Completed Reviews

Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2024

March 5, 2025
Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2023

February 28, 2025
Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2023

February 28, 2025
Communications Security Establishment’s Equities Management Framework

February 28, 2025
Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces Section 35 Report – Source Handling

February 28, 2025
Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Accountability Mechanisms

February 28, 2025
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Lifecycle of Warranted Information

February 28, 2025
Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Human Source Program’s Human Source Program

February 28, 2025
Communications Security Establishment’s Network-Based Solutions and Related CS/IA Activities

February 28, 2025
Communications Security Establishment-Canadian Security Intelligence Service Operational Collaboration

February 28, 2025
Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2020

February 28, 2025
Communications Security Establishment’s ACO & DCO Operations

February 28, 2025
Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces’s Source Handling Program

February 28, 2025
Communications Security Establishment’s FI Program (Part 1)

February 28, 2025
Survey of Canadian Security Intelligence Service Technical Capabilities

February 28, 2025
Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (Review of 2021)

February 21, 2025
Operational Research

February 14, 2025
Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (Review of 2024)

February 3, 2025
Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces’s Open source intelligence Activities

February 3, 2025
Canada Border Services Agency Enforcement Flags

February 3, 2025

Date Modified:: 2023-07-11

Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s ministerial authorizations and ministerial orders under the CSE Act: Report

Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s ministerial authorizations and ministerial orders under the CSE Act

Report

Table of Contents

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Date of Publishing:

April 27, 2023

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Date Modified:: 2025-02-25

Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s ministerial authorizations and ministerial orders under the CSE Act: Backgrounder

Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s ministerial authorizations and ministerial orders under the CSE Act

Backgrounder

Following the coming in to force of the Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act), CSE received a new set of Ministerial Authorizations (MA) – written documents by which the Minister of National Defence authorizes CSE to engage in activity that risks contravening an “Act of Parliament or interfering with a reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or person in Canada.” The CSE Act also created a legislative authority for the Minister of National Defence to “designate electronic information or information infrastructures or classes of electronic information or information infrastructures as being of importance to the Government of Canada” through a Ministerial Order (MO).

NSIRA’s Foundational Review of CSE’s Ministerial Authorizations (MAs) and Ministerial Orders (MOs) represents a different approach to reviewing MAs than that of the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner (OCSEC), CSE’s former independent external review body. While OCSEC previously reported on the number of private communications, we leave this matter to CSE’s classified annual report to the Minister. Further, it is not necessary to review whether Ministerial Authorizations are based on reasonable conclusions, which is now the responsibility of the Intelligence Commissioner. NSIRA chose to approach the Ministerial Authorizations as an opportunity to learn about CSE’s operational activities, and the Ministerial Orders were reviewed as supplementary to the Ministerial Authorizations.

This foundational review highlighted the need to focus on Active and Defensive Cyber Operations immediately following the completion of this review, given that the Intelligence Commissioner does not approve these activities and that they represent a new aspect of CSE’s mandate.

Date Modified:: 2025-02-25

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) use of Geolocation information: CSIS Responses

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) use of Geolocation information

Responses

Geolocation Data Tool (SIRC 2018-05)

NSIRA Recommendation: NSIRA recommends that CSIS review its use of [the geolocation tool] to date and make a determination as to which of the operational reports generated through the use of [the geolocation tool] were in breach of section 8 of the Charter. These operational reports and/or any documents related to those results should be purged from its systems.

CSIS Response: CSIS has received advice from the Department of Justice on its use of a geolocation data tool in Canada and the disposition of information derived from its use. CSIS is working to implement this advice to ensure compliance with the Charter, CSIS Act and other legal obligations.

More broadly, CSIS recognizes that keeping pace with the global threat environment and rapid technological change necessitates continuous reflection to ensure that we have the tools, authorities required of a modern intelligence agency; CSIS must be fully equipped to protect Canada’s national security. Canadians expect CSIS to leverage technology to keep them safe in a manner that is entirely in keeping with the Canadian expectation of privacy.

NSIRA Recommendation: NSIRA recommends that policy be developed or amended as appropriate that would require a documented risk assessment, including legal risks, in situations like [the geolocation tool] when information collected through new and emerging technologies may contain information in respect of which there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy. If not, NSIRA further recommends that a policy centre for this type of collection be clearly identified.

