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Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2022-23

Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2022-23


Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Privacy Act gives individuals the right to access information about themselves that is held by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat, subject to certain specific and limited exceptions. The Privacy Act also protects the privacy of individuals by giving them substantial control over the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information and by preventing others from having access to that information.

Section 72 of the act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the act within the institution and to submit the report to Parliament.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled in accordance with section 72 of the Privacy Act, describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat in administering the Act during the period of April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023.

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:

Access to Information and Privacy Office
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5
​Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who we are

Established in July 2019, NSIRA is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.

The NSIRA Secretariat assists NSIRA in fulfilling its mandate. It is the NSIRA Secretariat, headed by an Executive Director, that is the government institution for the purposes of the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act.

Mandate

The NSIRA Secretariat supports NSIRA in its dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities.

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.

Investigations

NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Access to Information and Privacy Office – Organizational Structure

NSIRA’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. For the reporting period, the NSIRA ATIP office consisted of:

  • 1 Full-time Access to Information Consultant;
  • 1 Part-time Privacy Consultant; and
  • 1 Full-time ATIP Manager who fulfilled the duties that would normally be carried out by an ATIP Coordinator, as well as managed the ATIP Office in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Manager of Administrative Services for the Secretariat and Agency Members.

NSIRA Secretariat Senior General Counsel and Corporate Counsel supported the ATIP Office on an as required basis.

The ATIP Office is responsible for the following:

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
  • processing requests under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat respected the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments.
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and
  • representing the NSIRA Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

The NSIRA Secretariat was a party to a service agreement under section 73.1 of the Privacy Act during the reporting period, pursuant to which it received administrative services from the Privy Council Office related to the tabling of the Privacy Act annual report in Parliament. The NSIRA Secretariat was also a party to a service agreement under section 71.1 of the Act, pursuant to which it received ATIP Online services from the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.

To assist the ATIP Office in meeting its overall legislative obligations, the NSIRA Secretariat relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter points of contact from all its branches.

Delegation Order

The Executive Director, as the Head of the NSIRA Secretariat, is responsible for the administration of the Privacy Act within the institution. Pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act, the Executive Director has delegated the ATIP Manager and ATIP Officer – as well as persons acting in these positions – to perform powers, duties, and functions for the administration of the Act. These positions have limited delegation of authority under the Act and the Access to Information Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The Privacy Act Delegation Order can be found in Appendix A.

Performance 2022-2023

Performance in Processing Privacy Requests

During the reporting period, from April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023, the NSIRA Secretariat received 12 formal requests. All 12 requests were completed during the reporting period. No requests were carried over from the previous reporting period.

Statistical Reports for 2022-2023

The institution’s 2022-2023 Statistical Report on the Privacy Act and Supplemental ATIP Statistical Report for 2022-2023 are found in Appendices B and C.

Extensions and Completion Time of Closed Requests

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat invoked extensions in processing 5 requests: 3 extensions of 31 to 60 days, and 2 extensions of 61 to 120 days, all of which included extensions necessary to consult with third parties.

Of the requests completed during the reporting period:

  • 1 request, or 8.33% of the requests completed, was disclosed in its entirety. This request was completed within 16 to 30 days.
  • 4 requests, or 33.33% of the requests completed, were disclosed in part. 1 request completed within 16 to 30 days, 2 requests completed within 31 to 60 days, and 1 request completed within 61 to 120 days.
  • 7 requests, or 58.33% of the requests completed, resulted in no records. 1 request completed within 1 to 15 days, 4 requests completed within 16 to 30 days, 1 request completed within 31 to 60 days, and 1 request completed within 61 to 120 days.

The NSIRA Secretariat’s responses to many requests required intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations. In 2022-23, the NSIRA Secretariat’s on-time response rate decreased to 58.33% from 71% in the previous reporting year.

Consultations

No consultations were received by the NSIRA Secretariat during the reporting period.

Impact of COVID-19 Measures

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat was not affected by measures related to the COVID‑19 pandemic.

Complaints and Investigations

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat received 9 privacy complaints, 2 of which were related to access. All 9 complaints remained active on March 31, 2023.

Moreover, one privacy breach-related investigation initiated by the Privacy Commissioner in fiscal year 2020-2021 continued during the reporting period and remained active on March 31, 2023.

Training and Awareness

During the reporting period, privacy training requirements were identified for all NSIRA Secretariat employees, as well as for those with functional or delegated responsibility for the administration of the Privacy Act, in accordance with the Directive on Personal Information Requests and Correction of Personal Information. The Canada School of Public Service course Access to Information and Privacy Fundamentals (COR502) was included as mandatory training in all employees’ training curriculum.

In addition, an all-staff lunch and learn session was held in August 2022 to provide employees with a debrief of the International Association of Privacy Professionals Privacy Conference.

Policies, Guidelines, and Procedures

The NSIRA Secretariat updated the Delegation Order during the reporting period and also established its internal Directive on Managing Security and Safety Events in March 2023, which provides for coordination with the ATIP Office and Office of Primary Interest when a security event involves a suspected or actual privacy breach.

Initiatives and Projects to Improve Privacy

The NSIRA Secretariat’s IT team began work to develop an ATIP software tool for our classified and unclassified systems. The NSIRA Secretariat also signed a memorandum of understanding with TBS to make full use of ATIP Online and implemented the tool during the reporting period.

Summary of Key Issues and Actions Taken on Complaints

As previously outlined, all 9 complaints received during the reporting period remained active on March 31, 2023. The NSIRA Secretariat meaningfully engaged with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner on all active investigations and disclosed additional records in 1 of the 2 access-related complaints.

Material Privacy Breaches

In the 2022-2023 reporting period, no material privacy breaches occurred.

Privacy Impact Assessments

The NSIRA Secretariat did not complete any PIAs in 2022-2023. During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat received feedback from TBS for its PIA on the creation of NSIRA — which had been submitted to TBS in FY 2021-2022 — and undertook revisions to the PIA. During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat also launched a PIA exercise pertaining to its investigations-related activities.

Public Interest Disclosures

No disclosures were made pursuant to paragraph 8(2)(m) of the Privacy Act during the reporting period.

Monitoring Compliance

In order to meet the legislative deadlines for privacy requests, deadlines for individual requests are strictly monitored by using MS Outlook reminders. The ATIP Manager organizes ad hoc meetings to discuss request-related activities (such as whether inter-institutional consultations are necessary), determine deadlines and ensure that all team members are informed of the status of files. At bi-weekly team meetings with the Senior General Counsel and Corporate Counsel, the ATIP Manager raises and discusses compliance with legislative and policy obligations. The Executive Director is also briefed on all ATIP compliance issues.

For contracts issued during the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat included a Standard Procurement Clause on the Handling of Personal Information or a Supplemental General Condition on Personal Information from Public Services and Procurement Canada’s Standard Acquisition Clauses and Conditions Manual.

Appendices

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Access to Information Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act*, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Appendix B: 2022-2023 Statistical Report on the Privacy Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2022-04-01 – 2023-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 12
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 12
Closed during reporting period 12
Carried over to next reporting period 0
Carried over within legislated timeline 0
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 0
1.2 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 10
E-mail 2
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 12

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 0
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 0
Closed during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 0
E-Mail 0
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 0
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

3.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Disclosed in part 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 4
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 1 4 1 1 0 0 0 7
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 6 3 2 0 0 0 12
3.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
18(2) 0
19(1)(a) 0
19(1)(b) 0
19(1)(c) 0
19(1)(d) 0
19(1)(e) 0
19(1)(f) 0
20 0
21 1
22(1)(a)(i) 3
22(1)(a)(ii) 0
22(1)(a)(iii) 0
22(1)(b) 4
22(1)(c) 0
22(2) 0
22.1 0
22.2 0
22.3 0
22.4 0
23(a) 0
23(b) 0
24(a) 0
24(b) 0
25 0
26 0
27 2
27.1 0
28 0
3.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69.1 0
70(1) 0
70(1)(a) 0
70(1(b) 0
70(1)(c) 0
70(1)(d) 0
70(1)(e) 0
70(1)(f) 0
70.1 0
3.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
0 5 0 0 0 0
3.5 Complexity
3.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
795 795 5
3.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 3 150 0 0 1 644 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4 151 0 0 1 644 0 0 0 0
3.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Assessment of Fees Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0
3.6 Closed requests
3.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 7
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 58.33333333
3.7 Deemed refusals
3.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
5 0 3 0 2
3.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 0 1 1
16 to 30 Days 1 0 1
31 to 60 Days 1 1 2
61 to 120 Days 1 0 1
121 to 180 Days 0 0 0
181 to 365 Days 0 0 0
More than 365 Days 0 0 0
Total 3 2 5
3.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 4: Disclosures Under Subsections 8(2) and 8(5)

Paragraph 8(2)(e) Paragraph 8(2)(m) Subsection 8(5) Total
0 0 0 0

Section 5: Requests for Correction of Personal Information and Notations

Disposition for Correction Requests Received Number
Notations attached 0
Requests for correction accepted 0
Total 0

Section 6: Extensions

6.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Number of requests where an extension was taken 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
3 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0
6.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
1 to 15 days 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0
16 to 30 days 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
31 days or greater               0
Total 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 0 0 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 0 0 0 0
Carried over within regotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7.3 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Complaints and Investigations Notices Received

Section 31 Section 33 Section 35 Court action Total
1 8 0 0 9

Section 10: Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and Personal Information Banks (PIBS)

10.1 Privacy Impact Assessments
Number of PIA(s) completed Number of PIAs modified
0 0
10.2 Institution-specific and Central Personal Information Banks
Personal Information Banks Active Created Terminated Modified
Institution-specific 0 0 0 0
Central 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0

