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Review of Air Passenger Targeting by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA): Government Responses

Review of Air Passenger Targeting by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)


Government Responses

NSIRA Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA document its triaging practices in a manner that enables effective verification of whether all triaging decisions comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions.

GOC Response: The CBSA agrees with this recommendation. The CBSA will complete a review of its APT triaging practices to ensure practices are in place which will enable effective verification of compliance with statutory and regulatory restrictions.

NSIRA Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA ensure, in an ongoing manner, that its triaging practices are based on information and/or intelligence that justifies the use of each indicator. This justification should be well-documented to enable effective internal and external verification of whether the CBSA’s triaging practices comply with its non-discrimination obligations.

GOC Response: The CBSA agrees with this recommendation. While we are satisfied that justification for triaging and targeting practices exist, the CBSA acknowledges that better documentation practices could be implemented to enable effective internal and external verification of whether the CBSA’s triaging practices comply with its non-discrimination obligations. The CBSA’s Scenario Based Targeting Governance Framework will be updated to include information and/or intelligence that justifies the use of each indicator. Annual reviews of scenarios will continue to be conducted and documented to confirm that each active scenario is supported by recent and reliable intelligence.

NSIRA Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA ensure that any Air Passenger Targeting related distinctions on protected grounds that are capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage constitute a reasonable limit on travellers’ equality rights under the Charter.

GOC Response: The CBSA agrees with this recommendation. The CBSA will review its APT practices to ensure that distinctions based on protected grounds are reasonable and can be demonstrably justified in the border administration and enforcement context.

NSIRA Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA develop more robust and regular oversight for Air Passenger Targeting to ensure that its practices are not discriminatory. This should include updates to the CBSA’s policies, procedures, training, and other guidance, as appropriate.

GOC Response: The CBSA agrees with this recommendation. The CBSA acknowledges that policies, procedures, training, and other guidance, as appropriate can be improved to ensure robust and regular oversight for Air Passenger Targeting to ensure that its practices are not discriminatory. The CBSA will complete a review of its policies, procedures, guidelines and training to ensure practices are not discriminatory.

NSIRA Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA start gathering and assessing the necessary data to identify, analyze, and mitigate discrimination-related risks. This includes disaggregated demographic data, data on the effects of Air Passenger Targeting on secondary examinations that may be apparent from related human rights complaints, and data on a baseline comparator group.

GOC Response: The CBSA agrees with this recommendation. To that end, the CBSA is taking deliberate steps to develop its capacity to capture and analyze reliable and accurate data in non-intrusive ways. The Agency is working on developing standard and consistent positions and frameworks on the collection, use, management and governance of disaggregated data, developing  metrics and indicators to measure the impact of decisions and policies on different groups; using data to build more inclusive and representative policies and strategies, and; identifying possible discrimination and bias.

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Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022: Government Responses

Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022


Government Responses

Government of Canada Response to the Recommendations of the NSIRA Review of Federal Institutions’ Disclosures of Information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (“SCIDA”) in 2022

NSIRA Recommendation Related Findings(s) Government Response Explanation
1. NSIRA recommends that information sharing arrangements be used to govern regular SCIDA disclosures between GAC and CSIS; IRCC and CSIS; as well as IRCC and CSE. Finding no. 1: CSE, CSIS, GAC, and IRCC regularly use the SCIDA in a manner that warrants information sharing arrangements, as encouraged by subsection 4(c) of the SCIDA. Agree The Government of Canada recognizes the value of using information sharing arrangements to facilitate the effective and responsible sharing of information between federal institutions that frequently disclose information of a similar nature under the SCIDA. In response to this recommendation, and in consultation with the designated recipient institutions under the SCIDA, Public Safety Canada has developed an information sharing agreement template.

The template has been reviewed by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and specifically assessed against the SCIDA, the Privacy Act, the 10 fair information principles of the Canadian Standards Association Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information (the Model Code), applicable Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) policies, directives and guidelines, and internationally recognized best practices.

Public Safety Canada has disseminated this template to federal institutions, including those named in NSIRA’s findings and recommendations, so that they may adapt it to their unique operating environments and the types of information that they frequently disclose and receive, while continuing to respect the Charter, the Privacy Act, the SCIDA, as well as other relevant policies, legislation and regulation.

In addition, several departments and agencies have already entered into information sharing agreements to facilitate the disclosure of information under the SCIDA. For example, CSIS and GAC entered into an information sharing agreement in 2016 under the SCISA (the precursor to the SCIDA). The agreement outlines the types of information that GAC may share with CSIS. While it is still in effect, it is currently being reviewed to ensure the scope remains current. CSIS and IRCC are currently holding preliminary discussions to establish an information sharing agreement to address disclosures under SCIDA. IRCC and CSE also recently signed an information sharing agreement, as recommended in the 2020 SCIDA Annual Report.

2. NSIRA recommends that all GC institutions prepare record overviews to clearly address the requirements of subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA; and provide them to NSIRA along with a copy of the disclosure itself and, where relevant, a copy of the request.
Finding no. 2: CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA, as they failed to provide all records created under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) to NSIRA within the legislated timeframe.

Finding no. 3: Improved compliance outcomes in instances where departments prepared record overview spreadsheets under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA that displayed the following characteristics:

  • a row for each disclosure made or received;
  • columns explicitly tied to each individual paragraph under section 9; and
  • additional columns to capture relevant administrative details, such as whether the disclosure was requested or proactive; the date of the request (if applicable); and any applicable file reference numbers.
Agree The Government of Canada recognizes the importance of keeping records of SCIDA disclosures and receipts, as required under the Act.

Public Safety Canada assists partners in adopting best practices that facilitate ease-of-review and improve compliance. Government of Canada partners implement Public Safety Canada’s guidance in a manner that complies with the SCIDA and works best with their unique mandates and internal procedures.

In March 2023, the Step-by-Step SCIDA Guide 2022 (“SCIDA Guide 2022”) was updated and published on Public Safety Canada’s public-facing webpage. The SCIDA Guide 2022 includes templates that support federal institutions with their record-keeping requirements. Public Safety Canada will continue to review and update existing SCIDA resources, including advice pertaining to record keeping. Public Safety Canada has also circulated a record overview template that NSIRA found particularly effective during the course of its 2022 review.

