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Review of the Passenger Protect Program and Secure Air Travel Act: Notification Letter

Review of the Passenger Protect Program and Secure Air Travel Act


Notification Letter

Date of Publishing:

NSIRA’s Letter to the Ministers

Dear Ministers,

I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated a review of Passenger Protect Program, within the context of its legislative framework, the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA).

This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of cabinet confidences.

NSIRA’s review will examine processes for listing or de-listing individuals under section 8 of the SATA, and related administrative recourse. The review may also consider how the SATA list is used to screen air passengers. As such, NSIRA will review activities carried out by the following departments and agencies: the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA); the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS); the Department of Justice (DoJ); Global Affairs Canada (GAC); Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC); Public Safety Canada; the Royal Canadian Mounted Policy (RCMP); and Transport Canada.

NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.

Sincerely,

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

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Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Mesures (Review of 2021): Backgrounder

Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (Review of 2021)


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

This report is NSIRA’s third annual review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) Threat Reduction Measures (TRMs). The review covers CSIS’s TRM activities between January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021. As mandated by the NSIRA Act, NSIRA is required to review at least one aspect of CSIS’s TRM performance each year. Before NSIRA was created in 2019, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) reviewed CSIS’s TRM activities from 2016 to 2019.

In 2015, the Anti-Terrorism Act granted CSIS the authority to undertake TRMs. These are operational measures aimed at reducing threats to the security of Canada. TRMs may be taken in Canada or outside of Canada. TRMs are subject to limits outlined in the CSIS Act. The measures may limit a right or freedom guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) or may otherwise be contrary to Canadian law if authorized by a warrant issued by a Federal Court judge. TRM powers differ greatly from CSIS’s traditional mandate to collect and disseminate intelligence and, as such, the use of TRMs demands thorough and ongoing independent scrutiny.

NSIRA’s review of CSIS’s TRM activities in 2021 builds upon findings from earlier NSIRA and SIRC TRM reviews. These previous reviews identified concerns such as the inclusion of some individuals in TRMs without a rational link to the identified threat and CSIS’s need to improve record-keeping regarding TRM outcomes. In 2021, NSIRA observed that the use of TRM powers by CSIS followed similar trends to prior years. Notably, 2021 was the first year that TRMs involving Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism threats outnumbered those aimed at addressing Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism.

NSIRA found that CSIS met its obligations under the CSIS Actand the Charter. However, NSIRA found that improvements were needed in CSIS’s reporting procedures and made recommendations for improving legal risk assessments conducted for TRMs. Additionally, in one case, NSIRA identified that CSIS had not met its obligations under the 2015 Ministerial Direction for Operations and Accountability and the 2019 Ministerial Direction for Accountability issued by the Minister of Public Safety.

The findings and recommendations in this report highlight the importance of NSIRA’s independent scrutiny of TRM activities.

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Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (Review of 2021): Report

Review of CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (Review of 2021)


Report

Table of Contents

Date of Publishing:

HTML Version Coming Soon

Our team is working on an HTML version of this content to enhance usability and compatibility across devices. We aim to make it available in the near future. Thank you for your patience!

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Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces’s Open source intelligence Activities: Notification Letter

Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces’s Open source intelligence Activities


Notification Letter

Table of Contents

Date of Publishing:

Notification Letter

Dear Minister Blair,

I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated a review of the Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces’ Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Activities.

This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of Cabinet confidences.  

NSIRA will review the reasonableness, necessity, and compliance with applicable legislation, ministerial direction, internal policies, directives, orders, regulations, guidance, and doctrine of DND/CAF’s open-source intelligence activities.

NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.

Sincerely, 

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.

Chair // National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

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Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (Review of 2024): Notification Letter

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (Review of 2024)


Notification Letter

Table of Contents

Date of Publishing:

Notification Letter

Dear Ministers,

I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated its annual review of Government of Canada institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) for 2024.

This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) and subsection 39(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of cabinet confidences.  

NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.

We would also like to take this opportunity to remind departments of their obligation, under subsection 9(3) of the SCIDA, to provide NSIRA with copies of records prepared under subsections 9(1) or 9(2) of that Act to NSIRA within 30 days after the end of the calendar year; that is, by January 30, 2025.

We request that these records be provided to the attention of The Honourable Marie Deschamps, NSIRA’s Chair, via the NSIRA Leadership Mailbox (leadership@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca) or CTSN.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.

Sincerely,

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.

Chair // National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

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Annual reports

Annual Reports


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Review of the Canada Border Services Agency’s Confidential Human Source Program: Backgrounder

Review of the Canada Border Services Agency’s Confidential Human Source Program


Backgrounder

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The use of confidential human sources is an activity that carries inherent risks, including to the safety and security of human sources themselves.
  • CBSA has operated its human source program since 1984, but it wasn’t until 2014 that formal policies and standard operating procedures were established.
  • CBSA’s human source program, as an investigative tool supporting its mandate, operates within a legally sound framework.
  • NSIRA made six recommendations to strengthen the governance of the program, stressing the importance of prioritizing the safety and well-being of human sources in all aspects of CBSA operations.

In 2021, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) began its review of the Canada Border Services Agency’s (CBSA) Confidential Human Source Program, building upon earlier work by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) in this area. While CBSA had been the subject of previous NSIRA reviews, this marked one of NSIRA’s first in-depth reviews specifically focused on CBSA activities.

CBSA’s mandate in national security and intelligence is extensive and complex. In this review, NSIRA focused on the use of confidential human sources, an activity that carries inherent risks. These risks encompass not only the safety and security of the individuals operating as human sources, but also the broader implications of managing such a program. CBSA has operated its human source program since 1984,  but it wasn’t until 2014 that formal policies and standard operating procedures were established. Operating for decades without a formal, documented framework significantly heightened these risks.

This CBSA review was part of a broader series of three NSIRA reviews, with the others  focusing on  the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the source handling operations of the Department of Defence/ Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) human source programs. All three reviews addressed critical issues: managing and assessing risks, ensuring the welfare of sources, and ensuring proper ministerial direction and accountability. These areas are essential for ensuring that human source programs are accountable, lawful, and ethical.

The review found that CBSA’s human source program, as an investigative tool supporting its mandate, operates within a legally sound framework. However, it identified several gaps in the program’s governance, and in two cases, raised concerns about potential legal non-compliance.

 NSIRA made six recommendations to strengthen the governance of the human source program. These recommendations stress the importance of prioritizing the safety and well-being of human sources in all aspects of CBSA operations. They also reinforce NSIRA’s ongoing commitment to ministerial accountability. Overall, the findings and recommendations reflect the continued development of CBSA’s human source program. Although the program has been in place for nearly 40 years, the introduction of formal policies governing human sources is a more recent change, and the review highlights CBSA’s ongoing efforts to improve the program’s governance and operations.

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Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2022: Backgrounder

Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2022


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

Having its origin in the recommendations of Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and the directions issued under its authority seek to avoid risks of Canadian complicity in torture or other forms of mistreatment. They do so by putting limits on Government of Canada information sharing with foreign entities such as states and non-governmental organizations.  

The directions prohibit Government of Canada departments from disclosing information to – or requesting information from – foreign entities if doing so would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of any individual by any foreign entity. The directions also limit how departments may use information that is likely to have been obtained through mistreatment. Collectively, the ACA regime codifies Canadian values and commitments under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Criminal Code, and international law in respect of protecting rights and prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment. 

NSIRA is required to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA. To date, such directions have been issued to the Deputy Heads of twelve departments and agencies. NSIRA’s annual review of ACA implementation ensures that the Government of Canada remains accountable for the information that it shares with foreign partners, and respects related Canadian values and commitments. While the ACA separately requires each department to report publicly and to their Minister on ACA implementation each year, NSIRA’s horizontal review mandate offers unique insights into the consistency of this implementation and corresponding decision-making government wide. 