Section 11: Privacy Breaches

11.1 Material Privacy Breaches reported
Number of material privacy breaches reported to TBS Number of material privacy breaches reported to OPC
0 0
11.2 Non-Material Privacy Breaches
Number of non-material privacy breaches
0
12.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $60,000
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $5,000
Professional services contracts $5,000
Other $0
Total $65,000
12.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.000
Part-time and casual employees 1.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 0.500
Students 0.000
Total 1.500

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act

Section 1: Capacity to Receive Requests under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

  Number of weeks
Able to receive requests by mail 52
Able to receive requests by email 52
Able to receive requests through the digital request service 52

Section 2: Capacity to Process Records under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

2.1 Number of weeks your institution was able to process paper records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
2.2 Number of weeks your institution was able to process electronic records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52

Section 3: Open Requests and Complaints Under the Privacy Act

3.1 Number of open requests that are outstanding from previous reporting periods.

Fiscal Year Open Requests Were Received Open Requests that are Within Legislated Timelines as Open Requests that are Beyond Legislated Timelines as of March 31, 2023 Total
Received in 2022-23 0 0 0
Received in 2021-22 0 0 0
Received in 2020-21 0 0 0
Received in 2019-20 0 0 0
Received in 2018-19 0 0 0
Received in 2017-18 0 0 0
Received in 2016-17 0 0 0
Received in 2015-16 0 0 0
Received in 2014-15 0 0 0
Received in 2013-14 or earlier 0 0 0

3.2 Number of open complaints with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that are outstanding from previous reporting periods

Fiscal Year Open Complaints were received by institutions Open Requests that are Within Legislated Timelines as
Received in 2022-23 9
Received in 2021-22 0
Received in 2020-21 0
Received in 2019-20 0
Received in 2018-19 0
Received in 2017-18 0
Received in 2016-17 0
Received in 2015-16 0
Received in 2014-15 0
Received in 2013-14 or earlier 0
Total 9

Section 4: Social Insurance Number

Has your institution begun a new collection or a new consistent use of the SIN in 2022-23?
No

Section 5: Universal Access under the Privacy Act

How many requests were received from confirmed foreign nationals outside of Canada in 2022-2023?
0
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Date Modified:

Annual Report on the Access to Information Act 2021–22

Annual Report on the Access to Information Act 2021–22


Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Access to Information Act gives Canadian citizens and permanent residents, as well as any person or corporation present in Canada, a right of access to information contained in government records, subject to certain specific and limited exceptions.

Section 94(1) of the Act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the Act within the institution and to submit the report to Parliament. In addition, section 20 of the Service Fees Act requires institutions to report on all statutory fees processed during the reporting period.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled in accordance with Section 94 of the Access to Information Act, and section 20 of the Service Fees Act, describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat in administering these Acts during the period April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022.

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:

Access to Information and Privacy Office
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5
Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who we are

Established in July 2019, NSIRA is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.

The NSIRA Secretariat assists the Review Agency in fulfilling its mandate.

Mandate

NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities. 

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.

Investigations

NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Access to Information and Privacy Office

NSIRA’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

For the reporting period, the NSIRA ATIP office consisted of:

  • 1 full-time ATIP Coordinator
  • 1 part-time ATIP Consultant
  • 1 full-time Senior Director, who managed the ATIP office in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Senior Director of Corporate Services

NSIRA Legal Services supported the ATIP team on an as required basis.

The main activities of the ATIP Coordinator included:

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
  • processing requests under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat respected the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments.
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and
  • representing the NSIRA Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

To assist the ATIP Office in meeting its legislative obligations, NSIRA relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter points of contact from all its branches.

Delegation Order

The Executive Director, as the Head of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat and pursuant to s.95(1) of the ATIA, is responsible for the implementation of the ATIA for NSIRA. Through the most recent NSIRA delegation order, the Executive Director has designated the ATIP Coordinator and ATIP Officer to perform the powers, duties, functions, or administrative tasks pertaining to the ATIA. These functions have limited delegation of authority under the Act and the Privacy Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The recently amended ATIA delegation orders can be found in Appendix A.

Performance and Statistical Overview

Performance in Processing Access Requests

During the reporting period, the number of access requests received by NSIRA increased by 1300% (14) compared to the previous year (1). The Agency also managed one request that was pending from previous years, bringing the total number of cases to 15. Of these, NSIRA closed 5 requests in 2021- 22, and 10 were carried over to the next reporting period.

NSIRA’s responses to many requests required intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations. In 2021-22, NSIRA’s on-time response rate decreased to 80% from 100% in the previous reporting year.

Consultations

NSIRA was consulted on 12 requests this fiscal year, compared to 7 in the previous reporting period. NSIRA closed 11 consultations and carried over one into 2022-2023.

Requests Treated Informally

In 2021-2022, NSIRA responded to 7 informal requests for records previously released under the ATIA process. This is an increase from no informal requests in 2020-2021. NSIRA responded to all 7 requests within 30 days of the request.

Complaints and Investigations of Access Requests

Subsection 30(1) of the Act describes how the Office of the Information Commissioner receives and investigates complaints from individuals regarding the processing of requests under the Act. NSIRA received one new complaint during the reporting period and worked closely with the Office of the Information Commissioner to resolve the complaint. This complaint concerned NSIRA’s delay in providing a response to a request before the established legislative deadline. NSIRA’s delay was largely due to extended external consultations; however, the complaint was closed as “well-founded” in 2022-2023 reporting period.

Access to Information Act fees for the Purposes of the Service Fees Act

In accordance with the Interim Directive on the Administration of the ATIA, issued on May 5, 2016, and the changes to the ATIA that came into force on June 21, 2019, NSIRA waived or refunded all fees prescribed by the Act and Regulations during the reporting period.

Training

In 2021–22, the ATIP office provided orientation sessions to new and current employees. In all, 3 separate sessions on access and privacy legislation were provided to 60 employees.

Privacy policies, guidelines, procedures and initiatives

NSIRA did not revise policies, guidelines, or procedures related to the Access to Information Act—or implement new ones—during the reporting period. 

Monitoring processing time

Request processing times are monitored through the Access Pro software dashboard. The ATIP Coordinator notifies the Executive Director and suggests a course of action should any legislative timelines for responding to an ATIA request appear to be at risk. 

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Access to Information Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act*, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Appendix B: 2019-2020 Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2019-04-01 – 2020-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 14
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 1
Total 15
Closed during reporting period 5
Carried over to next reporting period 10
Carried over within legislated timeline 9
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 1
1.2 Sources of requests
Source Number of Requests
Media 4
Academia 0
Business (private sector) 0
Organization 0
Public 10
Decline to Identify 0
Total 14
1.3 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 12
E-mail 1
Mail 1
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 14

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 7
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 7
Closed during reporting period 7
Carried over to next reporting period 0
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 7
E-Mail 0
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 7
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
0 7 0 0 0 0 0 7
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 Pages re-released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
7 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Applications to the Information Commissioner on Declining to Act on Requests

  Number of Requests
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Sent during reporting period 0
Total 0
Approved by the Information Commissioner during reporting period 0
Declined by the Information Commissioner during reporting period 0
Withdrawn during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0

Section 4: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

4.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Request transferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decline to act with the approval of the Information Commisioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 5
4.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
13(1)(a) 0
13(1)(b) 0
13(1)(c) 0
13(1)(d) 0
13(1)(e) 0
14 0
14(a) 0
14(b) 0
15(1) – I. A. * 0
15(1) – Def. * 2
15(1) – S.A. * 0
16(1)(a)(i) 0
16(1)(a)(ii) 0
16(1)(a)(iii) 0
16(1)(b) 1
16(1)(c) 2
16(1)(d) 0
16(2) 0
16(2)(a) 0
16(2)(b) 0
16(2)(c) 0
16(3) 0
16.1(1)(a) 0
16.1(1)(b) 0
16.1(1)(c) 0
16.1(1)(d) 0
16.2(1) 0
16.3 0
16.31 0
16.4(1)(a) 0
16.4(1)(b) 0
16.5 0
16.6 0
17 0
18(a) 0
18(b) 0
18(c) 0
18(d) 0
18.1(1)(a) 0
18.1(1)(b) 0
18.1(1)(c) 0
18.1(1)(d) 0
19(1) 2
20(1)(a) 0
20(1)(b) 0
20(1)(b.1) 0
20(1)(c) 0
20(1)(d) 0
20.1 0
20.2 0
20.4 0
21(1)(a) 1
21(1)(b) 0
21(1)(c) 0
21(1)(d) 0
22 0
22.1(1) 0
23 2
23.1 0
24(1) 1
26 0

* I.A.: International Affairs
* Def.: Defence of Canada
* S.A.: Subversive Activities

4.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
68(a) 0
68(b) 0
68(c) 0
68.1 0
68.2(a) 0
68.2(b) 0
69(1) 0
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69(1)(c) 0
69(1)(d) 0
69(1)(e) 0
69(1)(f) 0
69(1)(g) re (a) 0
69(1)(g) re (b) 0
69(1)(g) re (c) 0
69(1)(g) re (d) 0
69(1)(g) re (e) 0
69(1)(g) re (f) 0
69.1(1) 0
4.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
2 1 0 0 0 0
4.5 Complexity
4.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
63 63 3
4.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 3 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
4.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
4.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 2 0 0 2
All exempted 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0
Total 2 0 0 2
4.6 Closed requests
4.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 4
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 80
4.7 Deemed refusals
4.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
1 0 0 1 0
4.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 1 0 1
16 to 30 Days 0 0 0
31 to 60 Days 0 1 0
61 to 120 Days 0 0 0
121 to 180 Days 0 0 0
181 to 365 Days 0 0 0
More than 365 Days 0 0 0
Total 1 0 1
4.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 5: Extensions

