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Annual Report on the Access to Information Act 2023–24

Date of Publishing:

Introduction

The Access to Information Act (ATIA) gives Canadian citizens and permanent residents, as well as any person or corporation present in Canada, the right of access to information under the control of a government institution, subject to certain specific and limited exemptions and exclusions.

Section 94 of the ATIA requires the head of each government institution to prepare an annual report on the administration of the ATIA within the institution that is to be tabled in both Houses of Parliament. In addition, section 20 of the Service Fees Act requires the responsible authority to report to Parliament each fiscal year on all statutory fees processed during the reporting period.

This report to Parliament, which is prepared and tabled pursuant to section 94 of the ATIA and section 20 of the Service Fees Act, describes the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Secretariat in administering these Acts during the period of April 1, 2023 to March 31, 2024 (the reporting period).

If you require more information or wish to make a request under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, please direct your inquiries to the following:

Access to Information and Privacy Office
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
P.O. Box 2430, Station “D” Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5W5
Email: ATIP@nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

Who we are

Established in July 2019, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent agency that reports to Parliament and conducts investigations and reviews of the federal government’s national security and intelligence activities.

The NSIRA Secretariat (the Secretariat) assists NSIRA in fulfilling its mandate. The Secretariat headed by an Executive Director, is designated as the government institution for the purposes of administering the ATIA and the Privacy Act.

Mandate

The Secretariat supports NSIRA in its dual mandate to conduct reviews and investigations in relation to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities.

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the national security or intelligence-related activities of any other federal department or agency. This includes, but is not limited to, the national security or intelligence activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of Justice. Further, NSIRA may review any national security or intelligence matter that a Minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

NSIRA’s reviews assess whether Canada’s national security and intelligence activities comply with relevant laws, policies, and ministerial directions, as well as whether they are reasonable and necessary. In conducting its reviews, NSIRA can make any findings or recommendations it considers appropriate.

Investigations

NSIRA is also responsible for investigating national security or intelligence-related complaints from members of the public. As outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA has the mandate to investigate complaints about:

  • any activity of CSIS or of CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances;
  • any complaint referred under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
  • reports made under section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
  • matters referred under section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Access to Information and Privacy Office – Organizational Structure

The Secretariat’s ATIP Office is accountable for the development and implementation of effective policies, guidelines, systems, and procedures to ensure that the Secretariat meets its responsibilities under the ATIA and the Privacy Act.

For the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office consisted of:

  • 1 full-time Access to Information Consultant;
  • 1 part-time Privacy Consultant;
  • 1 full-time ATIP Coordinator, who managed the Secretariat’s ATIP Office, and fulfilled the normal duties as Manager of Administrative Services for the Secretariat and NSIRA Members; and
  • the Secretariat’s Senior Counsel, Internal Services as well as Senior General Counsel supported the Secretariat’s ATIP Office when required.

The Secretariat’s ATIP Office is responsible for the following:

  • monitoring compliance with ATIP legislation and relevant procedures and policies;
  • processing requests under both the ATIA and the Privacy Act;
  • developing and maintaining policies, procedures, and guidelines to ensure that the Secretariat respects the ATIA and the Privacy Act;
  • maintaining Personal Information Banks and conducting privacy impact assessments;
  • preparing annual reports to Parliament and other statutory reports, as well as other materials that might be required by central agencies; and
  • representing the Secretariat in dealings with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS), the information and privacy commissioners, and other government departments and agencies in matters pertaining to the ATIA and the Privacy Act.

During the reporting period, the Secretariat was a party to a service agreement under section 96 of the ATIA in which the Secretariat received administrative support from the Privy Council Office related to the tabling of the Annual Report in Parliament. The Secretariat was also a party to a service agreement under section 92 of the ATIA, in which the Secretariat received ATIP Online services from TBS.

Part 2: Proactive Publications

The Secretariat ensured that the following proactive publication legislative requirements were met during the reporting period with the assistance of its Finance division:

  • travel expenses;
  • hospitality expenses;
  • reports tabled in Parliament; and
  • contracts over $10,000.00

To assist the Secretariat’s ATIP Office in meeting its overall legislative obligations, the Secretariat relied on a collaborative internal group of subject matter experts from all divisions.

Delegation Order

As the Head of the Secretariat, the Executive Director is responsible for the administration of the ATIA within the institution. Pursuant to section 95 of the ATIA, the Executive Director has delegated the ATIP Manager and ATIP Officer, as well as individuals acting in these positions, to perform certain and specific powers, duties, and functions for the administration of the ATIA. These positions have limited delegation of authority under the ATIA and the Privacy Act, in accordance with the delegation of authority instrument approved by the Executive Director in August 2022. The Delegation Order can be found in Appendix A (page 13).

Performance 2023-2024

Performance in Processing Access Requests

In addition to 5 requests that were outstanding from previous reporting periods, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office received 16 formal requests during the current reporting period, bringing the total number of formal requests to 21. Of these, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office closed 16 requests and processed approximately 15,323 pages during the reporting period. 5 requests were carried over to the following reporting period, 3 of the carried over requests were received during the reporting period.

Statistical Reports for 2023-2024

The Secretariat’s 2023-2024 Statistical Report on the ATIA and Supplemental ATIP Statistical Report for 2023-2024 were both previously validated by TBS.

Extensions and Completion Time of Closed Requests

During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office invoked extensions while processing 7 formal requests: 5 extensions of 31 to 60 days, 0 extensions of 61 to 120 days, 1 extension of 121 to 180 days, 0 extensions of 181 to 365 days, and 1 extension of 365 days or more, all of which required extensions to consult with third parties.

Of the requests completed during the reporting period,

  • 1 request, or 6.25% of the requests completed, was disclosed in its entirety. This request was completed within 181 to 365 days;
  • 5 requests, or 31.25% of the requests completed, were disclosed in part. 1 request was completed within 16 to 30 days, 1 request was completed within 61 to 120 days, 1 request was completed within 121 to 180 days, and 2 requests were completed after 365 days;
  • 0 requests, or 0% of the requests completed, were all exempted;
  • 10 requests, or 62.50% of the requests completed, resulted in no records. 1 request was completed within 16 to 30 days, 2 request were completed within 31 to 60 days, and 7 requests were completed within 61 to 120 days;
  • 0 requests, or 0% of the requests completed, were abandoned and completed; and
  • 0 requests, or 0% of the requests completed, were neither confirmed nor denied.

The responses to many requests required an intensive review of complex records, including extensive internal and external consultations due to a significant portion of the Secretariat’s information holdings consisting of sensitive and classified records created or originally received by other government institutions owing to NSIRA’s mandate. During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s on-time response rate decreased to 18.7% from 33.3% in the 2022-2023 reporting year due to a significant increase in the number of pages processed for formal requests.

Consultations

During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office received 20 consultation requests from other government institutions. 3 requests were completed within 0 to 15 days, 3 requests were completed within 16 to 30 days, 5 requests were completed within 31 to 60 days, 8 requests were completed within 61 to 120 days, and 1 request was completed within 121 to 180 days. The Secretariat’s ATIP Office closed all 20 consultations during the reporting period and processed approximately 549 pages.

Requests Treated Informally

During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s ATIP Office received 18 informal requests for records previously released under the ATIA, closed 6 informal requests, and carried over 12 informal requests into the 2024-2025 reporting period.

Complaints and Investigations of Access Requests

Subsection 30(1) of the ATIA describes how the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) receives and investigates complaints from individuals regarding the processing of requests under the ATIA. The Secretariat’s ATIP Office received 3 access complaints during the reporting period. 1 of these complaints was discontinued during the reporting period, while the other 2 complaints remained active on March 31, 2024.

Training and Awareness

The Secretariat took a customized approach to training subject matter experts on their legislative requirements, roles, and responsibilities. The Secretariat’s ATIP Office encouraged employees to take the ATIP training courses offered by the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS). The Executive Director held an awareness session for the Secretariat’s management team on the new Directive on Proactive Publication in the Fall of 2023 and senior management was briefed on Amending the Access to Information Regulations in June 2023. In addition, new employees were required to complete an online training session entitled Fundamentals of Access to Information and Privacy within six months of joining the Secretariat and in January 2024, an internal ATIP training session was held.

Policies, Guidelines, and Procedures

The Secretariat’s ATIP Office implemented certain efficiency-enhancing measures, such as online tracking tools, and continued to seek new opportunities to improve the efficiency and timeliness of request processing. For example, the Executive Director designated two officials within the Secretariat who were responsible for supporting the Executive Director’s accountability for proactive publication under various policies and guidelines specified under the ATIA.

The Secretariat continued to engaged with Library and Archives Canada on obtaining institution-specific disposition authorities.

Proactive Publication under Part 2 of the ATIA

In accordance with subsection 81(b) of the ATIA, the Secretariat is listed as a government entity subject to the following proactive publication requirements:

  • Travel expenses (section 82);
  • Hospitality expenses (section 83);
  • Reports tabled in Parliament (section 84);
  • Contracts over $10,000.00 (section 86);
  • Grants and Contributions over $25,000.00 (section 87); and
  • Briefing materials (section 88)

During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s proactive publications were published on open.canada.ca. of the total proactive publication requirements that were due during the reporting period, 80% were published within the legislated timelines.

Legislative Requirement Section Publication Timeline Institutional Requirement
All Government Institutions as defined in section 3 of the Access to Information Act
Travel Expenses 82 Within 30 days after the end of the month of reimbursement open.canada.ca
Hospitality Expenses 83 Within 30 days after the end of the month of reimbursement open.canada.ca
Reports tabled in Parliament 84 Within 30 days after tabling open.canada.ca
Government entities or Departments, agencies, and other bodies subject to the Act and listed in Schedules I, I.1, or II of the Financial Administration Act
Contracts over $10,000 86 Q1-3: Within 30 days after the quarter
Q4: Within 60 days after the quarter
open.canada.ca
Grants & Contributions over $25,000 87 Within 30 days after the quarter N/A
Packages of briefing materials prepared for new or incoming deputy heads or equivalent 88(a) Within 120 days after appointment N/A
Titles and reference numbers of memoranda prepared for a deputy head or equivalent, that is received by their office 88(b) Within 30 days after the end of the month received N/A
Packages of briefing materials prepared for a deputy head or equivalent’s appearance before a committee of Parliament 88(c) Within 120 days after appearance N/A
Government institutions that are departments named in Schedule I to the Financial Administration Act or portions of the core public administration named in Schedule IV to that Act
Reclassification of positions 85 Within 30 days after the quarter N/A
Ministers
Packages of briefing materials prepared by a government institution for new or incoming ministers 74(a) Within 120 days after appointment N/A
Titles and reference numbers of memoranda prepared by a government institution for the minister, that is received by their office 74(b) Within 30 days after the end of the month received N/A
Package of question period notes prepared by a government institution for the minister and in use on the last sitting day of the House of Commons in June and December 74(c) Within 30 days after last sitting day of the House of Commons in June and December N/A
Packages of briefing materials prepared by a government institution for a minister’s appearance before a committee of Parliament 74(d) Within 120 days after appearance N/A
Travel Expenses 75 Within 30 days after the end of the month of reimbursement N/A
Hospitality Expenses 76 Within 30 days after the end of the month of reimbursement N/A
Contracts over $10,000 77 Q1-3: Within 30 days after the quarter
Q4: Within 60 days after the quarter
N/A
Ministers’ Offices Expenses 78 Within 120 days after the fiscal year N/A

Initiatives and Projects to Improve Access to Information

During the reporting period, the Secretariat’s Information Technology division continued to improve our ATIP software tool for the Secretariat’s classified and unclassified systems.

Summary of Key Issues and Actions Taken on Complaints

During the reporting period, 3 complaints were received. 1 complaint was discontinued during the reporting period, while the other 2 complaints remained active on March 31, 2024.

Access to Information Act Fees for the Purposes of the Service Fees Act

The Service Fees Act requires a responsible authority to report annually to Parliament on the fees collected by the institution.

With respect to fees collected under the ATIA, the information below is reported in accordance with the requirements of section 20 of the Service Fees Act:

  • Enabling authority: Access to Information Act
  • Fee payable: $5.00 application fee is the only fee charged for an ATI request
  • Total revenue: $65.00
  • Fees waived: $15.00
  • Cost of operating the program: $360,421.00

Monitoring Compliance

Legislative deadlines for access to information requests were strictly monitored by using several Microsoft Lists trackers, as were proactive publication requirements. The ATIP Manager organized ad hoc meetings to discuss request-related activities (such as whether internal consultations were necessary), determine deadlines, and ensure that all division members were informed of the status of requests. At bi-weekly team meetings with the Senior General Counsel and Senior Counsel, Internal Services, the ATIP Manager raised and discussed compliance with legislative and policy obligations. The Executive Director was also briefed on all ATIP compliance issues.

During the reporting period, the Secretariat also continued to assess the feasibility of making information previously released under the ATIA available on its public-facing website.

Appendix A: Delegation Order

Access to Information Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 95 of the Access to Information Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Access to Information Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Privacy Act Designation Order

The Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, pursuant to section 73 of the Privacy Act, hereby designates the persons holding the positions or acting in these positions, set out in the schedule hereto to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Executive Director of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency as the head of a government institution under the section of the Privacy Act set out in the schedule opposite each position.

Appendix B: 2023-2024 Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act

Name of institution: National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Reporting period: 2023-04-01 – 2024-03-31

Section 1: Request Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Number of Requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 16
Outstanding from previous reporting period 3
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 2
Total 21
Closed during reporting period 16
Carried over to next reporting period 5
Carried over within legislated timeline 3
Carried over beyond legislated timeline 2
1.2 Sources of requests
Source Number of Requests
Media 2
Academia 3
Business (private sector) 2
Organization 1
Public 8
Decline to Identify 0
Total 16
1.3 Channels of requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 12
E-mail 0
Mail 4
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 16

Section 2: Informal requests

2.1 Number of informal requests
  Number of Requests
Received during reporting period 18
Outstanding from previous reporting periods 0
Outstanding from more than one reporting period 0
Total 18
Closed during reporting period 6
Carried over to next reporting period 12
2.2 Channels of informal requests
Source Number of Requests
Online 11
E-Mail 7
Mail 0
In person 0
Phone 0
Fax 0
Total 18
2.3 Completion time of informal requests
Completion Time
1 to 15 days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More than 365 Days Total
0 2 0 4 0 0 0 6
2.4 Pages released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
2 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 Pages re-released informally
Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
4 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 3: Applications to the Information Commissioner on Declining to Act on Requests

  Number of Requests
Outstanding from previous reporting period 0
Sent during reporting period 1
Total 1
Approved by the Information Commissioner during reporting period 0
Declined by the Information Commissioner during reporting period 1
Withdrawn during reporting period 0
Carried over to next reporting period 0

Section 4: Requests Closed During the Reporting Period

4.1 Disposition and completion time
Disposition of Requests Completion Time
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Disclosed in part 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 5
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No records exist 0 1 2 7 0 0 0 10
Request transferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decline to act with the approval of the Information Commisioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 2 2 8 1 1 2 16
4.2 Exemptions
Section Numbers of Requests
13(1)(a) 1
13(1)(b) 0
13(1)(c) 0
13(1)(d) 0
13(1)(e) 0
14 0
14(a) 0
14(b) 0
15(1) – I. A. * 1
15(1) – Def. * 2
15(1) – S.A. * 0
16(1)(a)(i) 2
16(1)(a)(ii) 0
16(1)(a)(iii) 1
16(1)(b) 1
16(1)(c) 1
16(1)(d) 0
16(2) 0
16(2)(a) 0
16(2)(b) 0
16(2)(c) 0
16(3) 0
16.1(1)(a) 0
16.1(1)(b) 0
16.1(1)(c) 0
16.1(1)(d) 0
16.2(1) 0
16.3 0
16.31 0
16.4(1)(a) 0
16.4(1)(b) 0
16.5 0
16.6 0
17 0
18(a) 0
18(b) 0
18(c) 0
18(d) 0
18.1(1)(a) 0
18.1(1)(b) 0
18.1(1)(c) 0
18.1(1)(d) 0
19(1) 2
20(1)(a) 0
20(1)(b) 0
20(1)(b.1) 0
20(1)(c) 0
20(1)(d) 0
20.1 0
20.2 0
20.4 0
21(1)(a) 2
21(1)(b) 0
21(1)(c) 0
21(1)(d) 0
22 0
22.1(1) 0
23 3
23.1 0
24(1) 1
26 0

* I.A.: International Affairs
* Def.: Defence of Canada
* S.A.: Subversive Activities

4.3 Exclusions
Section Numbers of Requests
68(a) 0
68(b) 0
68(c) 0
68.1 0
68.2(a) 0
68.2(b) 0
69(1) 0
69(1)(a) 0
69(1)(b) 0
69(1)(c) 0
69(1)(d) 0
69(1)(e) 0
69(1)(f) 0
69(1)(g) re (a) 0
69(1)(g) re (b) 0
69(1)(g) re (c) 0
69(1)(g) re (d) 0
69(1)(g) re (e) 0
69(1)(g) re (f) 0
69.1(1) 0
4.4 Format of information released
Paper Electronic Other
E-record Data set Video Audio
1 5 0 0 0 0
4.5 Complexity
4.5.1 Relevant pages processed and disclosed for paper and e-record formats
Number of Pages Processed Number of Pages Disclosed Number of Requests
15323 15323 6
4.5.2 Relevant pages processed per request disposition for paper and e-record formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
All disclosed 1 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 3 185 1 102 0 0 0 0 0 14966
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4 225 1 102 0 0 0 0 1 14996
4.5.3 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for audio formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
4.5.4 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for audio formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.5 Relevant minutes processed and disclosed for video formats
Number of Minutes Processed Number of Minutes Disclosed Number of Requests
0 0 0
4.5.6 Relevant minutes processed per request disposition for video formats by size of requests
Disposition Less Than 60 Minutes Processed 60 – 120 Minutes Processed More than 120 Minutes Processed
Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed Number of Requests Minutes Processed
All disclosed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.7 Other complexities
Disposition Consultation Required Legal Advice Sought Other Total
All disclosed 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 2 4 0 6
All exempted 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0
Neither confirmed nor denied 0 0 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0
Total 2 4 0 6
4.6 Closed requests
4.6.1 Requests closed within legislated timelines
  Requests closed within legislated timelines
Number of requests closed within legislated timelines 3
Percentage of requests closed within legislated timelines (%) 18.75
4.7 Deemed refusals
4.7.1 Reasons for not meeting legislated timelines
Number of Requests Closed Past the Legislated Timelines Principal Reason
Interference with Operations/Workload External Consultation Internal Consultation Other
13 12 1 0 0
4.7.2 Requests closed beyond legislated timelines (including any extension taken)
Number of Days Past Legislated Timelines Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where No Extension Was Taken Number of Requests Past Legislated Timeline Where an Extension Was Taken Total
1 to 15 Days 0 0 0
16 to 30 Days 1 0 1
31 to 60 Days 2 5 7
61 to 120 Days 2 0 2
121 to 180 Days 0 1 1
181 to 365 Days 1 0 1
More than 365 Days 0 1 1
Total 6 7 13
4.8 Requests for translation
Translation Requests Accepted Refused Total
English to French 0 0 0
French to English 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0

Section 5: Extensions

5.1 Reasons for extensions and disposition of requests
Disposition of Requests Where an Extension Was taken 9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(c) Third-Party Notice
Section 69 Other
All disclosed 0 0 0 0
Disclosed in part 3 3 0 0
All exempted 0 0 0 0
All excluded 0 0 0 0
Request abandoned 0 0 0 0
No records exist 0 1 0 0
Declined to act with the approval of the Information Commissioner 0 0 0 0
Total 3 4 0 0
5.2 Length of extensions
Length of Extensions 9(1)(a) Interference With Operations/Workload 9(1)(b) Consultation 9(1)(c) Third-Party Notice
Section 69 Other
30 days or less 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 days 3 2 0 0
61 to 120 days 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 days 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 days 0 0 0 0
365 days or more 0 0 0 0
Total 3 4 0 0

Section 6: Fees

Fee Type Fee Collected Fee Waived Fee Refunded
Number of Requests Amount Number of Requests Amount Number of Requests Amount
Application 13 $65.00 3 $0.00 0 $0.00
Other fees 0 $0.00 0 $0.00 0 $0.00
Total 13 $65.00 3 $0.00 0 $0.00

Section 7: Consultations Received From Other Institutions and Organizations

7.1 Consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions and other organizations
Consultations Other Government of Canada Institutions Number of Pages to Review Other Organizations Number of Pages to Review
Received during reporting period 20 549 0 0
Outstanding from the previous reporting period 0 0 0 0
Total 4 189 0 0
Closed during the reporting period 20 549 0 0
Carried over within negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
Carried over beyond negotiated timelines 0 0 0 0
7.2 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other Government of Canada institutions
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 4
Disclose in part 3 1 4 6 1 0 0 15
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3 3 5 8 1 0 0 20
7.3 Recommendations and completion time for consultations received from other organizations outside the Government of Canada
Recommendation Number of Days Required to Complete Consultation Requests
1 to 15 Days 16 to 30 Days 31 to 60 Days 61 to 120 Days 121 to 180 Days 181 to 365 Days More Than 365 Days Total
Disclose entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disclose in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exempt entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exclude entirely 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consult other institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 8: Completion Time of Consultations on Cabinet Confidences

8.1 Requests with Legal Services
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8.2 Requests with Privy Council Office
Number of Days Fewer Than 100 Pages Processed 101-500 Pages Processed 501-1000 Pages Processed 1001-5000 Pages Processed More Than 5000 Pages Processed
Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed Number of Requests Pages Disclosed
1 to 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 to 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 to 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 to 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 to 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 to 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section 9: Investigations and Reports of finding

9.1 Investigations
Section 32 Notice of intention to investigate Subsection 30(5) Ceased to investigate Section 35 Formal Representations
2 1 0
9.2 Investigations and Reports of finding
Section 37(1) Initial Reports Section 37(2) Final Reports
Received Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner Received Containing recommendations issued by the Information Commissioner Containing orders issued by the Information Commissioner
0 0 0 2 0 0

Section 10: Court Action

10.1 Court actions on complaints
Section 41
Complainant (1) Institution (2) Third Party (3) Privacy Commissioner (4) Total
0 0 0 0 0
10.2 Court actions on third party notifications under paragraph 28(1)(b)
Section 44 – under paragraph 28(1)(b)
0
11.1 Allocated Costs
Expenditures Amount
Salaries $90,000
Overtime $0
Goods and Services $270,421
Professional services contracts $270,421
Other $0
Total $360,421
11.2 Human Resources
Resources Person Years Dedicated to Access to Information Activities
Full-time employees 0.000
Part-time and casual employees 1.000
Regional Staff 0.000
Consultants and agency personnel 1.000
Students 0.500
Total 2.500

Note: Enter values to three decimal places.