In addition, CSIS has developed clear policy and subsequent guidelines on how to handle and document information disclosures in line with the SCIDA, including a requirement to maintain a record overview along with an associated template. This template has been adjusted for clarity based on feedback from NSIRA’s 2022 review. The CBSA and IRCC have also reviewed their current operational and reporting practices with regards to SCIDA and are making the necessary functional adjustments to ensure that they remain compliant in future information sharing activities.

3. NSIRA recommends that disclosing institutions explicitly address the requirements of both paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the records that they prepare under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA.
Finding no. 5: More than half of the descriptions provided by CBSA and IRCC under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA did not explicitly address their satisfaction that the disclosure was authorized under paragraph 5(1)(b), the proportionality test.

Finding no. 6: within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that disclosing institutions demonstrated they had satisfied themselves of both the contribution and proportionality tests, in compliance with subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA.

Agree The Government of Canada recognizes the importance of the SCIDA’s contribution and proportionality tests in 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b), respectively. It also recognizes the need for disclosing institutions to demonstrate their satisfaction that these two tests are met for each disclosure by providing NSIRA with a description of the information that was relied on to satisfy themselves that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA.

Through the publication of the SCIDA Guide 2022 and the delivery of training sessions, Public Safety Canada has provided guidance to federal institutions on ensuring that the contribution and proportionality thresholds are met when disclosing information under the SCIDA.

Recently, IRCC has added a new “Proportionality” section to their SCIDA template to require that the delegated official documents their satisfaction that the disclosure is authorized under paragraph 5(1)(b) before disclosing personal information to a recipient institution.

In addition to disclosing institutions having to satisfy the contribution and proportionality tests, CSIS independently assesses its authority to collect and retain the disclosure under the CSIS Act as a recipient institution. This includes an obligation for CSIS to ensure that the collection and retention of a SCIDA disclosure is compliant with all relevant legislation, including the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act. The SCIDA procedure published in 2022 includes direction on processing disclosures that do not meet CSIS’ threshold for collection, ensuring that the disclosure is appropriately documented and destroyed.

4. NSIRA recommends that GC institutions contemplating the use of proactive disclosures under the SCIDA communicate with the recipient institution, ahead of making the disclosure, to inform their assessments under subsection 5(1). Finding no. 7: GAC satisfied itself under the SCIDA’s paragraph 5(1)(a) contribution test based on an incorrect understanding of the recipient’s national security mandate in two cases. Agree The Government of Canada recognizes the value of general informal discussions ahead of SCIDA disclosures.

The SCIDA Guide 2022 emphasizes the importance of preliminary, high-level consultations between disclosing and recipient institutions prior to a disclosure in a manner that does not itself constitute a disclosure. The guidance specifies that informal communication should only include enough general information to ensure that the SCIDA contribution and proportionality thresholds are met before making a disclosure.

Annex F of the SCIDA Guide 2022 outlines the national security mandates of the designated recipient institutions under SCIDA. Public Safety Canada endeavours to keep the mandates updated to aid disclosing institutions in making their assessment required under subsection 5(1).

5. NSIRA recommends that all disclosing institutions include statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the same document as the disclosed information.
Finding no. 8: Within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that CBSA and GAC (in one and two disclosures, respectively) were non-compliant with the SCIDA’s subsection 5(2) requirement to provide a statement regarding accuracy and reliability.

Finding no. 9: In relation to the remaining disclosures within the sample, that GAC, IRCC, and RCMP included their statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the disclosures themselves, whereas CBSA provided its statement in the disclosures’ cover letters.

Agree The Government of Canada notes that providing statements on the accuracy and reliability of the manner in which information was obtained in a cover letter or in the disclosure itself both satisfy the legislated requirement under subsection 5(2) for disclosing institutions to provide such a statement.

The Government of Canada recognizes the additional value of including the statements in the actual disclosure, especially in the event of onward disclosure. Public Safety Canada will update its guidance to reflect this best practice.

6. NSIRA recommends that GC institutions review their administrative processes for sending and receiving disclosures under the SCIDA, and correct practices that cause delays.
Finding no. 10: DND/CAF destroyed information under the SCIDA subsection 5.1(1), but they were non-compliant with the requirement to do so “as soon as feasible after receiving it.”

Finding no. 11: Delays between when a disclosure was authorized for sending and when it was received by the individual designated by the head of the recipient institution to receive it in at least 20% (n=34) of disclosures.

Agree The Government of Canada recognizes the need to destroy unnecessary information as soon as feasible under the SCIDA, as well as the value of timely disclosures.

Government of Canada institutions each have their own systems, standards and procedures for physically and/or electronically sending and receiving information. Departments and agencies will work to review their own processes to ensure information is handled efficiently and appropriately in compliance with the SCIDA and other legislation.

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Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022: Report

Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022


Report

Date of Publishing:

List of Acronyms

CBSA Canada Border Services Agency
CFIA Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CRA Canada Revenue Agency
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DND/CAF Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces
FINTRAC Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
GAC Global Affairs Canada
GC Government of Canada
IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
NSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
PHAC Public Health Agency of Canada
PS Public Safety Canada
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCIDA Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
TC Transport Canada

Glossary of Terms

Contribution test The first part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (paragraph 5(1)(a)).
Proportionality test The second part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances (paragraph 5(1)(b)).

Executive summary

This review provides an overview of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)’s use in 2022. In doing so, it documents the volume and nature of information disclosures made under the SCIDA; assesses compliance with the SCIDA; and highlights patterns in the SCIDA’s use across Government of Canada (GC) institutions and over time.

In 2022, four disclosing institutions made a total of 173 disclosures to five recipient institutions. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) found that institutions complied with the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in relation to the majority of these disclosures. Instances of non-compliance related to subsection 9(3), regarding the timeliness of records copied to NSIRA; subsection 5.1(1), regarding the timeliness of destruction or return of personal information; and subsection 5(2), regarding the provision of a statement on accuracy and reliability. The observed non-compliance did not point to any systemic failures in GC institutions’ implementation of the SCIDA.

NSIRA also made findings in relation to practices that, although compliant with the SCIDA, left room for improvement. These findings related to:

  • the use of information sharing arrangements;
  • the format of records prepared by institutions and copied to NSIRA, including the characteristics of effective records;
  • the nature of information provided under paragraph 9(1)(e) and relied upon in the conduct of assessments under subsection 5(1);
  • the provision of statements regarding accuracy and reliability prepared under subsection 5(2); and
  • the timeliness of administrative processes supporting information disclosure.

