concomitant advances in mobile technology – including the development of secure Digital Identity platforms, predicated on biometrics – find natural application in the border continuum, where identification is key and, increasingly, so is convenience.
However, enhanced convenience continues to rub up against privacy concerns, particularly with respect to facial recognition technology. A robust public debate is emerging regarding the legal authority for the use of facial recognition in public spaces. Jurisdictions around the world are grappling with how to manage the proliferation of facial recognition technology, in some cases issuing moratoriums or outright bans on new applications of the technique until its implications are properly considered and new legal and/or regulatory frameworks governing its use are established. The OPC’s recent investigations into the use of Clearview-AI by the RCMP reflect the Canadian salient of this broader conversation.
The basic contours of the debate are whether existing frameworks for the handling of personal information (in some cases drafted decades ago, before the advent of facial recognition and other biometric technology) are adequate or whether specific legislation is required, designed explicitly for facial recognition. Greater specificity in legislation would enable standards to be set as to when the use of facial recognition is appropriate and proportional. It would also enhance the transparency of the norms set by Parliament and provide public information about the circumstances in which Parliament considers facial recognition to be lawful and reasonable in promoting security and convenience in Canadian society.
The OPC is currently drafting new privacy guidance on biometrics, for both the public and private sector, intended to shape how the technology is applied moving forward. While the border context is distinct from other public settings when it comes to privacy, applications of biometric technology at the border cannot be exempt from emerging legal and societal norms. The development of new activities must be aware of such challenges, and account for shifts in the legal and regulatory landscape.
Public concern is likely to be most acute with respect to live capture facial recognition, in the vein of the FOTM pilot discussed in Section 4. Static, one-to-one verification of identity at mobile kiosks – for example as currently takes place at PIKs – is well-established, and allows travellers to know when facial recognition is being used. Roving, one-to-many identification – in which biometrics are captured at a distance – are the source of more anxiety. Consider, for example, the legal challenge to the use of this type of facial recognition in the UK and the multiple calls for moratoriums with respect to the use of facial recognition in public places.
Given the developments described above, NSIRA expects that biometric information will be systematically incorporated into the traveller experience across the border continuum moving forward. Security considerations and general identity management will remain important, but so too will traveller convenience and, in the wake of COVID-19, ‘touchless’ or decongested travel. The use of mobile technology and Digital Identities reflect broader societal trends that are particularly well-suited for application in the border continuum. Informed consent, and/or specific, transparent legal authorities are important considerations for ensuring that such applications occur lawfully and with sound public understanding surrounding when biometrics are collected, how they are used, and how they are protected when in the possession of the government.
7. Observations
This report has documented and described the GoC’s use of biometrics in the border continuum. The scope of these activities is large and growing. For government, biometric information offers a firm foundation for identity management. At the same time, civil society groups, academics, and other concerned Canadians worry about the privacy implications of the government collecting, using, retaining, and disclosing information about immutable physical characteristics. The fundamental purpose of the present study was to inform this ongoing conversation, to both demystify present government activities and evaluate them from NSIRA’s unique, crosscutting perspective. In this final section, we leverage that perspective to articulate our observations according to nine general themes.
1. Biometrics and National Security
Biometrics enhance identity management; identity management at the border in turn serves national security. As outlined in Section 4, the impetus for the expanded collection and use of biometrics, particularly post-9/11, was their purported national security benefits.
Nonetheless, the centrality of national security as a justification for biometric activities has waned over time relative to other objectives.
First, there were the broader benefits associated with identity management, including assessing admissibility and entitlement, preventing fraud, and introducing efficiencies into service delivery. Of note, the CBSA and IRCC do not currently characterize their steady-state biometric activities primarily in national security terms. The Passport Program’s purpose is to enable the travel of eligible Canadians, while the Immigration Program’s purpose is to manage the flow of foreign nationals into Canada, the vast majority of whom arrive for legitimate reasons. Biometrics are information about individuals that facilitate these functions. The benefits to national security, in each instance, are a consequence of the robust identity management to which biometrics contribute. More recently, traveller facilitation has risen to the fore, with programs and pilots incorporating biometrics and mobile technology in pursuit of “seamless” and “touchless” travel (the latter of particular interest given COVID-19).
Although biometrics extend beyond the national security domain, the national security outcomes they support are undeniable. Part of identity management is identifying mala fide actors, including possible terrorists, Canadian extremist travellers, and other national and international security threats. Biometric screening for both immigration and passport applications, for example, includes querying databases (domestic and foreign) that may return information pertinent to national security (e.g. presence on a watchlist, suspected terrorist activity, previous national security convictions, multiple identities, etc.).
The assessment of these programs’ proportionality must therefore be done in light of the full panoply of benefits that biometrics contribute to Canada’s activities at its border. This includes their benefits for identity management in admissibility and passport decisions, traveller screening, and also national security.
As pertains to areas for future NSIRA review, the present study’s overview of the border continuum highlighted several possibilities:
The collection of biometrics at Visa Application Centres (VACs). Here the national security concern stems from personal information – including biometrics – passing through VACs operating in high-risk jurisdictions and run by private contractors and sub-contractors. A review of VACs would include the risks associated with the collection and transmission of biometric information, but also cover the broader security arrangements and national security implications pertaining to the overall operation of such locations.
Instances where biometrics link information across databases for national security purposes. For example, when automated querying occurs with M5 partners in the immigration context, what are the statistics and other metrics associated with national security outcomes (e.g. information that leads to a decision of inadmissibility on IRPA s. 34 grounds)? What about case-by-case exchanges with M5 and other partners that occur because of national security concerns? Finally, what role, if any, has biometric information played in cases where the Minister of Public Safety has denied, revoked, or cancelled a Canadian passport for reasons of national security? These examples illustrate the potential for review of national security activities made possible by biometrics. In such instances, the balance between privacy and security – between protecting sensitive personal information and the security objectives of the state – suggests a clear role for NSIRA in terms of reviewing lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity.