CSIS Response: CSIS is modifying its policy framework to address this recommendation. This aligns with the most recent Ministerial Direction on Accountability from September 2019. The MD requires CSIS to notify the Minister of Public Safety when a novel technology is used.

Date Modified:: 2025-02-25

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Internal Security Branch: CSIS Responses

CSIS Internal Security (SIRC 2018-15)

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS develop an internal policy, in consultation with Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), outlining parameters on reporting information obtained during the course of IS screening, inquiries, and investigations to law enforcement in a timely manner.

CSIS Response: CSIS has established an internal set of procedures for disclosing information obtained during the course of Internal Security screening to law enforcement, as required. CSIS will continue to review these procedures and will continue to seek legal advice from the Department of Justice regarding these disclosures, as required. CSIS and the Department of Justice have a collaborative relationship that fosters discussion and allows for robust engagement in these matters.

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS strengthen internal governance over polygraph activities, including modifying the methodology for conducting polygraph assessments, as appropriate.

CSIS Response: CSIS considers the findings and observations in this review as an opportunity to enhance its internal processes. As such, CSIS is working to address this recommendation by strengthening internal governance. New policy and procedures will provide clarity, accountability and transparency to its polygraph program by outlining roles and the ethical and procedural responsibilities of polygraph examiners.

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS update applicable policy and procedures on the use of the polygraph to address security and procedural fairness implications stemming from failed polygraph results.

CSIS Response: CSIS values the important work done by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). To address gaps identified by NSIRA, CSIS is currently updating the polygraph policy and procedures to ensure an enhanced degree of transparency and procedural fairness.

NSIRA Recommendation: IS further align its overarching policy suite with the assessment criteria for adverse information outlined in the Standard on Security Screening, as well as update the its Questionnaire Guidebook with clear definitions and risk indicators.

CSIS Response: CSIS continually engages in the process of updating its guides, procedures and policies. CSIS will ensure that procedures are well aligned with the Treasury Board Secretariat’s Standard on Security Screening. Providing consistency in assessments between cases remains a priority.

Date Modified:: 2025-02-25

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation: Responses

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation

Responses

CSIS-RCMP relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation (NSIRA 2019-04)

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS invest the resources needed to develop a broader range of sources of information in order to prevent further serious damage to the reviewed investigation.

CSIS-RCMP Response: Due to the variety of factors inherent in each investigation, CSIS always considers how best to collect information and mitigate threats, drawing on a number of tools and resources – in accordance with the CSIS Act and ministerial direction – dependent on the situation.

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS and the RCMP prioritize the deployment of usable and compatible secure communications systems in order to make regional de-confliction more efficient.

CSIS-RCMP Response: CSIS and the RCMP are prioritizing the deployment of compatible secure communication. The CSIS Director and the RCMP Commissioner approved the development of a CSISRCMP Secure Communications Strategy, the implementation of which is already underway.

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS and the RCMP continue to prioritize the timely implementation of recommendations from the Operational Improvement Review (OIR) in order to help address the operational shortcomings reported by the OIR and further illustrated in this review.

CSIS-RCMP Response: CSIS and the RCMP remain committed to implementing the OIR recommendations as well as the implementation of One Vision 3.0.

The OIR resulted in 76 recommendations, some of which include enhanced collaboration and information sharing in national security investigations, additional training for national security personnel, as well as the improved handling and disclosure of sensitive and classified information. Significant effort has been undertaken to ensure recommendations are adopted and implemented within both organisations. Some of the early successes include pilot projects such as the Leads Pilot that has resulted in enhanced CSISRCMP de-confliction within national security areas of focus.

The RCMP and CSIS continue to be fully supportive of implementing these needed changes to our organisations. This work, and efforts of the broader community, will ensure that the Government of Canada has a strong foundation of enhanced collaboration and the best tools available to mitigate threats and ensure public safety. This complex work however, is ongoing and challenges remain, particularly as it relates to the issue of intelligence and evidence. These significant challenges will require a whole-ofgovernment approach in order to address.

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS and the RCMP develop a properly resourced complimentary strategy to address the threat examined in this report. In accordance with the vision set out in the Operational Improvement Review, the strategy should consider the full range of tools available to both agencies.

CSIS-RCMP Response: CSIS and the RCMP coordinate and collaborate on national security threats and use strategies and resources best suited to individual operations.