5.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Disposition of Requests Where an Extension Was taken 9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload 9(1)(b) Consultation
Section 69 Other
All disclosed 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0
Request abandoned      
No records exist 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0
5.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload 9(1)(b) Consultation
Section 69 Other
30 days or less 0 0 0
31 to 60 days 0 0 0
61 to 120 days 0 0 0
121 to 180 days 0 0 0
181 to 365 days 0 0 0
365 days or more 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 6: Fees

Fee Type Fee Collected Fee Waived Fee Refunded
Number of Requests Amount Number of Requests Amount Number of Requests Amount
Application 0 $0.00 14 $0.00 0 $0.00
Other fees 0 $0.00 0 $0.00 0 $0.00
Total 0 $0.00 14 $0.00 0 $0.00

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 12 143 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 12 143 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 11 123 0 0
Carried over within regotiated timelines 1 20 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Investigations and Reports of finding

9.1 Investigations
Section 32 Notice of intention to investigate Subsection 30(5) Ceased to investigate Section 35 Formal Representations
0 0 1
9.2 Investigations and Reports of finding
Section 37(1) Initial Reports Section 37(2) Final Reports
Received Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner Received Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner
0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 10: Court Action

10.1 Court actions on complaints
Section 41
Complainant (1) Institution (2) Third Party (3) Privacy Commissioner (4) Total
0 0 0 0 0
10.2 Court actions on third party notifications under paragraph 28(1)(b)
Section 44 – under paragraph 28(1)(b)
0
11.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $24,082
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $0
Professional services contracts $0
Other $0
Total $24,082
11.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.300
Part-time and casual employees 0.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 0.000
Students 0.000
Total 0.300

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act

Section 1: Capacity to Receive Requests under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

  Number of weeks
Able to receive requests by mail 52
Able to receive requests by email 52
Able to receive requests through the digital request service 52

Section 2: Capacity to Process Records under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

2.1 Number of weeks your institution was able to process paper records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
2.2 Number of weeks your institution was able to process electronic records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
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Date Modified:

Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2021-22

Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2021-22


Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Privacy Act gives individuals the right to access information about themselves that is held by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat, subject to certain specific and limited exceptions. The Privacy Act also protects the privacy of individuals by giving them substantial control over the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information and by preventing others from having access to that information.

Section 72 of the act requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the act within the institution and to submit the report to Parliament.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled in accordance with Section 72 of the Privacy Act describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat in administering the Act during the period of April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022.

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:

Access to Information and Privacy Office
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5
​Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who we are

Established in July 2019, NSIRA is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.

The NSIRA Secretariat assists the Review Agency in fulfilling its mandate.

Mandate

NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities. 

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security- or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

NSIRA reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, and whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.

Investigations

NSIRA is responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Access to Information and Privacy Office

NSIRA’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. For the reporting period, the NSIRA ATIP office consisted of:

  • 1 full-time ATIP Coordinator
  • 1 part-time ATIP Consultant
  • 1 full-time Senior Director, who managed the ATIP office in addition to fulfilling normal duties as Senior Director of Corporate Services

NSIRA Legal Services supported the ATIP team on an as required basis.

The main activities of the ATIP Coordinator included:

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
  • processing requests under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the NSIRA Secretariat respected the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act;
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments.
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other material that might be required by central agencies; and
  • representing the NSIRA Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

To assist the ATIP Office in meeting its legislative obligations, NSIRA relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter points of contact from all its branches.

Delegation Order

The Executive Director, as the Head of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat and pursuant to s.95(1) of the ATIA, is responsible for the implementation of the ATIA for NSIRA. Through the most recent NSIRA delegation order, the Executive Director has designated the ATIP Coordinator and ATIP Officer to perform the powers, duties, functions, or administrative tasks pertaining to the ATIA. These functions have limited delegation of authority under the Act and the Privacy Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The recently amended ATIA delegation orders can be found in Appendix A.

Performance and Statistical Overview

Performance in Processing Access Requests

During the reporting period, the number of privacy requests received by NSIRA increased by 75% (7) compared to the previous year (4). All requests were completed in 2021-22, and no requests were carried over the next year.

NSIRA’s responses to most requests required intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations. In 2021-22, NSIRA’s on-time response rate decreased to 71% from 75% in the previous reporting year.

Consultations

NSIRA received one new consultation request from another government institution which was responded within 30 days of its receipt.

Corrections and Notations

For this reporting period, NSIRA did not receive any requests for corrections of personal information.

Complaints and Investigations of Privacy Requests

NSIRA did not receive any complaints pursuant to the Privacy Act during this reporting period. However, one investigation was initiated by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) concerning the cyber-attack discussed under the “Breaches” section below.

Training

In 2021–22, the ATIP office provided orientation sessions to new and current employees. In all, 3 separate sessions on access and privacy legislation were provided to 60 employees.

Policies, guidelines, procedures and initiatives

During the reporting period, the NSIRA Secretariat:

  • Initiated work on a Privacy Policy, a Privacy Protocol, and on a Privacy Breach Plan and Procedures; and
  • Submitted a request to the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) for the approval of changes respecting Personal Information Banks.

Monitoring processing time

Request processing times are monitored through the Access Pro software dashboard. The ATIP Coordinator notifies the Executive Director and suggests a course of action should any legislative timelines for responding to a Privacy Act request appear to be at risk.

Breaches

In March 2021, NSIRA was the victim of a cyber-attack on its public-facing network. As required by the TBS’ Directive on Privacy Practices, NSIRA reported the breach to the OPC and the TBS. Consistent with the Privacy Act, TBS requirements and advice from the OPC, the affected individuals were notified of the breach and how it could affect them.

Privacy Impact Assessments

NSIRA has completed a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) of its operations.

NSIRA is in the process of completing a PIA regarding its complaint investigation process.

Disclosure of Personal Information Under Section 8(2)

No disclosures were made pursuant to subsection 8(2) during the reporting period.

Appendices

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Access to Information Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act*, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Appendix B: 2021-2022 Statistical Report on the Privacy Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2021-04-01 – 2022-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 7
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 7
Closed during reporting period 7
Carried over to next reporting period 0
Carried over within legislated timeline 0
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 0
1.2 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 4
E-mail 3
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 7

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 0
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 0
Closed during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 0
E-Mail 0
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 0
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

3.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 4
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 7
3.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
18(2) 0
19(1)(a) 0
19(1)(b) 0
19(1)(c) 0
19(1)(d) 0
19(1)(e) 0
19(1)(f) 0
20 0
21 2
22(1)(a)(i) 0
22(1)(a)(ii) 0
22(1)(a)(iii) 0
22(1)(b) 1
22(1)(c) 0
22(2) 0
22.1 0
22.2 0
22.3 0
22.4 0
23(a) 0
23(b) 0
24(a) 0
24(b) 0
25 0
26 2
27 1
27.1 0
28 0
3.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69.1 0
70(1) 0
70(1)(a) 0
70(1(b) 0
70(1)(c) 0
70(1)(d) 0
70(1)(e) 0
70(1)(f) 0
70.1 0
3.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
1 2 0 0 0 0
3.5 Complexity
3.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
768 768 3
3.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 1 71 2 697 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 71 2 697 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
3.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Assessment of Fees Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 2 0 0 0 2
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 0 0 0 2
3.6 Closed requests
3.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 5
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 71.42857143
3.7 Deemed refusals
3.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
2 0 2 0 0
3.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 0 0 0
16 to 30 Days 0 2 2
31 to 60 Days 0 0 0
61 to 120 Days 0 0 0
121 to 180 Days 0 0 0
181 to 365 Days 0 0 0
More than 365 Days 0 0 0
Total 0 2 2
3.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 4: Disclosures Under Subsections 8(2) and 8(5)

Paragraph 8(2)(e) Paragraph 8(2)(m) Subsection 8(5) Total
0 0 0 0

Section 5: Requests for Correction of Personal Information and Notations

Disposition for Correction Requests Received Number
Notations attached 0
Requests for correction accepted 0
Total 0

Section 6: Extensions

6.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Number of requests where an extension was taken 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
6.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 15(a)(i) Interference with operations 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(b) Consultation
Further review required to determine exemptions Large volume of pages Large volume of requests Documents are difficult to obtain Cabinet Confidence Section (Section 70) External Internal
1 to 15 days 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 days 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
31 days or greater             0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 1 52 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 1 52 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 1 52 0 0
Carried over within regotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
7.3 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Complaints and Investigations Notices Received

Section 31 Section 33 Section 35 Court action Total
0 0 0 0 0

Section 10: Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and Personal Information Banks (PIBS)

10.1 Privacy Impact Assessments
Number of PIA(s) completed Number of PIAs modified
1 0
10.2 Institution-specific and Central Personal Information Banks
Personal Information Banks Active Created Terminated Modified
Institution-specific 2 0 0 0
Central 0 0 0 0
Total 2 0 0 0

Section 11: Privacy Breaches

11.1 Material Privacy Breaches reported
Number of material privacy breaches reported to TBS Number of material privacy breaches reported to OPC
1 1
11.2 Non-Material Privacy Breaches
Number of non-material privacy breaches
0
12.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $24,082
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $0
Professional services contracts $97,006
Other $0
Total $121,088
12.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.300
Part-time and casual employees 0.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 0.500
Students 0.000
Total 0.800

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act

Section 1: Capacity to Receive Requests under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

  Number of weeks
Able to receive requests by mail 52
Able to receive requests by email 52
Able to receive requests through the digital request service 52

Section 2: Capacity to Process Records under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act

2.1 Number of weeks your institution was able to process paper records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
2.2 Number of weeks your institution was able to process electronic records in different classification levels
  No capacity Partial Capacity Full capacity Total
Unclassified Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Protected B Paper Records 0 0 52 52
Secret and Top Secret Paper Records 0 0 52 52
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Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021: Report

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021


Report

Date of Publishing:

1. Executive Summary

1.This report describes the results of a review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) of the 2021 disclosures made by federal institutions under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). This is the third year of implementation of the SCIDA regime. This year, NSIRA decided to focus the review on Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) proactive disclosures.

