Last Updated:
Status:
In Progress
Review Number:
23-12
Last Updated:
Status:
In Progress
Review Number:
23-12
ISSN: 2817-7525
This report presents findings and recommendations made in NSIRA’s annual review of disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). It was tabled in Parliament by the Minister of Public Safety, as required under subsection 39(2) of the NSIRA Act, on November 1st, 2023.
The SCIDA provides an explicit, stand-alone authority to disclose information between Government of Canada institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine its security. Its stated purpose is to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.
This report provides an overview of the SCIDA’s use in 2022. In doing so, it:
The report contains six recommendations designed to increase standardization across the Government of Canada in a manner that is consistent with institutions’ demonstrated best practices and the SCIDA’s guiding principles.
Last Updated:
Status:
In Progress
Review Number:
23-08
Date of Publishing:
This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards, GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2024–2025 Main Estimates.
This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament. Established in July 2019, NSIRA is responsible for conducting reviews of the Government of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. NSIRA also hears public complaints regarding key national security agencies and their activities.
The NSIRA Secretariat supports the Agency in the delivery of its mandate. Independent scrutiny contributes to strengthening the accountability framework for national security and intelligence activities and to enhancing public confidence. Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable, and necessary
A summary description NSIRA’s program activities can be found in Part II of the Main Estimates. Information on NSIRA’s mandate can be found on its website.
This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the agency’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the agency, consistent with the 2024–2025 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special-purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.
The authority of Parliament is required before money can be spent by the government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authorities for specific purposes.
The Department uses the full accrual method of accounting to prepare and present its annual departmental financial statements that are part of the departmental results reporting process. However, the spending authorities voted by Parliament remain on an expenditure basis.
This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended September 30, 2024.
NSIRA Secretariat spent approximately 45% of its authorities by the end of the second quarter, compared with 33% in the same quarter of 2023–2024 (see graph 1).
2024-25 | 2023-24 | |
---|---|---|
Total Authorities | $19.5 | $24.3 |
Q2 Expenditures | $5.3 | $3.8 |
Year-to-Date Expenditures | $8.8 | $8.1 |
As of September 30, 2024, Parliament had approved $19.5 million in total authorities for use by NSIRA Secretariat for 2024–2025 compared with $24.3 million as of September 30, 2023, for a net decrease of $4.8 million or 19.8% (see graph 2).
Fiscal year 2023-24 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2024 | Fiscal year 2024-25 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2025 | |
---|---|---|
Vote 1 – Operating | 22.6 | 17.9 |
Statutory | 1.7 | 1.6 |
Total budgetary authorities | 24.3 | 19.5 |
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
The decrease of $4.8 million in authorities is mostly explained by a reduction in capital funding for infrastructure projects due to the fact that they have reached completion in this fiscal year.
The second quarter expenditures totalled $5.3 million for an increase of $1.5 million when compared with $3.8 million spent during the same period in 2023–2024. Table 1 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) | Fiscal year 2024–25: expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2024 | Fiscal year 2023–24: expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2023 | Variance $ | Variance % |
---|---|---|---|---|
Personnel | 3,856 | 3,014 | 842 | 28% |
Transportation and communications | 77 | 62 | 15 | 24% |
Information | 7 | 4 | 3 | 75% |
Professional and special services | 1,320 | 504 | 816 | 162% |
Rentals | 17 | 25 | (8) | (32%) |
Repair and maintenance | 37 | 3 | 34 | 1133% |
Utilities, materials, and supplies | 12 | 50 | (38) | (76%) |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 8 | 4 | 4 | 100% |
Other subsidies and payments | (38) | 118 | (156) | (132%) |
Total gross budgetary expenditures | 5,296 | 3,784 | 1,512 | 40% |
The increase of $842,000 reflects management’s decision to increase FTEs to enhance operational capacity in response to greater demand for output. It is also a result of an increase in average salary due to alignment with increases approved as part of collective bargaining.
The increase of $816,000 is mainly explained by a change in the timing of the billing for maintenance and services in support of our classified IT network infrastructure.
The increase of $34,000 is explained by some one-time office repairs in fiscal year 2024-2025.
The decrease of $38,000 is explained by temporarily unreconciled acquisition card purchases in fiscal year 2023-2024.
The decrease of $156,000 is explained by an increase in the recovery of salary overpayments.
The year-to-date expenditures totalled $8.8 million for an increase of $0.7 million (8%) when compared with $8.1 million spent during the same period in 2023-2024. Table 2 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) | Fiscal year 2024–25: year-to-date expenditures as of September 30, 2024 | Fiscal year 2023–24: year-to-date expenditures as of September 30, 2023 | Variance $ | Variance % |
---|---|---|---|---|
Personnel | 6,864 | 5,900 | 964 | 16% |
Transportation and communications | 135 | 192 | (57) | (30%) |
Information | 13 | 4 | 9 | 225% |
Professional and special services | 1,589 | 1,669 | (80) | (5%) |
Rentals | 42 | 73 | (31) | (42%) |
Repair and maintenance | 40 | 27 | 13 | 48% |
Utilities, materials and supplies | 40 | 57 | (17) | (30%) |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 20 | 52 | (32) | (62%) |
Other subsidies and payments | 41 | 122 | (81) | (66%) |
Total gross budgetary expenditures | 8,784 | 8,096 | 688 | 8% |
The decrease of $57,000 is due to the timing of invoicing for the organization’s Network Services.
The increase of $9,000 is due to the timing of invoicing for printing services.
The decrease of $32,000 is mainly explained by the one-time purchase of a specialized laptop in 2023-2024.
The decrease of $81,000 is mainly explained by higher leasehold improvement amortization expenses in 2023-2024.
There is a risk that the funding received to offset pay increases will be insufficient to cover the costs of such increases and the year-over-year cost of services provided by other government departments/agencies is increasing significantly. To mitigate, NSIRA Secretariat is forecasting both personnel and operating expenditures three fiscal years out and identifying critical functions.
NSIRA Secretariat is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner. It continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls such as participating in PSPC’s Reconciliation Tool (RT) initiative.
Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA Secretariat’s approach and timelines for the execution of its mandated activities.
Mr. Charles Fugère was appointed by the Governor-in-Council to be Executive Director of the NSIRA Secretariat, for a period of three years, on July 27, 2024.
Charles Fugère
Executive Director
Martyn Turcotte
Chief Financial Officer
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2024–25 | Fiscal year 2023–24 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2025 (note 1) | Used during the quarter ended September 30, 2024 | Year to date used at quarter-end | Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2024 (note 1) | Used during the quarter ended September 30, 2023 | Year to date used at quarter-end | |
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures | 17,857 | 4,895 | 7,983 | 22,564 | 3,345 | 7,218 |
Budgetary statutory authorities | ||||||
Contributions to employee benefit plans | 1,601 | 401 | 801 | 1,755 | 439 | 878 |
Total budgetary authorities (note 2) | 19,458 | 5,296 | 8,784 | 24,319 | 3,784 | 8,096 |
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2024–25 | Fiscal year 2023–24 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2025 (note 1) | Expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2024 | Year-to-date used at quarter-end | Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2024 | Expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2023 | Year-to-date used at quarter-end | |
Expenditures | ||||||
Personnel | 13,205 | 3,856 | 6,864 | 13,303 | 3,014 | 5,900 |
Transportation and communications | 685 | 77 | 135 | 650 | 62 | 192 |
Information | 76 | 7 | 13 | 371 | 4 | 4 |
Professional and special services | 4,624 | 1,320 | 1,589 | 4,906 | 504 | 1,669 |
Rentals | 309 | 17 | 42 | 271 | 25 | 73 |
Repair and maintenance | 436 | 37 | 40 | 4,580 | 3 | 27 |
Utilities, materials, and supplies | 58 | 12 | 40 | 73 | 50 | 57 |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 65 | 8 | 20 | 132 | 4 | 52 |
Other subsidies and payments | 0 | (38) | 41 | 33 | 118 | 122 |
Total gross budgetary expenditures (note 2) |
19,458 | 5,296 | 8,784 | 24,319 | 3,784 | 8,096 |
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Ottawa, Ontario, November 6, 2024 – The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s (NSIRA) fifth annual report has been tabled in Parliament.
This report provides an overview and discussion of NSIRA’s review and investigation work throughout 2023, including its findings and recommendations. It highlights the significant outcomes achieved through strengthened partnerships and an unwavering commitment to all Canadians to provide accountability and transparency regarding the Government of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities.
The annual report also reflects on a major milestone: NSIRA’s five-year anniversary. The agency has matured since its inception in 2019, keeping pace with emerging threats, technological advancements, and evolving security and intelligence activities. In stride, NSIRA has built an enhanced capacity to address complex issues and conduct thorough and effective reviews and investigations with a team of dedicated professionals with diverse expertise.
In 2023, in addition to its mandatory reviews, NSIRA continued executing discretionary reviews that were deemed relevant and appropriate. Of the ongoing reviews in 2023, NSIRA has since completed 12. In particular, NSIRA’s review on the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, 2018–2023 was a significant achievement. NSIRA evaluated the flow of intelligence within government from the collectors to consumers, including senior public servants and elected officials. This involved scrutinizing internal processes regarding how collected information was shared and escalated to relevant decision-makers. NSIRA determined it was in the public interest to report on this matter and produced its first special report under section 40 of the NSIRA Act, which was tabled in both houses of Parliament in May 2024.
Review highlights in the report include the following:
NSIRA also closed 12 investigations in 2023. Last year, the agency saw an increase in complaints against CSIS under section 16 of the NSIRA Act, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening.
This annual report demonstrates the value of expanded partnerships and how the organization leveraged its network of international oversight partners in 2023, including lessons learned and shared. NSIRA’s integration into the global community of national security and intelligence oversight has advanced the agency’s development and enhanced its capacity to carry out its mandate.
Over the past five years, NSIRA has sought to demystify the often-opaque domain of national security and intelligence agencies and empower Canadians to participate in informed discussions about their security and rights. Recently, the agency codified its approach by formalizing its vision, mission, and values statements.
Looking ahead, NSIRA is committed to continuing its vital work reporting on whether national security or intelligence activities are respectful of the rights and freedoms of all Canadians and enhancing public awareness and understanding of the critical issues at stake in national security and intelligence.
Date of Publishing:
As members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), we are pleased to present our 2023 Annual Report, marking the five-year milestone of our agency’s journey. This report encapsulates our activities of the past year and provides an opportunity for reflection on the progress and evolution of our agency since 2019.
As world events have unfolded, and the pace of security and intelligence activities has advanced, the presence of our agency has never been more important. Since NSIRA’s inception, our mandate has been to provide independent oversight and accountability of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities. Over the last five years, we have brought greater transparency on such activities to the Canadian public, and we are proud of the strides we have made in fulfilling this crucial role.
Our agency has matured and strengthened in many ways. We have built enhanced capacity to conduct thorough and effective reviews and investigations of our country’s diverse range of national security and intelligence activities. We have assembled a team of dedicated professionals with a wealth of expertise in numerous fields, enabling us to address complex issues and provide informed assessments and recommendations.
We have also fostered constructive relationships with our reviewees, partner agencies, parliamentary committees, and civil society organizations. These partnerships have been instrumental in facilitating our access to information, engagement in meaningful dialogue, and our ability to promote transparency and accountability.
Over the last five years, we have enhanced public awareness and understanding of the critical issues at stake in the realm of national security and intelligence. Through the publication of our reports, we have sought to demystify this often-opaque domain and empower Canadians to participate in informed discussions about their security and rights.
As we reflect on our achievements to date, we are mindful of the challenges that lie ahead. The landscape of national security and intelligence is constantly evolving as emerging threats and technological advancements present new challenges. As adaptive and agile responses are required by Canada’s security and intelligence agencies, NSIRA will continue to assess whether such responses are lawful, reasonable, and necessary.
Looking ahead, we are committed to continuing our vital work. We remain dedicated and vigilant in our role of ensuring that Canada’s national security and intelligence framework remains accountable, and reporting on whether national security or intelligence activities are respectful of the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.
We extend our gratitude to all Secretariat staff, past and present, whose dedication and support has contributed to NSIRA’s evolution over the past five years. Their efforts have been invaluable in shaping our agency and our work serving the Canadian public.
Marie Deschamps
Marie-Lucie Morin
Foluke Laosebikan
Jim Chu
Craig Forcese
Matthew Cassar
Colleen Swords
2023 marked a momentous year for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). Relentless efforts to mature the agency’s processes and professionalize its approaches allowed NSIRA to conduct its reviews and investigations to the highest standards. This report highlights the significant outcomes achieved through refined methodologies, strengthened partnerships, and an unwavering commitment to all Canadians to provide accountability and transparency of the national security and intelligence activities of the Government of Canada.
NSIRA celebrated its fifth anniversary in July 2024 and has used this as an opportunity to reflect on its growth and development, as well as lessons learned. The agency has embraced its broad and unique mandate, completing reviews that span organizations and increasing its transparency in implementing its investigations mandate. NSIRA has prioritized the growth and development of its staff, enhanced review literacy across reviewed entities, and continued to maintain best practices and the highest standards in implementing its mandate.
NSIRA has expanded and leveraged its network of oversight partners through its numerous engagements with international counterparts and participation in international forums in 2023. This has benefitted all parties through sharing best practices, lessons learned, expertise, and research. NSIRA’s integration into the international community of national security and intelligence oversight has advanced the agency’s development and enhanced its capacity to carry out its mandate.
The following are highlights and key outcomes of the reviews NSIRA completed in 2023. (Ongoing reviews are not included.) Annex B lists all the findings and recommendations associated with reviews completed in 2023.
NSIRA completed the following reviews where Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) activities were solely at issue:
NSIRA completed the following reviews where Communications Security Establishment (CSE) activities were mostly at issue:
NSIRA completed a review of the Canada Border Services Agency’s (CBSA’s) Confidential Human Source (CHS) program, which examined the legal and policy frameworks governing the program, with particular attention to the management and assessment of risk; the agency’s discharge of its duty of care to its sources; and the sufficiency of ministerial direction and accountability in relation to the program.
NSIRA completed a review of the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAFs) Human Source Handling program, which examined whether DND/CAF conducts its human source-handling activities lawfully, ethically, and with appropriate accountability.
NSIRA completed a review of the operational collaboration between CSE and CSIS, which was NSIRA’s first review to examine the effectiveness of the collaboration by assessing their respective mandates and associated prohibitions. This review also satisfied NSIRA’s annual requirement under section 8(2) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act) to review an aspect of CSIS’ threat reduction measures (TRMs).
NSIRA completed two mandated multi-departmental reviews in 2023:
The NSIRA Secretariat – in consultation with NSIRA members – established service standards for complaint investigations and set the goal of completing 90 percent of cases within the service standards. This commitment supports NSIRA’s complaint investigations by ensuring timeliness. NSIRA also implemented an independent verification process for complaints against CSE. Additionally, the agency completed a study on the collection of race-based data and other demographic information.
NSIRA observed an increase of complaints against CSIS, pursuant to section 16 of the NSIRA Act, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and has the authority to conduct an integrated review of Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities. This provides Canada with one of the most extensive systems for independent review of national security in the world. NSIRA has a dual mandate: to conduct reviews, and to carry out investigations, of complaints related to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities. In fulfilling its mandate, the agency is assisted by a Secretariat headed by an Executive Director.
NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as those of any other federal department or agency that are related to national security or intelligence. The agency may also review any national security or intelligence matter that a Minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.
NSIRA is responsible for investigating complaints related to national security or intelligence. This is outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, and involves investigating the following:
The conversation on national security and intelligence issues is evolving in Canada. In recent years, armed conflicts, the COVID-19 pandemic, and activities of foreign and domestic security and intelligence agencies have all been featured in news headlines. Most recently, Parliament debated the role of Canada’s security and intelligence agencies in responding to the threat of foreign political interference. The importance of robust review and oversight has never been more clear or timely. As the conversation grows, Canadians will want more information about the functioning of their security and intelligence systems. NSIRA is the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians, providing transparency that did not previously exist.
NSIRA’s mandate is to review issues and conduct investigations of complaints related to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities. Prior to NSIRA, although some activities were subject to review, no single agency had the mandate and authority to review activities across the national security and intelligence landscape, and some departments lacked an independent review body.
The siloed framework limited NSIRA’s predecessor agencies, the Security and Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner to reviews and investigations of complaints within their narrow mandates. For example, reviews did not trace the progression of an issue as it traversed government departments.
NSIRA’s broad mandate is unique within the international community, providing a much greater understanding of how departments and agencies work and interact in the national security and intelligence space. For example, in 2023, NSIRA launched a review of the dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference, focusing on how intelligence progressed from departments charged with collecting intelligence through to its ultimate consumers. Such a review was not possible for NSIRA’s siloed predecessors.
NSIRA’s reviews have involved 19 departments and agencies to date. Its expanded mandate for investigating complaints encompasses those against CSIS, CSE and, upon referral, those from the CRCC concerning the RCMP and the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC). NSIRA’s work gets to the heart of how national security and intelligence activities are conducted, allowing for precise and effective recommendations.
NSIRA has prioritized professionalizing how it conducts reviews by developing policies and processes to support the review process. These were created even as the agency was growing and delivering on its complex mandate, and through the COVID-19 pandemic.
NSIRA has also modernized its policies and processes for its investigations of complaints. The agency undertook significant reform of its investigative process and published new Rules of Procedure to replace the previous model, increasing procedural transparency for those involved in the complaints process. When the COVID-19 pandemic made in-person hearings impossible, NSIRA pivoted and introduced alternate solutions, such as conducting its investigative interviews over video conference, thereby retaining access for participants.
NSIRA has built a proactive disclosure practice to publish its reports on its website. It has also undertaken an effort to publish those prepared by SIRC, to the greatest extent possible. The goal is to make NSIRA’s reviews and its findings and recommendations available to the public as soon as possible. Proactive disclosure increases transparency and contributes to the dialogue on national security and intelligence in Canada.
The Secretariat is now staffed by almost 100 full-time employees. NSIRA’s greatest asset is its people, and the Secretariat continues to attract staff with a range of expertise in research, review, technology, and law. This breadth has resulted in a diversity of reviews and a professionalized investigative model for addressing complaints.
NSIRA has actively developed a unique culture and is innovative in how it manages its review process. Review teams are comprised of individuals with diverse skill sets that reflect the need for legal and technical expertise. Teams are responsible for executing reviews under the direction of NSIRA members, with the guidance and support of Secretariat management. The result is detailed, fearless reviews.
Similarly, NSIRA’s model for investigations of complaints is now designed for NSIRA members to be expertly supported by legal, registry, and research staff. This enhances members’ effectiveness in their adjudicative role conducting investigations.