NSIRA made six recommendations designed to increase standardization across the GC in a manner that is consistent with institutions’ demonstrated best practices and the SCIDA’s guiding principles.

Overall, NSIRA observed improvements in reviewee performance as compared with findings from prior years’ reports and over the course of the review. These improvements include corrective actions taken by reviewees in response to NSIRA’s requests for information in support of this review.

1. Introduction

Authority

This review was conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) and subsection 39(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act).

Scope of the Review

This review provides an overview of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)’s use in 2022. In doing so, it:

  1. Documents the volume and nature of information disclosures made under the SCIDA;
  2. Assesses Government of Canada (GC) institutions’ compliance with the SCIDA’s requirements for record keeping;
  3. Assesses GC institutions’ compliance with the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure, including the destruction or return of personal information, as appropriate; and
  4. Highlights patterns in the SCIDA’s use across GC institutions and over time.

The review’s scope was defined by records provided to NSIRA under the SCIDA, subsection 9(3) (see Annex A for a copy of institutions’ section 9 obligations under the Act). As such, the review’s assessment of compliance was limited to the seven GC institutions identified within these records as either disclosers or recipients (Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA], Communications Security Establishment [CSE], Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS], Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces [DND/CAF], Global Affairs Canada [GAC], Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC], and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]); and to instances of information disclosure where the SCIDA was identified by these institutions as an authority for disclosure. The review also included Public Safety Canada (PS) in its capacity as manager of the Strategic Coordination Centre on Information Sharing, which provides SCIDA-related policy guidance and training across the GC. 

The review satisfies the NSIRA Act’s section 39 requirement for NSIRA to report to the Minister of Public Safety on disclosures made under the SCIDA during the previous calendar year.

Methodology

The review’s primary source of information was records provided to NSIRA by disclosing and recipient institutions under the SCIDA, subsection 9(3). NSIRA also identified a targeted sample of disclosures for which it requested and assessed all associated documents provided by both the disclosing and recipient institution. This information was supplemented by a document review of institutions’ SCIDA policies and procedures, and related explanations.

NSIRA assessed administrative compliance with the SCIDA’s record-keeping obligations in relation to all disclosures identified in the records provided to NSIRA under subsection 9(3) (N=173). Where these records were incomplete, NSIRA provided an opportunity for institutions to supply the missing records. NSIRA accounted for such late submissions in its assessment of compliance with subsections 9(1) and 9(2).

NSIRA assessed substantive compliance with the SCIDA’s disclosure requirements in relation to the sample of disclosures (n=19). The sample was designed to reflect a non-representative cross-section of the SCIDA’s use, with particular attention to areas at higher risk of non-compliance. Disclosures were selected for the sample based on the content of records provided to NSIRA under subsection 9(3), according to defined parameters (see Annex B, Sample of Disclosures).

Review Statements

NSIRA found that, overall, its expectations for responsiveness by CSE, CSIS, DND/CAF, GAC, IRCC, PS, and RCMP during this review were met. Its expectations for responsiveness by CBSA were partially met, as CBSA required repeated follow-up to provide the requested information.

NSIRA was able to verify information for this review in a manner that met NSIRA’s expectations.

2. Backgrounder

The SCIDA provides an explicit, stand-alone authority to disclose information between GC institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine its security. Its stated purpose is to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.

Section 9 of the SCIDA prescribes record-keeping obligations for all institutions who (1) disclose or (2) receive information under the Act. Each paragraph under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) identifies particular elements that must be set out in the records prepared and kept by each institution (see Annex A). Subsection 9(3) requires that these records be provided to NSIRA within 30 days after the end of each calendar year.

Subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA authorizes GC institutions to disclose information – subject to any prohibitions or restrictions in other legislation or regulations – to designated recipient institutions, if the disclosing institution is satisfied that (a) the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (the “contribution test”); and (b) the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances (the “proportionality test”).

Subsection 5(2) requires institutions that disclose information under subsection (1) to, at the time of the disclosure, also provide information regarding its accuracy and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained.

When a GC institution receives information under the Act, subsection 5.1(1) requires that the institution destroy or return any unnecessary personal information as soon as feasible after receiving it.

The Act’s guiding principles underscore the importance of effectiveness and responsibility across disclosure activities. Of note, subsection 4(c) sets out that information sharing arrangements are appropriate in particular circumstances.

3. Findings, Analysis, and recommendations

Volume and Nature of Disclosures

In 2022, four disclosing institutions made a total of 173 disclosures to five recipient institutions (see Table 1). 79% (n=136) of these disclosures were requested by the recipient institution. The other 21% of disclosures (n=37) were sent proactively by the disclosing institution.

Table 1: Number of SCIDA disclosures made in 2022, by disclosing and recipient institution [all disclosures (proactive disclosures)]

    Designated Recipient Institutions
Disclosing Institution   CBSA CFIA CNSC CRA CSE CSIS DND/CAF Finance FINTRAC GAC Health IRCC PHAC PSC RCMP TC TOTAL (proactive)
CBSA 4
(3)
4
(3)
GAC 39
(18)
2
(2)
12
(12)
53
(32)
IRCC 59
(0)
56
(2)
115
(2)
RCMP 1
(0)
1
(0)
TOTAL (proactive) 59
(0)
95
(20)
2
(2)
1
(0)
16
(15)
173
(37)

The total number of disclosures made under the SCIDA since its implementation reflects a slight downward trend, with a generally constant proportion of requested versus proactive disclosures for the years in which this data was collected (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Number of SCIDA disclosures over time

In 2022, these disclosures were made and received by institutions that had each disclosed or received information, as the case may be, in at least two prior review years (see Annex C, Overview of SCIDA Disclosures in Prior Years).

Finding 1: NSIRA found that CSE, CSIS, GAC, and IRCC regularly use the SCIDA in a manner that warrants information sharing arrangements, as encouraged by subsection 4(c) of the SCIDA.

CSE, CSIS, GAC, and IRCC were the most frequent users of the SCIDA in 2022. The number of disclosures between these institutions was comparable to those observed by NSIRA in prior years (see Annex C), indicating the occurrence of regular exchange over time.

NSIRA also observed regular patterns in the purpose and nature of the information exchanged between these institutions in 2022, as described in Table 2. These information exchanges were not governed by up-to-date information sharing arrangements.