Appendix C: Supplemental Statistical Report on the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act

Section 1: Open Requests and Complaints Under the Access to Information Act

1.1 Enter the number of open requests that are outstanding from previous reporting periods
Fiscal Year Open Requests Were Received Open Requests that are Within Legislated Timelines as March 31, 2024 Open Requests that are Beyond Legislated Timelines as of March 31, 2024 Total
Received in 2023-24 3 0 3
Received in 2022-23 0 1 1
Received in 2021-22 0 0 0
Received in 2020-21 0 1 1
Received in 2019-20 0 0 0
Received in 2018-19 0 0 0
Received in 2017-18 0 0 0
Received in 2016-17 0 0 0
Received in 2015-16 0 0 0
Received in 2014-15 or earlier 0 0 0
Total 3 2 5
1.2 Enter the number of open complaints with the Information Commissioner of Canada that are outstanding from previous reporting periods
Fiscal Year Open Complaints were received by institutions Number of Open Complaints
Received in 2023-24 0
Received in 2022-23 0
Received in 2021-22 0
Received in 2020-21 0
Received in 2019-20 0
Received in 2018-19 0
Received in 2017-18 0
Received in 2016-17 0
Received in 2015-16 0
Received in 2014-15 or earlier 0
Total 0

Section 2: Open Requests and Complaints Under the Privacy Act

2.1 Number of open requests that are outstanding from previous reporting periods.
Fiscal Year Open Requests Were Received Open Requests that are Within Legislated Timelines as March 31, 2024 Open Requests that are Beyond Legislated Timelines as of March 31, 2024 Total
Received in 2023-24 2 0 2
Received in 2022-23 0 0 0
Received in 2021-22 0 0 0
Received in 2020-21 0 0 0
Received in 2019-20 0 0 0
Received in 2018-19 0 0 0
Received in 2017-18 0 0 0
Received in 2016-17 0 0 0
Received in 2015-16 0 0 0
Received in 2014-15 or earlier 0 0 0
Total 2 0 2
2.2 Enter the number of open complaints with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that are outstanding from previous reporting periods
Fiscal Year Open Complaints were received by institutions Number of Open Complaints
Received in 2023-24 0
Received in 2022-23 7
Received in 2021-22 0
Received in 2020-21 0
Received in 2019-20 0
Received in 2018-19 0
Received in 2017-18 0
Received in 2016-17 0
Received in 2015-16 0
Received in 2014-15 or earlier 0
Total 7

Section 3: Social Insurance Number

Has your institution begun a new collection or a new consistent use of the SIN in 2023-24? No
How many requests were received from foreign nationals outside of Canada in 2023-24? 0
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Review of Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2022

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Review of the Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021: RCMP Responses

Review of the Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021: RCMP Responses


Date of Publishing:

List of Acronyms

Abbreviation Expansion
2017 MD 2017 Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Mistreatment by Foreign Entities
ACA (ACMFEA, or “the Act”) Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act
ADM Assistant Deputy Minister
AMCC Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee
CBSA Canada Border Services Agency
CRA Canada Revenue Agency
CRCC Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans
DND/CAF Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces
EPPP Enhanced Passenger Protect Program
FINTRAC Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
FIRAC Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee
FPNS Federal Policing National Security
GAC Global Affairs Canada
GATE Governance, Accreditation, Technical Security and Espionage
HOM Head of Mission (or Chargé)
HRR Human Right Report
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICE Integrated Collaborative Environment
INPL Intelligence Policy and Programs Division
IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
ISCG Information Sharing Coordination Group
LEAG Law Enforcement Assessment Group
LO Liaison Officer
MDCC Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee
NSICOP National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
NSIRA National Security Intelligence Review Agency
OiC Orders in Council
PPP Passenger Protect Program
PS Public Safety Canada
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RFI Requests for Information
TC Transport Canada
Abréviation Développement
AL Agent de liaison
AMC Affaires mondiales Canada
ARC Agence du revenu du Canada
ASFC Agence des services frontaliers du Canada
CANAFE Centre d’analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada
CCDM Comité de conformité à la directive ministérielle
CCEMT Comité de conformité pour éviter les mauvais traitement
CCETP Commission civile d’examen et de traitement des plaintes relatives à la GRC
CCRIE Comité consultatif sur les risques – Information de l’étranger
CDM Chef de mission (ou chargé de mission)
CPSNR Comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le renseignement
CST Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
DC Décret en conseil
DI Demande d’information
ECI Environnement collaboratif intégré
GASE Gouvernance, accréditation, sécurité technique et espionnage
GCER Groupe de coordination d’échange de renseignements
GEAL Groupe d’évaluation de l’application de la loi
GRC Gendarmerie royale du Canada
IM-2017 Instructions du ministre de 2017 visant à éviter la complicité dans les cas de mauvais traitements par des entités étrangères
INPL Direction des politiques et des programmes liés au renseignement
IRCC Immigration, Réfugiés et Citoyenneté Canada
Loi visant à éviter la complicité, la Loi Loi visant à éviter la complicité dans les cas de mauvais traitements infligés par des entités étrangères
MDN/FAC Ministère de la Défense nationale/Forces armées canadiennes
MPO Ministère des Pêches et des Océans
OSSNR Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement
PIDCP Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques
PPP Programme de protection des passagers
PPP-A Programme de protection des passagers amélioré
RDP Rapport sur les droits de la personne
SCRS Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité
SMA Sous-ministre adjoint
SNPF Sécurité nationale et Police fédérale
SP Sécurité publique Canada
TC Transports Canada

Executive Summary

This review focuses on departmental implementation of directions received through the Orders in Council (OiC) issued pursuant to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA, ACA, or “the Act”). This is NSIRA’s third annual assessment of the statutorily mandated implementation of the directions issued under the ACA.

This year’s review covers the 2021 calendar year and has been split into three sections. First, the review addresses the statutory obligations of all departments. Sections two and three of the review focus on in-depth analysis of how the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) have implemented the directions under the ACA. NSIRA has used case studies, where possible, to examine these departments’ implementation of the ACA framework.

NSIRA has observed that this is the third consecutive year where there have been no cases referred to the deputy head level in any department. This is a requirement of the OiC in cases where officials are unable to determine if the substantial risk can be mitigated. Future reviews will be attuned to the issue of case escalation and departmental processes for decision-making.

In the 2019 NSIRA Review of Departmental Frameworks for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2019-06), NSIRA recommended that “the definition of substantial risk should be codified in law or public direction.” NSIRA notes that some departments have accounted for this gap by relying on the definition of substantial risk in the 2017 MDs. In light of the pending statutorily mandated review of The National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59) and the centrality of the concept of substantial risk to the regime governing the ACA, NSIRA reiterates its 2019 recommendation that the definition of substantial risk be codified in law.

In last year’s review NSIRA identified Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Safety Canada (PS) as not yet having finalized their ACA policies. While CBSA and PS continue to make advancements these departments still have not fully implemented an ACA framework and supporting policies and procedures.

RCMP has a robust framework in place for the triage and processing of cases pertaining to the ACA. The in-depth analysis portion of this review found that the RCMP does not have a centralized system of documenting assurances and does not regularly monitor and update the assessment of the reliability of assurances. NSIRA also found that the RCMP has not developed mechanisms to update country and entity profiles in a timely manner, and the information collected through the Liaison Officer in the course of an operation is not centrally documented such that it can inform future assessments.

In the analysis of one of the RCMP’s Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC) case files, NSIRA found that the Assistant Commissioner’s rationale for rejecting FIRAC’s advice did not adequately address concerns consistent with the provisions of the Orders in Council. In particular, NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner erroneously considered the importance of the potential future strategic relationship with a foreign entity in the assessment of potential risk of mistreatment of the individual.

NSIRA conducted a review of all twelve departments by examining relevant policy and legal frameworks as communicated by the departments. The RCMP was responsive to NSIRA’s requests, providing documents and briefings within agreed time frames. Due to timing constraints, NSIRA relied heavily on the written record as provided. GAC demonstrated a willingness to provide NSIRA with the information requested, and made every effort to clarify requests. GAC was timely in their responses and provided access to people and information as requested.

NSIRA found that GAC is now strongly dependent on operational staff and Heads of Mission for decision-making and accountability under the ACA. This is a marked change from the findings of the 2019 review that found decision-making was done at the Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC) at Headquarters.

GAC has also not conducted an internal mapping exercise to determine which business lines are most likely to be implicated by the ACA. Considering the low number of cases this year and the size of GAC, and that ACA training is not mandatory for staff, NSIRA has concerns that not all areas involved in information sharing within GAC are being properly informed of their ACA obligations.

NSIRA also notes that GAC has no formalized tracking, or documentation mechanism for the follow-up of caveats and assurances. This is problematic as mission staff are rotational and may therefore have no visibility as to their ability to rely on caveats and assurances based on past information sharing instances.

During the review, GAC demonstrated a willingness to provide NSIRA with the information requested, and made every effort to clarify requests. GAC has provided NSIRA with all documents requested within a reasonable time frame.

This review assessed departments’ implementation of the directives received under the ACA and their operationalization of frameworks to address ACA requirements. As such, this review constitutes the first in-depth examination of the ACA within individual departments.

Authorities

This review is being conducted under the authority of paragraph 8(2.2) of the National Security Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA, ACA, or “the Act”).

Introduction

This review will focus on departmental implementation of directions received through the Orders in Council issued pursuant to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act. The overarching objective of this review is to assess whether departments are meeting their obligations under the ACA and associated directions. NSIRA is mandated to conduct this review on an annual basis.

Background

Many departments and agencies in the Government of Canada routinely share information with foreign entities. Given that information sharing with entities in certain countries can result in a risk of mistreatment of individuals, it is incumbent upon the Government of Canada to evaluate and mitigate the risks that such sharing creates. This is particularly the case for information sharing related to national security and intelligence, where information often relates to alleged participation in terrorism or other criminal activity.

The 2017 Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2017 MD), defined the substantial risk of mistreatment as:

[A] personal, present and foreseeable risk of mistreatment. In order to be ‘substantial’, the risk must be real and must be based on something more than mere theory or speculation. In most cases, the test for substantial risk of mistreatment will be satisfied when it is more likely than not that there will be mistreatment; however, in some cases particularly where there is a risk of severe harm, the ‘substantial risk’ standard may be satisfied at a lower level of probability.

This review will be NSIRA’s third annual assessment of the implementation of the directions issued under the ACA. This review will build on the previous reviews conducted in respect of avoiding complicity in mistreatment. The first review was in respect to the 2017 MD. The second review assessed the directions issued under the ACA, but was limited to the four months from when the directions were issued to the end of the 2019 calendar year. The third review was NSIRA’s first full year assessment of the implementation of the directions issued under the ACA for the 2020 calendar year.

NSIRA has focused on conducting in-depth reviews of how departments implement the directions under the ACA. This approach builds on the foundational knowledge obtained over the last three years and reviews how departments operationalize the directions under the ACA by using case studies to assess departments ACA frameworks in practice.

The review, covering the 2021 calendar year has been split into three sections. The first section addresses NSIRA’s statutory obligations covering a full year review of all departments. This year NSIRA conducted an in-depth review of two departments: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC), sections two and three respectively.

Methodology

Subsection 7(1) of the ACA imposes a statutory obligation on the deputy head to whom directions were issued to submit a report to the Minister regarding the implementation of those directions during the previous calendar year and publish a public copy of the report. The Minister must then provide the classified copy to NSIRA.

The obligations for departments noted above are mirrored in the NSIRA Act. Under subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA must, each calendar year, review the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA. Additionally, NSIRA has the statutory right to review the implementation beyond the specific requirements of the ACA, namely through its mandate to review any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence.

The issued Orders in Council (OiC) include a reporting requirement, whereby decisions necessitating referral to the deputy head for determination must be reported to the Minister and subsequently the review bodies. This requirement creates additional accountability for decisions undertaken by departments and allows NSIRA to be informed of any potential issues outside of the annual reporting cycle.

This review encompasses the implementation of the directions for the 12 departments that were in receipt of the OiC pursuant to the ACA. The review period is January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021. Additionally, NSIRA has selected two departments for more in-depth case study review: GAC and the RCMP. NSIRA will ensure that additional departments are selected for case study analysis in future years.

In completing this review, NSIRA considered legal authorities and governance frameworks. NSIRA also relied on documentation and information obtained through briefings with the departments.

Verification of Information and Responsiveness

NSIRA conducted a review of all twelve departments by examining relevant policy and legal frameworks as communicated by the departments.

The RCMP was responsive to NSIRA’s requests, providing documents and briefings within agreed time frames. Due to timing constraints, NSIRA relied heavily on the written record as provided. NSIRA found that overall, its expectation for responsiveness by the RCMP during this review were met.

GAC demonstrated a willingness to provide NSIRA with the information requested, and made every effort to clarify requests. GAC was timely in their responses and provided access to people and information as requested. NSIRA found that overall, its expectation for responsiveness by GAC during this review were met.

All Departments

Framework Updates and Reporting

Finding 1: NSIRA finds that the Canada Border Services Agency and Public Safety Canada still have not fully implemented an ACA framework, and supporting policies and procedures are still under development.

Based on submissions to NSIRA, ten departments have established frameworks and policies addressing whether the disclosure of information to a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. The submissions provided to NSIRA by Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), and Transport Canada (TC) indicate that they are actively working on refining existing policies and frameworks. NSIRA, in last year’s report identified Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Safety Canada (PS) as not yet having finalized their ACA policies.

Frameworks

CBSA advised that it has provisionally approved a framework for deciding whether a request for information from a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. CBSA advised NSIRA that it issued direction to conduct an internal review with the goal of confirming the feasibility of operational implementation across multiple program areas.

PS has advised that a full suite of risk assessments are under development and that it intends to conduct information sessions to ensure other program areas not directly affected by the ACA are aware of information sharing obligations. PS also advised that the program area implicated by the Ministerial Directions (the Directions) has operationalized the policy and has ensured that their procedures and processes align with the requirements outlined in the departmental policy, Act and the Directions. These policies came into effect in January 2022, with “a few aspects” having not yet been finalized. The suite of risk assessments is still in development.

PS also intends to hold information sessions with various sections of the department that may not currently need to apply the Directions, but should nonetheless be aware of their existence should they develop new programs with an information sharing dimension.

In 2020, GAC initiated a full review of the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee (AMCC) as directed by its terms of reference. GAC has advised that notional recommendations have been developed to address the identified shortcomings. Recommendations include timeliness of Committee decisions, addressing duty of care issues, and reporting case outcomes regarding Committee decisions.

NSIRA has been advised that the AMCC’s secretariat review will be completed in 2022 and the terms of reference will be updated shortly after. In response to NSIRA’s inquires about risk analysis, GAC has advised that during the review period they created a new risk assessment form and are developing a broader orientation guide with the goal of supporting employees through the risk assessment and decision-making process. These issues are further explored in section two of this report.

RCMP has noted internal shortcomings in regards to country assessments and the inability to regularly update the reports. A framework has been provided to NSIRA on how the RCMP intends to remedy these shortcomings in the future to better serve the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC) process.

Reporting

Subsection 7(1) of the Act requires deputy heads to submit a report to the appropriate Minister on the implementation of directions received under the Orders in Council during the previous year. The ACA stipulates that report submissions are required before March 01 of each year.

All twelve departments have fulfilled their obligations to report to their respective ministers The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and TC did, however, submit their reports shortly after the March 01 deadline.

Subsection 7(2) of the Act also requires deputy heads make an unclassified version of the report available to the public as soon as feasible after submission to the Minister. Reports were made available in all of the twelve departments.

Section 8 of the Act requires the Minister to provide a copy of the report to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICoP), NSIRA and, if applicable, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (CRCC).

The table below captures a summary of both the departmental responses to the implementation questions and NSIRA’s assessment regarding these responses. The assessment was based on the associated details provided by departments in the context of the specific information requested. If a specific requirement was not met, it has been flagged. The relatively few instances of these were connected with departments not meeting certain reporting obligations under the Act.

Summary Table 1.1 – Requirements under the Act
  CBSA CRA CSE CSIS DFO DND FINTRAC GAC IRCC PS RCMP TC
Cases referred to the deputy head? No No No No No No No No No No No No
Was a report submitted to the Minister? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Was the report made available to the public? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Did the Minister provide a copy to NSICoP, NSIRA, CRCC? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Case Triage and Escalation

Finding 2: NSIRA finds that from January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

All twelve departments indicated that they did not have any cases referred to the Deputy Head level for determination. This is a requirement of the OiC in cases where officials are unable to determine if the substantial risk can be mitigated. Therefore, all additional reporting requirements associated with this level of decision were not applicable.

Summary Table 1.2 – Cases Escalated, by Level of Approval
  CBSA CRA CSE CSIS DFO DND FINTRAC GAC IRCC PS RCMP TC
First Level. (Supervisor/Deputy Chief) 0 634 236 (23) 780) 0 Not Known/Not Tracked 48 6 2 401 55 0
Second Level (Manager/Chief) 0 325 176 (24) 243 0 Not Known/Not Tracked 48 6 2 401 55 0
Third Level(Director/DDG) 8(25) 69
Fourth Level (DG/Committee/ Working Group) 0 63 1 (26) 81 0 7 48 0 0 0 55 0
Fifth Level (ADM/A.Commis sioner/L1) 0 0 0 (27) 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 55 0
Sixth Level (Deputy Head) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NSIRA notes that this is the third consecutive year where there have been no cases referred to the deputy head level in any department.

Future reviews may be particularly attuned to the issue of case escalation and departmental processes for decision-making, as one of the stated objectives of NSIRA’s review of ACA obligations is to ensure that the assessment of risk is escalated to appropriate level of authority.

Implementation of Previous Recommendations

As part of this review, NSIRA requested information regarding the implementation of previous recommendations. The following analysis is based on responses received from departments.

In the 2019 NSIRA Review of Departmental Frameworks for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2019-06), NSIRA recommended that “the definition of substantial risk should be codified in law or public direction.” NSIRA notes that some departments have accounted for this gap by relying on the definition of substantial risk in the 2017 MDs. In light of the pending statutorily mandated review of The National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59) and the centrality of the concept of substantial risk to the regime governing the ACA, NSIRA reiterates its 2019 recommendation that the definition of substantial risk be codified in law.

DND/CAF has advised NSIRA that as a result of its recommendation, the department has included the definition of “substantial risk” within the Chief of Defence Intelligence Functional Directive on DND/CAF Information Sharing Activities with Foreign Entities. However, it should be noted that DND/CAF has also adopted additional definitions including its definition of “foreseeable.” NSIRA has previously expressed its concerns in its 2019 detailed Annex of DND/CAF application of the MD regarding the DND/CAF interpretation of foreseeability. DND/CAF has also advised NSIRA that it leveraged the human rights assessment methodology from other organizations to develop the methodology for DND/CAF’s profiles. DND/CAF has also advised that it is actively participating with ACA-related interdepartmental working groups to share its country’s human rights methodology, procedures, and assessments, and raise concerns.

Of the twelve departments, CRA, CBSA, CSIS, DND/CAF, PS and TC have continued to adjust frameworks and policies as a result of the findings and recommendations from previous reviews of the ACA. While recommendations may not have been specific to individual departments, many have advised that they have taken into them into consideration and applied improvements more generally.

CRA for example in response to Recommendation #1 from NSIRA’s 2019 review (regarding the importance of conducting periodic internal reviews), has reviewed its exchanges of information procedures. As a result, CRA has implemented procedural changes where risk assessments deemed to be of low-risk are now approved at the manager level, whereas previously the minimum approval level was Director.

CBSA has provisionally approved its ACA policy and is currently conducting an additional review to ensure that the policy is operable across multiple program areas. CBSA has advised that the policy includes guidance on the disclosure of information, the request for information, and the use of information where there may be a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. As part of the policy, the CBSA has incorporated procedures and processes to assess risk and coordinate with its Senior Management Risk Assessment Committee.

PS has also finalized its draft policy in response to NSIRA’s 2020 ACA review finding that it did not finalize its policy frameworks in support of the Direction received under the ACA. PS has noted that a policy was approved and came into effect on January 1, 2022. NSIRA has been advised additional aspects of the policy are still being implemented, including the development of risk assessment tools.

Finally, TC has advised NSIRA that it has taken stock of feedback on the implementation of the ACA since initial promulgation of the Corporate Policy in August 2020. TC notes that its corporate policy is under revision and seeks to clarify and strengthen key elements. TC has advised that adjustments underway include refining language to further clarify roles, responsibilities program-level requirements, and timelines associated with implementation. To this end, TC is providing more guidance on reporting format and content requirements for program-level support to the annual reporting exercise.

At the program level, TC is reviewing the policy impact of changes (over the past year) to the functional structure and roles associated with the Passenger Protect Program (PPP). To date, the PPP is the only program activity that TC has identified where risks associated with the ACA may be present. The PPP is currently transitioning to an enhanced framework, which is expected to be fully implemented prior to March 2023.

NSIRA maintains its previous recommendation that departments identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach by departments when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern under the ACA.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The ACA review for 2021 is NSIRA’s second full year assessment of the implementation of the Act. As discussed in the background to this review, NSIRA has complemented the knowledge gained through its annual review of the ACA with an in-depth analysis of the implementation of the Directions. The in-depth analysis highlights to departments some best practices within the Government of Canada as well as some potential issues in the adopted frameworks. This year, the RCMP and GAC were selected. As one of the “original” departments subject to the 2011 Ministerial Direction, the RCMP has had over a decade to develop, implement, and adjust its framework. GAC was selected because it was issued a Ministerial Directive in 2017 and due to its role as a primary developer of human rights reports.

Implementation of the ACA

Finding 3: NSIRA finds that the RCMP has a robust framework in place for the triage of cases pertaining to the ACA.

In 2011, the RCMP was issued the Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities. However the issued MD only applied to information sharing in national security matters. In response to the 2011 MD, the RCMP created the Foreign Information Risk Analysis Committee (FIRAC), the Committee was renamed the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee following the issuance of the 2017 MD.

The 2017 MD’s scope was broadened to include all units and personnel of the RCMP, and FIRAC was expanded accordingly. The enactment of the ACA imposed the requirement of the Orders in Council directions to the Commissioner. The operational requirements between 2017 and 2019 remained the same. The RCMP’s Implementation of the ACA is composed of three key mechanisms, FIRAC, Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG), and Annual Reporting.

FIRAC is an advisory body to senior management, tasked with providing RCMP personnel with a mechanism to review information exchanges where there may be a substantial risk of mistreatment. FIRAC is a central part of the determination making mechanism for cases with ACA considerations. The committee examines the operational context of each request, the application of risk-mitigation strategies, and the strength of assurances and makes recommendations to the responsible Assistant Commissioner.

It is important to note that the Terms of Reference for FIRAC were updated in December 2021, this is after the conclusion of the last FIRAC meeting on the case study discussed below. The previous Terms of Reference which were drafted following the issuance of the 2017 MD stated that “in case of information sharing where there is a clear operational need to proceed, but a substantial risk of mistreatment, the decision will be referred to the Commissioner for final approval, as per the MD and Operational policy”. The revised Terms of Reference identifies that the Assistant Commissioner, or Executive Director is responsible for deciding whether the substantial risk of mistreatment can be mitigated. The Terms of Reference now clearly stipulates that the Assistant Commissioner, or the Executive Director as the sole decision maker, and that FIRAC fulfills an advisory function. NSIRA cautions that this apparent or perceived delegation of the final decision to the Assistant Commissioner risks non-compliance with the purpose and object of the Act and the OiC.

The Committee is comprised of two rotating chairs and a number of members from various divisions within the RCMP. As a result of an internal review, the RCMP have adjusted membership of FIRAC to ensure that co-chairs were not making determinations on cases from their respective units, with the intention of removing situations where a real or apparent conflict of interest could arise.

FIRAC meets bi-monthly or on an as-needed basis when urgent, time sensitive cases arise. All recommendations made by the committee are non-binding. NSIRA has also observed that the addition of Committee members is planned for April 2022.

Over the last year, the RCMP have made efforts to improve their framework and have created tools to aid personnel in engaging with FIRAC. They have established a FIRAC Coordination Unit, which is responsible for conducting consultations with personnel in order to help triage potential cases and determine the appropriate level of FIRAC engagement. The RCMP have also developed a suite of tools outlining definitions and thresholds, mitigation strategies and FIRAC requirements.

The FIRAC Coordination Unit works with RCMP staff, and members to assist with the risk assessment process and determine if a FIRAC evaluation is required. The Coordination Unit’s roles and responsibilities have been adjusted with the stated goal of providing guidance and support to members to strengthen case submissions. The intent of the Unit is to improve upon record keeping, identify internal strategic level issues, engage with external federal partners on cross-cutting issues to enhance processes and practices, and to share outcomes of case-specific FIRAC meetings with LEAG to inform updates on foreign entity assessments.

