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Annual Report on the Privacy Act 2023-24
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Having its origin in the recommendations of Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and the directions issued under its authority seek to avoid risks of Canadian complicity in torture or other forms of mistreatment. They do so by putting limits on Government of Canada information sharing with foreign entities such as states and non-governmental organizations.
The directions prohibit Government of Canada departments from disclosing information to – or requesting information from – foreign entities if doing so would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of any individual by any foreign entity. The directions also limit how departments may use information that is likely to have been obtained through mistreatment. Collectively, the ACA regime codifies Canadian values and commitments under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Criminal Code, and international law in respect of protecting rights and prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment.
NSIRA is required to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA. To date, such directions have been issued to the Deputy Heads of twelve departments and agencies. NSIRA’s annual review of ACA implementation ensures that the Government of Canada remains accountable for the information that it shares with foreign partners, and respects related Canadian values and commitments. While the ACA separately requires each department to report publicly and to their Minister on ACA implementation each year, NSIRA’s horizontal review mandate offers unique insights into the consistency of this implementation and corresponding decision-making government wide.
NSIRA’s ACA review for 2022 focused on how departments assess mistreatment risk in the context of their information sharing with foreign entities. NSIRA pursued this focus because departmental compliance with the directions depends on whether departments are accurately identifying which information exchanges may engage a substantial risk of mistreatment. If departments under-assess the level of risk involved in an exchange or over-assess the impact of mitigations to reduce this risk, they will not trigger the ACA’s embedded mechanisms for accountability and transparency. These mechanisms include referring certain high-risk cases to Deputy Heads as well as onward reporting to NSIRA.
NSIRA found major inconsistencies in how different Government of Canada departments assessed the mistreatment risk posed by different countries. Indeed, NSIRA even identified some instances where different departments concurrently assessed the same country as presenting low, medium, and high mistreatment risk. NSIRA also found that departments often attributed an unjustifiably high weight to proposed risk mitigations and, in some cases, incorrectly incorporated mitigations within their initial assessments of countries’ baseline risk.
Such methodological deficiencies, as well as a lack of checks and balances in the risk assessment process, may lead departments to systematically under-assess the risks involved in contemplated information exchanges. The net effect is that, when it does not adhere to the substance of the directions under the ACA, the Government of Canada risks exchanging information contrary to the directions’ prohibitions.
As part of a suite of recommendations designed to address this risk, NSIRA reaffirmed its 2019 recommendation for the Government of Canada to develop a unified set of risk assessments for ACA purposes. In every ACA review since 2019, NSIRA has maintained its position that human rights risks within a given country should be assessed consistently across government. Doing so would avoid the unnecessary drain on resources caused by each department independently assessing risk and eliminate opportunities for discrepant outcomes.
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In 2021, NSIRA began its review of the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) use of the polygraph for security screening. This review also explored the Treasury Board Secretariat’s (TBS) role in including the polygraph in the Standard on Security Screening introduced in 2014.
The Government of Canada has used the polygraph as a tool for security screening since the Cold War. When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) started using the polygraph in 1984, its then-review body, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), criticized its use in screening the thousands of Canadians CSIS employs. SIRC specifically questioned the science behind the polygraph as a legitimate, effective, and fair means to judge the loyalty of Canadians, as well as the justification for the general application of what is seen as a highly invasive tool.
In 2019, NSIRA completed a review of CSIS’s Internal Security Branch, which included CSIS’s use of the polygraph for security screening. In that review, NSIRA found several shortcomings with the CSIS program, including:
At CSE, NSIRA found many of the same or strikingly similar shortcomings.
NSIRA’s priority in conducting this review was always clear: to evaluate whether the privacy and Charter rights of CSE’s employees and prospective employees were being protected. As this report demonstrates, NSIRA found that in some cases, they were not.
The Government of Canada is responsible for safeguarding its employees, information, and assets. Threats to Canada and Canadians are real. Security screening is the primary way the government determines an individual’s loyalty to Canada before entrusting them with access to sensitive information or facilities required to carry out their duties as public servants.
NSIRA’s review of CSE’s use of the polygraph for security screening is important because it is the first time an independent review body in Canada has assessed such a program with this level of operational detail and scrutiny.
From the outset, NSIRA determined that this review could not be completed without being able to assess the actual conduct of polygraph exams, with appropriate protections in place to protect the anonymity of the individuals submitting to the exam. As demonstrated by this report, access to these recordings was, in fact, fundamental to many of NSIRA’s findings.
This review is also timely as TBS reviews and updates the 2014 Security Screening Standard. The importance of security screening should prompt TBS to undertake a thorough analysis to support which screening tools it promotes and requires while being mindful that security screening does not grant an organization the license to override the fundamental privacy protections granted under Canadian law.
The government now has an opportunity to correct past errors and conduct the fulsome assessment and analysis required to rigorously explore whether using the polygraph for security screening is justified. We trust that the government will consider our findings and recommendations, which may be informative as TBS completes these long-overdue updates.
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The CSE Act provided CSE with the authority to conduct Active and Defensive Cyber Operations (ACO/DCO). As defined by the Act, a DCO stops or impedes foreign cyber threats from Canadian federal government networks or systems deemed by the Minister of National Defence (MND) as important to Canada. On the other hand, ACOs intend to limit an adversary’s ability to affect Canada’s international relations, defence, or security. ACO/DCOs are authorized by Ministerial Authorizations (MA) and, due to the potential impact on Canadian foreign policy, require the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to either consent or be consulted on ACO and DCO MAs respectively.
In this review, NSIRA set out to assess the governance framework that guides the conduct of ACO-DCOs, and to assess if CSE appropriately considered its legal obligations and the foreign policy impacts of operations. NSIRA analyzed policies and procedures, governance and operational documentation, and correspondence within and between CSE and GAC. The review began with the earliest available materials pertaining to ACO/DCOs and ended concurrently with the validity period of the first ACO/DCO Ministerial Authorizations.
NSIRA incorporated GAC into this review given its key role in the ACO/DCO governance structure arising from the legislated requirement for the role of the MFA in relation to the MAs. As a result, NSIRA was able to gain an understanding of the governance and accountability structures in place for these activities by obtaining unique perspectives from the two departments on their respective roles and responsibilities.
The novelty of these powers required CSE to develop new mechanisms and processes while also considering new legal authorities and boundaries. NSIRA found that considerable work has been conducted in building the ACO/DCO governance structure by both CSE and GAC. In this context, NSIRA has found that some aspects of the governance of can be improved by making them more transparent and clear.
Specifically, NSIRA found that CSE can improve the level of detail provided to all parties involved in the decision-making and governance of ACO/DCOs, within documents such as the MAs authorizing these activities and the operational plans that are in place to govern their execution. Additionally, NSIRA found that CSE and GAC have not sufficiently considered several gaps identified in this review, and recommended improvements relating to:
The gaps observed by NSIRA are those that, if left unaddressed, could carry risks. For instance, the broad and generalized nature of the classes of activities, techniques, and targets [**redacted**] ACO/DCOs can capture unintended [**redacted**] activities and targets. Additionally, given the difference in the required engagement of GAC in ACOs and DCOs, misclassifying what is truly an ACO as a pre-emptive DCO could result in a heightened risk to Canada’s international relations through the insufficient engagement of GAC.
While this review focused on the governance structures at play in relation to ACO/DCOs, of even greater importance is how these structures are implemented, and followed, in practice. We have made several observations about the information contained within the governance documents developed to date, and will subsequently assess how they are put into practice as part of our forthcoming review of ACO/DCOs.
The information provided by CSE has not been independently verified by NSIRA. Work is underway to establish effective policies and best practices for the independent verification of various kinds of information, in keeping with NSIRA’s commitment to a ‘trust but verify’ approach.
This review was conducted pursuant to paragraphs 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Act.
With the coming into force of the CSE Act on August 1, 2019, CSE received the authority to independently conduct Active and Defensive Cyber Operations (“Active and Defensive Cyber Operations,” or ACO/DCOs henceforth) for the first time. While initial briefings on the subject in late fall of 2019 conveyed to NSIRA [**relates to CSE operations**] CSE later explained that [**redacted**].In this context, NSIRA will be assessing ACO/DCOs in a staged approach. The objective of this review is to better understand CSE’s development of a governance structure for ACO/DCOs. NSIRA will follow up with a subsequent review of the operations. This subsequent review is underway, with completion expected in 2022.
This review pertained to the structures put in place by CSE to govern the conduct of ACO/DCOs. Governance in this context can pertain to the establishment of processes to guide and manage planning, inter-departmental engagement, compliance, training, monitoring, and other overarching issues that affect the conduct of ACO/DCOs. NSIRA recognizes that these structures may be revised over time based on lessons learned from operations. Canada’s allies, who have had similar powers to conduct cyber operations for many years, [**relates to foreign partners’ capabilities**]. In this context, as its objectives, NSIRA sought out to determine if, in developing a governance structure for ACO/DCOs at this early stage, CSE appropriately considered and defined its legal obligations, and the foreign policy and operational components of ACO/DCOs.
As part of this governance review, NSIRA assessed policies, procedures, governance and operational planning documents, risk assessments, and correspondence between CSE and GAC (whose key role in this process is described below). NSIRA reviewed the earliest available materials relating to the development of the ACO/DCO governance structure, with the review period ending concurrent with the validity period of the first ACO/DCO Ministerial Authorizations on August 24, 2020. As such, the findings and recommendations made throughout this report pertain to the governance structure as it was presented during the period of review.
As defined in the CSE Act, Defensive Cyber Operations (DCOs) are those that stop or impede foreign cyber threats before they reach Canadian federal government systems or networks and systems designated by the Minister of National Defence (MND) as being of importance to Canada, such as Canada’s critical infrastructures and registered political parties. Active Cyber Operations (ACOs), on the other hand, allow the government to use CSE’s online capabilities to undertake a range of activities in cyberspace that limit an adversary’s ability to negatively impact Canada’s international relations, defence, or security, without their knowledge or consent. ACOs can include, for example, activities that disable communications devices used by a foreign terrorist network to communicate or plan attacks. The impacts of ACO/DCOs, [**relates to CSE operations**] of an ACO/DCO.
To conduct ACO/DCOs, CSE relies on its existing access to the global information infrastructure (GII), foreign intelligence expertise, and domestic and international partnerships to obtain relevant intelligence to support the informed development of ACO/DCOs. Activities conducted under CSE’s foreign intelligence and cybersecurity mandates allow CSE to gather information related to the intent, plans, and activities of actors seeking to disrupt or harm Canadian interests. According to CSE, the preliminary gathering of intelligence, capability development, [**redacted**] comprises the majority of the work necessary to conduct an ACO/DCO whereas the resulting activity in cyberspace is considered to be [**redacted**] of the task.
The CSE Act provides the legal authority for CSE to conduct ACO/DCOs, and these aspects of the mandate are described in the Act as per Figure 1. The ministerial authorization regime in the CSE Act provides CSE with the authority to conduct the activities or classes of activities listed in section 31 of the CSE Act in furtherance of the ACO/DCO aspects.
Importantly, the Act limits ACO/DCOs in that they cannot be directed at Canadians or any person in Canada and cannot infringe on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; nor can they be directed at any portion of the GII within Canada.
ACO/DCOs must be conducted under a Ministerial Authorization (MA) issued by the MND under subsection 29(1) (DCO) or under subsection 30(1) (ACO) of the CSE Act. ACO/DCO MAs permit CSE to conduct ACO/DCO activities despite any other Act of Parliament or of any foreign state. In order to issue an MA, the MND must conclude that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any activity is reasonable and proportionate, and must also conclude that the objective of the cyber operation could not reasonably be achieved by other means. In addition, the MND must consult with the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in order to issue DCO MAs, and must obtain the MFA’s consent in order to issue ACO MAs. Any authorized ACO/DCO activities cannot cause, intentionally or by criminal negligence, death or bodily harm to an individual; or willfully attempt in any manner to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice or democracy. Importantly, unlike the MAs issued under the foreign intelligence, and cybersecurity and information assurance aspects of CSE’s mandate, ACO and DCO MAs are not subject to approval by the Intelligence Commissioner.
In addition to the ACO/DCO aspects of its mandate, CSE may also conduct ACO/DCO activities through technical and operational assistance to other Government of Canada (GC) departments. CSE may assist federal law enforcement and security agencies (LESAs) for purposes such as preventing criminal activity, reducing threats to the security of Canada, and supporting GC- authorized military missions. When providing assistance, CSE operates entirely within the legal authorities and associated limitations of the department requesting the assistance. Similarly, persons acting on CSE’s behalf also benefit from the same exemptions, protections and immunities as persons acting on behalf of the requesting LESAs. These assistance activities will be reviewed in subsequent NSIRA reviews.
In addition to the CSE Act, international law forms part of the legal framework in which ACO/DCO activities are conducted. Customary international law is binding on CSE’s activities, as Canadian law automatically adopts customary international law through the common law, unless there is conflicting legislation.
NSIRA notes that international law in cyberspace is a developing area. There is limited general state practice, or opinio juris (i.e, state belief that such practice amounts to a legal obligation), or treaty law, which elaborates on how international law applies in the cyber context. Moreover, while Canada has publically articulated that international law applies in cyberspace, it has not articulated a position on how it believes international law applies in cyberspace. At the same time, Canada has committed to building a common understanding between states of agreed voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. NSIRA will closely monitor this emerging area of international law, including State practice in relation to CSE’s ACO/DCO activities – particularly in assessing CSE and GAC’s consideration of applicable international law as part of our subsequent review of ACO/DCOs.
Conducting ACO/DCOs may elevate risks to Canada’s foreign policy and international relations. While CSE’s foreign intelligence mandate seeks only to collect information, ACO/DCOs [**redacted**]. As GAC is the department responsible for Canada’s international affairs and foreign policy, the MFA has a legislated role to play in consenting to MND’s issuance of an ACO Ministerial Authorization.
As directed by the MFA, CSE and GAC worked together to develop a framework for collaboration on matters related to ACO/DCOs. CSE and GAC began to engage on these matters before the coming into force of the CSE Act to proactively address the consultation and consent requirements embedded in the Act. Together, CSE and GAC have developed various interdepartmental bodies related to ACO/DCOs to facilitate consultation at different levels, including working groups at the levels of Director General and Assistant Deputy Minister.
CSE’s Mission Policy Suite (MPS) details the authorities in place to guide ACO/DCOs, prohibited activities when conducting ACO/DCOs and guidance in interpreting these prohibitions, as well as the governance framework to oversee the development and conduct of ACO/DCOs – known as the Joint Planning and Authorities Framework (JPAF). The general structure of this governance framework and process is intended to be used for all ACO/DCOs, irrespective of their risk-level. However, depending on the risk level of the operations, the framework sets out the specific approval levels.
During the period of review, the JPAF comprised several components required to plan, approve, and conduct cyber operations. The primary planning instrument for ACO/DCOs was [**relates to CSE operations**] that detailed the [**redacted**] identified [**redacted**] and highlighted risks and mitigations. [**redacted**] is used to determine and enumerate a range of risks associated with any new activity. In this period, CSE developed [**redacted**] NSIRA also received these documents [**redacted**] that fell slightly outside the review period, but provided relevant insight into the governance structure at the operation level.
Two primary internal working groups exist to evaluate and approve CSE’s internal plans for ACO/DCOs. The Cyber Operations Group (COG) is a Director-level approval body composed of key stakeholders and is chaired by the Director of the operational area that has initiated or sponsored a cyber operations request. The role of the COG is to review the operational plan and assess any associated risks and benefits. The COG may approve a [**redacted**] or may defer approval to the CMG as appropriate. The Cyber Management Group (CMG) is a Director General (DG) level approval body that is formed [**redacted**] has been reviewed and recommended by the COG.
CSE then develops the [**relates to CSE operations**] is reviewed internally to ensure it aligns [**redacted**] and is later approved at the Director level, although CSE has indicated it could be subject to delegation to a Manager.
NSIRA set out to assess whether the requirements of the CSE Act in relation to ACO/DCOs are appropriately reflected in the MND’s MAs authorizing ACO/DCO activities, and that CSE appropriately consulted or received the consent of the MFA, as required by the Act.
NSIRA reviewed two MAs related to ACOs and DCOs, respectively, which were valid from [**redacted**]. Notably, both MAs only approved [**redacted**] ACO/DCOs. Additionally, NSIRA reviewed documentation supporting the MAs, including the Chief’s Applications to the MND and the associated confirmation letters from the MFA, as well as working- level documents and correspondence provided by both CSE and Global Affairs Canada (GAC).
The MAs examined by NSIRA outlined the new authorities found in the CSE Act, and set conditions on how ACO/DCOs are to be conducted, including the prohibitions that are found in the Act. Additionally, the MAs required that ACO/DCO activities align with Canada’s foreign policy priorities and respond to Canada’s national security, foreign, and defence policy priorities as articulated by the GC.
CSE received its authority to conduct ACO/DCOs during a time when CSE’s collection of foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT) was authorized by MAs issued under the National Defence Act (NDA). [**redacted**]. CSE confirmed to NSIRA that the ACO/DCOs [**redacted**] relied solely on information collected under CSE Act MAs. CSE explained that [**redacted**] NSIRA will confirm this as part of our subsequent review of specific ACO/DCOs.
CSE provided GAC with the full application packages for the ACO/DCO MAs in place during the review period. Further, GAC and CSE officials engaged at various levels prior to the coming into force of the CSE Act, and during the development of the MAs – particularly in assessing the classes of activities authorized within them. In response to CSE’s MA application package, the MFA provided letters acknowledging her consultation and consent on the DCO and ACO MAs respectively. NSIRA welcomes this early and rigorous engagement on the part of both departments, given the intersection of their respective mandates in the context of ACO/DCOs.
Both letters from the MFA note the utility of ACO/DCOs [**redacted**] for the GC, articulating the importance of approaching this capability with caution in the initial stages. Notably, the MFA highlights the “carefully defined” classes of activities defined in the ACO MA as assurance that the activities authorized under the MA presented [**redacted**]. Finally, the MFA directed her officials to work with CSE to establish a framework for collaboration on [**redacted**] This direction from the MFA aligns with GAC’s view of the importance of ensuring CSE’s activities would be coherent with Canada’s foreign policy, and that either the MA or another mechanism should provide for that.
[**relates to CSE operational policy**] ACO MA issued under section 31 of the CSE Act authorized classes of activities such as:
[**redacted**] DCO MA authorized the same activities, except for the last class of activities, [**relates to CSE operations**].
Both of the ACO/DCO MAs required CSE to conduct ACO/DCOs [**in a certain way**]. According to the ACO MA, it is these conditions, if met, that would make ACO/DCOs conducted under these MAs [**redacted**]. While GAC assesses While GAC assesses foreign policy risks at a more operational level, the MAs developed in the review period only required these two conditions to be met when conducting ACOs or DCOs. Further, the specifics of how to meet these broad conditions are left to CSE’s discretion, and the MA only requires CSE to self-report this. NSIRA further notes that these conditions do not include foreign policy variables, [**redacted**]. To confirm [**redacted**] foreign policy risk associated with an operation, NSIRA believes it is important that the MAs stipulate the calculation of foreign policy risk factors.
[**redacted**] stating that:
[**redacted**]
CSE appears to have responded to [**relates to CSE operations**]. This may also impact the Minisiter’s ability to assess any authorized activities as stipulated in the CSE Act, which requires sufficient precision in an MA application for the Minister to satisfy these requirements.
The classes of ACO/DCO activities, some of which are detailed in paragraph 27, are highly generalized. For instance, nearly any activity conducted in cyberspace can be feasibly classed as [**redacted**] interfering with elements of the global information infrastructure.” [**relates to CSE operations**]
Indeed, early discussions between CSE and GAC highlighted that the activity of [**redacted**] and content “raises difficult questions,” though NSIRA notes that such an activity is nevertheless authorized in the final ACO MA in the activity class of [**redacted**]. In short, the authorization for a class of activities [**redacted**] was incorporated into an even broader class of activities, without any evident [**redacted**] previously associated with it. This type of categorization does not sufficiently communicate information to the Minister to appreciate [**redacted**] activities that could be carried out under the MA.
By contrast, the techniques and associated examples outlined in the Applications are the only means through which it is clarified what types of activities could be taken as part of an ACO/DCO. These examples provide the basis for the MND to assess the classes of activities requested in the MA. Early correspondence between CSE and GAC saw the classes of activities described and analyzed in tandem with the techniques that would enable them. For instance, it was noted that [**relates to CSE operations**] which NSIRA found more informative with respect to what specific actions were captured within the class of activities. NSIRA further notes that even these techniques and examples are described in the Applications as a non-exhaustive list, potentially enabling CSE to conduct activities that are not clearly outlined in the Applications.
Similarly, the target of ACO/DCO activities is typically identified as ‘foreign actor,’ which could encompass a wide range of [**redacted**] In the early stages of MA development, CSE and GAC had discussed [**relates to CSE operations**] within the MAs, and GAC specified that the intent of [**redacted**] was to focus on [**redacted**] given the [**redacted**]. GAC also noted that the ACO MA “would [more] clearly define [**redacted**] to some extent. Neither of these considerations were reflected in the final [**redacted**] MAs, which CSE explained “are not limited to activities [**redacted**] meaning that [**redacted**]. NSIRA believes that the MAs should carefully define targets of ACO/DCO activities [**redacted**]. ACO/DCOs to specific target sets [**redacted**] to ensure that the activities permitted by the MA are reflective of its [**redacted**].
NSIRA notes that only the MAs, and not the associated Applications, authorize CSE to conduct its activities. As such, the exclusion of this information from the MAs means that only the broad classes of activities, as described in the MAs, guide the actions that CSE can take in conducting an ACO/DCO, and not the techniques and examples in the Applications that help justify the standard on which the risk of the activities is based. NSIRA does not believe that the classes of activities as described within the MAs sufficiently limit CSE’s activities [**relates to CSE operations**]. Even though, as explained by GAC, interdepartmental consultative processes between the two departments may serve as a mechanism to limit CSE’s activities, these processes were not explicitly recorded in the MAs authorizing them. NSIRA believes more precise ACO/DCO MAs will minimize the potential for any misunderstanding regarding the specific activities authorized.
The approach of specifying broad classes of activities is in line with CSE’s general practice of obtaining broad approvals from senior levels such as the Minister, with more specific internal controls guiding the operations to be conducted within the scope of the approved activity. According to GAC, it tends to rely on more specific approvals based on the [**redacted**] for which approval is sought. CSE offered that its approach allows CSE to obtain approval for activities in such a way that “enables flexibility to maximize opportunities, but with enough caveats to ensure risks are appropriately mitigated.”
While NSIRA acknowledges that MAs should be reasonably nimble to enable CSE to conduct [**redacted**]. ACO/DCOs should the need arise, it is important that CSE does not conduct activities that were not envisioned or authorized by either the MND or MFA in the issuance of the applicable MAs. NSIRA believes that in the context of [**redacted**] ACO/DCOs, CSE can adopt a more transparent approach that would make clearer the classes of activities it requests the Minister to authorize. This is especially important given the early stage of CSE’s use of these new authorities. By authorizing more precise classes of activities, associated techniques, and intended target sets ACO/DCOs would be less likely to [**redacted**] of the MAs.
CSE has stated that, “being clear about objectives is critical for demonstrating reasonableness and proportionality.” NSIRA shares this view, and believes that the classes of activities and the objectives described in the MAs and their associated Applications should be more explicit for the MND to be able to conclude on reasonableness and proportionality of ACO/DCOs – particularly given that the MAs assessed as part of this review were not specific to an operation. As part of the Authorization, the Minister also requires CSE to provide a quarterly retroactive report on the activities conducted. Moreover, to issue an authorization, the MND must be satisfied that the activities are reasonable and proportionate, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the objective of the cyber operation could not reasonably be achieved by other means. This requirement further points toward a need for the MND to appreciate, with a certain degree of specificity, the types of activities and objectives that will be carried out under the authorization.
In both of the MAs reviewed, the Minister concluded that the requirements set out within s. 34(4) of the CSE Act are met. Further, the MAs set out the objectives to be met in the conduct of ACO/DCOs. However, the rationale offered that the objectives could not be reasonably achieved by other means within the ACO MA is quite broad and focuses on general mitigation strategies for cyber threat activities. The paucity of detail provided to the Minister under the current framework could make it challenging for the MND to meet this legislative requirement. In relation to the thresholds of s. 34(4) of the CSE Act, CSE has indicated that “the application for the Authorization, must set out the facts that explain how each of the activities described in the Authorization are part of a larger set of individual activities or part of a class of activities that achieves an objectives that could not reasonably be achieved by other means.” In our subsequent review of ACO/DCOs, NSIRA will assess whether specific ACO/DCOs aligned with the objectives of the MA, and CSE’s determination that they could not have reasonably been achieved by other means.
Finding no. 1: The Active and Defensive Cyber Operations Ministerial Authorization Applications do not provide sufficient detail for the Minister(s) to appreciate the scope of the classes of activities being requested in the authorization. Similarly, the Ministerial Authorization does not sufficiently delineate precise classes of activities, associated techniques, and intended target sets to be employed in the conduct of operations.
Finding no. 2: The assessment of the foreign policy risks required by two conditions within the Active and Defensive Cyber Operations Ministerial Authorizations relies too much on technical attribution risks rather than characteristics that reflect Government of Canada’s foreign policy.
Recommendation no. 1: CSE should more precisely define the classes of activities, associated techniques, and intended target sets to be undertaken for Active and Defensive Cyber Operations as well as their underlying rationale and objectives, both in its Applications and associated Ministerial Authorizations for these activities.
Recommendation no. 2: GAC should include a mechanism to assess all relevant foreign policy risk parameters of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations within the associated Ministerial Authorizations.
During the review period, CSE only developed MA applications for what it considered [**redacted**]. ACO/DCOs, which were first prioritized for development [**related to CSE operations**]. As CSE’s capacity to conduct ACO/DCOs matures and it begins to [**redacted**]. NSIRA has observed CSE and GAC exploring the idea of [**redacted**] ACOs, which, if pursued, would [**redacted**] based on GAC’s methodology.
While the MAs obtained to date, which are not specific to an operation, allow CSE to act in [**redacted**]. NSIRA believes their generalized nature is not transferable to [**potential MAs of a different nature**]. For instance, [**description of an NSIRA concern about the Minister’s ability to filly assess certain factors about cyber operations in a certain context**]. In the context of the development of the 2019-20 ACO MA Application, GAC noted, “other purposes would require other MAs. They will not be completely general; they will be specific to a context.
Further, under the current legislative scheme, the MA Applications are a key mechanism through which the MFA has an opportunity to assess ACO/DCO activities. Because of the [**redacted**] ACO/DCOs to Canada’s foreign policy and international relations, NSIRA believes the MFA should be more directly involved in their development and execution at the Ministerial level, in addition to the working level engagement that takes place between CSE and GAC. Both Ministers can more effectively take accountability for such operations through individual MAs that provide specific details relating to the operation, its rationale, and the activities, tools, and techniques that will enable it. As such, when CSE [**redacted**] ACOs, NSIRA encourages CSE to develop MA Applications that are specific to these operations, and ensure these documents contain all the pertinent operational details that would allow each Minister to fully assess the implications and risks of each cyber operation and take accountability for it.
Section 19 of the CSE Act directs CSE’s authority to conduct ACOs in relation to international affairs, defence, or security, all areas that could implicate the responsibility of other departments. Additionally the MAs reviewed by NSIRA require that ACOs “align with Canada’s foreign policy and respond to national security, foreign, and defence policy priorities as articulated by the Government of Canada.” The setting of these priorities involve a wide range of GC departments, including the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Department of National Defence (DND), and Public Safety Canada (PS) – which are responsible for coordination and oversight of different parts of priority setting in this context. Throughout this governance review, it emerged that CSE confirms compliance with these requirements with a statement that the MA meets broader GC priorities with no elaboration of how these priorities are met.
Interdepartmental GC processes are not new in the context of coordinating national security activities and operations. As one example, when the MFA requires foreign intelligence collection within Canada, he or she submits a request to the Minister of Public Safety for this collection to be facilitated by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in accordance with section 16 of the CSIS Act. A Committee consisting [**redacted**] subsequently considers this type of request. The Committee considers issues at the Assistant Deputy Minister level, [**relates to GC decision making processes**]. Similarly, ensuring an ACO’s alignment with broader priorities and that it could not reasonably be achieved by other means can also be confirmed through an interdepartmental process. In other words, interdepartmental consultations are a means to assess the objectives of ACOs, their alignment with broader GC priorities, as well as whether there are other means by which to achieve the set objectives, as required by the CSE Act.
The setting of broader GC priorities and objectives for ACOs emerged as a key component of the governance structure for this new power in early discussions between CSE and GAC. During the period of review, CSE developed ACOs with GAC participating in some aspects of the planning process. GAC encouraged the MFA to request the development of a governance mechanism to mitigate the risk that “CSE could decide, on their own, to engage [**redacted**] noting that [**redacted**].
