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Review of Departmental Frameworks for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities 2017 MD: Report

Review of Departmental Frameworks for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities 2017 MD


Report

Date of Publishing:

1. Executive Summary

In 2011 and again in 2017, ministers issued direction (hereafter Ministerial Direction or MD) to a number of departments setting out how to manage the risks of mistreatment posed by the sharing of information with foreign entities. Most recently, Parliament passed the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA). In September 2019, direction under the ACMFEA was issued to twelve departments, six of which had never before received formal direction regarding information sharing with foreign entities.

This review set out to build NSIRA’s knowledge of the information sharing processes adopted by departments under the 2017 MD. The direction issued pursuant to the ACMFEA in September 2019 codified many provisions of the 2017 MD and left the essential prohibitions and limits unchanged. As such, this review provided a foundation that will expedite and facilitate NSIRA’s future information sharing reviews.

The review focused on the six departments that had received the 2017 MD: the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CSBA), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF).

Observations and Recommendations

Degrees of implementation vary across departments

NSIRA noted significant differences between the six departments with regard to the level of implementation of information sharing processes. In summary:

  • CSE, CSIS and the RCMP have implemented the 2017 MD.
  • DND/CAF is in the process of implementing final elements of the 2017 MD.
  • GAC has not yet fully implemented the 2017 MD.
  • In practice, CBSA has not yet operationalized the 2017 MD.

The concept of “substantial risk” of mistreatment is not defined

Like the 2017 MD, the ACMFEA and its associated direction prohibit information sharing that would result in a “substantial risk” of mistreatment. Neither the ACMFEA nor its direction include a definition of substantial risk, however, despite the centrality of this concept to the regime. A definition of substantial risk existed in both the 2011 and 2017 MD; its absence now raises concerns about its interpretation in future.

Recommendation: The definition of “substantial risk” should be codified in law or public direction.

Departments vary with respect to the independence of their decision-making

  • CSE and the RCMP have the most independent processes.
  • The information sharing processes implemented by GAC to date remove high- risk decision-making from “front line” personnel.
  • At CSIS and DND/CAF, decision-makers typically have a direct operational interest in the sharing of information.
  • CBSA has not yet operationalized its information sharing processes.

Recommendation: Departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.

Lack of standardized information sharing risk assessments

Under the 2017 MD, GAC, CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP all maintain their own sets of foreign country and/or entity profiles, while DND/CAF is currently developing its own as well. The existence of multiple different assessments is duplicative and unnecessary. It may also yield inconsistencies, as departments have at times come to quite different conclusions about foreign countries’ and entities’ human rights records and the associated risks of information sharing.

Recommendation: Departments should develop: (a) a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including a standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and (b) to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.

Benefits of internal information sharing process reviews

Finally, NSIRA noted that periodic internal reviews of information sharing policies and processes supported their successful functioning in the long term.

Recommendation: Departments should conduct periodic internal reviews of their policies and processes for sharing information with foreign entities in order to identify gaps and areas in need of improvement.

2. Authorities

This review was conducted under the authority of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), specifically paragraphs 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(b) as well as sections 9 and 11.

3. Introduction

Many departments and agencies in the Government of Canada routinely share information with foreign entities. Given that information sharing with entities in certain countries can result in a risk of mistreatment for individuals, it is incumbent upon the Government of Canada to evaluate and mitigate the risks that such sharing creates. This is particularly the case for information sharing related to national security and intelligence, where the information often relates to alleged participation in terrorism or other criminal activity.

Canada has made a number of binding commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading treatment or Punishment (CAT), and other international agreements. The prohibitions on mistreatment – including complicity in mistreatment – set out in these agreements are also considered to be customary international law. Some of Canada’s obligations have been incorporated into domestic law under section 269.1 of the Criminal Code.

In 2011 and again in 2017, ministers issued direction to a number of departments setting out how to manage the risks in information sharing with foreign entities. Most recently, Parliament passed Bill C-59, which included the ACMFEA. In September 2019, direction under the ACMFEA was issued to twelve departments, six of which had never before received formal direction regarding information sharing with foreign entities.

Subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act requires NSIRA to review annually every department’s implementation of the directions of the GiC issued under the ACMFEA. In 2020, the NSIRA will undertake its first such review. The purpose of the present review, however, was to build NSIRA’s knowledge and understanding of departments’ implementation of the 2017 MD. The direction issued pursuant to the ACMFEA in September 2019 codified many provisions of the 2017 MD and left the essential prohibitions and limits unchanged. As such, this review provided a valuable foundation that will expedite and facilitate NSIRA’s future information sharing reviews.

The review focused on the six departments that received the 2017 MD: CSIS, CSE, the RCMP, CBSA, GAC, and DND/CAF. NSIRA examined departments’ policies and processes as well as documents related to foreign arrangements. Where possible, NSIRA examined a single case study for each department in order to illustrate how information sharing works in practice. Given the high-level approach taken in this review, NSIRA opted to make a series of broad observations about the strengths and weaknesses of departments’ framework for information sharing with foreign entities, in the place of formal findings. Where NSIRA made recommendations, they were interdepartmental in scope.

This review focused on departmental policies and procedures for the disclosure and requesting of information involving a risk of mistreatment. It did not examine the use of information that may have been derived from mistreatment; NSIRA may review this topic in future.

4. Background

In 2011, the Government of Canada approved a general framework for “Addressing Risks of Mistreatment in Sharing Information with Foreign Entities”. The framework was the first multi-departmental set of instructions issued regarding information sharing and mistreatment. Its main aim was to establish a coherent and consistent approach across government when sharing information with foreign entities.

Later in 2011, a number of departments whose mandate related to national security and/or intelligence received Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (the 2011 MD). Specifically, the 2011 MD was issued to CSIS, CSE, CBSA, and the RCMP. The 2011 MD, which was eventually released under the Access to Information Act, was subject to extensive criticism from non-governmental organizations, civil liberties groups, and others including the Canadian Bar Association. The main critique was that the 2011 MD did not clearly prohibit the disclosure or requesting of information entailing a “substantial risk” of mistreatment, but rather permitted departments to weigh the value of the information against the risk of mistreatment.

In 2017, the 2011 MD was replaced by a new Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (the 2017 MD). The 2017 MD was received by CSIS, CSE, CBSA, and the RCMP – the departments that had received the 2011 MD – as well as by DND/CAF and GAC. The 2017 MD included numerous changes, but the most significant were clear prohibitions on the disclosure and requesting of information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment, as well as new limits on the use of information likely derived from mistreatment by a foreign entity. In addition, the new MD required departments to maintain policies and procedures to assess the risks of their information sharing relationships with foreign entities.

The 2017 MD further directed departments to cooperate in making assessments regarding foreign countries and entities. In response, Public Safety Canada (PS) established the Information Sharing Coordination Group (ISCG) comprised of PS and the six departments that had received the 2017 MD. The objective was to encourage interdepartmental discussions in support of a coordinated approach to the implementation of the MD.

On July 13, 2019, the ACMFEA came into force. The ACMFEA requires the GiC to issue direction to the six departments that had received the 2017 MD, and gives the GiC discretion to issue direction to other departments as well. On September 4, 2019, the GiC issued direction under the ACMFEA to twelve departments. In addition to the six mandatory departments, direction was issued to PS; the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC); Transport Canada; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC); the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA); and Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO). These six new departments have now also joined the PS-led ISCG.

In practice, the information sharing regime set out by the ACMFEA and the subsequent GiC direction closely resembles the 2017 MD. The fundamental limits on Canadian departments’ scope to share information remain unchanged. Notably, however, the new regime omits certain aspects of the 2017 MD. The ACMFEA and its associated direction lack the 2017 MD’s requirement that departments maintain policies and procedures for assessing the risks associated with foreign information sharing arrangements, in collaboration with other departments. More importantly, the new system omits a definition of the threshold of “substantial risk”. The ramifications of this are discussed below.

5. Observations and Recommendations

Reporting

One of the new obligations placed on departments in the 2017 MD was a requirement that they provide an annual report to their minister that included:

All of the departments that were issued the 2017 MD fulfilled their obligation to report to their respective ministers by producing a report in late 2018 or early 2019 discussing the first year of activity under the MD. At the time of writing, however, not all of the departments have issued a public report. As this was a foundational review, NSIRA did not critically evaluate the reports.