The RCMP is also in the final stages of updating its operational manual with the goal of supporting the Direction’s consistent application across the RCMP. This update is intended to clarify roles and responsibilities, as well as thresholds and triggers that require an information exchange to be reviewed by FIRAC.

As will be addressed later in this report, the 2019 OiC includes a requirement for the case to be referred to the RCMP Commissioner for determination, where officials are unable to determine whether the risk of sharing information can be mitigated. Additionally, pursuant to section 3(1)c of the OiC, the RCMP Commissioner must report and disclose any information considered in making the determination or decision to NSIRA, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (CRCC), and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICoP) in a timely manner, if certain information that was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity was used, in order to prevent loss of life, or significant personal injury.

The LEAG is responsible for developing country assessment profiles and maintaining the Integrated Collaborative Environment portal, where the information is stored and accessed by officers as needed. NSIRA was informed that during the last few years, the LEAG team has been severely underfunded and under-resourced, resulting in country profiles that are out of date with a third of countries having no assessment report whatsoever.

An annual report detailing the implementation of the Act and any cases brought to the Commissioner for determination must be sent to the Minister of Public Safety, NSIRA, NSICoP and the CRCC. The RCMP must also disclose any information considered in the making of a determination or decision. For full description of the RCMP’s process please see Annex A: Departmental Frameworks.

The RCMP continues to improve upon FIRAC process. Recently, the RCMP has made strides to enhance products used to assess whether proposed information exchanges carry a substantial risk of mistreatment that require FIRAC assessments. These improvements include visual tools outlining the decision-making process, key definitions, mitigation strategies, and triggers for a FIRAC evaluation.

RCMP continues to make considerable progress on updating resources on the designated SharePoint site, the ACA training module, and policy in the RCMP operational manual. While these initiatives are still in progress, NSIRA commends the RCMP’s initiative in conducting an internal review of FIRAC, and making efforts to address identified shortcomings.

Information Sharing Framework and Risk Analysis

Finding 4: NSIRA finds that the RCMP’s FIRAC risk assessments include objectives external to the requirements of the Orders in Council, such as the risk of not exchanging information.

Finding 5: NSIRA finds that the RCMP use of a two-part risk assessment, that of the country profile and that of the individual to determine if there is a substantial risk, including the particular circumstances of the individual in question within the risk assessment, is a best practice.

The RCMP’s information sharing framework as it relates to ACA is predicated on managing risk. While this is largely dependent on the use of assurances and caveats, investigators rely on the Liaison Officers/Analysts Deployed Overseas (LOs/ADOs) assessment of the particular country or foreign entity in question. LOs/ADOs as part of their role, are expected to provide up-to-date information on current country and entity reports, relationships established with specific entities, and the RCMP’s history as it relates to information sharing and current human rights records. Investigators use this information to help inform a mitigation measure applied to a proposed information request, and/or disclosure.

In making assessments and providing recommendations to the Assistant Commissioner, FIRAC considers the specifics of the case included in the initial risk assessment (included in the FIRAC submission), the LEAG country assessment, as well as input from the Liaison Officers/Analysts Deployed Overseas (LO/ADO). A Record of Decision is completed after each meeting and highlights the history of sharing with the entities, the risks and mitigation measures discussed, and the final recommendation of the Committee. Based on the information provided in the Record of Decision and the recommendation of the committee, the Assistant Commissioner will then make a determination.

While the RCMP has not formalized a Gender Based Analysis within their ACA risk-related assessments, NSIRA notes that considerations applied in the RCMP’s country risk assessments identify vulnerable groups at risk of mistreatment under the “Human Rights Concerns for Specific Groups.” Individuals identified as at risk in a country/entity designated as medium risk would require a FIRAC assessment prior to any information exchanges.

NSIRA sampled twenty instances where FIRAC was convened. However, there were a number of cases where multiple FIRAC meetings pertained to the same case. For example, [**redacted**] which is examined in closer detail as part of the NSIRA’s sample file review, had three separate FIRAC meetings. The twenty FIRAC instances in the selected sample amount to sixteen individual cases. Requests made by NSIRA used the FIRAC nomenclature, and the RCMP fulfilled requests based on what was requested in the Requests for Information. The result was that NSIRA was only able to view case file information where the case was a touch point within the FIRAC process; the full operational case files were not provided.

NSIRA recognizes that the RCMP fulfilled its obligation when responding to our request for information. However, when it became clear that NSIRA had not obtained the entirety of the case, including the investigative file, significant time constraints prevented NSIRA from obtaining and considering the additional information in this review.

Outbound Information Sharing

NSIRA observed that in at least 35 percent of FIRAC cases sampled, the RCMP factored the potential for the negative impact of not sharing in their assessment. FIRAC’s assessment considers the risk of not sharing outbound information with a particular emphasis on maintaining, developing, or preserving a relationship with an information-sharing partner. Furthermore, the RCMP informed NSIRA that they will also consider the potential public risk to security of not sharing the information. NSIRA understands that the reliability of assurances and caveats depend crucially on the circumstances and the context of a particular case, but would strongly encourage the RCMP to base its rationale for sharing information primarily on the risk to the individual. NSIRA notes that the risk assessment and mitigating strategies (to minimize risk) are the primary tools to be used when assessing whether information is to be shared. The ACA and issued Orders in Council do not permit the weighing of external considerations such as relationship damage associated with not sharing information and public safety against the risk to the individual.

Mitigation and Assurance Measures

Finding 6: NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not have a centralized system of documenting assurances and does not regularly monitor and update the assessment of the reliability of assurances.

The RCMP advised NSIRA that any assurances or caveats that have or have not been adhered to in relation to information sharing with foreign entities are recorded within the investigative case file. The RCMP further explained that information is shared on a case-by- case basis by means of either the Liaison Officer responsible, or INTERPOL channels.

Liaison Officers/Analysts Deployed Overseas (LOs/ADOs) are required to record their interaction in their notes which would be included within the operational investigative file. The RCMP has advised NSIRA these notes are where any violations of assurances or caveats would be recorded.

The RCMP explained that it relies on its overseas network to monitor the reliability of assurances and caveats, and that personnel meet regularly with law enforcement partners and foreign allied LOs. The RCMP further noted any indication of a deterioration in human rights within a country or specific report on mistreatment of an individual would be discussed and captured within the RCMP (operational) case file, and ultimately documented in the RCMP’s FIRAC risk assessment form.

As noted above, due to time constraints, NSIRA obtained information on FIRAC meetings and the supporting documents, and did not have an opportunity to review the RCMP’s operational case files. When NSIRA asked to provide rationales used to assess the reliability of assurances and caveats for the selected sample, NSIRA was referred back to the FIRAC risk assessment form (also known as Form 6517), and provided with the following:

The footnote highlights a number of case files. General and Supplementary reports on these files were reviewed in the preparation of this response. No concerns with respect to assurances were documented and only one instance with respect to caveats was identified. In this regard, [**redacted**] documents one instance wherein a partner agency had not adhered to a caveat’s requirement to coordinate actions – no allegation of mistreatment was documented on the file. The issue was raised with the partner agency and addressed.

NSIRA notes that while the [**redacted**] was in relation to a company operating in the [**redacted**], witness information was sought from the [**redacted**]. The LEAG Country Risk Assessment for [**redacted**], designated as medium risk, does cite an issue specific to the sharing of information and the use of caveats, but has not been updated since August 2018. The RCMP has advised that:

While the LEAG country assessment has not yet been updated, the LO would be expected to raise this issue in any future consultations with various investigative teams seeking to share with this entity.

NSIRA stresses the importance of the post-monitoring of assurances and caveats. NSIRA has observed that the issuance of an assurance, and/or caveat may sometimes rely on assurances provided by a specific official (within the foreign entity/country). Absent appropriate documentation, this may be problematic due to the fact that movement within positions is to be expected and assurances can no longer be valid if the individual has moved out of the position. Assurances must be followed up on and renewed to ensure they are being followed in the event of employee turnover.

Furthermore, there is no centralized process for the documentation of assurances. Rather, some documentation that is occasionally noted on specific investigative files may be problematic in situations where LOs/ADOs are rotational. If the investigative file is closed, the new LOs/ADOs to the post may not be aware of situations where assurances have not been respected.

Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that the RCMP establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and where possible to monitor and document whether said caveats and assurances were respected.

Country and Entity Profiles

Finding 7: NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not regularly update, or have a schedule to update its Country and Entity Assessments. In many cases these assessments are more than four years old and are heavily dependent on an aggregation of open source reporting.

Finding 8: NSIRA finds that information collected through the Liaison Officer in the course of an operation is not centrally documented such that it can inform future assessments.

In 2019, the RCMP conducted an internal review of its information sharing framework including LEAG and FIRAC. Based on this review, NSIRA recommended in 2019, that departments adopt internal reviews of their policies and processes as a best practice. While it is not the intention to cover items already identified in the (internal) review, NSIRA notes that three years have elapsed and the issues associated to country and entity assessments still remain.

Of the 90 assessments, the RCMP is currently using to base its risk assessments, 87 percent have not been updated since 2018, and the remaining thirteen percent have not been updated since 2019. Over the course of 2021, the RCMP did not update any of its country profiles. NSIRA has been advised that in 2022, [**redacted**] but cite funding constraints as a key challenge.

A key finding of the RCMP’s internal review relates composition of the profiles themselves, in that they: “do not sufficiently reflect the RCMP’s operational experience.” The review states that: “LEAG country and entity risk profiles are predominately based on open source information rather than input from operational units…” The RCMP through the course of the review emphasized the role and importance to the Liaison Officer during the FIRAC process, suggesting that the Liaison Officer is positioned to offset any shortcoming with the country and entity profiles. NSIRA notes the internal review highlights some of the challenges faced by the Liaison Officers, referring to the added responsibilities of the LEAG and the FIRAC processes as adversely affecting their ability to preform their regular duties.

NSIRA notes the RCMP’s ongoing efforts at improving its post-monitoring efforts. NSIRA looks forward to reviewing the progress made over the next year on the measures taken on updating the RCMP’s country profiles, and inclusion of post-monitoring of automating media monitoring and information sharing tracking mechanism with INTERPOL Ottawa.

Case Study: [**redacted**]

[**redacted**] the RCMP sought approval to interview a [**redacted**]

[**redacted**] The RCMP sought to [**redacted**] interview [**redacted**] in order to assess the current risk or threat [**redacted**] to Canada and Canadian citizens, [**redacted**]. The RCMP has advised that a “…successful interview could advance the investigation [**redacted**]and significantly improve the ability to identify the threat and risk [**redacted**] to [**redacted**] security.”

Additionally, the RCMP believed that “engagement with [**redacted**] may lead to [**redacted**] information and evidence [**redacted**].

[**redacted**]

The RCMP’s internal Country profile classifies [**redacted**] as a High-Risk Profile (RED). The profile notes serious documented allegations of human rights abuses [**redacted**] (but not limited to) torture [**redacted**] suspects routinely subjected to unfair trials. The RCMP had concerns that “If [**redacted**] could face torture and mistreatment [**redacted**]”. As per policy the case was escalated to the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC).

a) FIRAC [**redacted**]

[**redacted**], the FIRAC convened and discussed the request to interview [**redacted**] Committee found that there are substantial risks of mistreatment for [**redacted**] that there are currently no measures in place that could effectively mitigate the identified risks. FIRAC noted [**redacted**].

FIRAC did however also note, “that efforts should be made to better position possible future interviews.” They noted that [**redacted**] would “allow the RCMP to monitor the outcomes and assurances of discussions at a strategic level [**redacted**].

Accordingly, FIRAC recommended that the RCMP “engage in discussion [**redacted**] on the [**redacted**] potential for [**redacted**]. The Assistant Commissioner for [**redacted**] approved this recommendation.

Events of [**redacted**]

In response to the FIRAC recommendation, senior RCMP [**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

Based on [**redacted**] the investigative team sought FIRAC’s recommendation to allow [**redacted**] further discussions [**redacted**] in order to have the RCMP [**redacted**] interview with [**redacted**] and seek assurances [**redacted**].

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**], the FIRAC convened [**redacted**] to consider the request to engage and exchange information to [**redacted**] interview [**redacted**] to seek assurances [**redacted**]. The request was approved by FIRAC, if certain mitigation measures and assurances be received, [**redacted**].

Events of [**redacted**]

[**redacted**] RCMP [**redacted**] engaged the [**redacted**]. The RCMP [**redacted**] there is a [**redacted**] they would be interested in interviewing [**redacted**].

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

The RCMP [**redacted**] escalated the requests to interview [**redacted**] to FIRAC with additional mitigation measures.

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

FIRAC convened a meeting to discuss the request to share the personal information of [**redacted**].

The Committee concluded that there is a substantial risk of mistreatment [**redacted**] should the information be shared and that said risk cannot be mitigated by caveats and assurances. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the information not be exchanged. This recommendation was based on the following concerns:

  • [**redacted**]
  • The existence of a significant risk of mistreatment that could not be mitigated [**redacted**].
  • Inability to guarantee [**redacted**]
  • Safety concerns based on information that may be derived from the interview;
  • [**redacted**]
  • [**redacted**]
  • Assurances were deemed insufficient to mitigate the risk, [**redacted**] to allow for an assessment of the confidence in the assurance.

FIRAC recommended [**redacted**] explore additional options to reduce the potential risk of mistreatment and then return to the committee for reconsideration. Among these options, the Committee suggested [**redacted**].

[**redacted**], the Assistant Commissioner [**redacted**] rejected FIRAC’s recommendation and allowed the sharing of information. He based his decision on the following:

  1. [**redacted**] the RCMP should consider the consequences of not sharing [**redacted**] as this would be detrimental for the relationship stating that “engagement [**redacted**] will give insight and influence”;
  2. [**redacted**]
  3. The importance of the RCMP maintaining a strong relationship [**redacted**].

The Assistant Commissioner then concludes, “failure to share presents risk that cannot be managed [**redacted**]. Although influence is not guaranteed, I believe it is the better choice”

A subsequent email by the Assistant Commissioner [**redacted**] outlined additional considerations that factored into the decision to reject FIRAC’s recommendations. These considerations focused on the risk of not sharing the information. The additional information included operational and strategic considerations [**redacted**]. The Assistant Commissioner stated that lack of engagement [**redacted**]. Strategically, the Assistant Commissioner noted the risk to relationship should the information not be shared, noting that “failure to follow through [**redacted**] and associated mitigation efforts articulated below will likely have a negative impact on the [**redacted**] relationship [**redacted**].

The Assistant Commissioner’s reasoning goes on to include a “necessity” analysis regarding the challenges [**redacted**] the importance of the information from the interview, and the importance of the relationship [**redacted**]. Of note, the Assistant Commissioner notes that [**redacted**] a strong relationship [**redacted**] will aid in plans to mitigate the greater risk while also managing the risk that exists today for the Canadian [**redacted**]. The Assistant Commissioner also concludes his email by stressing that it is his belief that sharing the information is required to reduce the risk of mistreatment [**redacted**] that lack of involvement will lead to greater risk.

Analysis

Finding 9: NSIRA finds that FIRAC members concluded that the information sharing would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment that could not be mitigated. The Assistant Commissioner determined that it may be mitigated. This amounts to a disagreement between officials or a situation where “officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated.”

The ACA and issued OIC place an absolute prohibition on the sharing of information where there is a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. Unless “officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk”, the information cannot be disclosed. Section 1(2) of the OICs further stipulate, “that where officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated, the Commissioner must ensure that the matter is referred to the Commissioner for determination.

The Assistant Commissioner’s decision to share the information contrary to FIRAC’s recommendation, cites section 1(2) of the OIC and concludes that since the FIRAC is responsible for making a recommendation to the Assistant Commissioner then the Assistant Commissioner is the final decision maker. The Assistant Commissioner “made the decision that the risk can be mitigated.” The Assistant Commissioner did not consider that making the final decision in this instance ran contrary to the process set out in the FIRAC Terms of Reference, and contrary to the OICs. The OICs are clear, where officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated the matter must be referred to the Commissioner…” Accordingly, pursuant to section 1(2) of the OIC, NSIRA notes that this case should have been elevated to the Commissioner for determination.

Finding 10: NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner’s rationale for rejecting FIRAC’s advice did not adequately address concerns consistent with the provisions of the Orders in Council. In particular, NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner erroneously considered the importance of the potential future strategic relationship with a foreign entity in the assessment of potential risk of mistreatment of the individual.

[**redacted**]

A number of assumptions characterize the justifications by the Assistant Commissioner to share the requested information.

[**redacted**]. However, this reasoning disregards [**redacted**]. It further dismisses the RCMP’s own reporting [**redacted**]. FIRAC’s record of decision which notes, [**redacted**]. The Assistant Commissioner accordingly disregards the possibility that [**redacted**].

In the alternative, the Assistant Commissioner relies on [**redacted**] but does not consider now the risk [**redacted**] may increase [**redacted**].

Secondly, the Assistant Commissioner’s reasoning relied on [**redacted**].

The Assistant Commissioner does not address FIRAC’s concerns for [**redacted**] the insufficiency of mitigation measures. Rather the Assistant Commissioner concludes [**redacted**] greater risk should the information not be shared – but does not explain why or how so? Nor does the Assistant Commissioner address FIRAC’s concerns regarding [**redacted**].

Additionally, the Assistant Commissioner’s decision considered and emphasized the importance of the relationship between the RCMP [**redacted**] While FIRAC expressed concern assurances would be respected. The Assistant Commissioner’s reasoning focuses on the importance of [**redacted**], that relationship [**redacted**].

As mentioned earlier, according to the RCMP:

“…while the ACA and OiC may not speak to external considerations, it does not prohibit strategic considerations as part of the totality of the analysis, rather than against the risk to the individual, including whether strategic partnerships may act as a mitigation measure. It is important to note that the ACA and OiC do not supersede our obligations under the RCMP Act.”

The RCMP further noted that: “…As such, any action or inaction could result in unwanted consequences, and to include them as a consideration to demonstrate due diligence, and that all aspects of an activity is considered is prudent. Strategic relationships, or more importantly, in this case, actions that jeopardize the strategic relationship, can lead to harm. The A/C clearly stated that.”

NSIRA notes that the assessment of mistreatment must be limited to whether the disclosure would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment to the individual and whether said risk may be mitigated. NSIRA strongly cautions against the use of additional considerations such as strategic relationships in the assessment of substantial risk.

It should be noted that the Assistant Commissioner did provide additional mitigation measures for consideration. However, those measures were all premised on [**redacted**]. The measures did not require that the assurances and the FIRAC suggested mitigation measures be adopted as a prerequisite to the information sharing.

Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that in cases where the RCMP Assistant Commissioner disagrees with FIRAC’s recommendation not to share the information, the case be automatically referred to the Commissioner.

Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that the assessment of substantial risk be limited to the provisions of the Orders in Council – namely the substantial risk of mistreatment and whether the risk may be mitigated – and external objectives such as fostering strategic relationships should not factor into this decision-making.

Finally, in the case at hand the Assistant Commissioner responsible for approving the FIRAC recommendations was the same Assistant Commissioner supervising the business line of the case. In 2019 NSIRA recommended that “departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.” As discussed in paragraph 61 above, in 2021 the RCMP adjusted its FIRAC process such that there are co-chairs for the FIRAC. Adding an additional Chair (co-chairs) was to ensure that the Chair overseeing a specific FIRAC is not the one responsible for business line where the case originated. The case at hand demonstrates the need to emulate that structure at the senior level in order to maintain independent decision-making and ensure that the case focus is on the substantial risk of mistreatment to the individual rather than additional strategic considerations.

Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that FIRAC recommendations are referred to an Assistant Commissioner who is not responsible for the branch from which the case originates.

Global Affairs Canada

During the course of the review period from January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, six cases reported to having been referred to the Intelligence Policy and Programs Division (INPL) for further assessment. In the cases that were provided to NSIRA all were specific to Mission security, where Missions were dependent on local authorities to assist in situations where there was a potential threat to staff at the embassy or consulate. When asked about the low number of cases, GAC advised NSIRA that sharing personal identifying information with foreign entities was very rare in an ACA context.

Implementation of the ACA

Finding 11: NSIRA finds that GAC is now strongly dependent on operational staff and Heads of Mission for decision-making and accountability under the ACA.

On December 14, 2017, GAC was issued Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2017 MD). GAC had not received the Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign entities (the 2011 MD) that was issued to a number of other departments.

The department manages a global network of over 175 missions in 110 countries, employing approximately 12,000 staff with an operating with a budget of over $7 billion.

When asked how the department operationalizes the Act, GAC referred to their outreach and training programs. GAC advised NSIRA that their training programs targeted specific staff to ensure awareness of and compliance with the ACA. The training outlines the roles and responsibilities regarding the ACA and Orders in Council requirements, and provides employees a definition of “substantial risk,” and points of contact at headquarters.

In 2021, NSIRA committed to further scrutinizing the processes regarding ACA triage and decision-making by reviewing both GAC and the RCMP. In the 2020 ACA review, NSIRA found that there were significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and required level of approvals across departments. In particular, NSIRA identified procedural gaps in GAC’s risk assessments that should have warranted escalation to the Deputy Minister.

When asked if GAC had initiated any adjustments, or changes to frameworks or policies as a result of the findings and recommendations from previous reviews of the ACA, GAC advised that adjustments had been made to the framework by creating a Mistreatment Risk Assessment form. They explained that the form would support the application of a more consistent threshold for elevating a case in the decision-making process, and would standardize how cases are documented. As of August 31, 2022, GAC has yet to implement the use of this form.

Currently, the Head of Mission (HoM, or Chargé) makes the initial assessment in determining if the risk of mistreatment to the individual may be mitigated below the substantial risk threshold. Only where the HoM identifies a concern as to the sufficiency of the mitigation measures or assessment, would the HoM seek guidance through the Intelligence Policy and Programs Division (INPL) generic e-mail.

INPL can assist the Mission in conducting a risk assessment. If at this point it is determined there is a substantial risk of mistreatment that cannot be mitigated and the Mission still wants to proceed, the responsible geographic Director General may request that the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee (AMCC) be convened. The AMCC provides a decision to the HoM. GAC has advised that the role of the AMCC:

….is to recommend risk-mitigation strategies, seek escalatory senior-level discussion and approval for decisions as required, up to and including the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and document how each case is managed. It is convened on an ad hoc basis to review the proposed disclosure, request, or use of information in cases in which prohibitions under the Directions may be engaged. The Committee is similar to structures that exist within other departments and agencies subject to the OiC.

In 2020 and 2021, GAC initiated a review of the Secretariat of the AMCC, formerly known as the Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC). GAC has advised that notional recommendations have been developed to improve the working methods of the Committee and update the terms of reference. Explaining that the timeliness of Committee decisions, addressing duty of care issues, and final reporting of case outcomes regarding Committee decisions are currently being examined. It is expected that the AMCC Secretariat’s review will be completed in 2022 and the terms of reference updated shortly thereafter.

In the six cases provided over the review period, NSIRA observed that the final decision on whether to share information with local authorities was left to the HoM. This is best illustrated in the HANOI case where the mission was advised

To note, decision-making authority on such situations ultimately rests with mission/geo. INPL’s role—as departmental focal point for the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA)—is simply to advise on relevant considerations, not authorize.

In further correspondence between INPL and the Mission in Hanoi there appears to be the need for additional clarification on the decision-making roles in regards to applying the ACA. INPL further advised the Mission that “it is in fact the Mission’s responsibility to determine if there is a substantial risk of mistreatment or not.

The centralization of accountability with the HoM as opposed to headquarters represents a significant change in implementation since NSIRA’s in-depth review of GAC in 2019. Namely, in the previous review any cases where there was a potential substantial risk of mistreatment would require escalation MDCC (via the INPL) where the Committee would ultimately be responsible for deterring if the proposed mitigation measures are sufficient and if the information sharing should take place. This change in implementation threatens the independence of the process from individuals with a potential operational interest in the outcome of the information sharing.

Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure that accountability for compliance with the ACA clearly rests with the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee.

Information Sharing Framework

Finding 12: NSIRA finds that GAC has not demonstrated that all of its business lines are integrated into its framework under the ACA.

GAC does not have any information-sharing arrangements with foreign entities related to the ACA. When asked in last year’s review how GAC monitors its information exchanges, the response provided reads as follows:

There is a handful of divisions at GAC that receive information that may have been obtained through mistreatment. Because of the very different type of information they each receive due to their specific mandates, each has a different process/framework for identifying information likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment. Therefore, there is not one unified set of processes at GAC for initially marking/identifying incoming information potentially derived from mistreatment.

GAC has also not conducted an internal mapping exercise to determine which business lines are subject to the ACA. Considering the low number of cases this year and the size of GAC, and that ACA training is not mandatory for staff, NSIRA has concerns that not all areas involved in information sharing within GAC are being properly informed of their ACA obligations.

When asked to elaborate on the nature of information exchanges triggering the ACA, GAC further clarified:

[T]hat information exchanges occur without formal arrangement with foreign entities, and the vast majority of the information that is exchanged does not pertain to individuals. Each information exchange situation is unique and occurs within a specific relational and country context.

Each instance of information sharing is handled on a case-by-case basis and escalated to the appropriate level based on the individual circumstances.

It is important to note that if the assessment determines that there is NOT a substantial risk of mistreatment, but that the exchange of information directly or indirectly involves personally identifiable information about an individual AND the country or foreign entities is not a trusted partner when it comes to human rights, GAC employees must still capture via a risk assessment form the reason why there is NOT a substantial risk of mistreatment and keep a thorough record.

Finding 13: NSIRA finds that GAC has not made ACA training mandatory for all staff across relevant business lines. This could result in staff being involved in information exchanges without the proper training and knowledge of the implications of the ACA.

When determining whether there is a risk of mistreatment, GAC employees will leverage human rights reports, as well as any intelligence relevant to the country/entity associated with the information. The risk profile of the individual about whom information is shared is also taken into consideration when making a determination regarding whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists. It is a collection of information that informs any assessment and respective decision, rather than a single tool.

Training is only mandatory for employees working in a high-risk mission or functions and offered as a suggestion for other staff at mission and headquarters. GAC has committed to establishing a dedicated ACA page on the intranet, along with supporting communication, however, employees are only encouraged to review it.

GAC provides an outreach program and training, for staff both at headquarters and at missions abroad on their ACA obligations. The ACA components are embedded in GAC’s Governance, Accreditation, Technical Security and Espionage (GATE) awareness program, the Legal and Policy Framework on Information Sharing, and a module in the Heads of Mission pre-posting training. These training courses outline the roles and responsibilities of officials regarding their ACA and Orders in Council obligations, including the definition of “substantial risk”, and key points of contact at headquarters. It is important to note that the GATE awareness program and that the ACA segment of the training is considered as an outreach tool and not a core training module, meant to provide situational awareness for Canadian- based staff on information security and intelligence topics. The training provided by the Department of Justice acts as the core training module for staff.

When asked about Consular Operations bureau training, GAC appeared to have only a cursory knowledge citing that they were aware from the 2021 Annual Report (on the Application of the Orders in Council Directions for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities) that ACA directions were included as part of the training session offered by the Consular Operations bureau.

The target employees for training at headquarters are outgoing Mission Security Officers, Management Consular Officers, Readiness Program Managers, Global Security Reporting Program Officers and Heads of Mission, as well as all members of the Intelligence Bureau. At mission, the training is provided to all Canada-based staff, including other government departments’ employees posted at missions. GAC has only recently begun tracking the number of staff that have been provided ACA training, and estimates that at least 300 GAC employees have been provided ACA-related training since 2020.

When further queried about the breakdowns of training provided, GAC posited that there are only a small proportion of GAC officers abroad that may encounter ACA-related decisions. With training only mandatory for some staff, NSIRA is concerned that given the volume of information exchanges, and the multiplicity of business lines there is very well potential that information sharing may be occurring, or not properly triggered by those without proper ACA knowledge.

In light of the fact that GAC engages with foreign entities with poor human rights records and operates in highly volatile environments, NSIRA expresses deep concern that GAC has not demonstrated that it has implemented ACA framework across business lines.

Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that GAC conduct a formal internal mapping exercise of other possibly implicated business lines to ensure it is meeting its obligations set out in the ACA.

Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that GAC make ACA training mandatory for all rotational staff.

Human Rights Reporting

Finding 14: NSIRA finds that GAC has not regularly updated its Human Rights Reports. While many were updated during the 2021 review year, more than half have not been updated since 2019. This is particularly problematic when departments and agencies rely on these reports as a key source in assessing risk related to the ACA.

GAC develops classified human rights reports making them available to a number of internal Government of Canada partners. These reports are intended to provide an overview of the human rights situation of a particular country. They help inform Canada’s international engagement and programming decisions, including foreign policy, development, trade, security, and consular activities. Updated human rights reports (post 2019) include a designated section that addresses the Orders in Council and the ACA, and the circumstances of mistreatment within that country.

The coming into force of the ACA and the issuance of the Orders in Council resulted in a greater number of departments being subject to directions specific to the avoidance of mistreatment by foreign entities. Many of these departments did not have frameworks or any country assessments to support this obligation. This created an increased demand for the GAC Human Rights Reports.

Prior to Royal Assent of the ACA, GAC provided human rights reports to departments that were subject to the 2017 Ministerial Directives. GAC also works with partners to incorporate feedback on human rights reporting and considers input on countries of interest for subsequent reporting cycles. It is important to note that GAC does not keep statistics on how often, or which reports were requested/accessed by internal partners.

NSIRA recognizes that in 2021 GAC has recently implemented a prioritized list to update the human rights reports and has been making considerable headway during the review period, updating 25 percent of their profiles. A number of high-risk countries have been updated to reflect current events. Still, a number of reports are outdated and close to 60 percent of the 133 human rights reports have not been updated since 2019. For example, Pakistan, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen have not been updated since 2019, while South Africa and Belarus have not been reviewed since 2015.

Maintaining up-to-date reports will help ensure that critical human rights information is being used when making ACA determinations, this is especially vital considering that other department leverage GAC’s human rights report as part of their risk assessments. NSIRA notes that the Information Sharing Coordination Group coordinated by Public Safety Canada continues to work through the prioritization and the issues associated with the sharing of human rights reports across departments. It should be stressed that the GAC human rights reports are viewed as a supplement to what departments have already collected as part of their own assessments. For this reason GAC does not provide evaluative judgment on risk within their human rights reports, that is they do not designate whether a country or entity is high or low risk, consequently leaving departments to assess risk based on the information they have collected as part of their mandates.

NSIRA has been advised that the GAC country priority list was developed in consultation with partner departments and agencies, and relevant GAC divisions. And is based on an assessment of the operational needs of Canadian federal departments and agencies. While understanding the impact the pandemic had on operations, particularly at Missions abroad, NSIRA encourages GAC to develop, maintain, and continue to work with other departments and agencies to ensure countries’ HRRs are updated as regularly as possible.

Development of Human Rights Reports

GAC produces human rights reports in collaboration with its missions. Coordinated by GAC’s office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion directorate, the reports are used not only to inform risk assessments, but assist in the guidance of policy and programming decisions.

Missions are responsible for updating their human rights reports, and, if tasked, are linked to Head of Mission’s performance measurement agreements. Mission staff work collaboratively with geographic branches in the preparation of the reports. While headquarters is responsible for the tasking and coordination of the reports, it is Head of Mission that approves the report. The reports include information on the overall human rights context in the country, as well as an analysis of the significant human rights-related events that took place during the review period. Generally, reports are a collection of various sources, which include open source reporting, consultations with human rights organizations and civil society partners, and engagement with government authorities and stakeholders.

Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure countries’ Human Rights Reports are updated more regularly to ensure evolving human rights related issues are captured.

Assurances

Finding 15: NSIRA finds that GAC does not have a standardized centralized approach for the tracking and documentation of assurances.

GAC advised that there was no standardized approach in place to assess the reliability or document assurances received from foreign entities. Risk assessments are conducted on a case-by-case basis. When asked how assurances were developed, GAC stated that there was no statutory or regulatory language that specifically addressed the use of diplomatic assurances, but officials implicated in individual cases would consider the foreign entity’s credibility, recent precedents, the experiences of like-minded partners, and the feasibility of monitoring assurances and caveats to be communicated with the disclosure. It is the Mission’s responsibility to track and monitor whether assurances and caveats are being respected

NSIRA noted that on the ATHENS case provided by GAC, there was a concerted effort to ensure assurances and caveats were in place before information was shared with local authorities. It is in NSIRA’s opinion that the mission was attuned to their obligations under the Act (and directions) and tried to ensure the welfare of the individual detained by authorities. [**redacted**] Mission staff took remedial action to ensure that the individual is not at risk of mistreatment.

In the ATHENS case, [**redacted**]. NSIRA noted that there is no formalized tracking, or documentation mechanism for the follow-up caveats and assurances. This is problematic as mission staff are rotational and may therefore have no visibility as to their ability to rely on caveats and assurances based on past information sharing instances.

Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that GAC establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and document any instances of non-compliance for use in future risk assessments.

Appendix I: Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1: NSIRA finds that the Canada Border Services Agency and Public Safety Canada still have not fully implemented an ACA framework and supporting policies and procedures are still under development.

Finding 2: NSIRA finds that from January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

Finding 3: NSIRA finds that the RCMP has a robust framework in place for the triage of cases pertaining to the ACA.

Finding 4: NSIRA finds that the RCMP’s FIRAC risk assessments include objectives external to the requirements of the Orders in Council, such as the risk of not exchanging information.

Finding 5: NSIRA finds that the RCMP use of a two-part risk assessment, that of the country profile and that of the individual to determine if there is a substantial risk, including the particular circumstances of the individual in question within the risk assessment is a best practice.

Finding 6: NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not have a centralized system of documenting assurances and does not regularly monitor and update the assessment of the reliability of assurances.

Finding 7: NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not regularly update, or have a schedule to update its Country and Entity Assessments. In many cases these assessments are more than four years old and are heavily dependent on an aggregation of open source reporting.

Finding 8: NSIRA finds that information collected through the Liaison Officer in the course of an operation is not centrally documented such that it can inform future assessments.

Finding 9: NSIRA finds that FIRAC members concluded that the information sharing would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment that could not be mitigated. The Assistant Commissioner determined that it may be mitigated. This amounts to a disagreement between officials or a situation where “officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated”.

Finding 10: NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner’s rationale for rejecting FIRAC’s advice did not adequately address concerns consistent with the provisions of the Orders in Council. In particular, NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner erroneously considered the importance of the potential future strategic relationship with a foreign entity in the assessment of potential risk of mistreatment of the individual.

Finding 11: NSIRA finds that GAC is now strongly dependent on operational staff and Heads of Mission for decision-making and accountability under the ACA.

Finding 12: NSIRA finds that GAC has not demonstrated that all of its business lines are integrated into its framework under the ACA.

Finding 13: NSIRA finds that GAC has not made ACA training mandatory for all staff across relevant business lines. This could result in staff being involved in information exchanges without the proper training and knowledge of the implications of the ACA.

Finding 14: NSIRA finds that GAC has not regularly updated its Human Rights Reports. While many were updated during the 2021 review year, more than half have not been updated since 2019. This is particularly problematic when departments and agencies rely on these reports as a key source in assessing risk related to the ACA.

Finding 15: NSIRA finds that GAC does not have a standardized centralized approach for the tracking and documentation of assurances.

Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that the RCMP establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and where possible to monitor and document whether said caveats and assurances were respected.

Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that in cases where the RCMP Assistant Commissioner disagrees with FIRAC’s recommendation not to share the information, the case be automatically referred to the Commissioner.

Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that the assessment of substantial risk be limited to the provisions of the Orders in Council – namely the substantial risk of mistreatment and whether the risk may be mitigated – and external objectives such as fostering strategic relationships should not factor into this decision-making.

Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that FIRAC recommendations are referred to an Assistant Commissioner who is not responsible for the branch from which the case originates.

Recommendation 5 : NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure that accountability for compliance with the ACA clearly rests with the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee.

Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that GAC conduct a formal internal mapping exercise of other possibly implicated business lines to ensure it is meeting its obligations set out in the ACA.

Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that GAC make ACA training mandatory for all rotational staff.

Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure countries’ Human Rights Reports are updated more regularly to ensure evolving human rights related issues are captured.

Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that GAC establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and document any instances of non-compliance for use in future risk assessments.

Appendix II: ACA Framework and Background

It is important to note how the legal frameworks have evolved over the past decade. In international law Canada is a state party to a number of international instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Many of the prohibitions on mistreatment, in these conventions are now considered customary international law. These international commitments have been implemented in Canadian domestic law; most notably the prohibition on torture is clearly defined and codified in the Criminal Code under section 269.1.

In 2010, the Canadian Government implemented a general framework for “Addressing the Risks of Mistreatment in Information Sharing with Foreign Entities”. This was the first multidepartment instruction given by the government regarding the issue of information sharing and mistreatment.

The framework was followed by two detailed Ministerial Directions to departments in 2011 and 2017. The 2017 MD was issued to seven departments and created prohibitions on the sharing of information that may lead to a substantial risk of mistreatment that cannot be mitigated. The MD also provided clear parameters on the use of information potentially derived from mistreatment. Additionally, the MD broadened the scope of applicability to all information sharing with foreign entities and not just that pertaining to national security issues.

On July 12, 2019, the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act came into force. The Act codifies and enshrines Canada’s commitment to respect the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the international agreements prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that it is party to. A primary objective of enshrining these principles through statute rather than the previous use of Ministerial Directions was to ensure that Canada’s commitment to these principles does not rest with the Minister or Government in power. The ACA provides the statutory authority for the Governor in Council (GiC) to issue directions through Orders in Council. The Act imposes an obligation on the GiC to issue Orders in Council to at least seven specific departments. In September 2019, there were in total 12 Orders in Council issued to departments and agencies engaged in information sharing with foreign entities.

The Orders in Council prohibits the disclosure of information to any foreign entity where said disclosure would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual and prohibits the making of any requests to any foreign agency for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of any individual. Additionally, the issued Orders in Council places parameters on the use of information likely derived from mistreatment of an individual by barring its use where it may create a substantial risk of further mistreatment, as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding, or in any way that deprives someone of their rights and freedoms (unless determined by the deputy head that it is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant personal injury).

Ministerial Direction (2011)

  • Issued to CSIS, CSE, CBSA and RCMP;
  • DND developed similar internal instruction; but was not issued as a ministerial direction (functional directive); and,
  • Main criticism was that departments were permitted to weigh the value of the information against the risk of mistreatment

Ministerial Direction (2017)

  • Addition of GAC, and DND (to CSIS, CSE, RCMP, CBSA);
  • A number of changes, most significant were prohibitions of the disclosure and requesting of information, as well as new limits on the use of information (derived from mistreatment);
  • Requirement for departments to maintain policies and procedures to assess risks; and,
  • Inter-agency co-operation requirement

OiCs issued pursuant to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (2019)

  • Issued to twelve departments, six of which had never before received formal direction regarding information sharing with foreign entities (PS, FINTRAC, TC, IRCC, CRA and DFO); and,
  • Codified many provisions of the 2017 MD

As noted in the introduction, the legal framework governing the sharing of information with foreign entities applies to information pertaining to all individuals, regardless of whether they are detainees or not. There is currently no government-wide implementation policy for the ACA. However, the issued Orders in Council do provide guidance on the requisite threshold for information sharing and the requisite hierarchy of approval where there is uncertainty as to whether mitigation measures may sufficiently diminish the substantial risk of mistreatment. Public Safety Canada in 2018, set up an Information Sharing Coordination Group with the objective of sharing best practices between departments.

Individual departments develop their own internal framework and policies for the implementation of the ACA. Some departments that were previously subject to the MDs on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities had a greater opportunity to create internal processes, procedures and policies to identify when information sharing practices may create a substantial risk of mistreatment. These departments have developed structured approaches to recording assurances (verbal or written) received from the foreign entities whom they engage and possible mitigation strategies such that the threat is diffused below the substantial risk of mistreatment threshold.

Appendix III: Previous Recommendations

Past findings and recommendations
Report for Year 2018 Report for Year 2019 Report for Year 2020
Finding #1: Benefits of internal information sharing process reviews. NSIRA noted that periodic internal reviews of information sharing policies and processes supported their successful functioning in the long term. Finding #1: NSIRA found that several departments, new to the considerations of the Act, described considerable progress being made during the review period and afterwards to build out formalized frameworks to support implementation. Finding #1: NSIRA found that CBSA and PS did not finalize their policy frameworks in support of Directions received under the ACA over the review period.
Recommendation #1: Departments should conduct periodic internal reviews of their policies and processes for sharing information with foreign entities in order to identify gaps and areas in need of improvement. Finding #2: NSIRA found that departments conducting minimal information exchanges with foreign entities have not yet fully addressed the importance of having an official information sharing framework in place. Finding #2: NSIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.
Findings #2: Departments vary with respect to the independence of their decision-making. NSIRA examined the extent to which high-risk decision-making is removed from operational personnel who may have vested interest in the sharing. In some departments, the decision-makers have a direct operational interest in the sharing of information, creating the potential for conflict between operational imperatives and departmental obligations to respect the MD. In particular, NSIRA noted that:
  • CSE and the RCMP have the most independent processes.
  • The information sharing process implemented by GAC to date remove high-risk decision-making from “front line” personnel.
  • At CSIS and DND/CAF, decision makers typically have a direct operational interest in the sharing of information.
  • CBSA has not yet operationalized its information sharing processes.
Recommendation #1: NSIRA recommends that all departments in receipt of directions under the Act have official framework that ensure they can fully support the implementation of the directions. Finding #3: NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be escalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.
Recommendation #2: Departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested the outcome. Finding #3: NSIRA found that the differences and variability in departmental frameworks demonstrate a previous lack of coordination across the community and a need to identify best practices. Finding #4: NSIRA found a procedural gap of concern in a case study involving the disclosure of information, even though information was ultimately not shared. The risk of mistreatment was substantial and the decision should have been referred to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs as the accountable deputy minister for this request.
Finding #3: Lack of standardized information sharing risk assessments. Under the 2017 MD, GAC, CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP all maintain their own sets of foreign country and/or entity profiles, while DND/CAF is currently developing its own as well. The existence of multiple different assessments is duplicative and unnecessary. It may also yield inconsistencies, as departments have at times come to quite different conclusions about foreign countries’ and entities’ human rights records and the associated risks of information sharing. Recommendation #2: NSIRA recommends that departments coordinate to identify best practices for all essential components of information sharing frameworks and that ISCG is leveraged to ensure these practices are shared where possible across the community to support the implementation of the Act.
Recommendation #3: Departments should develop:
  • Unified set of assessments of the human rights situation in foreign countries including a standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and
  • To the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.
Finding #4: NSIRA found that there are inconsistencies in the application of existing sharing frameworks between departments, specifically concerning information evaluation thresholds, and decisions being elevated for senior level determinations.
Finding #4: The concept of “substantial risk” of mistreatment is not defined. Like the 2017 MD, the ACMFEA and its associated direction prohibit information sharing that would result in a “substantial risk” of mistreatment, Neither the ACMFEA nor its direction include a definition of substantial risk, however, despite the centrality of this concept to the regime. A definition of substantial risk existed in both the 2011 and 2017 MD; its absence now raises concerns about its interpretation in the future. Recommendation #3: NSIRA recommends that departments establish consistent thresholds for triggers in their information sharing frameworks, including initial evaluations against the concerns of the Act, when a case is to be elevated in the decision process, and how this is documented.
Recommendation #4: The definition of “substantial risk” should be codified in law or public direction. Finding #5: NSIRA found a lack of unification and standardization in the country and entity assessments being leveraged by departments, resulting in inconsistencies in approach/stance by the community when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern related to the Act.
Recommendation #4: NSIRA recommends that departments identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach by departments when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern under the Act.

Annex A: Departmental Frameworks

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Following receipt of the 2017 MD, the RCMP established a new Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG). LEAG has a detailed Terms of Reference that outlines its membership as well as roles and responsibilities. LEAG’s primary task is to assess foreign countries and law enforcement entities with regard to the risk of mistreatment. In its assessments, LEAG considers a number of factors, including the human rights record of the country, specific foreign entities’ engagement in human rights abuses, local law enforcement’s history of respecting caveats, as well as country-specific risks to individual safety related to political views, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so on. LEAG thus “plays an integral role in informing FIRAC’s decision on whether to share information with foreign law enforcement entities.”

At present, the RCMP has categorized 146 approved country profiles, of which 20 are high risk, 69 are medium risk, and 57 are low risk. 51 country assessments remain outstanding. LEAG currently intends to update its profiles every two years, although LEAG will update some reports more frequently based on operational requirements. To date, 40 countries have been assessed as being a high priority for periodic updates due to the volume of information sharing conducted.

Graphic of FIRAC Process

Process

If an RCMP officer identified a need and wishes to share information with a foreign entity, they must follow a set process:

The officer must first consult a specific RCMP intranet website created by LEAG. The site lists countries by colour. If the officer finds that the country in question is “green”, he or she may proceed to share the information. If the country is “red”- or “yellow” and the circumstances of the proposed sharing match any of the case-specific factors and considerations listed- then the case must be referred to FIRAC. If a FIRAC is required, the officer completes a standard form which must be approved by the relevant Criminal Operations (CROPS) Officer or other approving officer. The form includes a summary of the information to be shared, the kind of sharing (request, disclosure or use), the operational context, the risks of sharing information, the investigative value of the information, possible mitigation strategies, and- where applicable- the actual information to be disclosed or used.

Once approved, the form is sent to the Director General (DG) responsible for the relevant program at RCMP headquarters for approval. Following approval, the DG submits the form to the FIRAC secretariat.

The FIRAC secretariat compiles a briefing package that includes the officer’s form, the country profile from LEAG, and any supporting documentation submitted by the DG. The briefing package is distributed to FIRAC members ahead of the meeting.

A FIRAC meeting is convened and the request is considered along with possible mitigation strategies. While the final decision regarding FIRAC’s recommendation rests with the Chair, in the vast majority of cases the decision is unanimous. Dissenting opinions are recorded in the Record of Decision (RoD). Once FIRAC has noted its recommendation, the RoD and an accompanying briefing note are sent to the Assistant Commissioner for final determination.

In cases where FIRAC cannot determine whether a substantial risk of mistreatment can be mitigated, the responsible Assistant Commissioner will provide the RoD to the Deputy Commissioner in order to obtain the Commissioner’s decision.

Global Affairs Canada

Framework Updates

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) indicated that no changes to their framework was made during the current review period.

Annex I: Global Affairs Canada Framework

Process

Triage

There is not one unified set of processes at GAC for determining whether information being used by the department is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity. If an official determines that information that he or she has received is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and that official still wants to use the information, they are instructed in their training to consult with their Program management at HQ. Should that manager be unable to make a determination on their own as to whether the use would comply with the Act, they will consult the relevant departmental policy group and the department’s Legal Services Unit.

Senior Management Committees

The Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee (AMCC) meetings focuses on the following:

  • Has the information, the use of which is being sought, likely been derived from mistreatment?
  • What are the proposed measures to mitigate the risks? What is the likelihood of their success?
  • Consider the justifications for and proportionality of any potential involvement with the foreign state or entity that may result in mistreatment.