Early internal GAC assessments contrast this with CSE’s foreign intelligence mandate, which responds to Cabinet-approved intelligence priorities, and captured the essence of this discrepancy in stating:
[**quotation from GAC that reflects discussion related to strategic objectives and priorities of cyber operations**]
In another instance, GAC described the setting of such priorities as an “important issue that has not yet been agreed to with CSE,” and explained its view at the time, that a body with a mandate relevant to the cyber operation should decide if it is the appropriate tool to achieve a particular objective. GAC explained that its officials eventually agreed to move forward without pursuing this matter as long as a governance mechanism was established with CSE.
In this context, s. 34(4) of the CSE Act requires that the objectives of the cyber operation could not be reasonably attained by other means, and that cyber operations respond to priorities in various subject areas. Given these requirements, NSIRA notes that GC departments, other than just CSE and GAC, may be able to provide meaningful insight regarding other options or ongoing activities that could achieve the same objectives.
Furthermore, GAC highlighted the fact that Cabinet sets the Standing Intelligence Requirements (SIRs) that limit and more narrowly direct CSE’s foreign intelligence collection activities. When asked about this issue, CSE responded that “these discussions led both GAC and CSE to agree to begin with a [**redacted**] Ministerial Authorization supported by the CSE-GAC ACO/DCO consultation structure and governance framework.”
In NSIRA’s view, the CSE Act and the ACO MA directly relate ACOs to broader GC objectives and priorities that directly implicate the mandates of departments such as DND, PCO, CSIS, and PS, in addition to those of CSE and GAC. It is not sufficient for CSE to state that an MA and its associated activities align with these priorities without elaboration or consultation of any other parties, given that Canada’s national security and defence policy priorities are under the remit or coordination of DND, PCO, and PS. These departments would be best positioned to comment on, and confirm, a specific ACO’s alignment with Canada’s goals in order to mitigate the potential risks associated with these operations and contribute to overall accountability of these operations.
[**relates to GC national security matters**] As such, the governance process merits the inclusion of – or at the very least consultation with – other departments whose mandates are to oversee Canada’s broader strategic objectives. This could ensure that Canada’s broader interests and any potential risks have been sufficiently considered and reflected in the development of ACOs.
Finding no. 3: The current governance framework does not include a mechanism to confirm an Active Cyber Operation’s (ACO) alignment with broader Government of Canada (GC) strategic priorities as required by the CSE Act and the Ministerial Authorization. While these objectives and priorities that are outside CSE and GAC’s remit alone, the two departments govern ACOs without input from the broader GC community involved in managing Canada’s overarching objectives.
Recommendation no. 3: CSE and GAC should establish a framework to consult key stakeholders, such as the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister and other federal departments whose mandates intersect with proposed Active Cyber Operations to ensure that they align with broader Government of Canada strategic priorities and that the requirements of the CSE Act are satisfied.
CSE differentiates between DCOs initiated in response to a cyber threat, and DCOs issued pre-emptively to prevent a cyber threat from manifesting. Further, CSE and GAC have discussed the nature of these operations, including that they exist on a spectrum ranging from operations which are responsive, to those which can be proactive in nature. Notably, in the case of DCOs, [**relates to CSE operations**].
CSE has explained that the initiation of a DCO “requires evidence of a threat that represents a source of harm to a federal institution or designated electronic information or information infrastructure.” In CSE’s view, this threat does not need to compromise the infrastructure before a DCO be initiated so long as evidence establishes a connection between the two.
At the same time, CSE has not yet developed a means to distinguish between this type of DCO and an ACO, given that discussions between GAC and CSE noted that a DCO could resemble an ACO when it is conducted proactively. Unlike ACOs, which require the consent of the MFA and result in a comprehensive engagement of GAC throughout the planning process, DCOs only require consultation with the MFA. Without a clear threshold for a proactive DCO, the potential exists for insufficient involvement of GAC in an operation that could resemble (or constitute) an ACO, [**redacted**].
In our subsequent review, we will pay close attention to the nature of any pre-emptive DCOs planned and/or conducted to ensure that they do not constitute an ACO.
Finding no. 4: CSE and GAC have not established a threshold to determine how to identify and differentiate between a pre-emptive Defensive Cyber Operation and an Active Cyber Operation, which can lead to the insufficient involvement of GAC if the operation is misclassified as defensive.
Recommendation no. 4: CSE and GAC should develop a threshold that discerns between an Active Cyber Operation and a pre-emptive Defensive Cyber Operation, and this threshold should be described to the Minister of National Defence within the applicable Ministerial Authorizations.
Under s. 34(4) of the CSE Act, the MND only issues an authorization if he or she concludes that no information will be acquired under the authorization except in accordance with an authorization issued under ss. 26(1) or 27(1) or (2) or 40(1). The ACO/DCO MAs issued under the period of review reflect this restriction. The ACO/DCO MAs and corresponding applications only mention that existing foreign intelligence MAs will be used to acquire information to support ACO/DCO activities. It further articulates that no information will be acquired in the conduct of ACO/DCO activities which are authorized under the ACO MA.
However, the MAs and the supporting applications do not describe the full extent of information collection activities resulting from ACO/DCOs. According to CSE policy, CSE is still permitted to collect information [**redacted**] so long as this activity is covered under another existing MA. CSE explained that ACO/DCO MAs cannot be relied on to facilitate intelligence collection, however [**relates to CSE operations**]. For example, [**redacted**] using the applicable Foreign Intelligence (FI) authority to [**redacted**] in accordance with GC intelligence priorities.
Although the CSE Act permits CSE to acquire information pursuant to collection MAs, NSIRA believes that CSE’s policy to allow collection activities under different MAs during the conduct of cyber operations is not accurately expressed within the ACO/DCO MAs. Instead, the collection of information is listed under prohibited conduct within the ACO MA, giving the impression that collection cannot occur under any circumstances. As a result, NSIRA notes that the way in which the ACO MA is written does not provide full transparency of CSE’s own internal policies.
CSE explained that [**redacted**] during an ACO/DCO. Further, NSIRA learned from a CSE subject-matter expert (SME) that a specific [**redacted**] which outlines the precise activities to be undertaken as part of the operation, guides each ACO/DCO. [**relates to CSE operations**].
Given CSE’s policy of allowing collection and cyber operations to occur simultaneously [**redacted**]NSIRA will closely review the roles and responsibilities [**redacted**] involved in ACO/DCOs, as well as the technical aspects of using CSE’s systems in support of ACO/DCOs, in our subsequent review of specific operations conducted by CSE to date.
Finding no. 5: CSE’s internal policies regarding the collection of information in the conduct of cyber operations are not accurately described within the Active and Defensive Cyber Operations Ministerial Authorizations.
Recommendation no. 5: In its applications to the Minister of National Defence, CSE should accurately describe the potential for collection activities to occur under separate authorizations while engaging in Active and Defensive Cyber Operations.
NSIRA set out to assess whether CSE’s internal governance process sufficiently incorporates all the necessary considerations in the planning and execution of the operations and, whether those implicated in the conduct of ACO/DCOs (i.e. GAC and [**redacted**]) are adequately informed of the parameters and limitations pertaining to cyber operations.
During the period of review, CSE operationalized its requirements in the CSE Act and MAs through various internal planning and governance mechanisms. These ranged from strategic, high-level planning documents and mechanisms to the individual operational [**documents/mechanisms**] of each ACO/DCO.
As described earlier, CSE uses various planning and governance documentation in the approval process for individual ACO/DCOs, including the [**redacted**] CSE first develops the [**redacted**] an ACO/DCO. Following this, CSE creates a [**redacted**] which outlines the risks to be considered in conducting the ACO/DCO. Additionally, the [**redacted**] and the [**redacted**] both generally include fields relating to the prohibitions set out within the CSE Act. Once a specific target is chosen, the [**redacted**] serves as the final governance document, prior to the [**redacted**] of an ACO/DCO.
Similar to the ACO/DCO MAs, as an initial operational plan, the [**redacted**] generally preapproves a set of activities and a generalized [**redacted**] which are then further refined and developed as part of the [**redacted**] process. In NSIRA’s view, [**relates to CSE operations**].
Specifically, the [**relates to CSE operations**] and other operational details that, in NSIRA’s view, surpass simply [**redacted**] and contain key components of operational planning. [**redacted**] details the specific [**redacted**]. Nonetheless, despite the [**redacted**] the [**redacted**] it may have a lower approval threshold than that of the [**redacted**].
Overall, NSIRA welcomes that CSE has developed procedures and documented its operational planning associated with ACO/DCO activities, in accordance with its requirements in the MPS. Nonetheless, the numerous governance documents that comprise the governance of ACO/DCOs exist to serve different audiences and purposes, and result in pertinent information dispersed across them, rather than being available in a unified structure for all implicated stakeholders and decision- makers to assess. NSIRA believes the many separate components of governance may be redundant and result in unnecessary ambiguity within the same operational plans that are meant to guide ACO/DCOs. Thus, NSIRA will assess the efficacy of this governance structure as it is applied to operations as part of our subsequent review.
Finding no. 6: The [**redacted**] process, which occurs after planning documents have been approved, contains information that is pertinent to CSE’s broader operational plans. The at [**redacted**] times contained pertinent information absent from these other documents, even though it is approved at a lower level of management.
Recommendation no. 6: CSE should include all pertinent information, including targeting and contextual information, within all operational plans in place for a cyber operation, and in materials it presents to GAC.
Both the ACO and DCO Ministerial Authorizations authorize the following classes of persons to conduct ACO/DCO activities: [**relates to CSE’s operational policy**]. The MAs further require that these “persons or classes of persons must operationally support CSE and Government of Canada intelligence requirements, and demonstrate an understanding of the relevant legal and policy requirements.”
Further demonstrating a commitment to the training and education of its operational staff of the new legal and policy requirements, CSE has stated—with respect to a specific operation—that:
The operational activities undertaken [**redacted**] who receive extensive and continuous training on their function and duties as well as the policy considerations and compliance requirements for their specific role. Additionally, [**redacted**] are trained and accountable for the activities they are carrying out, including all relevant compliance reporting requirements. [**redacted**] performing activities [**redacted**] are also provided, in advance, all related operational materials to ensure the operational conditions outlined within are understood and adhered to.
Finally, CSE explained to NSIRA that “prior to the new Act being approved, CSE provided virtual and in-person briefings on the new authorities to all of CSE’s workforce. More tailored briefings were available for operational teams.” These included presentations and question-and-answer sessions with the Deputy Chief, Policy and Communications and other briefing sessions created by CSE’s policy teams. However, NSIRA notes these types of training sessions, while educational at a high level, are not operation-specific and do not test employees understanding of their new legislative operating environment.
Based on the above requirements and assurances, NSIRA expected to find that CSE employees supporting ACO/DCOs were provided with sufficient and effective training to thoroughly understand their responsibilities in light of CSE’s new legal authorities and constraints, and to apply this knowledge in the delivery of ACO/DCOs.
In this context, CSE conducted a tabletop exercise with a view to introduce [**certain employees**] to the MA design process at an early stage, to enlist their involvement in the drafting of MAs, and to test the functional viability of the MA framework, among other objectives. Throughout the exercise, [**the above mentioned employee**] barred from seeking advice from policy and legal representatives for management to be able to observe results as they may naturally occur. NSIRA notes a key observation from the exercise:
[**redacted**] expressed unease with the need to rely on multiple MAs to support evolving mission objectives. Policy guidance and training will be needed to [**redacted**] to know what authority they are operating under as they proceed with an operation across missions and across MAs. This guidance and training must also account for the fact that information collected under different MAs could be subject to different data management requirements.
CSE stated that [**certain employees**] obtain knowledge of the legal authorities, requirements, and prohibitions of an ACO or DCO through planning meetings and knowledge of the operational documents. In an interview with a CSE SME [**redacted**] NSIRA learned that the training offered on CSE’s new legal authorities, requirements, and prohibitions [**redacted**]. The SME said that if they had any questions about the governance, they would [**relates to CSE operations**].
It is unclear to NSIRA whether there exists a requirement for [**redacted**] to thoroughly understand the parameters delineated for an ACO/DCO within the [**redacted**]. For instance, when asked about their comfort level of operating under different MAs [**redacted**] contained in the [**redacted**] CSE explained that [**redacted**] are developed from the [**redacted**], but as described [**redacted**]. NSIRA is concerned that if [**certain employees**] are focused primarily on the [**certain document/mechanism**] they may not have an adequate understanding of the broader parameters and restrictions associated with an operation.
The MAs authorizing ACO/DCOs impose a condition on CSE’s employees involved in the execution of ACO/DCOs to demonstrate an understanding of the legal and policy requirements under which they operate. The MAs and operational planning documents contain valuable information about the parameters of the broader authority to conduct ACO/DCOs and specific operations. As such, NSIRA believes it is imperative that employees working on any aspect of delivering an ACO/DCO receive thorough training sessions to familiarize them with the requirements and limitations of their respective operations set out in the [**redacted**] and [**redacted**]. Finally, [**certain employees**] could be tested on their understanding of the MAs and their constraints on specific operations.
Finding no. 7: CSE has provided its employees with high-level learning opportunities to learn about its new authorities to conduct Active and Defensive Cyber Operations (ACO/DCOs). However, employees working directly on ACO/DCOs may not have the requisite understanding of the specifics of CSE’s new legal authorities and parameters surrounding their use.
Recommendation no. 7: CSE should provide a structured training program to its employees involved in the execution of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations (ACO/DCOs), to ensure that they have the requisite knowledge of CSE’s legal authorities, requirements, and prohibitions, as required by the associated Ministerial Authorizations.
Given the legislative requirement for the MFA to provide consent or to be consulted in relation to ACO/DCOs, NSIRA set out to assess whether CSE developed a framework for effective consultation and engagement of GAC officials in the intersection of their respective mandates.
In GAC and CSE’s engagement during the development of the consultation framework, they developed a mechanism by which GAC is to consent or be consulted on an operation, and to provide its assessment of the operation’s foreign policy risk. In response to a consultation request by CSE, GAC is responsible for providing, within five business days, a Foreign Policy Risk Assessment (FPRA) that confirms whether [**redacted**]. Notably, the FPRA does not constitute an approval of an operation, only a consultation. In order to inform the development of the FRPA, CSE prepares a tailored [**document/mechanism**] for GAC which summarizes aspects of the operation. In our subsequent review, NSIRA will analyse whether the timeline provided to GAC for specific operations enabled it to meaningfully assess the associated foreign policy risks.
For GAC, several factors affect whether or not an ACO/DCO [**redacted**] These factors include whether an ACO/DCO aligns with GAC’s position on international norms in cyberspace and the furtherance of Canada’s national interests, [**relates to GC national security matters**] This is reflected in the TORs for the CSE-GAC WG, which require GAC to assess:
In the context of the above assessment requirements, GAC explained to NSIRA that it conducts a less detailed assessment of the foreign policy risk of specific operations, through the FPRA, on the basis that it has conducted a more detailed assessment of the classes of activities authorized in the MA.106 This assessment approach is reflected in [**redacted**] FPRAs received by NSIRA, which concluded that the operations fall within [**redacted**] but did not elaborate on the factors listed above. Given that the FPRA provides assurance of [**redacted**] of specific operations and is required under the ACO MA, NSIRA will closely review these assessments as part our subsequent review of operations.
[**redacted**]
Parliament may authorize violations of international law, but must do so expressly. An example of this is following the decision in X (Re), 2014 FCA 249, Parliament amended the CSIS Act through the adoption of Bill C-44 in 2015. The new provisions made it explicitly clear that CSIS could perform its duties and functions within or outside of Canada and that, pursuant to the newly adopted provisions of the CSIS Act, a judge may authorize activities outside Canada to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada “without regard to any other law.” As per the language of the CSE Act, ACO/DCO MAs may only authorize CSE to carry out ACO/DCO activities “despite any other Act of Parliament or of any foreign state.” As outlined by case law, this language may not be sufficiently clear to allow the Minister to authorize violations of customary international law.
[**redacted**] the MAs reviewed by NSIRA stated that the activities “will conform to Canada’s obligations under international law” and each MA required that CSE’s “activities will not contravene Canada’s obligations under international law.” This would indicate that all activities conducted under this MA would be compliant with international law. However, the governance documents developed by CSE and GAC, such as the CSE-GAC consultation framework, do not set out parameters for assessing ACO/DCO activities for compliance with Canada’s obligations under international law, nor is it made clear against which specific international legal obligations ACO/DCO activities are to be assessed. NSIRA will closely monitor how CSE and GAC consider compliance with international law in relation to ACO/DCO activities in the subsequent review.
In NSIRA’s engagement with GAC, GAC highlighted its interdepartmental and international consultations dating back to 2016 on the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Tallinn Manual 2.0), which informed part of its development of the MAs [**redacted**]. GAC has created a Draft Desk book resulting from these consultations, which identifies Canada’s preliminary assessment of key rules of international law in cyberspace as described within the Tallinn Manual 2.0. NSIRA notes that while this analysis is a draft and does not represent Canada’s final position, it “has served as a starting point for further legal consideration.” NSIRA received no further documents that outline Canada’s understanding of how international law applies to ACO/DCO activities.
Further, documentation provided by both GAC and CSE recognizes a need to assess each potential ACO/DCO for lawfulness. GAC wrote that an analysis of the terms “acknowledged to be harmful” or “posing a threat to international peace and security” should be conducted within the context of each ACO/DCO. [**redacted**]
GAC explained that it assessed each activity within the authorized classes for compliance with international law at the MA development stage, and that consequently, a less detailed assessment of compliance with international law took place at the FPRA stage for each operation. GAC explained that the Draft Desk book and the Tallinn Manual 2.0 were consulted for these activities. From [**redacted**] FPRAs reviewed by NSIRA to date, it is not clear how the Draft Desk book or the analysis of the 2015 UN GGE voluntary norms has informed the assessment of each operation’s level of risk, or GAC’s conclusions that the ACO/DCOs complied with international law. Rather, GAC indicates that activities are compliant with international law, without an explanation of the basis behind these conclusions.
NSIRA notes that international law in cyberspace is a developing area, and recognizes that Canada and other States are continuing to develop and refine their legal analysis in this field. ACO/DCO activities conducted without a thorough and documented assessment of an operation’s compliance with international law would create significant legal risks for Canada if an operation violates international law. Ultimately, a better documented analysis of Canada’s legal obligations when conducting ACO/DCOs is necessary in order for GAC and CSE to assess an operation’s compliance with international law. NSIRA will further examine the lawfulness of ACO/DCO activities in our subsequent review.
Finding no. 8: CSE and GAC have not sufficiently developed a clear and objective framework with which to assess Canada’s obligations under international law in relation to Active and Defensive Cyber Operations.
Recommendation no. 8: CSE and GAC should provide an assessment of the international legal regime applicable to the conduct of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations. Additionally, CSE should require that GAC conduct and document a thorough legal assessment of each operation’s compliance with international law.
Both GAC and CSE have implemented methodologies that require them to calculate risks based on certain factors. However, these types of risks are not absolute, and depend on a wide range of factors that can change over time or with the emergence of new information. In the case of GAC, those factors center around [**redacted**].
At present, CSE and GAC’s approach to accounting for any change in risks relies on GAC informing CSE if any change to Canada’s foreign policy should arise. However, based on GAC’s methodology above, the foreign policy risk of an operation may also rise if new information is uncovered about [**redacted**] or in relation to the potential impacts of the operation beyond a [**redacted**] For CSE’s part, it appears to primarily focus on changes to operational risks [**that are uncovered at a certain time or in a certain manner**]. This one-way mechanism does not account for other factors [**redacted**].
In this context, CSE has explained that an ACO/DCO is [**redacted**] and that as result, [**redacted**]. CSE further explained that DX and that subsequent activities may be adjusted as required using information obtained from the previous one. [**redacted**].
In this context, NSIRA observed operations that were planned to take place over a period of time, including a DCO where CSE would undertake [**related to CSE operations**]. Another ACO would see CSE [**redacted**]. In describing this operation to GAC, CSE wrote that activities would take place over a period of time [**redacted**].
[**related to CSE operations**] benefit from [**redacted**] of the ADO/DCOs [**redacted**]. NSIRA believes that a two-way notification mechanism triggering a re-assessment of the risks associated with an ACO/DCO should be established between CSE and GAC, whether those risks are uncovered prior to or during the course of an operation.
Finally, CSE’s internal governance process brings in GAC through [**a certain document/mechanism**]. In this context, GAC has highlighted objectives, [**redacted**] of an operation as information that CSE should provide for the purposes of assessing foreign policy risks. NSIRA has observed that the [**redacted**]. NSIRA notes that these details serve as important context to which GAC should have access as part of its assessment, particularly as GAC includes in its conclusions that the activities complied with [**redacted**].
Finding no. 9: CSE expects GAC to provide notification of any changes to foreign policy risks, but has not sufficiently considered the need to communicate other risks that may arise during an operation to GAC. Further, information critical to GAC’s assessment of foreign policy risks has also been excluded in materials CSE uses to engage GAC on an operation. As such, within the current consultation framework, CSE may not sufficiently communicate relevant information to GAC in support of its foreign policy assessment, and to manage ongoing changes in the risk associated with a cyber operation.
Recommendation no. 9: CSE and GAC should communicate to one another all relevant information and any new developments relevant to assessing risks associated with a cyber operation, both in the planning phases and during its execution.
This was NSIRA’s first review of CSE’s new powers to conduct ACO/DCOs, and it has illustrated CSE and GAC’s development of a governance structure for conducting these operations. CSE has now had the power to conduct these operations since 2019, though this review demonstrated that both departments begun conceptualizing a governance regime prior to the coming into force of the CSE Act. NSIRA is satisfied that CSE has, to date, developed a comprehensive governance structure, and commends its regular engagement with GAC to develop a consultation framework that sets out the roles and responsibilities of both departments.
However, at the broader governance level, CSE can improve the transparency and clarity around the planning of ACO/DCOs, particularly at this early stage, by setting out clearer parameters within the associated MAs for the classes of activities and target sets that could comprise ACO/DCOs. NSIRA further believes the continued development of cyber operations should benefit from consultation with other government departments responsible for Canada’s strategic priorities and objectives in the areas of national security and defence. Finally, CSE and GAC should develop a threshold and a definition for what constitutes a pre-emptive DCO, so as to ensure the appropriate involvement of GAC in an operation.
At the operational level, CSE and GAC should ensure that each operation’s compliance with international law is assessed and documented. On CSE’s part, it should ensure that information critical to assessing the risks of an operation be streamlined and included within all governance documents, and made available to all those involved in the development and approval of ACO/DCOs – including GAC. Finally, CSE should ensure that its operational staff are well-versed in the specifics of their new legislative framework and its applicability to specific operations.
While this review focused on the governance structures at play in relation to ACO/DCOs, of even greater importance is how these structures are implemented, and followed, in practice. We have made several observations about the information contained within the governance documents developed to date, and will subsequently assess how they are put into practice as part of our forthcoming review of ACO/DCOs.
Figure 1: Different types of cyber operations. Source: CSE briefing materials
[**redacted figure**]
Figure 2: Difference between ACOs and DCOs. Source: CSE briefing material.
DEFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS | ACTIVE CYBER OPERATIONS | |
---|---|---|
Authorized Activites |
|
|
Ministerial Approval | MND approval with MFA consultation | MND approval with the consent or request of MFA |
Intent | To take action online to protect electronic information and infrastructures of importance to the government of Canada | To degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with capabilities of foreign individual, state, organization |
Context | Initiated in response to a cyber threat, or proactively to prevent a cyber threat | Initiated in accordance with Ministerial direction as it relates to international affairs defence or security. |
Threat Actor/Target Set | Conducted against threats linked to Government systems and systems of importance, irrespective of the actor **Once confirmed not against a Canadian, person in Canada, or on GII in Canada |
Conducted against specific targets in acordance with the Ministerial Authorization **Once confirmed not against a Canadian, person in Canada, or on GII in Canada |
Outcome | Conducted with a view to stop or prevent cyber threats in a manner that is reasonable and proportionate to the intrusion or threat | Conducted to the extent directed by the Ministerial Authorization and that is reasonable and proportionate |
[**redacted**]
Interdepartmental Group | CSE-GAC Senior Management Team (SMT) | DG CSE-GAC ACO/DCO Working Group | ADM-Level |
---|---|---|---|
Co-Chairs | SMT Co-Chairs: CSE DG, [**redacted**], GAC, DG Intelligence Bureau | Co-Chairs: CSE, DG [**redacted**] GAC,DG Intelligence Bureau. It iscomposed of some of the same DG-Level participants as the SMT as well as their working-level supports. | Co-Chairs: CSE, Deputy Chief, SIGINT GAC, ADM (Political Director) International Security |
Roles and Responsibilities | Exchanges information on the departments’ respective plans and priorities, as well as areas of collaboration. | Under the auspices of the SMT, this entity was established with a mandate to collaborate specifically on ACO/DCO matters. Implementation of the governance framework associated with current and planned [**redacted**]. Coordinates information sharing related to the operational planning and execution of ACO/DCOs, as well as their associated risks and adherence to Canada’s foreign policy Collaborates on the renewal, evolution, and development of current and future MAs | Resolves any issues under the purview of the WG that cannot reach resolution at the DG-level. |
Finding no. 1: The Active and Defensive Cyber Operations Ministerial Authorization Applications do not provide sufficient detail for the Minister(s) to appreciate the scope of the classes of activities being requested in the authorization. Similarly, the Ministerial Authorization does not sufficiently delineate precise classes of activities, associated techniques, and intended target sets to be employed in the conduct of operations.
Finding no. 2: The assessment of the foreign policy risks required by two conditions within the Active and Defensive Cyber Operations Ministerial Authorizations relies too much on technical attribution risks rather than characteristics that reflect Government of Canada’s foreign policy.
Finding no. 3: The current governance framework does not include a mechanism to confirm an Active Cyber Operation’s (ACO) alignment with broader Government of Canada (GC) strategic priorities as required by the CSE Act and the Ministerial Authorization. While these objectives and priorities that are outside CSE and GAC’s remit alone, the two departments govern ACOs without input from the broader GC community involved in managing Canada’s overarching objectives.
Finding no. 4: CSE and GAC have not established a threshold to determine how to identify and differentiate between a pre-emptive Defensive Cyber Operation and an Active Cyber Operation, which can lead to the insufficient involvement of GAC if the operation is misclassified as defensive.
Finding no. 5: CSE’s internal policies regarding the collection of information in the conduct of cyber operations are not accurately described within the Active and Defensive Cyber Operations Ministerial Authorizations.
Finding no. 6: The [**redacted**] process, which occurs after planning documents have been approved, contains information that is pertinent to CSE’s broader operational plans. The [**redacted**] at times contained pertinent information absent from these other documents, even though it is approved at a lower level of management.
Finding no. 7: CSE has provided its employees with high-level learning opportunities to learn about its new authorities to conduct Active and Defensive Cyber Operations (ACO/DCOs). However, employees working directly on ACO/DCOs may not have the requisite understanding of the specifics of CSE’s new legal authorities and parameters surrounding their use.
Finding no. 8: CSE and GAC have not sufficiently developed a clear and objective framework with which to assess Canada’s obligations under international law in relation to Active and Defensive Cyber Operations.
Finding no. 9: CSE expects GAC to provide notification of any changes to foreign policy risks, but has not sufficiently considered the need to communicate other risks that may arise during an operation to GAC. Further, information critical to GAC’s assessment of foreign policy risks has also been excluded in materials CSE uses to engage GAC on an operation. As such, within the current consultation framework, CSE may not sufficiently communicate relevant information to GAC in support of its foreign policy assessment, and to manage ongoing changes in the risk associated with a cyber operation.
Recommendation no. 1: CSE should more precisely define the classes of activities, associated techniques, and intended target sets to be undertaken for Active and Defensive Cyber Operations as well as their underlying rationale and objectives, both in its Applications and associated Ministerial Authorizations for these activities.
Recommendation no. 2: GAC should include a mechanism to assess all relevant foreign policy risk parameters of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations within the associated Ministerial Authorizations.
Recommendation no. 3: CSE and GAC should establish a framework to consult key stakeholders, such as the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister and other federal departments whose mandates intersect with proposed Active Cyber Operations, to ensure that they align with broader Government of Canada strategic priorities and that the requirements of the CSE Act are satisfied.
Recommendation no. 4: CSE and GAC should develop a threshold that discerns between an Active Cyber Operation and a pre-emptive Defensive Cyber Operation, and this threshold should be described to the Minister of National Defence within the applicable Ministerial Authorizations.
Recommendation no. 5: In its applications to the Minister of National Defence, CSE should accurately describe the potential for collection activities to occur under separate authorizations while engaging in Active and Defensive Cyber Operations.
Recommendation no. 6: CSE should include all pertinent information, including targeting and contextual information, within all operational plans in place for a cyber operation, and in materials it presents to GAC.
Recommendation no. 7: CSE should provide a structured training program to its employees involved in the execution of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations (ACO/DCOs), to ensure that they have the requisite knowledge of CSE’s legal authorities, requirements, and prohibitions, as required by the associated Ministerial Authorizations.