As a result of the OIR, discussions between CSIS and the RCMP are more frequent and occur earlier in the process which has reduced the duplication of efforts between both of our agencies

Date Modified:: 2025-02-25

Review of Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s threat reduction activities: CSIS Responses

Review of Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s threat reduction activities

Responses

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS create an accountability framework for information related to TRMs, and that this information be documented and retained in a central, easily retrievable location.

CSIS Response: CSIS’s robust governance framework for its TRM authorities has been the subject of review by both SIRC and NSIRA. As a result of these reviews, considerable adjustments have been made to the governance of TRMs.

CSIS is developing an improved organisational case management tool. While that work occurs, CSIS is implementing interim measures to respond to NSIRA’s recommendations. Finally, CSIS is leveraging additional communication methods to ensure awareness of the TRM specific requirements.

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS create a formalized and documented process that ensures pertinent facts regarding TRM subjects are provided to the National Security Litigation and Advisory Group (NSLAG) to ensure that it has the information necessary to provide considered legal advice on the identification and selection of interviewees for inclusion in TRMs.

CSIS Response: CSIS and the Department of Justice have a collaborative relationship that fosters discussion and allows for continuous engagement. When parliament established CSIS’s threat reduction mandate, CSIS worked closely with the Department of Justice to develop an appropriate and robust governance framework. This framework includes a formal and documented process to seek a legal risk assessment as well as practical guidance regarding relevant information and level of detail required for TRM submissions.

CSIS engages the Department of Justice to ensure all requirements of the CSIS Act are met including consideration that measures are reasonable and proportional to the threat and warrants are obtained if required. CSIS ensures this guidance is applied so that TRMs remain lawful and respect all Canadian laws, including Charter rights and freedoms.

NSIRA Recommendation: CSIS develop an accountability framework for compliance with legal advice on TRMs, including documenting when and why legal advice was not followed.

CSIS Response: CSIS’s compliance framework provides an opportunity to report instances of potential non-compliance with Ministerial Direction, internal policies or procedures, and the law. In instances where this may occur, CSIS’s Compliance program remains well situated to complete requisite fact finding and engage with the Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice provides advice to ensure TRMs remain lawful and respect the right of Canadians. CSIS diligently applies these principles and guidance from the Department of Justice in the execution of all TRMs. While advice from the Department of Justice does not provide explicit and tactical directions on the execution of TRMs, CSIS considers all Justice advice during its operational deliberations.

NSIRA Recommendation: When considering whether a Charter right is limited by a proposed TRM, NSLAG should undertake a case-by-case analysis that assesses factors identified in our report.

CSIS Response: The Department of Justice will further consider this recommendation and factor it into its work related to TRM under the CSIS Act. CSIS and the Department of Justice will continue to build their long-established and collaborative relationship in order to improve and refine the governance of TRMs.

Date Modified:: 2025-02-25

Faisal Mirza

Faisal Mirza

Faisal Mirza is a partner at Mirza Kwok Defence Lawyers. He practices trial and appellate litigation in the areas of criminal, constitutional, and regulatory law. He frequently appears on behalf of clients and human rights organizations at the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada.

Mr. Mirza is an Adjunct Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School where he teaches Advanced Criminal Law. He is also an instructor in National Security and the Law at the University of Toronto. He is the author of Criminal Jury Charge Practice and several articles about criminal procedure and sentencing.

Mr. Mirza is co-founder of the Sentencing and Parole Project, which focuses on anti-Black racism in the criminal justice system. He is President of the Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association, a board member of The Advocates’ Society, and a contributor to various initiatives with the South Asian Bar Association and the Criminal Lawyers’ Association.

Mr. Mirza has been recognized by Best Lawyers magazine as one of Canada’s leading appellate lawyers and received the Diversity Award by the South Asian Bar Association for his work in social justice. He was also nominated in Canadian Lawyer’s Top 25 Most Influential Lawyers of 2020, in the Changemakers section.

Mr. Mirza holds a Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts from the University of Toronto, and a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) from Osgoode Hall. Before being called to the bar in 2002, he articled at Greenspan Humphrey Lavine, and worked for the Honourable Fred Kaufman and Mark Sandler during an independent review of the Government of Nova Scotia’s response to abuse in provincial institutions.