Table 2: Nature of disclosures between the SCIDA’s most frequent users

GAC-to-CSIS (N=39) IRCC-to-CSIS (N=56) IRCC-to-CSE (N=59)
  • GAC information holdings relevant to threats to the security of Canada
  • Often (85%) made in direct response, or as a follow-up, to CSIS requests
  • IRCC information holdings relevant to threats to the security of Canada
  • Almost always (96%) made in response to CSIS requests
  • IRCC confirmation of Canadian status of named individuals of interest, required to ensure lawfulness of CSE operational activities
  • All (100%) made in response to CSE requests

NSIRA has previously recommended that information sharing arrangements be updated (for GAC and CSIS) or created (for IRCC and CSE) to govern certain information exchanges made under the SCIDA.

Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that information sharing arrangements be used to govern regular SCIDA disclosures between GAC and CSIS; IRCC and CSIS; as well as IRCC and CSE.

Record Keeping

Copy to NSIRA: Subsection 9(3)

Finding 2: NSIRA found that CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA, as they failed to provide all records created under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) to NSIRA within the legislated timeframe.

Requests for information from NSIRA during the course of this review prompted the late production of additional records relating to paragraphs under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) from each of CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC (see Table 3).

Table 3: Number [and associated subsection 9(1) or 9(2) paragraph] of late records leading to non-compliance with subsection 9(3), by cause

Administrative Error Delayed Preparation of Records
CBSA 2 [paragraph 9(1)(e)]
DND/CAF 2 [paragraphs 9(2)(e-g)]
IRCC 6 [paragraph 9(1)(e)] 1 [paragraphs 9(2)(e-g)]

CBSA and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) due to administrative error; the records they eventually supplied had existed at the time of the reporting deadline, but were not copied to NSIRA as required.

NSIRA expected that all records would be prepared within 30 days after the end of the calendar year, in order to meet the subsection 9(3) requirement to provide a copy of those records to NSIRA within that timeframe.

DND/CAF and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) on account of delayed preparation of records; they did not prepare the records referred to in Table 3 within 30 days after the end of the calendar year, and therefore did not provide a copy of them to NSIRA within the legislated timeframe.

NSIRA underscores the importance of administrative precision and timeliness in preparing records and copying them to NSIRA.

Format of Records

Finding 3: NSIRA found improved compliance outcomes in instances where departments prepared record overview spreadsheets under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA that displayed the following characteristics:

  • a row for each disclosure made or received;
  • columns explicitly tied to each individual paragraph under section 9; and
  • additional columns to capture relevant administrative details, such as whether the disclosure was requested or proactive; the date of the request (if applicable); and any applicable file reference numbers.

The SCIDA does not specify a format for records prepared under section 9. Accordingly, in 2022, GC institutions fulfilled their record-keeping obligations in different ways.

Most institutions provided NSIRA with an overview of each disclosure made or received. These overviews were submitted to NSIRA as spreadsheets that generally captured the information required in records under subsections 9(1) and 9(2).

Most institutions also provided NSIRA with a copy of the disclosure itself and a selection of related documents. These documents often included email consultations with legal services, disclosure request letters, and other correspondence between disclosing and recipient institutions. The scope of requests for information in the course of the review was minimized in cases where institutions provided such documents.

DND/CAF and IRCC (for its one disclosure receipt) were the only institutions that originally provided NSIRA with a copy of the raw disclosure, including transmittal details, in the absence of a record overview or other related documents.

NSIRA observed that DND/CAF and IRCC’s choice in records format for these disclosures contributed to their non-compliance with subsection 9(3), described in Table 3. The information elicited under paragraphs 9(2)(e-g) cannot by definition be found within a copy of the disclosure itself, as it relates to action taken by recipient institutions following the disclosure’s receipt. A copy of the disclosure on its own is therefore insufficient to comply with all requirements under subsection 9(2).

Both DND/CAF and IRCC were infrequent recipients of disclosures under the SCIDA in 2022, accounting for only two and one disclosures, respectively. Each of the more frequent recipients of information (CSE, CSIS, and RCMP) included express columns in their record overview spreadsheets to capture whether and, if applicable, when personal information was destroyed or returned, per the requirements of paragraphs 9(2)(e-g).

NSIRA also observed that CBSA and IRCC’s choice in records format contributed to their non-compliance with subsection 9(3) due to administrative error. These institutions did not account for the full scope of information required under paragraph 9(1)(e) in their record overview spreadsheets.

The information relied upon to satisfy the disclosing institution that a disclosure is authorized under the Act is not required to be conveyed within the disclosure itself. Completing an appropriately-specified record overview spreadsheet is therefore an effective way to ensure that the corresponding information is documented and conveyed to NSIRA ahead of the legislated deadline.

The RCMP’s record overview spreadsheet was particularly effective in demonstrating compliance with the Act. The spreadsheet included columns that were explicitly tied to individual paragraphs under section 9, with additional fields limited to RCMP administrative information such as file and database reference numbers.

Spreadsheets designed in this way enable institutions’ efficient self-assessment against the requirements of the Act. They also facilitate the task of review by clearly matching the information provided with its corresponding requirement under the SCIDA, and by organizing disclosures and receipts of information in a manner that supports cross-verification.

Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that all GC institutions prepare record overviews to clearly address the requirements of subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA; and provide them to NSIRA along with a copy of the disclosure itself and, where relevant, a copy of the request.

Preparing and Keeping Records: Subsections 9(1) and 9(2)

Finding 4: NSIRA found that all GC institutions complied with their obligation to prepare and keep records that set out the information prescribed under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA.

Finding 5: NSIRA found that more than half of the descriptions provided by CBSA and IRCC under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA did not explicitly address their satisfaction that the disclosure was authorized under paragraph 5(1)(b), the proportionality test.

Although NSIRA expected an express statement describing the information that was relied on to satisfy the disclosing institution that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA, in this review, NSIRA considered any records that demonstrated the corresponding assessment had been conducted.

IRCC n’a pas fait de déclaration expresse précisant que les communications demandées par le SCRS, qui représentent 57 % (n=54) de l’ensemble de ses communications, lui semblaient satisfaisantes du point de vue du critère de proportionnalité. En revanche, IRCC a fourni des copies des lettres de demande et de l’information communiquée en guise de réponse, ce qui confirme que la communication était manifestement conforme aux besoins précis de la demande (et donc témoigne d’une évaluation de la proportionnalité).