Recommendation no. 8: CSE and GAC should provide an assessment of the international legal regime applicable to the conduct of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations. Additionally, CSE should require that GAC conduct and document a thorough legal assessment of each operation’s compliance with international law.
Recommendation no. 9: CSE and GAC should communicate to one another all relevant information and any new developments relevant to assessing risks associated with a cyber operation, both in the planning phases and during its execution.
Date of Publishing:
This was NSIRA’s first review of CSE’s governance of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations (ACO/DCOs). The review assessed the governance framework that guides the conduct of ACO/DCOs and whether CSE appropriately considers its legal obligations and the foreign policy impacts of operations.
CSE’s authority to conduct ACO/DCOs was introduced in 2019 through the Communications Security Establishment Act. These powers did not exist prior to the introduction of that legislation and are important new capabilities for the Government of Canada. The current global environment is clarifying the relevance of these capabilities and authorities for Canada.
In keeping with its commitment to lawfulness, CSE has worked diligently and methodically to operationalize these new authorities. As CSE continues to develop this capability, it is proceeding cautiously to ensure all activities are carried out in accordance with the CSE Act, and in line with Canada’s international obligations, in particular those highlighted in Canada’s recently published statement on the application of International Law in cyberspace.
CSE acknowledges the crucial role that review bodies play in the national security and intelligence community and CSE welcomes reviews by and recommendations from these review bodies. NSIRA’s recommendations from its review of CSE’s ACO/DCO governance framework will help guide the development of CSE’s capabilities so that CSE can continue to ensure lawfulness as well as effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness.
As a crucial partner in the ACO/DCO governance framework, NSIRA engaged GAC in this review and made recommendations in relation to both GAC and CSE. CSE and GAC are pleased to provide the following response to NSIRA’s recommendations.
CSE should more precisely define the classes of activities, associated techniques, and intended target sets to be undertaken for Active and Defensive Cyber Operations as well as their underlying rationale and objectives, both in its Applications and associated Ministerial Authorizations for these activities.
CSE agrees with this recommendation.
While CSE agrees with this recommendation, CSE notes that the Minister is always provided with a sufficient amount of information and detail necessary to assess the application and grant an authorization.
CSE agrees that, where operationally appropriate, combining the information contained in briefings and presentations into the written application and authorisation will provide a more comprehensive written record. CSE has begun refining the information included in Active Cyber Operations (ACO) and Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO) applications and authorisations.
GAC should include a mechanism to assess all relevant foreign policy risk parameters of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations within the associated Ministerial Authorizations.
GAC agrees with this recommendation.
GAC already includes a consideration of a wide variety of factors in its Foreign Policy Risk Assessment, as identifiable in the Foreign Policy Risk Assessment template.
CSE has also in the past provided separate operational/technical risk assessments in its mission plans. This has included additional information about the targets and their activities on the GII, the technologies they use, or the complex technical systems CSE develops and deploys to conduct these operations.
CSE and GAC should establish a framework to consult key stakeholders, such as the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister and other federal departments whose mandates intersect with proposed Active Cyber Operations to ensure that they align with broader Government of Canada strategic priorities and that the requirements of the CSE Act are satisfied.
In principle, CSE and GAC agree with this recommendation.
All relevant Government of Canada stakeholders whose mandates may intersect with a planned ACO are consulted. We agree with the importance of ensuring alignment with broad Government of Canada strategic priorities and believe there are a number of avenues already in place through which updates can be shared and consultations can be undertaken with the broader security and intelligence community as and when needed. Examples of this include the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) and Deputy Minister (DM) level security and intelligence committee infrastructure (e.g. ADM National Security Operations Committee, DM Operations Committee) and the geographic-specific committee infrastructure. Additionally, there is a community-wide intelligence priority process that provides a framework and guidance for intelligence-related activities such as cyber operations.
We appreciate that as the types of ACOs considered and undertaken broaden, the current model for consulting government departments and agencies may need to evolve. CSE and GAC will work together to evolve an appropriate consultation framework over time as needed.
CSE and GAC should develop a threshold that discerns between an Active Cyber Operation and a pre-emptive Defensive Cyber Operation, and this threshold should be described to the Minister of National Defence within the applicable Ministerial Authorizations.
CSE and GAC disagree with this recommendation.
CSE and GAC cannot agree with this recommendation as it refers to an activity (pre-emptive Defensive Cyber Operation) that is not provided for in the Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act) and that CSE does not conduct.
Under the DCO aspect of CSE’s mandate in section 18 of the CSE Act, CSE is authorized to carry out activities on or through the global information infrastructure to help protect federal institutions’ electronic information and information infrastructures and electronic information and information infrastructures designated under the CSE Act as being of importance to the Government of Canada (relevant infrastructure). The threat does not need to have compromised the information or infrastructure before a DCO is initiated, but it must present a credible threat to the designated information infrastructure(s). (U) In circumstances where CSE is aware a cyber threat exists but this threat has not manifested as a threat to the designated infrastructure(s), CSE can consider conducting an ACO. CSE can only conduct an ACO if it can satisfy the Minister that any intended activities would degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state or organisation or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.
If NSIRA believes that CSE and GAC need to more clearly define the threshold between an ACO and a DCO, then CSE and GAC also disagree with this recommendation on the basis that the CSE Act clearly sets out the conditions that CSE must satisfy before undertaking cyber security activities, DCOs or ACOs. There is no need for any other threshold to be created.
In its applications to the Minister of National Defence, CSE should accurately describe the potential for collection activities to occur under separate authorizations while engaging in Active and Defensive Cyber Operations.
CSE agrees with this recommendation.
CSE already accurately describes the potential for collection activities, and the authority for such activities, in its applications to the Minister of National Defence. CSE has taken steps to ensure that applications for and authorizations of ACOs and DCOs clearly reference the authorizations under which any acquisition of information required to achieve the intended outcome of the ACO or DCO is conducted.
Importantly, CSE is not permitted to acquire information under an ACO or DCO authorization. The acquisition of the information relied on to conduct ACO and DCO activities is authorised under CSE’s foreign intelligence authorization, cybersecurity authorization or an emergency authorization. The use of this information in support of ACO and DCO purposes is outlined in CSE’s foreign intelligence and cybersecurity authorizations. These authorizations are reviewed by the Intelligence Commissioner who assesses the reasonableness and proportionality of the acquisition and use of information for ACO and DCO purposes.
CSE should include all pertinent information, including targeting and contextual information, within all operational plans in place for a cyber operation, and in materials it presents to GAC.
CSE disagrees with this recommendation.
GAC requires sufficient and pertinent information upon which to base its analysis related to foreign risk and international law. CSE has worked with GAC to share the appropriate level of operational detail that GAC has requested to conduct their work. This need is reflected in the CSE-GAC Governance Framework whereby GAC is provided with an operation-specific Mission Plan to inform its Foreign Policy Risk Assessment. GAC is satisfied with the information provided by CSE. When GAC has required additional information to conduct its Foreign Policy Risk Assessment or international law assessment, CSE has provided the supplemental information requested.
CSE should provide a structured training program to its employees involved in the execution of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations (ACO/DCOs), to ensure that they have the requisite knowledge of CSE’s legal authorities, requirements, and prohibitions, as required by the associated Ministerial Authorizations.
CSE agrees with this recommendation.
To supplement the existing mandatory annual training and testing that covers CSE’s legal authorities, requirements and prohibitions, CSE will consider developing a tailored training program for employees involved in the planning and execution of ACOs and DCOs.
CSE and GAC should provide an assessment of the international legal regime applicable to the conduct of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations. Additionally, CSE should require that GAC conduct and document a thorough legal assessment of each operation’s compliance with international law.
CSE and GAC partially agree with this recommendation.
In the time since this review concluded, GAC and CSE have continued to develop the process for assessing the international legal implications of cyber operations, with GAC’s Legal Bureau documenting a thorough legal assessment of each operation’s compliance with international law.
Procedurally, CSE submits a Mission Plan to GAC requesting a Foreign Policy Risk Assessment. Once received, GAC’s Legal Bureau leads a consultation process with Department of Justice (DOJ) counsel from both CSE’s and GAC’s Department of Legal Services (DLS), and in some cases, with DOJ counsel from the Constitutional, Administrative and International Law Section (CAILS), to discuss the international law implications of the planned operation as described in the Mission Plan. (U) These discussions are summarised in a written legal assessment recorded in the Foreign Policy Risk Assessment and are grounded in the international law analysis the GAC Legal Bureau has been developing over many years, including in the Government of Canada’s comments on the draft chapter of Tallinn Manual 2.0 in 2016, the development of the Draft Desk Book coordinated by GAC’s Legal Bureau and produced in August 2019, and the extensive legal analysis done in advance of the original ACO and DCO MAs.
GAC notes that it would be unusual to produce a comprehensive legal assessment of applicable law with respect to a range of potential or hypothetical operations that might be conducted by Canada, its allies and its adversaries in any field, cyber or otherwise. Rather it is GAC’s practice, like that of States generally, to produce legal assessments in relation to specific proposed activities or operations or court cases or other potential disputes.
GAC has consolidated its international legal analysis into a public statement on international law applicable to cyberspace. This public statement was developed and completed through extensive interdepartmental consultations among legal and policy experts, as well as an analysis of other national statements and leading publications and processes, including Tallinn Manual 2.0, the Swiss-led Expert Dialogue on International Law and Cyber, the Dutch-led Hague process, the Swiss-led Informal Consultations on International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations, the Oxford Process, and the US Cyber Command annual Legal Conference. Canada has joined like-minded and other nations in producing a public statement, in part to advance ongoing multilateral processes at the United Nations and elsewhere, to further develop common understandings and a broader consensus on how international law applies in cyberspace.
CSE and GAC should communicate to one another all relevant information and any new developments relevant to assessing risks associated with a cyber operation, both in the planning phases and during its execution.
CSE and GAC agree with this recommendation.
In the time since this review concluded, CSE and GAC have increased the frequency of working-level exchanges. Under the GAC-CSE Foreign Cyber Operations Governance Framework, GAC and CSE will bolster the existing points of contact and develop standard operating procedures for CSE and GAC to mutually provide any new information or developments relevant to a cyber operation.
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ACRONYM | Description |
---|---|
CSIS | Canadian Security Intelligence Service |
DAG | Data Acquisition and Governance |
DDO | Deputy Director of Operations |
DMEX | Data Management and Exploitation |
ERC | External Review and Compliance |
FC | Federal Court |
IC | Intelligence Commissioner |
JA | Judicial Authorization |
NSA 2017 | National Security Act 2017 |
NSIRA | National Security and Intelligence Review Agency |
ODAC | Operational Data Analysis Center |
PAD | Publicly Available Dataset |
PCO | Privy Council Office |
PS | Public Safety Canada |
SIRC | Security Intelligence Review Committee |
Approved classes of Canadian datasets. Categories of Canadian datasets approved by the Minister and authorized by the Intelligence Commissioner. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service can only collect and retain a Canadian dataset if it falls under an approved class.
Canadian dataset. A dataset that predominantly relates to individuals within Canada or Canadians.
Dataset. A collection of information stored as an electronic record and characterized by a common subject matter.
Designated employee. An employee designated by the Minister who can carry out one or more activities referred to in sections 11.07 and 11.22, such as evaluating, querying, and exploiting section 11.05 datasets.
Dataset regime. Sections 11.01 to 11.25, 27.1 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act governing datasets.
Evaluation. The period in which designated employees shall, as soon as feasible but no later than the 90th day after the day on which the dataset was collected, evaluate the dataset and confirm if it:
Exigent circumstances. A situation in which there is a danger to the life or safety of an individual or a situation requiring the acquisition of intelligence of significant importance to national security, the value of which would be diminished or lost if the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is required to comply with the authorization process under section 11.13 or sections 11.17 and 11.18.
Exploitation. A computational analysis of one or more datasets for obtaining intelligence that would not otherwise be apparent.
Foreign dataset. A dataset that predominantly relates to individuals who are not Canadians and who are outside Canada or corporations that were not incorporated or continued under the laws of Canada and who are outside Canada.
Judicial Authorization. The process by which a Federal Court judge authorizes the retention of a Canadian dataset.
Minister. In this report, Minister refers to the Minister of Public Safety.
Publicly available dataset. A dataset that was publicly available at the time of collection.
Query. A specific search, with respect to a person or entity, of one or more datasets, for obtaining intelligence.
Section 12 investigations. Investigations carried out by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service that relates to threats to the security of Canada.
Threat to the security of Canada. Activities within or that relate to Canada that involve the following:
The Government of Canada introduced the dataset regime through the National Security Act 2017 (NSA 2017) as a modification to the CSIS Act in July 2019. This regime, constituting sections 11.01-11.25 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act, hereafter the Act), enables CSIS to collect and retain datasets containing personal information that are not directly and immediately related to activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada, but are likely to assist in national security investigations.
This review has four sections. The first section, the governance section, describes how CSIS has implemented the regime, CSIS’s first judicial authorization for a Canadian dataset, legislative gaps in the Act, and the department’s internal policies governing the regime. The second section of this review concerns CSIS’s dataset information management and retention practices. The third section concerns how CSIS trains its employees on their dataset regime-related duties and obligations as well as resourcing challenges. Finally, this review includes a case study that encompasses the issues and obstacles related to all of the above-mentioned sections.
In terms of governance and implementation, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) found that CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime is inconsistent with the statutory framework. CSIS’s current approach to dataset information collection under section 12 risks the creation of a parallel collection mechanism, one that weakens s.12’s statutory thresholds and simultaneously lacks the external oversight regime intended to protect personal information under the dataset regime.
In 2021, CSIS sought judicial authorization to retain the first Canadian dataset, but in a manner that leads NSIRA to doubt the Federal Court was fully apprised of the internal contradicting views concerning the datasets use prior to the invocation of the dataset regime. Moreover, pending the judicial authorization, CSIS conducted queries pursuant to the exigent circumstances authorization, and retained partial name matches. NSIRA found that the results retained thereof did not meet the strictly necessary threshold applicable for the retention of this information pursuant to section 12 of the Act. NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy any record containing the names retained pursuant to the exigent circumstances queries, as they do not meet the “strictly necessary” threshold.
This review highlights a gap in the CSIS Act that presents issues as to the governance of foreign datasets. NSIRA notes that the current Act does not provide a time limitation for the Minister, or the Minister’s designate, to authorize the retention of a foreign dataset. Prior to the dataset regime, CSIS collected bulk data that would no longer be compliant pursuant to the new regime. After the dataset regime came into force, CSIS submitted on October 11, 2019, several foreign datasets to the Director, acting as the Minister’s designate. The Intelligence Commissioner (IC) approved the first foreign dataset from this bulk data on December 16, 2020. As of December 2022, CSIS had only submitted two more requests for approval to the IC, totalling three approvals in three years. NSIRA notes that the legislative gap allows the authorization request to remain before the Director, un-actioned for years, and puts into question how CSIS will meet the “likely to assist” threshold and utility of these datasets. NSIRA recommends adding a time limitation for the authorization of a foreign dataset by the Minister or the Minister’s designate.
The final piece on the governance section of this review focuses on the policies CSIS adopted for the dataset regime. NSIRA found that CSIS policies governing publicly available datasets do not contain a requirement for a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis of the collected information. This issue is especially pertinent when considering the strong emerging market for data purchased through data brokers and risks associated with purchasing commercially available information that collectors may have unlawfully collected. NSIRA recommends that CSIS meaningfully analyze and document any possible reasonable expectation of privacy when evaluating publicly available datasets. NSIRA also found that CSIS does not have a policy governing transitory information and that the existing internal directive does not provide employees with sufficient instruction which may result in CSIS retaining information that would otherwise be subject to the dataset regime.
This review’s second section concerns information management and retention of section 11 datasets. From 2018-2019, CSIS conducted an inventory of its holdings to identify information that would be subject to the dataset regime once it came into force. In early 2022, CSIS identified multiple incidents of data, operational reports, and Canadian information extracted from foreign datasets that should have been destroyed. Having identified the non-compliance, CSIS proceeded to implement remedial actions to ensure that any such data is identified and destroyed. In October 2022, NSIRA conducted a search in CSIS’s corporate system and found files containing tens of thousands of entries of Canadian personal information extracted from foreign datasets as well as information amounting to foreign datasets. NSIRA was not provided a satisfactory explanation as to why this information continues to be retained in CSIS’s corporate system or how CSIS distinguishes this information from what it had previously identified as a non-compliance. NSIRA finds that, as of August 2023, CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act because it retained Canadian information extracted from foreign datasets, and foreign information amounting to a dataset.
Moreover, NSIRA did another search in CSIS’s operational repository and found information that would amount to a Canadian dataset. CSIS had not sequestered the operational report, rendering it accessible to all who use the system, contrary to the dataset regime’s retention obligations. NSIRA informed CSIS of this report and was informed it would be treated as a compliance incident. NSIRA again conducted a second search and found another report containing information that would otherwise amount to a Canadian dataset. NSIRA finds that CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions of the CSIS Act because it retained Canadian information and referenced it as recently as 2022. NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy Canadian and foreign information found in its corporate and operational repositories that is not strictly necessary to retain. This non-compliant information no longer falls within the legal 90-day evaluation period and retaining it pursuant to the dataset regime is no longer a possibility. NSIRA recommends that CSIS cease to create duplicates of information reported in the operational system and conduct an exhaustive scan of its operational and corporate repositories to identify any non- compliant information.
This review’s third section focuses on training and resourcing. Prior to the coming into force of the dataset regime, CSIS developed and implemented training for the designation of employees pursuant to the dataset regime and mandatory training for all operational employees. NSIRA finds that the training required to become a designated employee to evaluate, query, and exploit section 11 datasets offers clear information on collection and retention requirements. However, NSIRA finds that CSIS operational personnel, including those predominantly dealing with bulk information collection, have not received adequate training allowing them to identify when collected information may fall within the dataset regime. The training is offered on a once-and-done basis for operational employees and contradicts CSIS’s current application of the regime. NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop and deliver scenario-based workshops to train operational personnel on CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime so that they can engage subject matter experts as necessary.
Encompassing all the above-mentioned issues, NSIRA identified a case study that illustrates the challenges CSIS faces in its implementation of the dataset regime. The case involved a dataset containing information regarding thousands of Canadians. NSIRA finds CSIS collected information in relation to activities that could not on reasonable grounds be suspected to have constituted a threat to the security of Canada and the collection, analysis and retention of which was not strictly necessary. The Department of Justice and CSIS managers did not present CSIS executives the totality of information regarding the dataset at the point of collection. The information was also collected absent an analysis of the Charter and privacy considerations. NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy the case study dataset it collected pursuant to section 12. This information no longer falls within the legal 90-day evaluation period and retaining it pursuant to the dataset regime is no longer a possibility.
The review concludes that CSIS has failed to adequately operationalize the dataset regime. CSIS did not seek to clarify legal ambiguities [**redacted**] of the application of the regime before the Court when given the opportunity to do so. Rather, CSIS has adopted multiple positions on the application of the dataset regime, and now risk limiting what is a collection and retention regime to a retention mechanism. Internally, CSIS has not provided sufficient resources and training to ensure compliance with the regime. Absent an internal commitment to adequately operationalize, resource and support the implementation of a new legal regime, any such regime will fail no matter how fit for purpose it is perceived.
The National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) conducted this review pursuant to 8(1)(a) of the National Security Intelligence Review Agency Act.
NSIRA reviewed the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS, or the Service) implementation of the dataset regime between January, 2019 and June 30, 2022. As the review progressed, NSIRA found it necessary to also consider pertinent information outside of this scope.
NSIRA conducted document reviews, interviews, and received briefings. NSIRA also received onsite demonstrations of systems by CSIS subject matter experts. Direct access to these systems was also granted to NSIRA.
NSIRA was able to verify the information it received during the review in a manner that met its internal expectations and requirements. NSIRA had direct access to CSIS systems and repositories, and therefore was able to corroborate information.
With respect to responsiveness, while there were minor instances where CSIS did not provide the totality of the information to NSIRA, overall CSIS met NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness.
In 2015, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), NSIRA’s predecessor, reviewed the collection and retention of information related to CSIS’s Data Acquisition Program. The review examined CSIS’s bulk datasets regime and noted that “SIRC has seen no evidence to suggest that CSIS has systematically taken the CSIS Act s 12 statutory threshold of ‘strictly necessary’ into consideration; CSIS’s lack of process, governance and legal guidance around the acquisition and management of bulk data is lacking and non consistent with the practice of close allies.”
Following the publication of SIRC’s annual report, the Federal Court (hereafter the Court) considered data retention issues in the 2016 “Associated Data” decision. The Court found that CSIS had exceeded the limitations of its legislative mandate by retaining information contrary to the “strictly necessary” limitations prescribed by section 12(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act). Under the “strictly necessary” statutory requirement as applicable to the facts in that judgment, CSIS cannot retain information that is not directly threat-related to the security of Canada unless such information can be related to a warranted target. The Court concluded that CSIS was acting unlawfully when retaining non-threat-related information under the “strictly necessary” qualifier past the warranted time limits.
The Government of Canada introduced the dataset regime through the National Security Act 2017 (NSA 2017) as a modification to the CSIS Act in July 2019. This regime authorizes CSIS to collect datasets that are likely to assist it in its duties and functions; that is, datasets that do not meet the “strictly necessary” otherwise required by s 12.
NSIRA’s review of the dataset regime is the first since the NSA 2017 came into force. This review examines and scrutinizes the governance and operationalization of the regime. In looking at the implementation of the regime, NSIRA also reviews the systems and processes in place for the ingestion, evaluation, query, and exploitation of datasets, a detailed description of which is provided in the Technical Annex A of this report.
The CSIS Act’s (hereafter the Act) provisions governing the regime are found at sections 11.01 to 11.25, 21, 27 & 27.1 of the Act (henceforth referred to as the dataset regime). The Act defines a dataset as a “collection of information stored as an electronic record and characterized by a common subject matter.” The application clause at section 11.02 states that: “Sections 11.01 to 11.25 apply to every dataset that contains personal information, as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act, that does not directly and immediately relate to activities that represent a threat to the security of Canada.”
The level of authorizations and approvals for collection and retention of a dataset are proportionate with the level of privacy intrusion. For all categories of datasets, publicly available, Canadian, and foreign, CSIS may: “collect the dataset if it is satisfied that the dataset is relevant to the performance of its duties and functions under sections 12 to 16.” An additional, higher threshold exists for the retention of foreign and Canadian datasets where CSIS must establish that the collected dataset is “likely to assist” in the performance of its duties or functions.
The legal framework for the publicly available datasets (PADs), the foreign dataset and Canadian datasets is summarized in the table below:
Publicly Available | Foreign | Canadian | |
---|---|---|---|
Definition | A dataset that was publicly available at the time of collection. | A dataset that predominately relates to individuals who are not Canadians and who are outside Canada or corporations that were not incorporated or continued under the law of Canada who are outside Canada. | A dataset that predominately relates to individuals within Canada or Canadians. |
Collection | Threshold: Relevant to the performance of duties and functions under s. 12 to s.16 | ||
Must belong to an approved class authorized by the Minister and approved by the Intelligence Commissioner (IC) | |||
Evaluation | Within 90 days of the day on which it was collected (no query or exploitation): Designated employee shall delete any personal information that is not relevant to CSIS’s performance of its duties and functions. Designated employee may delete extraneous/erroneous/poor quality information; conduct translation and/or decryption, apply privacy protection techniques; any activity to organize the dataset. | ||
Designated employee shall delete any information where there is reasonable expectation of privacy that relates to physical or mental health. | |||
Designated employee to remove any information that relates to a Canadian or person in Canada. | Designated employee to delete any information that is subject to solicitor client privilege. | ||
Retention | May retain for purposes of s. 12 to s.16. | Threshold: Must be likely to assist in the performance of duties and functions. | |
Minister or Ministers designate authorize, followed by approval by the IC. | Minister approval followed by application for judicial authorization. | ||
Retention period | No limitations (internal retention policy) | Maximum 5 years (can reapply) | Maximum 2 years (can reapply) |
Query/Exploit | May query, exploit, and retain results for s. 12 to 16. | Designated employee may query or exploit (and retain results) to extent that is strictly necessary for s. 12, 12.1, and as required under s. 16. | |
May query and exploit (and retain results) for s. 15. | |||
Record Keeping | Record: – rationale for collection; – details of every exploitation; and – details of statutory authority under which query/exploit information is retained. Conduct random and periodic verification | ||
Must: – Store and manage separately from other information; and – Limit access to designated employees and ensure that information is communicated only for performing duties under the act. | |||
Exigent Circumstances | Director may authorize (subject to IC approval) the query of a dataset that has not been authorized if there are exigent circumstances that require the query to preserve life of safety of an individual or to acquire intelligence of significant importance to national security the value of which would be diminished or lost if CSIS were too comply with the authorization process. | ||
Reporting | Report to NSIRA: – Any verification done as required by record keeping provisions. – Removal of information from a foreign dataset that concerns Canadians or persons in Canada. – Copy of the Director’s authorization for exigent circumstances query, the results of the query, and the actions taken after obtaining the results of the query. *NSIRA may report to the Director if it is of the view that query/exploitation of the dataset did not comply with the law. Director to send report along with any additional information to the Federal Court. Federal Court may issue a direction or order or take any other measure considered appropriate |
Finding 1: NSIRA finds that CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime is inconsistent with the statutory framework.
Finding 2: NSIRA finds that CSIS’s current approach to dataset information collection under section 12 risks the creation of a parallel collection mechanism, one that weakens section 12’s statutory thresholds and at the same time lacks the external oversight regime intended to protect personal information under the dataset regime.
The dataset regime sought to create a method of allowing the collection and retention of certain information that would not be possible pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act. CSIS was actively involved in advocating for this detailed regime and noted during the senate hearings that it (sections 11.01-11.24) was “quite a complex piece of legislation” which required that they work closely with the Department of Justice (hereafter Justice) to examine the “various processes that [they] could employ to make sure” that it was a very “charter compliant regime.” Having been so involved with the drafting of the regime, CSIS was thus well positioned to develop policies and procedures governing the collection, evaluation, query, exploitation and verification of datasets. At issue for CSIS was whether the dataset regime limits collection authorities of datasets under CSIS’s information collection mandates in section 12 (security intelligence), section 15 (security screening investigations), or section 16 (foreign intelligence). CSIS initially adopted the position that, in cases where the dataset was not directly and immediately related to threat activities, it had to be ingested under the section 11.01 regime (hereafter, CSIS’s initial position). This position did not affect the ability to collect information that directly and immediately related to threat activities under section 12.
[**redacted**] CSIS shifted its position to consider the dataset regime as, in effect, subordinate to the collection authorities in sections 12, 15, or 16 of the CSIS Act. In practice, CSIS relies on the dataset regime if and when it has determined that the information falls outside these collection authorities (hereafter, CSIS’s current position). This position reflects an evolution in understanding about the dataset regime’s scope.
CSIS’s application of the dataset regime as reflected in their policies, presentations, and NSA 2017 training materials more closely conformed to their initial position. However, by April 2022, CSIS adopted its current position on the application of the dataset regime, concluding also that the Court supported this interpretation. CSIS now regards the dataset regime as allowing the collection and use (searches) of datasets pursuant to section 12, followed by their retention pursuant to the dataset regime. CSIS has continued to evolve its current position to allow for broader collection and retention under section 12.
Notably, section 12 includes conditions on collection (and retention) that are more demanding than the equivalent thresholds for collection and retention under the dataset regime. Under section 12, an investigation depends on a reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada, and information collection and retention only to the extent “strictly necessary.” The dataset regime, for its part, permits collection where CSIS is “satisfied that the dataset is relevant to the performance of its duties and functions” under sections 12 to 16. Retention of foreign and Canadian datasets is permitted on the threshold of “likely to assist” the enumerated CSIS mandates. Section 12 and the dataset regime also differ in terms of control regimes. CSIS retains under section 12 without any external oversight. Retention under the dataset regime of Canadian datasets requires the Court’s authorization, retention of foreign datasets requires the IC’s approval.
The dataset regime was created for the purpose of broadening carefully-regulated dataset collection and retention in circumstances where the section 12 “strictly necessary” threshold could not be met. NSIRA noted, however, that in the period since the evolution of CSIS’s current position, discussed above, CSIS’s operationalization of the dataset regime and their understanding of the application of the regime seems to have significantly broadened the scope of information captured under its section 12 authorities. This evolution is discussed in the case study at the end of this report.
The [**redacted**] formerly the Data Management and Exploitation or DMEX) is a branch whose primary function is the governance of the dataset regime. By June 2023, CSIS informed NSIRA that [**redacted**] would now move to fully prioritize s. 12 collection over dataset regime collection. CSIS stated that absent a less prescriptive legislative framework for dataset collection, CSIS would not be collecting datasets unless the intention was to exploit them. CSIS then presented NSIRA with a clear example of a foreign dataset within the meaning of the dataset regime and indicated that since there was a possibility that there may be hostile actors on the list, it could be collected pursuant either to section 11.05 of the dataset regime or collected pursuant to s. 12. It could also be searched under section 12, with any threat related search results retained under section 12 and the remainder of the list destroyed.