Department Report to Minister Public report Cases approved Cases denied
CBSA Provided Published 0 0
CSIS12 Provided Published 1 1
RCMP13 Provided Published 25 4
CSE14 Provided Published 1 0
DND/CAF Provided Not Published 0 0
GAC Provided Not Published 0 0

Implementation of the 2017 Ministerial Direction

When the 2017 MD was issued, departments that had already built information sharing policies and procedures under the 2011 MD found themselves at a significant advantage. CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP in particular were able to quickly adapt their existing systems to the 2017 MD. Accordingly, for departments that had not received the 2011 MD – or had not implemented it – the arrival of the 2017 MD proved more challenging.

CSE: NSIRA observes that CSE has fully implemented all of the elements of the 2017 MD. The MD’s requirements have been integrated directly into CSE’s operational policies and processes. A detailed overview of CSE’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex D.

RCMP: In response to the 2017 MD, the RCMP overhauled their information sharing framework and stood up a new Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG) that, amongst other things, assesses country human rights records and maintains a system for streaming information sharing requests according to risk. The RCMP is currently working to integrate these processes into their comprehensive operational manual. A detailed overview of the RCMP’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex E.

CSIS: Following the issuance of the 2017 MD, CSIS quickly updated their policies and procedures. In 2018, CSIS also created a new system to implement the MD’s requirement to restrict information sharing with foreign entities that engage in mistreatment, with three levels of restriction depending on the seriousness of the problem. CSIS has informed NSIRA that it is overhauling its current policies and procedures. A detailed overview of CSIS’s current information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex F.

DND/CAF: Although DND/CAF did not receive the 2011 MD, DND/CAF has had internal directives in place governing information sharing with foreign entities since 2010. The DND/CAF policy and process suite for information sharing was updated following the issuance of the 2017 MD to bring it into compliance with the new requirements. While DND/CAF vets partner forces, it does not yet have a fully developed system for assessing and managing the risks of sharing information with foreign entities. DND/CAF is, however, currently developing more extensive country risk profiles and a standardized assessment process that will be used to assess the risks of information sharing prior to establishing information sharing arrangements. A detailed overview of DND/CAF’s information sharing framework can be found at Annex G.

GAC: Following receipt of the 2017 MD, GAC established a new Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC) in December 2018. The MDCC’s objective is to review requests for information sharing that may engage the MD. This is the extent of GAC’s policies and processes pursuant to the MD, however. GAC lacks any policies or procedures setting out how employees are to assess instances of possible information sharing to ensure that all appropriate cases reach the MDCC. It is insufficient to merely inform employees that they are responsible for assessing a complex legal threshold – the concept of a “substantial risk” of mistreatment at the core of the 2011 and 2017 MD as well as the ACMFEA – without guidance as to how they should proceed. As such, NSIRA observes that GAC has not yet fully implemented the 2017 MD.

GAC (cont.): Of note, GAC produces human rights reports on countries that are widely used within government to assist in assessing the risks of sharing with foreign entities. Following the 2017 MD, GAC added a subsection specific to mistreatment to these reports. A detailed overview of GAC’s information sharing framework and the results of the case study examined by NSIRA can be found at Annex H.

CBSA: In October 2018, CBSA issued a revised high-level policy document in response to the 2017 MD. The document did not include concrete processes for identifying and handling instances of information sharing involving a risk of mistreatment, however. CBSA employees thus lack effective guidance with which to discharge their responsibilities under the MD. CBSA also has no process for assessing the risks associated with specific foreign countries and entities, as required by the MD. CBSA has since drafted processes and additional policies, but they have not yet been finalized or invoked. Given these significant gaps, NSIRA observes that CBSA has not yet operationalized the 2017 MD. CBSA has informed NSIRA, however, that it intends to introduce significant improvements over the coming year. A detailed overview of CBSA’s information sharing framework can be found at Annex I.

Additional observations are included in the department-specific annexes referenced above. It should also be noted that NSIRA examined departmental policies and processes at a high level, and as such future reviews may make additional findings and recommendations regarding policies and processes. Moreover, a number of departments are in the process of revamping their information sharing practices, including in particular CSIS and DND/CAF.

In its survey of departments, NSIRA noted varying levels of rigour and consistency with regard to record keeping. Accurate and detailed records of deliberations and reasoning in support of decision-making related to information sharing with foreign entities are necessary to support accountability, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Vavilov. NSIRA may return to this subject in future years.

In June 2019, the RCMP conducted an internal review of the framework and policies in place for its information sharing policies and procedures. The review identified certain shortcomings with regard to policies, processes, training, and resourcing. Based on the draft provided, NSIRA observes that the review was candid and thorough. The review is currently being used to guide improvements. Periodic internal reviews – such as the one conducted by the RCMP – should be considered a best practice.

Recommendation no. 1: Departments should conduct periodic internal reviews of their policies and processes for sharing information with foreign entities in order to identify gaps and areas in need of improvement.

Independent Decision-Making

The concept of risk mitigation is key to the information sharing frameworks of departments. When information sharing would result in a substantial risk that an individual would be mistreated, the information can only be shared if the department takes measures to mitigate the risk of mistreatment such that the residual risk is no longer substantial. Much therefore depends on who, within departments, is authorized to make decisions regarding whether:

  • an instance of proposed information sharing would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment; and
  • the proposed mitigation measures are sufficient.

In looking at the various decision-making processes adopted by departments, NSIRA noted varying levels of independence from operational personnel. Of particular interest were processes where the individual making decisions has a direct operational interest in the sharing of the information, creating the potential for conflict between operational imperatives and departmental obligations to respect the MD.

At CSE, the complete Mistreatment Risk Assessment process is conducted by non-operational units. The centralization of information sharing decision-making in a single branch minimizes direct operational pressure while facilitating informed and objective decisions.

The RCMP process uses other mechanisms to ensure independent decision- making. Individual investigators, when they wish to share information, must consult a list of countries and types of information sharing that the RCMP has pre-determined as representing sufficient risk of mistreatment. If the proposed sharing matches the list, then the case is automatically referred to the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC). FIRAC comprises a range of senior officials from RCMP headquarters who are a step removed from the operational front-line. The RCMP’s system of referral to FIRAC based on clear criteria removes discretion from officers with a vested interest in the sharing of the information. These officers may not have a full understanding of the geopolitical context of the proposed information sharing and thus are not best-placed to assess whether a substantial risk of mistreatment would result.

GAC requests that Directors General and Heads of Mission refer all cases where proposed information sharing “presents the potential for substantial risk of mistreatment” to the MDCC. The decision as to whether the substantial risk can be mitigated is made centrally by the MDCC, which comprises senior officials from across the department as well as a legal representative. As noted above, however, GAC currently does not provide officials with guidance on how to determine whether the threshold for referral to the MDCC has been met.

Compared to CSE, GAC, and the RCMP, decision-making at CSIS and DND/CAF is much closer to operations. CSIS provides high-level guidance to desks on how to identify information sharing that may result in a substantial risk of mistreatment, but leaves final decision-making regarding whether the situation does in fact create a substantial risk, and whether the risk can be mitigated, to the Deputy Director General or the Director General of each branch. Only if CSIS has heavily restricted information sharing with the foreign entity in question – or else the branch is unsure whether the substantial risk can be mitigated – then the branch must refer the case to the Information Sharing Evaluation Committee (ISEC) for determination. As a result, most of CSIS’s information sharing decisions – even those involving a substantial risk of mistreatment – are made by officials with a direct operational stake in the outcome of the proposed information sharing.

Within DND/CAF, decisions regarding the sharing of information rest with officers within the military chain of command. NSIRA was informed that while routine information sharing is approved by designated lower-level officers in theatre, cases involving unusual circumstances, or where there is uncertainty as to whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists or can be mitigated, are elevated to senior levels. Once passed up the chain of command, senior officers receive advice from a range of officials at headquarters.

CBSA, at the present time, does not have processes to assess substantial risk or to make decisions regarding whether such risks can be mitigated. In practice, therefore, the onus currently rests on CBSA officers, acting without guidance, to identify cases that invoke the 2017 MD and to manage the associated risks. CBSA has drafted a procedure for cases where there is uncertainty as to whether a substantial risk of mistreatment can be mitigated, but it has not yet been implemented.

Recommendation no. 2: Departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.

Country Assessments

As noted above, a significant addition to the 2017 MD was the requirement that departments maintain policies and procedures to assess the risks of their information sharing relationships with foreign entities. Notably, the MD required departments to assess the human rights records of foreign countries generally and not just of specific foreign entities (i.e., police or intelligence services) within those countries. While the MD did not prohibit information sharing with foreign entities in countries with troubling human rights records, it implied that Canada’s relationships with such foreign entities could not be considered in isolation from the broader human rights environment in which these entities functioned.