NSIRA’s mission is to serve as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians through independent, expert review and investigation of the Government of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities. To successfully implement its mission, NSIRA must select the right reviews and have access to the required information.
The NSIRA Act requires NSIRA to conduct certain annual reviews; it also gives the agency discretion to choose topics to review. This discretion is fundamental as NSIRA must be able to “follow the thread” to ensure that activities deserving scrutiny are independently reviewed. Specifically, NSIRA has developed a review planning and consideration matrix, consisting of formal criteria that help identify review topics in accordance with NSIRA’s core mandate and mission. The prioritization of reviews is informed by additional strategic factors, including assessments of the nature of the activity and the compliance risk its poses, the novelty of the activity and any technology it employs, as well as resourcing, ongoing reviews, and public interest.
Access to information is the lifeblood of review, and NSIRA continues to insist upon its access rights. Effective review requires timely and complete responses to NSIRA’s requests for information, open and candid briefings, and mutual respect. Despite the agency’s unfettered access under the NSIRA Act, navigating access issues has not been without its struggles. There has been a learning curve, for both reviewed entities and NSIRA, and increasing review literacy in the departments and agencies under NSIRA’s review mandate is an ongoing priority.
NSIRA’s impact on the national security and intelligence community extends beyond that of the reviewed departments. Recently, the Federal Court released a decision on a CSIS warrant matter that used an NSIRA report to inform its background and analysis. The Court considered the issues identified by NSIRA to be important in relation to the sharing of information collected under certain warrants.
Additionally, Ministers accountable for the security and intelligence community’s activities have recognized the value of independent review and have referred matters to NSIRA. The first of such reviews stemmed from a Federal Court judgment. As a result, the Ministers of Public Safety and Justice referred the matter to NSIRA. NSIRA’s report made findings and recommendations on Justice’s provision of legal advice, CSIS and Justice’s management of the warrant acquisition process, and broader cultural and governance issues.
Since 2019, NSIRA has completed 39 reviews (13 statutory and 26 discretionary). Of these reviews, 21 involved more than one department. NSIRA has also issued 17 different compliance reports to responsible Ministers, as required under section 35 of the NSIRA Act, whenever the agency finds that an activity may not be in compliance with the law. Compliance issues range from a department missing a deadline prescribed in legislation to a potential Charter violation. NSIRA’s reports have included more than 200 recommendations, ranging from specific process changes to wide-ranging structural reform. NSIRA has also received more than 200 complaints, highlighting the importance of accessibility to an independent investigation process to address complaints concerning the activities of CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP.
As NSIRA looks to its future, it will also turn attention inward to ensure NSIRA’s structure and governance is fit for purpose. The upcoming legislative review of the NSIRA Act provides the opportunity to make any required improvements.
NSIRA is immensely proud of its contributions to the scrutiny and transparency of Canada’s security and intelligence activities during its first five years. It has played a pivotal role in ensuring there is independent accountability for the organizations involved in Canada’s security and intelligence activities. As NSIRA looks ahead, it does so with enthusiasm and a renewed mission. NSIRA has recently codified its approach by formalizing its vision, mission, and values statements, and while the formal statements may be new, the underlying elements have provided the agency’s foundation from its beginning.
Under NSIRA’s predecessors, international partnerships were primarily established through the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC), which continues to be a foundational alliance for NSIRA. In addition to reinforcing and building upon the relationships it inherited, NSIRA has cultivated new partnerships with foreign counterparts and actively participated in international forums. In 2023 alone, NSIRA engaged with the following organizations and attended the following events:
Connecting with international counterparts and participating in multilateral discussions has enabled NSIRA to tap into a network of partners. Relevant information is shared regarding best practices, methodologies, recent developments, and common issues. Information sharing and cooperation in the traditionally esoteric and insulated field of national security oversight has broadened NSIRA’s outlook and informed its expectations with respect to the departments and agencies that it oversees.
NSIRA has found that many of the challenges it faces have been experienced, and in some cases overcome, by international partners. These include challenges that are operational in nature, such as tactics for acquiring and verifying information, and those that relate to NSIRA’s Secretariat, such as the recruitment, training, and retention of staff. Leveraging the lessons learned by our international counterparts has accelerated NSIRA’s own development and contributed to the agency’s growing reputation as an exemplar in the realm of national security and intelligence oversight.
While certainly a voracious consumer of best practices, NSIRA is an equally active contributor. The agency has reciprocally shared its own unique approaches, processes, and methods with the broader oversight community, which in some instances has led partner organizations to follow NSIRA’s lead and adopt its practices. Even where NSIRA has not been confronted with a specific issue firsthand, its perspective has been sought and acted upon by partners that recognize NSIRA’s wealth of experience and renown for innovation.
Continuous and repeated engagements with international partners have allowed for working- level relationships to take root, flourish, and bear fruit in the form of both regularly scheduled touch points and casual, ad hoc, file-specific exchanges. Lowering the institutional barriers has promoted the exchange of expertise, had a more direct impact on the substantive work of each institution, and produced more tangible outcomes, as described in the examples below.
Through an extended assignment to NSIRA, a communications expert from IPCO UK conducted a wholistic assessment of the agency’s current communications posture and played a critical role in crafting an inaugural communications strategy. The implementation of this strategy has helped NSIRA reach and build connections with domestic stakeholders. NSIRA’s members and Secretariat staff are deeply grateful for the expert’s contributions during their time with the agency.
TET Denmark and EOS Norway were influential in the development and use of a new IT system review inspection, first used as part of NSIRA’s Review of the Lifecycle of CSIS’ Warranted Information. They also contributed to functional and performance benchmarking used by NSIRA in its methodologies, common practices, and assessment criteria.
NSIRA has consulted the American Inspector General to improve the responsiveness of reviewed departments and agencies to NSIRA’s recommendations. NSIRA has begun adopting best practices for ensuring there is follow-up on recommendations it has provided.
At an event hosted by Global Affairs Canada (GAC) as part of Canada’s work in cooperation with the UNCTED, NSIRA gave a presentation to the UNCTED delegation to explain the role that independent review plays in assessing the legality of Canadian activities in the counter-terrorism realm. This showcased to international assessors how the Canadian model has built robust independent mechanisms for review of counter-terrorism operations that reaches both law enforcement and the intelligence service.
NSIRA’s review planning and consideration matrix was shared with New Zealand’s IGIS, TET Denmark, and several other international partners. Following their visit to NSIRA, TET Denmark has updated its IT standards to include quality assurance steps and added additional factors to its risk assessment framework.
Just as security and intelligence agencies regularly cooperate and share information with international partners, so too must the bodies that oversee them. Collaboration among NSIRA and its foreign counterparts has produced, and continues to yield, mutual benefits for all parties involved. As a result, NSIRA has become a more capable organization with greater visibility in the transnational security and intelligence community, ensuring effective and exhaustive accountability of Canada’s national security apparatus.
Domestically, within Canada’s review and oversight community, NSIRA brings a distinct and valued perspective, filling a previously unoccupied space in this important network. As such, the agency complements the activities of its peers. In 2023, NSIRA met with numerous Agents of Parliament, including the Auditor General of Canada, the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, and the Privacy Commissioner. The multi-decade institutional experience and maturity of these agents and their respective offices has proven to be invaluably instructive for NSIRA, and the exchange of best practices has been extremely helpful, particularly in the development of the Secretariat’s communications capacity.
As provided for in the NSIRA Act, NSIRA engages with other oversight bodies to deconflict on issues of mutual interest. For example, in 2023, both NSIRA and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) launched reviews on the issue of political foreign interference. While maintaining its independence, NSIRA coordinated with NSICOP to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work in relation to each organization’s review.
In addition to its annual reviews, NSIRA continued to execute discretionary reviews that it deemed relevant and appropriate to the authorities of its mandate. Of note was NSIRA’s review on the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, 2018–2023. NSIRA evaluated the flow of intelligence within government from the collectors to consumers, including senior public servants and elected officials. This involved scrutinizing internal processes regarding how collected information was shared and escalated to relevant decision-makers. NSIRA determined that it was in the public interest to report on this matter and produced its first special report under section 40 of the NSIRA Act. This report was tabled in both houses of Parliament in May 2024.
Table 1 captures all review work that was underway in 2023. This includes annually mandated reviews, discretionary reviews, and annual reviews of CSE and CSIS activities. High-level summaries of their content and outcomes are provided in subsequent sections for those reviews completed by the end of the calendar year; the full findings and recommendations can be found in Annex B. NSIRA makes the reviews available once they have been redacted for public release.
Review | Department(s) | Status |
---|---|---|
Annual Report to the Minister of National Defence on CSE activities for 2022 | CSE | Completed |
Annual Report to the Minister of Public Safety on CSIS activities for 2022 | CSIS | Completed |
Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022 | PS, CSE, CSIS, GAC, RCMP, IRCC | Completed |
Review of CSE’s Network-based Solutions and Related Cybersecurity & Information Assurance Activities | CSE and SSC | Completed |
Review of CSIS Dataset Regime | CSIS | Completed |
Review of the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces’ Human Source Handling Program | DND/CAF | Completed |
Review of Operational Collaboration Between the CSE and CSIS | CSE and CSIS | Completed |
Review of the CBSA’s Confidential Human Source Program | CBSA | Completed |
Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2022 | CBSA, CRA, CSE, CSIS, DFO, DND/CAF, FINTRAC, GAC, IRCC, PS, RCMP, TC | Completed |
CSE’s Use of the Polygraph for Security Screening | CSE and TBS | Completed |
Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People’s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, 2018–2023 | CSIS, RCMP, GAC, CSE, PS, PCO | Completed |
Review of Public Safety Canada and CSIS’s Accountability Mechanisms | CSIS, GAC, PS, DOJ | Completed |
Review of the Lifecycle of CSIS’ Warranted Information | CSIS | Completed |
Review of the RCMP’s Human Source Program | RCMP | Completed |
Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2023 | PS, CSE, CSIS, GAC, RCMP, CBSA, IRCC | Ongoing |
Review of CSE’s Vulnerabilities Equities Process | CSE, CSIS, RCMP | Ongoing |
Review of CRA’s Review and Analysis Division (RAD) | CRA | Ongoing |
NSIRA has a mandate to review any Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) activity. The NSIRA Act requires the agency to submit an annual report on CSIS activities each year to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. These reports are classified and include information related to CSIS’s compliance with the law and applicable ministerial directions, and the reasonableness and necessity of CSIS exercising its powers.
In 2023, NSIRA completed one dedicated review of CSIS and its annual review of CSIS activities, both summarized below. Furthermore, CSIS is involved in other NSIRA multi-departmental reviews, such as the agency’s review of the operational collaboration between CSE and CSIS, and the legally mandated annual reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, the results of which are described in section 4.5, Multi-departmental reviews.
In July 2019, the dataset regime came into force as part of the National Security Act 2017 (NSA 2017), creating sections 11.01–11.25 of the CSIS Act.The regime enables CSIS to collect and retain datasets containing personal information that are not directly and immediately related to threats, but likely to assist in national security investigations.
NSIRA examined the implementation of the regime, including aspects of governance, information management, retention practices, and training. The agency found compliance issues that permeated all aspects of the regime under review. Of concern, NSIRA found that CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime is inconsistent with the statutory framework. NSIRA also found multiple compliance issues with how CSIS has implemented the regime, including the retention of Canadian and foreign information without the requisite legally mandated authorizations and approvals.
The review concluded that CSIS has failed to adequately operationalize its dataset regime. CSIS did not seek to clarify legal ambiguities of the application of the regime before the Federal Court, despite having had the opportunity to do so. CSIS adopted multiple positions on its application and now risks limiting what is intended to be a collection and retention regime to a retention mechanism. Internally, CSIS has not provided sufficient resources and training to ensure compliance with the regime. Absent an internal commitment to adequately operationalize, resource, and support the implementation of a new legal regime, any such regime will fail no matter how fit for purpose it is believed to be.
NSIRA completed its annual review of CSIS activities, which covers a range of activities contemplated and undertaken between January 1 and December 31, 2023. The review highlighted compliance-related challenges faced by CSIS, allowed NSIRA to continue monitoring ongoing trends, and identified emerging issues in CSIS’s exercise of its powers. Information obtained throughout the review, including that which CSIS is required to provide to NSIRA under the CSIS Act, was used in NSIRA’s Annual Report to the Minister of Public Safety on CSIS activities, as well as to inform ongoing NSIRA reviews and internal review planning for upcoming reviews.
To achieve greater public accountability, NSIRA has requested that CSIS publish statistics and data about public interest and compliance-related aspects of its activities. NSIRA is of the opinion that the following statistics will provide the public with information related to the scope and breadth of CSIS operations, as well as display the evolution of activities from year to year.
Section 21 of the CSIS Act authorizes CSIS to apply to a judge for a warrant if it believes, on reasonable grounds, that more intrusive powers are required to investigate a particular threat to the security of Canada. Warrants may be used by CSIS, for example, to intercept communications, enter a location, or obtain information, records, or documents. Each individual warrant application could include multiple individuals or request the use of multiple intrusive powers.
Applications | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022* | 2023 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total section 21 applications | 24 | 24 | 15 | 31 | 28 | 30 |
Total approved warrants | 24 | 23 | 15 | 31 | 28 | 30 |
New warrants | 10 | 9 | 2 | 13 | 6 | 9 |
Replacements | 11 | 12 | 8 | 14 | 14 | 10 |
Supplemental | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 11 |
Total denied warrants | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
*The applications submitted by CSIS to the Federal Court in 2022 resulted in the approval and issuance of 194 judicial authorities, including 164 warrants and 28 assistance orders issued pursuant to sections 12, 16, and 21 of the CSIS Act, as well as two judicial authorizations issued pursuant to section 11.13 of the Act. Each application is subject to a thorough production and vetting process that includes review by an independent Department of Justice counsel and challenge by a committee composed of executives of CSIS, PS, CSE, and the RCMP (as applicable) before seeking ministerial approval. A number of warrants issued during this period reflected the development of innovative new authorities and collection techniques, which required close collaboration between collectors, technology operators, policy analysts, and legal counsel. |
CSIS is authorized to seek a judicial warrant for a threat reduction measure (TRM) if it believes that certain intrusive measures, outlined in section 21 (1.1) of the CSIS Act, are required to reduce a threat. The CSIS Act is clear that when a proposed TRM would limit a right or freedom protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or would otherwise be contrary to Canadian law, a judicial warrant authorizing the measure is required. To date, CSIS has sought no judicial authorizations to undertake warranted TRMs. TRMs approved in one year may be executed in future years. Operational reasons may also prevent an approved TRM from being executed.
Threat reduction measures | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Approved | 10 | 8 | 15 | 23 | 24 | 11 | 23 | 16 | 14 |
Executed | 10 | 8 | 13 | 17 | 19 | 8 | 17 | 12 | 19 |
Warranted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
CSIS is mandated to investigate threats to the security of Canada, including espionage; foreign- influenced activities; political, religious, or ideologically motivated violence; and subversion. Section 12 of the CSIS Act sets out criteria for permitting the Service to investigate an individual, group, or entity for matters related to these threats. Subjects of a CSIS investigation, whether they be individuals or groups, are called “targets.”
Targets | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Number of targets | 430 | 467 | 360 | 352 | 340 | 323 |
Data analytics is an investigative tool for CSIS, through which it seeks to make connections and identify trends that may not be visible using traditional methods of investigation. NSA 2017 gave CSIS new powers, including a legal framework for the Service to collect, retain, and use datasets. The framework authorizes CSIS to collect datasets (divided into publicly available, Canadian, and foreign datasets) that may have the ability to assist it in the performance of its duties and functions. It also establishes safeguards for the protection of Canadian rights and freedoms, including privacy rights. These protections include enhanced requirements for ministerial accountability. Depending on the type of dataset, CSIS must meet different requirements before it is able to use a dataset.
The CSIS Act also requires that NSIRA be kept apprised of certain dataset-related activities. Reports prepared following the handling of datasets are to be provided to NSIRA under certain conditions and within reasonable timeframes. While CSIS is not required to advise NSIRA of judicial authorizations or ministerial approvals for the collection of Canadian and foreign datasets, CSIS has been proactively keeping NSIRA apprised of these activities.
Type of dataset | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Publicly available datasets | |||||
Evaluated | 9 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
Retained | 9 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
Canadian datasets | |||||
Evaluated | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
Retained (approved by the Federal Court) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
Denied by the Federal Court | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Foreign datasets | |||||
Evaluated | 10 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
Retained (approved by the Minister of Public Safety and Intelligence Commissioner) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
Denied by the Minister | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Denied by the Intelligence Commissioner | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
CSIS’s Justification Framework establishes a limited justification for its employees, and persons acting at their direction, to carry out activities that would otherwise constitute offences under Canadian law. CSIS’s framework is modelled on those already in place for Canadian law enforcement. It provides needed clarity to CSIS, and to Canadians, about what CSIS may lawfully do in the course of its activities. The framework recognizes that it is in the public interest to ensure that CSIS employees can effectively carry out intelligence collection duties and functions, including by engaging in otherwise unlawful acts or omissions, in the public interest and in accordance with the rule of law. The types of otherwise unlawful acts and omissions that are authorized by the Justification Framework are determined by the Minister of Public Safety and approved by the Intelligence Commissioner. There remain limitations on what activities can be undertaken, and nothing in the framework permits the commission of an act or omission that would infringe on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter.
According to section 20.1 of the CSIS Act, employees must be designated by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to be covered under the Justification Framework while committing or directing an otherwise unlawful act or omission. Designated employees are CSIS employees who require the Justification Framework as part of their duties and functions. Designated employees are justified in committing an act or omission themselves (commissions by employees) and they may direct another person to commit an act or omission (directions to commit) as a part of their duties and functions.
2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Authorizations | 49 | 147 | 178 | 172 | 172 |
Commissions by employees | 1 | 39 | 51 | 61 | 47 |
Directions to commit | 15 | 84 | 116 | 131 | 116 |
Emergency designations | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
CSIS’s operational compliance program unit leads and manages overall compliance within the Service. The objective of this unit is to promote a culture of compliance within CSIS by leading an approach for reporting and assessing potential non-compliance incidents that provides timely advice and guidance related to internal policies and procedures for employees. This program is the centre for processing all instances of potential non-compliance related to operational activities.
NSIRA will continue to monitor closely the instances of non-compliance that relate to Canadian law and the Charter, and work with CSIS to improve transparency around these activities.