L’ASFC n’a pas fourni de déclaration expresse concernant sa satisfaction au regard du critère de proportionnalité pour 75 % (n=3) de ses communications. Elle a plutôt démontré qu’elle tenait compte du principe de proportionnalité en fournissant divers documents justificatifs, y compris de la correspondance interne.

La feuille de calcul utilisée par AMC pour donner une vue d’ensemble de ses documents a été particulièrement efficace pour répondre aux exigences de l’alinéa 9(1)e). L’analyse détaillée qu’elle a consignée en ce qui concerne les critères de contribution et de proportionnalité lui a permis de remplir ses obligations en matière de conservation des dossiers et de démontrer qu’elle respectait en substance le paragraphe 5(1).

Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that disclosing institutions explicitly address the requirements of both paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the records that they prepare under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA.

Disclosure of Information

Contribution and Proportionality Tests: Paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b)

Finding 6: NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that disclosing institutions demonstrated they had satisfied themselves of both the contribution and proportionality tests, in compliance with subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA.

Finding 7: NSIRA found that GAC satisfied itself under the SCIDA’s paragraph 5(1)(a) contribution test based on an incorrect understanding of the recipient’s national security mandate in two cases.

The threshold for compliance with subsection 5(1) is that the disclosing institution has satisfied itself of the contribution and proportionality tests, and that it has done so prior to having made the disclosure.

In relation to the two disclosures that it made proactively to DND/CAF, GAC provided a rationale for the information’s contribution to DND/CAF’s mandate in respect of national security. Upon receipt of the information, however, DND/CAF did not agree with GAC’s assessment and therefore assessed that the SCIDA was not an appropriate disclosure mechanism in the circumstances.

Informal communication between the two institutions may have allowed DND/CAF and GAC to resolve this issue prior to the disclosure. When such communications occur, it is important that they be limited to the information necessary to confirm that the information contributes to the recipient’s mandate in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada.

Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that GC institutions contemplating the use of proactive disclosures under the SCIDA communicate with the recipient institution, ahead of making the disclosure, to inform their assessments under subsection 5(1).

Statement Regarding Accuracy and Reliability: Subsection 5(2)

Finding 8: NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that CBSA and GAC (in one and two disclosures, respectively) were non-compliant with the SCIDA’s subsection 5(2) requirement to provide a statement regarding accuracy and reliability.

Finding 9: NSIRA found, in relation to the remaining disclosures within the sample, that GAC, IRCC, and RCMP included their statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the disclosures themselves, whereas CBSA provided its statements in the disclosures’ cover letters.

Providing the statement on accuracy and reliability in a cover letter for the disclosure satisfies the Act’s requirement to provide the statement at the time of disclosure. However, separating the statement from the information disclosed increases the risk that the information may be subsequently used without awareness of relevant qualifiers. The location of the statement on accuracy and reliability – and not just its contemporaneous provision to the recipient – is therefore relevant to its value added.

Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that all disclosing institutions include statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the same document as the disclosed information.

Requirement to Destroy or Return Personal Information: Subsection 5.1(1)

Finding 10: NSIRA found that DND/CAF destroyed information under the SCIDA subsection 5.1(1), but they were non-compliant with the requirement to do so “as soon as feasible after receiving it.”

DND/CAF determined, upon receipt of the two disclosures it received from GAC, that the personal information contained within the disclosures should not be retained. The information, however, was not destroyed until April 2023 – 12 days following a request for information from NSIRA to provide a copy of records that set out whether and when the information had been destroyed or returned. The date of destruction was 299 and 336 days following DND/CAF’s receipt of each disclosure.

Taking into consideration the elapsed time between receipt of the information and its destruction, as well as DND/CAF’s timely conclusion that the information should not be retained, DND/CAF’s ultimate destruction of the information was non-compliant with the requirement to destroy the information “as soon as feasible after receiving it.” Its delay in this respect was also inconsistent with the responsible use and management of the information.

DND/CAF was the only institution to identify any disclosures as containing information that was destroyed or returned under subsection 5.1(1) in 2022. NSIRA did not identify any other disclosures within the sample for which personal information disclosed should have been destroyed or returned.

Purpose and Principles: Effective and responsible disclosure of information

Finding 11: NSIRA found delays between when a disclosure was authorized for sending and when it was received by the individual designated by the head of the recipient institution to receive it in at least 20% (n=34) of disclosures.

These 34 disclosures include 29 for which there was a delay between the dates provided by disclosing and recipient institutions in their section 9 records, as well as an additional five for which CSIS reported both the date of administrative receipt within the institution and the subsequent date of receipt by the person designated by the head to receive it (i.e., the relevant operational unit).

NSIRA attributes most of these delays to expected dynamics in classified information sharing: the individual authorizing the disclosure is not always the same individual who administratively sends it to the recipient, and the person who administratively receives the disclosure is not always the same person who is designated by the head to receive it.

In the majority of cases, the observed delays were shorter than one week. In nine cases, however, the delay ranged from 30 to 233 days.

Such delays mean that information is not processed and actioned within the recipient institution until long after it was sent – or intended to be sent – by the individual authorizing the disclosure. While these delays do not amount to non-compliance with the SCIDA, they are inconsistent with the Act’s purpose and guiding principles.

Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that GC institutions review their administrative processes for sending and receiving disclosures under the SCIDA, and correct practices that cause delays.

4. Conclusion

The SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping apply to both disclosing and recipient institutions in all cases where the SCIDA is invoked as a mechanism for disclosure. This review assessed GC institutions’ compliance with requirements for record keeping in respect of all 173 disclosures that were made and received in 2022. It assessed their compliance with requirements for disclosure in relation to a targeted sample of 19 disclosures.

NSIRA found that institutions complied with the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in relation to the majority of disclosures. GC institutions’ non-compliance with subsection 9(3) was driven by irregularities in the reporting of 11 disclosures. Observed non-compliance with substantive requirements under subsection 5(2) related to three disclosures; and non-compliance with subsection 5.1(1) related to two disclosures. These instances of non-compliance do not point to any systemic failures in GC institutions’ implementation of the SCIDA.

Within this context, NSIRA observed improvements in reviewee performance as compared with findings from prior years’ reports and over the course of the review. Of note, NSIRA’s requests for information in support of this review prompted corrective action by CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC that would have otherwise amounted to non-compliance with requirements under section 9.