In several instances, NSIRA noticed departments citing an absence of direct Government of Canada intelligence of mistreatment by a specific foreign entity in support of a proposed sharing of information, or else in support of a less restrictive information sharing policy towards the entity in question – despite ample reporting of systemic human rights abuses in the public domain. NSIRA observes that a lack of internal Government of Canada reporting of mistreatment by a specific foreign entity is not evidence that the entity does not engage in mistreatment. Departments must consider the full range of sources in assessing risk, including open sources such as the media and non-governmental organizations.

GAC, CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP all maintain their own sets of foreign country and/or entity profiles, while DND/CAF is currently developing its own as well. The existence of multiple different assessments is duplicative and unnecessary. and It may also yield significant inconsistencies, as departments have at times come to quite different conclusions about foreign countries’ and entities’ human rights records and the associated risks of information sharing. With the issuance of direction under the ACMFEA to twelve departments, this issue will likely grow. See Annex F for additional discussion of this point.

The ISCG seeks to guide departments in developing their human rights assessment processes by providing a forum to discuss best practices. PS informed NSIRA that the ISCG had not discussed plans to standardize these assessments.

Recommendation no. 3: Departments should develop:

  • a unified set of assessments of the human rights situations in foreign countries including a standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and
  • to the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.

The recommendation above does not preclude department-specific approaches to mitigating the risks of mistreatment. For instance, a department may be able to draw upon aspects of its relationship with a foreign entity to reduce the risk of mistreatment not available to other departments. These differences should not affect the initial determination of the underlying risk of mistreatment posed by information sharing with a foreign entity, however.

In India v. Badesha (2017), the Supreme Court of Canada recently provided guidance on contextual factors to be considered when assessing the reliability of assurances sought from foreign entities regarding mistreatment. Though not exhaustive, the decision provides departments with some guidance regarding the adequacy of assurances received.

Duty of Care

In reviewing GAC, NSIRA noted a tension between adherence to the 2017 MD and GAC’s duty of care with regard to the safety and security of mission staff abroad. Indeed, both cases of information sharing referred to the MDCC in 2019 involved threats to mission In one of the cases, information was shared with a foreign entity before the MDCC had had the chance to assess the risk of mistreatment. In this instance, the GAC official cited the need to protect the safety of mission staff (see Annex H).

NSIRA acknowledges the importance of mission security and the seriousness of the conundrums that can arise when the needs of mission security and GAC’s obligations with respect to information sharing collide. Yet the charged atmosphere of a mission under threat may not be the best venue for quick decision-making involving risks of mistreatment.

Substantial Risk

Like the 2017 MD, the ACMFEA and its associated direction prohibit information sharing that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment. Neither the ACMFEA nor its direction include a definition of “substantial risk”, however, despite the centrality of this concept to the regime. A definition of substantial risk existed in both the 2011 and 2017 MD; its absence now raises concerns about its interpretation in the future.

In consultation with other departments, PS is developing a policy document that includes the same definition of substantial risk that was found in the 2011 and 2017 MD. The document also contains guidance on other requirements contained in the 2017 MD but that were omitted from the ACMFEA and its direction. When asked by NSIRA, the six departments that had been subject to the 2017 MD all stated that they intended to continue abiding by the established definition of substantial risk. This is reassuring, and should limit the potential for inconsistency between departments. Nonetheless, such a crucial definition should not be left up to individual departments to determine.

Recommendation no. 4: The definition of “substantial risk” should be codified in law or public direction.

The definition of substantial risk in the 2017 MD requires that mistreatment be “foreseeable”. As described in Annex G, DND/CAF’s assessment of foreseeability encompasses a number of factors, but a key component is that the risk of mistreatment be a “causal consequence” of DND/CAF information sharing. NSIRA observes that DND/CAF’s interpretation of foreseeability runs the risk of narrowing the definition of substantial risk and therefore the application of the 2017 MD. Given the importance of a clear and consistent understanding of “substantial risk” across departments, in future years NSIRA may review the application of the “substantial risk” threshold by DND/CAF – and other departments – to information sharing with foreign entities.

A substantial risk of mistreatment is defined as existing in cases where mistreatment is more likely than not. The definition includes a qualifier, however, that the threshold may be met at lower level of probability “where the risk is of severe harm”. This reflects a larger point that the assessment of substantial risk is not intended to be a narrowly mechanistic process of balancing probabilities. The 2017 MD notes that the Government of Canada “has no interest in actions associated with the use of torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. Knowingly associating the Government of Canada with any of these actions would damage the credibility and effectiveness of any department or agency associated with them”. When interpreting the threshold of substantial risk, departments should always bear in mind the larger purpose of Canada’s framework for sharing information with foreign entities.

In order to give life to this framework, it is incumbent on departments, first, to ensure that their employees are trained to the point where they fully understand their legal obligations, and second, to establish clear and well-developed processes that foster and facilitate compliance in the broadest sense.

6. Conclusion

This review set out to build NSIRA’s knowledge of the information sharing processes adopted by departments under the 2017 MD. NSIRA noted significant differences between the six departments reviewed with respect to the level of implementation of information sharing processes. Processes also varied widely in terms of the level of independence of decision-making.

Although departmental information sharing frameworks will continue to evolve over time, this review will provide a baseline of comparison for future developments under the ACMFEA. The review also served to identify areas of potential concern that NSIRA may revisit in future years.

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Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021: Report

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021


Report

Date of Publishing:

1. Executive Summary

1.This report describes the results of a review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) of the 2021 disclosures made by federal institutions under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). This is the third year of implementation of the SCIDA regime. This year, NSIRA decided to focus the review on Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) proactive disclosures.

2.The SCIDA encourages and facilitates the disclosure of information between federal institutions to protect Canada against activities that undermine or threaten national security, subject to certain conditions. The SCIDA provides a two-part threshold which must be met prior to making a disclosure: that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances. The SCIDA also includes provisions and guiding principles related to the management of disclosures, including accuracy and reliability statements and record keeping obligations.

3.NSIRA identified concerns that demonstrate the need for improved training. NSIRA found that there is potential for confusion on whether the SCIDA is the appropriate mechanism for certain disclosures of national security-related information. Some disclosures were of concern as GAC did not meet the two-part threshold requirements of the SCIDA prior to disclosing the information. Without meeting these requirements, some disclosures of personal information were not compliant with the SCIDA. Two disclosures did not contain accuracy and reliability statements, as required under the SCIDA. With respect to record-keeping, NSIRA recommends that departments contemporaneously document the information relied on to satisfy themselves that disclosures will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

4.NSIRA is confident that it received all information necessary to conduct the review.

2. Introduction

5.When federal departments fail to share national security information in a timely, coordinated, or responsible manner, serious and tragic consequences can result – as the Arar and Air India Inquiries found. As a mechanism in Canada’s national security accountability framework, NSIRA is mandated to prepare a report respecting disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) during the previous calendar year. This is the only NSIRA review that must be made public and laid before both the House of Commons and the Senate, reflecting the importance Parliament has placed on independent review and accountability of national security information disclosure.

6.The SCIDA’s designated long title also reflects its stated purpose: An Act to encourage and facilitate the disclosure of information between Government of Canada institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine the security of Canada.

7.The SCIDA governs how Government of Canada institutions disclose information, including personal information, that is relevant to activities that undermine the security of Canada, to a select group of federal institutions with national security mandates. Disclosures are either made proactively, on the initiative of a Government of Canada institution, or in response to a request by an institution authorized to receive information under the SCIDA.

8.It is important to note that the SCIDA is simply a tool. It is only as useful as its real-time recognition and application. Its success relies on how individuals and institutions interact with and implement its provisions. Those federal government institutions authorized to disclose information under the SCIDA must maintain a certain vigilance for information that may have national security repercussions, including at the most basic operational level. Having recognized information that could involve national security matters, departments must then decide whether they are authorized to disclose that information and to whom, paying close attention to minimizing any impacts on individual privacy rights.

9.Federal departments and agencies with core national security mandates are generally able to rely on their own legal frameworks to share information with other domestic institutions, and do not require the SCIDA to do so. Previous NSIRA reports have found that for many such institutions, disclosures made under the SCIDA comprise only a small portion of their domestic national security information sharing.