Incidents | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Processed compliance incidents | 53 | 99 | 85 | 59 | 79 |
Administrative | 53 | 64 | 42 | 48 | |
Operational | 40a | 19b | 21 | 17 | 31 |
Canadian law | N/A | N/A | 1 | 2 | 4 |
Charter | N/A | N/A | 6 | 5 | 15 |
Warrant conditions | N/A | N/A | 6 | 3 | 11 |
CSIS governance | N/A | N/A | 8 | 15 | 27 |
a For 2021, each operational non-compliance incident was reported based on the highest non-compliance (i.e., if the incident were non-compliant with the Charter and CSIS governance, it would be counted only under the Charter category). For 2022 and 2023, each incident is counted in all of the areas in which it was non-compliant. As such, the sum of operational non-compliance in the various categories exceeds the total number of such incidents. | |||||
b The total number of incidents of non-compliance were not further broken down in 2019 and 2020. This number represents the number of incidents of non-compliance with requirements such as the CSIS Act, the Charter, warrant terms and conditions, or CSIS internal policies or procedures. |
NSIRA has the mandate to review any activity conducted by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). NSIRA must submit an annual report to the Minister of National Defence on CSE activities, including information related to CSE’s compliance with the law and applicable ministerial directions, and NSIRA’s assessment of the reasonableness and necessity of CSE exercising its powers.
In 2023, NSIRA completed two dedicated reviews of CSE and commenced an annual review of CSE activities, summarized below. Furthermore, CSE is included in other NSIRA multi-departmental reviews, such as the review of the operational collaboration between CSE and CSIS and the legally mandated annual reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (see section 4.5).
NSIRA’s review of CSE’s use of the polygraph for security screening found that the policies and procedures in place at CSE inadequately addressed privacy issues. In particular, CSE’s use of personal information collected during polygraph exams for staffing purposes may have exceeded the consent provided and may not have complied with section 7 of the Privacy Act.
NSIRA also found issues with the way in which CSE operated its polygraph program, including unnecessarily repetitive and aggressive questioning by examiners, insufficient quality control of exams, and retention issues related to audiovisual recordings. Additionally, the way in which CSE used the results of polygraph exams to inform security screening decision-making could cause uncertainty over the opportunity to challenge denials of security clearances pursuant to the NSIRA Act. CSE generally over-relied on the results of polygraph exams for deciding security screening cases. When taken as a whole, CSE’s use of the polygraph for security screening raised serious concerns related to the Charter.
NSIRA also explored the role of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) in establishing the Standard on Security Screening (the Standard), which governs the use of the polygraph for security screening by the Government of Canada. NSIRA found that TBS did not adequately consider the privacy or Charter implications of the use of the polygraph. TBS also did not implement sufficient safeguards in the Standard to address these implications.
As a result, NSIRA recommended that CSE and TBS both urgently address the fundamental issues related to the legality, reasonableness, and necessity of the use of the polygraph for security screening. If these issues cannot be addressed, NSIRA recommended that TBS remove the polygraph from the Standard and CSE should cease using it for security screening.
Since the CSE Act came into force in 2019, CSE’s cybersecurity and information assurance (CSIA) activities have grown in extent and importance. CSE acquires and analyzes vast amounts of information to identify and prevent cybersecurity threats, a necessary activity that nonetheless engages important privacy interests, a balance NSIRA sought to understand.
This was NSIRA’s first review of CSE’s CSIA activities, along with its first review of Shared Services Canada (SSC). The two departments work together on CSIA activities, as SSC is the system owner for most Government of Canada networks.
NSIRA found that CSE operates a comprehensive and integrated ecosystem of cybersecurity systems, tools, and capabilities to protect against cyber threats, with a design that incorporates measures meant to protect the privacy of Canadians and persons in Canada.
NSIRA made findings and recommendations in two areas of concern:
NSIRA built foundational knowledge about CSE’s CSIA activities through this review, which will inform NSIRA’s future activities.
NSIRA conducted the second annual review of CSE activities. The 2023 review aimed to identify compliance-related challenges, general trends, and emerging issues based on information CSE is required by law to provide to NSIRA, as well as supplementary information. Primarily resulting in NSIRA’s Annual Report to the Minister of National Defence on CSE activities, the review also identified areas for future reviews of CSE activities and bolstered NSIRA’s knowledge of CSE activities.
To achieve greater accountability and transparency, NSIRA has requested statistics and data from CSE about public interest and compliance-related aspects of its activities. NSIRA is of the opinion that these statistics will provide the public with important information related to the scope and breadth of CSE operations, as well as display the evolution of activities from year to year.
Ministerial authorizations are issued to CSE by the Minister of National Defence. The authorizations support specific foreign intelligence, cybersecurity activities, defensive cyber operations, or active cyber operations conducted by CSE pursuant to those aspects of its mandate. Authorizations are issued when these activities could otherwise contravene an Act of Parliament or interfere with a reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada.
Type of ministerial authorization | Enabling section of the CSE Act | Issued in 2019 | Issued in 2020 | Issued in 2021 | Issued in 2022 | Issued in 2023 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Foreign intelligence | 26(1) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
Cybersecurity (federal and non-federal) | 27(1) and 27(2) | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
Defensive cyber operations | 29(1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Active cyber operations | 30(1) | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
Ministerial orders are issued by the Minister for the purpose of (1) designating any electronic information, any information infrastructures, or any class of electronic information or information infrastructures as electronic information or information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada (section 21[1] of the CSE Act); or (2) designating recipients of information related to Canadians or persons in Canada – that is, Canadian-identifying information (sections 45 and 44[1] of the CSE Act).
Name of ministerial order | Enabling section of the CSE Act |
---|---|
Designating Recipients of Canadian Identifying Information Used, Analyzed or Retained Under a Foreign Intelligence Authorization | 43 |
Designating Recipients of Information Relating to a Canadian or Person in Canada Acquired, Used or Analyzed Under the Cybersecurity and Information Assurance Aspects of the CSE Mandate | 44 |
Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Importance to the Government of Canada | 21 |
Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Ukraine as of Importance to the Government of Canada | 21 |
Designating Electronic Information and Information Infrastructures of Latvia as of Importance to the Government of Canada | 21 |
Under section 16 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to acquire information from or through the global information infrastructure. The CSE Act defines the global information infrastructure as including electromagnetic emissions; any equipment producing such emissions; communications systems; information technology systems and networks; and any data or technical information carried on, contained in, or relating to those emissions, that equipment, those systems, or those networks. CSE uses, analyzes, and disseminates the information for providing foreign intelligence in accordance with the Government of Canada’s intelligence priorities.
CSE foreign intelligence reporting | 2020 (#) | 2021 (#) | 2022 (#) | 2023 (#) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Reports released | Not available | 3,050 | 3,185 | 3,184 |
Departments and agencies | >25 | 28 | 26 | 28 |
Specific clients within departments and agencies | >2,100 | 1,627 | 1,761 | 2,049 |
Information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada (IRTC) is information about Canadians or persons in Canada that may be incidentally collected by CSE while conducting foreign intelligence or cybersecurity activities under the authority of a ministerial authorization. Incidental collection refers to information acquired that CSE was not deliberately seeking and where the activity that enabled its acquisition was not directed at a Canadian or a person in Canada. According to CSE policy, IRTC is defined as any information recognized as having reference to a Canadian or person in Canada, regardless of whether that information could be used to identify that Canadian or person in Canada.
CSE was asked to release statistics or data about the regularity with which IRTC is included in CSE’s end-product reporting. CSE responded that this information “remains classified and cannot be published.”
CSE is prohibited from directing its activities at Canadians or persons in Canada. However, its collection methodologies sometimes result in incidentally acquiring such information. When such incidentally collected information is used in CSE’s foreign intelligence reporting, any part that potentially identifies a Canadian or a person in Canada is suppressed to protect the privacy of the individual(s) in question. CSE may release unsuppressed Canadian-identifying information (CII) to designated recipients when the recipients have the legal authority and operational justification to receive it, and when it is essential to international affairs, defence, or security (including cyber security).
Type of request | 2021 (#) | 2022 (#) | 2023 (#) |
---|---|---|---|
Government of Canada requests | 741 | 657 | 1,087 |
Five Eyes requests | 90 | 62 | 142 |
Non-Five Eyes requests | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Total | 831 | 719 | 1,229 |
In 2023, of the 1,229 requests received, CSE reported having denied 281 requests. By the end of the calendar year, 40 were still being processed.
CSE was asked to release the number of instances where CII is suppressed in CSE foreign intelligence or cyber security reporting. It indicated that this information “remains classified and cannot be published.”
A privacy incident occurs when the privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada is put at risk in a manner that runs counter to, or is not provided for, in CSE’s policies. CSE tracks such incidents through its Privacy Incidents File, and for privacy incidents that are attributable to a second-party partner or a domestic partner, through its Second-Party Privacy Incidents File.
Type of incident | 2021 (#) | 2022 (#) | 2023 (#) |
---|---|---|---|
Privacy incidents | 96 | 114 | 107 |
Second-party privacy incidents | 33 | 23 | 37 |
Non-privacy compliance incidents | Not available | Not available | 28 |
Type of incident | 2023 (#) |
---|---|
Privacy incidents | 70 |
Second-party privacy incidents | 37 |
Non-privacy compliance incidents | 16 |
Type of incident | 2023 (#) |
---|---|
Privacy incidents | 37 |
Non-privacy compliance incidents | 12 |
Under section 17 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to provide advice, guidance, and services to help protect electronic information and information infrastructures of federal institutions, as well as those of non-federal entities that are designated by the Minister of National Defence as being of importance to the Government of Canada.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) is Canada’s unified authority on cybersecurity. The Cyber Centre, which is a part of CSE, provides expert guidance, services, and education while working in collaboration with stakeholders in the private and public sectors. The Cyber Centre handles incidents in government and designated institutions that include:
Type of cyber incident | 2022 | 2023 |
---|---|---|
Federal institutions | 1,070 | 977 |
Critical infrastructure | 1,575 | 1,756 |
International | Not available | 82 |
Total | 2,645 | 2,815 |
Under section 18 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to conduct defensive cyber operations (DCO) to help protect electronic information and information infrastructures of federal institutions, as well as those of non-federal entities that are designated by the Minister as being of importance to the Government of Canada, from hostile cyber attacks.
Under section 19 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to conduct active cyber operations (ACO) against foreign individuals, states, organizations, or terrorist groups as they relate to international affairs, defence, or security.
CSE was asked to release the number of DCOs and ACOs approved, and the number carried out in 2023. CSE responded that this information “remains classified and cannot be published.”
As part of the assistance aspect of CSE’s mandate, CSE receives requests for assistance from Canadian law enforcement and security agencies, as well as from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (DND/CAF).
Action | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Approved | 23 | 32 | 59 | 48 |
Not approved | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
Under review | Not available | Not available | 0 | 2 |
Cancelled | Not available | Not available | 1 | 0 |
Denied | Not available | Not available | 2 | 1 |
Total received | 24 | 35 | 62 | 53 |
Note: For 2020 and 2021, CSE was able to provide only the number of requests received and actioned. CSE advised, however, that it has since improved its internal tracking system for requests for assistance. |
In addition to the CSIS and CSE reviews above, NSIRA completed the following reviews of departments and agencies in 2023:
This review examined the legal and policy frameworks governing CBSA’s Confidential Human Source (CHS) program. The review had three areas of focus: the management and assessment of risk; CBSA’s discharge of its duty of care to its sources; and the sufficiency of ministerial direction and accountability in relation to the program. Together, these areas support CBSA’s ability to conduct its human source-handling activities lawfully, ethically, and with appropriate accountability.
The review reflects that, as an investigative tool used in support of CBSA’s mandate, the CHS Program rests on an adequate legal framework. However, the review found a number of gaps in the framework governing the program and was especially attentive to how CBSA manages the particular risks associated with the use of human sources without status in Canada. The review contains a number of findings that relate to CBSA’s risk management practices.
In two instances, NSRIA’s review concluded that CBSA’s activities may not be in compliance with the law. In the first, the review concluded through a detailed case study that CBSA may have twice breached the law of informer privilege by improperly disclosing information that might identify the human source. In this and another instance, NSIRA found that CBSA failed to inform the Minister of Public Safety of a human source activity that may have impacted the safety of an individual, as required by the Ministerial Direction on Surveillance and Confidential Human Sources. This constitutes non-compliance with subsection 12(2) of the CBSA Act.
NSIRA made six recommendations in this review. Collectively, they are meant to enhance the governance of the human source program to ensure CBSA is attentive to the welfare of its human sources across the full spectrum of activities. They also reflect NSIRA’s ongoing attention to the principle of ministerial accountability. Overall, NSIRA’s findings and recommendations reflect the level of maturity of CBSA’s program; although it has been operating for almost 40 years, the introduction of the policy suite specific to human sources is a relatively recent innovation. The review also reflects CBSA’s recent efforts to improve its program.
This review examined whether DND/CAF conducts its human source-handling activities lawfully, ethically, and with appropriate accountability.
NSIRA found that DND/CAF’s policy framework allows human source-handling activities that may not be in compliance with the law. These risks arise particularly in relation to sources associated with terrorist groups. NSIRA recommended that Parliament enact a justification framework that would authorize DND/CAF and its sources to commit otherwise unlawful acts outside Canada, where reasonable for the collection of defence intelligence.
NSIRA found that DND/CAF’s risk assessment frameworks do not provide commanders with the accurate, consistent, and objective information they need to evaluate the risks of engaging with particular sources. NSIRA recommended that these frameworks be revised to ensure that all applicable risk factors are considered.
NSIRA found gaps in DND/CAF’s discharge of its duty of care to sources. Safeguarding processes were not always appropriately engaged; the complaints process was underdeveloped; and the risk posed to agents was, at times, insufficiently assessed. Measures to address these issues should be clearly operationalized in governance documents.
NSIRA found that the Minister of National Defence is not sufficiently informed on human source-handling operations to fulfill their ministerial accountabilities. The Minister should be aware of the legal, policy, and governance issues that may affect human source-handling operations.
NSIRA also found that further ministerial direction is required to support the governance of DND/CAF’s human source handling program. NSIRA recommended that the Minister issue ministerial direction to DND/CAF that will guide the lawful and ethical conduct of source-handling operations.
CSE and CSIS are two core pillars of Canadian intelligence collection, which means that effective collaboration between the departments is critical to national security. However, a tension exists between CSIS’s mandate, which authorizes collection and sharing of information about Canadians, and CSE’s core prohibition against directing its activities at Canadians. This is the first review that was able to access information from both departments and consider that tension.
NSIRA examined a sample of CSE and CSIS collaborative operational activities and information sharing, as well as collaboration between CSIS and CSE further to CSIS’s threat reduction measure (TRM) mandate. This satisfied NSIRA’s annual requirement under section 8(2) of the NSIRA Act to review an aspect of CSIS’s TRMs.
With respect to operational collaboration, including under CSIS’s TRM mandate, NSIRA found a lack of information sharing and proactive planning, as well as a failure on CSE’s part to properly account for and mitigate the risk of targeting Canadians when working with CSIS. NSIRA recommended some procedural changes to improve information flow, consultation, transparency, and accountability.
Concerning information sharing, NSIRA found that existing processes between the departments lacked guidance and accountability, and created risks of CSE targeting Canadians that were actualized in some instances. NSIRA recommended both departments establish policies, procedures, and analyst training. Additionally, NSIRA recommended that CSIS cease making requests to CSE pertaining to Canadians and consider the Canadian information it shares with CSE. NSIRA also recommended that CSE reconsider how it collects, retains, and reports Canadian information in certain scenarios and only use foreign lead information from CSIS reporting.
In this review, NSIRA found two cases of non-compliance with the law. Both involved CSE directing its activities at Canadians under its foreign intelligence mandate.
This review provided an overview of the use of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) in 2022. In doing so, it documented the volume and nature of information disclosures made under the SCIDA, assesses compliance with the Act, and highlights patterns in its use across Government of Canada institutions and over time.
In 2022, four disclosing institutions made a total of 173 disclosures to five recipient institutions. NSIRA found that institutions complied with the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in relation to the majority of these disclosures. Observed instances of non-compliance that were related to subsection 9(3), regarding the timeliness of records copied to NSIRA; subsection 5.1(1), regarding the timeliness of destruction or return of personal information; and subsection 5(2), regarding the provision of a statement on accuracy and reliability. These instances did not point to any systemic failures in Government of Canada institutions’ implementation of the Act.
NSIRA also made findings in relation to practices that, although compliant with the SCIDA, left room for improvement. NSIRA’s corresponding recommendations were designed to increase standardization across the Government of Canada in a manner that is consistent with the institutions’ demonstrated best practices and the Act’s guiding principles.
Overall, NSIRA observed improvements in reviewee performance compared to findings from prior years’ reports and over the course of the review. These improvements include corrective actions taken by reviewees in response to NSIRA’s requests for information in support of this review.
This review assessed departments’ compliance with the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and their implementation of the ACA’s associated directions during the 2022 calendar year. Within this context, the review pursued a thematic focus on departments’ conduct of risk assessments, including the ways in which their methodologies may lead to a systematic under-assessment of the level of risk involved in an information-sharing transaction.
NSIRA’s findings and recommendations in this report reflect both developments and stagnations in departments’ implementation of the directions over time. NSIRA observed efforts to collaborate interdepartmentally and standardize certain practices across the Government of Canada. While these efforts reflect an improvement over past approaches, they fall short of the consistent framework for foreign information sharing government-wide envisioned by the Act. Additionally, NSIRA observed a number of practices that may lead departments to systematically under-assess the risks involved in contemplated information exchanges. Such under-assessments may in turn lead to information being exchanged, in contravention of the directions’ prohibitions.
NSIRA made five recommendations in this review. Collectively, they would ensure that all departments’ ACA frameworks reflect a degree of standardization commensurate with the spirit of the Act and its associated directions; and that these frameworks are designed to support compliance with the directions.
NSIRA is mandated to investigate national security-related public complaints. NSIRA complaint investigations are conducted with consistency, fairness, and timeliness. The agency’s public complaint mandate plays a critical role in ensuring that Canada’s national security and intelligence organizations are accountable to the Canadian public.
In 2022, NSIRA had committed to establishing service standards for the investigation of complaints, with the goal of completing 90 percent of investigations within its new service standards. These service standards were implemented and have been in effect since April 1, 2023, and set internal time limits for certain investigative steps for each type of complaint, under normal circumstances. NSIRA is pleased to report that for the period of April 1 to December 31, 2023, 100 percent of the service standards have been met across all investigation files subject to these service standards.