NSIRA also observed several practices that, although compliant with the SCIDA, leave room for improvement. NSIRA’s recommendations in this review are designed to increase standardization across the GC in a manner that is consistent with institutions’ demonstrated best practices and the SCIDA’s guiding principles.

Annex A. Record Keeping Obligations for Disclosing and Recipient Institutions

Obligation – disclosing institution Obligation — recipient institution 
9 (1) Every Government of Canada institution that discloses information under this Act must prepare and keep records that set out (2) Every Government of Canada institution that receives information under this Act must prepare and keep records that set out
(a) a description of the information; (a) a description of the information;
(b) the name of the individual who authorized its disclosure; (b) the name of the institution that disclosed it;
(c) the name of the recipient Government of Canada institution; (c) the name or position of the head of the recipient institution — or of the person designated by the head — who received the information;
(d) the date on which it was disclosed; (d) the date on which it was received by the recipient institution;
(e) a description of the information that was relied on to satisfy the disclosing institution that the disclosure was authorized under this Act; and (e) whether the information has been destroyed or returned under subsection 5.1(1);
(f) if the information has been destroyed under subsection 5.1(1), the date on which it was destroyed;
(g) if the information was returned under subsection 5.1(1) to the institution that disclosed it, the date on which it was returned; and
(f) any other information specified by the regulations. (h) any other information specified by the regulations.

Copy to National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Within 30 days after the end of each calendar year, every Government of Canada institution that disclosed information under section 5 during the year and every Government of Canada institution that received such information must provide the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency with a copy of every record it prepared under subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, with respect to the information.

Annex B. Sample of Disclosures

Disclosures were selected for the sample based on the content of records provided to NSIRA under subsection 9(3), according to the following parameters:

  • At least two disclosures per discloser-recipient pair, if available;
  • At least one proactive disclosure per discloser, if available;
  • At least one requested disclosure per recipient, if available;
  • All disclosures identified by recipient institutions as including personal information that was destroyed or returned under the SCIDA, subsection 5.1(1);
  • All disclosures for which there is a high-level discrepancy in the discloser and recipient records (i.e., a record of receipt, but no record of disclosure; a substantive misalignment in the description of the information; greater than seven days’ discrepancy in the date sent and received; date of receipt earlier than the date of sending);
  • All disclosures made by an institution that is not listed in Schedule 3 of the SCIDA; and
  • All disclosures received by institutions added to Schedule 3 in the preceding year.

Annex C. Overview of SCIDA Disclosures in Prior Years

Drawing on information published in previous NSIRA reports, Table 5 summarizes the number and distribution of disclosures made under the SCIDA in prior years.

Table 5: Number of SCIDA disclosures, by disclosing and recipient institution, 2019-2021

    Designated Recipient Institutions
  Disclosing Institution CBSA CFIA CNSC CRA CSE CSIS DND/CAF Finance FINTRAC GAC Health IRCC PHAC PSC RCMP TC TOTAL (proactive)
2021 DND/CAF 2 2
GAC 41 1 2 44
IRCC 68 79 2 149
TOTAL 68 122 2 1 2 195
2020 CBSA 1 3 4
GAC 1 25 1 13 40
IRCC 60 61 37 1 159
RCMP 1 3 5 9
TC 2 2
Other 1 1
TOTAL 61 88 1 3 6 55 1 215
2019 CBSA 1 2 3
GAC 23 3 1 15 42
IRCC 5 17 1 36 59
RCMP 4 1 3 1 9
TC 1 1
TOTAL 4 5 41 1 1 3 4 1 54 114

Annex D. Findings and Recommendations

Findings

NSIRA found that CSE, CSIS, GAC, and IRCC regularly use the SCIDA in a manner that warrants information sharing arrangements, as encouraged by subsection 4(c) of the SCIDA.

NSIRA found that CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA, as they failed to provide all records created under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) to NSIRA within the legislated timeframe.

NSIRA found improved compliance outcomes in instances where departments prepared record overview spreadsheets under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA that displayed the following characteristics:

  • a row for each disclosure made or received;
  • columns explicitly tied to each individual paragraph under section 9; and
  • additional columns to capture relevant administrative details, such as whether the disclosure was requested or proactive; the date of the request (if applicable); and any applicable file reference numbers.

NSIRA found that all GC institutions complied with their obligation to prepare and keep records that set out the information prescribed under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA.

NSIRA found that more than half of the descriptions provided by CBSA and IRCC under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA did not explicitly address their satisfaction that the disclosure was authorized under paragraph 5(1)(b), the proportionality test.

NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that disclosing institutions demonstrated they had satisfied themselves of both the contribution and proportionality tests, in compliance with subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA.

NSIRA found that GAC satisfied itself under the SCIDA’s paragraph 5(1)(a) contribution test based on an incorrect understanding of the recipient’s national security mandate in two cases.

NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that CBSA and GAC (in one and two disclosures, respectively) were non-compliant with the SCIDA’s subsection 5(2) requirement to provide a statement regarding accuracy and reliability.

NSIRA found, in relation to the remaining disclosures within the sample, that GAC, IRCC, and RCMP included their statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the disclosures themselves, whereas CBSA provided its statements in the disclosures’ cover letters.

NSIRA found that DND/CAF destroyed information under the SCIDA subsection 5.1(1), but they were non-compliant with the requirement to do so “as soon as feasible after receiving it.”

NSIRA found delays between when a disclosure was authorized for sending and when it was received by the individual designated by the head of the recipient institution to receive it in at least 20% (n=34) of disclosures.

Recommendations

  1. NSIRA recommends that information sharing arrangements be used to govern regular SCIDA disclosures between GAC and CSIS; IRCC and CSIS; as well as IRCC and CSE.
  2. NSIRA recommends that all GC institutions prepare record overviews to clearly address the requirements of subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA; and provide them to NSIRA along with a copy of the disclosure itself and, where relevant, a copy of the request.
  3. NSIRA recommends that disclosing institutions explicitly address the requirements of both paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the records that they prepare under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA.
  4. NSIRA recommends that GC institutions contemplating the use of proactive disclosures under the SCIDA communicate with the recipient institution, ahead of making the disclosure, to inform their assessments under subsection 5(1).
  5. NSIRA recommends that all disclosing institutions include statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the same document as the disclosed information.
  6. NSIRA recommends that GC institutions review their administrative processes for sending and receiving disclosures under the SCIDA, and correct practices that cause delays.
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Investigations All Frequently Asked Questions

Investigations Frequently Asked Questions


Who can file a complaint, and what does it cost?