The AMCC Secretariat will create a record of decision and circulate it for comment by AMCC members. Once finalized, it will be kept by the Secretariat for future reporting. The AMCC Secretariat follows up with the requesting official for updates on the outcome of the situation and requests a final update from the requesting official once the situation is resolved.

Global Affairs Canada’s human rights reports provide an evidence-based overview of the human rights situation in a particular country, including significant human rights-related events, trends and developments and include a section focused on mistreatment. There are no scores for countries however, and it is up to the officials to assess the risk based on the information in the reports.

Mitigation Measures

The Legal Services Unit and/or Intelligence Policy and Programs division will provide guidance on the limitations and the prohibitions of the use of information obtained through mistreatment. They are also able to propose potential mitigation measures, such as sanitization of the information, if there is a risk of further mistreatment; of depriving someone of their rights or freedoms; or if the information could be used as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding.

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Review of the Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021: Minister of Foreign Affairs Responses

Review of the Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021


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Review of the Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021: Report

Review of the Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021


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List of Acronyms

Abbreviation Expansion
2017 MD 2017 Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Mistreatment by Foreign Entities
ACA (ACMFEA, or “the Act”) Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act
ADM Assistant Deputy Minister
AMCC Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee
CBSA Canada Border Services Agency
CRA Canada Revenue Agency
CRCC Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans
DND/CAF Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces
EPPP Enhanced Passenger Protect Program
FINTRAC Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
FIRAC Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee
FPNS Federal Policing National Security
GAC Global Affairs Canada
GATE Governance, Accreditation, Technical Security and Espionage
HOM Head of Mission (or Chargé)
HRR Human Right Report
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICE Integrated Collaborative Environment
INPL Intelligence Policy and Programs Division
IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
ISCG Information Sharing Coordination Group
LEAG Law Enforcement Assessment Group
LO Liaison Officer
MDCC Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee
NSICOP National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
NSIRA National Security Intelligence Review Agency
OiC Orders in Council
PPP Passenger Protect Program
PS Public Safety Canada
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RFI Requests for Information
TC Transport Canada
Abréviation Développement
AL Agent de liaison
AMC Affaires mondiales Canada
ARC Agence du revenu du Canada
ASFC Agence des services frontaliers du Canada
CANAFE Centre d’analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada
CCDM Comité de conformité à la directive ministérielle
CCEMT Comité de conformité pour éviter les mauvais traitement
CCETP Commission civile d’examen et de traitement des plaintes relatives à la GRC
CCRIE Comité consultatif sur les risques – Information de l’étranger
CDM Chef de mission (ou chargé de mission)
CPSNR Comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le renseignement
CST Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
DC Décret en conseil
DI Demande d’information
ECI Environnement collaboratif intégré
GASE Gouvernance, accréditation, sécurité technique et espionnage
GCER Groupe de coordination d’échange de renseignements
GEAL Groupe d’évaluation de l’application de la loi
GRC Gendarmerie royale du Canada
IM-2017 Instructions du ministre de 2017 visant à éviter la complicité dans les cas de mauvais traitements par des entités étrangères
INPL Direction des politiques et des programmes liés au renseignement
IRCC Immigration, Réfugiés et Citoyenneté Canada
Loi visant à éviter la complicité, la Loi Loi visant à éviter la complicité dans les cas de mauvais traitements infligés par des entités étrangères
MDN/FAC Ministère de la Défense nationale/Forces armées canadiennes
MPO Ministère des Pêches et des Océans
OSSNR Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement
PIDCP Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques
PPP Programme de protection des passagers
PPP-A Programme de protection des passagers amélioré
RDP Rapport sur les droits de la personne
SCRS Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité
SMA Sous-ministre adjoint
SNPF Sécurité nationale et Police fédérale
SP Sécurité publique Canada
TC Transports Canada

Executive Summary

This review focuses on departmental implementation of directions received through the Orders in Council (OiC) issued pursuant to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA, ACA, or “the Act”). This is NSIRA’s third annual assessment of the statutorily mandated implementation of the directions issued under the ACA.

This year’s review covers the 2021 calendar year and has been split into three sections. First, the review addresses the statutory obligations of all departments. Sections two and three of the review focus on in-depth analysis of how the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) have implemented the directions under the ACA. NSIRA has used case studies, where possible, to examine these departments’ implementation of the ACA framework.

NSIRA has observed that this is the third consecutive year where there have been no cases referred to the deputy head level in any department. This is a requirement of the OiC in cases where officials are unable to determine if the substantial risk can be mitigated. Future reviews will be attuned to the issue of case escalation and departmental processes for decision-making.

In the 2019 NSIRA Review of Departmental Frameworks for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2019-06), NSIRA recommended that “the definition of substantial risk should be codified in law or public direction.” NSIRA notes that some departments have accounted for this gap by relying on the definition of substantial risk in the 2017 MDs. In light of the pending statutorily mandated review of The National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59) and the centrality of the concept of substantial risk to the regime governing the ACA, NSIRA reiterates its 2019 recommendation that the definition of substantial risk be codified in law.

In last year’s review NSIRA identified Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Safety Canada (PS) as not yet having finalized their ACA policies. While CBSA and PS continue to make advancements these departments still have not fully implemented an ACA framework and supporting policies and procedures.

RCMP has a robust framework in place for the triage and processing of cases pertaining to the ACA. The in-depth analysis portion of this review found that the RCMP does not have a centralized system of documenting assurances and does not regularly monitor and update the assessment of the reliability of assurances. NSIRA also found that the RCMP has not developed mechanisms to update country and entity profiles in a timely manner, and the information collected through the Liaison Officer in the course of an operation is not centrally documented such that it can inform future assessments.

In the analysis of one of the RCMP’s Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC) case files, NSIRA found that the Assistant Commissioner’s rationale for rejecting FIRAC’s advice did not adequately address concerns consistent with the provisions of the Orders in Council. In particular, NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner erroneously considered the importance of the potential future strategic relationship with a foreign entity in the assessment of potential risk of mistreatment of the individual.

NSIRA conducted a review of all twelve departments by examining relevant policy and legal frameworks as communicated by the departments. The RCMP was responsive to NSIRA’s requests, providing documents and briefings within agreed time frames. Due to timing constraints, NSIRA relied heavily on the written record as provided. GAC demonstrated a willingness to provide NSIRA with the information requested, and made every effort to clarify requests. GAC was timely in their responses and provided access to people and information as requested.

NSIRA found that GAC is now strongly dependent on operational staff and Heads of Mission for decision-making and accountability under the ACA. This is a marked change from the findings of the 2019 review that found decision-making was done at the Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC) at Headquarters.

GAC has also not conducted an internal mapping exercise to determine which business lines are most likely to be implicated by the ACA. Considering the low number of cases this year and the size of GAC, and that ACA training is not mandatory for staff, NSIRA has concerns that not all areas involved in information sharing within GAC are being properly informed of their ACA obligations.

NSIRA also notes that GAC has no formalized tracking, or documentation mechanism for the follow-up of caveats and assurances. This is problematic as mission staff are rotational and may therefore have no visibility as to their ability to rely on caveats and assurances based on past information sharing instances.

During the review, GAC demonstrated a willingness to provide NSIRA with the information requested, and made every effort to clarify requests. GAC has provided NSIRA with all documents requested within a reasonable time frame.

This review assessed departments’ implementation of the directives received under the ACA and their operationalization of frameworks to address ACA requirements. As such, this review constitutes the first in-depth examination of the ACA within individual departments.

Authorities

This review is being conducted under the authority of paragraph 8(2.2) of the National Security Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), which requires National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to review, each calendar year, the implementation of all directions issued under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA, ACA, or “the Act”).

Introduction

This review will focus on departmental implementation of directions received through the Orders in Council issued pursuant to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act. The overarching objective of this review is to assess whether departments are meeting their obligations under the ACA and associated directions. NSIRA is mandated to conduct this review on an annual basis.

Background

Many departments and agencies in the Government of Canada routinely share information with foreign entities. Given that information sharing with entities in certain countries can result in a risk of mistreatment of individuals, it is incumbent upon the Government of Canada to evaluate and mitigate the risks that such sharing creates. This is particularly the case for information sharing related to national security and intelligence, where information often relates to alleged participation in terrorism or other criminal activity.

The 2017 Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2017 MD), defined the substantial risk of mistreatment as:

[A] personal, present and foreseeable risk of mistreatment. In order to be ‘substantial’, the risk must be real and must be based on something more than mere theory or speculation. In most cases, the test for substantial risk of mistreatment will be satisfied when it is more likely than not that there will be mistreatment; however, in some cases particularly where there is a risk of severe harm, the ‘substantial risk’ standard may be satisfied at a lower level of probability.

This review will be NSIRA’s third annual assessment of the implementation of the directions issued under the ACA. This review will build on the previous reviews conducted in respect of avoiding complicity in mistreatment. The first review was in respect to the 2017 MD. The second review assessed the directions issued under the ACA, but was limited to the four months from when the directions were issued to the end of the 2019 calendar year. The third review was NSIRA’s first full year assessment of the implementation of the directions issued under the ACA for the 2020 calendar year.

NSIRA has focused on conducting in-depth reviews of how departments implement the directions under the ACA. This approach builds on the foundational knowledge obtained over the last three years and reviews how departments operationalize the directions under the ACA by using case studies to assess departments ACA frameworks in practice.

The review, covering the 2021 calendar year has been split into three sections. The first section addresses NSIRA’s statutory obligations covering a full year review of all departments. This year NSIRA conducted an in-depth review of two departments: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC), sections two and three respectively.

Methodology

Subsection 7(1) of the ACA imposes a statutory obligation on the deputy head to whom directions were issued to submit a report to the Minister regarding the implementation of those directions during the previous calendar year and publish a public copy of the report. The Minister must then provide the classified copy to NSIRA.

The obligations for departments noted above are mirrored in the NSIRA Act. Under subsection 8(2.2) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA must, each calendar year, review the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA. Additionally, NSIRA has the statutory right to review the implementation beyond the specific requirements of the ACA, namely through its mandate to review any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence.

The issued Orders in Council (OiC) include a reporting requirement, whereby decisions necessitating referral to the deputy head for determination must be reported to the Minister and subsequently the review bodies. This requirement creates additional accountability for decisions undertaken by departments and allows NSIRA to be informed of any potential issues outside of the annual reporting cycle.

This review encompasses the implementation of the directions for the 12 departments that were in receipt of the OiC pursuant to the ACA. The review period is January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021. Additionally, NSIRA has selected two departments for more in-depth case study review: GAC and the RCMP. NSIRA will ensure that additional departments are selected for case study analysis in future years.

In completing this review, NSIRA considered legal authorities and governance frameworks. NSIRA also relied on documentation and information obtained through briefings with the departments.

Verification of Information and Responsiveness

NSIRA conducted a review of all twelve departments by examining relevant policy and legal frameworks as communicated by the departments.

The RCMP was responsive to NSIRA’s requests, providing documents and briefings within agreed time frames. Due to timing constraints, NSIRA relied heavily on the written record as provided. NSIRA found that overall, its expectation for responsiveness by the RCMP during this review were met.

GAC demonstrated a willingness to provide NSIRA with the information requested, and made every effort to clarify requests. GAC was timely in their responses and provided access to people and information as requested. NSIRA found that overall, its expectation for responsiveness by GAC during this review were met.

All Departments

Framework Updates and Reporting

Finding 1: NSIRA finds that the Canada Border Services Agency and Public Safety Canada still have not fully implemented an ACA framework, and supporting policies and procedures are still under development.

Based on submissions to NSIRA, ten departments have established frameworks and policies addressing whether the disclosure of information to a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. The submissions provided to NSIRA by Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), and Transport Canada (TC) indicate that they are actively working on refining existing policies and frameworks. NSIRA, in last year’s report identified Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Safety Canada (PS) as not yet having finalized their ACA policies.

Frameworks

CBSA advised that it has provisionally approved a framework for deciding whether a request for information from a foreign entity would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. CBSA advised NSIRA that it issued direction to conduct an internal review with the goal of confirming the feasibility of operational implementation across multiple program areas.

PS has advised that a full suite of risk assessments are under development and that it intends to conduct information sessions to ensure other program areas not directly affected by the ACA are aware of information sharing obligations. PS also advised that the program area implicated by the Ministerial Directions (the Directions) has operationalized the policy and has ensured that their procedures and processes align with the requirements outlined in the departmental policy, Act and the Directions. These policies came into effect in January 2022, with “a few aspects” having not yet been finalized. The suite of risk assessments is still in development.

PS also intends to hold information sessions with various sections of the department that may not currently need to apply the Directions, but should nonetheless be aware of their existence should they develop new programs with an information sharing dimension.

In 2020, GAC initiated a full review of the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee (AMCC) as directed by its terms of reference. GAC has advised that notional recommendations have been developed to address the identified shortcomings. Recommendations include timeliness of Committee decisions, addressing duty of care issues, and reporting case outcomes regarding Committee decisions.

NSIRA has been advised that the AMCC’s secretariat review will be completed in 2022 and the terms of reference will be updated shortly after. In response to NSIRA’s inquires about risk analysis, GAC has advised that during the review period they created a new risk assessment form and are developing a broader orientation guide with the goal of supporting employees through the risk assessment and decision-making process. These issues are further explored in section two of this report.

RCMP has noted internal shortcomings in regards to country assessments and the inability to regularly update the reports. A framework has been provided to NSIRA on how the RCMP intends to remedy these shortcomings in the future to better serve the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC) process.

Reporting

Subsection 7(1) of the Act requires deputy heads to submit a report to the appropriate Minister on the implementation of directions received under the Orders in Council during the previous year. The ACA stipulates that report submissions are required before March 01 of each year.

All twelve departments have fulfilled their obligations to report to their respective ministers The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and TC did, however, submit their reports shortly after the March 01 deadline.

Subsection 7(2) of the Act also requires deputy heads make an unclassified version of the report available to the public as soon as feasible after submission to the Minister. Reports were made available in all of the twelve departments.

Section 8 of the Act requires the Minister to provide a copy of the report to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICoP), NSIRA and, if applicable, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (CRCC).

The table below captures a summary of both the departmental responses to the implementation questions and NSIRA’s assessment regarding these responses. The assessment was based on the associated details provided by departments in the context of the specific information requested. If a specific requirement was not met, it has been flagged. The relatively few instances of these were connected with departments not meeting certain reporting obligations under the Act.

Summary Table 1.1 – Requirements under the Act
  CBSA CRA CSE CSIS DFO DND FINTRAC GAC IRCC PS RCMP TC
Cases referred to the deputy head? No No No No No No No No No No No No
Was a report submitted to the Minister? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Was the report made available to the public? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Did the Minister provide a copy to NSICoP, NSIRA, CRCC? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Case Triage and Escalation

Finding 2: NSIRA finds that from January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

All twelve departments indicated that they did not have any cases referred to the Deputy Head level for determination. This is a requirement of the OiC in cases where officials are unable to determine if the substantial risk can be mitigated. Therefore, all additional reporting requirements associated with this level of decision were not applicable.

Summary Table 1.2 – Cases Escalated, by Level of Approval
  CBSA CRA CSE CSIS DFO DND FINTRAC GAC IRCC PS RCMP TC
First Level. (Supervisor/Deputy Chief) 0 634 236 (23) 780) 0 Not Known/Not Tracked 48 6 2 401 55 0
Second Level (Manager/Chief) 0 325 176 (24) 243 0 Not Known/Not Tracked 48 6 2 401 55 0
Third Level(Director/DDG) 8(25) 69
Fourth Level (DG/Committee/ Working Group) 0 63 1 (26) 81 0 7 48 0 0 0 55 0
Fifth Level (ADM/A.Commis sioner/L1) 0 0 0 (27) 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 55 0
Sixth Level (Deputy Head) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NSIRA notes that this is the third consecutive year where there have been no cases referred to the deputy head level in any department.

Future reviews may be particularly attuned to the issue of case escalation and departmental processes for decision-making, as one of the stated objectives of NSIRA’s review of ACA obligations is to ensure that the assessment of risk is escalated to appropriate level of authority.

Implementation of Previous Recommendations

As part of this review, NSIRA requested information regarding the implementation of previous recommendations. The following analysis is based on responses received from departments.

In the 2019 NSIRA Review of Departmental Frameworks for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2019-06), NSIRA recommended that “the definition of substantial risk should be codified in law or public direction.” NSIRA notes that some departments have accounted for this gap by relying on the definition of substantial risk in the 2017 MDs. In light of the pending statutorily mandated review of The National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59) and the centrality of the concept of substantial risk to the regime governing the ACA, NSIRA reiterates its 2019 recommendation that the definition of substantial risk be codified in law.

DND/CAF has advised NSIRA that as a result of its recommendation, the department has included the definition of “substantial risk” within the Chief of Defence Intelligence Functional Directive on DND/CAF Information Sharing Activities with Foreign Entities. However, it should be noted that DND/CAF has also adopted additional definitions including its definition of “foreseeable.” NSIRA has previously expressed its concerns in its 2019 detailed Annex of DND/CAF application of the MD regarding the DND/CAF interpretation of foreseeability. DND/CAF has also advised NSIRA that it leveraged the human rights assessment methodology from other organizations to develop the methodology for DND/CAF’s profiles. DND/CAF has also advised that it is actively participating with ACA-related interdepartmental working groups to share its country’s human rights methodology, procedures, and assessments, and raise concerns.

Of the twelve departments, CRA, CBSA, CSIS, DND/CAF, PS and TC have continued to adjust frameworks and policies as a result of the findings and recommendations from previous reviews of the ACA. While recommendations may not have been specific to individual departments, many have advised that they have taken into them into consideration and applied improvements more generally.

CRA for example in response to Recommendation #1 from NSIRA’s 2019 review (regarding the importance of conducting periodic internal reviews), has reviewed its exchanges of information procedures. As a result, CRA has implemented procedural changes where risk assessments deemed to be of low-risk are now approved at the manager level, whereas previously the minimum approval level was Director.

CBSA has provisionally approved its ACA policy and is currently conducting an additional review to ensure that the policy is operable across multiple program areas. CBSA has advised that the policy includes guidance on the disclosure of information, the request for information, and the use of information where there may be a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. As part of the policy, the CBSA has incorporated procedures and processes to assess risk and coordinate with its Senior Management Risk Assessment Committee.

PS has also finalized its draft policy in response to NSIRA’s 2020 ACA review finding that it did not finalize its policy frameworks in support of the Direction received under the ACA. PS has noted that a policy was approved and came into effect on January 1, 2022. NSIRA has been advised additional aspects of the policy are still being implemented, including the development of risk assessment tools.

Finally, TC has advised NSIRA that it has taken stock of feedback on the implementation of the ACA since initial promulgation of the Corporate Policy in August 2020. TC notes that its corporate policy is under revision and seeks to clarify and strengthen key elements. TC has advised that adjustments underway include refining language to further clarify roles, responsibilities program-level requirements, and timelines associated with implementation. To this end, TC is providing more guidance on reporting format and content requirements for program-level support to the annual reporting exercise.

At the program level, TC is reviewing the policy impact of changes (over the past year) to the functional structure and roles associated with the Passenger Protect Program (PPP). To date, the PPP is the only program activity that TC has identified where risks associated with the ACA may be present. The PPP is currently transitioning to an enhanced framework, which is expected to be fully implemented prior to March 2023.

NSIRA maintains its previous recommendation that departments identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach by departments when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern under the ACA.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The ACA review for 2021 is NSIRA’s second full year assessment of the implementation of the Act. As discussed in the background to this review, NSIRA has complemented the knowledge gained through its annual review of the ACA with an in-depth analysis of the implementation of the Directions. The in-depth analysis highlights to departments some best practices within the Government of Canada as well as some potential issues in the adopted frameworks. This year, the RCMP and GAC were selected. As one of the “original” departments subject to the 2011 Ministerial Direction, the RCMP has had over a decade to develop, implement, and adjust its framework. GAC was selected because it was issued a Ministerial Directive in 2017 and due to its role as a primary developer of human rights reports.

Implementation of the ACA

Finding 3: NSIRA finds that the RCMP has a robust framework in place for the triage of cases pertaining to the ACA.

In 2011, the RCMP was issued the Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities. However the issued MD only applied to information sharing in national security matters. In response to the 2011 MD, the RCMP created the Foreign Information Risk Analysis Committee (FIRAC), the Committee was renamed the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee following the issuance of the 2017 MD.

The 2017 MD’s scope was broadened to include all units and personnel of the RCMP, and FIRAC was expanded accordingly. The enactment of the ACA imposed the requirement of the Orders in Council directions to the Commissioner. The operational requirements between 2017 and 2019 remained the same. The RCMP’s Implementation of the ACA is composed of three key mechanisms, FIRAC, Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG), and Annual Reporting.

FIRAC is an advisory body to senior management, tasked with providing RCMP personnel with a mechanism to review information exchanges where there may be a substantial risk of mistreatment. FIRAC is a central part of the determination making mechanism for cases with ACA considerations. The committee examines the operational context of each request, the application of risk-mitigation strategies, and the strength of assurances and makes recommendations to the responsible Assistant Commissioner.

It is important to note that the Terms of Reference for FIRAC were updated in December 2021, this is after the conclusion of the last FIRAC meeting on the case study discussed below. The previous Terms of Reference which were drafted following the issuance of the 2017 MD stated that “in case of information sharing where there is a clear operational need to proceed, but a substantial risk of mistreatment, the decision will be referred to the Commissioner for final approval, as per the MD and Operational policy”. The revised Terms of Reference identifies that the Assistant Commissioner, or Executive Director is responsible for deciding whether the substantial risk of mistreatment can be mitigated. The Terms of Reference now clearly stipulates that the Assistant Commissioner, or the Executive Director as the sole decision maker, and that FIRAC fulfills an advisory function. NSIRA cautions that this apparent or perceived delegation of the final decision to the Assistant Commissioner risks non-compliance with the purpose and object of the Act and the OiC.

The Committee is comprised of two rotating chairs and a number of members from various divisions within the RCMP. As a result of an internal review, the RCMP have adjusted membership of FIRAC to ensure that co-chairs were not making determinations on cases from their respective units, with the intention of removing situations where a real or apparent conflict of interest could arise.

FIRAC meets bi-monthly or on an as-needed basis when urgent, time sensitive cases arise. All recommendations made by the committee are non-binding. NSIRA has also observed that the addition of Committee members is planned for April 2022.

Over the last year, the RCMP have made efforts to improve their framework and have created tools to aid personnel in engaging with FIRAC. They have established a FIRAC Coordination Unit, which is responsible for conducting consultations with personnel in order to help triage potential cases and determine the appropriate level of FIRAC engagement. The RCMP have also developed a suite of tools outlining definitions and thresholds, mitigation strategies and FIRAC requirements.

The FIRAC Coordination Unit works with RCMP staff, and members to assist with the risk assessment process and determine if a FIRAC evaluation is required. The Coordination Unit’s roles and responsibilities have been adjusted with the stated goal of providing guidance and support to members to strengthen case submissions. The intent of the Unit is to improve upon record keeping, identify internal strategic level issues, engage with external federal partners on cross-cutting issues to enhance processes and practices, and to share outcomes of case-specific FIRAC meetings with LEAG to inform updates on foreign entity assessments.

The RCMP is also in the final stages of updating its operational manual with the goal of supporting the Direction’s consistent application across the RCMP. This update is intended to clarify roles and responsibilities, as well as thresholds and triggers that require an information exchange to be reviewed by FIRAC.

As will be addressed later in this report, the 2019 OiC includes a requirement for the case to be referred to the RCMP Commissioner for determination, where officials are unable to determine whether the risk of sharing information can be mitigated. Additionally, pursuant to section 3(1)c of the OiC, the RCMP Commissioner must report and disclose any information considered in making the determination or decision to NSIRA, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (CRCC), and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICoP) in a timely manner, if certain information that was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity was used, in order to prevent loss of life, or significant personal injury.