While remaining mindful of the interests of the complainant and the security imperatives of the organization, NSIRA established an independent verification process with CSE for new complaints filed under section 17 of the NSIRA Act. More specifically, after receiving a complaint, NSIRA must evaluate whether it is within NSIRA’s jurisdiction to investigate, based on conditions stated in the NSIRA Act. For complaints against CSE, just as with complaints against CSIS and the RCMP, NSIRA must be satisfied that the complaint against the respondent organization refers to an activity carried out by the organization and is not trivial, frivolous, or vexatious. This new independent verification process assists NSIRA in ascertaining its jurisdiction to investigate complaints filed against CSE.
NSIRA has developed a new internal tracking tool to ensure effective case management of complaint files.
NSIRA previously reported that it would improve its website to promote accessibility to the investigation of complaints. During the overhaul of its public-facing website in the fall of 2023, NSIRA amended its complaint forms to ensure that they meet WCAG 2.0 accessibility criteria and conformity requirements.
In 2023, NSIRA completed the last phase of a study jointly commissioned with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) regarding the collection of race-based data and other demographic information. The study assessed the viability of the collection of identity-based and demographic data as part of the Government of Canada’s ongoing anti-racism initiatives.
In the course of this study, interviews were conducted with community members familiar with NSIRA, the CRCC, and the agencies they review. The study ultimately found that the collection of raced-based data was feasible.
The study also included recommendations in relation to the collection of race-based data as follows:
NSIRA welcomes the insights provided by the joint study and will closely review the recommendations to determine how they might be implemented by NSIRA. The collection of race-based and other demographic data in the national security and intelligence space is an entirely novel area. The study’s literature review highlighted that this type of race-based and other demographic data collection has never been done before in the national security and intelligence space in Canada, or by any of Canada’s international partners. NSIRA and the CRCC will continue to collaborate on this important initiative by determining potential implementation strategies.
In 2023, NSIRA began revising its Rules of Procedure to refine the procedures governing its complaints investigations. This revision will continue in 2024 with the support of the Secretariat in ensuring that the agency’s obligations provided for in its Accessibility Plan are met.
Part of the revisions to NSIRA’s procedures in 2024 will be to review the privacy statement included in its complaint forms to ensure greater transparency about how the information submitted to NSIRA by complainants will be used in NSIRA’s investigations.
The complainant alleged that CSIS agents interacted with them on multiple occasions and claimed that those interactions amounted to illegal arrests and detentions; that the agents illegally intimidated them by claiming that they would deport them to Guantanamo Bay; and that the Service erroneously applied the Privacy Act in refusing to provide documents the complainant claims they were coerced into signing under duress during one of the above-noted interactions.
Upon reviewing all of the evidence presented by the parties and available information, NSIRA observed that the complainant never had any interactions with CSIS. NSIRA found that none of their allegations could be substantiated.
The complainant alleged that, following an overseas trip, they experienced difficulties travelling internationally, which they believed were attributable to CSIS and CSIS’ sharing of information with the governments of foreign countries. The complainant claimed that CSIS had placed them on a “blacklist” as a member of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. They further alleged that CSIS harassed them and discriminated against them on the basis of race, ethnic origin, and religion.
At the time of the complainant’s trip, certain countries were regularly being used by extremist travellers from North America and Europe as intermediate destinations to access Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-controlled territory.
The complainant’s family was interviewed by CSIS to gain information about the complainant, their beliefs, and possible intentions. The complainant considered this interaction to have been an inappropriate and wrongful interrogation of members of their family.
Upon review of all of the evidence, NSIRA found the activities of CSIS in this matter to have been lawful and reasonable. While investigative steps were conducted by CSIS, there was no evidence suggesting that CSIS placed the complainant on a blacklist or that information pertaining to the complainant was shared improperly. Similarly, the allegation that CSIS was responsible for the complainant’s travel difficulties was found to be unsubstantiated. The source of the complainant’s travel difficulties may lie outside of Canadian authorities, and thus beyond the scope of NSIRA’s jurisdiction.
NSIRA concluded that CSIS conducted an interview with the complainant’s parent at their home and with other family members present, during which their parent participated voluntarily and expressed their willingness to be of further assistance if required. The basis for conducting this interview was found to be reasonable and NSIRA did not find any evidence of inappropriateness, intimidation, wrongdoing, or harassment.
NSIRA did not find an evidentiary basis to support the allegations of harassment and of discrimination on the basis of racial, ethnic origins, or religion by CSIS against the complainant.
The complainant’s allegations were found to be unsupported.
The complainant alleged that a CSIS agent invaded their house and stated that they were an intelligence officer in operation. According to the complainant, the CSIS agent physically assaulted them, video recorded the complainant while the complainant was undressed, and threatened to kill them. The complainant further alleged that the Service is trying to silence them.
Upon a review of all of the evidence, it became clear that the complainant’s own conduct brought them to the attention of CSIS. They first communicated with CSIS and raised complaints regarding an individual. These allegations were received and considered by CSIS, which acted on the complaints to determine whether the individual named by the complainant was affiliated with CSIS. Based on a review of the documents submitted by CSIS, NSIRA determined that the individual alleged by the complainant to be a CSIS Agent was not a CSIS employee or otherwise involved with CSIS.
NSIRA further found that as part of the Service’s activities conducted in relation to the complainant, CSIS collected limited information on the complainant. NSIRA concluded that the collection of the complainant’s personal information was justified by CSIS’ mandate.
NSIRA concluded that the CSIS’ activities in relation to the complainant after they came to their attention were lawful and reasonable in the circumstances.
The complainant had applied for Canadian citizenship and was subsequently required to attend an interview with CSIS. The complainant attended this interview with their lawyer. The complainant alleged that the CSIS officers who conducted the interview:
Upon considering all of the evidence, NSIRA found that the CSIS officers erred in denying the complainant and their counsel the opportunity to take notes that they could take from the premises. CSIS acknowledged that this practice was no longer in place. NSIRA recommended that CSIS adjust its governing policy to make clear that the interviewee and their representative may take and retain notes from interviews.
NSIRA commented that since 2000, numerous SIRC reports and decisions have recommended that CSIS record immigration security screening interviews. However, CSIS did not consistently record such interviews at the time of the complainant’s interview. CSIS indicated that efforts to require recording of all immigration interviews in its written procedures was in progress. NSIRA recommended that CSIS proactively record interviews in immigration and citizenship matters, and that CSIS retain this recording at least until a decision is made by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) on CSIS’ advice. In the event that CSIS provides a negative conclusion, the recording should be kept until the immigration status is determined and for the period of any appeal of that determination.
Given that the complainant was unable to retain notes from the interview and that no recording of the interview existed, NSIRA was unable to make findings on most of the improper statements that the CSIS interviewer was alleged to have made. However, one statement in particular, which was an English idiom that the CSIS officer acknowledged using, was found to be unnecessary and counterproductive, as it risked compounding tension in the interview and may not have had a reasonable, literal translation in the language spoken by the complainant.
CSIS indicated and NSIRA agreed that counsel to an interviewee has a role in, but not control of, the interview process. An interview subject’s lawyer is not limited to passive silence, but also must not act in a manner that impairs the Service’s ability to perform its mandate. To this end, it is not open to counsel to lead witnesses or have an intrusive role in questioning. NSIRA noted, however, that it is proper for counsel to raise concerns about interpretation or to suggest clarifying questions. These concerns are to be posed during a pause or in some other pre-organized manner that does not disrupt the questioning. NSIRA recommended, therefore, that CSIS articulate within its own operating procedure the role of counsel (or other third parties) in the manner elaborated above, and that it communicates these expectations in advance to those attending an interview.
Finally, to remedy these errors, NSIRA recommended that CSIS convene a second interview attended by different officers and a different interpreter. Given the irregularities in the first interview and the resulting concern that it may contain inaccuracies, NSIRA further recommended that in completing its assessment and in providing advice to the IRCC, CSIS avoid giving weight to the results of the first interview.
The complainant filed a complaint against the RCMP alleging that it failed to return property that was seized from their office, resulting from an RCMP investigation into a terrorist plot. The complainant further alleged that the RCMP damaged his property.
Upon considering the facts and timeline of the RCMP’s investigation that resulted in the seizure of the complainant’s property, NSIRA found that the property was properly detained, pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Code and in accordance with RCMP policy.
NSIRA further found that there was no evidence that would permit to conclude that the complainant’s property was damaged by the RCMP during and after the seizure.
The complainant’s allegations were found to be unsupported.
The complainant came to Canada as a refugee fleeing violent persecution. As a result of litigation against their former employer, who was linked to the government of a foreign state, the complainant alleged that they had been the victim of death threats from their former employer and government officials of the country from which they had fled. The complainant believed these threats to be credible, as they were often accompanied by contemporaneous details, such as the complainant’s clothing during a particular outing and the location they attended. The complainant believed that representatives of the aforementioned government employed at the country’s embassy in Canada were assisting in the surveillance of the complainant and their family, including their children while at school.
The complainant alleged that the RCMP failed to conduct a complete investigation into incidents involving threats, including death threats, made against the complainant and their family, and that these decisions by the RCMP were improperly influenced by foreign individuals.
The evidence provided by the RCMP demonstrated that it took the necessary steps to review the information submitted by the complainant, but determined that there were insufficient grounds for the RCMP to continue their investigation of the foreign influence aspects of the threats. However, the local police force was the police of jurisdiction for investigating the criminal harassment, threats, and safety concerns related to the complainant. The RCMP advised this police force that information collected by the RCMP would be turned over to them, and asked to be notified should the local police force identify someone in Canada working on behalf of a foreign government to threaten or intimidate the complainant. NSIRA found the RCMP’s initial investigation to be reasonably thorough and their ultimate decision to be a justifiable exercise of police discretion.
Furthermore, there was no evidence before NSIRA to support the complainant’s allegation that the RCMP’s decision to discontinue their investigation was improperly influenced by foreign individuals.
The complainant’s allegations were found to be unsupported.
The RCMP arrested the complainant at his home on terrorism-related charges. In the course of the operation, the complainant’s family members were handcuffed. It was the complainant’s position that this was improper and that the RCMP officers did not utilize their cultural sensitivity training.
NSIRA found that:
NSIRA determined that, although the RCMP assumed a general supervisory role over the execution of the operation, they depended on the professionalism of the other police forces in planning and executing a dynamic search. Given that the conduct of the other police officers who participated in the search could not be attributed to the RCMP, no findings or recommendations were made for the RCMP in keeping with NSIRA’s jurisdiction.
The complainants filed complaints against CSIS, alleging that the Service caused a significant delay in submitting the security assessment for their immigration or citizenship applications. During the investigations, NSIRA inquired about whether CSIS could provide updates with respect to their involvement in the respective processes. The Service provided letters to NSIRA that could be shared with the complainants advising them that CSIS had completed its assessment in the security screening process. As the complainants’ main allegations were in relation to the delay in the security screening, the matters were informally resolved in accordance with Rule 10.10 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure and the files were closed.
The complainant filed a section 17 complaint regarding their employment application with CSE. More specifically, upon completing a student term contract with CSE and receiving a verbal offer for a further contract, CSE decided not to renew the complainant’s employment. The complainant alleged that this decision from CSE was based on their ethnicity. Despite the Chief of CSE having received a letter of complaint from the complainant, CSE notified NSIRA that its notification letter constituted their first notice of the complaint and requested that the matter be placed in abeyance (on hold). After completing an internal investigation of the complainant’s allegations (independent of NSIRA’s complaints process), CSE and the complainant began discussions toward a settlement. The parties ultimately reached a settlement and notified NSIRA accordingly. The complaint was informally resolved pursuant to Rule 10 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure prior to NSIRA rendering a decision on its jurisdiction to investigate this matter.
This complaint was referred to NSIRA by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) for the RCMP, pursuant to subsection 45.53(4.1) of the RCMP Act. The complaint alleged that the RCMP failed to investigate individuals allegedly participating in a militia group. NSIRA tried to establish contact with the complainant several times to proceed with its investigation. NSIRA found that reasonable attempts had been made to communicate with the complainant and that the agency had exhausted all options. Accordingly, NSIRA issued reasons that the complaint had been abandoned, as per NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure. The complaint investigation file was closed.
Investigations progressed at significant levels in 2023 (see Annex C). NSIRA concluded several investigations and issued seven final reports. Additionally, four files were informally resolved in accordance with Rule 10 of NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure.
In 2023, NSIRA observed an increase of complaints against CSIS, pursuant to section 16 of the NSIRA Act, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening. Of note, under sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA to guide determinations with respect to whether citizenship or immigration applicants are threats to the security of Canada. While CSIS is committed to performing its security screening mandate in a timely manner, there is no standard for time allotted. In the 2023 calendar year, out of the six complaints over which NSIRA assumed jurisdiction under section 16 of the NSIRA Act, five pertained to allegations of delays that complainants attributed to CSIS’s security screening activities.
The comprehensive reviews and investigations NSIRA conducted in 2023 underscore the agency’s dedication to transparency and accountability. This work has provided constructive recommendations to enhance the operational practices and policy frameworks of Canada’s important national security and intelligence actors.
NSIRA recognizes the persistent and evolving nature of security threats, which necessitates adaptive and proactive approaches by Canada’s security and intelligence agencies. NSIRA is likewise committed to continually refining its methodologies, embracing technological advancements, and strengthening its analytical capabilities to keep pace in a rapidly changing world. NSIRA will continue to engage with domestic and international security and intelligence review partners to improve its practices and foster better public understanding of its work and the value it provides.
NSIRA is driven by its role as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians within the otherwise closed domain of national security and intelligence, providing the critical function of enhancing transparency and accountability. NSIRA’s vision, mission, and values reflect this commitment and will guide NSIRA’s work at it looks to the future.
Abbreviation | Full Name |
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ACA | Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act |
ACO | active cyber operations |
CAF | Canadian Armed Forces |
CBSA | Canada Border Services Agency |
CHRC | Canadian Human Rights Commission |
CHS | Confidential Human Source (program) |
CII | Canadian-identifying information |
CRA | Canada Revenue Agency |
CRCC | Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP |
CSE | Communications Security Establishment |
CSIA | Cybersecurity and information assurance |
CSIS | Canadian Security Intelligence Service |
CTIVD Netherlands | Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security |
Cyber Centre | Canadian Centre for Cyber Security |
DCO | defensive cyber operations |
DFO | Department of Fisheries and Oceans |
DND | Department of National Defence |
EOS Norway | Norwegian Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Intelligence and Security Services |
FINTRAC | Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada |
FIORC | Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Committee |
GAC | Global Affairs Canada |
GC | Government of Canada |
HUMINT | Human Intelligence |
IC IG US | United States of America’s Inspector General of the Intelligence Community |
IGIS Australia | Australia’s Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security |
IGIS New Zealand | New Zealand’s Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security |
IPCO UK | United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office |
IRCC | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada |
IRTC | information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada |
IT | information technology |
MD | Ministerial Direction |
NBS | network-based solutions |
NDA | National Defence Act |
NSICOP | National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians |
NSIRA | National Security and Intelligence Review Agency |
OA-IA | Independent Oversight Authority for Intelligence Activities of Switzerland |
PCLOB US | United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board |
PCO | Privy Council Office |
PKGr | German Parliamentary Oversight Panel |
PS | Public Safety Canada |
RAD | Review and Analysis Division |
RCMP | Royal Canadian Mounted Police |
REP | reasonable expectation of privacy |
SCIDA | Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act |
SIRC | Security and Intelligence Review Committee |
SSC | Shared Services Canada |
TBS | Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat |
TC | Transport Canada |
TET Denmark | Danish Intelligence Oversight Board |
the Standard | Standard on Security Screening |
TRM | threat reduction measure |
UNCTED | United Nations’ Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate |
Abréviation | Nom Complet |
---|---|
AMC | Affaires mondiales Canada |
ARC | Agence du revenu du Canada |
ARVP | Attente raisonnable en matière de droit à la vie privée |
ASFC | Agence des services frontaliers du Canada |
AS-Rens | Autorité de surveillance indépendante des activités de renseignement |
BCP | Bureau du Conseil Privé |
CANAFE | Centre d’analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada |
CCC | Centre canadien pour la cybersécurité |
CCDP | Commission canadienne des droits de la personne |
CCETP | Commission civile d’examen et de traitement des plaintes relatives à la Gendarmerie royale du Canada |
COA | Cyberopérations actives |
COD | Cyberopérations défensives |
CPSNR | Comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le renseignement |
CSAI | Cybersécurité et assurance de l’information |
CSARS | Comité de surveillance des activités de renseignement de sécurité |
CSERGC | Conseil de surveillance et d’examen du renseignement du Groupe des cinq |
CST | Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications |
CTIVD Pays-Bas | Commission néerlandaise de contrôle des services de renseignement et de sécurité |
DECT | Direction exécutive du Comité contre le terrorisme des Nations Unies |
DRA | Division de la recherche et de l’analyse |
EOS Norvège | Commission parlementaire norvégienne de contrôle des services de renseignement et de sécurité |
FAC | Forces armées canadiennes |
GRC | Gendarmerie royale du Canada |
HUMINT | Renseignement humain |
IC IG É.-U. | Inspecteur général de la communauté du renseignement des États-Unis d’Amérique |
IGIS Australie | Inspecteur général du renseignement et de la sécurité de l’Australie |
IGIS Nouvelle-Zélande | Inspecteur général du renseignement et de la sécurité de la Nouvelle-Zélande |
INC | Information nominative sur un Canadien |
IPCO R.-U. | Bureau du commissaire aux pouvoirs d’enquête du Royaume-Uni |
IRCC | Immigration, Réfugiés et Citoyenneté Canada |
IRCPC | Information qui se rapporte à des Canadiens ou à des personnes au Canada |
la Norme | Norme sur le filtrage de sécurité |
LCISC | Loi sur la communication d’information ayant trait à la sécurité du Canada |
LCMTIEE | Loi visant à éviter la complicité dans les cas de mauvais traitements infligés par des entités étrangères |
MND | Ministère de la Défense nationale |
MPO | Ministère des Pêches et des Océans |
MRM | Mesure de réduction de la menace |
OSSNR | Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement |
PCLOB É.-U. | Conseil de surveillance de la vie privée et des libertés civiles des États-Unis |
PKGr | Comité de surveillance parlementaire de l’Allemagne |
SCRS | Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité |
SCT | Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor du Canada |
SHC | (Programme) des sources humaines confidentielles |
SP | Sécurité publique Canada |
SPC | Services partagés Canada |
SR | Solutions réseau |
TC | Transports Canada |
TET Danemark | Conseil danois de surveillance des services de renseignement |
TI | Technologie de l’information |
This Annex lists the full findings and recommendations of NSIRA’s reviews that were completed in 2023. In certain instances, original language has been redacted and replaced with summary language designated by [*summary*]. Once redacted, full reviews and available government responses to recommendations are published on NSIRA’s website.