Any person can file a complaint with NSIRA. There is no fee associated when you file a complaint.

How long do I have to submit a complaint?

When submitting a complaint relating to the denial or revocation of a security clearance, you must submit your complaint within 30 days after receipt of the notice issued by the department responsible for the denial or revocation of your security clearance. Should you submit your complaint outside the 30-day timeline, you must indicate the reasons for the delay on your complaint form (Form 18). NSIRA has the authority to accept a complaint past the 30-day time limit and will review the reasons for the delay in making that determination.

What should you include in your complaint?

Your complaint is deemed received when you submit all required documents. For example, if you are submitting a complaint against CSIS (rule 5.03), you are required to provide the following:

  • Form 16;
  • A copy of your letter sent to the Director of CSIS;
  • A copy of the Director’s response, if any; and
  • A statement indicating that you are dissatisfied with the Director’s response or a statement that a period of more than sixty (60) days has lapsed since you provided the Director with a written complaint.

If you are submitting a complaint against CSE (rule 5.04), you are required to provide the following:

  • Form 17;
  • A copy of your letter sent to the Chief of CSE;
  • A copy of the Chief’s response, if any; and
  • A statement indicating that you are dissatisfied with the Chief’s response or a statement that a period of more than sixty (60) days has lapsed since you provided the Chief with a written complaint.

If you are submitting a complaint relating to the denial or revocation of your security clearance (rule 5.05), you are required to provide the following:

  • Form 18;
  • A copy of the notice from the department responsible informing you of the decision to deny or revoke your security clearance.

If your complaint against the RCMP was referred to NSIRA by the CRCC, the complaint is deemed received upon receipt of the CRCC’s notice to NSIRA.

Can I file a complaint for another person?

You must provide written authorization for another person to act on their behalf. The authorized representative may be included on the complaint form, or on a separate form should the complaint already be filed.

Once I have sent my complaint in, can I make changes to it?

Yes, you can (rule 16). Should you wish to amend your complaint, you must make a request in writing to the Registrar.

I submitted my complaint. What can I get out of it?

Should NSIRA determine that it has the mandate to investigate your complaint, the assigned Member will conduct an investigation and may make findings and/or recommendations in the final report, if any. The assigned Member cannot make a remedial order, such as compensation, or order a government department to pay damages. The Member cannot order the government to pay for the costs of the complaint.

Can NSIRA refuse to investigate my complaint? What happens should NSIRA determine it does not have jurisdiction to investigate my complaint?

Should the Review Agency determine that your complaint does not fall within its mandate, NSIRA will not investigate your complaint and your complaint file will be closed. A letter of decision is provided to the parties.

Where and how are investigative interviews held?

Should NSIRA schedule an investigative interview, it is generally held by videoconference. Prior to scheduling the interview, NSIRA will canvass your availability and other procedural matters so that you are ready for your interview.

How long will the entire process take?

The time required to conduct an investigation varies depending on the complexity of the matter. During the COVID-19 pandemic, limitations on in-person work affected complaint investigations. Unlike in many other administrative proceedings, in-person presence is often required because of the classified nature of the relevant information. Some investigations were delayed during the pandemic and may require additional time. NSIRA has been working to find innovative approaches to continue to advance its investigations and to find efficiencies to enhance the timeliness of its complaint investigations. NSIRA is committed to addressing every complaint as informally and expeditiously as possible and also in a timely and efficient manner.

When does an Informal Resolution take place?

A party (you or the responding government department) or the assigned member may request an informal resolution meeting at any time throughout the process.

How does it work?

If a party or the assigned member requests an informal resolution meeting, the Registrar may contact the parties to seek their availability and willingness to participate in settlement discussions. A resolution meeting is an informal and confidential meeting between you, the respondent and an independent member of the NSIRA.

The role of the independent Member of the NSIRA during an informal resolution meeting is to provide the parties with an opportunity to gain a better understanding of the situation that brought them into conflict and to facilitate discussions surrounding the settlement of some or all of the issues in a complaint. If the complaint is resolved informally, the terms of the informal resolution must be set out in writing and signed by all parties (rule 10).

Is an informal resolution mandatory step in the complaints process?

It is not a mandatory step. For an informal resolution to take place, it requires both parties to agree and participate in settlement discussions on a “without prejudice” basis. This means that the statements made in the course of the settlement discussions cannot be introduced as evidence in the investigation.

What happens if a resolution of my complaint is achieved?

Should your complaint be resolved, you and the other party will agree to and sign a notice of settlement and your complaint will be closed.

What happens if a resolution of my complaint isn’t met?

Should a settlement not be reached at a resolution meeting, a different Member will be assigned to your complaint to conduct a full investigation. That said, the parties may consent to the same Member investigating the complaint.

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Murray Rankin

Murray Rankin


Murray Rankin was first elected as Member of Parliament for Victoria in 2012 and, until recently, served as the New Democratic Party’s Critic for Justice and for the Attorney General. He also served as Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Previously, he was critic for various portfolios, including National Revenue, Pensions, and Health.

In 2015, Mr. Rankin helped bring all parties together for a unanimous vote to compensate survivors of thalidomide poisoning. In December 2016, he was elected Vice-Chair of the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying, which advised on the government’s response to the Supreme Court’s decision relating to medical assistance in dying. 

Prior to serving in Parliament, Mr. Rankin was a Professor of Law at the University of Victoria, where he taught administrative and environmental law. He helped build legal organizations such as West Coast Environmental Law, the Land Conservancy of British Columbia, the BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, and the Environmental Law Centre. Working with the provincial government, he negotiated treaties with First Nations and shaped British Columbia’s laws for privacy and freedom of information.

In 1990, he co-founded the law firm of Arvay Finlay, where his practice focused on public law matters. In 2006, he joined a national law firm.

Murray Rankin earned a Master of Laws from Harvard University (LL.M.), after graduating from the University of Toronto with a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.). Mr. Rankin’s graduate research at Harvard Law School focused on freedom of information and national security. He later served as legal counsel to the Security Intelligence Review Committee and as a special advocate under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, conducting hearings on issues of national security. 

In 2017, Mr. Rankin was appointed by the Governor General, on the advice of the Prime Minister, to the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. 