The LEAG is responsible for developing country assessment profiles and maintaining the Integrated Collaborative Environment portal, where the information is stored and accessed by officers as needed. NSIRA was informed that during the last few years, the LEAG team has been severely underfunded and under-resourced, resulting in country profiles that are out of date with a third of countries having no assessment report whatsoever.

An annual report detailing the implementation of the Act and any cases brought to the Commissioner for determination must be sent to the Minister of Public Safety, NSIRA, NSICoP and the CRCC. The RCMP must also disclose any information considered in the making of a determination or decision. For full description of the RCMP’s process please see Annex A: Departmental Frameworks.

The RCMP continues to improve upon FIRAC process. Recently, the RCMP has made strides to enhance products used to assess whether proposed information exchanges carry a substantial risk of mistreatment that require FIRAC assessments. These improvements include visual tools outlining the decision-making process, key definitions, mitigation strategies, and triggers for a FIRAC evaluation.

RCMP continues to make considerable progress on updating resources on the designated SharePoint site, the ACA training module, and policy in the RCMP operational manual. While these initiatives are still in progress, NSIRA commends the RCMP’s initiative in conducting an internal review of FIRAC, and making efforts to address identified shortcomings.

Information Sharing Framework and Risk Analysis

Finding 4: NSIRA finds that the RCMP’s FIRAC risk assessments include objectives external to the requirements of the Orders in Council, such as the risk of not exchanging information.

Finding 5: NSIRA finds that the RCMP use of a two-part risk assessment, that of the country profile and that of the individual to determine if there is a substantial risk, including the particular circumstances of the individual in question within the risk assessment, is a best practice.

The RCMP’s information sharing framework as it relates to ACA is predicated on managing risk. While this is largely dependent on the use of assurances and caveats, investigators rely on the Liaison Officers/Analysts Deployed Overseas (LOs/ADOs) assessment of the particular country or foreign entity in question. LOs/ADOs as part of their role, are expected to provide up-to-date information on current country and entity reports, relationships established with specific entities, and the RCMP’s history as it relates to information sharing and current human rights records. Investigators use this information to help inform a mitigation measure applied to a proposed information request, and/or disclosure.

In making assessments and providing recommendations to the Assistant Commissioner, FIRAC considers the specifics of the case included in the initial risk assessment (included in the FIRAC submission), the LEAG country assessment, as well as input from the Liaison Officers/Analysts Deployed Overseas (LO/ADO). A Record of Decision is completed after each meeting and highlights the history of sharing with the entities, the risks and mitigation measures discussed, and the final recommendation of the Committee. Based on the information provided in the Record of Decision and the recommendation of the committee, the Assistant Commissioner will then make a determination.

While the RCMP has not formalized a Gender Based Analysis within their ACA risk-related assessments, NSIRA notes that considerations applied in the RCMP’s country risk assessments identify vulnerable groups at risk of mistreatment under the “Human Rights Concerns for Specific Groups.” Individuals identified as at risk in a country/entity designated as medium risk would require a FIRAC assessment prior to any information exchanges.

NSIRA sampled twenty instances where FIRAC was convened. However, there were a number of cases where multiple FIRAC meetings pertained to the same case. For example, [**redacted**] which is examined in closer detail as part of the NSIRA’s sample file review, had three separate FIRAC meetings. The twenty FIRAC instances in the selected sample amount to sixteen individual cases. Requests made by NSIRA used the FIRAC nomenclature, and the RCMP fulfilled requests based on what was requested in the Requests for Information. The result was that NSIRA was only able to view case file information where the case was a touch point within the FIRAC process; the full operational case files were not provided.

NSIRA recognizes that the RCMP fulfilled its obligation when responding to our request for information. However, when it became clear that NSIRA had not obtained the entirety of the case, including the investigative file, significant time constraints prevented NSIRA from obtaining and considering the additional information in this review.

Outbound Information Sharing

NSIRA observed that in at least 35 percent of FIRAC cases sampled, the RCMP factored the potential for the negative impact of not sharing in their assessment. FIRAC’s assessment considers the risk of not sharing outbound information with a particular emphasis on maintaining, developing, or preserving a relationship with an information-sharing partner. Furthermore, the RCMP informed NSIRA that they will also consider the potential public risk to security of not sharing the information. NSIRA understands that the reliability of assurances and caveats depend crucially on the circumstances and the context of a particular case, but would strongly encourage the RCMP to base its rationale for sharing information primarily on the risk to the individual. NSIRA notes that the risk assessment and mitigating strategies (to minimize risk) are the primary tools to be used when assessing whether information is to be shared. The ACA and issued Orders in Council do not permit the weighing of external considerations such as relationship damage associated with not sharing information and public safety against the risk to the individual.

Mitigation and Assurance Measures

Finding 6: NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not have a centralized system of documenting assurances and does not regularly monitor and update the assessment of the reliability of assurances.

The RCMP advised NSIRA that any assurances or caveats that have or have not been adhered to in relation to information sharing with foreign entities are recorded within the investigative case file. The RCMP further explained that information is shared on a case-by- case basis by means of either the Liaison Officer responsible, or INTERPOL channels.

Liaison Officers/Analysts Deployed Overseas (LOs/ADOs) are required to record their interaction in their notes which would be included within the operational investigative file. The RCMP has advised NSIRA these notes are where any violations of assurances or caveats would be recorded.

The RCMP explained that it relies on its overseas network to monitor the reliability of assurances and caveats, and that personnel meet regularly with law enforcement partners and foreign allied LOs. The RCMP further noted any indication of a deterioration in human rights within a country or specific report on mistreatment of an individual would be discussed and captured within the RCMP (operational) case file, and ultimately documented in the RCMP’s FIRAC risk assessment form.

As noted above, due to time constraints, NSIRA obtained information on FIRAC meetings and the supporting documents, and did not have an opportunity to review the RCMP’s operational case files. When NSIRA asked to provide rationales used to assess the reliability of assurances and caveats for the selected sample, NSIRA was referred back to the FIRAC risk assessment form (also known as Form 6517), and provided with the following:

The footnote highlights a number of case files. General and Supplementary reports on these files were reviewed in the preparation of this response. No concerns with respect to assurances were documented and only one instance with respect to caveats was identified. In this regard, [**redacted**] documents one instance wherein a partner agency had not adhered to a caveat’s requirement to coordinate actions – no allegation of mistreatment was documented on the file. The issue was raised with the partner agency and addressed.

NSIRA notes that while the [**redacted**] was in relation to a company operating in the [**redacted**], witness information was sought from the [**redacted**]. The LEAG Country Risk Assessment for [**redacted**], designated as medium risk, does cite an issue specific to the sharing of information and the use of caveats, but has not been updated since August 2018. The RCMP has advised that:

While the LEAG country assessment has not yet been updated, the LO would be expected to raise this issue in any future consultations with various investigative teams seeking to share with this entity.

NSIRA stresses the importance of the post-monitoring of assurances and caveats. NSIRA has observed that the issuance of an assurance, and/or caveat may sometimes rely on assurances provided by a specific official (within the foreign entity/country). Absent appropriate documentation, this may be problematic due to the fact that movement within positions is to be expected and assurances can no longer be valid if the individual has moved out of the position. Assurances must be followed up on and renewed to ensure they are being followed in the event of employee turnover.

Furthermore, there is no centralized process for the documentation of assurances. Rather, some documentation that is occasionally noted on specific investigative files may be problematic in situations where LOs/ADOs are rotational. If the investigative file is closed, the new LOs/ADOs to the post may not be aware of situations where assurances have not been respected.

Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that the RCMP establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and where possible to monitor and document whether said caveats and assurances were respected.

Country and Entity Profiles

Finding 7: NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not regularly update, or have a schedule to update its Country and Entity Assessments. In many cases these assessments are more than four years old and are heavily dependent on an aggregation of open source reporting.

Finding 8: NSIRA finds that information collected through the Liaison Officer in the course of an operation is not centrally documented such that it can inform future assessments.

In 2019, the RCMP conducted an internal review of its information sharing framework including LEAG and FIRAC. Based on this review, NSIRA recommended in 2019, that departments adopt internal reviews of their policies and processes as a best practice. While it is not the intention to cover items already identified in the (internal) review, NSIRA notes that three years have elapsed and the issues associated to country and entity assessments still remain.

Of the 90 assessments, the RCMP is currently using to base its risk assessments, 87 percent have not been updated since 2018, and the remaining thirteen percent have not been updated since 2019. Over the course of 2021, the RCMP did not update any of its country profiles. NSIRA has been advised that in 2022, [**redacted**] but cite funding constraints as a key challenge.

A key finding of the RCMP’s internal review relates composition of the profiles themselves, in that they: “do not sufficiently reflect the RCMP’s operational experience.” The review states that: “LEAG country and entity risk profiles are predominately based on open source information rather than input from operational units…” The RCMP through the course of the review emphasized the role and importance to the Liaison Officer during the FIRAC process, suggesting that the Liaison Officer is positioned to offset any shortcoming with the country and entity profiles. NSIRA notes the internal review highlights some of the challenges faced by the Liaison Officers, referring to the added responsibilities of the LEAG and the FIRAC processes as adversely affecting their ability to preform their regular duties.

NSIRA notes the RCMP’s ongoing efforts at improving its post-monitoring efforts. NSIRA looks forward to reviewing the progress made over the next year on the measures taken on updating the RCMP’s country profiles, and inclusion of post-monitoring of automating media monitoring and information sharing tracking mechanism with INTERPOL Ottawa.

Case Study: [**redacted**]

[**redacted**] the RCMP sought approval to interview a [**redacted**]

[**redacted**] The RCMP sought to [**redacted**] interview [**redacted**] in order to assess the current risk or threat [**redacted**] to Canada and Canadian citizens, [**redacted**]. The RCMP has advised that a “…successful interview could advance the investigation [**redacted**]and significantly improve the ability to identify the threat and risk [**redacted**] to [**redacted**] security.”

Additionally, the RCMP believed that “engagement with [**redacted**] may lead to [**redacted**] information and evidence [**redacted**].

[**redacted**]

The RCMP’s internal Country profile classifies [**redacted**] as a High-Risk Profile (RED). The profile notes serious documented allegations of human rights abuses [**redacted**] (but not limited to) torture [**redacted**] suspects routinely subjected to unfair trials. The RCMP had concerns that “If [**redacted**] could face torture and mistreatment [**redacted**]”. As per policy the case was escalated to the Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC).

a) FIRAC [**redacted**]

[**redacted**], the FIRAC convened and discussed the request to interview [**redacted**] Committee found that there are substantial risks of mistreatment for [**redacted**] that there are currently no measures in place that could effectively mitigate the identified risks. FIRAC noted [**redacted**].

FIRAC did however also note, “that efforts should be made to better position possible future interviews.” They noted that [**redacted**] would “allow the RCMP to monitor the outcomes and assurances of discussions at a strategic level [**redacted**].

Accordingly, FIRAC recommended that the RCMP “engage in discussion [**redacted**] on the [**redacted**] potential for [**redacted**]. The Assistant Commissioner for [**redacted**] approved this recommendation.

Events of [**redacted**]

In response to the FIRAC recommendation, senior RCMP [**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

Based on [**redacted**] the investigative team sought FIRAC’s recommendation to allow [**redacted**] further discussions [**redacted**] in order to have the RCMP [**redacted**] interview with [**redacted**] and seek assurances [**redacted**].

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**], the FIRAC convened [**redacted**] to consider the request to engage and exchange information to [**redacted**] interview [**redacted**] to seek assurances [**redacted**]. The request was approved by FIRAC, if certain mitigation measures and assurances be received, [**redacted**].

Events of [**redacted**]

[**redacted**] RCMP [**redacted**] engaged the [**redacted**]. The RCMP [**redacted**] there is a [**redacted**] they would be interested in interviewing [**redacted**].

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

The RCMP [**redacted**] escalated the requests to interview [**redacted**] to FIRAC with additional mitigation measures.

[**redacted**]

[**redacted**]

FIRAC convened a meeting to discuss the request to share the personal information of [**redacted**].

The Committee concluded that there is a substantial risk of mistreatment [**redacted**] should the information be shared and that said risk cannot be mitigated by caveats and assurances. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the information not be exchanged. This recommendation was based on the following concerns:

  • [**redacted**]
  • The existence of a significant risk of mistreatment that could not be mitigated [**redacted**].
  • Inability to guarantee [**redacted**]
  • Safety concerns based on information that may be derived from the interview;
  • [**redacted**]
  • [**redacted**]
  • Assurances were deemed insufficient to mitigate the risk, [**redacted**] to allow for an assessment of the confidence in the assurance.

FIRAC recommended [**redacted**] explore additional options to reduce the potential risk of mistreatment and then return to the committee for reconsideration. Among these options, the Committee suggested [**redacted**].

[**redacted**], the Assistant Commissioner [**redacted**] rejected FIRAC’s recommendation and allowed the sharing of information. He based his decision on the following:

  1. [**redacted**] the RCMP should consider the consequences of not sharing [**redacted**] as this would be detrimental for the relationship stating that “engagement [**redacted**] will give insight and influence”;
  2. [**redacted**]
  3. The importance of the RCMP maintaining a strong relationship [**redacted**].

The Assistant Commissioner then concludes, “failure to share presents risk that cannot be managed [**redacted**]. Although influence is not guaranteed, I believe it is the better choice”

A subsequent email by the Assistant Commissioner [**redacted**] outlined additional considerations that factored into the decision to reject FIRAC’s recommendations. These considerations focused on the risk of not sharing the information. The additional information included operational and strategic considerations [**redacted**]. The Assistant Commissioner stated that lack of engagement [**redacted**]. Strategically, the Assistant Commissioner noted the risk to relationship should the information not be shared, noting that “failure to follow through [**redacted**] and associated mitigation efforts articulated below will likely have a negative impact on the [**redacted**] relationship [**redacted**].

The Assistant Commissioner’s reasoning goes on to include a “necessity” analysis regarding the challenges [**redacted**] the importance of the information from the interview, and the importance of the relationship [**redacted**]. Of note, the Assistant Commissioner notes that [**redacted**] a strong relationship [**redacted**] will aid in plans to mitigate the greater risk while also managing the risk that exists today for the Canadian [**redacted**]. The Assistant Commissioner also concludes his email by stressing that it is his belief that sharing the information is required to reduce the risk of mistreatment [**redacted**] that lack of involvement will lead to greater risk.

Analysis

Finding 9: NSIRA finds that FIRAC members concluded that the information sharing would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment that could not be mitigated. The Assistant Commissioner determined that it may be mitigated. This amounts to a disagreement between officials or a situation where “officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated.”

The ACA and issued OIC place an absolute prohibition on the sharing of information where there is a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual. Unless “officials determine that the risk can be mitigated, such as through the use of caveats or assurances and appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk”, the information cannot be disclosed. Section 1(2) of the OICs further stipulate, “that where officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated, the Commissioner must ensure that the matter is referred to the Commissioner for determination.

The Assistant Commissioner’s decision to share the information contrary to FIRAC’s recommendation, cites section 1(2) of the OIC and concludes that since the FIRAC is responsible for making a recommendation to the Assistant Commissioner then the Assistant Commissioner is the final decision maker. The Assistant Commissioner “made the decision that the risk can be mitigated.” The Assistant Commissioner did not consider that making the final decision in this instance ran contrary to the process set out in the FIRAC Terms of Reference, and contrary to the OICs. The OICs are clear, where officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated the matter must be referred to the Commissioner…” Accordingly, pursuant to section 1(2) of the OIC, NSIRA notes that this case should have been elevated to the Commissioner for determination.

Finding 10: NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner’s rationale for rejecting FIRAC’s advice did not adequately address concerns consistent with the provisions of the Orders in Council. In particular, NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner erroneously considered the importance of the potential future strategic relationship with a foreign entity in the assessment of potential risk of mistreatment of the individual.

[**redacted**]

A number of assumptions characterize the justifications by the Assistant Commissioner to share the requested information.

[**redacted**]. However, this reasoning disregards [**redacted**]. It further dismisses the RCMP’s own reporting [**redacted**]. FIRAC’s record of decision which notes, [**redacted**]. The Assistant Commissioner accordingly disregards the possibility that [**redacted**].

In the alternative, the Assistant Commissioner relies on [**redacted**] but does not consider now the risk [**redacted**] may increase [**redacted**].

Secondly, the Assistant Commissioner’s reasoning relied on [**redacted**].

The Assistant Commissioner does not address FIRAC’s concerns for [**redacted**] the insufficiency of mitigation measures. Rather the Assistant Commissioner concludes [**redacted**] greater risk should the information not be shared – but does not explain why or how so? Nor does the Assistant Commissioner address FIRAC’s concerns regarding [**redacted**].

Additionally, the Assistant Commissioner’s decision considered and emphasized the importance of the relationship between the RCMP [**redacted**] While FIRAC expressed concern assurances would be respected. The Assistant Commissioner’s reasoning focuses on the importance of [**redacted**], that relationship [**redacted**].

As mentioned earlier, according to the RCMP:

“…while the ACA and OiC may not speak to external considerations, it does not prohibit strategic considerations as part of the totality of the analysis, rather than against the risk to the individual, including whether strategic partnerships may act as a mitigation measure. It is important to note that the ACA and OiC do not supersede our obligations under the RCMP Act.”

The RCMP further noted that: “…As such, any action or inaction could result in unwanted consequences, and to include them as a consideration to demonstrate due diligence, and that all aspects of an activity is considered is prudent. Strategic relationships, or more importantly, in this case, actions that jeopardize the strategic relationship, can lead to harm. The A/C clearly stated that.”

NSIRA notes that the assessment of mistreatment must be limited to whether the disclosure would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment to the individual and whether said risk may be mitigated. NSIRA strongly cautions against the use of additional considerations such as strategic relationships in the assessment of substantial risk.

It should be noted that the Assistant Commissioner did provide additional mitigation measures for consideration. However, those measures were all premised on [**redacted**]. The measures did not require that the assurances and the FIRAC suggested mitigation measures be adopted as a prerequisite to the information sharing.

Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that in cases where the RCMP Assistant Commissioner disagrees with FIRAC’s recommendation not to share the information, the case be automatically referred to the Commissioner.

Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that the assessment of substantial risk be limited to the provisions of the Orders in Council – namely the substantial risk of mistreatment and whether the risk may be mitigated – and external objectives such as fostering strategic relationships should not factor into this decision-making.

Finally, in the case at hand the Assistant Commissioner responsible for approving the FIRAC recommendations was the same Assistant Commissioner supervising the business line of the case. In 2019 NSIRA recommended that “departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested in the outcome.” As discussed in paragraph 61 above, in 2021 the RCMP adjusted its FIRAC process such that there are co-chairs for the FIRAC. Adding an additional Chair (co-chairs) was to ensure that the Chair overseeing a specific FIRAC is not the one responsible for business line where the case originated. The case at hand demonstrates the need to emulate that structure at the senior level in order to maintain independent decision-making and ensure that the case focus is on the substantial risk of mistreatment to the individual rather than additional strategic considerations.

Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that FIRAC recommendations are referred to an Assistant Commissioner who is not responsible for the branch from which the case originates.

Global Affairs Canada

During the course of the review period from January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, six cases reported to having been referred to the Intelligence Policy and Programs Division (INPL) for further assessment. In the cases that were provided to NSIRA all were specific to Mission security, where Missions were dependent on local authorities to assist in situations where there was a potential threat to staff at the embassy or consulate. When asked about the low number of cases, GAC advised NSIRA that sharing personal identifying information with foreign entities was very rare in an ACA context.

Implementation of the ACA

Finding 11: NSIRA finds that GAC is now strongly dependent on operational staff and Heads of Mission for decision-making and accountability under the ACA.

On December 14, 2017, GAC was issued Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2017 MD). GAC had not received the Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign entities (the 2011 MD) that was issued to a number of other departments.

The department manages a global network of over 175 missions in 110 countries, employing approximately 12,000 staff with an operating with a budget of over $7 billion.

When asked how the department operationalizes the Act, GAC referred to their outreach and training programs. GAC advised NSIRA that their training programs targeted specific staff to ensure awareness of and compliance with the ACA. The training outlines the roles and responsibilities regarding the ACA and Orders in Council requirements, and provides employees a definition of “substantial risk,” and points of contact at headquarters.

In 2021, NSIRA committed to further scrutinizing the processes regarding ACA triage and decision-making by reviewing both GAC and the RCMP. In the 2020 ACA review, NSIRA found that there were significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and required level of approvals across departments. In particular, NSIRA identified procedural gaps in GAC’s risk assessments that should have warranted escalation to the Deputy Minister.

When asked if GAC had initiated any adjustments, or changes to frameworks or policies as a result of the findings and recommendations from previous reviews of the ACA, GAC advised that adjustments had been made to the framework by creating a Mistreatment Risk Assessment form. They explained that the form would support the application of a more consistent threshold for elevating a case in the decision-making process, and would standardize how cases are documented. As of August 31, 2022, GAC has yet to implement the use of this form.

Currently, the Head of Mission (HoM, or Chargé) makes the initial assessment in determining if the risk of mistreatment to the individual may be mitigated below the substantial risk threshold. Only where the HoM identifies a concern as to the sufficiency of the mitigation measures or assessment, would the HoM seek guidance through the Intelligence Policy and Programs Division (INPL) generic e-mail.

INPL can assist the Mission in conducting a risk assessment. If at this point it is determined there is a substantial risk of mistreatment that cannot be mitigated and the Mission still wants to proceed, the responsible geographic Director General may request that the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee (AMCC) be convened. The AMCC provides a decision to the HoM. GAC has advised that the role of the AMCC:

….is to recommend risk-mitigation strategies, seek escalatory senior-level discussion and approval for decisions as required, up to and including the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and document how each case is managed. It is convened on an ad hoc basis to review the proposed disclosure, request, or use of information in cases in which prohibitions under the Directions may be engaged. The Committee is similar to structures that exist within other departments and agencies subject to the OiC.

In 2020 and 2021, GAC initiated a review of the Secretariat of the AMCC, formerly known as the Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee (MDCC). GAC has advised that notional recommendations have been developed to improve the working methods of the Committee and update the terms of reference. Explaining that the timeliness of Committee decisions, addressing duty of care issues, and final reporting of case outcomes regarding Committee decisions are currently being examined. It is expected that the AMCC Secretariat’s review will be completed in 2022 and the terms of reference updated shortly thereafter.

In the six cases provided over the review period, NSIRA observed that the final decision on whether to share information with local authorities was left to the HoM. This is best illustrated in the HANOI case where the mission was advised

To note, decision-making authority on such situations ultimately rests with mission/geo. INPL’s role—as departmental focal point for the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACMFEA)—is simply to advise on relevant considerations, not authorize.

In further correspondence between INPL and the Mission in Hanoi there appears to be the need for additional clarification on the decision-making roles in regards to applying the ACA. INPL further advised the Mission that “it is in fact the Mission’s responsibility to determine if there is a substantial risk of mistreatment or not.

The centralization of accountability with the HoM as opposed to headquarters represents a significant change in implementation since NSIRA’s in-depth review of GAC in 2019. Namely, in the previous review any cases where there was a potential substantial risk of mistreatment would require escalation MDCC (via the INPL) where the Committee would ultimately be responsible for deterring if the proposed mitigation measures are sufficient and if the information sharing should take place. This change in implementation threatens the independence of the process from individuals with a potential operational interest in the outcome of the information sharing.

Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure that accountability for compliance with the ACA clearly rests with the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee.

Information Sharing Framework

Finding 12: NSIRA finds that GAC has not demonstrated that all of its business lines are integrated into its framework under the ACA.