NSIRA found that CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime is inconsistent with the statutory framework.
NSIRA found that CSIS’s current approach to dataset information collection under section 12 risks the creation of a parallel collection mechanism, one that weakens section 12’s statutory thresholds and at the same time lacks the external oversight regime intended to protect personal information under the dataset regime.
NSIRA found that CSIS failed to fully apprise the Court on their interpretation and application of the dataset regime. CSIS should have sought clarification from the Court as to its views on the precise conduct permissible prior to invocating the dataset regime.
NSIRA found that when conducting queries in exigent circumstances, CSIS retained information that did not meet the section 12 strictly necessary threshold.
NSIRA found that the lack of explicit time limits in section 11.17 of the dataset provisions governing foreign datasets has resulted in datasets being retained for multiple years pending a decision by the Minister or Minister’s designate (the CSIS Director).
NSIRA found that CSIS runs the risk of collecting information that is publicly available but for which there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy.
NSIRA found that CSIS’s policies governing the collection and retention of Canadian and foreign datasets do not align with its current interpretation of the dataset regime.
NSIRA found that CSIS does not have a policy governing the handling of transitory information. In addition, the existing Interim Direction [***] does not provide employees with sufficient instruction, which may result in CSIS retaining information that would otherwise be subject to the dataset regime.
NSIRA found that CSIS information management practices are responsible for multiple compliance incidents and currently create duplicates of datasets within CSIS’s systems.
NSIRA found that, as of August 2023, CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act because it retained Canadian information extracted from foreign datasets, and foreign information amounting to a dataset.
NSIRA found that CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act because it retained Canadian information and referenced it as recently as 2022. This information should have been destroyed upon coming into force of the NSA 2017, in July 2019.
NSIRA found that CSIS has not exhaustively scanned all of its systems to identify information that is subject to the dataset regime so that it may be processed in a compliant manner.
NSIRA found that the training required to become a designated employee to evaluate, query, and exploit section 11.01 datasets offers clear information on the collection and retention requirements.
NSIRA found that CSIS operational personnel, including those predominantly dealing with bulk information collection, have not received adequate training allowing them to identify when collected information may fall within the dataset regime.
NSIRA found that CSIS has not prioritized resourcing the technical unit responsible for the evaluation, querying, and exploitation of Canadian and foreign datasets.
NSIRA found that CSIS has not devoted sufficient resources to improving the current technical systems or developing new ones that are equipped to support bulk data use.
NSIRA found that CSIS collected information in relation to activities that could not on reasonable grounds be suspected to have constituted a threat to the security of Canada and the collection, analysis, and retention of which was not strictly necessary.
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Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that in the next judicial authorization application for a Canadian dataset CSIS put its current position on the application of the dataset regime before the Court, including any use of the information prior to the decision to retain under the dataset regime. |
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy any record containing names retained pursuant to the exigent circumstances queries, as they do not meet the strictly necessary threshold. |
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that Parliament legislates a time limitation for the authorization of a foreign dataset by the Minister or Minister’s designate. |
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that CSIS meaningfully analyze and document any possible reasonable expectation of privacy when evaluating publicly available datasets. |
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop:
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Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that CSIS cease to create duplicates of the information reported in the operational system. |
Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy Canadian and foreign dataset information that is not strictly necessary to retain. This information no longer falls within the legal 90 day evaluation period and retaining it pursuant to the dataset regime is no longer a possibility. |
Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that CSIS conduct an exhaustive scan of its operational and corporate repositories to identify and destroy any non-compliant information. |
Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop and deliver scenario-based workshops to train operational personnel on CSIS’s current application of the dataset regime so that they can engage subject matter experts as necessary. |
Recommendation 10: NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize resourcing the technical unit responsible for the evaluation, querying, and exploitation of Canadian and foreign datasets. |
Recommendation 11: NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize the improvement of current technical systems or development of new systems, equipped to support compliant bulk data use. |
Recommendation 12: NSIRA recommends that CSIS immediately destroy the case study dataset it collected pursuant to section 12, as it does not meet the statutory thresholds. This information no longer falls within the legal 90 day evaluation period and retaining it pursuant to the dataset regime is no longer a possibility. |
Recommendation 13: NSIRA recommends that CSIS share the full unredacted copy of this report with the Federal Court. |
NSIRA found that CSE’s governance of the use of the polygraph for security screening inadequately addresses privacy issues.
NSIRA found that CSE did not conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment related to its use of the polygraph for security screening.
NSIRA found that CSE may not have considered whether all information collected during the polygraph is directly related or necessary to the assessment of loyalty to Canada or criminality, as required by the Privacy Act and the Directive on Privacy Practices.
NSIRA found that polygraph examiners applied an ad hoc approach as they assessed medical information collected during the polygraph.
NSIRA found that CSE may not have complied with section 7 of the Privacy Act by using information collected during polygraph exams for suitability and hiring decisions without the consent of the subject.
NSIRA found that CSE provides subjects with information that overstates the reliability and validity of the polygraph prior to obtaining consent.
NSIRA found that, in some instances, the way in which CSE conducted polygraph exams risked prompting subjects to fabricate information in an effort to clear themselves when faced with an unfavourable polygraph assessment.
NSIRA found instances where CSE’s quality control practices for polygraph exams were not always consistent with CSE policy.
NSIRA found that approximately 20% of security files from the sample reviewed were missing audiovisual recordings of polygraph exams.
NSIRA found that in all cases, when initial polygraph exam results indicated deception or were inconclusive, CSE’s practice was to conduct multiple polygraph exams rather than a resolution of doubt process as provided for under the Standard.
NSIRA found that the polygraph had an inordinate importance in security screening decision-making at CSE and other less-intrusive security screening activities were under-used or not used at all.
NSIRA found that the polygraph was de facto determinative in security screening decisions at CSE.
NSIRA found that CSE’s security screening decision-making may not comply with record-keeping requirements of the Standard on Security Screening.
NSIRA found that CSE’s use of the polygraph in security screening decisions makes more uncertain the opportunity to challenge denials of security clearances pursuant to the NSIRA Act and the Standard.
NSIRA found that TBS did not adequately consider privacy or Charter implications when it included the polygraph as a security screening activity under the Standard on Security Screening.
NSIRA found that the Standard on Security Screening insufficiently addresses Charter and privacy implications related to the use of the polygraph.
NSIRA found that the Government of Canada’s current use of the polygraph for security screening in the manner described in this review may raise serious concerns in relation to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that the Treasury Board of Canada urgently remedy the issues identified by this review related to the legality, reasonableness and necessity of the use of the polygraph for security screening in Canada, or remove it from the Standard on Security Screening. |
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that CSE urgently remedy the issues identified by this review, including Charter and Privacy Act compliance, or cease conducting polygraph exams for security screening. |
NSIRA found that CSE operates a comprehensive and integrated ecosystem of cybersecurity systems, tools, and capabilities to protect against cyber threats, with a design that incorporates measures meant to protect the privacy of Canadians and persons in Canada.
NSIRA found that CSE treated all network-based solutions (NBS) information as information related to a Canadian or a person in Canada (IRTC), and applied measures intended to protect privacy to all NBS-acquired information.
NSIRA found that information acquired through NBS will, by its nature, always include information related to a Canadian or person in Canada (IRTC) and is certain to include some information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) of a Canadian or person in Canada. This was not transparently communicated in corresponding applications to the Minister.
NSIRA found that, due to a lack of clarity in its relationship with SSC, CSE did not obtain consent from system owners for its cybersecurity and information assurance activities in the way described to the Minister.
NSIRA found that SSC was not fully aware of its responsibilities as a system owner, as described in CSE’s applications to the Minister.
NSIRA found that, despite the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding between CSE and SSC, there was a lack of clarity between the organizations on the implementation of agreed-upon commitments about NBS activities on networks operated by SSC.
NSIRA found that CSE did not explain to the Minister why consent to CSE’s cybersecurity activities could not reasonably be obtained from users of Government of Canada systems.
NSIRA found that CSE’s narrow application of subsection 22(4) of the CSE Act introduces legal and accountability risks and resulted in CSE acquiring information that may interfere with a reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or person in Canada. This information was from a source acquired outside of the scheme of Ministerial authorizations.
NSIRA found that an incongruence between subsections 27(1) and 22(4) of the CSE Act prevents CSE from acquiring certain information from [*specific type of*] sources such as [*specific information source*], where this information interferes with the reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or person in Canada. Some of this information would enhance CSE’s ability to fulfill its cybersecurity and information assurance mandate.
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Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that CSE clearly explain, in its applications to the Minister, that:
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Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that CSE renew its Memorandum of Understanding with SSC to ensure CSE and SSC meet their respective commitments, including any that CSE makes to the Minister regarding SSC’s role in informing system owners about the NBS program. |
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that CSE update Memoranda of Understanding with all of its cybersecurity partners, to ensure these partners have consented to CSE cybersecurity activities, and to ensure these arrangements reflect, and conform to, contemporary governance authorities. CSE should continue these updates, as a standard practice, as authorities evolve. |
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that CSE explain to the Minister how consent to CSE’s cybersecurity activities is obtained from users of Government of Canada systems, or otherwise explain why this consent could not reasonably be obtained. |
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that CSE reconsider whether limits on the acquisition by CSE of information from the global internet infrastructure (as per subsection 22(4) of the CSE Act) apply to information [*specific source of information*] sources.
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Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that, in order to continue these acquisition activities that are necessary for cybersecurity and information assurance (CSIA) purposes, CSE assess its current sources of CSIA information—that are acquired outside of an Authorization—for interference with the reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or person in Canada.
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Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that section 27 of the CSE Act be amended to permit the Minister to authorize CSE to acquire information that is necessary for CSE’s cybersecurity and information assurance aspect (but which may contain information that interferes with the reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or person in Canada, or contravene an Act of Parliament), from sources other than federal information infrastructures and systems of importance to the Government of Canada. |
NSIRA found that CBSA policy does not require any documented approval or a documented assessment of the risks of using a CHS outside of the registration process.
NSIRA found that there was incomplete documentation in the preregistration period such that the CHS Program is impeded from monitoring the full spectrum of CHS Program activities.
NSIRA found that CBSA’s policies and practices around obtaining informed consent are insufficient to ensure that it is obtained systematically, and before individuals incur the risks of providing information in confidence to CBSA.
NSIRA found that measures to mitigate risks to CHSs are often not present or implemented.
NSIRA found that CBSA may have breached the law of informer privilege in two instances.
NSIRA found that Inland Enforcement Officers collected information and promised confidentiality, but did so without training under the applicable policy to support a proper understanding of the consequences of extending confidentiality.
NSIRA found that CBSA’s approach to risk management in their new policy suite does not fully align with principles in the MD.
NSIRA found that the information CBSA will provide to the Minister as required by Ministerial Direction is not sufficient to convey the size and scope of the Confidential Human Source Program.
NSIRA found that in two cases the CBSA did not comply with subsection 12(2) of the CBSA Act in that it failed to follow the MD’s requirement to inform the Minister when there was a Confidential Human Source activity that “may have significant adverse impact such as impacting the safety of an individual”.
Details |
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Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that CBSA amends its policy to require a documented risk assessment and formal approval for using a CHS in the preregistration period. |
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that CBSA require that the interview checklist be administered no later than when the promise of confidentiality is extended. |
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that CBSA provide guidance as to how obtaining informed consent should be tailored to the individual circumstances of the CHS. |
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that CBSA put in place specific guidance on how to mitigate the full range of risks to CHSs and ensure that those mitigation measures are implemented. |
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends CBSA expand its definition of active Confidential Human Source so that reporting to the Minister covers the breadth of the CHS program. |
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that CBSA immediately notify the Minister of the two cases identified in this review where safety of an individual is at issue. |
NSIRA found that DND/CAF’s policy framework allows human source handling activities that may not be in compliance with the law.
NSIRA found that DND/CAF policy is insufficiently specific with respect to recognizing and avoiding mistreatment risks created by human source handling activities.
NSIRA found that DND/CAF’s risk assessment framework for human source handling operations is inadequate. The current assessments of risk do not provide adequate or reliable information to decision-makers because they:
NSIRA found gaps in the discharge of DND/CAF’s duty of care from engagement of the human source to disengagement. These gaps include:
NSIRA found that the Minister of National Defence is not adequately informed in order to fulfill ministerial accountabilities for human source handling operations.
NSIRA found that further ministerial direction is required to support the governance of DND/CAF’s human source handling program.
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Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that Parliament enact a justification framework to authorize DND/CAF and its sources to commit acts or omissions outside Canada that would otherwise be unlawful, where reasonable for the collection of defence intelligence. |
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that DND/CAF develop policy governance to properly equip Field HUMINT teams to conduct their human source handling activities in compliance with the law. At minimum, this should include:
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Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that DND/CAF adopt an approach for assessing whether its exchanges with human sources create a substantial risk of mistreatment that is specific to human source handling, comprehensive with respect to its obligations in international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and formalized in policy and procedure. |
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that DND/CAF develop a risk assessment framework specific to human source handling, with appropriate doctrinal guidance for the assessment of human sources that includes consideration of all relevant risk factors.
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Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that DND/CAF adopt, in consultation with other departments as necessary, additional measures aimed at ensuring the welfare and protection of their human sources. These measures should be clearly operationalized in governance documents (directives, orders, procedures, etc.) and should address, at minimum, the issues identified in Finding #3. |
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that DND/CAF, in consultation with the Minister of National Defence, improve the content of biannual reports to the Minister to include, at minimum, the legal, policy and governance issues that may impact human source handling operations. |
Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that, with respect to human source handling operations, DND/CAF create official written records of notifications and briefings to the Minister of National Defence, as well as records of decision to improve mutual accountability. |
Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that the Minister of National Defence issue ministerial direction on human source handling to DND/CAF that includes, at minimum:
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NSIRA found that CSE does not routinely share its operational plans and associated risk assessments with CSIS when operating under CSIS authorities. This may leave CSIS unable to fully assess CSE’s activities for compliance.
NSIRA found that close collaboration at the working level created the right conditions for CSIS to monitor CSE’s assistance activities for compliance with warrant conditions.
NSIRA found that CSIS failed to submit an updated request for assistance to CSE in a timely manner when it sought new warrant powers.
NSIRA found that CSE and CSIS did not engage in any joint investigation, assessment, or tracking of a compliance incident.
NSIRA found that CSE and CSIS failed to implement an effective operational framework for their collection activity. This contributed to two instances of non-compliance with the Federal Court’s direction.
NSIRA found that CSE and CSIS identified an effective opportunity to collaborate under their respective mandates and carried out an operation that proved beneficial for both Canada and its allies.
NSIRA found that, while CSIS’s operational framework was sufficient, CSE’s operational framework did not assess legal and policy risk specific to the operation.
NSIRA found that CSE and CSIS did not draft joint terms of engagement, a joint operational plan, or engage in joint risk assessments.
NSIRA found that CSE’s foreignness assessment did not account for the increased risk of targeting Canadians when working with CSIS.
NSIRA found that both CSE and CSIS lack policies, procedures, and accountability mechanisms to govern CSIS lead information messages and associated requests and actions.
NSIRA found that CSIS’s use of lead information messages to share information and make requests about Canadians creates a high risk of potential for non-compliance for CSE.
NSIRA found that CSE’s application of incidental collection provisions may not be appropriate in situations where CSE knows there is a Canadian nexus to a CSIS foreign intelligence lead, and where it knows it is likely to collect Canadian information in pursuing the lead.
NSIRA found that CSE did not comply with section 22(1) of the CSE Act when it [*reviewed the contents*] of a Canadian’s device obtained through a CSIS lead information message.
NSIRA found that CSE did not comply with either section 22(1) of the CSE Act or section 273.64(2)(a) of the National Defence Act (NDA) when it used [*a number of*] complete exceptional reports for foreign intelligence purposes.
NSIRA found that CSE does not consistently utilize its protected entity tool to prevent targeting Canadian identifiers it receives from CSIS.
NSIRA found that while CSIS performs an initial consultation, it does not routinely pursue further engagement with CSE during Threat Reduction Measure activities that could overlap with CSE activities.
NSIRA found that CSE did not notify CSIS in a timely manner of a compliance incident in its Active Cyber Operation, which was connected to a CSIS Threat Reduction Measure.
NSIRA found that CSE failed to cooperate effectively with CSIS, leading to a missed opportunity to advance Canadian intelligence objectives via domestic collaboration.
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Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that CSE share its operational plans and associated risk assessments with CSIS prior to operating under CSIS authorities. |
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that when CSIS engages CSE for assistance with the execution of warranted powers, a CSIS employee be involved to ensure compliance in CSE’s collection activities until the request for assistance has terminated. |
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop a process to ensure that necessary requests for assistance are submitted to CSE in a timely manner subsequent to obtaining warrant powers. |
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends when working under a request for assistance CSIS and CSE develop a framework for joint investigation of potential compliance incidents. |
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that CSIS ensure roles and responsibilities are clearly agreed to prior to allowing partners to execute warrant powers. Where appropriate, these agreements should be shared with the Federal Court. |
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that CSIS ensure it is directly involved in all substantive communications with any partner actively executing its warrant powers. |
Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that CSIS share paragraphs 32 through 41 of this review, along with associated recommendations, with the Federal Court. |
Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that when CSE engages in joint operations with CSIS it should perform risk assessments for each operational activity. These should specifically consider the risk of targeting Canadians and implement proactive measures to mitigate this risk. |
Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that when participating in joint operations, CSE and CSIS either jointly develop or share written terms of engagement, operational plans, and risk assessments. |
Recommendation 10: NSIRA recommends that CSE perform foreignness assessments that account for the increased risk of targeting Canadians when working with CSIS. |
Recommendation 11: NSIRA recommends CSIS cease making requests for action and/or further information to CSE in relation to Canadians or people in Canada via CSIS lead information messages. |
Recommendation 12: NSIRA recommends that CSIS develop policies, procedures, and analyst training to standardize the disclosure of CSIS lead information messages to CSE. |
Recommendation 13: NSIRA recommends that CSE develop policies, procedures, and analyst training to standardize the use of CSIS lead information messages. |
Recommendation 14: NSIRA recommends that CSE develop a regime for collecting, retaining, and reporting to CSIS Canadian information it uncovers further to legitimate foreign intelligence activities where it has advance knowledge of the Canadian information. |
Recommendation 15: NSIRA recommends that CSE update its policies to prohibit the analysis of information relating to a Canadian or person in Canada for the purposes of identifying foreign intelligence. |
Recommendation 16: NSIRA recommends that if CSIS decides to disclose exceptional reporting to CSE, it should extract the relevant foreign intelligence for disclosure as opposed to sending the entire report. |
Recommendation 17: NSIRA recommends that CSE cease using complete exceptional reports from CSIS under its foreign intelligence mandate. |
Recommendation 18: NSIRA recommends that CSE introduce a requirement to always apply the protected entity tool to all Canadian identifiers. |
Recommendation 19: NSIRA recommends that CSIS pursue routine engagement with CSE during the implementation of its Threat Reduction Measures when the potential for operational overlap exists. |
Recommendation 20: NSIRA recommends that CSE share details of potential compliance incidents with CSIS when an overlap may exist with a CSIS Threat Reduction Measure. |
NSIRA found that CSE, CSIS, GAC, and IRCC regularly use the SCIDA in a manner that warrants information sharing arrangements, as encouraged by subsection 4(c) of the SCIDA.