Mr. Rankin and his spouse, Linda Hannah, reside in Victoria, B.C. and have two sons, Benjamin and Mark. 

Our Current Members


Marie Deschamps

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Craig Forcese

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Matthew Cassar

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Foluke Laosebikan

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Colleen Swords

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Jim Chu

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Yves Fortier

Yves Fortier


L. Yves Fortier was appointed on August 8, 2013, as a Member of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). On October 17, 2018, Mr. Fortier was reappointed for two years.

L. Yves Fortier was born in Quebec City in 1935. He received a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Montreal in 1955, a Bachelor of Civil Law from McGill University in 1958, and a Bachelor of Letters in 1960 from Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar. In 1960, he was called to the Barreau du Québec. He currently practices law in Montreal as an independent mediator/arbitrator. Mr. Fortier is the past chairman of Norton Rose (formerly Ogilvy Renault).

Throughout his distinguished legal career, Mr. Fortier has pleaded important cases before Canadian and international courts and arbitration panels. From 1984 to 1989, he was a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. He has represented Canada in maritime boundary disputes with the United States (1984) and with France (1991). He has been a Counsel to many Royal Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry in Canada, as well as a negotiator for the Government of Quebec with the Cree Nation.

From July 1988 to January 1992, Mr. Fortier was Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. He was Canada’s Chief Delegate to four sessions of the General Assembly. In 1989 and 1990, he served as Canada’s Representative to the Security Council of the United Nations, and was President of the Council in 1989. Mr. Fortier’s professional accomplishments have been recognized by his appointment as a Queen’s Counsel (1976) and by his election as National President of the Canadian Bar Association (1982). In May 2012, he was appointed chairman of the World Bank’s Sanctions Board.

In addition to having served as a director of many Canadian corporations, including the Royal Bank of Canada and TransCanada PipeLines Limited, Mr. Fortier is the former chairman of Alcan Inc. and the former Governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company.

In 1984, Mr. Fortier was appointed an Officer of the Order of Canada, and in 1991, he was elevated to Companion, the highest rank in the Order. In 2006, he was made an Officer of the National Order of Quebec. He has also received numerous honorary degrees from major universities in Canada.

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Marie Deschamps

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Craig Forcese

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Matthew Cassar

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Foluke Laosebikan

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Colleen Swords

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Jim Chu

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Pierre Blais

Pierre Blais


Pierre Blais was appointed on May 1, 2015, as Chairman of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC).

Mr. Blais was born in Berthier-sur-Mer, on December 30, 1948. He is the son of Edmond Blais and Marguerite Mercier.

He attended Collège Ste-Anne-de-la-Pocatière and received a Bachelor of Arts from Laval University in 1968, and a Licentiate in Laws from Laval University in 1976. He was then called to the Quebec Bar in 1977, and to the Ontario Bar in 1993.

Subsequently, he practiced law in Montmagny with the law firm of Morin, Lemieux, Blais, from 1977 to 1984. As a part-time lecturer, he taught business law at the Cégep of la Pocatière from 1980 to 1982. During that time, he also taught business law at the University du Québec in Rimouski in 1980, and industrial legislation (ethic and professional liability) at Laval University in 1983 and 1984; in addition, he taught for the Ordre des ingénieurs du Québec, also at Laval University in 1983 and 1984.

He was elected to the House of Commons for Bellechasse in 1984; subsequently, he served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture and to the Deputy Prime Minister before joining the Cabinet as Minister of State for Agriculture in 1987.

Subsequently, he served successively as Solicitor General of Canada, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, and President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada.

He retired from political life in November 1993 and joined, as a partner, the law firm of Langlois, Robert (later Langlois, Gaudreau) with offices in Montréal, Québec City and Montmagny.

While he held ministerial portfolios (from 1987 to 1993), he was a member of most Cabinet Committees, in particular, the Priorities and Planning Committee; in addition, he was Chairman of the Special Committee of Council and Deputy Chairman of the Government Operations Committee.

Mr. Blais has also been very active in community and social affairs. He has contributed, successively, as administrator, Vice-President and President, to a number of organizations, such as the Conseil de développement de la Côte-du-Sud, the Corporation culturelle Popularti, the Chamber of commerce of Montmagny, the Club Richelieu Montmagny, the Caisse populaire de Berthier-sur-Merthe Corporation Le Havre de Berthier-sur-Mer, the Fondation de l’Hôtel-Dieu de Montmagny, the Fondation des services universitaires Chaudières-Appalaches, the Club export agro-alimentaire du Québec.

As Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, he was actively involved in the negotiations that resulted in the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Mexico; he also took an active part in the GATT negotiations in Geneva from 1986 to 1993.

During that period, he took part in a large number of political, economic and commercial missions in the United States, Europe, Israel, Mexico, China and South America.

Mr. Blais was appointed Judge of the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division on June 23, 1998 and Judge of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada on December 3, 1998, to the Competition Tribunal as a judicial member in October 2002, and Chairperson of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal in July 2007. He was also designated by the Chief Justice to hear national security cases matters from 2000 to 2008. Indeed, he completed in 2008 a “Fellowship” at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London U.K, whereby he did comparative research about the treatment, by Canadian and English courts, of evidence undisclosed on national security grounds. He was appointed Judge of the Federal Court of Appeal on February 20, 2008 and Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal on September 9, 2009.

He retired from the Court on June 23, 2014.

He enjoys tennis, cycling, swimming, fishing, and reading and writes novels in his spare time.

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Marie Deschamps

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Craig Forcese

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Matthew Cassar

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Foluke Laosebikan

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Colleen Swords

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Jim Chu

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Process and Procedures

Process and Procedures


NSIRA Rules of Procedure

Pursuant to section 7.1 of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), the Review Agency may determine the procedure to be followed in the exercise of its powers or the performance of any of its duties or functions. The Review Agency’s procedures for its complaint investigations are formalized with Rules of Procedure, which can be found here:

Investigations Service Standards

The Review Agency’s service standards set time limits within which certain investigative steps for each type of complaint should be accomplished under normal circumstances. They can be found here:

NSIRA Complaint Forms


Complaint against CSIS

Form 16

Complaint against CSE

Form 17

Complaint – Security Clearances

Form 18

Affidavit

Form 1302

Notice of Informal Resolution

Form 1009

Notice of Motion

Form 1301

Statement of Events

Form

Summary of Anticipated Evidence

Form 1200

Summons

Form 800

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