10.NSIRA understands the significance of the SCIDA in the overall national security framework, and is concerned with its robust application, in keeping with the provisions of the SCIDA, including its guiding principles, and with respect to the disclosure of personal information. What is more, NSIRA has the ability to review all disclosures across the Government of Canada, and through this broad lens, can identify common themes and trends. This perspective, not available to individual federal departments, enables NSIRA to make findings and recommendations that can strengthen overall information disclosure within the national security framework.

Focus of this Review

11.In determining the focus of this review, NSIRA considered the concerns raised in its review conducted the year prior. In the review of disclosures made under the SCIDA in 2020, which NSIRA undertook jointly with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC), the review found that the majority of federal department disclosures – approximately 99 per cent – met the threshold requirements that permit information to be disclosed under the SCIDA. In other words, the disclosing institutions sufficiently demonstrated that they had satisfied themselves, prior to providing the disclosures, that the information to be disclosed would contribute to the exercise of the recipient’s jurisdiction or responsibilities respecting activities that undermine the security of Canada, and that it would not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

12.The few disclosures that raised concerns, however, were those that had been provided to the recipient institutions on a proactive basis. As such, NSIRA chose to focus on this category for its 2021 review of disclosures under the SCIDA. In 2021, the majority of proactive disclosures came from Global Affairs Canada (GAC). NSIRA therefore chose to focus on GAC’s proactive disclosures in 2021, as a representative sample.

13.In addition to reviewing these disclosures from the perspective of the SCIDA’s prerequisite thresholds, this review also assessed other important requirements under the SCIDA that help to ensure responsible disclosures of national security information. These include the need for disclosures to be accompanied by statements that attest to the accuracy and reliability of the information being disclosed, as well as the obligation on all disclosing institutions to prepare and keep records that set out a description of the information that was relied on to satisfy themselves that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA.

14.Although the review sample focused on GAC proactive disclosures, many findings and recommendations are general and illustrative and, in many instances, may be useful to all institutions when disclosing under the SCIDA.

Review Objectives

15.The objectives of this review were to assess proactive disclosures of information under the SCIDA.

16.Specifically, the review assessed whether GAC:

  • a) Satisfied itself, prior to disclosing any information, that the disclosure would contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction, or the carrying out of its responsibilities, in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, as required under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA;
  • b) Satisfied itself, prior to disclosing any information, that the disclosure would not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances, as required under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA;
  • c) Described, at the time of the disclosure, the accuracy of the information disclosed and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained, as required under subsection 5(2) of the SCIDA; and
  • d) Kept records that included a description of the information that was relied on to satisfy itself that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA, as required under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA.

Methodology

17.NSIRA received 195 disclosures of information from federal departments that reported either disclosing or receiving information under the SCIDA between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2021. NSIRA conducted a preliminary review of all disclosures received.

18.NSIRA focused this year’s review on GAC proactive disclosures only. GAC identified 16 proactive disclosures out of a total of 44 disclosures under the SCIDA in 2021. However, in reviewing the material provided by GAC, NSIRA noted that three of these files were in fact requests for information from another department, and not disclosures of information under the SCIDA. As such, NSIRA removed these three files from the review sample, and only analyzed the remaining 13 disclosures identified by GAC as proactive disclosures.

19.NSIRA sent five follow up requests for information to GAC regarding its disclosures, and assessed all records provided.

3. Analysis

20. In conducting this review, NSIRA observed positive components of disclosures that it endeavours to highlight in this report. Proactive disclosures are an important feature of the SCIDA regime, and the following findings and recommendations aim to enhance compliance with the SCIDA.

Thresholds for disclosing information to federal institutions under the SCIDA

a) Jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada

21. Paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA requires departments to satisfy themselves that disclosures “will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction, or the carrying out of its responsibilities, under an Act of Parliament or another lawful authority, in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada.”

22. The definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada” is set out at subsection 2(1) of the SCIDA and includes, for example, espionage and terrorism. Certain activities are excluded from this definition, notably advocacy and protest not carried out in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada.

23. In conducting this review, NSIRA examined each disclosure in the sample and its corresponding documentation to assess whether GAC had satisfied itself, prior to making the disclosure, that the information to be disclosed would contribute to the recipient department’s jurisdiction in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, as defined in the SCIDA.

24. In 12 of the 13 disclosures reviewed, GAC sufficiently demonstrated that it had satisfied itself as to these requirements. Furthermore, in all of these 12 disclosures, GAC documented that it had considered not only whether the recipient had the appropriate jurisdiction, but also how the information would contribute to that jurisdiction in respect of an activity that undermines the security of Canada as defined in the SCIDA. For example, see text box 1. The information in the disclosure file supports the text of this statement.

Text box 1: Example of statement in disclosure demonstrating GAC satisfied itself as to the requirements under 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA

GAC’s disclosure will contribute to the carrying out of CSIS’ responsibilities under section 12 of the CSIS Act, which require CSIS to investigate activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada. Section 2.a of the CSIS Act defines threats to the security of Canada as encompassing threats or acts of “espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage.” CSIS collects, analyzes and retains information and intelligence on these threats to the extent that it is strictly necessary to do so, and reports to and advises the Government of Canada. In the circumstances, GAC’s disclosure will contribute to CSIS’ responsibility under section 12 of the CSIS Act to investigate and report on threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2.a of the CSIS Act. Specifically, the disclosure will contribute to an assessment of a potential espionage threat [against Canadian interests abroad].

25.However, NSIRA observed that in one of those twelve disclosures, GAC consulted on more information than necessary to determine whether the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA. This disclosure is described below.

Disclosure 1

26.A foreign country provided information about an individual with ties to Canada, to GAC headquarters, and requested that GAC forward the information to appropriate authorities. GAC then met with CSIS and showed them the information in their holdings, in order to clarify whether the information contributed to CSIS’s national security mandate. CSIS reviewed the information and confirmed that the information was of value to their investigation. CSIS did not report any of the information in its holdings.

27.Following that consultation, GAC concluded that a number of the documents did not pertain to an activity that undermines the security of Canada, as they contained “significant amounts of personal information unrelated to [the subject of the investigation] and reflecting acts considered lawful in Canada, such as freedom of speech (with no stated intent to engage in acts of violence) and freedom of peaceful assembly.” As such, GAC subsequently formally disclosed to CSIS only a fraction of the previously consulted documents. With respect to this formal disclosure, GAC demonstrated that it satisfied itself as to the requirements under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA.

28. GAC indicated to NSIRA that the Public Safety guide on responsible information-sharing (PS Guide) is its primary policy guidance on the SCIDA. NSIRA notes that the PS Guide encourages government institutions to “communicate with the designated recipient institution prior to disclosure to determine not only whether the information is linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada but also how it contributed to that institution’s national security mandate.” This should not be interpreted as providing authorization to consult on more information than necessary, given the possibility that information outside the scope of a SCIDA disclosure may be included.

29. During its consultation with CSIS, GAC consulted on information that it later assessed as not concerning an activity that undermines the security of Canada as defined in the SCIDA and which was later removed from the formal disclosure under the SCIDA. The consultation involved showing GAC’s full information holdings to CSIS, which was more information than necessary to obtain confirmation from CSIS that the information was of value. Information used in consultations should be limited to the information necessary to obtain confirmation from the potential recipient that the information contributes to the carrying-out of its mandate and is linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

30. Furthermore, despite twelve out of thirteen disclosures meeting the requirements of paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA, one disclosure did not. NSIRA addresses this disclosure below.

Disclosure 2

31. An individual overseas, on their own initiative, identified themselves as a member of that country’s government and provided information to an official at a Canadian embassy about an alleged threat. GAC disclosed this information along with personal information, including the individual’s contact information, to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), invoking the SCIDA as an authority to make the disclosure. However, GAC did not consider whether this disclosure met the two threshold requirements under paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA, prior to disclosing this information in its entirety. During the course of this review, GAC explained to NSIRA that the disclosure was erroneously made under the SCIDA, and it was authorized under another authority for disclosing information in such circumstances, that is the Privacy Act or the Crown Prerogative. NSIRA did not assess whether these mechanisms would have been appropriate in the circumstances. Nonetheless this example demonstrates a) that there is potential for confusion on whether the SCIDA is the appropriate mechanism for certain disclosures of national security-related information, and b) that such confusion, in this case, led to the improper use of the SCIDA to disclose.

Finding no. 1: NSIRA finds that, in twelve out of thirteen disclosures, GAC demonstrated that it satisfied itself as to the contribution of the information to the recipient institution’s responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, as required under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA.