NSIRA found that CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA, as they failed to provide all records created under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) to NSIRA within the legislated timeframe.
NSIRA found improved compliance outcomes in instances where departments prepared record overview spreadsheets under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA that displayed the following characteristics:
NSIRA found that all GC institutions complied with their obligation to prepare and keep records that set out the information prescribed under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA.
NSIRA found that more than half of the descriptions provided by CBSA and IRCC under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA did not explicitly address their satisfaction that the disclosure was authorized under paragraph 5(1)(b), the proportionality test.
NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that disclosing institutions demonstrated they had satisfied themselves of both the contribution and proportionality tests, in compliance with subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA.
NSIRA found that GAC satisfied itself under the SCIDA’s paragraph 5(1)(a) contribution test based on an incorrect understanding of the recipient’s national security mandate in two cases.
NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that CBSA and GAC (in one and two disclosures, respectively) were non-compliant with the SCIDA’s subsection 5(2) requirement to provide a statement regarding accuracy and reliability.
NSIRA found, in relation to the remaining disclosures within the sample, that GAC, IRCC, and RCMP included their statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the disclosures themselves, whereas CBSA provided its statements in the disclosures’ cover letters.
NSIRA found that DND/CAF destroyed information under the SCIDA subsection 5.1(1), but they were non-compliant with the requirement to do so “as soon as feasible after receiving it.”
NSIRA found delays between when a disclosure was authorized for sending and when it was received by the individual designated by the head of the recipient institution to receive it in at least 20% (n=34) of disclosures.
Details |
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Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that information sharing arrangements be used to govern regular SCIDA disclosures between GAC and CSIS; IRCC and CSIS; as well as IRCC and CSE. |
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that all GC institutions prepare record overviews to clearly address the requirements of subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA; and provide them to NSIRA along with a copy of the disclosure itself and, where relevant, a copy of the request. |
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that disclosing institutions explicitly address the requirements of both paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the records that they prepare under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA. |
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that GC institutions contemplating the use of proactive disclosures under the SCIDA communicate with the recipient institution, ahead of making the disclosure, to inform their assessments under subsection 5(1). |
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that all disclosing institutions include statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the same document as the disclosed information. |
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that GC institutions review their administrative processes for sending and receiving disclosures under the SCIDA, and correct practices that cause delays. |
NSIRA found that all departments, with the exception of DFO in respect of subsection 7(1), complied with the reporting requirements set out in the ACA.
NSIRA found that all departments had frameworks to govern their implementation of the ACA and its associated directions by the end of 2022.
NSIRA found that most departments demonstrated continual refinements of their ACA frameworks based on self-identified gaps, NSIRA recommendations, and community-wide coordination efforts.
NSIRA found that TC’s ACA governance framework did not include policies and procedures for:
NSIRA found that all departments, with the exception of DFO, GAC, PS, and TC, used country and/or entity risk assessments to inform their assessments of substantial risk of mistreatment and corresponding case escalation.
NSIRA found that departments’ country risk assessments were inconsistent with one another.
NSIRA found that the simultaneous conduct of independent human rights risk assessments in different departments reflected a substantial duplication of effort across the GC, and created the opportunity for discrepant outcomes.
NSIRA found, for the fourth consecutive year, that no departments escalated cases to their deputy heads for determination or decision.
NSIRA found that some high-risk sharing activities were stopped prior to escalation for consideration of possible mitigations.
NSIRA found that certain departments’ ACA governance frameworks and risk assessment methodologies included features that may systematically under-assess the level of risk involved in a transaction. These features include:
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Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that TC update its ACA governance framework to include policies and procedures for:
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Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that the Government of Canada designate a body responsible for developing:
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Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that departments apply the “substantial risk” threshold in a manner consistent with the definition adopted government-wide; and that departments whose broader policy frameworks do not yet reflect this definition (CBSA, CRA, IRCC, and TC) make the attendant updates. |
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that departmental assessments of substantial risk of mistreatment be grounded in countries’ human rights records; and that subsequent entity-level considerations be based on validated, current, and consistent respect for caveats and assurances, rather than the absence of derogatory information particular to that entity or other bilateral considerations. |
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that all ACA governance frameworks incorporate layered checks and balances in the risk assessment and escalation of cases that may involve substantial risk of mistreatment. |
INTAKE INQUIRIES | 135 | |||||
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New complaints filed | 26 | |||||
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), section 16, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) complaints | 18 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 17, Communications Security Establishment (CSE) complaints | 5 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances | 3 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 19, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) referred complaints | 0 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 19, Citizenship Act | 0 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 45, Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) referrals | 0 | |||||
Accepted jurisdiction to investigate | 8 | |||||
Accepted | Declined | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints | 6 | 17 | ||||
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints | 1 | 4 | ||||
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances | 0 | 1 | ||||
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints | 1 | 0 | ||||
Total | 8 | 22 | ||||
Active investigations as of December 31, 2023 | 17 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints | 8 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints | 1 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances | 4 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints | 3 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 19, continuation of investigation (RCMP referred complaint)a | 1 | |||||
Informal resolution in progress as of December 31, 2023 | 1 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints) | 0 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints) | 0 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances) | 1 | |||||
NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints) | 0 | |||||
Total investigations closed | 12 | |||||
Abandoned | Final Report | Resolved Informally | Withdrawn | |||
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints | 0 | 4 | 3 | 0 | ||
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ||
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ||
NSIRA Act, section 45, CHRC referrals | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
Total | 1 | 7 | 4 | 0 | ||
a First final report was issued in 2022. The continuation is a remaining issue. |
Date of Publishing:
This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards, GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2024–2025 Main Estimates.
This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament. Established in July 2019, NSIRA is responsible for conducting reviews of the Government of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. NSIRA also hears public complaints regarding key national security agencies and their activities.
The NSIRA Secretariat supports the Agency in the delivery of its mandate. Independent scrutiny contributes to strengthening the accountability framework for national security and intelligence activities and to enhancing public confidence. Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable, and necessary
A summary description NSIRA’s program activities can be found in Part II of the Main Estimates. Information on NSIRA’s mandate can be found on its website.
This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the agency’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the agency, consistent with the 2024–2025 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special-purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.
The authority of Parliament is required before money can be spent by the government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authorities for specific purposes.
This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended June 30, 2024.
NSIRA Secretariat spent approximately 19% of its authorities by the end of the first quarter, compared with 19% in the same quarter of 2023–2024 (see graph 1).
2024-25 | 2023-24 | |
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Total Authorities | $18.4 | $23.0 |
Q1 Expenditures | $3.5 | $4.3 |
As of June 30, 2024, Parliament had approved $18.4 million in total authorities for use by NSIRA Secretariat for 2024–2025 compared with $23.0 million as of June 30, 2023, for a net decrease of $4.6 million or 20.0% (see graph 2).
Fiscal year 2023-24 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2024 | Fiscal year 2024-25 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2025 | |
---|---|---|
Vote 1 – Operating | 21.3 | 16.8.3 |
Statutory | 1.8 | 1.6 |
Total budgetary authorities | 23.0 | 18.4 |
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
The decrease of $4.6 million in authorities is mostly explained by a reduction in capital funding for infrastructure projects.
The first quarter expenditures totalled $3.5 million for a decrease of $0.8 million when compared with $4.3 million spent during the same period in 2023–2024. Table 1 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) | Fiscal year 2024–25: expended during the quarter ended June 30, 2024 | Fiscal year 2023–24: expended during the quarter ended June 30, 2023 | Variance $ | Variance % |
---|---|---|---|---|
Personnel | 3,008 | 2,886 | 122 | 4% |
Transportation and communications | 58 | 130 | (72) | (55%) |
Information | 6 | 0 | 6 | 100% |
Professional and special services | 269 | 1,165 | (896) | (77%) |
Rentals | 25 | 48 | (23) | (48%) |
Repair and maintenance | 3 | 24 | (21) | (88%) |
Utilities, materials, and supplies | 28 | 7 | 21 | 300% |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 12 | 48 | (36) | (75%) |
Other subsidies and payments | 79 | 4 | 75 | 1875% |
Total gross budgetary expenditures | 3,488 | 4,312 | (824) | (19%) |
The decrease of $72,000 is explained by a change in the timing of invoicing for the internet connection.
The decrease of $896,000 is mainly explained by a change in the timing of the billing for maintenance and services in support of our classified IT network infrastructure.
The decrease of $23,000 is explained by a decrease in cost for the rent for temporary office space.
The decrease of $21,000 is explained by a one-time maintenance contract purchased in fiscal year 2023-2024.
The increase of $21,000 is explained by unreconciled acquisition card purchases.
The decrease of $36,000 is explained by a one-time purchase of a specialized laptop along with a wall mounted charging station and warranty in 2023-2024.
The increase of $75,000 is explained by an increase in salary overpayments.
There is a risk that the funding received to offset pay increases anticipated over the coming year will be insufficient to cover the costs of such increases and the year-over-year cost of services provided by other government departments/agencies is increasing significantly.
NSIRA Secretariat is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner and continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls.
Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA Secretariat’s approach and timelines for the execution of its mandated activities.
Mr. Charles Fugère was appointed by the Governor-in-Council to be Executive Director of the NSIRA Secretariat on an interim basis on June 3, 2024.
Mr. Marc-André Cloutier, NSIRA Secretariat’s Director General, Corporate Services and CFO since 2023, retired in Q4 of 2023-2024. He has been replaced by Mr. Martyn Turcotte.
Charles Fugère
Executive Director
Amanda Wark
A/Chief Financial Officer
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2024–25 | Fiscal year 2023–24 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2025 (note 1) | Used during the quarter ended June 30, 2024 | Year to date used at quarter-end | Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2024 (note 1) | Used during the quarter ended June 30, 2023 | Year to date used at quarter-end | |
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures | 16,810 | 3,088 | 3,088 | 21,254 | 3,873 | 3,873 |
Budgetary statutory authorities | ||||||
Contributions to employee benefit plans | 1,601 | 400 | 400 | 1,755 | 439 | 439 |
Total budgetary authorities (note 2) | 18,411 | 3,488 | 3,488 | 23,009 | 4,312 | 4,312 |
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2024–25 | Fiscal year 2023–24 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2025 (note 1) | Expended during the quarter ended June 30, 2024 | Year to date used at quarter-end | Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2024 | Expended during the quarter ended June 30, 2023 | Year to date used at quarter-end | |
Expenditures | ||||||
Personnel | 13,205 | 3,088 | 3,088 | 13,303 | 2,886 | 2,886 |
Transportation and communications | 685 | 58 | 58 | 650 | 130 | 130 |
Information | 76 | 6 | 6 | 372 | 0 | 0 |
Professional and special services | 3,577 | 269 | 269 | 3,596 | 1,165 | 1,165 |
Rentals | 309 | 25 | 25 | 271 | 48 | 48 |
Repair and maintenance | 436 | 3 | 3 | 4,580 | 24 | 24 |
Utilities, materials, and supplies | 58 | 28 | 28 | 73 | 7 | 7 |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 65 | 12 | 12 | 132 | 48 | 48 |
Other subsidies and payments | 0 | 79 | 79 | 33 | 4 | 4 |
Total gross budgetary expenditures (note 2) |
18,411 | 3,488 | 3,488 | 23,009 | 4,312 | 4,312 |
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Date of Publishing:
Dear Prime Minister,
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) has initiated a review of the production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference in the 43rd and 44th Canadian federal elections, including how intelligence was communicated across agencies, departments and other groups in the Government of Canada.
The Right Honourable David Johnston, in his capacity as the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference (ISR), noted in his May 23, 2023 report that he was “given access to any Cabinet documents relevant to the foreign interference issues” in the scope of his review. He further recommended that the government disclose to NSIRA those Cabinet confidences provided to him for his review. The government has accepted this recommendation.
The scope of NSIRA’s review is distinct from the scope of the ISR’s review. In order to ensure the integrity of our review and not limit or influence our evidence base, NSIRA must have access to all documents contained in any class of documents provided, rather than a subset of these documents.
Therefore, NSIRA respectfully requests that all Cabinet confidence documents related to our review be released to us, and that all documents provided during the course of this review be without redaction for Cabinet confidence.
NSIRA recognizes the exceptional nature of this request and appreciates the significance of disclosing the requested documents. We look forward to your assistance in enabling NSIRA to access all requested documents, and to fulfilling the objectives of our independent review.
Yours sincerely,
The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
NSIRA considers transparency and independence to be fundamental values at the core of its mandate. While safeguarding information that could compromise national security, NSIRA is committed to transparency and promoting democratic accountability in every possible way through its work. Through its reviews, NSIRA acts as proxy for the public and serves to enhance the trust in Canada’s oversight and review mechanisms. NSIRA has designed, scoped, and begun its review on foreign interference in the 43rd and 44th Canadian federal elections exercising this independence. In the spirit of transparency and clarity, NSIRA underscores that while the subject matter of NSIRA’s review overlaps with matters contained in NSICOP’s ongoing review and the Independent Special Rapporteur’s (ISR) report of 23 May 2023, NSIRA’s review has a different scope and follows NSIRA’s own methodology as demonstrated by its published Terms of Reference . While there may be an opportunity in NSIRA’s final report to note any observations or findings related to the ISR’s work, the purpose of NSIRA’s report is to present findings and recommendations from NSIRA’s review.
NSIRA notes that the ISR suggested that “all the documents that were provided to (him) should be provided to NSICOP and NSIRA for them to review comprehensively and identify any different conclusions than (his).” Subsequently, the government provided NSIRA with a limited number of documents originally withheld for Cabinet Confidence. In all its reviews, NSIRA requires reviewees to adhere to the NSIRA Expectations for Responsiveness in Reviews. This expectation goes to NSIRA’s independence and to the integrity of its reviews. If NSIRA is to review Cabinet confidences, it must be able to review all Cabinet confidences relevant to its review. The NSIRA Chair has sent a letter to the Prime Minister requesting that all Cabinet confidence documents related to NSIRA’s review be released to the Review Agency, and that all documents provided during the course of the review be without redaction for Cabinet confidence. A copy of that letter is published on NSIRA’s website, available online here.
Contact
For more information, please contact:
Media Relations
NSIRA
media-medias@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca
On April 26, NSIRA provided its Special Report on the Government of Canada’s production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference in the 43rd and 44th Canadian federal elections to the Prime Minister.
The Special Report is a redacted version of the classified report initially sent to the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Public Safety, National Defence and Foreign Affairs on March 5.
As required by section 52(1)(b) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA consulted with deputy heads of each department and agency involved in the review to ensure that the Special Report does not contain injurious or privileged information.
From the outset of its review, while working independently from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), NSIRA ensured there was no unnecessary duplication of work between the two review bodies.
In line with obligations under the NSIRA Act, the Special Report must be tabled in each House of Parliament within the first 15 days on which that House is sitting.
Owing to parliamentary privilege, NSIRA will not comment on the contents of its report until this special report is tabled in Parliament.
Recognizing the importance of this topic to Canadians, NSIRA made every effort to draft the report in a manner that would be largely releasable. Once it is tabled in Parliament, NSIRA will promptly share the Special Report with the public through its website, ensuring transparency and public awareness.
Date of Publishing:
This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards, GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2024–25 Main Estimates.
This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament. Established in July 2019, NSIRA reviews Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary. The Agency also investigates complaints from members of the public on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as certain other national security-related complaints, independently and in a timely manner.
The NSIRA Secretariat supports the Agency in the delivery of its mandate. Independent scrutiny contributes to strengthening the accountability framework for national security and intelligence activities and to enhancing public confidence. Ministers and Canadians are informed whether national security and intelligence activities undertaken by Government of Canada institutions are lawful, reasonable, and necessary
A summary description NSIRA’s program activities can be found in Part II of the Main Estimates. Information on NSIRA’s mandate can be found on its website.
This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the secretariat’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the secretariat, consistent with the 2024–2025 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special-purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.
The authority of Parliament is required before money can be spent by the government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authorities for specific purposes.
The Secretariat uses the full accrual method of accounting to prepare and present its annual departmental financial statements that are part of the departmental results reporting process. However, the spending authorities voted by Parliament remain on an expenditure basis.
This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended December 31, 2024.
NSIRA Secretariat spent approximately 63% of its authorities by the end of the third quarter, compared with 52% in the same quarter of 2023–2024 (see graph 1).
2024-25 | 2023-24 | |
---|---|---|
Total Authorities | $20.5 | $24.4 |
Q3 Expenditures | $4.2 | $4.8 |
Year-to-Date Expenditures | $13.0 | $12.8 |
As of December 31, 2024, Parliament had approved $20.5 million in total authorities for use by NSIRA Secretariat for 2024–2025 compared with $24.4 million as of December 31, 2023, for a net decrease of $3.9 million or 16.1% (see graph 2).
Fiscal year 2023-24 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2024 | Fiscal year 2024-25 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2025 | |
---|---|---|
Vote 1 – Operating | 22.6 | 18.9 |
Statutory | 1.8 | 1.6 |
Total budgetary authorities | 24.4 | 20.5 |
The decrease of $3.9 million in authorities is mostly due to the end of several infrastructure projects that had required substantial funding in 2023-2024. No equivalent projects have been planned for 2024-2025, leading to a natural decrease in the authorizations allocated to this expenditure.
The third quarter expenditures totalled $4.2 million for a decrease of $0.6 million compared to $4.8 million spent during the same period in 2023–2024. Table 1 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) | Fiscal year 2024–25: expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2024 | Fiscal year 2023–24: expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2023 | Variance $ | Variance % |
---|---|---|---|---|
Personnel | 3,584 | 2,866 | 718 | 25% |
Transportation and communications | 131 | 110 | 21 | 19% |
Information | 15 | 1 | 14 | 1400% |
Professional and special services | 437 | 486 | (49) | (10%) |
Rentals | 40 | 78 | (38) | (49%) |
Repair and maintenance | 27 | 1,161 | (1,134) | (98%) |
Utilities, materials and supplies | (11) | (1) | (10) | 1000% |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 0 | 83 | (83) | (100%) |
Other subsidies and payments | 15 | (33) | 48 | (145%) |
Total gross budgetary expenditures | 4,238 | 4,751 | (513) | (11%) |
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
The increase of $718,000 is attributable to the addition of FTEs to meet increased demand, and to higher average salaries as a result of collective bargaining increases.