NSIRA’s ACA review for 2022 focused on how departments assess mistreatment risk in the context of their information sharing with foreign entities. NSIRA pursued this focus because departmental compliance with the directions depends on whether departments are accurately identifying which information exchanges may engage a substantial risk of mistreatment. If departments under-assess the level of risk involved in an exchange or over-assess the impact of mitigations to reduce this risk, they will not trigger the ACA’s embedded mechanisms for accountability and transparency. These mechanisms include referring certain high-risk cases to Deputy Heads as well as onward reporting to NSIRA. 

NSIRA found major inconsistencies in how different Government of Canada departments assessed the mistreatment risk posed by different countries. Indeed, NSIRA even identified some instances where different departments concurrently assessed the same country as presenting low, medium, and high mistreatment risk. NSIRA also found that departments often attributed an unjustifiably high weight to proposed risk mitigations and, in some cases, incorrectly incorporated mitigations within their initial assessments of countries’ baseline risk.  

Such methodological deficiencies, as well as a lack of checks and balances in the risk assessment process, may lead departments to systematically under-assess the risks involved in contemplated information exchanges. The net effect is that, when it does not adhere to the substance of the directions under the ACA, the Government of Canada risks exchanging information contrary to the directions’ prohibitions. 

As part of a suite of recommendations designed to address this risk, NSIRA reaffirmed its 2019 recommendation for the Government of Canada to develop a unified set of risk assessments for ACA purposes. In every ACA review since 2019, NSIRA has maintained its position that human rights risks within a given country should be assessed consistently across government. Doing so would avoid the unnecessary drain on resources caused by each department independently assessing risk and eliminate opportunities for discrepant outcomes. 

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Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022: Backgrounder

Review of Government of Canada Institutions’ Disclosures of Information Under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2022


Backgrounder

Backgrounder

ISSN: 2817-7525

This report presents findings and recommendations made in NSIRA’s annual review of disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)It was tabled in Parliament by the Minister of Public Safety, as required under subsection 39(2) of the NSIRA Act, on November 1st, 2023.

The SCIDA provides an explicit, stand-alone authority to disclose information between Government of Canada institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine its security. Its stated purpose is to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.

This report provides an overview of the SCIDA’s use in 2022. In doing so, it:

  • documents the volume and nature of information disclosures made under the SCIDA;
  • assesses compliance with the SCIDA; and
  • highlights patterns in the SCIDA’s use across Government of Canada institutions and over time.

The report contains six recommendations designed to increase standardization across the Government of Canada in a manner that is consistent with institutions’ demonstrated best practices and the SCIDA’s guiding principles.

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Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) use of Geolocation information: Backgrounder

Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) use of Geolocation information


Backgrounder

Review Backgrounder

On August 23rd, 2019, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) presented the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness with a classified report on its review of CSIS’s use of geolocation information.

In this review, NSIRA found that CSIS’s use of this geolocation data without a warrant risked breaching section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), which protects against unreasonable search and seizure. On March 16, 2020, NSIRA submitted a report under section 35 of the NSIRA Act, to the Minister of Public Safety regarding the possible unlawful activity.

This review raised pressing questions regarding the use of publically available data, but that nevertheless engages a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. NSIRA’s review examined the decision-making process that led CSIS to use this data without a warrant, and found that CSIS lacked the policies or procedures to ensure that, prior to using the data, CSIS sought legal advice to avoid its unlawful use.

The review was also an opportunity to note more broadly that, in this environment, ongoing legal support to CSIS’s data exploitation activities is essential in allowing CSIS to operate at an acceptable level of risk. It also noted that CSIS and the Department of Justice are expected to demonstrate institutional leadership in this regard.

Going forward, NSIRA will prioritize the scrutiny of CSIS’s use of technology, particularly new or emerging technologies that pose the greatest risks.

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