Other situations where biometrics collected for one purpose are subsequently used for any other program or purpose (see the discussion of dual-use in paragraphs 191-201, below).
2. The Steady-State Activities
Overall, the GoC’s steady-state biometric activities in the border continuum are well-supported by current legal authorities and are consistent with international practice.
The IRCC and CBSA’s use of biometrics in their steady-state programs is well-established and supported by detailed, statutory authority. Canada’s collection and verification of fingerprints and facial photographs in the immigration context is also consistent with that of other M5 members. By design, the use of fingerprints facilitates information sharing with the M5, who similarly collect fingerprints in support of their own immigration programs and to enforce domestic immigration law.
The Canadian ePassport, similarly, adheres to standards established by the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO), which mandates the use of facial photographs as a biometric measurement. Globally, more than 140 countries currently use ePassports based on ICAO specifications, making the system interoperable and facilitating international travel for Canadian passport holders. The use of facial recognition in the passport application process is consistent with ICAO guidelines and best practices on the issuance of travel documents.
The legislative framework for the steady-state activities provides a solid basis for the collection, use, retention and disclosure of biometrics as part of the GoC’s immigration and passport programs. Nonetheless, there may be more targeted areas of concern, as articulated below.
3. Expanding Use of Biometrics over Time
The use of biometrics in the border continuum has significantly expanded over the last three decades, and is likely to continue expanding in the future. The trend is driven, in part, by advancing technological capabilities and evolving challenges in identity management.
Beginning with asylum claimants and deportees in 1993, the collection of biometrics now covers all non-exempt foreign nationals entering Canada and, through the passport program, all Canadian citizens who apply for a passport as well as permanent residents who apply for a Certificate of Identity and refugees who apply for a Refugee Travel Document. The Biometric Expansion Project was initiated with the expressed aim of widening the scope – collection, sharing, and use – of biometrics. The M5 partners meet regularly in working groups to refine and enhance (frequently, to extend) the immigration information that is shared between them. Pilot and research projects conducted within the last several years have examined the use of facial recognition technology in airports, while others have explored the integration of mobile technology into biometric identity management in the travel continuum.
Undoubtedly, developments in technology drive some of this momentum. We can do more, so we do. Leveraging new capabilities to enhance program delivery is a legitimate objective. At the same time, however, such technological determinism cannot justify the collection of sensitive information in its own right. New biometric activities must be justified according to the necessity and proportionality of collecting and using biometrics for intended objectives.
Also at play is the impetus to keep pace with other jurisdictions. As countries around the world expand their biometric activities, it is natural for Canada to do the same; doing so facilitates global travel for Canadians, makes it easier for non-Canadians to travel to and through Canada, and helps Canadian officials identify possible security risks (as in M5 information-sharing). Yet keeping up with others, even Canada’s close international partners, is not on its own a valid justification for the expanded collection and use of sensitive personal information. Again, each new activity must be assessed, and justified, independently.
Exploiting the possibilities created by technological developments and keeping pace with other jurisdictions cannot justify the expanded use of biometrics in their own right. New biometric activities must be justified according to the necessity and proportionality of collecting and using biometrics for particular, intended objectives.
4. Pilot Projects
Pilot projects and initiatives raise more concerns than do steady-state activities, as they risk being implemented on an experimental basis, without sufficient legal analysis or policy development. These projects represent an area of continued interest for NSIRA.
Pilots are vehicles of expansion: a forum for new techniques and technologies that may strain the proportional balance between the government’s goals and intrusions on personal privacy. Furthermore, there tends to be less public information available to Canadians about pilot activities. In this report, we describe several such projects, though it was beyond the scope of our emphasis on current activities to determine whether any single pilot was proportionate in terms of its collection and use of biometrics.
Nonetheless, an illustration of the challenges and possible concerns associated with pilots is provided by the Faces-on-the-Move (FOTM) project. The pilot relied on legislative authority under sections 15-18 of the IRPA; yet, these provisions were drafted before facial recognition technology was contemplated. NSIRA is not satisfied that sections 15-18 of the IRPA provide clear authority for the collection of travellers’ facial biometrics, particularly prior to – and away from – the point of formal examination. In the future, legal advice should be sought to ensure that any similar activities are well-founded in the CBSA’s legislative authorities and consistent with the requirements of s.8 of the Charter. Attention must also be paid to the policy framework governing pilot activities to ensure the proper characterization of the affected personal information. Privacy notice statements and public signage should also ensure an appropriate degree of public transparency about the deployment of new technologies and the purposes for which they will be used.
Pilot projects that entail the collection of private or personal information must receive commensurate legal and policy attention. Despite the temporary or experimental nature of a project, NSIRA expects that departments will conduct the analysis necessary to ensure that legal authority is in place to conduct the activity, and that the attendant collection, use, retention and disclosure of personal information is well-governed by policy.
5. Evolving Legal and Societal Norms
The public debate surrounding legal authorities questions whether existing standards and protections are sufficient for regulating biometric activities or whether new standards and protections are required.
This debate is growing, especially as relates to facial recognition technology. Biometrics are personal information, but they have particular features that may set them apart: they capture immutable personal characteristics, they allow for reliable identification at a distance, and they act as unique identifiers that can be used to discover and connect information about individuals across multiple datasets. The question is whether it is appropriate to treat biometrics as being commensurate with other personal information collected by the government in the course of its programs and activities. Are specific legal regimes necessary to create standards that appropriately reflect the potential intrusiveness and sensitivity of certain biometric data, and ought there be specific use limitations beyond those currently applicable by virtue of the Privacy Act?