GAC does not have any information-sharing arrangements with foreign entities related to the ACA. When asked in last year’s review how GAC monitors its information exchanges, the response provided reads as follows:

There is a handful of divisions at GAC that receive information that may have been obtained through mistreatment. Because of the very different type of information they each receive due to their specific mandates, each has a different process/framework for identifying information likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment. Therefore, there is not one unified set of processes at GAC for initially marking/identifying incoming information potentially derived from mistreatment.

GAC has also not conducted an internal mapping exercise to determine which business lines are subject to the ACA. Considering the low number of cases this year and the size of GAC, and that ACA training is not mandatory for staff, NSIRA has concerns that not all areas involved in information sharing within GAC are being properly informed of their ACA obligations.

When asked to elaborate on the nature of information exchanges triggering the ACA, GAC further clarified:

[T]hat information exchanges occur without formal arrangement with foreign entities, and the vast majority of the information that is exchanged does not pertain to individuals. Each information exchange situation is unique and occurs within a specific relational and country context.

Each instance of information sharing is handled on a case-by-case basis and escalated to the appropriate level based on the individual circumstances.

It is important to note that if the assessment determines that there is NOT a substantial risk of mistreatment, but that the exchange of information directly or indirectly involves personally identifiable information about an individual AND the country or foreign entities is not a trusted partner when it comes to human rights, GAC employees must still capture via a risk assessment form the reason why there is NOT a substantial risk of mistreatment and keep a thorough record.

Finding 13: NSIRA finds that GAC has not made ACA training mandatory for all staff across relevant business lines. This could result in staff being involved in information exchanges without the proper training and knowledge of the implications of the ACA.

When determining whether there is a risk of mistreatment, GAC employees will leverage human rights reports, as well as any intelligence relevant to the country/entity associated with the information. The risk profile of the individual about whom information is shared is also taken into consideration when making a determination regarding whether a substantial risk of mistreatment exists. It is a collection of information that informs any assessment and respective decision, rather than a single tool.

Training is only mandatory for employees working in a high-risk mission or functions and offered as a suggestion for other staff at mission and headquarters. GAC has committed to establishing a dedicated ACA page on the intranet, along with supporting communication, however, employees are only encouraged to review it.

GAC provides an outreach program and training, for staff both at headquarters and at missions abroad on their ACA obligations. The ACA components are embedded in GAC’s Governance, Accreditation, Technical Security and Espionage (GATE) awareness program, the Legal and Policy Framework on Information Sharing, and a module in the Heads of Mission pre-posting training. These training courses outline the roles and responsibilities of officials regarding their ACA and Orders in Council obligations, including the definition of “substantial risk”, and key points of contact at headquarters. It is important to note that the GATE awareness program and that the ACA segment of the training is considered as an outreach tool and not a core training module, meant to provide situational awareness for Canadian- based staff on information security and intelligence topics. The training provided by the Department of Justice acts as the core training module for staff.

When asked about Consular Operations bureau training, GAC appeared to have only a cursory knowledge citing that they were aware from the 2021 Annual Report (on the Application of the Orders in Council Directions for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities) that ACA directions were included as part of the training session offered by the Consular Operations bureau.

The target employees for training at headquarters are outgoing Mission Security Officers, Management Consular Officers, Readiness Program Managers, Global Security Reporting Program Officers and Heads of Mission, as well as all members of the Intelligence Bureau. At mission, the training is provided to all Canada-based staff, including other government departments’ employees posted at missions. GAC has only recently begun tracking the number of staff that have been provided ACA training, and estimates that at least 300 GAC employees have been provided ACA-related training since 2020.

When further queried about the breakdowns of training provided, GAC posited that there are only a small proportion of GAC officers abroad that may encounter ACA-related decisions. With training only mandatory for some staff, NSIRA is concerned that given the volume of information exchanges, and the multiplicity of business lines there is very well potential that information sharing may be occurring, or not properly triggered by those without proper ACA knowledge.

In light of the fact that GAC engages with foreign entities with poor human rights records and operates in highly volatile environments, NSIRA expresses deep concern that GAC has not demonstrated that it has implemented ACA framework across business lines.

Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that GAC conduct a formal internal mapping exercise of other possibly implicated business lines to ensure it is meeting its obligations set out in the ACA.

Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that GAC make ACA training mandatory for all rotational staff.

Human Rights Reporting

Finding 14: NSIRA finds that GAC has not regularly updated its Human Rights Reports. While many were updated during the 2021 review year, more than half have not been updated since 2019. This is particularly problematic when departments and agencies rely on these reports as a key source in assessing risk related to the ACA.

GAC develops classified human rights reports making them available to a number of internal Government of Canada partners. These reports are intended to provide an overview of the human rights situation of a particular country. They help inform Canada’s international engagement and programming decisions, including foreign policy, development, trade, security, and consular activities. Updated human rights reports (post 2019) include a designated section that addresses the Orders in Council and the ACA, and the circumstances of mistreatment within that country.

The coming into force of the ACA and the issuance of the Orders in Council resulted in a greater number of departments being subject to directions specific to the avoidance of mistreatment by foreign entities. Many of these departments did not have frameworks or any country assessments to support this obligation. This created an increased demand for the GAC Human Rights Reports.

Prior to Royal Assent of the ACA, GAC provided human rights reports to departments that were subject to the 2017 Ministerial Directives. GAC also works with partners to incorporate feedback on human rights reporting and considers input on countries of interest for subsequent reporting cycles. It is important to note that GAC does not keep statistics on how often, or which reports were requested/accessed by internal partners.

NSIRA recognizes that in 2021 GAC has recently implemented a prioritized list to update the human rights reports and has been making considerable headway during the review period, updating 25 percent of their profiles. A number of high-risk countries have been updated to reflect current events. Still, a number of reports are outdated and close to 60 percent of the 133 human rights reports have not been updated since 2019. For example, Pakistan, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen have not been updated since 2019, while South Africa and Belarus have not been reviewed since 2015.

Maintaining up-to-date reports will help ensure that critical human rights information is being used when making ACA determinations, this is especially vital considering that other department leverage GAC’s human rights report as part of their risk assessments. NSIRA notes that the Information Sharing Coordination Group coordinated by Public Safety Canada continues to work through the prioritization and the issues associated with the sharing of human rights reports across departments. It should be stressed that the GAC human rights reports are viewed as a supplement to what departments have already collected as part of their own assessments. For this reason GAC does not provide evaluative judgment on risk within their human rights reports, that is they do not designate whether a country or entity is high or low risk, consequently leaving departments to assess risk based on the information they have collected as part of their mandates.

NSIRA has been advised that the GAC country priority list was developed in consultation with partner departments and agencies, and relevant GAC divisions. And is based on an assessment of the operational needs of Canadian federal departments and agencies. While understanding the impact the pandemic had on operations, particularly at Missions abroad, NSIRA encourages GAC to develop, maintain, and continue to work with other departments and agencies to ensure countries’ HRRs are updated as regularly as possible.

Development of Human Rights Reports

GAC produces human rights reports in collaboration with its missions. Coordinated by GAC’s office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion directorate, the reports are used not only to inform risk assessments, but assist in the guidance of policy and programming decisions.

Missions are responsible for updating their human rights reports, and, if tasked, are linked to Head of Mission’s performance measurement agreements. Mission staff work collaboratively with geographic branches in the preparation of the reports. While headquarters is responsible for the tasking and coordination of the reports, it is Head of Mission that approves the report. The reports include information on the overall human rights context in the country, as well as an analysis of the significant human rights-related events that took place during the review period. Generally, reports are a collection of various sources, which include open source reporting, consultations with human rights organizations and civil society partners, and engagement with government authorities and stakeholders.

Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure countries’ Human Rights Reports are updated more regularly to ensure evolving human rights related issues are captured.

Assurances

Finding 15: NSIRA finds that GAC does not have a standardized centralized approach for the tracking and documentation of assurances.

GAC advised that there was no standardized approach in place to assess the reliability or document assurances received from foreign entities. Risk assessments are conducted on a case-by-case basis. When asked how assurances were developed, GAC stated that there was no statutory or regulatory language that specifically addressed the use of diplomatic assurances, but officials implicated in individual cases would consider the foreign entity’s credibility, recent precedents, the experiences of like-minded partners, and the feasibility of monitoring assurances and caveats to be communicated with the disclosure. It is the Mission’s responsibility to track and monitor whether assurances and caveats are being respected

NSIRA noted that on the ATHENS case provided by GAC, there was a concerted effort to ensure assurances and caveats were in place before information was shared with local authorities. It is in NSIRA’s opinion that the mission was attuned to their obligations under the Act (and directions) and tried to ensure the welfare of the individual detained by authorities. [**redacted**] Mission staff took remedial action to ensure that the individual is not at risk of mistreatment.

In the ATHENS case, [**redacted**]. NSIRA noted that there is no formalized tracking, or documentation mechanism for the follow-up caveats and assurances. This is problematic as mission staff are rotational and may therefore have no visibility as to their ability to rely on caveats and assurances based on past information sharing instances.

Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that GAC establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and document any instances of non-compliance for use in future risk assessments.

Appendix I: Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1: NSIRA finds that the Canada Border Services Agency and Public Safety Canada still have not fully implemented an ACA framework and supporting policies and procedures are still under development.

Finding 2: NSIRA finds that from January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

Finding 3: NSIRA finds that the RCMP has a robust framework in place for the triage of cases pertaining to the ACA.

Finding 4: NSIRA finds that the RCMP’s FIRAC risk assessments include objectives external to the requirements of the Orders in Council, such as the risk of not exchanging information.

Finding 5: NSIRA finds that the RCMP use of a two-part risk assessment, that of the country profile and that of the individual to determine if there is a substantial risk, including the particular circumstances of the individual in question within the risk assessment is a best practice.

Finding 6: NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not have a centralized system of documenting assurances and does not regularly monitor and update the assessment of the reliability of assurances.

Finding 7: NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not regularly update, or have a schedule to update its Country and Entity Assessments. In many cases these assessments are more than four years old and are heavily dependent on an aggregation of open source reporting.

Finding 8: NSIRA finds that information collected through the Liaison Officer in the course of an operation is not centrally documented such that it can inform future assessments.

Finding 9: NSIRA finds that FIRAC members concluded that the information sharing would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment that could not be mitigated. The Assistant Commissioner determined that it may be mitigated. This amounts to a disagreement between officials or a situation where “officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated”.

Finding 10: NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner’s rationale for rejecting FIRAC’s advice did not adequately address concerns consistent with the provisions of the Orders in Council. In particular, NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner erroneously considered the importance of the potential future strategic relationship with a foreign entity in the assessment of potential risk of mistreatment of the individual.

Finding 11: NSIRA finds that GAC is now strongly dependent on operational staff and Heads of Mission for decision-making and accountability under the ACA.

Finding 12: NSIRA finds that GAC has not demonstrated that all of its business lines are integrated into its framework under the ACA.

Finding 13: NSIRA finds that GAC has not made ACA training mandatory for all staff across relevant business lines. This could result in staff being involved in information exchanges without the proper training and knowledge of the implications of the ACA.

Finding 14: NSIRA finds that GAC has not regularly updated its Human Rights Reports. While many were updated during the 2021 review year, more than half have not been updated since 2019. This is particularly problematic when departments and agencies rely on these reports as a key source in assessing risk related to the ACA.

Finding 15: NSIRA finds that GAC does not have a standardized centralized approach for the tracking and documentation of assurances.

Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that the RCMP establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and where possible to monitor and document whether said caveats and assurances were respected.

Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that in cases where the RCMP Assistant Commissioner disagrees with FIRAC’s recommendation not to share the information, the case be automatically referred to the Commissioner.

Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that the assessment of substantial risk be limited to the provisions of the Orders in Council – namely the substantial risk of mistreatment and whether the risk may be mitigated – and external objectives such as fostering strategic relationships should not factor into this decision-making.

Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that FIRAC recommendations are referred to an Assistant Commissioner who is not responsible for the branch from which the case originates.

Recommendation 5 : NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure that accountability for compliance with the ACA clearly rests with the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee.

Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that GAC conduct a formal internal mapping exercise of other possibly implicated business lines to ensure it is meeting its obligations set out in the ACA.

Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that GAC make ACA training mandatory for all rotational staff.

Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure countries’ Human Rights Reports are updated more regularly to ensure evolving human rights related issues are captured.

Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that GAC establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and document any instances of non-compliance for use in future risk assessments.

Appendix II: ACA Framework and Background

It is important to note how the legal frameworks have evolved over the past decade. In international law Canada is a state party to a number of international instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Many of the prohibitions on mistreatment, in these conventions are now considered customary international law. These international commitments have been implemented in Canadian domestic law; most notably the prohibition on torture is clearly defined and codified in the Criminal Code under section 269.1.

In 2010, the Canadian Government implemented a general framework for “Addressing the Risks of Mistreatment in Information Sharing with Foreign Entities”. This was the first multidepartment instruction given by the government regarding the issue of information sharing and mistreatment.

The framework was followed by two detailed Ministerial Directions to departments in 2011 and 2017. The 2017 MD was issued to seven departments and created prohibitions on the sharing of information that may lead to a substantial risk of mistreatment that cannot be mitigated. The MD also provided clear parameters on the use of information potentially derived from mistreatment. Additionally, the MD broadened the scope of applicability to all information sharing with foreign entities and not just that pertaining to national security issues.

On July 12, 2019, the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act came into force. The Act codifies and enshrines Canada’s commitment to respect the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the international agreements prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that it is party to. A primary objective of enshrining these principles through statute rather than the previous use of Ministerial Directions was to ensure that Canada’s commitment to these principles does not rest with the Minister or Government in power. The ACA provides the statutory authority for the Governor in Council (GiC) to issue directions through Orders in Council. The Act imposes an obligation on the GiC to issue Orders in Council to at least seven specific departments. In September 2019, there were in total 12 Orders in Council issued to departments and agencies engaged in information sharing with foreign entities.

The Orders in Council prohibits the disclosure of information to any foreign entity where said disclosure would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual and prohibits the making of any requests to any foreign agency for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of any individual. Additionally, the issued Orders in Council places parameters on the use of information likely derived from mistreatment of an individual by barring its use where it may create a substantial risk of further mistreatment, as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding, or in any way that deprives someone of their rights and freedoms (unless determined by the deputy head that it is necessary to prevent loss of life or significant personal injury).

Ministerial Direction (2011)

  • Issued to CSIS, CSE, CBSA and RCMP;
  • DND developed similar internal instruction; but was not issued as a ministerial direction (functional directive); and,
  • Main criticism was that departments were permitted to weigh the value of the information against the risk of mistreatment

Ministerial Direction (2017)

  • Addition of GAC, and DND (to CSIS, CSE, RCMP, CBSA);
  • A number of changes, most significant were prohibitions of the disclosure and requesting of information, as well as new limits on the use of information (derived from mistreatment);
  • Requirement for departments to maintain policies and procedures to assess risks; and,
  • Inter-agency co-operation requirement

OiCs issued pursuant to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (2019)

  • Issued to twelve departments, six of which had never before received formal direction regarding information sharing with foreign entities (PS, FINTRAC, TC, IRCC, CRA and DFO); and,
  • Codified many provisions of the 2017 MD

As noted in the introduction, the legal framework governing the sharing of information with foreign entities applies to information pertaining to all individuals, regardless of whether they are detainees or not. There is currently no government-wide implementation policy for the ACA. However, the issued Orders in Council do provide guidance on the requisite threshold for information sharing and the requisite hierarchy of approval where there is uncertainty as to whether mitigation measures may sufficiently diminish the substantial risk of mistreatment. Public Safety Canada in 2018, set up an Information Sharing Coordination Group with the objective of sharing best practices between departments.

Individual departments develop their own internal framework and policies for the implementation of the ACA. Some departments that were previously subject to the MDs on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities had a greater opportunity to create internal processes, procedures and policies to identify when information sharing practices may create a substantial risk of mistreatment. These departments have developed structured approaches to recording assurances (verbal or written) received from the foreign entities whom they engage and possible mitigation strategies such that the threat is diffused below the substantial risk of mistreatment threshold.

Appendix III: Previous Recommendations

Past findings and recommendations
Report for Year 2018 Report for Year 2019 Report for Year 2020
Finding #1: Benefits of internal information sharing process reviews. NSIRA noted that periodic internal reviews of information sharing policies and processes supported their successful functioning in the long term. Finding #1: NSIRA found that several departments, new to the considerations of the Act, described considerable progress being made during the review period and afterwards to build out formalized frameworks to support implementation. Finding #1: NSIRA found that CBSA and PS did not finalize their policy frameworks in support of Directions received under the ACA over the review period.
Recommendation #1: Departments should conduct periodic internal reviews of their policies and processes for sharing information with foreign entities in order to identify gaps and areas in need of improvement. Finding #2: NSIRA found that departments conducting minimal information exchanges with foreign entities have not yet fully addressed the importance of having an official information sharing framework in place. Finding #2: NSIRA found that from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.
Findings #2: Departments vary with respect to the independence of their decision-making. NSIRA examined the extent to which high-risk decision-making is removed from operational personnel who may have vested interest in the sharing. In some departments, the decision-makers have a direct operational interest in the sharing of information, creating the potential for conflict between operational imperatives and departmental obligations to respect the MD. In particular, NSIRA noted that:
  • CSE and the RCMP have the most independent processes.
  • The information sharing process implemented by GAC to date remove high-risk decision-making from “front line” personnel.
  • At CSIS and DND/CAF, decision makers typically have a direct operational interest in the sharing of information.
  • CBSA has not yet operationalized its information sharing processes.
Recommendation #1: NSIRA recommends that all departments in receipt of directions under the Act have official framework that ensure they can fully support the implementation of the directions. Finding #3: NSIRA found that even when departments employ similar methodologies and sources of information to inform their determination of whether or not a case involving the same country of concern should be escalated, significant divergences in the evaluation of risk and the required level of approval emerge.
Recommendation #2: Departments should ensure that in cases where the risk of mistreatment approaches the threshold of “substantial”, decisions are made independently of operational personnel directly invested the outcome. Finding #3: NSIRA found that the differences and variability in departmental frameworks demonstrate a previous lack of coordination across the community and a need to identify best practices. Finding #4: NSIRA found a procedural gap of concern in a case study involving the disclosure of information, even though information was ultimately not shared. The risk of mistreatment was substantial and the decision should have been referred to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs as the accountable deputy minister for this request.
Finding #3: Lack of standardized information sharing risk assessments. Under the 2017 MD, GAC, CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP all maintain their own sets of foreign country and/or entity profiles, while DND/CAF is currently developing its own as well. The existence of multiple different assessments is duplicative and unnecessary. It may also yield inconsistencies, as departments have at times come to quite different conclusions about foreign countries’ and entities’ human rights records and the associated risks of information sharing. Recommendation #2: NSIRA recommends that departments coordinate to identify best practices for all essential components of information sharing frameworks and that ISCG is leveraged to ensure these practices are shared where possible across the community to support the implementation of the Act.
Recommendation #3: Departments should develop:
  • Unified set of assessments of the human rights situation in foreign countries including a standardized ‘risk of mistreatment’ classification level for each country; and
  • To the extent that multiple departments deal with the same foreign entities in a given country, standardized assessments of the risk of mistreatment of sharing information with foreign entities.
Finding #4: NSIRA found that there are inconsistencies in the application of existing sharing frameworks between departments, specifically concerning information evaluation thresholds, and decisions being elevated for senior level determinations.
Finding #4: The concept of “substantial risk” of mistreatment is not defined. Like the 2017 MD, the ACMFEA and its associated direction prohibit information sharing that would result in a “substantial risk” of mistreatment, Neither the ACMFEA nor its direction include a definition of substantial risk, however, despite the centrality of this concept to the regime. A definition of substantial risk existed in both the 2011 and 2017 MD; its absence now raises concerns about its interpretation in the future. Recommendation #3: NSIRA recommends that departments establish consistent thresholds for triggers in their information sharing frameworks, including initial evaluations against the concerns of the Act, when a case is to be elevated in the decision process, and how this is documented.
Recommendation #4: The definition of “substantial risk” should be codified in law or public direction. Finding #5: NSIRA found a lack of unification and standardization in the country and entity assessments being leveraged by departments, resulting in inconsistencies in approach/stance by the community when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern related to the Act.
Recommendation #4: NSIRA recommends that departments identify a means to establish unified and standardized country and entity risk assessment tools to support a consistent approach by departments when interacting with Foreign Entities of concern under the Act.

Annex A: Departmental Frameworks

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Following receipt of the 2017 MD, the RCMP established a new Law Enforcement Assessment Group (LEAG). LEAG has a detailed Terms of Reference that outlines its membership as well as roles and responsibilities. LEAG’s primary task is to assess foreign countries and law enforcement entities with regard to the risk of mistreatment. In its assessments, LEAG considers a number of factors, including the human rights record of the country, specific foreign entities’ engagement in human rights abuses, local law enforcement’s history of respecting caveats, as well as country-specific risks to individual safety related to political views, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so on. LEAG thus “plays an integral role in informing FIRAC’s decision on whether to share information with foreign law enforcement entities.”

At present, the RCMP has categorized 146 approved country profiles, of which 20 are high risk, 69 are medium risk, and 57 are low risk. 51 country assessments remain outstanding. LEAG currently intends to update its profiles every two years, although LEAG will update some reports more frequently based on operational requirements. To date, 40 countries have been assessed as being a high priority for periodic updates due to the volume of information sharing conducted.

Graphic of FIRAC Process

Process

If an RCMP officer identified a need and wishes to share information with a foreign entity, they must follow a set process:

The officer must first consult a specific RCMP intranet website created by LEAG. The site lists countries by colour. If the officer finds that the country in question is “green”, he or she may proceed to share the information. If the country is “red”- or “yellow” and the circumstances of the proposed sharing match any of the case-specific factors and considerations listed- then the case must be referred to FIRAC. If a FIRAC is required, the officer completes a standard form which must be approved by the relevant Criminal Operations (CROPS) Officer or other approving officer. The form includes a summary of the information to be shared, the kind of sharing (request, disclosure or use), the operational context, the risks of sharing information, the investigative value of the information, possible mitigation strategies, and- where applicable- the actual information to be disclosed or used.

Once approved, the form is sent to the Director General (DG) responsible for the relevant program at RCMP headquarters for approval. Following approval, the DG submits the form to the FIRAC secretariat.

The FIRAC secretariat compiles a briefing package that includes the officer’s form, the country profile from LEAG, and any supporting documentation submitted by the DG. The briefing package is distributed to FIRAC members ahead of the meeting.

A FIRAC meeting is convened and the request is considered along with possible mitigation strategies. While the final decision regarding FIRAC’s recommendation rests with the Chair, in the vast majority of cases the decision is unanimous. Dissenting opinions are recorded in the Record of Decision (RoD). Once FIRAC has noted its recommendation, the RoD and an accompanying briefing note are sent to the Assistant Commissioner for final determination.

In cases where FIRAC cannot determine whether a substantial risk of mistreatment can be mitigated, the responsible Assistant Commissioner will provide the RoD to the Deputy Commissioner in order to obtain the Commissioner’s decision.

Global Affairs Canada

Framework Updates

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) indicated that no changes to their framework was made during the current review period.

Annex I: Global Affairs Canada Framework

Process

Triage

There is not one unified set of processes at GAC for determining whether information being used by the department is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity. If an official determines that information that he or she has received is likely to have been obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and that official still wants to use the information, they are instructed in their training to consult with their Program management at HQ. Should that manager be unable to make a determination on their own as to whether the use would comply with the Act, they will consult the relevant departmental policy group and the department’s Legal Services Unit.

Senior Management Committees

The Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee (AMCC) meetings focuses on the following:

  • Has the information, the use of which is being sought, likely been derived from mistreatment?
  • What are the proposed measures to mitigate the risks? What is the likelihood of their success?
  • Consider the justifications for and proportionality of any potential involvement with the foreign state or entity that may result in mistreatment.