2.The SCIDA encourages and facilitates the disclosure of information between federal institutions to protect Canada against activities that undermine or threaten national security, subject to certain conditions. The SCIDA provides a two-part threshold which must be met prior to making a disclosure: that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances. The SCIDA also includes provisions and guiding principles related to the management of disclosures, including accuracy and reliability statements and record keeping obligations.

3.NSIRA identified concerns that demonstrate the need for improved training. NSIRA found that there is potential for confusion on whether the SCIDA is the appropriate mechanism for certain disclosures of national security-related information. Some disclosures were of concern as GAC did not meet the two-part threshold requirements of the SCIDA prior to disclosing the information. Without meeting these requirements, some disclosures of personal information were not compliant with the SCIDA. Two disclosures did not contain accuracy and reliability statements, as required under the SCIDA. With respect to record-keeping, NSIRA recommends that departments contemporaneously document the information relied on to satisfy themselves that disclosures will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

4.NSIRA is confident that it received all information necessary to conduct the review.

2. Introduction

5.When federal departments fail to share national security information in a timely, coordinated, or responsible manner, serious and tragic consequences can result – as the Arar and Air India Inquiries found. As a mechanism in Canada’s national security accountability framework, NSIRA is mandated to prepare a report respecting disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) during the previous calendar year. This is the only NSIRA review that must be made public and laid before both the House of Commons and the Senate, reflecting the importance Parliament has placed on independent review and accountability of national security information disclosure.

6.The SCIDA’s designated long title also reflects its stated purpose: An Act to encourage and facilitate the disclosure of information between Government of Canada institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine the security of Canada.

7.The SCIDA governs how Government of Canada institutions disclose information, including personal information, that is relevant to activities that undermine the security of Canada, to a select group of federal institutions with national security mandates. Disclosures are either made proactively, on the initiative of a Government of Canada institution, or in response to a request by an institution authorized to receive information under the SCIDA.

8.It is important to note that the SCIDA is simply a tool. It is only as useful as its real-time recognition and application. Its success relies on how individuals and institutions interact with and implement its provisions. Those federal government institutions authorized to disclose information under the SCIDA must maintain a certain vigilance for information that may have national security repercussions, including at the most basic operational level. Having recognized information that could involve national security matters, departments must then decide whether they are authorized to disclose that information and to whom, paying close attention to minimizing any impacts on individual privacy rights.

9.Federal departments and agencies with core national security mandates are generally able to rely on their own legal frameworks to share information with other domestic institutions, and do not require the SCIDA to do so. Previous NSIRA reports have found that for many such institutions, disclosures made under the SCIDA comprise only a small portion of their domestic national security information sharing.

10.NSIRA understands the significance of the SCIDA in the overall national security framework, and is concerned with its robust application, in keeping with the provisions of the SCIDA, including its guiding principles, and with respect to the disclosure of personal information. What is more, NSIRA has the ability to review all disclosures across the Government of Canada, and through this broad lens, can identify common themes and trends. This perspective, not available to individual federal departments, enables NSIRA to make findings and recommendations that can strengthen overall information disclosure within the national security framework.

Focus of this Review

11.In determining the focus of this review, NSIRA considered the concerns raised in its review conducted the year prior. In the review of disclosures made under the SCIDA in 2020, which NSIRA undertook jointly with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC), the review found that the majority of federal department disclosures – approximately 99 per cent – met the threshold requirements that permit information to be disclosed under the SCIDA. In other words, the disclosing institutions sufficiently demonstrated that they had satisfied themselves, prior to providing the disclosures, that the information to be disclosed would contribute to the exercise of the recipient’s jurisdiction or responsibilities respecting activities that undermine the security of Canada, and that it would not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

12.The few disclosures that raised concerns, however, were those that had been provided to the recipient institutions on a proactive basis. As such, NSIRA chose to focus on this category for its 2021 review of disclosures under the SCIDA. In 2021, the majority of proactive disclosures came from Global Affairs Canada (GAC). NSIRA therefore chose to focus on GAC’s proactive disclosures in 2021, as a representative sample.

13.In addition to reviewing these disclosures from the perspective of the SCIDA’s prerequisite thresholds, this review also assessed other important requirements under the SCIDA that help to ensure responsible disclosures of national security information. These include the need for disclosures to be accompanied by statements that attest to the accuracy and reliability of the information being disclosed, as well as the obligation on all disclosing institutions to prepare and keep records that set out a description of the information that was relied on to satisfy themselves that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA.

14.Although the review sample focused on GAC proactive disclosures, many findings and recommendations are general and illustrative and, in many instances, may be useful to all institutions when disclosing under the SCIDA.

Review Objectives

15.The objectives of this review were to assess proactive disclosures of information under the SCIDA.

16.Specifically, the review assessed whether GAC:

  • a) Satisfied itself, prior to disclosing any information, that the disclosure would contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction, or the carrying out of its responsibilities, in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, as required under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA;
  • b) Satisfied itself, prior to disclosing any information, that the disclosure would not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances, as required under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA;
  • c) Described, at the time of the disclosure, the accuracy of the information disclosed and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained, as required under subsection 5(2) of the SCIDA; and
  • d) Kept records that included a description of the information that was relied on to satisfy itself that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA, as required under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA.

Methodology

17.NSIRA received 195 disclosures of information from federal departments that reported either disclosing or receiving information under the SCIDA between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2021. NSIRA conducted a preliminary review of all disclosures received.

18.NSIRA focused this year’s review on GAC proactive disclosures only. GAC identified 16 proactive disclosures out of a total of 44 disclosures under the SCIDA in 2021. However, in reviewing the material provided by GAC, NSIRA noted that three of these files were in fact requests for information from another department, and not disclosures of information under the SCIDA. As such, NSIRA removed these three files from the review sample, and only analyzed the remaining 13 disclosures identified by GAC as proactive disclosures.

19.NSIRA sent five follow up requests for information to GAC regarding its disclosures, and assessed all records provided.

3. Analysis

20. In conducting this review, NSIRA observed positive components of disclosures that it endeavours to highlight in this report. Proactive disclosures are an important feature of the SCIDA regime, and the following findings and recommendations aim to enhance compliance with the SCIDA.

Thresholds for disclosing information to federal institutions under the SCIDA

a) Jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada

21. Paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA requires departments to satisfy themselves that disclosures “will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction, or the carrying out of its responsibilities, under an Act of Parliament or another lawful authority, in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada.”

22. The definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada” is set out at subsection 2(1) of the SCIDA and includes, for example, espionage and terrorism. Certain activities are excluded from this definition, notably advocacy and protest not carried out in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada.

23. In conducting this review, NSIRA examined each disclosure in the sample and its corresponding documentation to assess whether GAC had satisfied itself, prior to making the disclosure, that the information to be disclosed would contribute to the recipient department’s jurisdiction in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, as defined in the SCIDA.

24. In 12 of the 13 disclosures reviewed, GAC sufficiently demonstrated that it had satisfied itself as to these requirements. Furthermore, in all of these 12 disclosures, GAC documented that it had considered not only whether the recipient had the appropriate jurisdiction, but also how the information would contribute to that jurisdiction in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada as defined in the SCIDA. For example, see text box 1. The information in the disclosure file supports the text of this statement.

Text box 1: Example of statement in disclosure demonstrating GAC satisfied itself as to the requirements under 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA

GAC’s disclosure will contribute to the carrying out of CSIS’ responsibilities under section 12 of the CSIS Act, which require CSIS to investigate activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada. Section 2.a of the CSIS Act defines threats to the security of Canada as encompassing threats or acts of “espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage.” CSIS collects, analyzes and retains information and intelligence on these threats to the extent that it is strictly necessary to do so, and reports to and advises the Government of Canada. In the circumstances, GAC’s disclosure will contribute to CSIS’ responsibility under section 12 of the CSIS Act to investigate and report on threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2.a of the CSIS Act. Specifically, the disclosure will contribute to an assessment of a potential espionage threat [against Canadian interests abroad].

25.However, NSIRA observed that in one of those twelve disclosures, GAC consulted on more information than necessary to determine whether the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA. This disclosure is described below.

Disclosure 1

26.A foreign country provided information about an individual with ties to Canada, to GAC headquarters, and requested that GAC forward the information to appropriate authorities. GAC then met with CSIS and showed them the information in their holdings, in order to clarify whether the information contributed to CSIS’s national security mandate. CSIS reviewed the information and confirmed that the information was of value to their investigation. CSIS did not report any of the information in its holdings.