Two concerns stem from CSIS’s evolving approach to datasets illustrated by the case studies that follow. First, the ingestion of datasets under section 12 may now, in practice, reflect a broadened understanding of the section 12 “reasonable grounds to suspect” and “strictly necessary” thresholds. The standards now invoked to justify the collection and retention of some datasets putatively under section 12, are closer to the “satisfied” and “likely to assist” thresholds for the dataset regime. NSIRA acknowledges that some information meeting the definition of a dataset, i.e. the collection of information stored as an electronic record and characterized by a common subject matter, may fall within section 12 collection and use authorities, e.g. a list of Canadian Extremist Travelers. However, NSIRA’s concerns relate to when s. 12 authorities are interpreted to allow for the collection and use of personal information that is not directly and immediately related to activities that represent a threat to the security of Canada. This approach is inconsistent with the statutory framework and risks the creation of a parallel collection mechanism, one that weakens section 12’s statutory thresholds and at the same time lacks the external oversight regime intended to protect personal information under the dataset regime.
Second, a multi-stage vetting process necessarily follows from an interpretation of the CSIS Act in which the dataset regime applies only where datasets (meeting the section 11.02 definition) cannot be collected or retained under the section 12, 15, or 16 mandates. Not least, there will be a preliminary phase in which CSIS will need to decide which authority applies and whether (because no other collection or retention authority is available) the dataset must be processed under the dataset regime. Without careful guidance, there is a considerable risk of confusion as to what may be done with the dataset during this triage vetting, especially since that vetting process is not expressly anticipated by the Act. It is not clear that the Act accommodates a parallel and separate process in which a dataset is collected under section 12, searched for intelligence purposes, and only then transferred for retention under the dataset regime. This would seem to render the exigent search powers in s 11.22 redundant. While NSIRA was not able to fully confirm the sequence of events, the Canadian dataset judicial authorization case study discussed in the next section reflects the risk of confusion.
Finding 3: NSIRA finds that CSIS failed to fully apprise the Court on their interpretation and application of the dataset regime. CSIS should have sought clarification from the Court as to its views on the precise conduct permissible prior to invocating the dataset regime.
Finding 4: NSIRA finds that when conducting queries in exigent circumstances, CSIS retained information that did not meet the section 12 strictly necessary threshold.
From [**redacted**], CSIS collected [**redacted**] individuals [**redacted**] contained personal information of [**redacted**]. The datasets were provided to CSIS from multiple government [**redacted**] departments [**redacted**]. These datasets were [**redacted**] received by the [**redacted**] Unit and therefore [**redacted**] deemed collected pursuant to s. 12. However, CSIS then sought to retain the pursuant to the dataset regime, requiring authorization by the Federal Court (FC). The result was the first judicial authorization decision under the dataset regime. There are two concerns about the management of this dataset.
In the lead-up to this authorization, there appears to have been considerable uncertainty as to how this dataset might be used. The evidence shows that [**redacted**] received the [**redacted**] through the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act. [**redacted**] considers all information disclosed and collected by their branch as section 12 information. Upon receipt of the dataset, [**redacted**] was not aware of the discussions occurring within other branches regarding the possibility of applying to the Court for the retention of [**redacted**] through judicial authorization. [**redacted**] treated the information much like any other section 12 information and searched at least two of the names [**redacted**] within CSIS’s operational database, [**redacted**], one of which yielded results.
NSIRA was initially informed that these searches did not amount to queries because they were not searches within the [**redacted**], rather they were searches of names from the [**redacted**] against [**redacted**]. NSIRA was also informed that the searches were not queries because they were not for “the purposes of obtaining intelligence” as defined in the Act, since the results of the searches were not reported [**redacted**]. In [**redacted**] discussion with CSIS, NSIRA received conflicting information that demonstrated internal contradictions and confusion on these points.
In the cover letter to the affidavit for judicial authorization (JA) for a Canadian dataset filed with the Court, Counsel notes that “the Service’s initial collection and use of this information as described in the affidavit falls with the scope of the service’s [**redacted**]. In the affidavit, CSIS stated that “… [**redacted**] verified whether this collection of information was already within Service holdings and assessed the potential intelligence value for its investigations. No searches were conducted for intelligence purposes…” In a previous draft of the affidavit, the chief of DMEX had expressed their concern regarding this wording of the draft affidavit.
They noted that “We have already clearly stated that the datasets were initially collected [**redacted**] authorities. We can also say that checks were done under those authorities but immediately ordered stopped once s.11 was invoked (which happened quickly).” NSIRA could not determine if searches of names from the list against CSIS’s operational system were conducted with the objective of “verifying” whether the “collection of information was already with Service holdings.” In examining this issue, it became apparent that there were multiple opinions and conflicting narratives regarding what actions were taken upon receipt of the dataset and what CSIS perceives as permissible when dataset information is collected through s. 12.
The Federal Court found in its authorization decision that it was reasonable to collect the dataset pursuant to s. 12, in the circumstances of this matter. The Court notes that “the decision was taken to invoke the dataset regime and to request approval to query the information under the exigent circumstances provision in s. 11.22 of the Act.” It is unclear if the Court knew the full record of uncertainty about what could be done with the dataset in the interim between collection under section 12 and the commencement of the dataset regime retention process. CSIS should have fully apprised the Court of this uncertainty (including the conflicting narratives regarding how the data was and may be used) and sought clarification from the Court as to its views on the precise conduct permissible prior to the invocation of the dataset regime.
This is especially the case since, both in the decision and during the hearings for the JA, the Court expressed its concern that the classes authorized by the Minister and approved by the IC were too broad. The Court added that “just about anything under the sun could be captured by one of those classes.” Yet, CSIS assured the Court more than once that information collected was pursuant to s. 11.05 and was protected by the safeguards of the regime, that the information had high access control and could not be queried or exploited. Accordingly, the Court was informed that while the classes are broad, the regime provides the necessary safeguards to protect the privacy of Canadians. This response deemphasized the degree to which information from the dataset might be used during the triage period. Again, this discussion presented CSIS with the opportunity to judicially test its application of the interpretation of the dataset regime before the Court. CSIS could have informed the Court that these safeguards may not necessarily be in place where information is collected pursuant to section 12 prior to a pivot to the dataset regime as the retention authority. It appears that CSIS chose to carry this legal uncertainty at the risk of receiving a constraining interpretation of the regime by the Court.
Notably, once CSIS initiated the dataset regime process, the dataset for which the JA was sought was the subject of an authorization and approval pursuant to s. 11.22 exigent circumstances. CSIS sought and received authorization from the Director and approval from the IC to query the datasets. As per the requirements of section 11.13(2) of the Act, CSIS included in its application for JA the contents of the exigent circumstances authorization, the results of the authorized query, and any actions taken after obtaining these results. This information was also provided to NSIRA as required by s. 11.25(c) of the Act.
CSIS queried the names [**redacted**] CSIS retained [**redacted**] partial matches and reported them in their section 12 operational system. In examining the queries conducted, NSIRA found that the initial searches were extremely broad with many name [**redacted**] searched using extensive use of [**redacted**], and a very large margin for date of birth [**redacted**].
These broad queries resulted in numerous “hits” against the list. For example, [**redacted**] were all considered by the CSIS analyst as appropriate search results against [**redacted**]. These names were then searched in [**redacted**]. Information from an exigent query may be retained if “carried out under section 12”, imposing that section’s “strictly necessary” threshold. Despite there being no results for any of full [**redacted**] names in [**redacted**], CSIS determined that the absence of the names in its operational system meant that the names could not be eliminated as “a possible candidate for identification” and that “ultimately, those possible matches that cannot be excluded will be reported to the desk and retained under s. 12 for further investigation.”28 Similarly, should the name of [**redacted**] be too common to rule out, CSIS retained that name as strictly necessary.
The results of these unnecessarily broad queries did not meet the strictly necessary threshold for retention. [**redacted**] In March 2022, CSIS reported that [**redacted**] has determined it would not pursue investigative steps regarding the results (reported in [**redacted**]) absent additional information” and that the [**redacted**] results retained were “captured in their entirety for retention in the event that the dataset is destroyed.” The exigent circumstances queries cannot be used to circumvent the retention obligations that would apply under s.12 or as means to retain information pending the outcome of the judicial authorization.
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that in the next judicial authorization application for a Canadian dataset CSIS put its current position on the application of the dataset regime before the Court, including any use of the information prior to the decision to retain under the dataset regime.
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy any record containing names retained pursuant to the exigent circumstances queries as they do not meet the strictly necessary threshold.
Finding 5: NSIRA finds that the lack of explicit time limits in section 11.17 of the dataset provisions governing foreign datasets has resulted in datasets being retained for multiple years pending a decision by the Minister or the Minister’s designate (the CSIS Director).
The dataset regime added many detailed provisions to the CSIS Act. Despite the complexity of the regime, NSIRA noted gaps in the legislation. The provisions of the Act governing the authorization of the retention of foreign datasets do not provide a time limitation for the Minister or the Minister’s designate to authorize the retention of a foreign dataset. Prior to the coming into force of the dataset regime, CSIS had accumulated bulk data that would no longer be compliant pursuant to the new regime. Accordingly, the transitional provisions of Bill C-59 recognized the presence of this information and deemed it collected on July 13, 2019 as per the Order in Council. CSIS then had 90 days to evaluate the foreign datasets it wished to retain, and determine if it wished to evaluate and seek judicial authorization for any bulk Canadian information.
On October 11, 2019, CSIS submitted ten applications for authorization to retain foreign datasets to the Director. The first dataset authorization was approved by the IC on December 16, 2020. In their December 16, 2020, decision, the IC made recommendations regarding the contents of the authorization. One of these recommendations concerned how these datasets collected in [**redacted**] remain likely to assist CSIS in the performance of its duties and functions. The [**redacted**] remaining datasets that had been submitted to the Director for authorization were then edited to include the information requested by the IC. These edits were included as an appendix to the applications. Despite the fact that the edits included material information regarding how the datasets remain likely to assist CSIS in its duties and functions, they were not considered resubmissions to the Director. As of December 2022, CSIS had only submitted two more requests for approval to the IC, totalling three approvals in three years.
CSIS asserted that there were no statutory deadlines that would limit the Director from having these applications for years and that resourcing constraints meant that the requisite edits would take time to complete. This legislative gap has allowed for a parallel mechanism of retention of data that is otherwise strictly governed. While CSIS cannot ingest, query, or exploit the data until the IC approves it, the gap in legislation allows them to query the data in exigent circumstances as per section 11.22 of the CSIS Act.
Furthermore, the legislative gap allowing the authorization request to remain before the Director, un-actioned for years, puts into question how CSIS will meet the “likely to assist” threshold tied to the utility of these datasets. It should be noted that as of April 2023, the dataset approved in 2020 had not been queried, while the one approved in 2021 has been queried only [**redacted**]. This gap in legislation was also noted by the IC, stating: “I am unconvinced that Parliament’s intent was for there to be such a long delay between a request from CSIS for authorization to retain a foreign dataset and the Director’s authorization.”
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that Parliament legislates a time limitation for the authorization of a foreign dataset by the Minister or Minister’s designate.
Finding 6: NSIRA finds that CSIS runs the risk of collecting information that is publicly available but for which there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Finding 7: NSIRA finds that CSIS’s policies governing the collection and retention of Canadian and foreign datasets do not align with its current interpretation of the dataset regime.
Finding 8: NSIRA finds that CSIS does not have a policy governing the handling of transitory information. In addition, the existing Interim Direction [**redacted**] does not provide employees with sufficient instruction, which may result in CSIS retaining information that would otherwise be subject to the dataset regime.
CSIS codified in policy its commitment during the enactment of Bill C-59 to not collect hacked or stolen datasets. It acknowledged that there would be a “much higher expectation of privacy associated with those datasets,” and noted that even if adversaries had access to this information CSIS would hold itself to “a higher standard.” However, overall CSIS found itself struggling to implement the provisions of the Act and align its policies and procedures with it.
NSIRA flags four specific concerns. First, the policy center for datasets is the Data Management and Exploitation Branch (DMEX), recently restructured and renamed as [**redacted**]. The dataset policy suite [**redacted**] includes a number of policies pertaining to the identification, collection and retention of section 11.01 datasets. Although the commitment to not collect stolen, hacked or leaked datasets is codified in [**redacted**], there is no corresponding requirement to ensure that information contained in publicly-available datasets (PADs) does not contain information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet, this requirement is especially pertinent when considering the strong emerging market for data purchased through data brokers and the risks associated with purchasing commercially available information that may have been unlawfully collected by said brokers.
Second, as discussed earlier, the shift in CSIS’s position on the relationship between datasets and its regular collection powers has resulted in discrepancies between what information amounts to s.11.01 datasets and what information may be collected pursuant to s. 12. CSIS’s interpretation of the applicability of the dataset regime was reconsidered in 2021, two years after the dataset governing policies were developed. The existing policy suite aligns more with CSIS’s initial position. This has resulted in a policy suite that no longer aligns with CSIS’s current position on the implementation of the dataset regime (discussed above) or with the current structure of the [**redacted**] branch.
Third, the [**redacted**] policy sought to guide and educate employees on the dataset regime. It also placed the onus on “employees who collect the dataset” to determine the appropriate collection authority. This further emphasizes the importance of training received by employees, discussed further below.
Fourth, in 2021, CSIS developed an Interim Direction to support its section 12 collection of datasets. The introduction of this Direction corresponded with the pivot in the interpretation and operationalization of the dataset regime, discussed in section 4 above. The Direction allows for collection of electronic information that has been assessed to be threat-related where threat and non threat information are inextricably co-mingled. It allows for the temporary retention of this information in these circumstances. The direction does not provide any information as to what amounts to inextricably co-mingled information but allows for its sequestered retention for up to [**redacted**] with extension. This non-threat related information would have been subject to the dataset regime, yet the Direction is silent on the requirements of the dataset regime including the connection and relationship to that regime’s 90 day evaluation period. In practice, CSIS does not have a central repository for temporary information, which results in this information being held on unit shared drives absent centralized monitoring, access controls, and auditing. This, along with the constant rotation of employees, lack of training on the Direction, the absence of clear points of accountability and responsibility in the policy, and the [**redacted**] time limitation which greatly exceeds the 90 days limitation in the dataset regime, creates a situation where CSIS risks retaining depositories of information that would otherwise be subject to the dataset regime.
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that CSIS meaningfully analyze and document any possible reasonable expectation of privacy when evaluating publicly available datasets.
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop:
Finding 9: NSIRA finds that CSIS information management practices are responsible for multiple compliance incidents and currently create duplicates of datasets within CSIS’s systems.
Finding 10: NSIRA finds that, as of August 2023, CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act because it retained Canadian information extracted from foreign datasets, and foreign information amounting to a dataset.
Finding 11: NSIRA finds that CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act because it retained Canadian information and referenced it as recently as 2022. This information should have been destroyed upon coming into force of the NSA 2017, in July, 2019.
Finding 12: NSIRA finds that CSIS has not exhaustively scanned all of its systems to identify information that is subject to the dataset regime so that it may be processed in a compliant manner.
From 2018-2019, CSIS conducted an inventory of its holdings to identify information that would be subject to the dataset regime—and therefore need to be deleted— once the regime came into force. CSIS identified several categories of operational reports containing collected Canadian or Foreign information, and developed caveats to insert into the reports indicating that information had been removed.
For foreign datasets, CSIS senior management identified which foreign datasets would be submitted for authorization. Technical analysts conducted a number of exercises on the foreign datasets to test their ability to identify and extract Canadian information as would be required under the dataset regime. These exercises led to the creation of multiple [**redacted**] containing the extracted Canadian data, which was then uploaded [**redacted**] for storage in CSIS’s corporate repository. In doing so, CSIS retained copies of data that should have been deleted.
According to CSIS, duplication is a requirement of CSIS’s information management policy (see Annex A). For example, when a query of a dataset is conducted, CSIS’s information management policy requires analysts to attach the results of the query to the report that gets saved in the operational system. Analysts are also required to save a copy of that report and its attachments to [**redacted**], CSIS’s corporate repository. This has contributed to compliance issues. It also increases the difficulty of deleting information when compliance incidents arise or if CSIS has retained information that is not strictly necessary. Additional examples of where data duplication occurs are described in Annex A.
On September 5, 2019, CSIS assured the Minister that it “undertook significant efforts to ensure compliance with the coming-into force of the dataset framework created by Bill C-59” and that “as a direct result of this exercise, a number of Canadian and foreign datasets were assessed as not meeting the criteria for retention under section 12 or the `likely to assist’ retention threshold under the new dataset framework. These datasets were therefore destroyed prior to coming-into force.” In September 2021, CSIS asserted to NSIRA that all the foreign datasets that were not before the Director for authorization were destroyed.
In [**redacted**] a former DMEX employee discovered [**redacted**] containing a foreign dataset, which had been collected prior to the coming into force of the dataset regime and subsequently submitted for Ministerial authorization. [**redacted**] contained the entire pre-evaluation dataset, including Canadian information. In [**redacted**] another DMEX employee discovered Canadian information extracted from foreign datasets [**redacted**] accessible only by designated employees. These latter records included Canadian information and foreign samples extracted from [**redacted**] foreign datasets, [**redacted**] of which were pending Ministerial authorization, [**redacted**] of which was already approved by the IC, and of [**redacted**] which were destroyed in their entirety prior to the coming into force of the regime. CSIS destroyed this information because it was unlawfully retained.
These incidents prompted DMEX to conduct a file review “to determine what steps has been taken prior to coming into force of NSA 2017 and what remediation efforts might be necessary. Although employees had been directed to delete potential dataset candidates for which it would not seek authorization to retain with the coming into force of NSA 2017 in July 2019, similar steps had not been taken to direct employees to identify and destroy other copies of datasets and any Canadian or other records removed from these datasets prior to coming into force of NSA 2017 or in the 90 day evaluation period that followed.” DMEX then instructed employees to “conduct a thorough search [**redacted**].” The outcome of these searches was that significant additional Canadian and foreign information was found. This included information pertaining to the [**redacted**] Dataset discussed below. DMEX reported these multiple compliance incidents to CSIS’s review and compliance branch by submitting a fact finding report with supporting material The concluding comments of the report state that a “fulsome” effort was made to identify residual data however [**redacted**] ”.
In October 2022, NSIRA conducted searches of CSIS’s corporate repository and found [**redacted**] files containing tens of thousands of entries of Canadian personal information extracted from [**redacted**] foreign datasets, including information extracted from datasets that have been destroyed, approved by the IC, and pending authorization. The files also contained foreign information. The Canadian information was extracted as part of the exercise to prepare for the coming into force of the Act and should have been destroyed.
NSIRA enquired as to why these files containing Canadian information extracted mostly from destroyed foreign datasets remained in CSIS’s corporate repository and the legal authority under which they are retained. CSIS failed to provide an adequate explanation as to this legal non-compliance, they stated that the information was part of a project in preparation for the coming into force of the dataset regime, and that:
“those Canadian records continue to exist in the PA’d file even though the original datasets were either all destroyed or sequestered pending Ministerial Authorisation. While certainly contrary to current (since June 2019) s.11 obligations, at that time, this work and retention would have been done under (implicit) s.12 authorities. As this predates the dataset framework, we are unclear if this presents a legal or compliance risk. [**redacted**]
CSIS stated that the records were retained “appropriately at the time, pre C-59, under s.12 implicit authorities”. It is unclear how CSIS distinguishes between the information found by NSIRA and that found by DMEX in [**redacted**] mentioned at paragraph 55 above. As of August 2023, information that NSIRA found in October 2022, containing Canadian and foreign data was being retained by CSIS, in contravention of its legal obligations pursuant to the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act.
NSIRA also searched for operational reports that had been identified prior to the coming into force of the dataset regime as containing information that would amount to Canadian datasets. NSIRA found a number of reports where the information had indeed been deleted and a caveat added. However, NSIRA found [**redacted**] report related to [**redacted**] dataset containing the [**redacted**]. It should be noted that the operational report in question was not sequestered, rather was accessible to all those using the system and was referenced in a report as recently as August, 2022. This would have amounted to a query of what should have otherwise been a Canadian dataset.
NSIRA requested that CSIS provide the authorities under which it is retaining this information. CSIS initially responded that they could not find the report as it had been previously destroyed. Shortly thereafter, CSIS stated that they have found the report and were treating it as a compliance incident. Upon searching the operational system once more, NSIRA found another report containing the [**redacted**] Both reports found by NSIRA contained information that would otherwise amount to a Canadian dataset, [**redacted**]. By retaining this Canadian information, CSIS did not comply with legal obligations pursuant to its dataset regime provisions in the CSIS Act.
The non-compliant information found by NSIRA (Canadian and foreign information from foreign datasets and Canadian information in operational reports) was discovered following CSIS’s initial pre C-59 scan of holdings reported to the Minister and following CSIS’s “thorough search of personal and shared holdings” due to the compliance incident in 2022. CSIS has not exhaustively scanned all of its systems to identify information that is subject to the dataset regime so that it may be processed in a compliant manner.
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that CSIS cease to create duplicates of the information reported in the operational system.
Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy Canadian and foreign dataset information that is not strictly necessary to retain. This information no longer falls within the legal 90 day evaluation period and retaining it pursuant to the dataset regime is no longer a possibility.
Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that CSIS conduct an exhaustive scan of its operational and corporate repositories to identify and destroy any non-compliant information.
Finding 13: NSIRA finds that the training required to become a designated employee to evaluate, query, and exploit s. 11.01 datasets offers clear information on collection and retention requirements.
Finding 14: NSIRA finds that CSIS operational personnel, including those predominantly dealing with bulk information collection, have not received adequate training allowing them to identify when collected information may fall within the dataset regime.
Prior to the coming into force of the NSA 2017, including the dataset regime, CSIS developed and implemented specialized training for employees to be designated pursuant to s. 11.06(1) of the CSIS Act, and mandatory Bill C-59 training for all operational employees. CSIS also developed and delivered a number of presentations to assistant directors, management, relevant branches, other government departments, and the Federal Court. This suite of training and presentations align with CSIS’s initial position, discussed above, on the applicability of the dataset regime.
CSIS currently offers two mandatory training courses for the designation of employees. These courses emphasize the distinction between s. 12 “strictly necessary” information and what may be collected pursuant to the dataset regime “likely to assist threshold.” The courses require that an employee familiarizes themselves with the standard operating procedures and requirements of the regime. While online training may not be the ideal training method, the training content along with the mix of standard and scenario based questions offered employees clear instruction on the regime and its requirements.
As noted above, CSIS also implemented mandatory training for all operational personnel. CSIS developed most of the dataset regime training prior to and immediately following the coming into force of the NSA 2017. As discussed at Section 4 of this report, CSIS’s understanding of its statutory obligations pursuant to the regime and how these obligations are perceived and implemented, has changed. The result is that the mandatory training received on a once-and-done basis by operational personnel in 2019 does not align with and may in fact contradict CSIS’s current operationalization and implementation of the regime.
Additionally, the very little training that is received by operational personnel does not allow collectors to determine what information is a dataset despite the onus placed on them to do so. This has resulted in individuals who deal with bulk information collection not being sufficiently aware or trained on the dataset regime.
For intelligence officers, CSIS developed a presentation on the dataset regime as part of the [**redacted**], the mandatory course offered to intelligence officers within a few years of their career [**redacted**]. Initially, when CSIS implemented the training program, employees had to work in groups in a series of workshops to identify the properties of s. 11.01 datasets, including distinguishing them from s. 12 datasets and relating Canadian datasets to approved sets of classes. This training was offered as an instructor-led course until March 2020, after which CSIS removed the workshop component from the updated training program, effectively eliminating any scenario-based questions and exercises. While CSIS has told NSIRA that it is currently working on updating the program, the current training offers little opportunity for collectors to distinguish s.11.01 datasets from s. 12 information.
NSIRA finds that CSIS’s once-and-done approach to training on datasets has resulted in a lack of understanding and sensitization of employees to the dataset regime. CSIS should increase its efforts to sensitize its collectors to the dataset regime requirements and particularities while encouraging them to contact the data exploitation branch when in doubt.
Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop and deliver scenario-based workshops to train operational personnel on CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime so that they can engage subject matter experts as necessary.
Finding 15: NSIRA finds that CSIS has not prioritized resourcing the technical unit responsible for the evaluation, query and exploitation of Canadian and foreign datasets.
Finding 16: NSIRA finds that CSIS has not devoted sufficient resources to improving the current technical systems or developing new ones that are equipped to support bulk data use.
In NSIRA’s past review work, issues of training and resourcing often arise together and correlate to an organization’s commitment to a particular program or branch. In April and in November 2022, CSIS informed NSIRA that the Operational Data Analysis Center (ODAC), housed within DMEX and responsible for the technical implementation of the dataset regime including the ingestion, query, and exploitation of datasets was [**redacted**] percent vacancy respectively.
In 2020, no employees were designated for the query or exploitation of datasets despite the authorization and approval of the first foreign dataset. CSIS’s approach to ensuring that they have individuals who are designated and therefore lawfully able to query and exploit information was reactive. In a 2020 verification report provided to NSIRA, CSIS stated that first foreign dataset was authorized by the Director and approved by the IC, yet “there were no employees designated for queries of exploitation of s. 11 Canadian or foreign datasets.
Consequently, no queries or exploitations” of the dataset were conducted. The fact that CSIS had sent its first dataset approval to the IC without having resourced its specialized unit and enabled them to conduct the potential requisite queries and exploitation of the dataset is indicative of [**redacted**]. It took CSIS almost [**redacted**] years to designate an employee for query and exploitation of foreign and Canadian datasets. With the exception of the queries conducted pursuant to the exigent circumstances, no other queries were conducted in 2021.
In November 2022, CSIS expressed concerns that the 90 days provided for evaluation in the Act is too inhibiting and has often resulted in missed collection opportunities. [**redacted**]. Upon further discussion NSIRA was informed that [**redacted**]. Similarly, in 2023 NSIRA was again informed of CSIS’s inability to work within the parameters of the current legislation; in this instance, CSIS had greater resources but had chosen to allocate them to [**redacted**] collection rather than the dataset regime.
The resourcing issues are further compounded by CSIS’s current technical ecosystem. The lifecycle of a dataset involves many different digital tools and systems, [**redacted**] Moreover, these tools and systems can only be customized and maintained by people with niche technical expertise. These compounding factors have created a situation where DMEX employees have limited options for conducting data exploitation, and this has affected the utility of all three categories of datasets. Based on briefings with technical experts and technical demonstrations, it is evident that the current systems are not designed to support bulk data use in a compliant manner.
Recommendation 10: NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize resourcing the technical unit responsible for the evaluation, query and exploitation of Canadian and foreign datasets.
Recommendation 11: NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize the improvement of current technical systems or development of new systems, equipped to support compliant bulk data use.
Finding 17: NSIRA finds that CSIS collected information in relation to activities that could not on reasonable grounds be suspected to have constituted a threat to the security of Canada and the collection, analysis and retention of which was not strictly necessary.
[**redacted**]
[**redacted**]
On [**redacted**], CSIS sent a brief to the Privy Council Office and Public Safety outlining the information in [**redacted**] noting that prior [**redacted**].
CSIS [**redacted**]. The brief discusses the possibility of collecting the dataset under section 11, utilizing the 90-day evaluation period to assess whether it is a publicly available or Canadian dataset, and “if retaining and using the dataset for analysis will help ensure the security of Canada.”
The following day, [**redacted**].
[**redacted**], the Director General of the Data Management and Exploitation branch and of [**redacted**] submitted a co-drafted Memo to the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) seeking the authorization to collect [**redacted**] pursuant to section 12 of the CSIS Act. The memo provides a summary of [**redacted**]. The memo notes [**redacted**] concerns regarding [**redacted**]. While the memo outlines the contents of the dataset as described [**redacted**], it fails to mention [**redacted**] within the database [**redacted**] likely stolen.
The memo quotes [**redacted**]. This statement again contradicts [**redacted**] assessment that information was likely collected for [**redacted**]. Based on that statement, the memo argues: [**redacted**].
Upon receipt of the memo, the DDO requests [**redacted**] ” In response, the DDO notes her concerns that [**redacted**] found no evidence suggesting that the [**redacted**]. The DDO further states that she will accept that the information “may indeed assist” CSIS’s investigation and that while no evidence of [**redacted**], “it is more likely than not” that this is the type of information [**redacted**] “would be interested in.” The DDO approved the collection pursuant to section 12 [**redacted**], CSIS received and ingested the Canadian [**redacted**].
[**redacted**]” It is unclear how this assessment was made, as it does not align with CSIS’s analysis of the [**redacted**], which was used to develop a CSIS Case Report, circulated to partners in government. The report states: “the portion of the dataset referencing Canadians appears [**redacted**]. The brief further notes that [**redacted**]. It should be noted that following the distribution of the Case Analysis Brief, CSIS has not conducted any further intelligence analysis or reporting on the dataset.