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) commented on this issue in the context of its recent investigation into the RCMP’s use of facial recognition via the private firm Clearview AI. “Canada’s privacy laws were designed to be technology neutral”, wrote the OPC, “which is positive, given the pace of technological change compared to that of legislative modernization. However, the risks of [facial recognition] technology are such that […] specific rules may be warranted.” The report further noted that many jurisdictions around the world have developed privacy laws which specifically regulate biometric activities. Quebec is presently the only Canadian jurisdiction to have enacted a law that specifically addressed biometrics. Other jurisdictions are calling for, or implementing, outright bans on facial recognition technologies. The European Data Protection Supervisor, for example, has called for a ban on facial recognition in public spaces, arguing that such applications constitute a “deep and non-democratic intrusion into individuals’ private lives.”
Civil liberty organizations have been vocal in raising concerns about biometric activities, as have academia and the media. Governments, meanwhile, can benefit from new capabilities and innovation in pursuit of program objectives, but must do so in a way that respects fundamental human rights. The tension at the core of this debate – how to achieve government objectives efficiently and effectively, while safeguarding individuals’ privacy – is familiar. It is the tension manifest in national security activities more generally, as society balances individual rights against collective protection. In the present context, this evergreen dilemma is catalyzed by advancements in technology, which widen the government’s toolkit while also widening the scope of possible intrusion on individual privacy, specifically the collection and use of sensitive personal data. Moving forward, the question of how biometric activities are designed, implemented, and regulated will be determined, in part, by shifting societal norms, established legal principles (including Charter considerations), and long-standing Canadian values associated with democracy and individual rights.
While the border is, comparatively, a space in which greater intrusiveness is considered reasonable, the boundaries of those justifications are not limitless, and will require careful calibration. For NSIRA, as for other review bodies, evolving legal and societal norms will shape how considerations such as compliance and reasonableness ought to be applied.
6. The Dual-Use of Biometrics
Dual-use refers to when biometrics collected for one purpose are subsequently used for any other program or purpose. The logic is appreciable. Biometrics constitute robust identifying information about individuals; if they are useful in one context, they are likely to be useful in another. However, this dynamic constitutes one of the main privacy concerns associated with biometrics.
NSIRA observed several instances of possible dual-use of biometric information in the activities examined in this report.
First, photographs collected under the Passport Program are also used for facial matching purposes in NEXUS.
Second, fingerprints collected from foreign nationals as part of immigration applications become searchable by law enforcement in the course of criminal investigations. While the RCMP maintains separate repositories for immigration fingerprints and criminal fingerprints, both are searched when law enforcement submit fingerprints for identification purposes.
Third, CSIS, RCMP and CBSA can submit photographs to IRCC to have them checked against passport and travel document application photographs using facial recognition. This can occur in the context of national security or law enforcement investigations in an attempt to identify an unknown individual, to determine if a known individual has multiple identities, and/or to assist in the execution of a warrant.
Dual-use does not always present a compliance issue. Indeed, many such uses are well-supported in law given the “consistent use” standard in s. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, the ability for certain institutions to request personal information under s. 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act, and other sector-specific legislative provisions (see, for example, paragraphs 85, 109, and 112, which outline the authorities that govern the law enforcement uses discussed above). With respect to NEXUS, in particular, the use of passport photographs is a clear consistent use (see paragraph 140). Privacy concerns are further muted given the program’s voluntary nature and individuals’ prior consent.
However, even where they pose demonstrable benefits, new uses of previously collected biometrics must be carefully considered to ensure their reasonableness and proportionality. In addition, all new uses must be justified and well-authorized in law.
Though authorized by law, the situations in which biometrics collected in the border continuum are leveraged for purposes outside of that continuum (such as when investigative agencies use biometric information initially compiled for immigration or passport purposes) may be worthy of particular scrutiny. NSIRA may return to these cases as it contemplates future review of biometric activities.
Additionally, the principle of “purpose limitation” may be a way of guarding against unjustified dual-use in the context of biometric activities.
Purpose limitation involves explicitly stipulating the specific purpose for which the collected biometrics will be used, with a commitment to not use them for any additional purposes in the future. It is well established in UK and European jurisprudence and is more restrictive than “consistent use.” While the “consistent use” principle reflects the GoC’s standing commitment to limit the repurposing of personal information, the standard ought to be read as narrowly as possible for biometric information. Again, biometrics are unique compared to other personal identifiers because they are essentially permanent and immutable. This means that once they are collected, if they are not subject to clear retention/deletion policies and purpose limitations, the government has a ready repository of information for identifying individuals in the future – perhaps in activities that are less benign than the activities under which the biometrics were originally collected.
It is premature for NSIRA to make a finding on whether the possible instances of dual-use identified above are reasonable or proportionate. Future review, whether by NSIRA or another review body, may consider the question in greater depth.
7. Technical Systems
NSIRA reviewed high-level technical information about the activities documented in this study. This included information pertaining to the various systems and databases used in the course of the GoC’s biometric activities.
There is significant overlap between the technical systems and databases used across the steady-state biometric activities.
Both the Passport Program and Immigration Program use the Global Case Management System (GCMS), and IRCC, CBSA and RCMP have access to GCMS. In the immigration context, facial photographs are stored in GCMS, while fingerprints are sent to the RCMP and stored in one (immigration) of several repositories of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). The immigration repository is then searchable by domestic law enforcement and can be queried by Canada’s M5 partners for immigration purposes.
The passport and travel document applications in the Passport Program, meanwhile, are stored in both GCMS and in IRCC’s Central Index (see Annex A), though IRCC has communicated that a full transition to GCMS is planned moving forward. The digitized photograph from the application is sent to IRCC’s FRS, converted into a biometric template, sent for evaluation in the FRS database, and stored in the CI. In both the Immigration Program and Passport Program, the intake of applications – and biometrics – employ a range of systems at different intake locations around the world, all of which connect back to IRCC servers in Canada.
The overall architecture of this system – biometric collection, transmission, and storage in the course of the GoC’s activities in the border continuum – is complex, though not necessarily problematic.
In keeping with the foundational nature of the study, NSIRA makes these observations as a first step in mapping the relevant systems architecture. This mapping, summarized in Annex A, will support NSIRA should it choose to review in detail the various technical systems used for biometrics in the course of border activities, including how they overlap and what privacy or security issues, if any, might arise from the present structure.