Finding no. 2: NSIRA finds that, without first conducting the analysis under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA, departments risk disclosing information that does not pertain to the national security mandate of the recipient institution or to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

Finding no. 3: NSIRA finds that, in one of thirteen disclosures, GAC consulted on more information than necessary to obtain confirmation that the disclosure contributed to CSIS’s mandate and was linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

Recommendation no. 1: NSIRA recommends that consultations be limited to the information necessary to obtain confirmation from the potential recipient that the information contributes to its mandate and is linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

b) Privacy interest not impacted more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances

32. Paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA requires that disclosing institutions be satisfied that the disclosure will not affect any person’s privacy interests more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

33. All thirteen proactive disclosures included personal information as defined in the Privacy Act, that is, identifiable information about an individual, such as name, contact information, background information, or suspicions concerning the individual.

34. The PS Guide provides direction on the type of analysis required prior to disclosing personal information. More specifically, the PS Guide states “whether the information impacting a person’s privacy interest is considered ‘reasonably necessary’ will depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Relevant considerations may include contextual factors, such as the type and nature of the information in question and the particular purpose for the disclosure.”

35. In response to NSIRA requests for further information, GAC explained how it satisfied itself that these proactive disclosures did not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

36. For example, GAC explained that in eight of the thirteen disclosures, GAC determined that some of the information it was considering disclosing was not within the scope of the recipient institution’s mandate. In the same disclosures, GAC also stated that it determined that some of the information in its holdings did not contribute to the institution’s investigation or fall within the recipient institution’s original request for information. For example, in one disclosure, only an individual’s travel status abroad was shared with CSIS as this pertained to the latter’s responsibilities in a national security matter. Other information in GAC’s holdings, such as information concerning other individuals, was determined by GAC not to be relevant, and therefore was not included in the disclosure.

37. Similarly, GAC explained that in two of the thirteen disclosures, GAC determined that some information was necessary to report to the recipient department, and therefore included in the disclosure. More detailed information not linked to activities that undermine the safety of Canada was not disclosed. For example, in one of the two disclosures, only information about suspected espionage activity was disclosed to CSIS, while detailed information about certain personal activities and behaviours was withheld.

38. NSIRA observed that of the 13 disclosures in the sample, three disclosures did not meet the requirements under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA.

39. In Disclosure 2, described above, GAC disclosed information that was received from an individual who, on their own initiative, provided information to an official at a Canadian embassy overseas. GAC did not conduct any analysis under the SCIDA including whether the disclosure would affect privacy interests more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances, and proceeded with disclosing the entirety of the information to CSIS. GAC explained to NSIRA that the disclosure was erroneously made under the SCIDA, and was authorized under another authority for disclosing information, that is the Privacy Act or the Crown Prerogative. NSIRA did not assess whether these mechanisms would have been appropriate in the circumstances.

Disclosures 3 and 4

40. A Canadian embassy abroad received screen shots of a private social media group. The screenshots included information about a political movement in a foreign country. They also contained the contact information of all members of the group. While the group shared posters about the movement and information concerning protests in Canada, there were no threats, whether specific or general, in the material. However, based on some information in the screenshots, as well as the broader context of protests, past events, and open source media, GAC determined that the information contributed to the exercise of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)’s and CSIS’s jurisdiction, or the carrying out of their responsibilities, in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada.

41. GAC disclosed the entirety of the information to both the RCMP and CSIS. The only information redacted was the name and contact information of the individual who provided the information to GAC.

42. GAC explained to NSIRA that it concluded that paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA was met because it did not identify a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the private social media group. NSIRA observes that GAC did not consider all of the relevant factors that would allow it to satisfy itself that the disclosure would not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. As such, the disclosure of information did not meet the second threshold requirement under subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA. Therefore, the disclosure of personal information of the group members did not comply with the requirements of the SCIDA.

Finding no. 4: NSIRA finds that, in ten out of thirteen disclosures, GAC satisfied itself that the disclosure will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances, as required under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA.

Accuracy and Reliability Statements

43. The Arar Report noted that “sharing unreliable or inaccurate information does not provide a sound foundation for identifying and thwarting real and dangerous threats to national security and can cause irreparable harm to individuals.”

44. A core theme in the SCIDA’s guiding principles is that of effective and responsible disclosure of information. Disclosing institutions are required, under subsection 5(2) of SCIDA, to provide information at the time of disclosure regarding the accuracy of the information disclosed and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained.

45. Given the valuable context that accuracy and reliability statements provide to disclosures, precise and complete statements tailored to the specific circumstances of the disclosure can help avoid false perceptions, and can help ensure that recipient institutions have a clear understanding as to the accuracy and reliability of the information disclosed.

46. GAC relied on the PS Guide as its primary policy guidance document on the SCIDA. The PS Guide sets out that ensuring that the information disclosed is as accurate, complete, and as upto-date as possible is key to responsible and effective information sharing.

47. GAC informed NSIRA that partner agencies can better verify the accuracy of the information and the reliability of its source than GAC. NSIRA agrees that in some instances, GAC has limited capability for verification. Nonetheless, the SCIDA requires accuracy and reliability statements in every disclosure; accuracy and reliability statements must be clear and contextspecific in order to be meaningful.

48. In an example of a well-developed statement, GAC provided the following: The information disclosed by GAC was obtained through interactions between GAC officials with [known and credible source X and another individual]. GAC is not in a position to assess the accuracy and reliability of the above information provided to GAC officials by [these individuals]. GAC assesses that [source X] is highly credible, and is likely providing reliable information. In this case, the statement made a distinction between the accuracy and reliability of the information disclosed, depending on the source of that information. The disclosure sets out which information was provided by which source.

49. Overall, eleven of the thirteen disclosures contained accuracy and reliability statements. Two disclosures did not include the statement as the SCIDA requires. These omissions were not tied to GAC’s inability to verify the accuracy and reliability of the information.

Finding no. 5: NSIRA finds that two out of thirteen disclosures did not contain accuracy and reliability statements as required by subsection 5(2) of the SCIDA.

Recommendation no. 2: NSIRA recommends that in order to provide the most valuable and meaningful context for the recipient institution, accuracy and reliability statements should be clear and specific to the circumstances of the disclosure.

Record-keeping

50. Paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA requires that disclosing institutions prepare a description of the information that they relied on to satisfy themselves that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA, including that the disclosure did not affect privacy interests more than reasonably necessary, as part of their record-keeping obligations under the SCIDA.

51. It is noted that the PS Guide sets out the steps to making a disclosure, which include creating a record describing the information that was relied on to satisfy the disclosing institution that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA. Furthermore, the PS Guide’s Appendix A: Record-keeping Template for Institutions Disclosing Information under the SCIDA, which is intended to help departments meet record-keeping obligations for disclosing institutions under the SCIDA, contains a field for departments to describe that information. It also restates the requirements under paragraphs 5(1)(a) and (b) of the SCIDA that the disclosing institution be satisfied that the disclosure will contribute to the recipient institution’s national security mandate, and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

52. The SCIDA 2020 Review observed that GAC’s records describing the information it used to satisfy itself that certain responsive disclosures to CSIS, were robust. The basis for this observation was that GAC’s records contained information provided by CSIS to aid in GAC’s assessment, including details of the potential impact on the subject(s) of the request.

53. During the course of this year’s review, NSIRA requested that GAC provide a description of how it satisfied itself that the disclosure was authorized under both threshold requirements under the SCIDA. NSIRA also requested that GAC provide all supporting documents GAC relied on in its assessment. GAC provided explanations in response to NSIRA’s queries in this regard, referencing supporting documents. Based on a review of the records provided, NSIRA observes that GAC’s practices could be improved by contemporaneously and expressly articulating which information it relied on to satisfy itself that the disclosures would not impact any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

Recommendation no. 3: NSIRA recommends that all disclosing departments contemporaneously prepare descriptions of the information that was relied on to satisfy themselves that disclosures were authorized under the SCIDA.

Training on the SCIDA

54. GAC used four distinct PowerPoint documents in 2021 to train employees on the SCIDA.

55. A course entitled Governance, Access, Espionage and Technical Security (GATE) was accessible to all employees going on postings as an introductory course focused on the awareness of information security at GAC. This presentation did not include practical examples or scenarios, but explained that any information sharing under the SCIDA must be done through GAC Headquarters.