When CSIS became aware of [**redacted**], the initial discussions focused on the potential collection of the information pursuant to the dataset regime provisions and utilizing the 90 day evaluation period to determine the scope of the dataset, whether it would be a Canadian, foreign, or publicly available dataset. It remains unclear to NSIRA why or what led the discussion to focus instead on a section 12 collection.
At the point of collection, CSIS had limited information regarding the dataset. Much of this information was also conflicting. [**redacted**]. Unfortunately, the full scope of this information was not presented to the DDO when seeking approval for collection pursuant to s.12.
Section 12 of the CSIS Act requires that “The Service shall collect by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada.” The threshold to be met is reasonable grounds to suspect. The Supreme Court of Canada has defined a reasonable suspicion as “something more than mere suspicion and something less than a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds.” It is a “robust standard,” which is “determined by the totality of the circumstances based on the objectively discernable facts.”
Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence regarding the reasonable suspicion standard to the case at hand, CSIS did not provide any evidence or intelligence to support that the information [**redacted**]. In its analytical tools [**redacted**]. NSIRA found no evidence to support this statement at the point of collection, nor could CSIS explain how they reached said conclusion. That is to say, there were no objectively discernable facts to support that the dataset was indeed connected to a threat to the security of Canada. Rather, CSIS’s explanations to NSIRA, as well as the written records, focus on the potential utility of the information [**redacted**]. CSIS could not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate how the collection of the information would be strictly necessary pursuant to s. 12. This is best articulated by the DDO’s comments stating that she is “not sold on the rationale” presented to her in the briefing note, but that she was convinced that given the importance of such information to [**redacted**] “it may indeed assist our [**redacted**] investigation of the threat represented [**redacted**]” NSIRA does contend that the information may be of use to [**redacted**] and the analysis of the dataset may be of use to CSIS. However, this dataset does not meet the strictly necessary threshold. Rather, it may meet the s. 11.05 threshold of “relevant to the performance of its duties and functions.”
Furthermore, the CSIS memo to the DDO did not disclose [**redacted**] belief that some of the information was not publicly available and that [**redacted**] may have been “stolen” [**redacted**]. Instead, it focused on [**redacted**]. The memo drafters used [**redacted**] statements to support their belief that there were ties to threat actors [**redacted**]. [**redacted**]. There was no preliminary assessment conducted by CSIS of the dataset as they did not have access to it. [**redacted**] stated [**redacted**] likely “stolen.”. Yet, there was no analysis of the privacy implications of the collection, nor an analysis on whether the collection of this dataset pursuant to section 12 may require a warrant.
Upon collection of the information CSIS analysed the dataset. It should be emphasized that this would have amounted to an exploitation of what should have otherwise been a Canadian dataset.
[**redacted**] the Data Management and Exploitation branch engaged [**redacted**] on the issue of retention of the dataset in light of the requirements in the policy.
[**redacted**]. This statement directly contradicts CSIS’ own assessment of the dataset, which states that [**redacted**]. It proceeds to justify retention by noting that [**redacted**].
A plain dictionary reading of the words “strictly necessary” in s. 12 of the CSIS Act would render a requirement that the information be “rigidly” “indispensable.” However, CSIS did not demonstrate in its justification how the information in the dataset is indispensable to its investigation. Rather, there is a “just in case” type argument put forward that states that it is important to retain the information as it could help a future targeting trend analysis. This justification may meet a likely to assist threshold but does not meet a strictly necessary threshold.
CSIS informed NSIRA that there has been no decision regarding the retention of the dataset, [**redacted**]. NSIRA also learned that should another relevant dataset or associated information arise in the future, at that point [**redacted**]. The dataset is currently in a controlled access shared drive, however no measures are in place to prevent its duplication or movement to other locations.
Recommendation 12: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy the case study dataset it collected pursuant to section 12 as it does not meet the statutory thresholds. This information no longer falls within the legal 90 day evaluation period and retaining it pursuant to the dataset regime is no longer a possibility.
In its annual classified report to the Minister, CSIS stated “When considering the challenges with both the exigent circumstances and normal applications of the dataset regime, it is clear that as currently designed, the regime is incapable of managing the volume and variety of data needed to build a robust and sustainable data analytics program, while maintaining Parliament’s intended control and oversight.”
Having been so involved with the drafting of the regime, CSIS was well positioned to develop policies and procedures governing the collection, evaluation, query, exploitation and verification of datasets. NSIRA expected to find a more mature and compliant application of the dataset regime.
As discussed in this report, CSIS has failed to adequately operationalize the dataset regime. While the regime is indeed complex, CSIS has not sought to clarify legal ambiguities [**redacted**] of the application of the regime before the Court when given the opportunity to do so. Rather, CSIS has adopted multiple positions on the application of the dataset regime that risk limiting what is a collection and retention regime to a retention mechanism. Internally, CSIS has not devoted sufficient resources to ensure compliance to the regime, this extends beyond the compliance incidents noted in this report and includes a lack of dedicated technical experts and systems capable of handling and exploiting bulk data. Nor has CSIS devoted adequate resources to sensitizing its employees to the requirements of the regime through training. Absent appropriate training and internal commitment to adequately resource and support the implementation of a new legal regime, any such regime will fail no matter how fit for purpose it is perceived.
Recommendation 13: NSIRA recommends that CSIS share the full unredacted copy of this report with the Federal Court.
This annex describes the technical processes and systems involved with CSIS’s identification, collection, evaluation, retention, querying, exploitation, ingestion, and destruction of Section 11.01 datasets. CSIS uses similar processes and systems for all Canadian and Foreign datasets. The following description of the technical processes and systems involved with the lifecycle of s.11.01 datasets stems from CSIS briefings delivered on 12 May 2022 and 3 October 2022, a technical demo delivered on 1 November 2022, as well as from the policy suite that governs the collection, evaluation and retention of s.11.01 datasets. This annex should be seen as reflective of the technical processes and systems in place until the end of this report’s review period.
Because datasets are defined by Section 2 of the CSIS Act as “a collection of information stored as an electronic record and characterized by a common subject matter,” the scope and breadth of what may be considered a ‘dataset’ is considerable. Some of the technical challenges that CSIS encounters with datasets stem from the variety of data types [**redacted**], and sizes of files [**redacted**] that can comprise a ‘dataset’.
SIS acknowledges that “while comprehensive, there remains residual risk in these complex systems. They are manual, resource-intensive and subject to error. They reflect the complexity of the datasets regime, and offer limited resilience and scalability.”
S.11.01 datasets can be identified and collected by CSIS in a number of ways. For example, Service employees can receive datasets from national and international partners or informants via email, USB drives, external hard drives, or other data storage devices. CSIS employees can [**redacted**], encounter a dataset while performing searches on the internet, [**redacted**]. These diverse processes involve any number of technical processes and systems depending on how, where, and by whom the datasets are identified and collected.
DMEX has centralized the s.11.01 dataset evaluation process; one of DMEX’s designated employees must evaluate the dataset within 90 days of its initial collection. During this 90 day period, a designated employee must determine if the dataset meets the requirements for retention as either a Canadian or foreign dataset. The technical processes and systems involved with the evaluation phase vary depending on the format(s), size(s), and location(s) of the dataset. [**redacted**]. Each dataset must be evaluated using techniques and tools suitable to its unique characteristics. If CSIS initially collected multiple versions of the same dataset, DMEX is responsible for ensuring that all other copies of the dataset have been deleted from Service systems.
If the evaluation results lead DMEX to attempt to retain a Canadian or foreign dataset, CSIS must proceed with the requisite applications for approval and authorization. The systems and programs used to develop materials submitted for approvals and authorizations often lead to the creation of substantial documentation (e.g. memos, briefing notes, and affidavits prepared in Microsoft Word or Excel) describing the datasets. In some cases, copies or subsets of information from the datasets are included in the materials submitted for approval and authorization.
To manage and track a dataset’s evaluation workflow, [**redacted**]. For each dataset it evaluates, DMEX [**redacted**].
Once a Canadian or foreign dataset has been approved for retention, it is ingested [**redacted**], which is CSIS’s [**redacted**] enables CSIS to store and aggregate all of their operational information and datasets, apply access controls to that information, and perform all requisite security logging processes.
All information ingested into [**redacted**] assigned attribute-based access controls that are mapped to CSIS’s [**redacted**] for designated employees who are evaluating a dataset and [**redacted**] for designated employees who can query and exploit the retained datasets. No other employees can access the datasets.
When employees access datasets, CSIS uses [**redacted**] to collect and index information about what they are doing. CSIS collects [**redacted**].
[**redacted figure**]
Figure 1: Map of [**redacted**] for querying and exploiting foreign and Canadian datasets.
Only ‘designated employees’ can query and exploit Canadian or foreign datasets, and DMEX has centralized these processes. When a Service employee wants to query a s.11.01 dataset in support of an investigation, they must submit a [**redacted**] to DMEX [**redacted**] . Alongside this request, [**redacted**] The information supplied in each [**redacted**] is used to select the appropriate “justification” when a designated DMEX Analyst performs queries or exploitations [**redacted**] or [**redacted**]. [**redacted**]
If the DMEX analyst finds any results from their queries or exploitations, they record [**redacted**]. They must then contact [**redacted**]. [**redacted**]. This manual set of processes creates multiple copies of raw data from datasets, which can be unintentionally retained on Service employees’ desktop computers or in their email sent/received folders.
[**redacted**] Data is compartmentalized (s.12, s.15, s.16, s.17) based on an investigation’s [**redacted**] and retained as per the [**redacted**] rules associated with it.
[**redacted**] CSIS’s corporate repository. This leads to further duplication of raw data from s.11.01 datasets within CSIS’s digital ecosystem.
When datasets are initially ingested into [**redacted**], they are assigned a retention period based on whether they are Canadian or foreign. When that retention period ends, [**redacted**].
Date | Subject |
---|---|
Briefings: | |
February 17, 2021 | Publicly Available Datasets. |
September 9, 2021 | Foreign Datasets. |
April 22, 2022 | CSIS Dataset Regime. |
May 12, 2022 | [**redacted**] Evaluation, Query, Exploitation, Retention & Reporting of Canadian and Foreign Datasets. |
October 3, 2022 | [**redacted**] |
November 1, 2022 | Technical Demonstration on Dataset Systems. |
[**redacted**] | Case Study Briefing. |
June 6, 2023 | [**redacted**] |
Interviews: | |
August 18, 2022 | Canadian dataset. |
September 6, 2022 | Canadian dataset. |
October 14, 2022 | Canadian dataset. |
October 21, 2022 | Canadian dataset. |
Finding 1: NSIRA finds that CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime is inconsistent with the statutory framework. | Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that in the next judicial authorization application for a Canadian dataset CSIS put its current position on the application of the dataset regime before the Court, including any use of the information prior to the decision to retain under the dataset regime. |
Finding 2: NSIRA finds that CSIS’s current approach to dataset information collection under section 12 risks the creation of a parallel collection mechanism, one that weakens section 12’s statutory thresholds and at the same time lacks the external oversight regime intended to protect personal information under the dataset regime. | |
Finding 3: NSIRA finds that CSIS failed to fully apprise the Court on their interpretation and application of the dataset regime. CSIS should have sought clarification from the Court as to its views on the precise conduct permissible prior to invocating the dataset regime. | |
Finding 4: NSIRA finds that when conducting queries in exigent circumstances, CSIS retained information that did not meet the section 12 strictly necessary threshold. | Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy any record containing names retained pursuant to the exigent circumstances queries, as they do not meet the strictly necessary threshold. |
Finding 5: NSIRA finds that the lack of explicit time limits in section 11.17 of the dataset provisions governing foreign datasets has resulted in datasets being retained for multiple years pending a decision by the Minister or Minister’s designate (the CSIS Director). | Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that Parliament legislates a time limitation for the authorization of a foreign dataset by the Minister or Minister’s designate. |
Finding 6: NSIRA finds that CSIS runs the risk of collecting information that is publicly available but for which there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy. | Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that CSIS meaningfully analyze and document any possible reasonable expectation of privacy when evaluating publicly available datasets. |
Finding 7: NSIRA finds that CSIS’s policies governing the collection and retention of Canadian and foreign datasets do not align with its current interpretation of the dataset regime. | Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop:
|
Finding 8: NSIRA finds that CSIS does not have a policy governing the handling of transitory information. In addition, the existing Interim Direction on [**redacted**] does not provide employees with sufficient instruction, which may result in CSIS retaining information that would otherwise be subject to the dataset regime. | |
Finding 9: NSIRA finds that CSIS information management practices are responsible for multiple compliance incidents and currently create duplicates of datasets within CSIS’s systems. | Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that CSIS cease to create duplicates of the information reported in the operational system. |
Finding 10: NSIRA finds that, as of August 2023, CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act because it retained Canadian information extracted from foreign datasets, and foreign information amounting to a dataset. | Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy Canadian and foreign dataset information that is not strictly necessary to retain. This information no longer falls within the legal 90 day evaluation period and retaining it pursuant to the dataset regime is no longer a possibility. |
Finding 11: NSIRA finds that CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act because it retained Canadian information and referenced it as recently as 2022. This information should have been destroyed upon coming into force of the NSA 2017, in July, 2019. | |
Finding 12: NSIRA finds that CSIS has not exhaustively scanned all of its systems to identify information that is subject to the dataset regime so that it may be processed in a compliant manner. | Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that CSIS conduct an exhaustive scan of its operational and corporate repositories to identify and destroy any non-compliant information. |
Finding 13: NSIRA finds that the training required to become a designated employee to evaluate, query, and exploit section 11.01 datasets offers clear information on the collection and retention requirements. | Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop and deliver scenario-based workshops to train operational personnel on CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime so that they can engage subject matter experts as necessary. |
Finding 14: NSIRA finds that CSIS operational personnel, including those predominantly dealing with bulk information collection, have not received adequate training allowing them to identify when collected information may fall within the dataset regime. | |
Finding 15: NSIRA finds that CSIS has not prioritized resourcing the technical unit responsible for the evaluation, querying, and exploitation of Canadian and foreign datasets. | Recommendation 10: NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize resourcing the technical unit responsible for the evaluation, querying, and exploitation of Canadian and foreign datasets. |
Finding 16: NSIRA finds that CSIS has not devoted sufficient resources to improving the current technical systems or developing new ones that are equipped to support bulk data use. | Recommendation 11: NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize the improvement of current technical systems or development of new systems, equipped to support compliant bulk data use. |
Finding 17: NSIRA finds that CSIS collected information in relation to activities that could not on reasonable grounds be suspected to have constituted a threat to the security of Canada and the collection, analysis, and retention of which was not strictly necessary. | Recommendation 12: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy the case study dataset it collected pursuant to section 12, as it does not meet the statutory thresholds. This information no longer falls within the legal 90 day evaluation period and retaining it pursuant to the dataset regime is no longer a possibility. |
Recommendation 13: NSIRA recommends that CSIS share the full unredacted copy of this report with the Federal Court. |
Date of Publishing:
This review focused on the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU) and how Information Technology (IT) searches were used to support counter-intelligence (CI) investigations. The review assessed whether IT searches and the collection of information in support of CI investigations interfered with individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstance(s).
Through the course of the review NSIRA has identified three (3) areas of concern tied to the requests for, and conduct of, CI information technology network searches. These are arranged under the following categories: (1) CFNCIU’s search of a Subject’s email, Internet and removable device activity; (2) The CFNCIU checklist used to identify and restrict search parameters, and how applicable stakeholders define search parameters; and, (3) How the acquisition of information is used to expand supplementary searches.
DND employees and CAF members have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using work computers for personal use. [**contains information related to DND/CAF operational capabilities**]. NSIRA found that CFNCIU may be inappropriately relying on DND/CAF policies as lawful authority to interfere with a Subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
NSIRA observed that the checklist has the potential to capture intimate and personal information that touches upon a Subject’s biographical core. NSIRA found that the checklist risks capturing information that is protected by s. 8 of the Charter. NSIRA also found that DND/CAF is applying a definition of metadata that captures information that could be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
NSIRA also observed that CFNCIU IT inquiries utilized broad search parameters which may include information not relevant to the investigation. These parameters were applied as broad approvals with no specific internal controls or oversight at both the operational and working levels. Collection techniques, due in part to the limitations of IT audit tools and broad search parameters, resulted in a wide net being cast. NSIRA found that the investigative IT system practices it observed in the context CFNCIU’s CI investigations [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**] have insufficient legal oversight to ensure that they are as minimally invasive as possible.
As a result of these findings, NSIRA recommends that DND/CAF suspend investigative IT system practices in the context of CFNCIU CI investigations until a reasonable legal authority has been established. Once a reasonable legal authority has been established DND/CAF should create a new policy framework that is reflective of the noted findings.
In keeping with NSIRA’s 2020 Annual Report which emphasized the implementation of a “trust but verify” approach for assessing information provided over the course of a review, NSIRA worked with the DND/CAF to design an approach for “proxy access” i.e. an approach involving a departmental intermediary an intermediary who accesses information repositories in the presence of NSIRA staff, and who can review relevant information on the system. DND/CAF agreed in principle to this form of access, however, given the disparate number of databases for which CI searches are conducted, this initiative could not be implemented in the course of this review. Notwithstanding, the information provided by DND/CAF has been independently verified by NSIRA through documentation analysis and meetings with DND/CAF subject matter experts. Further work is underway to continue mutually developing an access model for the independent verification of various kinds of information.
This review is being conducted under the authority of paragraph 8(1)(b) of the National Security Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act).
In July 2019, the NSIRA Act came into force, establishing the National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). NSIRA’s mandate allows it to review the full range of national security or intelligence activities across the Government of Canada, including authority to review the Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF).
NSIRA completed its first review of DND/CAF in 2020, focusing on the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU). During the course of the review, two (2) possible compliance issues were identified, with NSIRA Members approving further review in 2021.
The issues identified for further review were:
This review assessed, both in legal and technical terms, how IT searches are used to support CI investigations and the accountability structures that guide the acquisition of information and data.
Through the course of this review NSIRA examined all available written and electronic records, case files, correspondence, computer databases, and other information holdings and documentation related to the operations/investigations selected for review, as well as applicable policies, procedures, and legal advice to verify compliance with legal, ministerial and policy requirements. Presentations, interviews and meetings were conducted with managers/officers, as well as other pertinent DND/CAF personnel.
Through examination of selected case files, the review assessed whether IT searches and the collection of information in support of CI investigations interfered with individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstance(s). More specifically, NSIRA closely examined whether the searches used to support counter-intelligence (CI) investigations had the potential to include information that is meaningful, intimate and touching on a user’s “biographical core” of personal information. Everyone in Canada is constitutionally entitled to expect privacy in personal information of this kind, including when this information is contained on workplace computers.
NSIRA selected a sample of CFNCIU’s requested IT system searches, to assess whether CFNCIU, in the course of its activities, acted in compliance with the law, ministerial direction, and internal directives, policies and procedures, and had exercised its powers in a manner that is consistent, reasonable and necessary.
The review examined a cross-section of CFNCIU case files, and has focused on a contemporary, high level (Level III) case file [**redacted**] to illustrate CFNCIU and ADM(IM)’s practices when conducting searches on IT systems (Please refer to Appendix 1 for more on this case file). Through the lens of [**redacted**], NSIRA has examined whether CFNCIU and/or ADM(IM) interfered with individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstance(s) through the course of CI investigation. NSIRA closely examined searches conducted by Department of Information Management End- User Services (DIMEUS), Directorate of Information Management Engineering and Integration (DIMEI), and Canadian Forces Network Operations Center (CFNOC).
NSIRA also conducted an in-depth examination of the 2014 CFNCIU Subject interview in order to understand the lead up to the interview, what happened during the interview, the possible consequences, and what was done by DND/CAF after the incident. NSIRA reviewed CFNCIU’s case file and its compliance with relevant legislation, Ministerial Directives, DND/CAF policy, as well as the legal advice provided by the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OJAG) and the Canadian Forces Legal Advisor (CFLA).
As a direct result of NSIRA’s inquiries, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) issued a directive on September 9th 2021, [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**].
In NSIRA’s view these measures have addressed the initial concerns exemplified in the 2014 Subject interview referenced above. As a result, NSIRA has suspended further inquiry into the matter, however, NSIRA may choose to re-examine this investigative practice in future reviews after an updated functional directive is provided by CFINTCOM.
Since 1997, Counter-intelligence (CI) and security functions within the DND/CAF have experienced continuous transformation in an effort to find efficiencies and de-conflict with other security, intelligence, and law enforcement stakeholders. Since inception, the CFNCIU has been the subject of ten internal studies, each of which have identified the Unit as having suffered from resource and policy limitations (among others), resulting in an inability to fully meet its mandate. Very few of the recommendations presented in these reports have be implemented. When asked why so many recommendations were ignored the Unit cited resourcing shortfalls.
In 1997, the security and criminal investigative services that had resided within the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) were separated into two new and distinct units, the CFNCIU and Canadian Forces National Investigative Service (CFNIS). This was a direct result of the tabling of the Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services, and the External Review of the Canadian Forces Special Investigation Unit.
The separation mirrored the bifurcation that occurred in the mid-eighties between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and CSIS. For the first time, separate and distinct mandates within the DND/CAF were created for law enforcement, security and counter intelligence, and security clearance functions.
The newly created CFNCIU assumed the role of the security and counter intelligence functions within the DND/CAF. The CFNIS focused solely on criminal investigations. Finally, the security clearance function was established and now known as the Director General Defence Security, the Director Personal Security and Identification Management (DGDS/DPSIM).
The formation of the CFNCIU is authorized by the Minister of National Defence (MND) through a Ministerial Organization Order. Subsequently, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), through a Canadian Forces Organization Order, established the CFNCIU as a regular force unit allocated to the Canadian Forces Intelligence Group (CF INT GP).
Issued in March of 2003, under the authority of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the 8002 series Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) established the main policy framework for defence CI activities by reaffirming responsibilities of the MND, DM and CDS in safeguarding the resources of DND/CAF. [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**] would be equivalent to those undertaken by departmental security officers in other federal government departments.
There are no provisions of the National Defence Act (NDA) that authorize the conduct of defence intelligence activities. CFNCIU investigations are the only area of defence intelligence that is squarely focused on Canadian citizens (DND employees/CAF members). [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
In addition, Canadian law imposes legal constraints under the Privacy Act, the Criminal Code and the Charter on intelligence activities conducted in support of domestic operations. For example, the application of the interception of private communications provisions under the Criminal Code and the application of section 8 Charter protections against unreasonable search and seizure, would apply to domestic activities of DND/CAF.
Issued in July of 2012, under the authority of the Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management) and the Chief Information Officer, the 6002 series Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) establishes the main policy framework for operational, technical and security authorities for communications and information systems within the DND/CAF.
DAOD 6002-2, Acceptable Use of the Internet, Defence Intranet, Computers and Other Information Technology Systems, provides users with instructions on official, authorized, unauthorized and prohibited uses of IT systems. It is this policy that defines authorized use and a user’s expectation of privacy.
In DAOD 6002-2, users are advised that authorized use includes communication with family, friends and other persons, conducting personal banking transactions, as well as shopping for personal and family items, and would fall within the other than official uses category. Users are also advised that that there is only a limited expectation of privacy afforded due to the department’s responsibility for monitoring IT systems for the purposes of system administration, maintenance and security, and to ensure compliance with Treasury Board, DND/CAF policies, instructions, directives and standards.
Threat related information comes from a variety of sources to CFNCIU. Such information can originate from different detachments as well as from external partners. On initial receipt of threat-related information about a DND/CAF employee and/or incident, the Regional Detachments (RD) drafts an Intelligence Report (IntRep) to Headquarters (HQ), which centrally manages all investigations.
Following the initial identification of this security concern, there are two key determinatives to launch an investigation:
When operating within this scope, the nexus must be established for every investigation. [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**].If the TESSOC and nexus determinations are sufficiently justifiable, the Regional Detachments will submit a request outlining the proposed investigative level.
The investigative framework for CFNCIU is unique insofar as it covers security intelligence concerns similar to those of CSIS (i.e. TESSOC, in addition to organized crime), yet is limited in investigative scope to DND/CAF information, people and assets (i.e. nexus). Unlike CSIS, CFNCIU does not collect expansively on threats given the need for a nexus; and unlike a Departmental Security Officer, CFNCIU does not conduct investigations on issues regarding policy compliance, or security issues involving inappropriate behaviour by employees that do not point to an obvious TESSOC. Furthermore, CFNCIU does not have responsibility for security screening (which is the responsibility of DGDS/DPSIM), or for criminal investigations, which is the responsibility of the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS).
The investigative scope of CFNCIU is therefore best understood as occupying a very narrow space above those related to discipline and security screening, yet falling below criminal thresholds. Prior to the authorization of a counter-intelligence investigation or operation, DND/CAF must determine that:
The following text box summarizes the various investigative levels and what activities are authorized by departmental policy to be performed within that investigative threshold:
Although the levels of investigation are temporal, the review observed that most investigations are contained within the lowest investigative thresholds (i.e. PA or L1). This is not due to an absence of serious TESSOC threats but rather, this is due, in part, to CFNCIU’s [**redacted**] legal authorities [**contains information related to DND/CAF operational capabilities**].
When CFNCIU was created in 1997, the legal landscape with regard to the Charter was much different than it is today, and technology has expanded in a way that computers have become an all-encompassing tool. In addition, surveillance capacity and techniques have evolved. The law has evolved accordingly to protect Charter rights by requiring the State to obtain specific judicial authorizations (warrants) where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**] Warrantless searches that interfere with a reasonable expectation of privacy are presumptively unreasonable, unless the Collins test criteria is satisfied. CFNCIU has not identified a clear lawful authority that would permit warrantless searches for section 8 purposes during CI investigations. It is clear that under this evolved legal landscape that CFNCIU’s authorities have not kept up with the articulated mandate. The Unit, and largely CFINTCOM, have acknowledged that policy is outdated in terms of both terminology and content. NSIRA notes, however, that updating internal policies would not provide adequate authorities to conduct activities that would amount to a lawful interference with Charter rights. Amendments to allow CFNCIU to conduct most activities that would fall under a Level 2 or Level 3 investigation would require legislative amendments. This was documented within a number of internal reports identifying significant discrepancies in policy.
This explains why the Unit relies on the policies and legal authorities of external investigative bodies when carrying out certain functions, including those that would require a warrant. For example, CFNCIU cannot [**contains information related to DND/CAF operational capabilities**] these investigative techniques are all facilitated through other investigative bodies and these bodies’ mandates (i.e. CFNIS, CSIS, etc.).
This contemporary review NSIRA REVIEW 2021-10 should be viewed as a continuation to NSIRA’s 2019 review, the Canadian Forces Counter-Intelligence Unit (2019-01). As a result of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and access to DND/CAF’s IT/IM infrastructure, NSIRA elected to bifurcate the review. This separation allowed for the provision of findings and recommendations to the Minister of National Defence in February of 2021. While the DND/CAF have accepted all of the findings and recommendations from the 2019 review, NSIRA recognizes this current review follows in relatively short succession and changes may already be underway. The intent of this review is not to restate previous findings and recommendations, but to provide additional observations viewed through an operational context.
This review examined a cross-section of CFNCIU case files, and has focused on a contemporary, high level (Level III) case file [**redacted**] to illustrate CFNCIU and ADM(IM)’s practices when conducting searches on IT systems (Please refer to Appendix 1 for more on this case file).
Through the lens of [**redacted**] NSIRA has examined whether CFNCIU and/or ADM(IM) interfered with an individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstance(s) through the course of CI investigation. NSIRA closely examined searches conducted by Department of Information Management End-User Services (DIMEUS), Directorate of Information Management Engineering and Integration (DIMEI), and Canadian Forces Network Operations Center (CFNOC) on behalf of CFNCIU for CI purposes.
NSIRA selected a sample of CFNCIU’s IT system searches, to assess whether CFNCIU, in the course of its activities, acted in compliance with the law, ministerial direction, and internal directives, policies and procedures, and had exercised its powers in a manner that is consistent, reasonable and necessary.
This review focuses on CFNCIU searches of the Defence Wide Area Network (DWAN). This unclassified network allows for personal use by DND/CAF employees in accordance with internal policy. CFNCIU submits requests to three units which have the capability to query the DWAN activity and provide reports on specific users, and Subjects of investigation(s). The three internal units reviewed included the Department of Information Management End-User Services (DIMEUS), Directorate of Information Management Engineering and Integration (DIMEI), and Canadian Forces Network Operations Center (CFNOC).
Through the course of the review NSIRA has identified three (3) areas of concern tied to the requests for, and conduct of, CI information technology network searches. These are arranged under the following categories:
CFNCIU requests advanced IT system searches as an investigative tool when conducting CI investigations. This potentially includes searches across [**redacted**] networks across multiple classification levels (See Annex F: IT SYSTEMS MATRIX). In the context of investigations, searches are best described as mosaics compiled from the previously mentioned distinct internal groups: DIMEI CFNOC, and, DIMEUS.