8. Visibility into Algorithms
In addition to the public concern about governmental surveillance noted above, there is related apprehension about automated decision-making and about decision-making aided by automation, particularly when it occurs in conjunction with biometric identification. The general concern with respect to algorithms and automation is that the decision-making process is opaque, even to the human operators who rely on the algorithms or systems to do their work.
In the Immigration Program, Passport Program, and at PIK kiosks, IRCC, CBSA, and the RCMP have limited visibility into how the algorithms used operate.
The algorithms are procured from private vendors, and the details of how they work are proprietary. They are, in this sense, essentially a ‘black box’. NSIRA supports greater transparency in how algorithms work when analyzing personal information. Such transparency is necessary for third-party verification of the algorithms’ accuracy and reliability and would enhance public confidence in both the algorithms’ ability to function fairly and without discrimination and in the departments’ ability to mitigate any shortcomings in that respect.
Each department and agency did, however, demonstrate that performance metrics (e.g. error rates) are known and tested, and that customizations (such as adjusting match thresholds) are applied when appropriate.
Moreover, for IRCC’s FRS, and for the RCMP’s AFIS, human intervention occurs to either verify system results or complete matches if necessary. Facial matching at PIKs, by contrast, occurs without human adjudication, though any obvious errors may subsequently be corrected by BSOs through visual verification.
9. Preventing Bias and Discrimination
Related to the opacity of algorithms is the possibility that automated biometric analysis – e.g. facial recognition and fingerprint matching – may be subject to bias. It is well documented in the academic literature, for example, that many facial recognition algorithms are less reliable in identifying women, the very young and very old, and individuals with darker skin tones. Similarly, fingerprint capture and matching may be more difficult and/or less accurate for females, particular ethnic groups, and individuals working in certain trades (which may reflect socio-economic status). Given that important decisions in the border continuum – including the issuance of official travel documents, the granting of visas, asylum, and/or residency status, and possible referral for additional questioning/inspection during the immigration and customs process – are informed by automated analysis, the possibility of systematic bias is of concern.
IRCC and CBSA have conducted preliminary analyses to explore how their biometric activities may impact diverse groups of people, though the implementation of possible mitigation strategies was not always apparent.
For example, CBSA’s GBA+ for the PIK, completed in May 2016, suggested that the agency apply gender-specific thresholds for facial matching; an October 2020 analysis on possible gender bias at PIKs made a similar recommendation. For facial recognition in both FRS (IRCC) and PIK (CBSA), recent performance testing explicitly addressed the possibility of demographic bias. This analysis noted minor imbalances in terms of gender accuracy, but emphasized that advancements over time (updated algorithms) have steadily reduced, though not eliminated, the gap.
In some contexts, technological advancements have helped to reduce, but not eliminate, differential impacts.
The work to comprehensively address these issues – beyond noting that small discrepancies do exist – remains to be done. CBSA noted, for example, that its “work in this area is nascent and is not yet conclusive with significant work still to be conducted.” This includes GBA+ on facial recognition technologies, work on the visibility of bias in data, and the development of possible policy mitigations. Similarly, IRCC stated that “further demographic bias assessments will […] be conducted” following the implementation of a new algorithm in the FRS.
This is not to suggest that efforts to mitigate possible bias have been insufficient to this point; rather, both IRCC and CBSA have demonstrated that they are aware of possible issues and committed to future work in this area. However, such efforts should not be confined to accuracy testing, and relying on improving algorithms. Solutions at the policy level should also be explored, including the implementation of previously identified mitigation strategies and the analysis of the possible consequences of biometric errors for the experience of affected individuals.
A commitment to continuing to minimize discrepancies in the algorithms’ function for diverse groups, and to ensure such differences are taken into account by the human decision-making that follows biometrics screening, will continue to be important in ensuring the reasonable use of these algorithms in the future.
More work remains in terms of mitigating differential impacts on segments of the population. At the same time, the departments and agencies examined in this study have demonstrated their awareness of possible systemic inequalities and their commitment to addressing them.
8. Conclusion
Biometrics play a fundamental role in the border continuum. The Government of Canada uses biometrics to verify and establish identity. The question of who is coming into the country – and whether they have a right to – is more confidently answered as a result. In the immigration context, this involves the screening, verification (at arrival), and ongoing assessment of admissibility of foreign nationals coming to Canada as temporary or permanent residents. Applicants for Canadian passports (and other official travel documents) are screened to confirm eligibility to passport services and entitlement to a passport, and subsequently use their biometric, embedded in the ePassport, during the course of international travel. These two streams converge at Canadian airports, where CBSA verifies the identity of travellers using facial recognition at automated kiosks.
The purpose of this study was to examine and contextualize these activities. We looked back, tracing the evolution of the GoC’s biometric activities in the border continuum, noting a shift from strict national security objectives to broader goals of identity management. We looked forward, to possible future biometric applications, including the adoption of Digital Identities, and even greater systematization of biometrics into the overall traveller experience.
Our observations are meant to inform both the Canadian public as it contemplates the government’s collection and use of biometric information, and NSIRA as it plans future review of the same. We noted that the steady-state activities are well-supported by current legal authorities, and are consistent with international practice. At the same time, certain areas raise potential concern. These include pilot projects, which are vehicles for experimentation and require careful legal consideration; the ongoing possibility of systemic inequalities across diverse groups of people resulting from algorithmic biometric analysis; and the possible dual-use of biometric information, including the availability of biometric information to investigative agencies.
Public debate about the government’s application of biometric technology will continue to evolve, driving change in the legal and regulatory frameworks associated with such activities. As such, continued scrutiny from NSIRA is warranted, particularly in those instances where the collection and use of biometric information is justified by explicit reference to national security outcomes.
In 2019-2020, NSIRA conducted its first interdepartmental review on the implementation of the 2017 Ministerial Directions on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2017 MD). The review set out to build NSIRA’s knowledge of the information sharing process adopted by the six departments that received the 2017 MD.