56. Furthermore, a presentation provided by the Director General of the Intelligence Bureau to the majority of Heads of Mission going on postings, as an introductory course on intelligence support and security, did not provide illustrative examples or scenarios, but set out that information sharing under the SCIDA must be done through Headquarters.

57. Finally, the Department of Justice legal team provided two presentations: one to Global Security Reporting Program Officers going on postings as an introduction to information sharing policies and practices, including several slides on the SCIDA, and the other to groups of employees at Headquarters as an introduction to information sharing policies and practices. NSIRA noted that each presentation included only one or two examples illustrating the considerations in making a disclosure under the SCIDA.

58. Three of the four presentations also included a range of information about record-keeping requirements. However, the information in the presentations was largely limited to reiterating the requirements under the SCIDA, and no practical examples or scenarios were provided. Similarly, while these presentations reiterated requirements under the SCIDA to include accuracy and reliability statements, no practical examples were provided.

Finding no. 6: NSIRA finds that GAC training on the SCIDA lacks sufficient illustrative examples required to provide employees with adequate guidance to fulfill their obligations under the SCIDA.

Recommendation no. 4: NSIRA recommends that additional illustrative examples and scenarios be included in the SCIDA training, including for disclosure threshold requirements, accuracy and reliability statements and record-keeping requirements.

4. Responsiveness and provision of information

59. All departments met the timelines for the provision of information to NSIRA.

60. Subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA contain record-keeping obligations for disclosing and recipient institutions. Subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA requires all departments to provide every record prepared under those subsections to NSIRA, for the purpose of NSIRA’s annual review of disclosures under SCIDA. Not only is thorough record-keeping a legal requirement for disclosing and recipient institutions, it is not possible for NSIRA to fulfill its mandated annual review without all records from all departments.

61. This review focussed on GAC proactive disclosures. NSIRA conducted a cross-comparison of the number of disclosures reported by GAC and those received by recipient institutions and notes that the numbers align. NSIRA did not independently verify the completeness of the records provided by GAC. Nonetheless, the assessment under the SCIDA requires GAC to demonstrate compliance. Additional requests for information over the course of the review led NSIRA to conclude that it received all information necessary to conduct the review. Finally, GAC had the opportunity to review a preliminary draft of this report and provide additional information. For these reasons, NSIRA is confident that it received all information necessary to conduct the review.

5. Conclusion

62. The SCIDA is a legislative tool meant to encourage and facilitate the responsible and effective disclosure of national security-related information between federal government institutions. Of the thirteen disclosures in the review sample, three did not meet one or both disclosure threshold requirements and two did not contain accuracy and reliability statements. Prior to consulting on potential disclosures, departments should consider what information is necessary to include in the consultation. Departments should also contemporaneously document on what basis they were satisfied that disclosures were authorized under the SCIDA. Furthermore, improvements to ongoing training are recommended, to provide more illustrative examples to guide employees in fulfilling their obligations under the SCIDA. NSIRA looks forward to revisiting the implementation of the SCIDA in future years and expects to find improved compliance, recordkeeping, and delivery of training programs.

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Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021: Backgrounder

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

This report describes the results of a review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) of the 2021 disclosures made by federal institutions under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). This is the third year of implementation of the SCIDA regime. This year, NSIRA decided to focus the review on Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) proactive disclosures. 

The SCIDA encourages and facilitates the disclosure of information between federal institutions to protect Canada against activities that undermine or threaten national security, subject to certain conditions. The SCIDA provides a two-part threshold which must be met prior to making a disclosure: that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada,  and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.  The SCIDA also includes provisions and guiding principles related to the management of disclosures, including accuracy and reliability statements and record keeping obligations.

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Review of Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s threat reduction activities: Backgrounder

Review of Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s threat reduction activities


Backgrounder

Review Backgrounder

On February 15, 2021, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) presented the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness with a classified report on its review of CSIS threat reduction activities. This was NSIRA’s first review of CSIS’s threat reduction mandate. The report contains a detailed compliance review of a sample of TRMs from 2019.

NSIRA’s review found that all of the measures reviewed met the obligations under Ministerial Direction. For the most part, the measures taken by CSIS also satisfied the requirements of the CSIS Act. NSIRA also noted, however, that in a limited number of cases, CSIS selected individuals for inclusion in the TRM without a rational link between the selection of the individual and the threat. As a result, these measures were not “reasonable and proportional” as required under the CSIS Act.

For one type of TRM reviewed, NSIRA is of the view that more consideration needs to be given to the way in which CSIS engages third parties. This would require CSIS to consider fully the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) implications of its measures, and could require CSIS to obtain warrants before taking certain measures.

As 2020 marked five years since CSIS obtained threat reductions powers as part of the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, NSIRA conducted high-level analysis of all TRM activities over the past five years to identify trends and to inform NSIRA’s choice of future review topics. Overall, NSIRA noted that while CSIS’s use of TRM powers has not been extensive, CSIS has been applying TRM powers to the full spectrum of national security threats mandated under the CSIS Act.

Publishing this summary aligns with NSIRA’s efforts at increasing transparency and being more accessible to Canadians through its work. Going forward, NSIRA will continue to examine CSIS’s threat reduction activities annually as required by section 8(2) of the NSIRA Act.

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Review of Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s threat reduction activities: Report

Review of Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s threat reduction activities


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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation: Report

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation


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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation: Backgrounder

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service-Royal Canadian Mounted Police relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

On February 10, 2021, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) presented the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness with a classified report on its review of the CSIS-RCMP relationship in a region of Canada through the lens of an ongoing investigation.

NSIRA’s review found that in the specific region, the agencies have developed a strong relationship that has fostered effective tactical de-confliction of operational activities. Nonetheless, technological constraints are making CSIS-RCMP de-confliction excessively burdensome and time-consuming. Furthermore, NSIRA observed a general reluctance on the part of both agencies to connect CSIS information to an RCMP investigation.

NSIRA found that the current framework guiding the CSIS-RCMP relationship sets out principals and guidelines to manage the risks of interaction and information sharing between the two agencies; however, it left fundamental issues related to the “intelligence-to-evidence” problem unresolved.

On the whole, NSIRA found that CSIS and the RCMP have made little progress in addressing the threat under investigation. Moreover, CSIS and the RCMP do not have a shared vision or complementary strategy to address the threat.

Publishing this summary aligns with NSIRA’s efforts at increasing transparency and being more accessible to Canadians through its work. Going forward, NSIRA will review CSIS and the RCMP’s implementation of the Operational Improvement Review which set out ambitious recommendations to improve the way in which CSIS and the RCMP jointly manage threats.

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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Internal Security Branch: Report

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Internal Security Branch


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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Internal Security Branch: Backgrounder

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Internal Security Branch


Backgrounder

Review Backgrounder

On August 14, 2019, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) presented the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness with a classified report on its review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Internal Security Branch. This review is a follow-up to the 2013 study conducted by NSIRA’s predecessor, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) of CSIS’s Internal Security (IS) Branch. SIRC found a number of serious shortcomings related to CSIS’s handling of sensitive case files, access lists and their practices and management of internal investigations.

NSIRA’s latest review found that while significant improvements have been made with respect to internal security at CSIS since the 2013 review (The “Insider Threat” and Its Effect on Information Management — Section 54 Report (TOP SECRET) (PDF of Review) (SIRC 2013-06)), further improvements to internal security policies could strengthen the consistency of decision-making on personnel security files and investigations. It could also improve the procedural fairness of these processes writ large.

NSIRA’s review also examined the use of the polygraph, and sought justification for its use and the extent to which such determinations are reasonable and necessary. Several key observations were derived from this analysis. It also raised a much broader consideration: namely, the extent to which the government’s overarching policy document, the Standard on Security Screening, provides adequate guidance for departments and agencies when they implement this safeguarding measure.

Going forward, NSIRA will continue to examine the Government’s use of the polygraph as a security screening tool.

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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) use of Geolocation information: Report

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) use of Geolocation information


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1. Authorities

This review began under the authority of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) articulated in subsection 38(1 ) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS Act), which provided SIRC the mandate to review CSIS’s operations in the performance of its duties and functions.

During the course of the review. Bill C-59 -An Act Respecting National Security Matters received Royal Assent on June 21, 2019. Part 1 of Bill C-59 enacted the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which came into force by order of the Governor in Council on July 12, 2019. The NSIRA Act repeals the provisions of the CSIS Act that established and governed SIRC and establishes in its place the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). The NSIRA Act sets out the composition, mandate and powers of NSIRA and amends the CSIS Act, and other Acts, in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to NSIRA.