When conducting a CI investigation, CFNCIU must engage these groups individually through separate requests. Each group has a separate process for searching, collecting and reporting information. DIMEI, DIMEUS and CFNOC may lawfully access and monitor IT system searches for the purpose of “the management or protection of computer systems,” and may take reasonable measures for such purposes, including the interception of private communications. However, DIMEI, DIMEUS and CFNOC’s access to DND/CAF IT systems for network security activities does not provide an authority to access those IT systems for the purposes of [**redacted**]
The process for IT system searches, as described by CFNCIU, is illustrated by the figure below:
[**redacted figure**]
Generally DIMEI, DIMEUS and CFNOC utilize similar processes for providing “remits” – i.e. the collected product – to CFNCIU across IT systems. At the collection and filtering stage it is the IT analyst (DIMEI, DIMEUS, CFNOC) that decides what information is included as part of the remit. Analysts retrieve data from the Subject’s repositories based on a set of predefined selectors which is stipulated in a multi-point checklist (discussed further below) and relevance to the request is ultimately determined by the analyst’s post- collection review. [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
While CFNOC engages its legal counsel with the initiation of CFNCIU’s request, they do not appear to be engaged with, or consulted through the course of the investigation [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**] DIMEUS and DIMEI do not have assigned legal review, or oversight, and rely on the checklist to support their collection and filtering activities. DND/CAF notes that legal advice is sought by CFNOC and may be requested by DIMEUS and DIMEI, including verbally, [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]. However, NSIRA cannot verify this claim.
Importantly, CFNCIU IT searches may not interfere with an individual’s Charter rights. As noted above, this review examined whether searches of the unclassified DWAN network for CI purposes had the potential to infringe upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the informational content included on workplace computers. Case law recognizes that an individual’s use of workplace computers for personal purposes may give rise to a reasonable, though diminished expectation of privacy, protected by s. 8 of the Charter. A reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry is fact-sensitive and fact-specific, and depends on the “totality of the circumstances”.
It is likely that users of DND/CAF unclassified IT systems have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using such systems for personal use. DND/CAF policy on acceptable use of computer systems and devices permits limited personal use of such systems for a range of personal activities that are not necessary to carry out duties and official functions in furtherance of DND and CAF goals and objectives. This can include communicating with family, friends and other persons, for other than official use; shopping for personal and family items; or accessing news and other electronic network information sources. Such authorized activities (i.e, those for personal purposes) can generate revealing and meaningful private information that falls within the “biographical core” of information protected by section 8 of the Charter. A Subject under investigation by CFNCIU, therefore, would be able to establish a direct interest and a subjective expectation of privacy in any information content searched related to the personal use of DND/CAF networks.
DND Employees and CAF members have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using work computers for personal use. DND/CAF policy recognizes that:
“[t]here is only a limited expectation of privacy when using IT systems because they are subject to monitoring for the purposes of system administration, maintenance and security, and to ensure compliance with the Treasury Board, DND and CAF policies, instructions, directives and standards.”
A limited, or diminished, expectation of privacy is nonetheless a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by section 8 of the Charter. [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
NSIRA acknowledges that DND/CAF has a legitimate interest in safeguarding the resources of DND and the CAF. However, the “finer points” of an employer’s right to monitor computers issued to employees has been left by the Supreme Court for another day. While the law on employee computer searches continues to evolve, a reasonable expectation of privacy is subject to state intrusion only under the authority of a reasonable law.
A search carried out without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable and contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. In the absence of a warrant, the Crown must establish on a balance of probabilities (1) that the search was authorized by law; (2) that the authorizing law was itself reasonable; and (3) that the authority to conduct the search was exercised in a reasonable manner. NSIRA is concerned that CFNCIU has not adequately considered their legal authorities to determine whether they have reasonable lawful authority to conduct warrantless searches for CI purposes.
As CFNCIU [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**] and therefore CI activities would not constitute an unreasonable search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter.
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
CFNCIU [**redacted**] for CI activities, and is not clearly authorized by law to intrude upon a Subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy. NSIRA notes that the objective of the Treasury Board Policy is to manage government security, which is distinct from intelligence-gathering. Further, NSIRA emphasizes that internal policies– even those that “reflect and instantiate broader Treasury Board Policy on Government Security” – are likely not adequate authorities to conduct CI activities that allow for an interference with Charter rights. [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**] While the CFNCIU search is not for criminal purposes, the strict requirement to report wrongdoing to the authorities would likely aise the standards for protections under section 8 of the Charter.
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
In [**redacted**], the Counter-Intelligence Oversight Committee (CIOC) authorized a Level III CI investigation codenamed [**contains information related to national security investigations**].
[**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**]
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
Finding 1: NSIRA found that CFNCIU is inappropriately relying on DND/CAF policies as lawful authority to interfere with a Subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
The multi-point checklist is applied as a standard operating procedure that sets out the parameters used to capture CFNCIU IT search requests, by aligning technical search capabilities with DND/CAF’s existing cyber defence tools.
The checklist identifies IT inquiry questions to be answered in retroactive analysis reports on Subjects of investigation. The multi-point checklist is viewed as a list of pre-consulted IT support requests and associated search criteria that has been reviewed [**redacted**] The checklist serves as a basis for all CFNCIU requests to DIMEI and DIMEUS by aligning the specific information request to the allowable search criteria, all the while falling within CFNCIU’s mandate and legal authorities. CFNCIU has indicated [**redacted**].
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
[**redacted**] DIMEUS and DIMEI do not have imbedded legal counsel, and rely on legal counsel from Directorate of Law/ Intelligence and Information Operations (DLAW/I&IO), or legal counsel from headquarters within ADM(IM) through CFNCIU.
CFNCIU distinguishes metadata from content as “…the attributes of the content without revealing the content.” Their view is that because the metadata does not include content, it is claimed by CFNCIU to be less sensitive. Metadata, [**redacted**] is returned to CFNCIU as a list of all emails sent or received by the Subject, including all the email metadata attributes such as the sender, the recipient, as well as the subject line and any attachment names.
NSIRA notes that metadata can be just as revealing as content about a Subject’s biographical core, depending on the context. Information that might appear outside of the biographical core of a Subject may be revealing or intrusive when coupled with other information. When viewing the information compiled by the checklist in its entirety, it is possible that intimate personal information related to the Subject under investigation may be revealed beyond what was initially contemplated or authorized. Additionally, email subject lines are akin to content rather than metadata. An email subject line can reveal the content of the communication that it describes, and it can be just as sensitive as any communication contained within an email. Therefore, it is inaccurate to consider email subject lines as metadata, rather than content.
It is important to note that DIMEUS analysts, during the filtering process, assesses relevance based on the Subject’s email metadata, [**redacted**] DIMEI has a similar process where returns are filtered to include only metadata related to the Subject. DIMEUS and DIMEI, as mentioned above, do not have integrated legal support. NSIRA notes that the practice of DIMEUS and DIMEI analysts filtering information for relevance – and in some cases, to ensure the results do not include content – is an inappropriate method for conducting IT searches, as it is likely to intrude upon the Subject’s privacy interests (further discussed below). The proposed checklist selectors are applied to all DIMEI and DIMEUS search requests by means of a standardized template. These selectors are used as filters that are applied to each search. Data returns only include the selector, or an iteration of that selector. Noteworthy, is the practice of DIMEI, which if a date range is not specified by CFNCIU, all records irrespective of time period are provided. In practice, there is in fact no constraint on the metadata being provided to CFNCIU in this scenario. This appears to contradict two checklist items which limit the information requests to the inquiry period.
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
Ultimately, current CFNCIU IT policy [**redacted**] on IT searches [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]. Further, IT searches based on use of the checklist are not subject to additional legal consultation or oversight (beyond the creation of the checklist template) [**redacted**]. This is problematic as the checklist items as drafted may capture information that has the potential to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the Subject, which would be protected by section 8 of the Charter.
For example, item 8 of the checklist is [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]. Such an approach may still reveal information for which a Subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy. [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**].
It is important to note that CFNCIU, during the course of the [**redacted**] investigation, submitted a request to CFNOC that included [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**] CFNOC reminded CFNCIU that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed and ‘fishing expeditions were prohibited. This resulted in the withdrawal of the request for [**redacted**] with CFNOC. By contrast, CFNCIU requested similar information from DIMEI who complied and provided [**redacted**]. Although these two requests were not issued concurrently, they clearly demonstrate two separate outcomes based on very similar CI requests.
In contrast to DIMEUS and DIMEI’s approach, CFNOC operates under their own policies, directions and standard operating procedures, and need to meet specific requirements before a CFNCIU request can be initiated. For example, unlike DIMEI and DIMEUS, the CFNOC process includes an initial legal review by their CFIOG JAG [**redacted**].
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]. NSIRA notes that the CFNOC approach to receiving initial legal review by their CFIOG JAG in the context of an investigation is preferable to DIMEUS and DIMEI’s approach [**redacted**].
Given the risk that the checklist items and proposed selectors have the potential to capture intimate and personal information that touches upon a Subject’s biographical core, the use of the checklist outside of the initially agreed upon parameters and without additional legal guidance or approval is problematic.
Finding no. 2: NSIRA found that the DND/CAF checklist applied as a standard investigative operating procedure risks capturing information that is protected by s. 8 of the Charter.
Finding no. 3: NSIRA found that DND/CAF is applying a definition of metadata that captures information that could be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
CFNCIU has taken measures to constrain its search parameters over the course of the [**redacted**]. Initial Requests For Information (RFI) (before the multi-point checklist was constituted) included far-reaching and extensive search parameters. From 2014, to the introduction of the checklist RFI items included [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**] was included as part of the RFI. The [**redacted**].
In [**redacted**] a month prior to the authorization of the [**redacted**] investigation, CFNCIU investigators discussed the contents of the associated RFI and highlighted their preference to [**contains information related to the DND/CAF operations**].
DND/CAF has made attempts to constrain the search parameters with the implementation of the multi-point checklist. However, even with the checklist, the CFNCIU IT inquiry requests for the [**redacted**] investigation utilized broad search parameters which may have included information not relevant to the investigation.
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
Filtering the data for relevancy after this initial collection and search has occurred poses legal risks, as any potential interference into the Subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy would have already occurred by state action. The post-filtration of the information by the IT analyst before it is returned to CFNCIU does not negate that this initial search and seizure of the information by the IT analyst already constitutes a ‘search’ and ‘seizure’ within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, if this search interfered with a reasonable privacy interest.
These parameters are applied as broad approvals with no specific internal controls or oversight at both the operational and working levels. Collection techniques, due in part to the result in a wide net [**redacted**] being cast. It is left to the analyst/investigator to determine what is relevant and filter results after the information/data has been collected.
NSIRA has observed six instances of expanded search criteria, either outside of the stipulated checklist criteria or outside the initial request to CFNOC, as illustrated in Appendix II: Expanding the Search: [**redacted**] – Specific Examples, with no additional legal consultation, yet with clear risk of intruding upon Charter interests. As previously mentioned, the use of broad search parameters and then subsequent filtration of ‘relevant’ information is not an appropriate investigative technique. Furthermore, this approach does not align with DND/CAF policy on the CI program to ensure that prior to investigation or operation, the need to use intrusive techniques is weighed against a possible breach of constitutionally protected rights; and the least intrusive technique of information collected is used, taking into account the specific circumstances.
Finding 4: NSIRA found that CFNCIU risks breaching protected privacy interests by not having clear policy guidance based on lawful authority for IT searches, and by expanding IT searches beyond the approved search parameters.
Finding 5: NSIRA found that the investigative IT system practices it observed in the context CFNCIU’s CI investigations contradict the Office of the JAG and the Department of Justice’s legal advice, [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that DND/CAF suspend investigative IT system practices in the context of CFNCIU CI investigations until a reasonable legal authority has been established.
Recommendation 2: Once a reasonable legal authority has been established DND/CAF should create a new policy framework that is reflective of the noted findings, namely, the multi-point checklist, the categorization of metadata, the expansion of IT searches and the principle that these searches be as minimally invasive as possible.
On [**contains information related to national security investigations**]
[**contains information related to national security investigations**]
In [**redacted**] the CIOC authorized a level III CI investigation codenamed [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**].
DND/CAF, through its coordination body National Security and Intelligence Review and Oversight Coordination Secretariat (NSIROCS), has provided a large amount of documents in response to our Requests for Information. It is however also important to note that the information provided has not been independently verified by NSIRA.
[**redacted diagram and table containing information related to DND/CAF operations**]
[**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**]
DIMEI 3-5 provided [**redacted**] in [**redacted**] DIMEI 3-5 further elaborated with the release of the information that the report was generated from [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**]
Between [**redacted**] CFNOC provided CFNCIU with information in response to the IT inquiry request. This included [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**].
On [**redacted**] CFNCIU requested from CFNOC “a master spreadsheet of all emails with subject headings to date.”112 This request did not include the initially agreed upon search criteria. CFNOC agreed to this change and provided an additional report containing [**redacted**]. This change also affected all subsequent [**redacted**] reports generated by CFNOC and provided to CFNCIU on a periodic basis.
In [**redacted**] CFNCIU requested from CFNOC [**redacted**]. They also requested [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**].
In [**redacted**] DIMEI 3-5 prodived a report to the CFNCIU containing [**redacted**]. The search criteria used was more than the [**redacted**] previously identified by CFNCIU. DIMEI 3-5 also state that: “If there is an [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**]
In [**redacted**] CFNCIU requested CFNOC with a search of [**redacted**] CFNOC performed the search and provided the results, which included [**redacted**]. This additional request appears to have expanded the search criteria for all subsequent [**redacted**] activity reports. The new search criteria now included activity from any user where the device matched one previously used by the Subject of investigation.
[**redacted**]
In [**redacted**] CFNCIU requested from DIMEI 3-5 Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) data from [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**]. SIEM data includes [**redacted**] DIMEI 3-5 later confirmed that [**redacted**].
On [**redacted**] CFNCIU requested from DIMEUS IT inquiries for [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**] as well as any [**redacted**]. A few days later, DIMEUS shared with CFNCIU that they “are seeing [**redacted**].
In [**redacted**] DIMEI 3-5 internally discuss a pending CFNCIU request for “identify [**redacted**]. They further indicate that this is possible by [**redacted**]. At this point, it is unclear why the scope of the investigation includes more than the [**redacted**]. In a subsequent correspondence, DIMEI 3-5 defined the exact search criteria used to response to the 20 “IT Inquiry” questions. It included the [**redacted**] identified by CFNCIU has having been [**redacted**].
In [**redacted**] CFNCIU provided a list of [**redacted**] to CFNOC. The list of [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**]. This list was provided alongside a request to CFNOC [**redacted**].
In [**redacted**] CFNCIU requested from DIMEUS a search of [**contains information related to DND/CAF operations**]. One month later, DIMEUS replied with a report containing [**redacted**]. Of the [**redacted**].
Finding 1: NSIRA found that CFNCIU is inappropriately relying on DND/CAF policies as lawful authority to interfere with a Subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
Finding 2: NSIRA found that the DND/CAF checklist applied as a standard investigative operating procedure risks capturing information that is protected by s. 8 of the Charter.
Finding 3: NSIRA found that DND/CAF is applying a definition of metadata that captures information that could be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Finding 4: NSIRA found that CFNCIU risks breaching protected privacy interests by not having clear policy guidance based on lawful authority for IT searches, and by expanding IT searches beyond the approved search parameters.
Finding 5: NSIRA found that the investigative IT system practices it observed in the context CFNCIU’s CI investigations contradict the Office of the JAG and the Department of Justice’s legal advice, [**contains information protected by solicitor-client privilege**].
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that DND/CAF suspend investigative IT system practices in the context of CFNCIU CI investigations until a reasonable legal authority has been established.
Recommendation 2: Once a reasonable legal authority has been established DND/CAF should create a new policy framework that is reflective of the noted findings, namely, the multi-point checklist, the categorization of metadata, the expansion of IT searches and the principle that these searches be as minimally invasive as possible.
ADM(IM) | Assistant Deputy Minister Information Management |
CDS | Chief of the Defence Staff |
CF INT GP | Canadian Forces Intelligence Group |
CFINTCOM | Canadian Forces Intelligence Command |
CFIOG | Canadian Forces Information Operations Group |
CFIOG JAG | Canadian Forces Information Operations Group Judge Advocate General |
DND/CF Legal Advisor | Office of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Legal Advisor |
CFNCIU | Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit |
CFNIS | Canadian Forces National Investigation Service |
CFNOC | Canadian Forces Network Operations Center |
CI | Counter-intelligence |
CIOC | Counter-Intelligence Oversight Committee |
DAOD | Defence Administrative Orders and Directives |
DGDS/ DPSIM | Director General Defence Security, the Director Personal Security and Identification Management |
DIMEI | Directorate of Information Management Engineering and Integration |
DIMEUS | Department of Information Management End-User Services |
Cabinet du JAG | Cabinet du Juge-avocat général |
CEMD | Chef d’état-major de la défense |
CI | contre-ingérence |
CJ du MDN/FAC | Bureau du Conseiller juridique du ministère de la Défense et des Forces canadiennes |
COMRENSFC | Commandement du renseignement des Forces canadiennes |
CONS JUR | Bureau du conseiller juridique auprès du ministère de la Défense nationale et des Forces canadiennes |
CORFC | Centre d’opérations des réseaux des Forces canadiennes |
CSCI | Comité de surveillance de la contre‑ingérence |
DGSD/DSPGI | directeur général – Sécurité de la défense, Directeur – Sécurité du personnel et gestion de l’identité |
DIIGI | Direction – Ingénierie et intégration (Gestion de l’information) |
DJ/R et OI | directeur juridique/Renseignement et opérations d’information |
DOAD | Directives et ordonnances administratives de la défense |
DSUFGI | Direction – Services à l’utilisateur final (Gestion de l’information) |
GOIFC | Groupe des opérations d’information des Forces canadiennes |
GP RENS FC | Groupe du renseignement des Forces canadiennes |
INTREP | compte rendu de renseignement (Intelligence Report) |
[**redacted letter**]
[**redacted checklist**]
The table below highlights the networks within the DND/CAF IM/IT infrastructure as well as the areas of responsibility for each group described above.
[**redacted table**]
Date of Publishing:
GAC Minister letter to NSIRA To Follow
This report has been modified slightly from the final version which was provided to the Minister. An error in the language of Finding 4, wherein two different versions were presented within the report and the summary, has been corrected for publication. The correct language was always represented in the body of the final report. The incorrect language has been replaced with the correct language for publication.
(U) This review examined the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) legal authority for sharing information obtained in the course of one aspect of its mandate (“aspect”) for the purposes of fulfilling another aspect of its mandate. Specifically, the review focused on internal information sharing within CSE between the foreign intelligence (FI), and the cybersecurity and information assurance (cybersecurity) aspects of its mandate.
(U) NSIRA examined whether CSE’s internal sharing of information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada (IRTC) is consistent with the Privacy Act, which limits how collected personal information can be used by a federal institution, and the CSE Act, which applies to CSE’s incidental collection and use of IRTC. NSIRA concluded that from the descriptions of the aspects in sections 16 and 17 of the CSE Act, there may be instances where information acquired under one aspect can be used for the same, or a consistent purpose, as another. This would satisfy Privacy Act requirements for sharing information internally. However, this cannot simply be assumed as the purposes of the aspects differ within the CSE Act. CSE must conduct case-by- case compliance analysis that considers the purpose of the collection and sharing.
(U) NSIRA considers it necessary for the Chief of CSE’s application for a Ministerial Authorization to fully inform the Minister of how IRTC might be used and analysed by CSE, including the sharing of IRTC to another aspect, and for what purpose. With one exception, the Chief’s applications for the period of review appropriately informed the Minister of National Defence that retained IRTC might be used to support a different aspect. Moreover, the foreign intelligence applications appropriately informed the Minister how CSE assessed “essentiality” for IRTC collected under the FI aspect.
(U) Under CSE policy, an assessment of IRTC’s relevance, essentiality, or necessity to each aspect is required for sharing information across the aspects. CSE policy offers definitions and criteria for assessing and applying these thresholds to the information. NSIRA found that CSE’s policy framework with regards to the internal sharing of information between the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity aspects of the mandate is compliant with the CSE Act.
(U) The information provided by CSE has not been independently verified by NSIRA. Work is underway to establish effective policies and best practices for the independent verification of various kinds of information, in keeping with NSIRA’s commitment to a ‘trust but verify’ approach.
(U) This review was conducted under the authority of paragraph 8(1)(a) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act).
(U) This review examined the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) legal authority for sharing information obtained in the course of one aspect of its mandate (“aspect”) for the purposes of fulfilling another aspect of its mandate. Specifically, the review focused on internal information sharing within CSE between the foreign intelligence (FI), and the cybersecurity and information assurance (cybersecurity) aspects of its mandate. Broadly, this review also documented activities pertaining to the internal sharing of information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada between the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity aspects, in order to inform future reviews by NSIRA.
(TS) The Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner (OCSEC) previously studied the sharing of, and access to, cyber threat information between CSE’s SIGINT and IT Security Branches. OCSEC’s review found that CSE’s cyber threat information sharing and accessing activities between CSE’s SIGINT and IT Security were consistent with National Defence Act and Privacy Act authorities, and that information shared between the branches posed a minimal risk to the privacy of Canadians.
(U) With the coming into force of the CSE Act, on August 1, 2019, CSE’s legal authorities for conducting its activities have changed since OCSEC’s review. In light of this change of legal authority for CSE, NSIRA decided to re-assess and evaluate whether CSE’s internal information sharing activities between the FI and cybersecurity aspects are consistent with the CSE Act and the Privacy Act.
(U) NSIRA expects that CSE’s internal sharing of IRTC complies with the CSE Act and the Privacy Act. As such, the focus of this review was to examine the legal authority that allows for CSE to share IRTC between the FI and cybersecurity aspects.
(U) The Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act), creates five distinct aspects to CSE’s mandate. The CSE Act distinguishes between each aspect and its associated activities, as listed below: Foreign intelligence (FI) (section 16): to acquire information from the global information infrastructure (GII), and to use, analyse and disseminate the information for the purpose of providing foreign intelligence;
(U) The CSE Act also distinguishes between the aspects by requiring different Ministerial Authorizations (MAs) for CSE’s activities, except for assistance activities (s. 20). Under the CSE Act, and with the exception of assistance activities, CSE’s activities must not be directed at a Canadian or any person in Canada, and must not infringe the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Under the FI and cybersecurity aspects, CSE’s activities must not contravene any other Act of Parliament or involve the acquisition of information on or through the GII that interferes with the reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada, unless carried out under a MA.
(U) The Minister of National Defence may issue a MA that permits CSE to conduct activities or classes of activities that may contravene any other Acts of Parliament, and, in the case of FI and cybersecurity, would involve the acquisition of information that would interfere with the reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada. FI and cybersecurity MAs must be approved by the Intelligence Commissioner (IC), who must review whether the conclusions made by the Minister in issuing the authorization are reasonable.
(U) Thus, CSE is permitted to incidentally acquire information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada in the course of carrying out activities that are authorized by an FI (s. 26(1)), cybersecurity (s. 27(1) or 27(2)), or emergency (s. 40) MA. CSE refers to this information as information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada (IRTC). In order to issue an authorization, the Minister must be satisfied that CSE will only use, analyse or retain IRTC when it meets the “essentiality” conditions in section 34 of the CSE Act, which are different for the FI and cybersecurity aspects. For FI, “essentiality” means an assessment of whether the information is essential to international affairs, defence or security. For cybersecurity, “essentiality” means an assessment of whether the information is essential to identify, isolate, prevent or mitigate harm to (i) federal institutions’ electronic information or information infrastructures, or (ii) electronic information or information infrastructures designated under subsection 21(1) of the CSE Act.
(U) As the CSE Act distinguishes between the aspects and the corresponding MAs, NSIRA examined CSE’s legal authority for sharing IRTC between the FI and cybersecurity aspects.
(U) Due to operational and access-related challenges, including due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this review was not able to independently assess and verify CSE’s compliance with the law or compliance with the restrictions and authorities in place when internally sharing and using information between aspects. Additionally, NSIRA was not able to independently observe, investigate or validate the systems used when sharing data between aspects (consult Annex F for a description of processes and methods used by CSE to share information between the two aspects). These data sharing systems may be examined in future NSIRA reviews.
(U) NSIRA also intended to review the internal sharing of information with the active (ACO) and defensive (DCO) cyber operations aspects of CSE’s mandate, including compliance with the requirements in subsection 34(4) of the CSE Act on acquiring information while conducting ACO and DCO cyber operations. Among other things, this subsection stipulates that no information may be acquired pursuant to ACO and DCO authorizations unless done in accordance with an FI (CSE Act, s. 26(1)), cybersecurity (CSE Act, ss. 27(1) & 27(2)), or emergency (CSE Act, s. 40(1)) authorization. This facet of the review was instead covered in NSIRA’s review of CSE’s Active Cyber Operations and Defensive Cyber Operations – Governance, and will be further examined in NSIRA’s second review of ACO and DCO activities later in 2021.
(U) Importantly, this review did not examine the disclosure of Canadian identifying information (CII) outside of CSE.
(U) While the CSE Act mentions IRTC several times, it is not clearly defined. In practice, IRTC is the information about Canadians or persons in Canada that may be incidentally collected by CSE while conducting FI or cybersecurity activities under the authority of an MA. According to CSE policy, IRTC is any information recognized as having reference to a Canadian or person in Canada, regardless of whether that information could be used to identify that Canadian or person in Canada.
(U) There is a distinction to be made between IRTC and Canadian identifying information (CII). For example, the CSE Act uses both IRTC and CII throughout the Act to describe types of information. Where IRTC is any information recognized as having reference to a Canadian or a person in Canada, CII is information that could be used to identify a Canadian or a person in Canada and that has been used, analyzed or retained under a FI or emergency authorization. CSE describes CII as a subset of IRTC. CII may be disclosed by CSE to designated persons under section 43 of the CSE Act.
(TS) In some circumstances, CSE policy allows for IRTC collected under the authority of one aspect to be shared for use under another aspect (see Annex D for a description of the other types of information that is shared between the FI and cybersecurity aspects). CSE policy permits FI to be used internally to fulfill cybersecurity requirements. Information retained under the cybersecurity aspect may be used by CSE personnel operating under the FI aspect, unless the information is subject to any conditions imposed on it by external clients or disclosing entities. According to CSE, sharing information across aspects of the mandate enables CSE to carry out its activities in support of Government of Canada priorities.
(TS) In the cybersecurity context, CSE explained that any IRTC shared internally in support of the FI aspect [redacted description of CSE operations]
(TS//SI) An example that CSE provided [redacted example of CSE operations]. Sharing this information across the aspects of the mandate enabled CSE to help protect GC information and information infrastructures as well as those of Systems of Importance (SOI), by identifying, isolating and mitigating the threat, and provided GC decision- makers with a comprehensive view of the foreign threats targeting Canada.
(TS) After reviewing a random selection of reports, in addition to receiving information by CSE and interviewing analysts familiar with working on both FI and cybersecurity, NSIRA learned that the IRTC shared between the FI and cybersecurity aspects generally included: [redacted list of operational utilized in the system]. CSE policy permits [redacted].
(U) CSE asserts that although IRTC is shared across the aspects, activities will not be directed at Canadians or persons in Canada. As previously mentioned, CSE must not direct its activities at a Canadian or any person in Canada.
(S) The relevant statutes that apply to CSE’s internal information sharing are CSE’s enabling statute, the CSE Act, and the Privacy Act. The CSE Act does not provide a clear authority to share IRTC between the aspects. Likewise, the CSE Act disclosure provisions for CII in sections 43–45 do not prima facie contemplate internal sharing of IRTC, as to disclose information under these provisions, the Minister would need to authorize CSE to collect and disclose CII to itself. Additionally, CSE is not a designated entity under section 45 of the CSE Act for the purposes of receiving disclosed information under sections 43 and 44.
(U) IRTC could constitute personal information as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act, which is information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form. For example, Canadian IP addresses, may constitute both IRTC for the purposes of the CSE Act and personal information under the Privacy Act. Pursuant to section 4 of the Privacy Act, the collection of personal information must relate directly to an operating program or activity of the institution, which includes CSE’s mandated activities in the CSE Act.
(U) The Privacy Act also requires that personal information be used and disclosed in manner consistent with sections 7 and 8 of the Privacy Act. For reference, Section 7 of the Privacy Act states:
Personal information under the control of a government institution shall not, without the consent of the individual to whom it relates, be used by the institution except
(U) NSIRA examined whether CSE’s internal sharing of IRTC is consistent with the Privacy Act, which limits how collected personal information can be used by a federal institution. NSIRA concluded that in some circumstances, as described later in the report, internal sharing of IRTC that constitutes personal information between the FI and cybersecurity aspects might satisfy Privacy Act requirements. This compliance assessment requires a case-by-case analysis.