27.Following that consultation, GAC concluded that a number of the documents did not pertain to an activity that undermines the security of Canada, as they contained “significant amounts of personal information unrelated to [the subject of the investigation] and reflecting acts considered lawful in Canada, such as freedom of speech (with no stated intent to engage in acts of violence) and freedom of peaceful assembly.” As such, GAC subsequently formally disclosed to CSIS only a fraction of the previously consulted documents. With respect to this formal disclosure, GAC demonstrated that it satisfied itself as to the requirements under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA.

28. GAC indicated to NSIRA that the Public Safety guide on responsible information-sharing (PS Guide) is its primary policy guidance on the SCIDA. NSIRA notes that the PS Guide encourages government institutions to “communicate with the designated recipient institution prior to disclosure to determine not only whether the information is linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada but also how it contributed to that institution’s national security mandate.” This should not be interpreted as providing authorization to consult on more information than necessary, given the possibility that information outside the scope of a SCIDA disclosure may be included.

29. During its consultation with CSIS, GAC consulted on information that it later assessed as not concerning an activity that undermines the security of Canada as defined in the SCIDA and which was later removed from the formal disclosure under the SCIDA. The consultation involved showing GAC’s full information holdings to CSIS, which was more information than necessary to obtain confirmation from CSIS that the information was of value. Information used in consultations should be limited to the information necessary to obtain confirmation from the potential recipient that the information contributes to the carrying-out of its mandate and is linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

30. Furthermore, despite twelve out of thirteen disclosures meeting the requirements of paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA, one disclosure did not. NSIRA addresses this disclosure below.

Disclosure 2

31. An individual overseas, on their own initiative, identified themselves as a member of that country’s government and provided information to an official at a Canadian embassy about an alleged threat. GAC disclosed this information along with personal information, including the individual’s contact information, to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), invoking the SCIDA as an authority to make the disclosure. However, GAC did not consider whether this disclosure met the two threshold requirements under paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA, prior to disclosing this information in its entirety. During the course of this review, GAC explained to NSIRA that the disclosure was erroneously made under the SCIDA, and it was authorized under another authority for disclosing information in such circumstances, that is the Privacy Act or the Crown Prerogative. NSIRA did not assess whether these mechanisms would have been appropriate in the circumstances. Nonetheless this example demonstrates a) that there is potential for confusion on whether the SCIDA is the appropriate mechanism for certain disclosures of national security-related information, and b) that such confusion, in this case, led to the improper use of the SCIDA to disclose.

Finding no. 1: NSIRA finds that, in twelve out of thirteen disclosures, GAC demonstrated that it satisfied itself as to the contribution of the information to the recipient institution’s responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, as required under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA.

Finding no. 2: NSIRA finds that, without first conducting the analysis under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA, departments risk disclosing information that does not pertain to the national security mandate of the recipient institution or to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

Finding no. 3: NSIRA finds that, in one of thirteen disclosures, GAC consulted on more information than necessary to obtain confirmation that the disclosure contributed to CSIS’s mandate and was linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

Recommendation no. 1: NSIRA recommends that consultations be limited to the information necessary to obtain confirmation from the potential recipient that the information contributes to its mandate and is linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

b) Privacy interest not impacted more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances

32. Paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA requires that disclosing institutions be satisfied that the disclosure will not affect any person’s privacy interests more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

33. All thirteen proactive disclosures included personal information as defined in the Privacy Act, that is, identifiable information about an individual, such as name, contact information, background information, or suspicions concerning the individual.

34. The PS Guide provides direction on the type of analysis required prior to disclosing personal information. More specifically, the PS Guide states “whether the information impacting a person’s privacy interest is considered ‘reasonably necessary’ will depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Relevant considerations may include contextual factors, such as the type and nature of the information in question and the particular purpose for the disclosure.”

35. In response to NSIRA requests for further information, GAC explained how it satisfied itself that these proactive disclosures did not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

36. For example, GAC explained that in eight of the thirteen disclosures, GAC determined that some of the information it was considering disclosing was not within the scope of the recipient institution’s mandate. In the same disclosures, GAC also stated that it determined that some of the information in its holdings did not contribute to the institution’s investigation or fall within the recipient institution’s original request for information. For example, in one disclosure, only an individual’s travel status abroad was shared with CSIS as this pertained to the latter’s responsibilities in a national security matter. Other information in GAC’s holdings, such as information concerning other individuals, was determined by GAC not to be relevant, and therefore was not included in the disclosure.

37. Similarly, GAC explained that in two of the thirteen disclosures, GAC determined that some information was necessary to report to the recipient department, and therefore included in the disclosure. More detailed information not linked to activities that undermine the safety of Canada was not disclosed. For example, in one of the two disclosures, only information about suspected espionage activity was disclosed to CSIS, while detailed information about certain personal activities and behaviours was withheld.

38. NSIRA observed that of the 13 disclosures in the sample, three disclosures did not meet the requirements under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA.

39. In Disclosure 2, described above, GAC disclosed information that was received from an individual who, on their own initiative, provided information to an official at a Canadian embassy overseas. GAC did not conduct any analysis under the SCIDA including whether the disclosure would affect privacy interests more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances, and proceeded with disclosing the entirety of the information to CSIS. GAC explained to NSIRA that the disclosure was erroneously made under the SCIDA, and was authorized under another authority for disclosing information, that is the Privacy Act or the Crown Prerogative. NSIRA did not assess whether these mechanisms would have been appropriate in the circumstances.

Disclosures 3 and 4

40. A Canadian embassy abroad received screen shots of a private social media group. The screenshots included information about a political movement in a foreign country. They also contained the contact information of all members of the group. While the group shared posters about the movement and information concerning protests in Canada, there were no threats, whether specific or general, in the material. However, based on some information in the screenshots, as well as the broader context of protests, past events, and open source media, GAC determined that the information contributed to the exercise of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)’s and CSIS’s jurisdiction, or the carrying out of their responsibilities, in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada.

41. GAC disclosed the entirety of the information to both the RCMP and CSIS. The only information redacted was the name and contact information of the individual who provided the information to GAC.

42. GAC explained to NSIRA that it concluded that paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA was met because it did not identify a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the private social media group. NSIRA observes that GAC did not consider all of the relevant factors that would allow it to satisfy itself that the disclosure would not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. As such, the disclosure of information did not meet the second threshold requirement under subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA. Therefore, the disclosure of personal information of the group members did not comply with the requirements of the SCIDA.

Finding no. 4: NSIRA finds that, in ten out of thirteen disclosures, GAC satisfied itself that the disclosure will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances, as required under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA.

Accuracy and Reliability Statements

43. The Arar Report noted that “sharing unreliable or inaccurate information does not provide a sound foundation for identifying and thwarting real and dangerous threats to national security and can cause irreparable harm to individuals.”

44. A core theme in the SCIDA’s guiding principles is that of effective and responsible disclosure of information. Disclosing institutions are required, under subsection 5(2) of SCIDA, to provide information at the time of disclosure regarding the accuracy of the information disclosed and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained.

45. Given the valuable context that accuracy and reliability statements provide to disclosures, precise and complete statements tailored to the specific circumstances of the disclosure can help avoid false perceptions, and can help ensure that recipient institutions have a clear understanding as to the accuracy and reliability of the information disclosed.

46. GAC relied on the PS Guide as its primary policy guidance document on the SCIDA. The PS Guide sets out that ensuring that the information disclosed is as accurate, complete, and as upto-date as possible is key to responsible and effective information sharing.

47. GAC informed NSIRA that partner agencies can better verify the accuracy of the information and the reliability of its source than GAC. NSIRA agrees that in some instances, GAC has limited capability for verification. Nonetheless, the SCIDA requires accuracy and reliability statements in every disclosure; accuracy and reliability statements must be clear and contextspecific in order to be meaningful.

48. In an example of a well-developed statement, GAC provided the following: The information disclosed by GAC was obtained through interactions between GAC officials with [known and credible source X and another individual]. GAC is not in a position to assess the accuracy and reliability of the above information provided to GAC officials by [these individuals]. GAC assesses that [source X] is highly credible, and is likely providing reliable information. In this case, the statement made a distinction between the accuracy and reliability of the information disclosed, depending on the source of that information. The disclosure sets out which information was provided by which source.

49. Overall, eleven of the thirteen disclosures contained accuracy and reliability statements. Two disclosures did not include the statement as the SCIDA requires. These omissions were not tied to GAC’s inability to verify the accuracy and reliability of the information.

Finding no. 5: NSIRA finds that two out of thirteen disclosures did not contain accuracy and reliability statements as required by subsection 5(2) of the SCIDA.

Recommendation no. 2: NSIRA recommends that in order to provide the most valuable and meaningful context for the recipient institution, accuracy and reliability statements should be clear and specific to the circumstances of the disclosure.

Record-keeping

50. Paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA requires that disclosing institutions prepare a description of the information that they relied on to satisfy themselves that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA, including that the disclosure did not affect privacy interests more than reasonably necessary, as part of their record-keeping obligations under the SCIDA.

51. It is noted that the PS Guide sets out the steps to making a disclosure, which include creating a record describing the information that was relied on to satisfy the disclosing institution that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA. Furthermore, the PS Guide’s Appendix A: Record-keeping Template for Institutions Disclosing Information under the SCIDA, which is intended to help departments meet record-keeping obligations for disclosing institutions under the SCIDA, contains a field for departments to describe that information. It also restates the requirements under paragraphs 5(1)(a) and (b) of the SCIDA that the disclosing institution be satisfied that the disclosure will contribute to the recipient institution’s national security mandate, and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

52. The SCIDA 2020 Review observed that GAC’s records describing the information it used to satisfy itself that certain responsive disclosures to CSIS, were robust. The basis for this observation was that GAC’s records contained information provided by CSIS to aid in GAC’s assessment, including details of the potential impact on the subject(s) of the request.