This review continued under the authority described in subsections 8(1 )(a) and 8(3) of the NSIRA Act to review any activity carried out by CSIS and to make any finding and recommendation that NSIRA considers appropriate.

2. Introduction

In its review function, NSIRA expects CSIS’s activities to be lawful and comply with ministerial direction. This review focused on CSIS’ s non-warranted collection of geolocation information and is part of NSIRA’s ongoing interest in CSIS’s collection and exploitation of both warranted and unwarranted data. Past reviews have assessed CSIS’s warranted collection and retention of metadata and CSIS’s unwarranted collection and exploitation of bulk personal datasets. This is NSIRA’s first dedicated look at CSIS’s collection of geolocation data.

The review takes place in the context of Federal Court decisions, most particularly the IMSI decision of September 27. 2017, that impact on CSIS’s collection, use and retention of data, including geolocation data. The IMSI decision found that, though CSIS’s authority under section 12 does authorize it to obtain geolocation information for which there is a low expectation of privacy, anything beyond that, such as geolocating an individual, would require a warrant.

It is worth noting that the scope of the review was broader at the outset and was intended to include a more comprehensive examination of the collection of different types of geolocation information, both warranted and unwarranted. Although the scope was reduced in the course of the review, NSIRA will be mindful of this for future reviews.

3. Objectives

The objective of this review is to assess whether CSIS’s collection of unwarranted geolocation information used by CSIS in support of its operations is compliant with applicable sources of law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) and the CSIS Act, as well as ministerial direction and operational policy. A related objective is to determine whether CSIS has sufficient safeguards in the form of formal procedures and policies to ensure that it is able to comply with its legal obligations amid a period of rapid change in technology and a correspondingly fluid legal environment.

4. Scope and Methodology

The scope and direction of the review was identified through a preliminary investigation of available documentation and a briefing with the ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ Further, NSIRA requested that CSIS identify all activities undertaken by the █████ that may result in geographic information collected against non-warranted targets within the review period. This information was used as a foundation to
request specific documents from CSIS.

NSIRA examined all documents provided by CSIS and sought, retrieved and reviewed documents through CSIS’s various computer and email systems to ensure a clear record of activity. Documents reviewed included: ██████████████ taskings from the regions, responses to these taskings, briefing notes, planning documents, legal assessments and internal correspondence.

To conduct a compliance assessment of CSIS’ s use of geolocation information, NSIRA chose to conduct an in-depth case study of ██████████████████████████████████████████ geolocation information. NSIRA reviewed all instances when ██████████ was used by CSIS during the period under review. As this review consists of a single case study. NSIRA is mindful of generalizing the findings and conclusions to other types of geolocation data.

The core review period for this study was from January 1, 2017 to June 30, 2018, although NSIRA examined documentation that fell outside this period in order to provide a complete assessment of relevant issues.

5. Criteria

NSIRA expects CSIS to conduct its activities in accordance with relevant sources of law. including the CSIS Act. the Charter. the Privacy Act. and case law. NSIRA also expects CSIS to conduct its activities in accordance with ministerial direction. Most relevant in this review given the subject matter was an analysis of the Charter, which, in section 8, provides everyone with the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.
In this case, at issue was whether the use of ███████ to collect information about an individual’s location information constitutes a search for the purposes of section 8 such that a warrant would be required.

Policies and Procedures

NSIRA’s expectation was that there would be policies and procedures in place to guide the collection, use and retention of data from ███████ despite its uniqueness, and that those policies and procedures would support compliance with CSIS’s legal obligations, including the Charter, as well as its obligations stemming from ministerial direction.

For reference, the relevant policies that pertain to the collection of information ███████

  • ███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ In principle, this allows collection of this nature on a very broad cross-section of individuals;
  • The collection of █████████ policies, including the DDO Memorandum of 2015 that request the establishment of █████████ as the National Policy Centre for █████████. Additionally there is the procedure on █████████ that allows █████ to conduct █████████ defined as a non-warranted collection tool or technique, against a ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

6. Background

The Investigative Technique – █████████

████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ from users across the world.

█████████ contains three months of data. The information is not available in real-time; however, there is a delay of only 24-48 hours between the collection of the ████ and it becoming available in ████████.

████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

See Annex A for an example of the use of █████ against a CSIS target.

A chronology of CSIS’s use of █████

a. From introduction to the beginning of the pilot: July 2015 – January 2018

████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

█████ echoed those same governance-related issues; specifically, it questioned whether there were legal issues associated with █████ that needed to be addressed prior to the trial period. █████ asked for “the rules of engagement so that we can plan accordingly and get the most of this evaluation.”█████ further noted that, although the data seemed “wonderful….there must be some legal/governance rules that apply to this when in the hands of a government agency. These questions were raised in an email to both █████ and the ██████████

███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ Nevertheless, by September 2017 █████ was anticipating an evaluation of █████ that would involve using █████ for a trial period of two months with a limited ██████████.

█████convened a meeting in October with █████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ The objective of the meeting was to prepare for a █████ evaluation and, for that purpose, “to make decisions on a few details to ensure compliance with
legal and policy.

The questions to be covered in the agenda were:

  • 1 ) Does existing █████ policy cover the use of █████ or does the policy need to be adapted?
  • 2) Is the information contained in ███████ subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy?
  • 3) Is there anything else that needs to be considered before CSIS can use █████? For example, additional █████ procedures or tests?

According to a written summary of discussions circulated by █████ following the meeting, it was agreed that ███████ would be compliant with collection under the ████████████ which allows ████ to “research and use open information” in support of investigations, it was further decided that the use of ██████ would align with ████ policies as it would constitute threat related queries ██████████████ and would be used only with the ██████████ authorities in place. Finally, it was assessed that the ██████ data invested would meet the “strictly necessary” threshold for collection and retention as set out in the CSIS Act as it would be based on a specific threat.

██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Following the meeting, approval was granted for the trial use of ██████ by Deputy Chief █████████. Documentation of the approval consists of an email from the Deputy Chief to ███ and ███ with the understanding that, ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

b. CSIS’s trial period – March 2018 – July 2018

CSIS began its pilot of ████ on January 14. 2018. It was initially to be for two months; but because of technical issues at the beginning that delayed its full use, and due to ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

During that time, ████████ was tasked a total of approximately ████ times, resulting in ████ operational messages. As noted, efforts were made by ███ to ensure that its use of ████████ was compliant with CSIS’s ████ policies on collection ████████████████████ as well as the CSIS Act provision that collection and retention be done only to the extent that is “strictly necessary.”

████ completed its evaluation of ████ by the end of April 2018. ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

The first version of a briefing note to gain approval for the ████████████ was drafted jointly by ████ and ███ in April 2018. The briefing note stated that the pilot for ████ was “conducted operational policies.” The briefing note also ████████████████████ one was a restricted amount of information that would meet the strictly necessary threshold; and the other was a situation in which ████████████████████ in which case it would be ████████████████████████████.

A subsequent version of the briefing note was prepared, also jointly by ████████████. This one was dated May 15, 2018 and was sent to the Director General of ████. In contrast to the first version of the briefing note, this one was the dual purpose of obtaining a legal opinion and ████████████████. This version was ultimately sent to the DG ████████ and also included that ████████ had been assessed as compliant with ████ authorities, following discussion with CSIS’s External Review and Compliance (ERC). ████ as well as informally with a representatives of the DLS. The briefing note stated that ████████████████████████ fall within existing authorities and directives” and, further that “although ████ has assessed that ████████████████ a formal legal opinion has not yet been conducted and suggest this briefing note be used as a mechanism to obtain one.”

NSIRA inquired as to the substance of the ERC and DLS discussion, as well as documentation of those meetings. NSIRA was advised that the ERC compliance officer embedded within ████ was aware of ████ which was presented at a town hall, but that it was not discussed with her beyond that. NSIRA asked for documentation to substantiate the DLS discussions but non was provided.

c. Legal advice: July 2018 – February 2019

Following the May briefing note, on July 20th, the DG ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

By July 31, preliminary legal advice was received:

██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

A formal legal opinion was provided on December 7, 2018, that called into question CSIS’s use of ████████ without a warrant except in very narrow circumstances, ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

A further legal opinion was requested by CSIS to determine whether ████████████████████████████████████████. The resulting legal opinion, dated February 19 2019, ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. Accordingly, section 8 of the CHarter would not be engaed in this narrow circumstance.

based in part on the February 2019 legal opinion, CSIS subsequently took the decision to ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. It is NSIRA’s understanding that, presently, ████████████ being used only in very specific circumstances and according to the guidelines set out in the legal opinions.