The increase of $14,000 is explained by a one-time purchase of name plates and the hiring of a communications consultant.
The decrease of $38,000 is explained by a decrease in software maintenance fees.
The decrease of $1,134,000 is due to invoices related to a capital infrastructure project that was completed in 2023-24.
The decrease of $83,000 is explained by one-time purchases of application software and device lockers in 2023-24.
The increase of $48,000 is explained by a change in the timing of salary overpayment recoveries.
The year-to-date expenditures totalled $13.0 million for an increase of $0.2 million (1%) compared to $12.8 million spent during the same period in 2023- 2024. Table 2 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Variances in expenditures by standard object (in thousands of dollars) | Fiscal year 2024–25: year-to-date expenditures as of December 31, 2024 | Fiscal year 2023–24: year-to-date expenditures as of December 31, 2023 | Variance $ | Variance % |
---|---|---|---|---|
Personnel | 10,448 | 8,766 | 1,682 | 19% |
Transportation and communications | 266 | 302 | (36) | (12%) |
Information | 28 | 5 | 23 | 460% |
Professional and special services | 2,026 | 2,155 | (129) | (6%) |
Rentals | 82 | 151 | (69) | (46%) |
Repair and maintenance | 67 | 1,188 | (1,121) | (94%) |
Utilities, materials and supplies | 29 | 56 | (27) | (48%) |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 20 | 135 | (115) | (85%) |
Other subsidies and payments | 56 | 89 | (33) | (37%) |
Total gross budgetary expenditures | 13,022 | 12,847 | 175 | 1% |
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
The increase of $1,682,000 reflects management’s decision to increase FTEs to enhance operational capacity in response to greater demand for output. It is also a result of an increase in average salary due to alignment with increases approved as part of collective bargaining.
The increase of $23,000 is due to increased use of a communications consultant and printing services.
The decrease of $69,000 is due to a 3-year pre-paid software licence in 2023-24 and the timing of invoicing for the maintenance fees associated to the financial system.
The decrease of $1,121,000 is due to invoicing for a capital infrastructure project that was completed in 2023-24.
The decrease of $27,000 is due to a decrease in unreconciled acquisition card payments.
The decrease of $115,000 is mainly explained by one-time purchases of application software in 2023-24.
The decrease of $33,000 is explained by a change in the timing of salary overpayment recoveries.
There is a risk that the funds received to compensate for salary increases will be insufficient to cover the costs, and that the annual cost of services provided by other government departments and agencies will increase significantly. To mitigate these risks, the NSIRA Secretariat forecasts personnel and operating expenses over a period of three fiscal years, and identifies critical functions.
The NSIRA Secretariat closely monitors payroll transactions to identify and quickly correct any shortfalls or overruns. It continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls such as participation in PSPC’s Reconciliation Tool (RT) initiative. Mitigation measures for the risks described above have been defined, and are reflected in the NSIRA Secretariat’s approach and timetable for carrying out its mandated activities.
There have been no changes to the NSIRA Secretariat Program.
Charles Fugère
Executive Director
Martyn Turcotte
Chief Financial Officer
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2024–25 | Fiscal year 2023–24 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2025 (note 1) | Used during the quarter ended December 31, 2024 | Year to date used at quarter-end | Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2024 (note 1) | Used during the quarter ended December 31, 2023 | Year to date used at quarter-end | |
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures | 18,856 | 3,838 | 11,821 | 22,633 | 4,313 | 11,531 |
Budgetary statutory authorities | ||||||
Contributions to employee benefit plans | 1,601 | 400 | 1,201 | 1,755 | 438 | 1,316 |
Total budgetary authorities (note 2) | 20,457 | 4,238 | 13,022 | 24,388 | 4,751 | 12,847 |
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2024–25 | Fiscal year 2023–24 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2025 (note 1) | Expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2024 | Year-to-date used at quarter-end | Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2024 (note 1) | Expended during the quarter ended December 31, 2023 | Year-to-date used at quarter-end | |
Expenditures | ||||||
Personnel | 14,211 | 3,584 | 10,448 | 13,372 | 2,866 | 8,766 |
Transportation and communications | 685 | 131 | 266 | 650 | 110 | 302 |
Information | 76 | 15 | 28 | 371 | 1 | 5 |
Professional and special services | 4,617 | 437 | 2,026 | 4,906 | 486 | 2,155 |
Rentals | 309 | 40 | 82 | 271 | 78 | 151 |
Repair and maintenance | 436 | 27 | 67 | 4,580 | 1,161 | 1,188 |
Utilities, materials and supplies | 58 | (11) | 29 | 73 | (1) | 56 |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 65 | 0 | 20 | 132 | 83 | 135 |
Other subsidies and payments | 0 | 15 | 56 | 33 | (33) | 89 |
Total gross budgetary expenditures (note 2) |
20,457 | 4,238 | 13,022 | 24,388 | 4,751 | 12,847 |
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
Date of Publishing:
This quarterly report has been prepared by management as required by section 65.1 of the Financial Administration Act and in the form and manner prescribed by the Directive on Accounting Standards, GC 4400 Departmental Quarterly Financial Report. This quarterly financial report should be read in conjunction with the 2023–24 Main Estimates.
This quarterly report has not been subject to an external audit or review.
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament. Established in July 2019, NSIRA is responsible for conducting reviews of the Government of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. NSIRA also hears public complaints regarding key national security agencies and their activities.
A summary description NSIRA’s program activities can be found in Part II of the Main Estimates. Information on NSIRA’s mandate can be found on its website.
This quarterly report has been prepared by management using an expenditure basis of accounting. The accompanying Statement of Authorities includes the agency’s spending authorities granted by Parliament and those used by the agency, consistent with the 2023–24 Main Estimates. This quarterly report has been prepared using a special-purpose financial reporting framework (cash basis) designed to meet financial information needs with respect to the use of spending authorities.
The authority of Parliament is required before money can be spent by the government. Approvals are given in the form of annually approved limits through appropriation acts or through legislation in the form of statutory spending authorities for specific purposes.
This section highlights the significant items that contributed to the net increase or decrease in authorities available for the year and actual expenditures for the quarter ended September 30, 2023.
NSIRA Secretariat spent approximately 33% of its authorities by the end of the second quarter, compared with 23% in the same quarter of 2022–23 (see graph 1).
2023-24 | 2022-23 | |
---|---|---|
Total Authorities | $24.3 | $29.7 |
Q2 Expenditures | $3.8 | $3.6 |
Year-to-Date Expenditures | $8.1 | $6.9 |
As at September 30, 2023, Parliament had approved $24.3 million in total authorities for use by NSIRA Secretariat for 2023–24 compared with $29.7 million as of September 30th, 2022, for a net decrease of $5.4 million or 18.2% (see graph 2).
Fiscal year 2022-23 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2023 | Fiscal year 2023-24 total available for use for the year ended March 31, 2024 | |
---|---|---|
Vote 1 – Operating | 28.0 | 22.6 |
Statutory | 1.7 | 1.7 |
Total budgetary authorities | 29.7 | 24.3 |
*Details may not sum to totals due to rounding*
The decrease of $5.4 million in authorities is mostly explained by a gradual reduction in NSIRA Secretariat’s ongoing operating funding due to an ongoing construction project nearing completion.
The second quarter expenditures totalled $3.8 million for an increase of $0.2 million when compared with $3.6 million spent during the same period in 2022–2023. Table 1 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Variances in expenditures by standard object(in thousands of dollars) | Fiscal year 2023–24: expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2023 | Fiscal year 2022–23: expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2022 | Variance $ | Variance % |
---|---|---|---|---|
Personnel | 3,014 | 2,903 | 111 | 4% |
Transportation and communications | 62 | 70 | (8) | (11%) |
Information | 4 | 0 | 4 | 100% |
Professional and special services | 504 | 578 | (74) | (13%) |
Rentals | 25 | 39 | (14) | (36%) |
Repair and maintenance | 3 | 33 | (30) | (91%) |
Utilities, materials and supplies | 50 | 12 | 38 | 317% |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0% |
Other subsidies and payment | 118 | 3 | 115 | 3833% |
Total gross budgetary expenditures | 3,784 | 3,642 | 142 | 4% |
The decrease of $30,000 is due to the timing of invoicing for an ongoing capital project.
The increase of $38,000 is due to a temporarily unreconciled suspense account.
The increase of $115,000 is explained by an increase in payroll system overpayments which were subsequently resolved.
The year-to-date expenditures totalled $8.1 million for an increase of $1.1 million (17%) when compared with $6.9 million spent during the same period in 2022–23. Table 2 presents budgetary expenditures by standard object.
Variances in expenditures by standard object(in thousands of dollars) | Fiscal year 2023–24: year-to-date expenditures as of September 30, 2023 | Fiscal year 2022–23: year-to-date expenditures as of September 30, 2022 | Variance $ | Variance % |
---|---|---|---|---|
Personnel | 5,900 | 5,248 | 652 | 12% |
Transportation and communications | 192 | 114 | 78 | 68% |
Information | 4 | 5 | (1) | (20%) |
Professional and special services | 1,669 | 1,424 | 245 | 17% |
Rentals | 73 | 49 | 24 | 49% |
Repair and maintenance | 27 | 64 | (37) | (58%) |
Utilities, materials and supplies | 57 | 28 | 29 | 104% |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 52 | 13 | 39 | 300% |
Other subsidies and payment | 122 | 1 | 121 | 12100% |
Total gross budgetary expenditures | 8,096 | 6,946 | 1,150 | 17% |
The increase of $652,000 relates to an increase in average salary and an increase in full time equivalent (FTE) positions.
The increase of $78,000 is due to the timing of invoicing for the organization’s internet connections.
The increase of $245,000 is explained by an increase in IT support costs and guard services associated to a capital construction project.
The decrease of $37,000 is due to the timing of invoicing for an ongoing capital project.
The increase of $29,000 is due to a temporarily unreconciled suspense account.
The increase of $39,000 is mainly explained by the one-time purchase of a specialized laptop.
The increase of $121,000 is explained by an increase in payroll system overpayments which were subsequently resolved.
The Secretariat assisted NSIRA in its work with the departments and agencies subjected to reviews to ensure a timely and unfettered access to all the information necessary for the conduct of reviews. While work remains to be done on this front, we acknowledge the improvements in cooperation and support to the independent review process demonstrated by some reviewees.
There is a risk that the funding received to offset pay increases anticipated over the coming year will be insufficient to cover the costs of such increases and the year-over-year cost of services provided by other government departments/agencies is increasing significantly.
NSIRA Secretariat is closely monitoring pay transactions to identify and address over and under payments in a timely manner and continues to apply ongoing mitigating controls.
Mitigation measures for the risks outlined above have been identified and are factored into NSIRA Secretariat’s approach and timelines for the execution of its mandated activities.
There have been two new Governor-in-Council appointments during the Second quarter, Ms. Colleen Swords and Mr. Jim Chu.
There have been no changes to the NSIRA Secretariat Program.
John Davies
Deputy Head
Marc-André Cloutier
Director General, Corporate Services, Chief Financial Officer
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2023–24 | Fiscal year 2022–23 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2024 (note 1) | Used during the quarter ended September 30, 2023 | Year to date used at quarter-end | Total available for use for the year ending March 31, 2023 (note 1) | Used during the quarter ended September 30, 2022 | Year to date used at quarter-end | |
Vote 1 – Net operating expenditures | 22,564 | 3,345 | 7,218 | 27,931 | 3,210 | 6,082 |
Budgetary statutory authorities | ||||||
Contributions to employee benefit plans | 1,755 | 439 | 878 | 1,728 | 432 | 864 |
Total budgetary authorities (note 2) | 24,319 | 3,784 | 8,096 | 29,659 | 3,642 | 6,946 |
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal year 2023–24 | Fiscal year 2022–23 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2024 (note 1) | Expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2023 | Year to date used at quarter-end | Planned expenditures for the year ending March 31, 2023 | Expended during the quarter ended September 30, 2022 | Year to date used at quarter-end | |
Expenditures | ||||||
Personnel | 13,303 | 3,014 | 5,900 | 13,245 | 2,903 | 5,248 |
Transportation and communications | 650 | 62 | 192 | 597 | 70 | 114 |
Information | 371 | 4 | 4 | 372 | 0 | 5 |
Professional and special services | 4,906 | 504 | 1,669 | 4,914 | 578 | 1,424 |
Rentals | 271 | 25 | 73 | 271 | 39 | 49 |
Repair and maintenance | 4,580 | 24 | 27 | 9,722 | 33 | 64 |
Utilities, materials and supplies | 73 | 50 | 57 | 173 | 12 | 28 |
Acquisition of machinery and equipment | 132 | 4 | 52 | 232 | 4 | 13 |
Other subsidies and payments | 33 | 118 | 122 | 133 | 3 | 1 |
Total gross budgetary expenditures (note 2) |
24,319 | 3,784 | 8,096 | 29,659 | 3,642 | 6,946 |
Note 1: Includes only authorities available for use and granted by Parliament as at quarter-end.
Note 2: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Date of Publishing:
CBSA | Canada Border Services Agency |
CFIA | Canadian Food Inspection Agency |
CNSC | Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission |
CRA | Canada Revenue Agency |
CSE | Communications Security Establishment |
CSIS | Canadian Security Intelligence Service |
DND/CAF | Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces |
FINTRAC | Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada |
GAC | Global Affairs Canada |
GC | Government of Canada |
IRCC | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada |
NSIRA | National Security and Intelligence Review Agency |
PHAC | Public Health Agency of Canada |
PS | Public Safety Canada |
RCMP | Royal Canadian Mounted Police |
SCIDA | Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act |
TC | Transport Canada |
Contribution test | The first part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (paragraph 5(1)(a)). |
Proportionality test | The second part of the two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure under the SCIDA: it must be satisfied that the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances (paragraph 5(1)(b)). |
This review provides an overview of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)’s use in 2022. In doing so, it documents the volume and nature of information disclosures made under the SCIDA; assesses compliance with the SCIDA; and highlights patterns in the SCIDA’s use across Government of Canada (GC) institutions and over time.
In 2022, four disclosing institutions made a total of 173 disclosures to five recipient institutions. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) found that institutions complied with the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in relation to the majority of these disclosures. Instances of non-compliance related to subsection 9(3), regarding the timeliness of records copied to NSIRA; subsection 5.1(1), regarding the timeliness of destruction or return of personal information; and subsection 5(2), regarding the provision of a statement on accuracy and reliability. The observed non-compliance did not point to any systemic failures in GC institutions’ implementation of the SCIDA.
NSIRA also made findings in relation to practices that, although compliant with the SCIDA, left room for improvement. These findings related to:
NSIRA made six recommendations designed to increase standardization across the GC in a manner that is consistent with institutions’ demonstrated best practices and the SCIDA’s guiding principles.
Overall, NSIRA observed improvements in reviewee performance as compared with findings from prior years’ reports and over the course of the review. These improvements include corrective actions taken by reviewees in response to NSIRA’s requests for information in support of this review.
This review was conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) and subsection 39(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act).
This review provides an overview of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)’s use in 2022. In doing so, it:
The review’s scope was defined by records provided to NSIRA under the SCIDA, subsection 9(3) (see Annex A for a copy of institutions’ section 9 obligations under the Act). As such, the review’s assessment of compliance was limited to the seven GC institutions identified within these records as either disclosers or recipients (Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA], Communications Security Establishment [CSE], Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS], Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces [DND/CAF], Global Affairs Canada [GAC], Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC], and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]); and to instances of information disclosure where the SCIDA was identified by these institutions as an authority for disclosure. The review also included Public Safety Canada (PS) in its capacity as manager of the Strategic Coordination Centre on Information Sharing, which provides SCIDA-related policy guidance and training across the GC.
The review satisfies the NSIRA Act’s section 39 requirement for NSIRA to report to the Minister of Public Safety on disclosures made under the SCIDA during the previous calendar year.
The review’s primary source of information was records provided to NSIRA by disclosing and recipient institutions under the SCIDA, subsection 9(3). NSIRA also identified a targeted sample of disclosures for which it requested and assessed all associated documents provided by both the disclosing and recipient institution. This information was supplemented by a document review of institutions’ SCIDA policies and procedures, and related explanations.
NSIRA assessed administrative compliance with the SCIDA’s record-keeping obligations in relation to all disclosures identified in the records provided to NSIRA under subsection 9(3) (N=173). Where these records were incomplete, NSIRA provided an opportunity for institutions to supply the missing records. NSIRA accounted for such late submissions in its assessment of compliance with subsections 9(1) and 9(2).
NSIRA assessed substantive compliance with the SCIDA’s disclosure requirements in relation to the sample of disclosures (n=19). The sample was designed to reflect a non-representative cross-section of the SCIDA’s use, with particular attention to areas at higher risk of non-compliance. Disclosures were selected for the sample based on the content of records provided to NSIRA under subsection 9(3), according to defined parameters (see Annex B, Sample of Disclosures).
NSIRA found that, overall, its expectations for responsiveness by CSE, CSIS, DND/CAF, GAC, IRCC, PS, and RCMP during this review were met. Its expectations for responsiveness by CBSA were partially met, as CBSA required repeated follow-up to provide the requested information.
NSIRA was able to verify information for this review in a manner that met NSIRA’s expectations.
The SCIDA provides an explicit, stand-alone authority to disclose information between GC institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine its security. Its stated purpose is to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.
Section 9 of the SCIDA prescribes record-keeping obligations for all institutions who (1) disclose or (2) receive information under the Act. Each paragraph under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) identifies particular elements that must be set out in the records prepared and kept by each institution (see Annex A). Subsection 9(3) requires that these records be provided to NSIRA within 30 days after the end of each calendar year.
Subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA authorizes GC institutions to disclose information – subject to any prohibitions or restrictions in other legislation or regulations – to designated recipient institutions, if the disclosing institution is satisfied that (a) the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (the “contribution test”); and (b) the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances (the “proportionality test”).
Subsection 5(2) requires institutions that disclose information under subsection (1) to, at the time of the disclosure, also provide information regarding its accuracy and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained.
When a GC institution receives information under the Act, subsection 5.1(1) requires that the institution destroy or return any unnecessary personal information as soon as feasible after receiving it.