53. During the course of this year’s review, NSIRA requested that GAC provide a description of how it satisfied itself that the disclosure was authorized under both threshold requirements under the SCIDA. NSIRA also requested that GAC provide all supporting documents GAC relied on in its assessment. GAC provided explanations in response to NSIRA’s queries in this regard, referencing supporting documents. Based on a review of the records provided, NSIRA observes that GAC’s practices could be improved by contemporaneously and expressly articulating which information it relied on to satisfy itself that the disclosures would not impact any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

Recommendation no. 3: NSIRA recommends that all disclosing departments contemporaneously prepare descriptions of the information that was relied on to satisfy themselves that disclosures were authorized under the SCIDA.

Training on the SCIDA

54. GAC used four distinct PowerPoint documents in 2021 to train employees on the SCIDA.

55. A course entitled Governance, Access, Espionage and Technical Security (GATE) was accessible to all employees going on postings as an introductory course focused on the awareness of information security at GAC. This presentation did not include practical examples or scenarios, but explained that any information sharing under the SCIDA must be done through GAC Headquarters.

56. Furthermore, a presentation provided by the Director General of the Intelligence Bureau to the majority of Heads of Mission going on postings, as an introductory course on intelligence support and security, did not provide illustrative examples or scenarios, but set out that information sharing under the SCIDA must be done through Headquarters.

57. Finally, the Department of Justice legal team provided two presentations: one to Global Security Reporting Program Officers going on postings as an introduction to information sharing policies and practices, including several slides on the SCIDA, and the other to groups of employees at Headquarters as an introduction to information sharing policies and practices. NSIRA noted that each presentation included only one or two examples illustrating the considerations in making a disclosure under the SCIDA.

58. Three of the four presentations also included a range of information about record-keeping requirements. However, the information in the presentations was largely limited to reiterating the requirements under the SCIDA, and no practical examples or scenarios were provided. Similarly, while these presentations reiterated requirements under the SCIDA to include accuracy and reliability statements, no practical examples were provided.

Finding no. 6: NSIRA finds that GAC training on the SCIDA lacks sufficient illustrative examples required to provide employees with adequate guidance to fulfill their obligations under the SCIDA.

Recommendation no. 4: NSIRA recommends that additional illustrative examples and scenarios be included in the SCIDA training, including for disclosure threshold requirements, accuracy and reliability statements and record-keeping requirements.

4. Responsiveness and provision of information

59. All departments met the timelines for the provision of information to NSIRA.

60. Subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA contain record-keeping obligations for disclosing and recipient institutions. Subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA requires all departments to provide every record prepared under those subsections to NSIRA, for the purpose of NSIRA’s annual review of disclosures under SCIDA. Not only is thorough record-keeping a legal requirement for disclosing and recipient institutions, it is not possible for NSIRA to fulfill its mandated annual review without all records from all departments.

61. This review focussed on GAC proactive disclosures. NSIRA conducted a cross-comparison of the number of disclosures reported by GAC and those received by recipient institutions and notes that the numbers align. NSIRA did not independently verify the completeness of the records provided by GAC. Nonetheless, the assessment under the SCIDA requires GAC to demonstrate compliance. Additional requests for information over the course of the review led NSIRA to conclude that it received all information necessary to conduct the review. Finally, GAC had the opportunity to review a preliminary draft of this report and provide additional information. For these reasons, NSIRA is confident that it received all information necessary to conduct the review.

5. Conclusion

62. The SCIDA is a legislative tool meant to encourage and facilitate the responsible and effective disclosure of national security-related information between federal government institutions. Of the thirteen disclosures in the review sample, three did not meet one or both disclosure threshold requirements and two did not contain accuracy and reliability statements. Prior to consulting on potential disclosures, departments should consider what information is necessary to include in the consultation. Departments should also contemporaneously document on what basis they were satisfied that disclosures were authorized under the SCIDA. Furthermore, improvements to ongoing training are recommended, to provide more illustrative examples to guide employees in fulfilling their obligations under the SCIDA. NSIRA looks forward to revisiting the implementation of the SCIDA in future years and expects to find improved compliance, recordkeeping, and delivery of training programs.

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Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021: Backgrounder

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

This report describes the results of a review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) of the 2021 disclosures made by federal institutions under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). This is the third year of implementation of the SCIDA regime. This year, NSIRA decided to focus the review on Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) proactive disclosures. 

The SCIDA encourages and facilitates the disclosure of information between federal institutions to protect Canada against activities that undermine or threaten national security, subject to certain conditions. The SCIDA provides a two-part threshold which must be met prior to making a disclosure: that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada,  and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.  The SCIDA also includes provisions and guiding principles related to the management of disclosures, including accuracy and reliability statements and record keeping obligations.

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Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021


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Published

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22-06

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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Internal Security Branch: Report

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Internal Security Branch


Report

Table of Contents

Date of Publishing:

HTML Version Coming Soon

Our team is working on an HTML version of this content to enhance usability and compatibility across devices. We aim to make it available in the near future. Thank you for your patience!

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Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019: Report

Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019


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Date of Publishing:

Executive Summary

The Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (Avoiding Complicity Act or Act) and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual as a result of information exchanged between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated or not. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. This review covers the implementation of the directions sent to 12 departments and agencies from their date of issuance, September 4, 2019, to the end of the previous calendar year, December 31, 2019. It was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Act.

While this was the inaugural annual review under the NSIRA Act, it builds upon previous work in this area undertaken by NSIRA and its predecessor SIRC. NSIRA’s review on the 2017 Ministerial Direction on information sharing with Foreign Entities is an example. The results from this previous review were sent to applicable departments in July 2020. NSIRA is building upon this previous review and strongly supports the findings and recommendations within it. As of the date of this report, departmental responses have not been received regarding the recommendations provided in NSIRA’s July 2020 Ministerial Direction review.

(U) It was essential to ensure that both NSIRA and the departments being reviewed met their obligations under the Avoiding Complicity Act and the NSIRA Act. The approach used to gather information during a global pandemic was purposely designed for this first and unique review period.

To capture a complete view on the departmental implementation, NSIRA requested information that related directly to every department’s specific obligations under the Act and the directions. The responses and associated information captured departmental activities related to the Act during the review period, and what procedures, policies, tools, etc. (frameworks) were leveraged to support these activities. NSIRA believes that having a robust framework is an essential part of an effective implementation of the directions departments have received.

Beyond the specific requirements of implementation, the information provided by the departments also helped to identify gaps, considerations for best practices, and the work departments have undertaken since the review period to build and formalize their frameworks. This information and knowledge will help set up the foundation for future reviews and assist efforts on creating consistent implementation across departments. While many of the issues discussed in this report go beyond the specific requirements of the directions, their consideration is critical to the overall improvement of the implementation process and how departments ultimately support the Act. No case studies were undertaken for this review. However, the information gathered has helped establish a baseline for overarching issues the community is facing. Building on this, future reviews will begin to examine specific sharing framework challenges and questions and look closely at specific cases and departmental legal opinions to guide review findings.

While NSIRA was pleased with the considerable efforts made by many departments new to the Avoiding Complicity Act in building up their supporting frameworks, it was clear during this review that departments are employing very different approaches to guide their information handling activities. The responses received demonstrate various inconsistencies across the departments. Having a consistent and coordinated approach when addressing the concerns related the Act is not a requirement for implementation, however, NSIRA believes that there is value in such an approach. And while departments will always require unique aspects in their sharing frameworks to address the unique characteristics of their mandates and activities, to improve the implementation process, a goal all involved likely have, the identification and sharing of best practices is critical.

For example, determining the best means for having a unified approach when engaging with foreign entities of concern or ensuring that an information sharing activity is consistently evaluated for risk by all departments. The recommendations provided on these issues in this review capture what NSIRA believes to be important concerns and considerations for supporting and improving departmental implementation.

Additionally, as the directives received under the Act do not describe the specific means by which departments ‘implement’ them, it is incumbent on the community to ensure that they have sufficiently robust frameworks and programs in place to fully support an assertion of implementation. Therefore, the information gathered during this review went beyond a strict assessment of implementation, but also considered the aspects required to better support this implementation. Going forward, this approach will help establish the foundation for subsequent reviews. Drawing on the findings and concerns identified here, NSIRA will continue to consider aspects that will ultimately improve underlying frameworks, thereby supporting an improved implementation of the Act across the community.

Authorities

This review was conducted under subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act, which requires NSIRA to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity Act.

Introduction

Focus of the Act

In the same spirit as the Ministerial Direction (MD) that preceded it, the Avoiding Complicity Act and its associated directions seek to prevent the mistreatment of any individual due to the exchange of information between a Government of Canada department and a foreign entity. The Act also aims to limit the use of information received from a foreign entity that may have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual. While the previous MD guided the activities of a selection of Canada’s security and intelligence departments, the Act broadened this scope to capture all departments whose interactions with foreign entities included information exchanges where such a concern may apply.

The focus of the Act is to ensure departments take the necessary steps during their information sharing activities to avoid contributing in any way to the mistreatment of an individual. To do this, the Act and the directions lay out a series of requirements that need to be met or implemented when handling information. There is an expectation that each department will satisfy these requirements by leveraging departmentally established mechanisms and procedures, or frameworks that will allow each department to confidently demonstrate how it has responded to its responsibilities under the Act.

During the first year that the Act was in force, written directions using nearly identical language were sent to the Deputy Heads of 12 departments. In regard to disclosure, the directions read as follows:
“If the disclosure of information to a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that Department officials do not disclose the information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.”