(Protected B//Solicitor-Client Privilege) NSIRA examined CSE DLS’s legal analysis, provided by Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers, [redacted legal opinion or advice].
(Protected B//Solicitor-Client Privilege) In DOJ’s opinion, [redacted legal opinion or advice].
(Protected B//Solicitor-Client Privilege) According to DOJ, [redacted legal opinion or advice].
(U) NSIRA observes that, in assessing compliance with section 7 of the Privacy Act, CSE emphasizes compliance with paragraphs 34(2)(c) and 34(3)(d) of the CSE Act to support the internal sharing of personal information across the various aspects of the mandate.
(U) As noted, section 7 of the Privacy Act requires that personal information under the control of a government institution shall not be used without the consent of an individual, except for two purposes: (1) the purpose for which it was obtained, or for a use consistent with that purpose; or (2) for a purpose for which the information may be disclosed to the institution under subsection 8(2) of the Act. Importantly, a use of information need not be identical to the purpose for which information was obtained; it must only be consistent with that purpose.
(U) CSE’s reliance on section 34 of the CSE Act poses a challenge for compliance with the Privacy Act because section 34 does not identify the actual purpose of the incidental collection of the IRTC, or provide an authority for internal sharing. Rather, section 34 conditions the Minister’s authority to issue an MA on prerequisites. Paragraphs 34(2)(c) and 34(3)(d) of the CSE Act specify that the Minister must be satisfied that the privacy protection measures in section 24 of the Act will ensure that IRTC will be used, analysed, and retained only if it complies with the respective essentiality requirements for FI and cybersecurity, as the case may be. These conditions establish a required threshold for the use, analysis and retention of IRTC collected under a MA, and not an authority for internal sharing of IRTC.
(U) Depending on the factual circumstances in which the IRTC is shared, CSE’s sharing of IRTC that constitutes personal information between the FI and cybersecurity aspects could be supported by the CSE Act and the Privacy Act when the information is shared for the purpose for which it was obtained, or for a use consistent with that purpose. This would require a case-by- case assessment to ensure that the purpose for which the IRTC is shared internally is for the same purpose for which it was collected, a purpose consistent with that original purpose for collection, or as permitted by section 7(b), that the sharing is permitted for one of the reasons identified by Parliament in subsection 8(2) of the Privacy Act. As mentioned, CSE does not consider internal sharing a disclosure of information. NSIRA notes that the issue of whether internal sharing in this way constitutes a “use” or a “disclosure”, under the Privacy Act is unclear. Regardless, NSIRA observes that in relying solely on the “essentiality” criteria in section 34, CSE is not assuring itself that it has lawful authority for internal sharing.
(U) A justification under section 7(a) or paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act requires CSE to identify the purpose of the incidental collection and internal sharing, which is found in the corresponding aspect of CSE’s mandate. CSE’s purpose for collecting, and authority to collect, personal information comes from the CSE Act. Sections 16 and 17 of the Act identify FI and cybersecurity as operating programs and activities of the institution, and provide the authority to collect information for those purposes. As noted, MAs must authorize collection when activities might contravene any other Act of Parliament, or involve the acquisition of information from or through the GII that interferes with a reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada. From the descriptions of the aspects in sections 16 and 17 of the CSE Act, there may be instances where information acquired under one aspect can be used for the same, or a consistent purpose, as exists for another, thus satisfying Privacy Act requirements for sharing information internally. However, this cannot simply be assumed as the purposes of the aspects are described differently within the Act.
(U) Section 16 of the CSE Act authorizes CSE to acquire information from or through the GII, and to use, analyse and disseminate the information for the purpose of providing foreign intelligence in accordance with Government of Canada (GC) priorities. Section 17 of the CSE Act, in turn, authorizes CSE to provide advice, guidance and services to help protect the electronic information or information infrastructures of federal institutions and designated systems of importance, and to acquire, use and analyse information, from the GII or from other sources, in order to provide such advice, guidance and services.
(TS//SI) When sharing FI-acquired IRTC to support CSE’s cybersecurity aspect, there is arguably no shift in purpose if cybersecurity is among the purposes for which the FI is obtained, used, analysed and disseminated. For the period of this review, [redacted related to GC priorities]. Sharing FI information to fulfill CSE’s section 17 cybersecurity objectives of providing advice, guidance and services to help protect federal and designated electronic information and infrastructures could be considered as the same purpose, or consistent with the purpose, for which the IRTC was originally obtained. Where the FI is used in the section 17 aspect to protect federal and designated electronic information and infrastructures, the purpose of collection and the subsequent use of that information could remain the same.
(U) For cybersecurity-acquired IRTC, sharing information to the FI aspect could be permissible if the FI purpose is the same as, or consistent with, the purpose for which the information was initially acquired, i.e., for the purpose of providing advice, guidance and services to help protect federal and designated information infrastructures or electronic information. Thus, sharing cybersecurity IRTC to the FI aspect would be permissible under the Privacy Act if the internal sharing ultimately serves the purpose of helping to protect federal and designated information infrastructures or electronic information.
(U) In sum, if the purpose of CSE’s acquisition of personal information is for the purpose of, or consistent with, delivering on the foreign intelligence and/or cybersecurity aspects, CSE’s internal sharing of IRTC can be consistent with section 7(a) or paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, provided that purpose of the information collection and sharing is identified and justified. CSE must also always satisfy any conditions from the CSE Act and relevant MAs on the collection and use of IRTC. To support internal sharing of personal information between the aspects, further analysis is required based on the factual circumstances of each case.
Finding no. 1: CSE’s internal sharing of information between the FI and cybersecurity aspects of the mandate has not been sufficiently examined for compliance with the Privacy Act.
Recommendation no. 1: CSE should obtain additional legal advice on its internal sharing of information between the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity aspects of the mandate, explicitly in relation to compliance with the Privacy Act, which thoroughly addresses the following two issues:
(U) The CSE Act does not allow the Minister to authorize internal sharing of IRTC, as MAs may only authorize, in the case of FI, the activities or classes of activities listed in subsection 26(2), or for cybersecurity, access and acquisition of the information referred to in subsections 27(1) and 27(2). Any internal sharing of IRTC that constitutes personal information must be done in accordance with the Privacy Act.
(U) As mentioned, section 24 of the CSE Act requires CSE to have measures in place to protect the privacy of Canadians and of persons in Canada in the use, analysis, retention and disclosure of IRTC. When issuing a MA, the Minister must conclude that these measures will ensure that any acquired IRTC will only be used, analysed or retained if it meets the essentiality thresholds in paragraphs 34(2)(c) or 34(3)(d). The Minister may issue these authorizations if they are of the view that such activities would be “reasonable and proportionate, having regard to the nature of the objective to be achieved and the nature of the activities.” As the Minister considers the reasonableness of the activities proposed against either an FI or cybersecurity purpose, it is conceivable that some activities might be reasonable and proportionate in one context, but not in the other. As activities authorized under subsection 26(2) might acquire a broader range of information than what is contemplated in subsections 27(1) and 27(2), the sharing of FI to cybersecurity might allow for CSE to use more information for a cybersecurity purpose than what is permitted under cybersecurity authorizations alone, and may require different privacy protection measures when using such information.
(U) To issue an MA, the Chief of CSE must set out the facts in an application that would allow the Minister to conclude that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the authorization is necessary, and that the conditions for issuing it are met. NSIRA considers it necessary for the Chief’s application to fully inform the Minister of how IRTC might be used and analysed by CSE, including the sharing of IRTC to another aspect, and for what purpose. This information would also allow for the Minister to make a determination under section 35 whether any other terms, conditions, or restrictions are advisable to protect the privacy of Canadians when issuing a FI or cybersecurity authorization.
(TS//SI) For the authorizations issued during 2020, most of the Chief of CSE’s applications indicated that collected and retained information might be used under a different aspect, while the text of most of the corresponding MAs did not mention use under a different aspect. This situation was reversed in one instance: [redacted example of CSE operations].
(TS//SI) Moreover, the 2020 FI applications and authorizations indicate that in order to meet the essentiality condition for retention of IRTC under subsection 34(2)(c) of the CSE Act, IRTC will be retained if it is assessed as essential to cybersecurity. In these instances, cybersecurity is included under the concept of “essential to security”, thus providing the Minister with additional context as to how the essentiality conditions are assessed and met by CSE. NSIRA considers this information necessary for the Minister to assess whether the conditions listed in section 34 of the CSE Act for issuing the authorization are met.
Finding no. 2: With one exception, the Chief of CSE’s applications for Ministerial Authorizations issued in 2020 informed the Minister of National Defence that retained information might be used to support a different aspect.
Finding no. 3: The applications for foreign intelligence authorizations by the Chief of CSE for the period of review appropriately informed the Minister of National Defence how the essentiality condition in paragraph 34(2)(c) is met for IRTC collected under the FI aspect.
Recommendation no. 2: All foreign intelligence and cybersecurity applications from the Chief of CSE should appropriately inform the Minister of National Defence that retained information might be used to support a different aspect.
(U) Under CSE policy, an assessment of IRTC’s relevance, essentiality, or necessity to each aspect is required for sharing information across the aspects (see Annex G for CSE’s policy thresholds and definitions used to assess IRTC when shared between the aspects). These terms come from the CSE Act, but are not defined in the Act. CSE policy offers definitions and criteria for assessing and applying these thresholds to the information. NSIRA did not assess these policy thresholds or definitions for lawfulness, or how these requirements are satisfied by CSE when internally sharing IRTC. This may be examined in future reviews.
(TS) CSE policy also sets forth the criteria by which to authorize the sharing of IRTC across aspects (see Annex E for the approval processes at CSE for sharing information). Before any IRTC may be shared across aspects of the mandate, the information must be assessed for essentiality to the aspect for which it was acquired. If it does not pass this initial essentiality threshold, the information must be deleted.
(Protected B//Solicitor-Client Privilege) According to CSE, [redacted legal opinion or advice]
(U) NSIRA agrees that the CSE Act does not require that internally shared IRTC between the FI and cybersecurity aspects meet both of the essentiality conditions of paragraphs 34(2)(c) and 34(3)(d) of the CSE Act. Subsections 22(3) and 22(4) of the CSE Act require an FI or cybersecurity MA when the activities carried out in furtherance of either aspect involve acquiring information from the GII that may interfere with a reasonable expectation of privacy, or for activities that might contravene an Act of Parliament. MAs may only authorize the activities or classes of activities listed in subsection 26(2) for FI, or to access information infrastructures and acquire the information referred to in subsections 27(1) and 27(2). As mentioned, the “essentiality” thresholds in section 34 condition the Minister’s authority to issue an MA on the prerequisite of the privacy protection measures in section 24. Such a requirement can be understood as applying to use, analysis and retention of IRTC collected by CSE under the authority of a MA and within the confines of a single aspect. Therefore, there is no legal requirement within the CSE Act that CSE observe the essentiality threshold of the aspect of which the IRTC is internally shared. IRTC must only meet the original essentiality condition of either paragraph 34(2)(c) or 34(3)(d) when IRTC is acquired, as required by the MA authorizing its actual incidental collection.
Finding no. 4: CSE’s position that they do not need to assess “essentiality” twice when sharing information between the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity aspects of the mandate is compliant with paragraphs 34(2)(c) and 34(3)(d) of the CSE Act.
(U) As the CSE Act distinguishes between the aspects and the corresponding MAs, NSIRA examined CSE’s legal authority for sharing IRTC between the FI and cybersecurity aspects of its mandate. NSIRA concludes that internal sharing may be consistent with the Privacy Act in some circumstances. However, CSE must give further consideration to the purpose of the collection of the IRTC to justify any internal sharing of IRTC.
(U) This review also established a foundational understanding of some of the processes, systems, and compliance measures applied by CSE when sharing IRTC across aspects. Although NSIRA was not able to independently verify this information, NSIRA intends to build upon this information in future reviews.
(U) Initially, NSIRA intended to examine the internal sharing of IRTC between aspects of CSE’s mandate in a thematic manner that covered several operational areas and several aspects. The review intended to examine the sharing of information between aspects of CSE’s mandate for the period of August 1, 2019 to August 1, 2020, with the objective to independently assess and evaluate:
(U) Due to operational realities, including COVID-19 related disruptions and access challenges, the objectives, scope, and methodology of this review were significantly reduced from the original Terms of Reference (sent to CSE on August 28, 2020), to focus mainly on the legal authority for sharing of information between the FI and cybersecurity aspects.
(U) For this review, NSIRA examined documents and records relevant to the sharing of information between aspects of CSE’s mandate, from the coming into force of the CSE Act on August 1, 2019, until August 1, 2020.
(U) Two interviews were conducted with CSE employees involved with information sharing across CSE’s aspects, and an interview was conducted with a Department of Justice lawyer in CSE’s Directorate of Legal Services familiar with the legal framework of such activities.
(U) NSIRA also completed a foundational description of some of the processes, systems, and compliance measures in place when sharing such information, in order to establish a baseline of knowledge to inform future reviews.
Briefing. “Information Sharing: Sharing information for use across aspects of the CSE Mandate”, NSIRA Briefing, February 7, 2020.
NSIRA meeting with counsel from the Department of Justice at CSE DLS, October 13, 2020.
NSIRA meeting with CSE analysts, October 20, 2020.
Finding no. 1: CSE’s internal sharing of information between the FI and cybersecurity aspects of the mandate has not been sufficiently examined for compliance with the Privacy Act.
Recommendation no. 1: CSE should obtain additional legal advice on its internal sharing of information between the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity aspects of the mandate, explicitly in relation to compliance with the Privacy Act, which thoroughly addresses the following two issues:
Finding no. 2: With one exception, the Chief of CSE’s applications for Ministerial Authorizations issued in 2020 appropriately informed the Minister of National Defence that retained information might be used to support a different aspect.
Finding no. 3: The applications for foreign intelligence authorizations by the Chief of CSE for the period of review appropriately informed the Minister of National Defence how the essentiality condition in paragraph 34(2)(c) is met for IRTC collected under the FI aspect.
Recommendation no. 2: All foreign intelligence and cybersecurity applications from the Chief of CSE should appropriately inform the Minister of National Defence that retained information might be used to support a different aspect.
Finding no. 4: CSE’s position that they do not need to assess “essentiality” twice when sharing information between the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity aspects of the mandate is compliant with paragraphs 34(2)(c) and 34(3)(d) of the CSE Act.
(Protected B) Under the cybersecurity aspect, federal and non-federal clients may disclose cyber threat information to CSE as Canada’s lead agency for cybersecurity, or when seeking CSE services to analyse and mitigate known or suspected cyber incidents. Disclosed information may be used for FI purposes provided that it is done so for the purposes of identifying, isolating, preventing or mitigating harm to federal systems or systems of importance to the GC.
(Protected B) The documentation that governs CSE’s arrangements with GC and non- federal clients specifies that information obtained by CSE from a given client’s network or system that is relevant to the cybersecurity aspect may be shared with partners [redacted CSE operational information] or internal partners for GC clients) involved in cybersecurity for the purposes of identifying, isolating, preventing or mitigating harm to federal systems or systems of importance to the GC. However, this type of documentation does not explicitly mention that clients’ information might be used for FI purposes. For the purposes of obtaining the informed consent of disclosing entities, NSIRA considers it appropriate for CSE to be fully transparent with how clients’ information might be used by CSE.
(Protected B) When client information is shared with [redacted CSE operational information] partners, the information is anonymized and identifiable information is omitted. Any releasable cybersecurity products created from client information must only contain information necessary to mitigate a cyber compromise. Additionally, disclosing entities may also impose specific restrictions on the use and sharing of their data at the time of disclosure.
(TS) As per subsection 21(1) of the CSE Act, CSE is permitted to acquire and use publicly available information without seeking a MA. Currently, [redacted related to legal opinion or advice].
(TS//SI) The appropriate approval authority for sharing information is outlined in CSE internal policy, where the nature of the information dictates the release authority. CSE policy requires management approval (known as the release authorities) before sharing unsuppressed IRTC between aspects. However, policy does not stipulate the actual process for approval; this is determined by the relevant operational areas in accordance with their business practices. The Mission Policy Suite (MPS) requires all management decisions to be documented and retained in a central repository for transparency and accountability purposes. Those records must be accessible for review purposes. However, for this review, NSIRA was unable to independently verify and assess the approval process for internally shared IRTC.
(TS) Generally, CSE requires management approval for sharing information contained within a report for use across aspects of the mandate, and will elevate the appropriate release authority when the information contains IRTC. The appropriate release authority and conditions for release are outlined in policy (discussed below). The release authority is responsible for the information exchange, and must be informed if any changes are made to the data that result in a change in the type of privacy-related information to be shared.
(TS) Automated sharing techniques [redacted related to GC priorities].
(U) Retained IRTC under the cybersecurity aspect can be shared to FI as a Releasable Cybersecurity Product (RCP), which must meet the requirements listed below. The release authority is determined by the privacy impact that the release of information may have on an individual or entity, which is in turn determined by the level of sensitivity and privacy impact of the IRTC. Depending on the level of sensitivity of the IRTC, operational managers or supervisors from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS, or Cyber Centre) must approve RCPs containing IRTC.
(U) The requirements for a RCP as per CSE policy include the following:
Requirement | When and How the Requirement is Applied |
---|---|
Purpose is to provide advice, guidance, and services | At the time of sharing – why am I sharing this information? |
Product only contains retained information | The decision to use and retain information is made at the time the raw data is assessed for relevance and necessity (and in the case of IRTC, essentiality) to the cybersecurity aspect of the mandate. |
Privacy Protection | At the time of sharing, as appropriate (e.g., being shared back with the system owner/administrator who already has access to the information on their own systems; or to a broader audience with strict limits on the use of the information). No suppression is required if the IRTC is shared for use under the FI aspect of the mandate when the sharing is for the purposes of supporting activities to help protect the electronic information and information infrastructures of the GC or SOI to the GC |
Classification and limitations on use and handling | Either at the time of sharing, or applied at a later stage to the onward use and dissemination of the information by FI. Can include pre-approved uses and conditions, as well as limitations placed by the data/system owner if applicable. Can be applied by report-authoring platforms to End Product Reports (EPRs), restrict the use and dissemination of CSE information. |
Auditable | At the time of acquisition, applied automatically by CSE systems. All data entering CSE is automatically tagged with a unique identifier, as well as information regarding origin (e.g., MA vs non-MA, disclosing client if applicable etc.), access restrictions if applicable, aspect of the mandate under which the data was acquired, date and time of acquisition, use and handling requirements. |
Approved for release | At the time of sharing. The approval authority depends on the nature of the information. See table in s. 25.2 in the MPS cybersecurity chapter. |
(TS) IRTC under the FI aspect can be released to CCCS as a Releasable SIGINT Product (RSP). RSPs that contain information with a recognized Canadian privacy interest, or based on material with a Canadian privacy interest, require DC SIGINT approval for release, which can be delegated.
(TS) In order to create a RSP to share information for use under the cybersecurity aspect, the following table summarizes how the criteria required in policy must be met:
Requirement | When and How the Requirement is Applied |
---|---|
Information is relevant to FI | At the time of assessment. Must be met prior to use. |
Privacy protection e.g., suppression of IRTC | At the time of sharing, if necessary. Suppression is mandatory for IRTC included in an EPR shared outside CSE. CCCS clients that receive these EPRs may request this CII through the regular Action-On process. Otherwise, no suppression required if IRTC is necessary for cybersecurity purposes, but other measures to protect privacy are used, for example, restricting the audience for the information. |
Sanitization | Either at the time of sharing, or to be applied if/when cybersecurity use requires the information be sanitized to protect CSE equities. |
Serialization | At the time of acquisition, applied automatically by CSE systems. All data entering CSE is automatically tagged with a unique identifier, as well as information regarding origin [redacted example of CSE operations] access restrictions if applicable, aspect of the mandate under which the data was acquired, date and time of acquisition, use and handling requirements. |
Caveats | Either at the time of sharing, or applied at a later stage to the onward use and dissemination of the information by cybersecurity. Can include pre- approved actions-on. Automatically applied by report-authoring platforms to EPRs, limit the use and dissemination of CSE information. |
Approved for release | At the time of sharing. The approval authority depends on the nature of the information. See table in s. 27.8 of MPS FI chapter. |
(TS) Internal sharing of information between the aspects is subject to CSE internal review, for both automated sharing and data-based queries. SIGINT Compliance, the group responsible for internal compliance activities under the FI aspect, reviewed CSE-originated queries for 2019 and 2020, and found that query activity was complaint. The CCCS’ Internal Program for Operational Compliance (IPOC) did not prioritize compliance monitoring reviews for the past two fiscal years in order to monitor other activities that posed a higher-risk to compliance.
(TS) Automated sharing techniques are also subject to review. SIGINT Compliance is required to revalidate all instances of automated sharing between the FI and cybersecurity aspects every 12 months. The most recent review for the period of July 2019 to September 2020 found that the [redacted number] of automated sharing were compliant with policy requirements, except for [redacted number] that CSE was unable to assess.
(TS) This section describes the methods and processes used by CSE to share information between the FI and cybersecurity aspects. There is a multitude of systems, methods, and processes that enable information sharing between these aspects, both suppressed and unsuppressed. Note that the processes described below are not static, and that CSE’s systems, methods, and processes can change anytime.
(TS) Generally, access to information for each aspect is restricted by [redacted related to legal opinion or advice]
(TS//SI) For examples, [redacted description of CSE operations].
(U) As required by section 24 of the CSE Act, CSE must have measures in place to protect the privacy of Canadians and persons in Canada in the use of information related to them acquired in furtherance of the FI or cybersecurity aspects.
(TS) Suppression and minimization of IRTC is not required by CSE policy when sharing information internally; it is a default practice to share IRTC unsuppressed across the FI and cybersecurity aspects. According to CSE, although not mandated by policy, analysts are encouraged to anonymize or remove privacy-related information where it is not essential for the person using the information to understand the context and value. CSE recognizes that suppression and minimization are a best effort practice, and is of the opinion that CSE is not in contravention of the law should suppression, minimization, anonymization not occur when sharing information between the aspects.
(TS) When accessing data from another aspect that is not within a reporting product (i.e., RSPs or RCPs), analysts are subject to the policy requirements of the data they are accessing.
(TS//SI) Under the FI aspect, [redacted description of CSE operations].
(TS//SI) For examples, [redacted description of CSE].
(TS//SI) While analysing raw FI data, Cyber Centre personnel must follow all applicable foreign intelligence authorities and policy requirements. The use, handling, and retention of this information is further subject to any restrictions applied to the foreign intelligence data.
(TS//SI) SIGINT personnel may access and use Cyber Centre systems if they meet the requirements in section 26.1 of the MPS Cybersecurity. Access to Cyber Centre systems and raw cybersecurity data is similarly restricted [redacted] to individuals with an operational need-to-know and mandatory annual policy and compliance training and knowledge testing. [description of CSE operations].
(U) Retained information is internally shared through formal reporting processes in the form of either RSPs, which includes EPRs, or RCPs.
(TS//SI) Cyber Centre personnel operating under cybersecurity requirements may also be internal clients without access to raw FI data. Foreign intelligence information is shared to some cybersecurity personnel as an RSP, meaning that the information has met the requirements for release in CSE policy, including suppression and approval, and is subject to any restrictions on the intelligence data. For the period of review, there [redacted number] RSPs approved for release from the FI aspect that were made available to personnel operating under the cybersecurity aspect.
(TS//SI) Cybersecurity information can be reported and released to SIGINT personnel for subsequent use under the FI aspect via RCPs. Information released through RCPs must meet the requirements for release within CSE policy, and the use must be consistent with the cybersecurity aspect of CSE’s mandate and used for a subsequent use related to relevant GC priorities. For the period of review, [redacted number] RCPs were disseminated to authorized recipients in SIGINT.
(TS) Suppressed IRTC in EPRs disseminated through SLINGSHOT can be requested by internal CSE clients through the existing CII external disclosures process. This is the only mechanism by which suppressed identities can be accessed and released. Supressed IRTC can be requested by submitting a request to the Action-On team (D2A). The requestor must provide the legal authority and operational justification to receive the unsuppressed information. Between August 1, 2019 and August 1, 2020, [redacted description of CSE operations].
(TS) Although the mechanism for releasing this information is the same as the external disclosures process, it is not considered a “disclosure” of information but an internal “use” of information. As such, the disclosure regime requirements of sections 43 to 46 of the CSE Act do not need to be met in order for supressed information to be released to internal CSE clients.
(TS//SI) Information may also be shared between the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity aspects for the purposes of disseminating foreign intelligence under cybersecurity authorities. This foreign intelligence information must first be used for foreign intelligence purposes, and then may be shared to CCCS personnel use under the cybersecurity aspect and only then released under their authorities.
(TS//SI) Approval for sharing of foreign intelligence information under the cybersecurity aspect of the mandate must abide by the appropriate release approval authorities for both aspects. [redacted description of CSE operations]
(TS) Automated sharing is defined in CSE policy as “the use of automated techniques or processes to expedite the dissemination of [redacted releasable reporting products]”.
(TS//SI) There are various automated feeds used at CSE to exchange information between the aspects. [redacted description of CSE operations].
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS//SI) [redacted description of CSE operations and systems]
(TS) More informal methods of information exchange may occur between the two aspects. As CSE teams work closely together, analysts might gain knowledge of information that can be useful for either aspect of the mandate. Analysts may exchange general knowledge without any formal reporting. CSE policy provides for analytic exchanges whereby analysts may engage with partners working under a different aspect to work on common objectives by exchanging information. However, any data exchange must meet the requirements of issuing a RCP or RSP, although the data need not be released through the formal product dissemination systems.
(U) Generally, CSE policy provides that IRTC may be shared internally according to the thresholds outlined below. As mentioned, NSIRA did not assess these thresholds or definitions for lawfulness, but may do so in future reviews. Additionally, NSIRA did not assess how these policy requirements are satisfied in practice.
(TS) Under the FI aspect, IRTC must be essential and relevant to the FI aspect prior to sharing, as per the essentiality condition in 34(2)(c) of the CSE Act. According to CSE policy, the information must be considered essential to international affairs, defence or security, including cybersecurity. Essential is not defined in CSE policy, though policy provides criteria by which to assess the IRTC as it relates to protecting the lives or safety of individuals, or to serious criminal activity relating to the security of Canada.
(TS) To share FI IRTC information for use under the cybersecurity aspect of the mandate, the IRTC information must be relevant to the cybersecurity aspect. IRTC must further be assessed for necessity to the cybersecurity aspect, meaning whether the information is necessary to help protect GC systems and designated systems of importance. It is a policy decision to apply the threshold of necessity from subsection 44(1) of the CSE Act.
(TS) CSE policy requires the standard of necessity, [redacted description of CSE operations]. This information is necessary to fulfill the cybersecurity mandate as it enables activities that protect GC systems and designated SOIs (such as by blocking traffic). However, the identifiable individual or entity is not the focus of the activity.104 Therefore, CSE is of the opinion that since there is a lower risk to the reasonable expectation of privacy of the individual in the cybersecurity context, the threshold of necessity is sufficient for sharing FI-acquired IRTC to the cybersecurity aspect.
(TS//SI) Under the cybersecurity aspect, IRTC acquired under a MA must be both relevant and essential prior to sharing, as per the essentiality condition under paragraph 34(3)(d) of the CSE Act. In CSE policy, IRTC is considered essential when without the information, CSE would be unable to protect federal systems or SOIs and the electronic information on those systems. However, non-MA acquired IRTC, such as client information, must only be necessary.
(TS) The shared IRTC is also assessed for essentiality to the FI aspect (that is, essential to international affairs, defence or security), for both MA and non-MA cybersecurity information. It is a policy decision to further assess cybersecurity-acquired IRTC for essentiality under the FI criteria, [redacted description of CSE operations].
(TS//SI) As explained by CSE, the cybersecurity-acquired IRTC shared internally in support of the FI aspect is for the purposes of protecting federal institutions or SOIs and the electronic information they contain. This IRTC is used to identify foreign threats to Canadian systems, which aligns with the [redacted related to GC priorities].
This review focused on Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP, or the Program). The review was selected given that the GSRP is a key component to GAC’s security and intelligence footprint overseas, with approximately thirty officers posted around the world dedicated and funded to collect overt security-related information. GSRP clients have reported that the Program is both unique and valuable to the Government of Canada. This review is the first external review of GSRP and NSIRA’s inaugural review of GAC.
Many of the receiving states where GSRP officers work have poor human rights records and/or are environments where surveillance of foreigners and citizens is commonplace. As such, receiving state perceptions of GSRP activities have direct implications on reputational risk to Canada and its allies, to other Canadian departments and agencies (like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), for example), to GSRP officers, and finally, on the local contacts used to help collect the Program’s information.
The review found a number of areas where the Program can improve, including more robust governance and accountability structures, additional oversight and attention to information management best practices.
