Last Updated:
Status:
In Progress
Review Number:
25-02
Last Updated:
Status:
In Progress
Review Number:
25-02
Date of Publishing:
Dear Minister Blair,
I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated a review of the Canada Border Services Agency’s (CBSA) use of enforcement flags.
This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(a) and (b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of Cabinet confidences.
Enforcement flags are intelligence products designed to identify a person, business, or conveyance that may pose a threat to the safety, security, or economic prosperity of Canadians at the border. This review will assess whether the CBSA’s use of enforcement flags is lawful, reasonable, and necessary – including in situations where flags are issued by, or on behalf of, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. For the purpose of this review, enforcement flags include, but are not limited to, CBSA’s lookouts.
NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.
I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.
Sincerely,
The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
Date of Publishing:
I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated its 2023 review of departmental implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA). NSIRA is sending notification of this review to all deputy heads who have been issued directions under the ACA. This annual review is being conducted pursuant to subsection 8(2.2) and paragraph 8(1)(b) of the NSIRA Act. The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of Cabinet confidences.
The NSIRA review team conducting this review has been identified in the cover email to this letter; they should serve as your officials’ primary point of contact at NSIRA regarding this review. Please ensure that the relevant points of contact within your organization are identified to NSIRA’s review team in the coming days. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them regarding requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance. NSIRA reviews may also include independent inspections of technical systems. NSIRA’s “Expectations for Responsiveness in Reviews” are available on our website, www.nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.
We would also like to take this opportunity to remind you of the reporting requirements set out in the ACA: subsection 7(1) requires that deputy heads submit a report in respect of the implementation of ACA directions during the previous calendar year to the appropriate Minister before March 1; and subsection 8(1) requires that, as soon as feasible after receiving a report under section 7, the appropriate Minister provide a copy of it to NSIRA, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, and if applicable, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Sincerely,
The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
Date of Publishing:
Dear Ministers,
I am writing on behalf of the Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to inform you that NSIRA has initiated a review of Passenger Protect Program, within the context of its legislative framework, the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA).
This review is being conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). The NSIRA Act grants NSIRA full and timely access to all information held by reviewed departments and agencies, including classified and privileged information, with the exception of cabinet confidences.
NSIRA’s review will examine processes for listing or de-listing individuals under section 8 of the SATA, and related administrative recourse. The review may also consider how the SATA list is used to screen air passengers. As such, NSIRA will review activities carried out by the following departments and agencies: the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA); the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS); the Department of Justice (DoJ); Global Affairs Canada (GAC); Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC); Public Safety Canada; the Royal Canadian Mounted Policy (RCMP); and Transport Canada.
NSIRA will engage with your officials regarding this review. As the review progresses, NSIRA’s review team will be in regular contact with them with requests for information. Such requests may involve documents, system access, written explanations, briefings, interviews, surveys, and any other information that NSIRA determines to be of relevance to this review. This review may also include independent inspections of some technical systems. NSIRA’s expectations for responsiveness are available online at https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca.
I thank you in advance for your cooperation and support to the independent review process, which is key to transparency and democratic accountability.
Sincerely,
The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.
Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
Last Updated:
Status:
Submitted
Review Number:
24-03
Last Updated:
Status:
Submitted
Review Number:
21-13
In 2021, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) began its review of the Canada Border Services Agency’s (CBSA) Confidential Human Source Program, building upon earlier work by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) in this area. While CBSA had been the subject of previous NSIRA reviews, this marked one of NSIRA’s first in-depth reviews specifically focused on CBSA activities.
CBSA’s mandate in national security and intelligence is extensive and complex. In this review, NSIRA focused on the use of confidential human sources, an activity that carries inherent risks. These risks encompass not only the safety and security of the individuals operating as human sources, but also the broader implications of managing such a program. CBSA has operated its human source program since 1984, but it wasn’t until 2014 that formal policies and standard operating procedures were established. Operating for decades without a formal, documented framework significantly heightened these risks.