With respect to requesting information, the directions state:
“If the making of a request to a foreign entity for information would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual, the Deputy Head must ensure that Department officials do not make the request for information unless the officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances, and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk.”

Lastly, as it relates to the use of information, the directions indicate:
“The Deputy Head must ensure that information that is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity is not used by the Department

  • (a) in any way that creates a substantial risk of further mistreatment;
  • (b) as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding; or
    (c) in any way that deprives someone of their rights or freedoms, unless the Deputy Head or, in exceptional circumstances, a senior official designated by the Deputy Head determines that the use of the information is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant personal injury and authorizes the use accordingly.”

At the heart of the directions is the consideration of substantial risk, and whether that risk, if present, can be mitigated or not. This determination is done on a case-by-case basis. Each department is responsible for making these determinations as it applies to its activities. Following the outcome of a department’s determination of these important questions, cases may be approved, denied, or elevated to the Deputy Head for consideration. For the latter cases, this then results in additional reporting requirements for the Deputy Head. Throughout this process, there is also a requirement to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and limitations of use of all information being handled.

Review Objectives

After the Avoiding Complicity Act came into force in July 2019, the Governor in Council’s written directions were sent to each applicable department in September 2019. The period for this year’s review is September 4, 2019 to December 31, 2019. The short timeframe (approximately 4 months) associated with this year’s review means that departments are being assessed, in large part, on what they would already have had in place to address risks of mistreatment associated with information sharing, or what they were able to implement in a four-month window. NSIRA is cognizant that for the departments that were not previously subject to the 2017 MD on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities, the timeframe to implement the written directions was somewhat limited, as it would have been challenging to create and operationalize new procedures such that they would be reflected in the department’s activities during the period being reviewed.

While it was essential to ensure that both NSIRA and the departments being reviewed met their obligations, these challenges were kept in mind when evaluating the objectives for this first review. Given these considerations, the objectives of this year’s review were to determine whether:

  • departments had fully implemented the directions received under the Act in conformity with the obligations set out therein;
  • departments had established and operationalized frameworks that sufficiently enabled them to meet the obligations set out in the Act and directions; and,
  • there was consistency in implementation across applicable departments.

Methodology and assessment focus

To capture a complete view of the departmental implementation of the Act, NSIRA constructed a series of questions related directly to every department’s obligations under the Act and the directions. The responses and associated information captured what specific activities took place during the review period and what departmental frameworks were leveraged to adequately support these activities.

The information provided by the departments also helped to identify gaps, considerations for best practices, and the work departments have undertaken to build and formalize their frameworks to meet their obligations under the Act and directions. The information provided and the knowledge gained will help set up the foundation for future reviews and help create consistent implementation across departments.

The method used to gather information during a global pandemic was designed for this first and unique review period. We believe it allowed departments to quickly and efficiently indicate both whether the directions had been implemented, and what frameworks, processes, and policies had been leveraged or put in place.

Responses to many of the RFI questions were simply yes/no answers. Often, answers were dependent on what information handling activities took place with foreign entities by the department during the review period. As such, a number of questions could be returned with ‘not applicable’, and this was an acceptable response. Many of the questions were related to specific and easily defined requirements under the Act and its associated directions, e.g. ‘was a report submitted to the Minister?’ or ‘Did the Deputy Minister inform the applicable bodies of all their decision made under the act?’.

Other questions were designed to capture the details of the underlying processes that supported a department’s implementation, i.e. a department may indicate that they ensured no substantial risk of mistreatment was present in any of their information sharing activities, but how did they support this claim? Likewise, for an assertion that a possible substantial risk of mistreatment had been mitigated, what was in place that allowed a department to make this assertion? Therefore, this series of questions required sufficiently detailed responses to fully capture what a department had in place that allowed it to confidently state that it has met its implementation obligations under the Act and the issued directions.

Finally, a portion of the questions was intended to capture the level of uniformity in implementation across departments. This includes such things as country/entity assessments, triage practices, and record keeping. Much of this information will also help with recommendations going forward. This multi-faceted approach resulted in three main areas being evaluated to assess implementation for this review period and help set the groundwork for future reviews.

  • Departments have clear and comprehensive frameworks, policies, and guidelines such that they can demonstrate how they have fully implemented the directions under the Act.
  • All reporting requirements associated with both the Act and its applicable directions have been met.
  • Differences or gaps associate with areas such as country/entities assessments, record keeping, case triage, etc., such that consistent implementation across departments would be challenging.

Summary of the results table

The table in Annex A captures a summary of both the departmental responses to the implementation questions and NSIRA’s assessment regarding these responses. The assessment was based on the associated details provided by departments in the context of the specific information requested. As explained above, many of the responses were returned as not applicable (n/a). Since many implementation requirements are connected to specific activities, the absence of such activities would mean that the requirement does not come into play. The best example of this for the current review is the absence of any Deputy Minister level determinations. All 12 departments indicated that they did not have any cases referred to the Deputy Minister level for determination. All additional reporting requirements associated with this level of decision were not applicable and thus considered satisfied.

If a specific requirement was not met, it was flagged. The relatively few instances of this were connected with departments not meeting certain reporting obligations under the Act. In all cases, the department involved pre-identified these missing requirements and indicated that efforts were underway to address them.

The concerns and findings captured in the table (and others) are discussed subsequently. A concern was flagged in two situations: where there was an uncertainty associated with a department’s ability to support their implementation requirements; and cross-cutting issues related to general aspects of all of the frameworks described, both of which led to the findings and recommendations proposed.

Findings and Recommendations

Realities of Implementation for 2019

A challenge for departments for this first review was associated with one of the assessment items listed above, i.e. whether they had established frameworks to demonstrate how they supported the implementation of the directions they received.

With the Avoiding Complicity Act coming into force in July 2019, it was not feasible that departments would create and stand-up new frameworks for information exchanges in time for the period being reviewed. Although the Act did specify several Deputy Heads that were to receive directions, it only included those who received the previous 2017 MD. The remaining new departments received their directions in September 2019. Regardless of this two-month difference, each department would have been required to rely on, to some extent, existing procedures when handling information sharing with foreign entities during the review period.

This put the departments that had previously formalized policies and processes at an advantage when implementing the directions. For those departments who were not subject to the previous 2017 MD on information sharing, NSIRA considered how they leveraged and adjusted what was already in place to respond to their new responsibilities under the Act. What we then expected to see, for all departments, was what subsequent steps were taken during the review period and afterwards, to either adjust or create frameworks to better meet implementation requirements going forward. NSIRA noted that in response to questions on frameworks for handling information and mitigating risk, several of the departments new to the considerations of the Act provided extensive detail on their efforts and progress on building out their frameworks to support the directives. References to having these frameworks formalized over the subsequent year were also encouraging.

Finding no. 1: NSIRA found that several departments, new to the considerations of the Act, described considerable progress being made during the review period and afterwards to build out formalized frameworks to support implementation.

Importance of establishing operational framework

As discussed, having fully established operational frameworks in place for this review period may not have been feasible for the departments that did not previously have processes to support their activities. This, however, did not exempt a department from the requirements of implementation. Each department was still expected to leverage what it currently had in place to properly address the concerns associated with the Avoiding Complicity Act. Furthermore, there was a logical follow-on expectation that departments would take subsequent steps to build out formal frameworks to address any perceived gaps to support the implementation of the Act going forward if necessary.

After reviewing the responses received, NSIRA is concerned that departments with minimal information sharing activities taking place during their operations have yet to address the necessity of having a robust framework in place, regardless of how often that framework is leveraged. For example, although PS and TC may primarily act as facilitators or coordinators for information exchanges on specific programs, they are still interacting with foreign entities, and therefore are required to fully assess their interactions with a foreign entity in this regard.

If a department without a formal framework assesses that it has few or no cases associated with the Act, then it may believe it is adequately positioned to address any sharing concerns should they arise. This, however, is not the case. Even single instances of information exchange in which the concerns of the Act may apply require a framework to support it properly. In many cases, it will be the framework itself that properly identifies whether a sharing activity raises concerns under the Act. If there is no formal process in place, then this identification becomes problematic. Simply saying that there are no cases or activities associated with the Act is not sufficient. That determination can only be made after a sharing activity is scrutinized through the lens of a robust framework. Going forward, all departments who receive directions should demonstrate a formal framework that ensures all information sharing activities are adequately evaluated against the considerations of the Act.

Finding no. 2: NSIRA found that departments conducting minimal information exchanges with foreign entities have not yet fully addressed the importance of having an official information sharing framework in place.

Recommendation no. 1: NSIRA recommends that all departments in receipt of directions under the Act have an official framework that ensures they can fully support their implementation of the directions.

Community coordination and best practices

While departmental coordination and the sharing of best practices are not a requirement of the Avoiding Complicity Act or the directions, NSIRA considered such an approach’s value. What became clear during this first review was that every department employs a very different framework to guide their information sharing activities with foreign entities. This is to be expected to some extent, given the different mandates, sharing requirements, and areas of focus associated with each department. However, these differences are also a reflection of the independent, internal development that has taken place for the different frameworks being used. While the departments receiving directions under the Act do interact on this subject to some extent, to date, based on the responses provided, it appears that the majority of the work done by the departments to build supporting frameworks to address their responsibilities associated with the Act have been done so independently. There was little to no overlap with how departments described the various aspects of their frameworks, even amongst the departments subject to the earlier MD on this issue.