NSIRA conducted a case study for each department that had operationalized the 2017 MD. NSIRA noted significant differences in the six departments’ implementation and operationalization of information sharing processes. NSIRA found that CSE, CSIS and the RCMP had implemented the 2017 MD; DND/CAF was implementing the final elements of the 2017 MD; GAC had not yet fully implemented the 2017 MD; and, the CBSA had not yet operationalized the 2017 MD.
NSIRA examined and found differences in how high-risk decision-making is removed from operational personnel who may have a vested interest in the sharing. CSE and the RCMP had the most independent processes; GAC removed high-risk decision-making from front line personnel, while CSIS and DND/CAF decision makers had a direct operational interest in sharing information. NSIRA recommended that Departments ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.
NSIRA also found a lack of standardization in information sharing risk assessments for both foreign countries and foreign entities. This issue has been noted in other NSIRA information sharing reviews.
In 2019, parliament passed the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, which in conjunction with the subsequent issued Orders in Council (OIC’s) codified many of the provisions of the 2017 MD and left the essential prohibitions and limits unchanged. Noteworthy, the six departments examined in this review are also the same departments for which there is an obligation to issue OICs pursuant to the Act. This review set out the foundation that has assisted and facilitated NSIRA’s subsequent mandated information sharing reviews.
Publishing this review aligns with NSIRA’s efforts at increasing transparency and being more accessible to Canadians through its work.
In 2011 and again in 2017, ministers issued direction (hereafter Ministerial Direction or MD) to a number of departments setting out how to manage the risks of mistreatment posed by the sharing of information with foreign entities. Most recently, Parliament passed the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA). In September 2019, direction under the ACMFEA was issued to twelve departments, six of which had never before received formal direction regarding information sharing with foreign entities.
This review set out to build NSIRA’s knowledge of the information sharing processes adopted by departments under the 2017 MD. The direction issued pursuant to the ACMFEA in September 2019 codified many provisions of the 2017 MD and left the essential prohibitions and limits unchanged. As such, this review provided a foundation that will expedite and facilitate NSIRA’s future information sharing reviews.
The review focused on the six departments that had received the 2017 MD: the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CSBA), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF).
Observations and Recommendations
Degrees of implementation vary across departments
NSIRA noted significant differences between the six departments with regard to the level of implementation of information sharing processes. In summary:
CSE, CSIS and the RCMP have implemented the 2017 MD.
DND/CAF is in the process of implementing final elements of the 2017 MD.
GAC has not yet fully implemented the 2017 MD.
In practice, CBSA has not yet operationalized the 2017 MD.
The concept of “substantial risk” of mistreatment is not defined
Like the 2017 MD, the ACMFEA and its associated direction prohibit information sharing that would result in a “substantial risk” of mistreatment. Neither the ACMFEA nor its direction include a definition of substantial risk, however, despite the centrality of this concept to the regime. A definition of substantial risk existed in both the 2011 and 2017 MD; its absence now raises concerns about its interpretation in future.
Recommendation: The definition of “substantial risk” should be codified in law or public direction.
Departments vary with respect to the independence of their decision-making
CSE and the RCMP have the most independent processes.
The information sharing processes implemented by GAC to date remove high- risk decision-making from “front line” personnel.
At CSIS and DND/CAF, decision-makers typically have a direct operational interest in the sharing of information.
CBSA has not yet operationalized its information sharing processes.
Recommendation: Departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.
Lack of standardized information sharing risk assessments
Under the 2017 MD, GAC, CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP all maintain their own sets of foreign country and/or entity profiles, while DND/CAF is currently developing its own as well. The existence of multiple different assessments is duplicative and unnecessary. It may also yield inconsistencies, as departments have at times come to quite different conclusions about foreign countries’ and entities’ human rights records and the associated risks of information sharing.
Recommendation: Departments should develop: (a) a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including a standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and (b) to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.
Benefits of internal information sharing process reviews
Finally, NSIRA noted that periodic internal reviews of information sharing policies and processes supported their successful functioning in the long term.
Recommendation: Departments should conduct periodic internal reviews of their policies and processes for sharing information with foreign entities in order to identify gaps and areas in need of improvement.
2. Authorities
This review was conducted under the authority of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), specifically paragraphs 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(b) as well as sections 9 and 11.
3. Introduction
Many departments and agencies in the Government of Canada routinely share information with foreign entities. Given that information sharing with entities in certain countries can result in a risk of mistreatment for individuals, it is incumbent upon the Government of Canada to evaluate and mitigate the risks that such sharing creates. This is particularly the case for information sharing related to national security and intelligence, where the information often relates to alleged participation in terrorism or other criminal activity.
Canada has made a number of binding commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading treatment or Punishment (CAT), and other international agreements. The prohibitions on mistreatment – including complicity in mistreatment – set out in these agreements are also considered to be customary international law. Some of Canada’s obligations have been incorporated into domestic law under section 269.1 of the Criminal Code.
In 2011 and again in 2017, ministers issued direction to a number of departments setting out how to manage the risks in information sharing with foreign entities. Most recently, Parliament passed Bill C-59, which included the ACMFEA. In September 2019, direction under the ACMFEA was issued to twelve departments, six of which had never before received formal direction regarding information sharing with foreign entities.
Subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act requires NSIRA to review annually every department’s implementation of the directions of the GiC issued under the ACMFEA. In 2020, the NSIRA will undertake its first such review. The purpose of the present review, however, was to build NSIRA’s knowledge and understanding of departments’ implementation of the 2017 MD. The direction issued pursuant to the ACMFEA in September 2019 codified many provisions of the 2017 MD and left the essential prohibitions and limits unchanged. As such, this review provided a valuable foundation that will expedite and facilitate NSIRA’s future information sharing reviews.