7. Findings

Finding no. 1 Compliance with the CSIS Act and the Charter NSIRA finds that there was a risk that CSIS breached section 8 of the Charter during the trial period in which it used █████ without a warrant.

DLS was asked to provide a legal opinion to CSIS on this investigative technique; in particular, to address the question of the “legal risk of using ██████████ (i) with respect to Canadians or persons in Canada; and (ii) human sources and employees, with their informed consent”. CSIS was advised in a Legal Memorandum dated December 7,2018 that:

██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

NSIRA’s own review of the file, which is meant to provide the Committee with independent legal advice, supports DLS’s opinion in that regard. In particular, NSIRA believes that the use of ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. NSIRA observes that it is very unlikely that a court would find that section 12 of CSIS Act was sufficient legal authority to render warrantless use of ██████ reasonable” for the purposes of section 8 of the Charter. Accordingly, CSIS would be required to obtain a warrant pursuant to section 21 of the CSIS Act for such searches. Of note, NSIRA’s legal analysis was based on the same set of facts as DLS used for its opinion.

In reaching this conclusion. NSIRA interprets section 12 of the CSIS Act as only providing authority for collection activities of minimal intrusiveness. In that regard, NSIRA concurs with the DLS opinion that, ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

At the time of writing, CSIS is pursuing options for how █████████ may be used under the authority of a warrant in the future.

NSIRA recommends that CSIS review its use of █████████ to date and make a determination as to which of the operational reports generated through the use of ███████ were in breach of section 8 of the Charter. These operational reports and/or any documents related to those results should be purged from its systems.

Findings no. 2 Governance related to piloting █████████

NSIRA finds that there was no policy centre clearly responsible for the use of the data contained in ████████.

NSIRA asked about the policies and procedures that guided the decision to authorize the trial period, as well as which unit within the ██████████████████ branch would have been responsible for assessing and authorizing the use of ███████ As described above, the record suggests there were three discrete units involved in the ████████████████████████ for the trial period.

█████████████ was involved in the ██████████████████ As the policy centre with respect to the ███████████████████████████████ the role and mandate of ████ is to coordinate, manage and █████████████████████████████████. In this capacity, ████ would have been responsible for assessing ████████ for privacy impacts, among other things, had ████████ been assessed as a ████████. However, ████████ was not ████████████████ but rather, as ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. Therefore, █████ did not officially assess ███████████████████████████████████████. That said, the briefing note of May 15 2018, clearly indicates that ██████ assessed that the use of ████████████ fall within existing authorities and directives.” Given the lack of a formal record, NSIRA was unable to assess the content of, or the rationale for, this assessment.

██████ is the unit responsible for providing operational support for ████████████████████████ intelligence through the use of covert ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ and it was to ████ that the first demonstration of ██████ was given, ███ authorities were eventually identified as those under which ██████ would operate. However ██████ was not the primary user of ██████. Neither did it participate in the formal evaluation of the data contained in ████████████.

Responsibility for developing a means of formally evaluating ██████ fell to the ██████ given its expertise in geolocation information. However, ████ does not generally collect data, but is merely the user of data provided to it. As such, █████ thorough preliminary evaluation to determine whether there were legal or other issues that needed to be addressed, even at the pilot stage. Nevertheless, ████ prepared, on its own initiative, a formal document to guide its evaluation of ██████ during the trial period. NSIRA also notes that ████ followed existing policy in using ███████ only in instances when a valid targeting authority was in place.

NSIRA was not provided any formal documentation on the decision to authorize the pilot period. The record of decision to pilot ██████ consisted of an email, which contained the following:

I don’t see any reason not to start an evaluation – ████████████████████████████████████████████████ In addition, ████████████████████████ are not provided until after we can determine that they are “strictly necessary” and of relevance to the investigation -just until we find something of relevance.

Ultimately, NSIRA was unable to identify which of the three policy areas within ██████ should have had, according to existing policies and procedures, responsibility for the assessment of ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

Finding no. 3 Record of decision

NSIRA finds that the record of approval to pilot ██████ consisted of an email and that this email was not “put-away” as part of the official record, as it should have been.

As noted, the closest thing to a record of decision to pilot ██████ was an email from a Deputy Chief of ██████ the full text of which is cited above.

NSIRA notes that this email was not “put-away” as is should have been given that it represents, de facto, the approval for acquiring ██████ for the purposes of evaluation and is required for robust records management and for accountability purposes. Instead, it was saved on a “personal” drive and only produced as part of the review process.

Findings no. 4-5 Assessment of risk in the case of ██████

NSIRA finds that there are no developed policies or procedures around the assessment and handling of new and emerging collection technologies, such that a formal evaluation of the legal risks of using ██████ would have been required.

NSIRA finds that CSIS overlooked multiple indicators that using ██████ might raise legal issues.

Ministerial Direction requires that the risk of operational activities be assessed across four pillars (operational, political, foreign policy and legal ). In particular, the Direction states that CSIS should “consider its ow n level of experience and novelty of the operational activity in assessing risk”.

NSIRA was told that there is no formal process for the evaluation of risk in cases like ████████████ given that it was assessed as ████████████████████████. This is consistent with NSIRA’s reading of the relevant policies, cited earlier, pertaining to ██████████████████████████████████████████ of which require an assessment of legal risk prior to the use of ████████████ for collection purposes.

██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

It was suggested to NSIRA that it would not have been possible to conduct a thorough assessment of ████████ before the pilot based on the reasoning that a risk assessment is only possible with full ████████. NSIRA accepts in principle that there are situations when it would be difficult to appreciate the legal risks until such time ████████████████ and fully evaluated. Notwithstanding the difficulties, it is the responsibility of CSIS to mitigate these risks to the extent possible.

In this case, moreover. NSIRA notes that there were indications of a need for caution with respect to the ████████ in the period before the trial was even begun, including the IMSI decision of the Federal Court, which found that geolocating an individual would require a warrant.

Internally, there were multiple indications to the effect that there may be reason for particular attention, including:

two emails sent prior to the pilot, one by █████ on June 28. 2017. and the other by █████ September 27. 2017, both containing legal and governance questions;

the meeting convened by █████ for the purpose of discussing whether there existed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the █████ data;

the examples provided by ███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ and the evaluation of █████ in April 2018. which indicated that there were privacy concerns with this tool given its ability to generate ███████████████ and to ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

There were other indications of a need for caution, ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Despite these signs, no formal action was taken to assess the question of legal risk until the briefing note in May 2018 requested a formal legal opinion.

NSIRA recommends that policy be developed or amended as appropriate that would require a documented risk assessment, including legal risks, in situations like ██████████ when information collected through new and emerging technologies may contain information in respect of which there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy. If not █████ NSIRA further recommends that a policy centre for this type of █████ collection be clearlv identified.

Conclusion

At the outset █████ was characterized as making use of ██████████. This is made clear from the approval email, ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ would consider, it is not clear that the data exploited through ██████████ represents genuinely ██████████ at least as defined in plain language, as was asserted.

Assessing █████ in this way was not without its consequences in that it appears to have justified the lack of a more thorough legal assessment. This assumption proved to be problematic; the consequence was that CSIS placed itself at risk of having violated the Charter. Throughout this review. NSIRA has been mindful of the length of time it took for CSIS to obtain the final legal opinion, which was requested in July but finalized only in December, a full five months later.

NSIRA is aware that there have been discussions within ██████████ on the need to have ongoing legal support. In particular █████ has requested the establishment of a policy and legal operating envelope to ensure that policy and legal questions related to data exploitation are properly covered, including a resource from DLS who would provide ongoing, even weekly, legal assistance. NSIRA understands that this request was made in part due to the difficulties associated with obtaining legal advice on an as needed basis. NSIRA has been advised that █████ request to have weekly legal support has not yet been actioned.

The combination of an expanding scope in the type, volume and sources of data collected by CSIS and a fluid legal situation makes this an area of persistent high legal risk. CSIS has publicly affirmed that the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy is evolving over time and committed to ensuring that CSIS’s approach to a reasonable expectation of privacy “is kept consistent”.

NSIRA is of the view that, in this environment, legal support to █████ is essential to operate at an acceptable level of risk. NSIRA expects CSIS and the Department of Justice ( DOJ) to demonstrate institutional leadership that would allow responsible decision-making in an environment of uncertainty by making available legal support to █████ as required on a priority basis.

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