There would be value in departments collectively identifying the key aspects common or required in all information exchanges with foreign entities and then working together to craft best practices, irrespective of what a department currently has in place. This process should draw on all available resources to make this determination. Each department can then turn to their existing frameworks to consider where and how they can be adjusted to match this community-agreed upon ideal. This is not to say that aspects of what a department already has in place in their framework will not ultimately be seen as the best practice. Several departments do have robust sharing frameworks in place, and these will contribute significantly to this exercise. However, arriving at this determination independently will provide an additional level of confidence.

Department-specific challenges, of course, cannot be ignored. In fact, they will weigh in strongly on such a conversation. Departments share information under their mandates for various reasons, and this will mean that coordination on certain aspects of a sharing framework may not be possible. However, this needs to be evaluated. It is important that what already exists, or what is hard change, does not unduly influence what may be best. This approach will create uniformity (where possible) across the community and provide a starting point for ‘must haves’ for each department to evaluate their existing processes against.

The Public Safety Information Sharing Coordination Group (ISCG) was established to support departments on information sharing. As such, it is in an ideal position to help mitigate issues arising from the lack of coordination. Leading such efforts would build on the work already being done by this group. During recent discussions with NSIRA, the ISCG indicated that the tracking of lessons learned and the sharing of best practices was not yet routine. Going forward, there would be value in a more coordinated effort when departments are updating/changing their framework. Ensuring that this coordination takes place will require support and leadership by senior-level officials. This will help in sharing best practices once identified, and establish more consistent approaches across departments.

Finding no. 3: NSIRA found that the differences and variability in departmental frameworks demonstrate a previous lack of coordination across the community and a need to identify best practices.

Recommendation no. 2: NSIRA recommends that departments coordinate to identify best practices for all essential components of information sharing frameworks and that the ISCG is leveraged to ensure these practices are shared where possible across the community to support the implementation of the Act.

Framework application inconsistency

A series of questions in this review was related to aspects of consistency in how departments apply their frameworks. From this series, a comparison was made on how many times an information sharing/use event triggered an evaluation of any kind against the considerations of the Avoiding Complicity Act, versus how many of these triaged cases were elevated or referred up for decision. The results helped gauge two important aspects of a framework: One, the threshold requirements, i.e. how often a sharing activity triggers an evaluation of any kind; and two, the decision making power given to the operators who are initially handling these activities.

The feedback and the responses received demonstrate potential inconsistencies in both aspects across departments. For example, several departments indicated zero cases as being triaged/evaluated under the concerns of the Act during the review period, yet also specified that they are involved in regular information sharing or, specified that no information received from foreign entities was derived from mistreatment. These responses appear to be inconsistent as it would be problematic to participate in information sharing or to make such mistreatment determinations without the activity being evaluated on some level.

Other departments indicated a larger number of cases as initial triaged/evaluated, but also indicated that none of them were elevated in their decision making process for higher-level decisions. This would seem to suggest that all determinations were being made at the operational level. Such a result puts significant weight on the operator and the initial assessment tools they are leveraging if they are making all determinations independently. This reinforces the importance of a robust framework to help make these determinations, as previously indicated in Finding no. 2. As a result of these differences, potential challenges arise on accurately assessing the volume of cases being handled by departments, the tracking of those cases deemed to present a substantial risk, those which can be mitigated for, and those where the risk was not found to be substantial or even present.

These responses may result from how each department defines a ‘case’ or how it records a case, or they may be a result of differences in how a department’s decision-making process is leveraged. NSIRA’s concern is that these differences may indicate an inconsistency in application thresholds at different departments. As such, the following results were viewed as a potential issue based on the responses received:

  • if a department was involved in any kind for information exchange with a foreign entity during the review period, but did not indicate that any cases were formally triaged/evaluated; or
  • if there was a significant number of cases triaged, but none were elevated to a higher level for determination.

Such results do not necessarily indicate a problem as aspects of a framework may be able to account for this, however, looking further into how and why the department’s framework produced these outcomes is important. Future reviews will be able to do this. Consistent initial steps for information sharing activities, including triage/evaluation thresholds and documentation, are critical to the effective application of a framework, and ultimately to identifying best practices.

Finding no. 4: NSIRA found that there are inconsistencies in the application of existing sharing frameworks between departments, specifically concerning information evaluation thresholds, and decisions being elevated for senior level determinations,

Recommendation no. 3: NSIRA recommends that departments establish consistent thresholds for triggers in their information sharing frameworks, including initial evaluations against the concerns of the Act, when a case is to be elevated in the decision process, and how this is documented.

Country and entity assessments

A key recommendation of NSIRA’s previous review on information sharing related to the country/entity assessments being used by departments to inform their decision making process when sharing or using information with a foreign entity. While the use of country/entity assessments is not a required aspect of implementing the directions under the Act, NSIRA continues to support this tool as an important aspect of any sharing framework. In its previous review, NSIRA determined that having a firm grasp on the human rights situation, as well as any other pertinent information associated with a country/entity, was essential to making an informed decision on whether there should be concerns, caveats, or limitations when handling information with that country/entity. Moreover, having such information captured to ensure all departments consistently approach these countries/entities is critical. At the time of the previous review, the following recommendation was made:

  • a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including as standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and
  • to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.

It is important to note that there has been no formal response from departments on this previous recommendation as of the date of this report. Furthermore, during this report, two departments continue to raise concerns with NSIRA’s stance on this issue during the consultation process. While NSIRA continues to support this recommendation, as explained below, further discussions with departments on how to approach this matter may be warranted, specifically on the distinction between how this recommendation may apply to a foreign country/entity vs a specific foreign partner a department may be dealing with.

Based on the responses provided on this topic for the current review period, there is still inconsistency in this area. While almost all departments indicated that country/entity assessments were a standard part of their framework, the responses also indicate differences in which country assessments are used, how they are leveraged, and who is responsible for updating them. For example, several departments rely on their own in-house created assessments, while others leverage the assessments created by Global Affairs Canada and others. While departments who indicated that they are leveraging country/entity assessment tools in their process also indicated that these assessments captured human rights concerns, this has yet to be independently evaluated. NSIRA is concerned that these differences could result in different approaches/stances being taken by departments when dealing with the same foreign entity. While the country/entity assessments tools themselves are not necessarily in question, the fact that every department is not leveraging or does not have access to all useful or applicable information is.

NSIRA remains of the view that having a consistent stance on all countries and entities when implementing the requirements of the Act is important. Issues such as mistreatment and human rights should not be decided at a departmental level, but on a whole-of-government level. While mindful of classification levels, ensuring all departments have access to the same relevant information associated with a foreign country/entity is critical to making an informed decision. Due to the nature of their work, departments may be privy to unique information on a country/entity, some or all of which can be shared. This would lead to fully informed assessments that allow for a consistent approach when dealing with any country/entity. In addition to improving duplication of effort in this area by departments, NSIRA continues to see standardized country and entity assessments, which can be accessed and contributed to by all departments, as key to moving toward a more consistent and effective implementation of the Act across the community

Finding no. 5: NSIRA found a lack of unification and standardization in the country and entity assessments being leveraged by departments, resulting in inconsistencies in approach/stance by the community when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern related to the Act.

Recommendation no. 4: NSIRA recommends that departments identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach by departments when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern under the Act.

Conclusion

While aspects of implementation can be easily quantified and evaluated e.g. reporting requirements to a Minister, others, which support implementation are more difficult to measure, e.g.:

  • What does a sufficiently robust framework for assessing and mitigating risk when sharing with a foreign entity look like?
  • Does this depend on the specific requirements and activities of the department; or,
  • Are there steps that should always be involved when vetting a foreign entity under the considerations of the Act?

Measuring and weighing the answers to such questions is challenging. They are more nuanced, and can’t be as easily quantified. Regardless, they must be considered and addressed. Drawing on the considerations and concerns identified in this review will help departments to ask the questions that will improve their underlying frameworks with the following goals in mind:

  • To identify the essential/key elements that need to be a part of any framework for it to address the concerns associated with the Avoiding Complicity Act sufficiently; and,
  • To have all identified best practices implemented as consistently as possible across departments.

Future reviews will push towards these goals by seeking answers to those questions above. By looking more closely at specific case studies, departmental legal opinions, items of inconsistency, and the departmental frameworks that are already demonstrating best practices that should be shared. Ultimately the results of such efforts will contribute to improving the implementation of the Act across the community.

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Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019: Backgrounder

Review Of Departmental Implementation Of The Avoiding Complicity In Mistreatment By Foreign Entities Act For 2019


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

In 2011, the Government of Canada implemented a general framework for Addressing Risks of Mistreatment in Sharing Information with Foreign Entities. The framework aimed to establish a coherent and consistent approach across government when sharing and receiving information with Foreign Entities. Following this, Ministerial Direction was issued to applicable departments in 2011 on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities, and then again in 2017 on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities.

On July 13, 2019, the Avoiding Complicity Act came into force. This Act codifies and enshrines Canada’s commitments in respect to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Canada’s international legal obligations on prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment.

On September 4, 2019, pursuant to section 3 of the Act, the Governor in Council (GiC) issued written directions to the Deputy Heads of the following 12 departments and agencies: Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Public Safety Canada (PS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Transport Canada (TC).

The GiC issued directions focused on three aspects of handling information when interacting with a foreign entity: the disclosure of information, the requesting of information, and the use of any information received.

Pursuant to section 7 of the Act, every Deputy Head having received direction must, before March 1 of each year, submit to the appropriate Minister a report regarding the implementation of those directions during the previous calendar year. Following this, every Deputy Head must, as soon as feasible after submitting the report, make a version of it available to the public.

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