The Act’s guiding principles underscore the importance of effectiveness and responsibility across disclosure activities. Of note, subsection 4(c) sets out that information sharing arrangements are appropriate in particular circumstances.
In 2022, four disclosing institutions made a total of 173 disclosures to five recipient institutions (see Table 1). 79% (n=136) of these disclosures were requested by the recipient institution. The other 21% of disclosures (n=37) were sent proactively by the disclosing institution.
Designated Recipient Institutions | ||||||||||||||||||
Disclosing Institution | CBSA | CFIA | CNSC | CRA | CSE | CSIS | DND/CAF | Finance | FINTRAC | GAC | Health | IRCC | PHAC | PSC | RCMP | TC | TOTAL (proactive) | |
CBSA | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 (3) |
– | 4 (3) |
|
GAC | – | – | – | – | – | 39 (18) |
2 (2) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 (12) |
– | 53 (32) |
|
IRCC | – | – | – | – | 59 (0) |
56 (2) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 115 (2) |
|
RCMP | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 (0) |
– | – | – | – | 1 (0) |
|
TOTAL (proactive) | – | – | – | – | 59 (0) |
95 (20) |
2 (2) |
– | – | – | – | 1 (0) |
– | – | 16 (15) |
– | 173 (37) |
The total number of disclosures made under the SCIDA since its implementation reflects a slight downward trend, with a generally constant proportion of requested versus proactive disclosures for the years in which this data was collected (see Figure 1).
In 2022, these disclosures were made and received by institutions that had each disclosed or received information, as the case may be, in at least two prior review years (see Annex C, Overview of SCIDA Disclosures in Prior Years).
Finding 1: NSIRA found that CSE, CSIS, GAC, and IRCC regularly use the SCIDA in a manner that warrants information sharing arrangements, as encouraged by subsection 4(c) of the SCIDA.
CSE, CSIS, GAC, and IRCC were the most frequent users of the SCIDA in 2022. The number of disclosures between these institutions was comparable to those observed by NSIRA in prior years (see Annex C), indicating the occurrence of regular exchange over time.
NSIRA also observed regular patterns in the purpose and nature of the information exchanged between these institutions in 2022, as described in Table 2. These information exchanges were not governed by up-to-date information sharing arrangements.
GAC-to-CSIS (N=39) | IRCC-to-CSIS (N=56) | IRCC-to-CSE (N=59) |
---|---|---|
|
|
|
NSIRA has previously recommended that information sharing arrangements be updated (for GAC and CSIS) or created (for IRCC and CSE) to govern certain information exchanges made under the SCIDA.
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that information sharing arrangements be used to govern regular SCIDA disclosures between GAC and CSIS; IRCC and CSIS; as well as IRCC and CSE.
Finding 2: NSIRA found that CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA, as they failed to provide all records created under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) to NSIRA within the legislated timeframe.
Requests for information from NSIRA during the course of this review prompted the late production of additional records relating to paragraphs under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) from each of CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC (see Table 3).
Administrative Error | Delayed Preparation of Records | |
---|---|---|
CBSA | 2 [paragraph 9(1)(e)] | – |
DND/CAF | – | 2 [paragraphs 9(2)(e-g)] |
IRCC | 6 [paragraph 9(1)(e)] | 1 [paragraphs 9(2)(e-g)] |
CBSA and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) due to administrative error; the records they eventually supplied had existed at the time of the reporting deadline, but were not copied to NSIRA as required.
NSIRA expected that all records would be prepared within 30 days after the end of the calendar year, in order to meet the subsection 9(3) requirement to provide a copy of those records to NSIRA within that timeframe.
DND/CAF and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) on account of delayed preparation of records; they did not prepare the records referred to in Table 3 within 30 days after the end of the calendar year, and therefore did not provide a copy of them to NSIRA within the legislated timeframe.
NSIRA underscores the importance of administrative precision and timeliness in preparing records and copying them to NSIRA.
Finding 3: NSIRA found improved compliance outcomes in instances where departments prepared record overview spreadsheets under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA that displayed the following characteristics:
The SCIDA does not specify a format for records prepared under section 9. Accordingly, in 2022, GC institutions fulfilled their record-keeping obligations in different ways.
Most institutions provided NSIRA with an overview of each disclosure made or received. These overviews were submitted to NSIRA as spreadsheets that generally captured the information required in records under subsections 9(1) and 9(2).
Most institutions also provided NSIRA with a copy of the disclosure itself and a selection of related documents. These documents often included email consultations with legal services, disclosure request letters, and other correspondence between disclosing and recipient institutions. The scope of requests for information in the course of the review was minimized in cases where institutions provided such documents.
DND/CAF and IRCC (for its one disclosure receipt) were the only institutions that originally provided NSIRA with a copy of the raw disclosure, including transmittal details, in the absence of a record overview or other related documents.
NSIRA observed that DND/CAF and IRCC’s choice in records format for these disclosures contributed to their non-compliance with subsection 9(3), described in Table 3. The information elicited under paragraphs 9(2)(e-g) cannot by definition be found within a copy of the disclosure itself, as it relates to action taken by recipient institutions following the disclosure’s receipt. A copy of the disclosure on its own is therefore insufficient to comply with all requirements under subsection 9(2).
Both DND/CAF and IRCC were infrequent recipients of disclosures under the SCIDA in 2022, accounting for only two and one disclosures, respectively. Each of the more frequent recipients of information (CSE, CSIS, and RCMP) included express columns in their record overview spreadsheets to capture whether and, if applicable, when personal information was destroyed or returned, per the requirements of paragraphs 9(2)(e-g).
NSIRA also observed that CBSA and IRCC’s choice in records format contributed to their non-compliance with subsection 9(3) due to administrative error. These institutions did not account for the full scope of information required under paragraph 9(1)(e) in their record overview spreadsheets.
The information relied upon to satisfy the disclosing institution that a disclosure is authorized under the Act is not required to be conveyed within the disclosure itself. Completing an appropriately-specified record overview spreadsheet is therefore an effective way to ensure that the corresponding information is documented and conveyed to NSIRA ahead of the legislated deadline.
The RCMP’s record overview spreadsheet was particularly effective in demonstrating compliance with the Act. The spreadsheet included columns that were explicitly tied to individual paragraphs under section 9, with additional fields limited to RCMP administrative information such as file and database reference numbers.
Spreadsheets designed in this way enable institutions’ efficient self-assessment against the requirements of the Act. They also facilitate the task of review by clearly matching the information provided with its corresponding requirement under the SCIDA, and by organizing disclosures and receipts of information in a manner that supports cross-verification.
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that all GC institutions prepare record overviews to clearly address the requirements of subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA; and provide them to NSIRA along with a copy of the disclosure itself and, where relevant, a copy of the request.
Finding 4: NSIRA found that all GC institutions complied with their obligation to prepare and keep records that set out the information prescribed under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA.
Finding 5: NSIRA found that more than half of the descriptions provided by CBSA and IRCC under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA did not explicitly address their satisfaction that the disclosure was authorized under paragraph 5(1)(b), the proportionality test.
Although NSIRA expected an express statement describing the information that was relied on to satisfy the disclosing institution that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA, in this review, NSIRA considered any records that demonstrated the corresponding assessment had been conducted.
IRCC n’a pas fait de déclaration expresse précisant que les communications demandées par le SCRS, qui représentent 57 % (n=54) de l’ensemble de ses communications, lui semblaient satisfaisantes du point de vue du critère de proportionnalité. En revanche, IRCC a fourni des copies des lettres de demande et de l’information communiquée en guise de réponse, ce qui confirme que la communication était manifestement conforme aux besoins précis de la demande (et donc témoigne d’une évaluation de la proportionnalité).
L’ASFC n’a pas fourni de déclaration expresse concernant sa satisfaction au regard du critère de proportionnalité pour 75 % (n=3) de ses communications. Elle a plutôt démontré qu’elle tenait compte du principe de proportionnalité en fournissant divers documents justificatifs, y compris de la correspondance interne.
La feuille de calcul utilisée par AMC pour donner une vue d’ensemble de ses documents a été particulièrement efficace pour répondre aux exigences de l’alinéa 9(1)e). L’analyse détaillée qu’elle a consignée en ce qui concerne les critères de contribution et de proportionnalité lui a permis de remplir ses obligations en matière de conservation des dossiers et de démontrer qu’elle respectait en substance le paragraphe 5(1).
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that disclosing institutions explicitly address the requirements of both paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the records that they prepare under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA.
Finding 6: NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that disclosing institutions demonstrated they had satisfied themselves of both the contribution and proportionality tests, in compliance with subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA.
Finding 7: NSIRA found that GAC satisfied itself under the SCIDA’s paragraph 5(1)(a) contribution test based on an incorrect understanding of the recipient’s national security mandate in two cases.
The threshold for compliance with subsection 5(1) is that the disclosing institution has satisfied itself of the contribution and proportionality tests, and that it has done so prior to having made the disclosure.
In relation to the two disclosures that it made proactively to DND/CAF, GAC provided a rationale for the information’s contribution to DND/CAF’s mandate in respect of national security. Upon receipt of the information, however, DND/CAF did not agree with GAC’s assessment and therefore assessed that the SCIDA was not an appropriate disclosure mechanism in the circumstances.
Informal communication between the two institutions may have allowed DND/CAF and GAC to resolve this issue prior to the disclosure. When such communications occur, it is important that they be limited to the information necessary to confirm that the information contributes to the recipient’s mandate in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada.
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that GC institutions contemplating the use of proactive disclosures under the SCIDA communicate with the recipient institution, ahead of making the disclosure, to inform their assessments under subsection 5(1).
Finding 8: NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that CBSA and GAC (in one and two disclosures, respectively) were non-compliant with the SCIDA’s subsection 5(2) requirement to provide a statement regarding accuracy and reliability.
Finding 9: NSIRA found, in relation to the remaining disclosures within the sample, that GAC, IRCC, and RCMP included their statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the disclosures themselves, whereas CBSA provided its statements in the disclosures’ cover letters.
Providing the statement on accuracy and reliability in a cover letter for the disclosure satisfies the Act’s requirement to provide the statement at the time of disclosure. However, separating the statement from the information disclosed increases the risk that the information may be subsequently used without awareness of relevant qualifiers. The location of the statement on accuracy and reliability – and not just its contemporaneous provision to the recipient – is therefore relevant to its value added.
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that all disclosing institutions include statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the same document as the disclosed information.
Finding 10: NSIRA found that DND/CAF destroyed information under the SCIDA subsection 5.1(1), but they were non-compliant with the requirement to do so “as soon as feasible after receiving it.”
DND/CAF determined, upon receipt of the two disclosures it received from GAC, that the personal information contained within the disclosures should not be retained. The information, however, was not destroyed until April 2023 – 12 days following a request for information from NSIRA to provide a copy of records that set out whether and when the information had been destroyed or returned. The date of destruction was 299 and 336 days following DND/CAF’s receipt of each disclosure.
Taking into consideration the elapsed time between receipt of the information and its destruction, as well as DND/CAF’s timely conclusion that the information should not be retained, DND/CAF’s ultimate destruction of the information was non-compliant with the requirement to destroy the information “as soon as feasible after receiving it.” Its delay in this respect was also inconsistent with the responsible use and management of the information.
DND/CAF was the only institution to identify any disclosures as containing information that was destroyed or returned under subsection 5.1(1) in 2022. NSIRA did not identify any other disclosures within the sample for which personal information disclosed should have been destroyed or returned.
Finding 11: NSIRA found delays between when a disclosure was authorized for sending and when it was received by the individual designated by the head of the recipient institution to receive it in at least 20% (n=34) of disclosures.
These 34 disclosures include 29 for which there was a delay between the dates provided by disclosing and recipient institutions in their section 9 records, as well as an additional five for which CSIS reported both the date of administrative receipt within the institution and the subsequent date of receipt by the person designated by the head to receive it (i.e., the relevant operational unit).
NSIRA attributes most of these delays to expected dynamics in classified information sharing: the individual authorizing the disclosure is not always the same individual who administratively sends it to the recipient, and the person who administratively receives the disclosure is not always the same person who is designated by the head to receive it.
In the majority of cases, the observed delays were shorter than one week. In nine cases, however, the delay ranged from 30 to 233 days.
Such delays mean that information is not processed and actioned within the recipient institution until long after it was sent – or intended to be sent – by the individual authorizing the disclosure. While these delays do not amount to non-compliance with the SCIDA, they are inconsistent with the Act’s purpose and guiding principles.
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that GC institutions review their administrative processes for sending and receiving disclosures under the SCIDA, and correct practices that cause delays.
The SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping apply to both disclosing and recipient institutions in all cases where the SCIDA is invoked as a mechanism for disclosure. This review assessed GC institutions’ compliance with requirements for record keeping in respect of all 173 disclosures that were made and received in 2022. It assessed their compliance with requirements for disclosure in relation to a targeted sample of 19 disclosures.
NSIRA found that institutions complied with the SCIDA’s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in relation to the majority of disclosures. GC institutions’ non-compliance with subsection 9(3) was driven by irregularities in the reporting of 11 disclosures. Observed non-compliance with substantive requirements under subsection 5(2) related to three disclosures; and non-compliance with subsection 5.1(1) related to two disclosures. These instances of non-compliance do not point to any systemic failures in GC institutions’ implementation of the SCIDA.
Within this context, NSIRA observed improvements in reviewee performance as compared with findings from prior years’ reports and over the course of the review. Of note, NSIRA’s requests for information in support of this review prompted corrective action by CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC that would have otherwise amounted to non-compliance with requirements under section 9.
NSIRA also observed several practices that, although compliant with the SCIDA, leave room for improvement. NSIRA’s recommendations in this review are designed to increase standardization across the GC in a manner that is consistent with institutions’ demonstrated best practices and the SCIDA’s guiding principles.
Obligation – disclosing institution | Obligation — recipient institution |
---|---|
9 (1) Every Government of Canada institution that discloses information under this Act must prepare and keep records that set out | (2) Every Government of Canada institution that receives information under this Act must prepare and keep records that set out |
(a) a description of the information; | (a) a description of the information; |
(b) the name of the individual who authorized its disclosure; | (b) the name of the institution that disclosed it; |
(c) the name of the recipient Government of Canada institution; | (c) the name or position of the head of the recipient institution — or of the person designated by the head — who received the information; |
(d) the date on which it was disclosed; | (d) the date on which it was received by the recipient institution; |
(e) a description of the information that was relied on to satisfy the disclosing institution that the disclosure was authorized under this Act; and |
(e) whether the information has been destroyed or returned under subsection 5.1(1); (f) if the information has been destroyed under subsection 5.1(1), the date on which it was destroyed; (g) if the information was returned under subsection 5.1(1) to the institution that disclosed it, the date on which it was returned; and |
(f) any other information specified by the regulations. | (h) any other information specified by the regulations. |
Within 30 days after the end of each calendar year, every Government of Canada institution that disclosed information under section 5 during the year and every Government of Canada institution that received such information must provide the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency with a copy of every record it prepared under subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, with respect to the information.
Disclosures were selected for the sample based on the content of records provided to NSIRA under subsection 9(3), according to the following parameters:
Drawing on information published in previous NSIRA reports, Table 5 summarizes the number and distribution of disclosures made under the SCIDA in prior years.
Designated Recipient Institutions | ||||||||||||||||||
Disclosing Institution | CBSA | CFIA | CNSC | CRA | CSE | CSIS | DND/CAF | Finance | FINTRAC | GAC | Health | IRCC | PHAC | PSC | RCMP | TC | TOTAL (proactive) | |
2021 | DND/CAF | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 |
GAC | – | – | – | – | – | 41 | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | – | 44 | |
IRCC | – | – | – | – | 68 | 79 | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 149 | |
TOTAL | – | – | – | – | 68 | 122 | – | – | – | 2 | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | – | 195 | |
2020 | CBSA | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 4 |
GAC | – | – | – | – | 1 | 25 | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 13 | – | 40 | |
IRCC | – | – | – | – | 60 | 61 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 37 | 1 | 159 | |
RCMP | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 3 | – | 5 | – | – | – | – | 9 | |
TC | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 2 | |
Other | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | |
TOTAL | – | – | – | – | 61 | 88 | 1 | – | – | 3 | – | 6 | – | – | 55 | 1 | 215 | |
2019 | CBSA | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 3 |
GAC | – | – | – | – | – | 23 | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 1 | 15 | – | 42 | |
IRCC | – | – | – | – | 5 | 17 | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | – | 59 | |
RCMP | – | – | – | 4 | – | – | – | – | 1 | 3 | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | 9 | |
TC | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 1 | |
TOTAL | – | – | – | 4 | 5 | 41 | 1 | – | 1 | 3 | – | 4 | – | 1 | 54 | – | 114 |
NSIRA found that CSE, CSIS, GAC, and IRCC regularly use the SCIDA in a manner that warrants information sharing arrangements, as encouraged by subsection 4(c) of the SCIDA.
NSIRA found that CBSA, DND/CAF, and IRCC were non-compliant with subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA, as they failed to provide all records created under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) to NSIRA within the legislated timeframe.
NSIRA found improved compliance outcomes in instances where departments prepared record overview spreadsheets under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA that displayed the following characteristics:
NSIRA found that all GC institutions complied with their obligation to prepare and keep records that set out the information prescribed under subsections 9(1) and 9(2) of the SCIDA.
NSIRA found that more than half of the descriptions provided by CBSA and IRCC under paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA did not explicitly address their satisfaction that the disclosure was authorized under paragraph 5(1)(b), the proportionality test.
NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that disclosing institutions demonstrated they had satisfied themselves of both the contribution and proportionality tests, in compliance with subsection 5(1) of the SCIDA.
NSIRA found that GAC satisfied itself under the SCIDA’s paragraph 5(1)(a) contribution test based on an incorrect understanding of the recipient’s national security mandate in two cases.
NSIRA found, within the sample of disclosures reviewed, that CBSA and GAC (in one and two disclosures, respectively) were non-compliant with the SCIDA’s subsection 5(2) requirement to provide a statement regarding accuracy and reliability.
NSIRA found, in relation to the remaining disclosures within the sample, that GAC, IRCC, and RCMP included their statements regarding accuracy and reliability within the disclosures themselves, whereas CBSA provided its statements in the disclosures’ cover letters.
NSIRA found that DND/CAF destroyed information under the SCIDA subsection 5.1(1), but they were non-compliant with the requirement to do so “as soon as feasible after receiving it.”
NSIRA found delays between when a disclosure was authorized for sending and when it was received by the individual designated by the head of the recipient institution to receive it in at least 20% (n=34) of disclosures.