Date of Publishing:
GAC Minister letter to NSIRA To Follow
This review focused on Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP, or the Program). The review was selected given that the GSRP is a key component to GAC’s security and intelligence footprint overseas, with approximately thirty officers posted around the world dedicated and funded to collect overt security-related information. GSRP clients have reported that the Program is both unique and valuable to the Government of Canada. This review is the first external review of GSRP and NSIRA’s inaugural review of GAC.
Many of the receiving states where GSRP officers work have poor human rights records and/or are environments where surveillance of foreigners and citizens is commonplace. As such, receiving state perceptions of GSRP activities have direct implications on reputational risk to Canada and its allies, to other Canadian departments and agencies (like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), for example), to GSRP officers, and finally, on the local contacts used to help collect the Program’s information.
The review found a number of areas where the Program can improve, including more robust governance and accountability structures, additional oversight and attention to information management best practices.
More significantly, the review found that although the GSRP operates under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), it does so without legal guidance assessing the activities of the Program. Likewise, GSRP officers do not receive adequate training regarding their legal obligations. In particular, the activities of certain GSRP officers abroad raised concern that some activities may not be in accordance with the duties and functions under the VCDR.
Although GSRP officers rely on the VCDR as a shield for their actions, some officers did not appear to appreciate the limitations of this immunity nor understand the true scope of their duties and functions. In addition, it was not clear if all officers understood that once they are no longer afforded diplomatic immunity, a receiving state may seek retaliatory measures against them. The review found an absence of risk assessments, security protocols, and legal guidance specific to the increased scrutiny that GSRP officers may attract due to the nature of their reporting priorities.
As government partners overseas, CSIS and GSRP frequently interact with each other, with overlap between these respective mandates. Insufficient deconfliction at Mission and Headquarters between CSIS and GAC exists, which results in inconsistent governance [redacted].
The review also found that the Program does not have appropriate safeguards in place regarding the safety of contacts overseas. Although most interactions between officers and contacts are innocuous, the Program does not appear to appreciate the associated risks of these exchanges. Significantly, the review identified some possible concerns related to how recommended that GAC Canadian identity information is managed, and therefore conduct a privacy impact assessment of the Program.
The creation of a foreign intelligence entity within GAC, or the allowance of mission creep by the GSRP into covert collection would run against the principles of the VCDR. Therefore, NSIRA believes it is important that the Government consider the implications stemming from this review and decide on the most appropriate means of collecting this kind of information. NSIRA acknowledges that this is a topic that goes beyond our remit, and therefore may require consideration by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. We intend to share this review with our review counterpart in order to commence such deliberations.
This review was conducted under the authority of subsections 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act.
Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) collects and disseminates information in support of Canada’s intelligence priorities. As the program has matured during its nearly twenty years of existence, GSRP products have received attention from Government of Canada (GoC) departments and agencies, as well as allied nations.
This was the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s (NSIRA) first standalone review of GAC. As such, NSIRA familiarized itself with GAC’s mandate, policies, and legal authorities while simultaneously reviewing the GSRP as a unique and complex program.
NSIRA assessed whether GSRP activities were conducted in accordance with the law, relevant policies and procedures, and whether the activities were reasonable and necessary. Additionally, NSIRA examined whether the Program’s policies and procedures were sufficiently comprehensive to support overseas activities.
The core review period for this study was from January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2019, however, NSIRA reviewed information outside of this period in order to conduct a complete assessment. NSIRA also examined a significant sample of GSRP Missions that provided diverse perspectives on the nature and scope of the Program’s activities.
Given the unique circumstances of NSIRA’s recent establishment and the various logistical and procedural challenges associated with this transition, this review was only possible with the support of GAC staff, especially those within its External Review Liaison Unit. Additionally, NSIRA thanks CSIS and its External Review and Compliance team for its help in facilitating this review. This report was scheduled to be completed in the summer of 2020, but was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic that began when the review was in its initial scoping stages.
During the Cold War, security reporting was integrated into political reporting by Canadian diplomats abroad. The Canadian security and intelligence (S&l) community largely relied on this foreign security reporting to meet its information needs. Following the end of the Cold War, security reporting was no longer routinely incorporated into political reporting by Canadian diplomats. The change was reflective of:
“an evolving world order, in which different, non-traditional security challenges arose; new and changing national and departmental priorities; the loss of subject matter expertise as diplomats and managers both moved on and retired; and significant public service cuts and budget restraints in the 1990s influenced GAC activities and priorities.”
GSRP was created soon after the events of 9/11. The contemporary Program has a unit of approximately 30 diplomatic personnel dedicated to overt single source* reporting — from a network of primarily “non-traditional” contacts — on issues pertinent to the Canadian security, intelligence, defence, and foreign policy community. GSRP. officers (or officers) operate within and outside of host country capitals and regularly travel to areas less frequented by most diplomats. Since 2009, these reports (which inform both Canadian and allied decision-makers), have been anchored in the GoC intelligence priorities.
GSRP officers report to the Intelligence Assessments and Reporting Division (INA) under the Intelligence Bureau which falls under the ADM of International Security and Political Affairs.” The GSRP adheres to a matrix management structure: at mission, GSRP officers report to the Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Service (FPDS) manager or Head of Mission (HoM), while GSRP Headquarters (HQ) primarily determines officer collection priorities. In addition, GSRP HQ defines the expectations for the Program.
The GSRP is the only Canadian diplomatic program that is dedicated and funded to collect overt security-related information. GSRP functions as a fenced resource wherein the majority of an officer’s time (90%) is devoted to the production of single- source reports. No other GAC program devotes similar resource allocation to “pure collection”.
GSRP’s clients repeatedly stated that the reports provide pertinent information consistent with their department/agency’s collection requirements. Specifically, GSRP reporting provides “on-the-ground” perspectives from a diverse group of individuals, which is unique in comparison to other GoC collection streams. Recipients mentioned the reports provide useful information on broader threats and trends in areas of emerging interest.
Clients reported that one of the greatest assets of the GSRP is the priority placed on language training. This includes, in some cases, over a year of training, including immersive in-country exposure.’ GSRP clients have noted that language fluency is a key value of the Program.
Moreover, clients commended the Program’s ability to rapidly deploy officers to cover a specific area, event, or issue that is of significant value to the GoC. Despite these benefits, review of GSRP documentation indicates the need for improved product feedback mechanisms to help determine whether reports meet client needs”.
The lawful functions of a diplomatic mission and the duties owed by diplomats who enjoy privileges and immunities in a receiving state are articulated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). The VCDR is generally accepted as a codification of diplomatic law, rules and practices under customary international law. According to GAC, the GSRP falls within the functions of a diplomatic mission, as listed in Article 3 of the VCDR. As outlined under Article 3(1)(d), it forms part of the function of a diplomatic mission to ascertain, by all lawful means, the conditions and developments in the host state and report on them to the government of the sending state. Article 3(1)(d) specifically requires diplomatic reporting to be “by lawful means.”
Under Article 41(1) of the VCDR, it is the duty of diplomats exercising the functions listed under Article 3 and who enjoy privileges and immunities in the receiving state “to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state” and “not to interfere in the internal affairs of that state”. Breaches of these duties constitute abuses of privileges and immunities (also referred to as abuses of diplomatic functions).
Remedy for abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities, as outlined in the VCDR, includes notifying the sending state that a diplomat in question is declared persona non grata (Article 9 of the VCDR) and, in the most exceptional circumstances, breaking off diplomatic relations, which are established by mutual consent as articulated in Article 2 of the VCDR.
Importantly, these remedies do not require the host state to give reasons for the remedial action. The result is that the perception of abuse can be as likely a cause for expelling a diplomat or even breaking off diplomatic relations as an actual abuse. The International Court of Justice in the Tehran Hostages Case explained the discretion built into this regime as follows:
Article 9 of the [VCDR]… take[s] account of the difficulty that may be experienced in practice of proving such abuses in every case or, indeed, of determining exactly when exercise of the diplomatic function”…”may be considered as involving such acts as “espionage” or “interference in internal affairs”. The way in which Article 9 paragraph 1, takes account of any such difficulty is by providing expressly in its opening sentence that the receiving state may “at any time and without having to explain its decision” notify the sending state that any particular member of its diplomatic mission is “persona non grata” or “not acceptable”… Beyond that remedy for dealing with abuses of the diplomatic function by individual members of a mission, a receiving state has in its hands a more radical remedy if abuses of their functions by members of a mission reach serious proportions. This is the power which every receiving state has, at its own discretion, to break off diplomatic relations with a sending state and to call for the immediate closure of the offending mission. (emphasis NSIRA’S).
The personal immunity enjoyed by diplomats will normally cease when the functions of the diplomat have come to an end and “at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so. There are circumstances wherein the receiving state may prosecute a diplomat for those breaches that contravene their domestic law where the personal diplomatic immunity enjoyed by the diplomat has ceased.
Acts performed by a diplomat “in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission” will continue to be covered by immunity despite the diplomat’s personal immunity having ended. However, acts falling outside of a diplomat’s legitimate functions will not continue to be covered by immunity, and the diplomat may be liable to prosecution for illegal acts they performed during the mission if they later re-enter the receiving state without the protection of diplomatic immunity or where they fail to leave the receiving state within a reasonable time.
There are of course other less severe means at the receiving state’s disposal to respond to a diplomat’s abuse of functions, both legal and political. Aside from the more unlikely risks of expulsion or severing of diplomatic relations, there is a wide spectrum of reputational harm that may result from perceived breaches of the VCDR. NSIRA emphasizes that GSRP officers should be wary of placing a receiving state in the position to seek remedy.
Where the GSRP activities depart from the legal framework for diplomatic functions in international law, attention should also be turned to whether these activities are lawful under Canadian law. Diplomatic relations are conducted under the authority of Crown Prerogative over foreign relations, which is constrained, to some extent, by international law. Prohibitive rules of customary international law, which would include prohibitive rules of diplomatic law, are considered to be incorporated into Canadian common law unless there is legislation to suggest the contrary. Crown Prerogative is likewise part of our common law. Consideration must be given as to how the exercise of Crown Prerogative reconciles with these prohibitive rules.
Existing within GAC’s intelligence bureau, the GSRP’s reporting directions are derived from Canada’s intelligence priorities. Nonetheless, GAC characterized the Program to NSIRA as being consistent with regular diplomatic reporting. Effectively, NSIRA views the Program as existing within a grey zone between these two dichotomies.
GSRP officers are posted to countries to collect information relevant to the GoC’s intelligence priorities. These countries are often characterised by poor human rights records; a high degree of mistrust for outsiders; often take a hard line on internal security matters; and, tend to deploy mass surveillance on foreigners and citizens. This is why the perception of GSRP activities by receiving states is a relevant consideration for the Program.
When NSIRA asked how the Program accounts for disparities between what are legally permitted activities and the laws of the receiving state, GSRP officers were insistent that they operate under the VCDR.”’ Although officers acknowledged that they have a right under diplomatic law to fulfill their duties, they also understood that the receiving state might perceive their role differently. To help mitigate this risk, some officers indicated that they avoid reporting on sensitive topics.
Although the GSRP reports on intelligence priorities and obtains information from human contacts, officers believe they are distinct from intelligence practitioners given that they operate overtly as accredited members of a diplomatic mission, and do not pay or task their contacts. Despite these assertions, whether the actions of the GSRP officer are “overt” or “covert”, and whether or not they task or pay contacts, is not determinative when assessing for an abuse of privileges and immunities under the VCDR. In fact, many cases where interference activities have attracted the attention of receiving states were clearly overt.
GSRP officers must be alert to any activity that may be perceived by receiving states as falling outside of the functions of a diplomatic mission. This portion of the review briefly outlines some of the attendant risks.
NSIRA expected to find a GSRP governance framework that articulates internal policies and provides guidance to GSRP officers on how to perform their diplomatic reporting functions. Such a governance framework does not exist.
When questioned on the absence of a governance framework, GSRP indicated that a policy suite was unnecessary given that officers “are doing what diplomats have always done.” Although GSRP management noted that they are working towards professionalizing the Program, policy is currently:
established by the Head of the GSRP, exercising their judgement and discretion, and drawing on specialized expertise, including support from legal, human resources and finance divisions, and seeking formal or informal approval from senior executives as required and when appropriate.
Policy guidance provided by the Head of GSRP is disseminated to officers via email. There is no central repository to organize this information. In addition to a lack of information management structures, there are information management weaknesses in other areas, including multiple incompatible systems and various security accreditations across missions. Additionally, some information is solely held at mission, limiting HQ’s visibility and oversight of mission developments.
As a result of the absence of a sufficient governance structure, information management challenges and limited oversight of mission developments, there have been instances where the Program has not managed risk appropriately.
For example, the review observed instances in which Canada’s allies misidentified GSRP officers as Canadian intelligence representatives.
Although NSIRA did not observe any instances where GSRP officers intentionally mislead receiving states, in one case, the lack of understanding of the Program’s mandate [redacted].
Some recipients of GSRP reports also indicated that other recipients (particularly those with limited security and intelligence backgrounds) do not fully understand that these products are single-source, unvalidated, or uncorroborated. This is particularly relevant given that GSRP officers have in the past unwittingly reported information that turned out to be misinformation and disinformation. Of note, GSRP produced just over five thousand reports over the review period, with two significant instances of confirmed disinformation in ten reports. Moreover, recipients repeatedly referred to misinformation in GSRP reports, yet NSIRA was unable to independently corroborate all of the Program’s reports over the review period.
As already noted, one of the challenges facing the Program is the absence of sufficient oversight. Four full time employees at HQ are responsible for the management of approximately thirty officers, the vetting of approximately two thousand reports per year, for providing informal policy guidance, and conducting outreach with relevant stakeholders. This deprives HQ of the capacity to perform adequate quality control of officer activities.
Finding no. 1: NSIRA found that GSRP’s governance and accountability structures are insufficiently developed.
Finding no. 2: NSIRA found that GSRP activities have the potential to cause unnecessary reputational and political harm to the Government of Canada.
Finding no. 3: NSIRA found that GSRP does not adequately maintain central repositories or follow information management best practices.
Recommendation no. 1: NSIRA recommends GSRP prioritize the development of a governance framework.
Recommendation no. 2: NSIRA recommends that GAC enforce data retention and information management practices as laid out in already-existing GoC policies.
CSIS has a framework that outlines host country expectations, both politically and operationally. The CS/S Act specifies, under section 17, how these arrangements are to be governed. In addition, there is Ministerial Direction that further guides CSIS’ conduct abroad. This governance framework structures CSIS’ operations to be consistent with domestic and international law. In most cases, CSIS prefers to be the primary interlocutor with foreign security or intelligence partners, just as GAC prefers to be the primary contact with diplomatic representatives.
In at least one instance, GSRP was a primary contact with a foreign intelligence agency instead of CSIS. In this instance, GAC refused to approve a Section 17 relationship between CSIS and [redacted] due to an ongoing sensitive diplomatic case. However, NSIRA did not observe anything to indicate these same relationship prohibitions were extended to RCMP or GSRP. Regardless of the circumstances, in cases where CSIS is prohibited from engaging a foreign entity due to restrictions on the foreign arrangement, GAC does not have the same restrictions.
Moreover, where CSIS and GAC have identical legal obligations under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA), these obligations risk being applied differently. For example, where CSIS has controls on who they can and cannot liaise with as derived from Ministerial direction (i.e. s.17, CS/S Act), GAC does not have comparable restrictions. Rather, GAC relies on internal mitigation processes when sharing information with foreign entities, which for CSIS, are only relevant if the Minister permits the Service to engage with that entity to start with.
Although GSRP management stated that it is not the role of officers to liaise with foreign security and intelligence agencies, GSRP officers did not consistently articulate this to NSIRA. For instance, some officers interacted with members of local intelligence agencies, while others mentioned that they consider this to be outside their mandate.
In several instances, CSIS was asked by receiving states to clarify what was perceived to be inappropriate activities by GSRP officers. In these cases, CSIS. attempted to reassure these partners that the GSRP was not a covert collection program. NSIRA also observed coordination challenges in regions where CSIS and GSRP activities overlap (e.g. contact pools).
NSIRA heard from multiple GSRP officers that they generally found CSIS partners at missions collegial and forthcoming with security advice.” In one other instance, the GSRP officer reported a hostile relationship with their CSIS counterpart.
NSIRA also observed numerous cases where it did not appear that GSRP officers had adequately productive relationships with CSIS at mission. In these instances, although individuals were cordial, there was minimal interaction, with CSIS officers often keeping to themselves. Although NSIRA understands the legal protections pertaining to CSIS information sharing, there appeared to be a lack of consistent deconfliction and interaction between GSRP and CSIS in the field.
When NSIRA raised the issue of deconfliction overseas, GSRP management maintained that such mechanisms were unnecessary given that CSIS is a client, and not a partner, of the Program Although CSIS is indeed a client of GSRP reporting, the above also clearly indicates that the GSRP and CSIS operate in close proximity to each other overseas, with attendant relationship complexities that must be managed.
CSIS and GAC both participate in a Joint Management Team (JMT), which convenes at the Director General and Deputy Minister levels. NSIRA observed that although there is potential for the JMT to serve as an effective deconfliction mechanism, there was no evidence that key takeaways concerning GSRP and CSIS collaboration were acted upon. Further, the JMT convenes too infrequently to have a lasting or substantive impact.
Finding no. 4: NSIRA found that there is insufficient deconfliction between CSIS and GSRP, which results in inconsistent governance when engaging foreign entities.
Recommendation no. 3: NSIRA recommends the development of clear deconfliction guidelines between CSIS and GSRP and that there must be a consistent approach by CSIS and GSRP when engaging with foreign entities overseas.
GAC advised that they have no legal opinions on the legal framework for the GSRP. NSIRA observes that not enough attention has been turned to ascertaining the scope of the functions of a diplomatic mission as described by Article 3(1)(d) and the duties outlined in Article 41(1) of the VCDR, as well as the types of activities that may expose GSRP officers to being declared persona non grata by the receiving state. One area of particular ambiguity is the broad concept of diplomatic interference under Article 41(1) which is not clearly defined under diplomatic law and requires further consideration. The more sensitive a GSRP officer’s conduct, the more likely a receiving state may perceive interference. In addition, thresholds for interference will likely differ between states.
Similarly, where GSRP activity takes on the perceived attributes of espionage, there is increased risk of exceeding the GSRP mandate, violating the receiving state’s domestic law, and exceeding the GSRP officer’s legal diplomatic functions. These risks require further consideration by GAC’s legal and policy team, as outlined further below.
The risks of not creating a legal and policy framework could result in reputational harm to Canada and its diplomatic relations, and presents risks to the individual GSRP officers. NSIRA observed that many GSRP officers routinely relied on the VCDR as a shield for their actions. Indeed, officers did not appear to appreciate that a breach of their obligations under the VCDR amounts to an abuse of their diplomatic privileges and immunities. Article 3(1)(d) of the VCDR recognizes reporting information ascertained through lawful means. Any departure from this requirement would mean that a GSRP officer runs a risk of not being protected by immunity once the GSRP officer’s personal immunity ceases at the end of the individual’s diplomatic posting.
GAC’s Conduct Abroad Code explicitly acknowledges that host country local norms are to be followed by Canadian representatives and that perceptions of Canadian representatives may have a negative effect on Canada’s reputation. Additionally, the activities of GSRP officers are governed by other protocols, which cover the risk of natural disasters, local health concerns, crime, and the physical security of the mission.
In order to collect pertinent information, GSRP officers often travel to dangerous regions not regularly frequented by other diplomats. In addition, GSRP officers also engage with contacts who may hold viewpoints that are considered sensitive by receiving states. Obviously, these contacts would be of little value to the Program if the information/perspective they possess could be collected anywhere. Although all diplomats can attract attention of local authorities, given the nature of the GSRP’s mandate, officers are at particular risk of scrutiny by receiving states.
There also appears to be a disconnect between GSRP HQ and mission management. Namely, there does not appear to be a shared accountability structure. As a result, this undermines the primacy of any one of the managing parties. For example, NSIRA observed multiple instances in which the reporting structure was not clear either for Program partners or for GAC management. For example, the time lag for receiving critical guidance placed one officer at risk of continuing activities which could have been perceived as non-compliant with the VCDR.
GSRP officers do not receive adequate training or briefings on the parameters of diplomatic privileges and immunities. This lack of knowledge may have serious consequences on the GSRP officer’s ability to conduct themselves in accordance with their diplomatic duties. In addition, once a GSRP officer is no longer afforded diplomatic immunity, a receiving state may seek retaliatory measures.
During the course of the review, NSIRA observed many instances where GSRP officers claimed to have a good understanding of their legal boundaries. However, an instance that occurred in [redacted] highlighted the need to ensure that GSRP officers are properly aware of their legal obligations. In this case, a GSRP officer received what appeared to be classified [redacted] from a contact.
Like Canada, [redacted] has laws prohibiting the disclosure of classified information. The GSRP officer’s actions must comply with [redacted]. In addition, Article 41 of the VCDR is clear that diplomats are required to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state. NSIRA did not see any indication that consultation with legal counsel occurred in this particular case.
In another case, a GSRP officer [redacted] requested and received what was likely classified information from a contact. The information received included [redacted].
In both of the cases examined above, the two GSRP officers appeared to believe that their actions were distinguishable from the activities of an intelligence officer because they did not pay for the information. As noted previously, this is not pertinent when considering compliance with the VCDR; moreover, the aforementioned cases raise concerns related to abuses of diplomatic privileges.
GSRP officers do not have clear guidelines on how to proceed when exposed to information that falls outside the limits of diplomatic collection. NSIRA did observe one instance in which a GSRP officer was given suspected classified information and appropriately returned it to the contact. However, this result was a consequence of the good judgment exhibited by the officer, rather than derived from explicit direction.
Finding no. 5: NSIRA found there was an absence of risk assessments and security protocols specific to the increased scrutiny that GSRP officers may attract because of the nature of their reporting priorities.
Finding no. 6: NSIRA found that although the GSRP operates under the VCDR, it does so without adequate legal guidance assessing the activities of the Program.
Finding no. 7: NSIRA found that GSRP officers do not receive adequate training regarding their legal obligations.
Recommendation no. 4: NSIRA recommends that GSRP develop risk protocols and security guidelines specific to the GSRP.
Recommendation no. 5: NSIRA recommends that GAC complete a thorough legal assessment of GSRP activities. GSRP officers should receive applicable training based on the result of the assessment.
As already explained above, the more sensitive a GSRP officer’s conduct, the more likely a receiving state will perceive interference. This is particularly true with respect to officer interactions with contacts. It is important to underscore that the assumed diplomatic protections granted to the GSRP officer do not apply to contacts. As such, everything depends on a) the degree to which the contact is genuinely free to share such information with a foreign state and b) the degree to which the GSRP officer’s activities do not raise unnecessary suspicion about this interaction.
GSRP officers reported many different experiences regarding risk and security for their contacts, consistent with the diverse environments in which they operate. Most GSRP officers believed that there was little reason to be concerned for contacts, irrespective of the environment, given the overt nature of the collection. In cases where officers acknowledged that certain regions and/or circumstances created a higher risk to the contact, these situations were often mitigated by following the lead of the contact. In other words, given that the contact was most familiar with the environment, the GSRP officer paid close attention to these sensitivities.
In some instances however, GSRP officers mentioned concern for the security of their contacts, which could not be easily mitigated. One GSRP officer noted in an interview that his contact informed him that their interactions would garner unwanted attention by local authorities. Similarly, another GSRP contact was detained by the local authorities and questioned about his interaction with a GSRP officer. In other instances, GSRP officers reported political turmoil or increased security as reasons why contacts suddenly stopped talking to them.’”
Throughout the course of this review, the implications of the differences between overt contacts and clandestine sources were ever-present. In many respects, GSRP. management’s contention that a contact cannot be perceived in the same manner as an intelligence source is accurate. Certainly, most GSRP officers’ interactions with contacts are innocuous. However, given the very nature of the reporting requirements for the Program, there were cases where the contact’s interactions with the officer were high risk. Such examples include GSRP [redacted] speaking with various individuals in [redacted].
These topics and regions are not only widely known as highly sensitive to the receiving states, but also align closely with what a covert source may be tasked to collect information on.
The problem facing the Program from a “contact management” perspective is that anything that takes on the trappings of a “source management” program lends itself to appropriate criticism of being too closely affiliated to non-diplomatic reporting. For example, although the Program would benefit from some of the best practices of HUMINT management, discerning precisely which aspects would be most beneficial, while remaining a diplomatic program, is a key challenge.
In the absence of a “contact management” governance structure, it is therefore left to the best judgment of individual officers on how these interactions are to transpire. This includes the officer determining who to meet, where to meet, and what security protocols are most appropriate in the given circumstances.
In some cases, the officer took it upon themselves to try to enhance security for the contact, including setting up meeting venues minutes before in order to decrease the likelihood of third parties discovering the meeting location. In another example, the officer attempted to obscure mobile device tracking with a faraday bag.
Although these measures were undertaken with the best interest of the contact at hand, intelligence services observing these behaviours could draw an alternative perspective about the intent of such behaviours. Most notably, this could run the risk that GSRP contacts would be perceived by receiving states as assets of a hostile intelligence service.
Irrespective of the environment, or the comfort of the contact, there was also inconsistency in how GSRP officers provided assurances to contacts. For example, while some officers reassured contacts that there is anonymity or confidentiality in GSRP reports, others did not. There was no evidence of a consistent understanding among officers on what assurances could be offered to contacts, or if contacts fully understood what would be done with the information they provided.
Recipients of GSRP reports repeatedly mentioned the ease at which they were able to identify contacts from the descriptions in the reports. Significantly, the majority of officers mentioned that they also report on meetings with Canadian contacts. The anonymization of Canadians is particularly important with regard to ensuring that GAC is meeting its obligations under the Privacy Act and other pertinent legislation. NSIRA will examine the issue of the GSRP meeting their information-sharing obligations with regard to Canadian contacts in the future.
Finding no. 8: NSIRA found that the GSRP does not have appropriate safeguards for interactions with contacts overseas.
Recommendation no. 6: NSIRA recommends that GSRP develop best practices for interactions with contacts based on consultation with GAC legal advisors.
Recommendation no. 7: NSIRA recommends that GAC conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment of the GSRP.
GSRP operates in a distinctly grey zone; GSRP’s vision for the Program includes “greater integration of intelligence community standards and best practices into the GSRP, while maintaining its diplomatic ethos”. Reconciling what this means, in practice, is the most pressing challenge facing the Program.
Reciprocity is an important element of diplomacy. The activities of certain GSRP officers abroad raises concerns that Canada’s diplomats are at times not conducting themselves in accordance with their duties and functions under the VCDR, and of consequence, this may inadvertently influence how these states conduct activities in Canada.
There is a strong appetite for foreign intelligence collected by Canadians. Academics and senior officials from various departments have made clear that Canada’s allies are also eager for Canada to be more involved.
The creation of a foreign intelligence entity within GAC, or the allowance of mission creep by the GSRP into this area of collection, would run against the principles of the VCDR. Therefore, it is important that the GoC consider the implications stemming from this review and decide on the most appropriate means of collecting this kind of information. NSIRA appreciates that issues raised in this review necessarily evoke a renewed conversation on a dedicated Canadian foreign intelligence agency. This is, however, beyond the remit of NSIRA and may require consideration by the NSICoP.
Finding no. 1: NSIRA found that GSRP’s governance and accountability structures are insufficiently developed.
Finding no. 2: NSIRA found that GSRP activities have the potential to cause reputational and political harm to the Government of Canada.
Finding no. 3: NSIRA found that GSRP does not adequately maintain central repositories or follow information management best practices.
Finding no. 4: NSIRA found that there is insufficient deconfliction between CSIS and GSRP which results in inconsistent governance when engaging foreign entities.
Finding no. 5: NSIRA found there was an absence of risk assessments and security protocols specific to the increased scrutiny that GSRP officers may attract because of the nature of their reporting priorities.
Finding no. 6: NSIRA found that although the GSRP operates under the VCDR, it does so without adequate legal guidance assessing the activities of the Program.
Finding no. 7: NSIRA found that GSRP officers do not receive adequate training regarding their legal obligations.
Finding 8: NSIRA found that the GSRP does not have appropriate safeguards for interactions with contacts overseas.
Recommendation no. 1: NSIRA recommends GSRP prioritize the development of a governance framework.
Recommendation no. 2: NSIRA recommends that GAC enforce data retention and information management practices as laid out in already-existing GoC policies.
Recommendation no. 3: NSIRA recommends the development of clear deconfliction guidelines between CSIS and GSRP and that there must be a consistent approach by CSIS and GSRP when engaging with foreign entities overseas.
Recommendation no. 4: NSIRA recommends that GSRP develop risk protocols and security guidelines specific to the GSRP.
Recommendation no. 5: NSIRA recommends that GAC complete a thorough legal assessment of GSRP activities. GSRP officers should receive applicable training based on the result of the assessment.
Recommendation no. 6: NSIRA recommends that GSRP develop best practices for interactions with contacts based on consultation with GAC legal advisors.
Recommendation no. 7: NSIRA recommends that GAC conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment of the GSRP.