The review focused on the six departments that received the 2017 MD: CSIS, CSE, the RCMP, CBSA, GAC, and DND/CAF. NSIRA examined departments’ policies and processes as well as documents related to foreign arrangements. Where possible, NSIRA examined a single case study for each department in order to illustrate how information sharing works in practice. Given the high-level approach taken in this review, NSIRA opted to make a series of broad observations about the strengths and weaknesses of departments’ framework for information sharing with foreign entities, in the place of formal findings. Where NSIRA made recommendations, they were interdepartmental in scope.
This review focused on departmental policies and procedures for the disclosure and requesting of information involving a risk of mistreatment. It did not examine the use of information that may have been derived from mistreatment; NSIRA may review this topic in future.
4. Background
In 2011, the Government of Canada approved a general framework for “Addressing Risks of Mistreatment in Sharing Information with Foreign Entities”. The framework was the first multi-departmental set of instructions issued regarding information sharing and mistreatment. Its main aim was to establish a coherent and consistent approach across government when sharing information with foreign entities.
Later in 2011, a number of departments whose mandate related to national security and/or intelligence received Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (the 2011 MD). Specifically, the 2011 MD was issued to CSIS, CSE, CBSA, and the RCMP. The 2011 MD, which was eventually released under the Access to Information Act, was subject to extensive criticism from non-governmental organizations, civil liberties groups, and others including the Canadian Bar Association. The main critique was that the 2011 MD did not clearly prohibit the disclosure or requesting of information entailing a “substantial risk” of mistreatment, but rather permitted departments to weigh the value of the information against the risk of mistreatment.
In 2017, the 2011 MD was replaced by a new Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (the 2017 MD). The 2017 MD was received by CSIS, CSE, CBSA, and the RCMP – the departments that had received the 2011 MD – as well as by DND/CAF and GAC. The 2017 MD included numerous changes, but the most significant were clear prohibitions on the disclosure and requesting of information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment, as well as new limits on the use of information likely derived from mistreatment by a foreign entity. In addition, the new MD required departments to maintain policies and procedures to assess the risks of their information sharing relationships with foreign entities.
The 2017 MD further directed departments to cooperate in making assessments regarding foreign countries and entities. In response, Public Safety Canada (PS) established the Information Sharing Coordination Group (ISCG) comprised of PS and the six departments that had received the 2017 MD. The objective was to encourage interdepartmental discussions in support of a coordinated approach to the implementation of the MD.
On July 13, 2019, the ACMFEA came into force. The ACMFEA requires the GiC to issue direction to the six departments that had received the 2017 MD, and gives the GiC discretion to issue direction to other departments as well. On September 4, 2019, the GiC issued direction under the ACMFEA to twelve departments. In addition to the six mandatory departments, direction was issued to PS; the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC); Transport Canada; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC); the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA); and Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO). These six new departments have now also joined the PS-led ISCG.
In practice, the information sharing regime set out by the ACMFEA and the subsequent GiC direction closely resembles the 2017 MD. The fundamental limits on Canadian departments’ scope to share information remain unchanged. Notably, however, the new regime omits certain aspects of the 2017 MD. The ACMFEA and its associated direction lack the 2017 MD’s requirement that departments maintain policies and procedures for assessing the risks associated with foreign information sharing arrangements, in collaboration with other departments. More importantly, the new system omits a definition of the threshold of “substantial risk”. The ramifications of this are discussed below.
5. Observations and Recommendations
Reporting
One of the new obligations placed on departments in the 2017 MD was a requirement that they provide an annual report to their minister that included:
All of the departments that were issued the 2017 MD fulfilled their obligation to report to their respective ministers by producing a report in late 2018 or early 2019 discussing the first year of activity under the MD. At the time of writing, however, not all of the departments have issued a public report. As this was a foundational review, NSIRA did not critically evaluate the reports.
Department
Report to Minister
Public report
Cases approved
Cases denied
CBSA
Provided
Published
0
0
CSIS12
Provided
Published
1
1
RCMP13
Provided
Published
25
4
CSE14
Provided
Published
1
0
DND/CAF
Provided
Not Published
0
0
GAC
Provided
Not Published
0
0
Implementation of the 2017 Ministerial Direction
When the 2017 MD was issued, departments that had already built information sharing policies and procedures under the 2011 MD found themselves at a significant advantage. CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP in particular were able to quickly adapt their existing systems to the 2017 MD. Accordingly, for departments that had not received the 2011 MD – or had not implemented it – the arrival of the 2017 MD proved more challenging.
CSE: NSIRA observes that CSE has fully implemented all of the elements of the 2017 MD. The MD’s requirements have been integrated directly into CSE’s operational policies and processes. A detailed overview of CSE’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex D.
RCMP: In response to the 2017 MD, the RCMP overhauled their information sharing framework and stood up a new Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG) that, amongst other things, assesses country human rights records and maintains a system for streaming information sharing requests according to risk. The RCMP is currently working to integrate these processes into their comprehensive operational manual. A detailed overview of the RCMP’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex E.
CSIS: Following the issuance of the 2017 MD, CSIS quickly updated their policies and procedures. In 2018, CSIS also created a new system to implement the MD’s requirement to restrict information sharing with foreign entities that engage in mistreatment, with three levels of restriction depending on the seriousness of the problem. CSIS has informed NSIRA that it is overhauling its current policies and procedures. A detailed overview of CSIS’s current information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex F.
DND/CAF: Although DND/CAF did not receive the 2011 MD, DND/CAF has had internal directives in place governing information sharing with foreign entities since 2010. The DND/CAF policy and process suite for information sharing was updated following the issuance of the 2017 MD to bring it into compliance with the new requirements. While DND/CAF vets partner forces, it does not yet have a fully developed system for assessing and managing the risks of sharing information with foreign entities. DND/CAF is, however, currently developing more extensive country risk profiles and a standardized assessment process that will be used to assess the risks of information sharing prior to establishing information sharing arrangements. A detailed overview of DND/CAF’s information sharing framework can be found at Annex G.