This CBSA review was part of a broader series of three NSIRA reviews, with the others focusing on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the source handling operations of the Department of Defence/ Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) human source programs. All three reviews addressed critical issues: managing and assessing risks, ensuring the welfare of sources, and ensuring proper ministerial direction and accountability. These areas are essential for ensuring that human source programs are accountable, lawful, and ethical.
The review found that CBSA’s human source program, as an investigative tool supporting its mandate, operates within a legally sound framework. However, it identified several gaps in the program’s governance, and in two cases, raised concerns about potential legal non-compliance.
NSIRA made six recommendations to strengthen the governance of the human source program. These recommendations stress the importance of prioritizing the safety and well-being of human sources in all aspects of CBSA operations. They also reinforce NSIRA’s ongoing commitment to ministerial accountability. Overall, the findings and recommendations reflect the continued development of CBSA’s human source program. Although the program has been in place for nearly 40 years, the introduction of formal policies governing human sources is a more recent change, and the review highlights CBSA’s ongoing efforts to improve the program’s governance and operations.
Having its origin in the recommendations of Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA) and the directions issued under its authority seek to avoid risks of Canadian complicity in torture or other forms of mistreatment. They do so by putting limits on Government of Canada information sharing with foreign entities such as states and non-governmental organizations.
The directions prohibit Government of Canada departments from disclosing information to – or requesting information from – foreign entities if doing so would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of any individual by any foreign entity. The directions also limit how departments may use information that is likely to have been obtained through mistreatment. Collectively, the ACA regime codifies Canadian values and commitments under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Criminal Code, and international law in respect of protecting rights and prohibiting torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment.
NSIRA is required to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA. To date, such directions have been issued to the Deputy Heads of twelve departments and agencies. NSIRA’s annual review of ACA implementation ensures that the Government of Canada remains accountable for the information that it shares with foreign partners, and respects related Canadian values and commitments. While the ACA separately requires each department to report publicly and to their Minister on ACA implementation each year, NSIRA’s horizontal review mandate offers unique insights into the consistency of this implementation and corresponding decision-making government wide.
NSIRA’s ACA review for 2022 focused on how departments assess mistreatment risk in the context of their information sharing with foreign entities. NSIRA pursued this focus because departmental compliance with the directions depends on whether departments are accurately identifying which information exchanges may engage a substantial risk of mistreatment. If departments under-assess the level of risk involved in an exchange or over-assess the impact of mitigations to reduce this risk, they will not trigger the ACA’s embedded mechanisms for accountability and transparency. These mechanisms include referring certain high-risk cases to Deputy Heads as well as onward reporting to NSIRA.
NSIRA found major inconsistencies in how different Government of Canada departments assessed the mistreatment risk posed by different countries. Indeed, NSIRA even identified some instances where different departments concurrently assessed the same country as presenting low, medium, and high mistreatment risk. NSIRA also found that departments often attributed an unjustifiably high weight to proposed risk mitigations and, in some cases, incorrectly incorporated mitigations within their initial assessments of countries’ baseline risk.
Such methodological deficiencies, as well as a lack of checks and balances in the risk assessment process, may lead departments to systematically under-assess the risks involved in contemplated information exchanges. The net effect is that, when it does not adhere to the substance of the directions under the ACA, the Government of Canada risks exchanging information contrary to the directions’ prohibitions.
As part of a suite of recommendations designed to address this risk, NSIRA reaffirmed its 2019 recommendation for the Government of Canada to develop a unified set of risk assessments for ACA purposes. In every ACA review since 2019, NSIRA has maintained its position that human rights risks within a given country should be assessed consistently across government. Doing so would avoid the unnecessary drain on resources caused by each department independently assessing risk and eliminate opportunities for discrepant outcomes.
Last Updated:
Status:
In Progress
Review Number:
24-11
Last Updated:
Status:
In Progress
Review Number:
24-06