GAC: Following receipt of the 2017 MD, GAC established a new Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC) in December 2018. The MDCC’s objective is to review requests for information sharing that may engage the MD. This is the extent of GAC’s policies and processes pursuant to the MD, however. GAC lacks any policies or procedures setting out how employees are to assess instances of possible information sharing to ensure that all appropriate cases reach the MDCC. It is insufficient to merely inform employees that they are responsible for assessing a complex legal threshold – the concept of a “substantial risk” of mistreatment at the core of the 2011 and 2017 MD as well as the ACMFEA – without guidance as to how they should proceed. As such, NSIRA observes that GAC has not yet fully implemented the 2017 MD.
GAC (cont.): Of note, GAC produces human rights reports on countries that are widely used within government to assist in assessing the risks of sharing with foreign entities. Following the 2017 MD, GAC added a subsection specific to mistreatment to these reports. A detailed overview of GAC’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex H.
CBSA: In October 2018, CBSA issued a revised high-level policy document in response to the 2017 MD. The document did not include concrete processes for identifying and handling instances of information sharing involving a risk of mistreatment, however. CBSA employees thus lack effective guidance with which to discharge their responsibilities under the MD. CBSA also has no process for assessing the risks associated with specific foreign countries and entities, as required by the MD. CBSA has since drafted processes and additional policies, but they have not yet been finalized or invoked. Given these significant gaps, NSIRA observes that CBSA has not yet operationalized the 2017 MD. CBSA has informed NSIRA, however, that it intends to introduce significant improvements over the coming year. A detailed overview of CBSA’s information sharing framework can be found at Annex I.
Additional observations are included in the department-specific annexes referenced above. It should also be noted that NSIRA examined departmental policies and processes at a high level, and as such future reviews may make additional findings and recommendations regarding policies and processes. Moreover, a number of departments are in the process of revamping their information sharing practices, including in particular CSIS and DND/CAF.
In its survey of departments, NSIRA noted varying levels of rigour and consistency with regard to record keeping. Accurate and detailed records of deliberations and reasoning in support of decision-making related to information sharing with foreign entities are necessary to support accountability, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Vavilov. NSIRA may return to this subject in future years.
In June 2019, the RCMP conducted an internal review of the framework and policies in place for its information sharing policies and procedures. The review identified certain shortcomings with regard to policies, processes, training, and resourcing. Based on the draft provided, NSIRA observes that the review was candid and thorough. The review is currently being used to guide improvements. Periodic internal reviews – such as the one conducted by the RCMP – should be considered a best practice.
Recommendation no. 1: Departments should conduct periodic internal reviews of their policies and processes for sharing information with foreign entities in order to identify gaps and areas in need of improvement.
Independent Decision-Making
The concept of risk mitigation is key to the information sharing frameworks of departments. When information sharing would result in a substantial risk that an individual would be mistreated, the information can only be shared if the department takes measures to mitigate the risk of mistreatment such that the residual risk is no longer substantial. Much therefore depends on who, within departments, is authorized to make decisions regarding whether:
an instance of proposed information sharing would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment; and
the proposed mitigation measures are sufficient.
In looking at the various decision-making processes adopted by departments, NSIRA noted varying levels of independence from operational personnel. Of particular interest were processes where the individual making decisions has a direct operational interest in the sharing of the information, creating the potential for conflict between operational imperatives and departmental obligations to respect the MD.
At CSE, the complete Mistreatment Risk Assessment process is conducted by non-operational units. The centralization of information sharing decision-making in a single branch minimizes direct operational pressure while facilitating informed and objective decisions.
The RCMP process uses other mechanisms to ensure independent decision- making. Individual investigators, when they wish to share information, must consult a list of countries and types of information sharing that the RCMP has pre-determined as representing sufficient risk of mistreatment. If the proposed sharing matches the list, then the case is automatically referred to the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC). FIRAC comprises a range of senior officials from RCMP headquarters who are a step removed from the operational front-line. The RCMP’s system of referral to FIRAC based on clear criteria removes discretion from officers with a vested interest in the sharing of the information. These officers may not have a full understanding of the geopolitical context of the proposed information sharing and thus are not best-placed to assess whether a substantial risk of mistreatment would result.
GAC requests that Directors General and Heads of Mission refer all cases where proposed information sharing “presents the potential for substantial risk of mistreatment” to the MDCC. The decision as to whether the substantial risk can be mitigated is made centrally by the MDCC, which comprises senior officials from across the department as well as a legal representative. As noted above, however, GAC currently does not provide officials with guidance on how to determine whether the threshold for referral to the MDCC has been met.
Compared to CSE, GAC, and the RCMP, decision-making at CSIS and DND/CAF is much closer to operations. CSIS provides high-level guidance to desks on how to identify information sharing that may result in a substantial risk of mistreatment, but leaves final decision-making regarding whether the situation does in fact create a substantial risk, and whether the risk can be mitigated, to the Deputy Director General or the Director General of each branch. Only if CSIS has heavily restricted information sharing with the foreign entity in question – or else the branch is unsure whether the substantial risk can be mitigated – then the branch must refer the case to the Information Sharing Evaluation Committee (ISEC) for determination. As a result, most of CSIS’s information sharing decisions – even those involving a substantial risk of mistreatment – are made by officials with a direct operational stake in the outcome of the proposed information sharing.
Within DND/CAF, decisions regarding the sharing of information rest with officers within the military chain of command. NSIRA was informed that while routine information sharing is approved by designated lower-level officers in theatre, cases involving unusual circumstances, or where there is uncertainty as to whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists or can be mitigated, are elevated to senior levels. Once passed up the chain of command, senior officers receive advice from a range of officials at headquarters.
CBSA, at the present time, does not have processes to assess substantial risk or to make decisions regarding whether such risks can be mitigated. In practice, therefore, the onus currently rests on CBSA officers, acting without guidance, to identify cases that invoke the 2017 MD and to manage the associated risks. CBSA has drafted a procedure for cases where there is uncertainty as to whether a substantial risk of mistreatment can be mitigated, but it has not yet been implemented.
Recommendation no. 2: Departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.
Country Assessments
As noted above, a significant addition to the 2017 MD was the requirement that departments maintain policies and procedures to assess the risks of their information sharing relationships with foreign entities. Notably, the MD required departments to assess the human rights records of foreign countries generally and not just of specific foreign entities (i.e., police or intelligence services) within those countries. While the MD did not prohibit information sharing with foreign entities in countries with troubling human rights records, it implied that Canada’s relationships with such foreign entities could not be considered in isolation from the broader human rights environment in which these entities functioned.
In several instances, NSIRA noticed departments citing an absence of direct Government of Canada intelligence of mistreatment by a specific foreign entity in support of a proposed sharing of information, or else in support of a less restrictive information sharing policy towards the entity in question – despite ample reporting of systemic human rights abuses in the public domain. NSIRA observes that a lack of internal Government of Canada reporting of mistreatment by a specific foreign entity is not evidence that the entity does not engage in mistreatment. Departments must consider the full range of sources in assessing risk, including open sources such as the media and non-governmental organizations.
GAC, CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP all maintain their own sets of foreign country and/or entity profiles, while DND/CAF is currently developing its own as well. The existence of multiple different assessments is duplicative and unnecessary. and It may also yield significant inconsistencies, as departments have at times come to quite different conclusions about foreign countries’ and entities’ human rights records and the associated risks of information sharing. With the issuance of direction under the ACMFEA to twelve departments, this issue will likely grow. See Annex F for additional discussion of this point.
The ISCG seeks to guide departments in developing their human rights assessment processes by providing a forum to discuss best practices. PS informed NSIRA that the ISCG had not discussed plans to standardize these assessments.
Recommendation no. 3: Departments should develop:
a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including a standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and
to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.
The recommendation above does not preclude department-specific approaches to mitigating the risks of mistreatment. For instance, a department may be able to draw upon aspects of its relationship with a foreign entity to reduce the risk of mistreatment not available to other departments. These differences should not affect the initial determination of the underlying risk of mistreatment posed by information sharing with a foreign entity, however.
In India v. Badesha (2017), the Supreme Court of Canada recently provided guidance on contextual factors to be considered when assessing the reliability of assurances sought from foreign entities regarding mistreatment. Though not exhaustive, the decision provides departments with some guidance regarding the adequacy of assurances received.
Duty of Care
In reviewing GAC, NSIRA noted a tension between adherence to the 2017 MD and GAC’s duty of care with regard to the safety and security of mission staff abroad. Indeed, both cases of information sharing referred to the MDCC in 2019 involved threats to mission In one of the cases, information was shared with a foreign entity before the MDCC had had the chance to assess the risk of mistreatment. In this instance, the GAC official cited the need to protect the safety of mission staff (see Annex H).
NSIRA acknowledges the importance of mission security and the seriousness of the conundrums that can arise when the needs of mission security and GAC’s obligations with respect to information sharing collide. Yet the charged atmosphere of a mission under threat may not be the best venue for quick decision-making involving risks of mistreatment.
Substantial Risk
Like the 2017 MD, the ACMFEA and its associated direction prohibit information sharing that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment. Neither the ACMFEA nor its direction include a definition of “substantial risk”, however, despite the centrality of this concept to the regime. A definition of substantial risk existed in both the 2011 and 2017 MD; its absence now raises concerns about its interpretation in the future.
In consultation with other departments, PS is developing a policy document that includes the same definition of substantial risk that was found in the 2011 and 2017 MD. The document also contains guidance on other requirements contained in the 2017 MD but that were omitted from the ACMFEA and its direction. When asked by NSIRA, the six departments that had been subject to the 2017 MD all stated that they intended to continue abiding by the established definition of substantial risk. This is reassuring, and should limit the potential for inconsistency between departments. Nonetheless, such a crucial definition should not be left up to individual departments to determine.
Recommendation no. 4: The definition of “substantial risk” should be codified in law or public direction.
The definition of substantial risk in the 2017 MD requires that mistreatment be “foreseeable”. As described in Annex G, DND/CAF’s assessment of foreseeability encompasses a number of factors, but a key component is that the risk of mistreatment be a “causal consequence” of DND/CAF information sharing. NSIRA observes that DND/CAF’s interpretation of foreseeability runs the risk of narrowing the definition of substantial risk and therefore the application of the 2017 MD. Given the importance of a clear and consistent understanding of “substantial risk” across departments, in future years NSIRA may review the application of the “substantial risk” threshold by DND/CAF – and other departments – to information sharing with foreign entities.
A substantial risk of mistreatment is defined as existing in cases where mistreatment is more likely than not. The definition includes a qualifier, however, that the threshold may be met at lower level of probability “where the risk is of severe harm”. This reflects a larger point that the assessment of substantial risk is not intended to be a narrowly mechanistic process of balancing probabilities. The 2017 MD notes that the Government of Canada “has no interest in actions associated with the use of torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. Knowingly associating the Government of Canada with any of these actions would damage the credibility and effectiveness of any department or agency associated with them”. When interpreting the threshold of substantial risk, departments should always bear in mind the larger purpose of Canada’s framework for sharing information with foreign entities.
In order to give life to this framework, it is incumbent on departments, first, to ensure that their employees are trained to the point where they fully understand their legal obligations, and second, to establish clear and well-developed processes that foster and facilitate compliance in the broadest sense.
6. Conclusion
This review set out to build NSIRA’s knowledge of the information sharing processes adopted by departments under the 2017 MD. NSIRA noted significant differences between the six departments reviewed with respect to the level of implementation of information sharing processes. Processes also varied widely in terms of the level of independence of decision-making.
Although departmental information sharing frameworks will continue to evolve over time, this review will provide a baseline of comparison for future developments under the ACMFEA. The review also served to identify areas of potential concern that NSIRA may revisit in future years.
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