The AMCC Secretariat will create a record of decision and circulate it for comment by AMCC members. Once finalized, it will be kept by the Secretariat for future reporting. The AMCC Secretariat follows up with the requesting official for updates on the outcome of the situation and requests a final update from the requesting official once the situation is resolved.

Global Affairs Canada’s human rights reports provide an evidence-based overview of the human rights situation in a particular country, including significant human rights-related events, trends and developments and include a section focused on mistreatment. There are no scores for countries however, and it is up to the officials to assess the risk based on the information in the reports.

Mitigation Measures

The Legal Services Unit and/or Intelligence Policy and Programs division will provide guidance on the limitations and the prohibitions of the use of information obtained through mistreatment. They are also able to propose potential mitigation measures, such as sanitization of the information, if there is a risk of further mistreatment; of depriving someone of their rights or freedoms; or if the information could be used as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other proceeding.

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Date Modified:

Review of the Departmental Implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021

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22-05

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Date Modified:

Review of Air Passenger Targeting by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA): Report

Review of Air Passenger Targeting by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)


Report

Date of Publishing:

Executive Summary

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)’s Air Passenger Targeting program performs pre-arrival risk assessments on inbound passengers. It seeks to identify passengers that may be at higher risk of being inadmissible to Canada or of otherwise contravening the CBSA’s program legislation. It does so by using information submitted by commercial air carriers called Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data in a multi-stage process that involves manual and automated triaging methods, referred to as Flight List Targeting and Scenario Based Targeting.

The Advance Passenger Information and/or Passenger Name Record data used to perform these prearrival risk assessments include personal information about passengers that relates to prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). These grounds include age, sex, and national or ethnic origin. The CBSA relies on information and intelligence from a variety of different sources to determine which of these data elements indicate a risk in passengers’ characteristics and travel patterns in the context of specific enforcement issues, including national security-related risks. Given their potential importance for Canada’s national security and for the CBSA’s concurrent obligations to avoid discrimination, attention to the validity of the inferences underpinning the CBSA’s reliance on the particular indicators it creates from this passenger data to perform these risk assessments is warranted. These considerations also have implications for Canada’s international commitments to combat terrorism and serious transnational crime and to respect privacy and human rights in the processing of passenger information.

NSIRA conducted an in-depth assessment of the lawfulness of the CBSA’s activities in the first step of the pre-arrival risk assessment, where inbound passengers are triaged using the passenger data provided by commercial air carriers. The review examined whether the CBSA complies with restrictions established in statutes and regulations on the use of the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data and whether the CBSA complies with its obligations pertaining to non-discrimination.

While NSIRA found that the CBSA’s use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data complied with the Customs Act, the CBSA does not document its triaging activities in a manner that enables effective verification of compliance with regulatory restrictions established under the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations. This was more of a weakness in the CBSA’s manual Flight List Targeting triaging method than its automated Scenario Based Targeting method.

The CBSA was also unable to consistently demonstrate that an adequate justification exists for its reliance on particular indicators it created from the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to triage passengers. This is important, as the CBSA’s reliance on certain indicators results in drawing distinctions between travellers based on prohibited grounds of discrimination. These distinctions may lead to adverse impacts on passengers’ time, privacy, and equal treatment, which may be capable of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating a disadvantage. Adequate justification for such adverse differentiation is needed to demonstrate that such distinctions are not discriminatory and are a reasonable limit on travellers’ equality rights.

Recordkeeping is important to ensure effective verification that Air Passenger Targeting triaging activities comply with the law and respect human rights and NSIRA observed important weaknesses in this regard. These recordkeeping weaknesses stem in part from the fact that the CBSA’s policies, procedures, and training are insufficiently detailed to adequately equip CBSA staff to identify discrimination and compliance-related risks and to act appropriately in their duties. Oversight structures and practices are also not rigorous enough to identify and mitigate potential compliance and discrimination-related risks. This is compounded by lack of collection and assessment of relevant data. NSIRA recommends improved documentation practices for triaging to demonstrate compliance with statutory and regulatory restrictions and to demonstrate that an adequate justification exists for its reliance on the indicators it creates from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data. Such documentation is essential to enable effective internal oversight as well as external review.

NSIRA also recommends more robust training and increased oversight to ensure that triaging practices are not discriminatory. This should include updates to policies as appropriate as well as the collection and analysis of the data necessary to identify, analyze and mitigate discrimination-related risks

Front matter

Lists of acronyms

API Advance Passenger Information
APT Air Passenger Targeting
CBSA Canada Border Services Agency
CHRA COVID-19 EU Canadian Human Rights ActNovel Coronavirus/Coronavirus Disease of 2019European Union
FLT Flight List Targeting
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICES Integrated Customs Enforcement System
IRPA Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
IRPR Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
OAG Office of the Auditor General of Canada
OPC Office of the Privacy Commissioner
PAXIS Passenger Information System
PCLMTFA Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act
PICR Passenger Information (Customs) Regulations
PNR Passenger Name Record
PPIR Protection of Passenger Information Regulations
RFI Request for Information
SBT Scenario Based Targeting
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States

Lists of figures

Figure 1. Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Elements

Figure 2. Steps in the Air Passenger Targeting

Figure 3. Process for Developing Scenarios for Scenario Based Targeting

Figure 4. What is a “High Risk” Flight or Passenger

Figure 5. Instances Where the Link to Serious Transnational Crime or Terrorism Offences was unclear

Figure 6. Instances Where the Potential Contravention was Unclear in Targets

Figure 7. Legal Tests under the CHRA and the Charter

Figure 8. Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Data That Relate to Protected Grounds

Figure 9. Instances Where Behavioural Indicators Were Protected Grounds or Did Not Narrow Scope

Figure 10. Impacts on Travellers Resulting from Initial Triage

Figure 11. Summary of NSIRA’s Assessment of Scenario Supporting Documentation

Figure 12. Examples of Weaknesses in Scenario Supporting Documentation

Figure 13. Example of a Well-Substantiated Scenario

Figure 14. Why the Justification for the Indicators Used in Targeting is Important

Authorities

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) conducted this review under paragraph 8(1)(b) of the NSIRA Act.

Introduction

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)’s Air Passenger Targeting program is one of several programs that help the Agency fulfill its mandate of “providing integrated border services that support [Canada’s] national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow of [admissible] persons and goods” into Canada. Air Passenger Targeting uses passenger data submitted by commercial air carriers called Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to conduct pre-arrival risk assessments. The pre-arrival risk assessments are intended to identify individuals at higher risk of being inadmissible to Canada or of otherwise contravening the CBSA’s program legislation. In 2019-20, the CBSA received this information to risk assess 33.9 million inbound international travellers.

Air Passenger Targeting has become an increasingly important tool for screening passengers. The CBSA’s deployment of self-serve kiosks to process travellers arriving in Canadian airports has decreased the ability of Border Services Officers to risk assess travellers through in-person observations or interactions, increasing the CBSA’s reliance on pre-arrival risk assessments, like Air Passenger Targeting, to identify and interdict inadmissible people and goods.

The Canadian border context affords the CBSA considerable discretion in how it conducts its activities. Individuals have lower reasonable expectations of privacy at the border. Brief interruptions to passengers’ liberty and freedom of movement are reasonable, given the state’s legitimate interest in screening travellers and regulating entry. However, the activities of the CBSA must not be discriminatory, meaning that any adverse differential treatment on the basis of prohibited grounds of discrimination, such as national or ethnic origin, age, or sex must be justified. Both the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) create distinct obligations in this regard. The Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data that the CBSA uses to perform these pre-arrival risk assessments includes personal information about passengers that is either a prohibited ground of discrimination or that relates closely to such grounds, warranting further attention to the CBSA’s compliance with these obligations. As Air Passenger Targeting involves passenger screening to identify national security-related risks (among others), attention to the validity of the inferences underpinning the CBSA’s interpretation of passenger information also has implications for Canada’s national security.

Air Passenger Targeting also engages Canada’s international commitments to combat terrorism and serious transnational crime and to respect privacy and human rights in the processing of passenger information. The latter commitment has been of particular importance to the European Union in the context of ongoing negotiations on an updated agreement for sharing passenger information.

About the review

NSIRA’s review examined two main aspects of the lawfulness of the CBSA’s passenger triaging activities in Air Passenger Targeting and their effects on travellers. The review examined whether the CBSA’s triaging activities comply with restrictions established in statutes and regulations on the use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data; and whether passenger triaging activities comply with the CBSA’s obligations pertaining to non-discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Charter.9 NSIRA expected to find that the CBSA’s triaging activities are conducted with appropriate legal authority and comply with use restrictions on the passenger data and non-discrimination obligations, namely, that any adverse differentiation among travellers based on protected grounds is supported by adequate justification.

The review focused on the CBSA’s triaging activities in Air Passenger Targeting relevant to identifying potential national security-related threats and contraventions. However, it also examined the program as a whole across the CBSA’s three main targeting categories—national security, illicit migration, and contraband—to fully appreciate the program’s governance and operations, given its reliance on intelligence analysis. The review examined the Air Passenger Targeting program as implemented by the CBSA between November 2020 and September 2021.

The review relied on information from the following sources:

  • Program documents and legal opinions
  • Information provided in response to requests for information (written answers and briefings)
  • [***Sentence revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes the number of scenarios that were active on May 26, 2021***]
  • Supporting documentation for a sample of 12 scenarios that were active on May 26, 2021
  • A sample of 83 targets issued between January and March 2021 (including 59 targets subsequent to Flight List Targeting and 24 targets subsequent to Scenario Based Targeting)
  • A live demonstration at the National Targeting Centre, which conducts Air Passenger Targeting
  • Open sources, including news articles, academic articles, and prior reviews by other agencies.
  • Past performance data and relevant policy developments

Confidence statement

For all reviews, NSIRA seeks to independently verify information it receives. Access to information was through requests for information and briefings by the CBSA. During this review, NSIRA corroborated the information that was received through verbal briefings by receiving copies of program files and alive demonstration of Air Passenger Targeting. NSIRA is confident in the report’s findings and recommendations.

Orientation to the Review Report

After providing essential background information on the steps and activities involved in Air Passenger Targeting and its contribution to the CBSA’s mandate in Section 5, the review’s findings and recommendations are presented in Section 6.

In Section 6.1, NSIRA’s assessed the CBSA’s compliance with statutory and regulatory restrictions on the CBSA’s use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data. Weaknesses in how the CBSA documents its Air Passenger Targeting program activities prevented NSIRA from verifying that all triaging activities complied with these restrictions. These weaknesses also impede the CBSA’s own ability to provide effective internal oversight.

In Section 6.2, NSIRA’s assessed the CBSA’s compliance with its obligations pertaining to nondiscrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Charter. Similar weaknesses in documentation and recordkeeping prevented the CBSA from demonstrating, in several instances, that an adequate justification exists for its reliance on the indicators it created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to triage inbound travellers. Ensuring that Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices are substantiated by relevant, reliable and documented information and intelligence is important to demonstrating that travellers’ equality rights are being respected, given that some of the indicators relied on to triage passengers relate to protected grounds and given that passenger triage may lead to adverse impacts for travellers. NSIRA recommends a number of measures to improve recordkeeping and identify and mitigate discrimination-related risks.

Background and content

Air Passenger Targeting and the CBSA’s Mandate

The Air Passenger Targeting program is housed within the National Targeting Centre and is currently supported by 92 Full-Time Equivalents. Air Passenger Targeting is one of several targeting programs at the CBSA, and pre-arrival risk assessments are also performed on cargo and conveyances in other modes of travel, such as marine or rail. Pre-arrival risk assessments are currently only performed on crew and passengers for commercial-based air and marine travel. Screening and secondary examinations of travellers entering Canada through other modes of travel such as land or rail are undertaken at the border.

The Air Passenger Targeting pre-arrival risk assessments are intended to help front line Border Services Officers to identify travellers and goods with a higher risk of being inadmissible to Canada or of otherwise contravening the CBSA’s program legislation and referring them for further examination once they arrive at a Canadian Port of Entry.

Pre-arrival risk assessments are performed in relation to multiple enforcement issues, all of which are associated with ever-evolving travel patterns and traveller characteristics that may vary from one part of the world to the other. Staff at the National Targeting Centre receive training, develop on-the-job experience, and have access to a large body of information and intelligence to perform their duties.

How Air Passenger Targeting works

Key Information Relied Upon in Air Passenger Targeting

Air Passenger Targeting relies on two sets of information to triage passengers for these risk assessments. The first set consists of information about passengers that commercial air carriers submit to the CBSA under section 148(1)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and 107.1 of the Customs Act. This information is referred to as Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data. Advance Passenger Information comprises information about a traveller and the flight information associated with their travel to Canada; Passenger Name Record data is not standardized and refers to information about a passenger kept in the air carrier’s reservation system. The particular data elements are prescribed under section 5 of the Passenger Information(Customs) Regulations and section 269(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.

For simplicity, NSIRA refers to Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Data collectively as “passenger data” in this review unless otherwise specified. Figure 1 provides an overview of common Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data elements. Once received by the CBSA, the passenger data is loaded into the CBSA’s Passenger Information System (PAXIS). This is the main system used to conduct Air Passenger Targeting.

Figure 1. Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Elements
Figure 1: Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Elements Graphic

The second set consists of information and intelligence from a variety of other sources that is used to help the CBSA determine which Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data elements may indicate risks in passengers’ characteristics and travel patterns in the context of specific enforcement issues and can therefore provide indicators for triaging passengers. Key sources include:

  • Recent significant interdictions that are cross-referenced with historical enforcement and intelligence information, as well as with the Advance Passenger Information and/or Passenger Name Record data for interdicted subjects
  • Port of entry seizures
  • Information from Liaison Officers overseas
  • International intelligence bulletins
  • Intelligence products shared by domestic and international partners concerning actionable indicators and trends from partner agencies based on their area of expertise.
  • Open sources, including news articles, op-eds, academic articles, social media.
  • CBSA intelligence products based on one or more of the above-mentioned sources, such as Intelligence Bulletins, Targeting Snapshots or Placemats, Country Threat Assessments, Intelligence Briefs, daily news briefings.

The quality of the information supporting the CBSA’s inferences as to who may be a high-risk traveller is important to ensure the triage is reasonable and non-discriminatory (see Section 6.2).

Step by Step Process of Air Passenger Targeting

Air Passenger Targeting involves three key steps, illustrated in Figure 2. First, CBSA officers triage passengers based on the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data using manual or automated methods. Second, CBSA officers undertake a risk assessment of the selected passengers using different sources of information and intelligence. Third, Targeting Officers decide whether to issue a “target,” based on the results of this risk assessment.

Figure 2. Steps in the Air Passenger Targeting Process
Figure 2: Horizontal diagram of the steps in the Air Passenger Targeting Process

Step 1: Passenger Triage

The CBSA uses two distinct methods to triage passengers using Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data: Flight List Targeting and Scenario-Based Targeting.

Flight List Targeting is a manual triage method that involves two main steps. The officers use their judgement to make these selections (see Figure 4 for further details).

  • Targeting Officers select an inbound flight from those arriving that day that they consider to be at “higher risk” of transporting passengers that may be contravening the CBSA’s program legislation.
  • Targeting Officers then select passengers on those flights for further assessment, based on the details displayed about them in the list of passengers.

Scenario Based Targeting is an automated triage method that relies on “scenarios,” or pre-established set of indicators created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data elements that the CBSA considers as risk factors for a particular enforcement issue. The data for passengers on all inbound flights are automatically compared against the parameters of each scenario. Any passengers whose data match all of the parameters of one (or more) scenario are automatically selected for a Targeting Officer to assess further.

[***Sentence revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes the steps involved in developing scenarios ***]

Figure 3. Process for Developing Scenarios for Scenario Based Targeting

[***Figure revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes the steps involved in developing scenarios. ***]

Both of these triage methods are informed by an analysis of information and intelligence in slightly different ways. In Scenario Based Targeting, the National Targeting Centre’s Targeting Intelligence unit analyses intelligence and information to identify combinations of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data elements associated with “high risk” passengers and travel patterns for the purposes of developing scenarios, as illustrated in Step 1 of Figure 3 above. In Flight List Targeting, Targeting Officers analyze information and intelligence to develop a personal “mental model” about what constitute “high risk” flights or passengers in the context of a specific enforcement issue. Examples are provided in Figure 4.

Figure 4. What is a “High Risk” Flight or Passenger?

Based on information about past trends and intelligence about future travel, CBSA officers identify certain flights or airports that have had a higher incidence of travellers subsequently found to be in contravention of the CBSA’s program legislation. The CBSA assesses flights from these points of origin as “high risk” flights. [Sentence revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It provided examples of flight information that the CBSA indicated was associated with past contraventions.]

Based on similar analysis, CBSA officers have assessed that certain combinations of traveller characteristics and travel patterns are or may be associated with contraventions of the CBSA’s program legislation. Travellers who match these characteristics are considered to be “high risk” travellers. [Sentence revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It provided examples of flight information that the CBSA indicated was associated with past contraventions.]

Steps 2 and 3: Passenger Risk Assessments and Issuing Targets

The initial triage of passengers may result in two additional steps for those who have been selected for further assessment: further passenger risk assessments (referred to by the CBSA as a “comprehensive review”) and a decision to issue a target if risks that were initially identified remain.

The passenger risk assessment process involves requesting and analyzing the following information to determine whether risks initially identified in the passenger’s Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data are no longer of concern (referred to as “negation”), whether they continue to be of concern, or whether those concerns have increased:

  • Mandatory and discretionary queries of CBSA and other government databases;
  • Open-source searches (including social media);
  • Requests for information to other Government of Canada departments and to the United States Customs and Border Protection agency (mandatory for all potential contraventions related to national security, but optional for other enforcement issues).

A target is issued when the risk assessment cannot “negate” risks initially inferred about the passenger. A target is a notification to Border Services Officers at a Canadian Port of Entry (in this case, airports) to refer the passenger for “secondary examination”. It does not mean that a passenger has been found in contravention of the CBSA’s program legislation. A target includes details about the passenger and the risks identified in relation to the potential contravention (referred to as a “target narrative”).

During secondary examinations, Border Services Officers engage in a progressive line of questioning. This questioning is informed by the details contained in the target as well as all other information available to the officers, including information provided by travellers and other observations developed during the examination. This information may allow the officers to establish a reasonable suspicion about whether the passenger has contravened customs, immigration, or other requirements that are enforced by the CBSA and pursue further questioning or examination. These examinations may also involve a search of luggage and/or digital devices where required and with managerial approval. The outcome of these examinations determines the next steps for individual travellers.

Findings and Recommendations

The CBSA’s Compliance with Restrictions Established in Law and Regulations

Restrictions that Apply to Air Passenger Targeting and Why They Matter

While Air Passenger Targeting is not explicitly discussed in legislation, both the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provide the CBSA with legislative authority to collect and use Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data in Air Passenger Targeting. Such use is further supported by section 4(1)(b) of the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations, which expressly contemplates the use of Passenger Name Record data to conduct trend analysis and to develop risk indicators for the purpose of identifying certain high-risk individuals.

NSIRA is satisfied that these statutory provisions also authorize the CBSA to collect and analyze the information and intelligence necessary to support Air Passenger Targeting. These inputs are necessary to contextualize its interpretation of the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data and determine which data elements characterize “high risk” passengers and travel patterns in the context of different enforcement issues. However, the review did not examine whether all information and intelligence collected by the CBSA was necessary to the conduct of its operations (in Air Passenger Targeting or otherwise). This related topic may be the subject of future review.

These authorizing provisions create restrictions on the CBSA’s use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data. Two layers of use restrictions apply: one set arises from the Customs Act or the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act as authorizing statutes, and the other set arises from section 4 of the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations.

In examining compliance with the first set, NSIRA referred to section 107(3) of the Customs Act, the broader of the two authorities. Section 107(3) authorizes the CBSA to use Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data:

  • To administer or enforce the Customs Act, Customs Tariff, or related legislation;
  • To exercise its powers, duties and functions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, including establishing a person’s identity or determining their inadmissibility; and/or
  • For the purposes of its program legislation.

NSIRA also examined compliance with the use restrictions established by section 4 of the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations. The regulations limit the CBSA’s use of Passenger Name Record data to the identification of persons “who have or may have committed” either a terrorism offence or a serious transnational crime. The data can be used to identify such persons directly, or to enable trend analysis or the development of risk indicators for that same purpose.

The Protection of Passenger Information Regulations were enacted to fulfill Canada’s commitments respecting its use of Passenger Name Record data as part of an agreement signed with the European Union. The Agreement specifies that “[Passenger Name Record] data will be used strictly for purposes of preventing and combating: terrorism and related crimes; other serious crimes, including organized crime, that are transnational in nature.” Although the 2006 agreement expired, ongoing efforts to negotiate a new agreement place continued importance on ensuring the CBSA’s ability to demonstrate compliance with the lawful uses of Passenger Name Record data. The constraints established in the regulations also indicate the Minister’s determination of when the use of Passenger Name Record data by the CBSA will be reasonable and proportional.

As a matter of law, the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations restrictions apply only to Passenger Name Record data provided to the CBSA under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. However, Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data are integrated within its systems. The CBSA also uses Passenger Name Record data to issue targets for the purposes of the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act simultaneously. Given the CBSA’s commitments to the European Union under the above-mentioned Agreement and these other considerations, the CBSA observes these regulatory restrictions across its Air Passenger Targeting program as a matter of policy.

Assessing compliance with the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations required NSIRA to determine whether the enforcement issue of interest in the triaging decision fell within the regulations’ definitions of a “terrorism offence” or of a “serious transnational crime.”

What NSIRA found?

NSIRA found that, in its automated Scenario Based Targeting triaging method, the CBSA’s use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to identify potential threats and contraventions of the CBSA’s program legislation complied with statutory restrictions. For its manual Flight List Targeting triaging method, NSIRA was not able to assess the reasons for the CBSA’s selection of individual travellers and was therefore not able to verify compliance with section 107(3) of the Customs Act. For both methods, NSIRA was also unable to verify that all triaging complied with the regulatory restrictions imposed by the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations on the CBSA’s use of Passenger Name Record data, namely that its use served to identify potential involvement in terrorism offences or serious transnational crimes. This was due to lack of precision in Scenario Based Targeting program documentation and lack of documentation about the basis for Flight List Targeting triaging decisions.

Do Scenario Based Targeting triage practices comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions?

In Scenario Based Targeting, all scenarios complied with the statutory restrictions on the use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data, as all scenarios were developed for the purposes of administering or enforcing the CBSA’s program legislation. However, in several instances, the scenario documentation did not precisely identify why the CBSA considered a particular enforcement concern to be related to a terrorism offence or serious transnational crime. This lack of precision obscured whether the scenarios complied with the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations.

NSIRA reviewed the information contained within the scenario templates for [***Sentence revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes the number of scenarios that were active on May 26, 2021***]. The templates require information on the specific legislative provisions associated with the potential contravention the scenario seeks to identify. The templates also require a general description of the details of the scenario, including the potential contravention.

The CBSA’s use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data in Scenario Based Targeting complied with the first layer of legal restrictions, as all of the scenarios sought to identify contraventions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Customs Act, the Customs Tariff, and/or the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, which are authorized purposes under section 107(3) of the Customs Act. In many instances, the scenario’s purpose also complied with the complementary restrictions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Regarding the second layer of restrictions imposed by the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations, most scenarios cited provisions for potential contraventions that were reasonably viewed as relating to terrorism or serious transnational crime. In several instances, however, the link to terrorism or serious transnational crime was not clear. This occurred in one of two ways:

  • Scenarios did not establish why a potential contravention cited as the intent of the scenario was related to an offence punishable by a term of at least four years of imprisonment, which one of the criteria in the definition of a serious transnational crime. It was therefore unclear how the enforcement interest related to a serious transnational crime (observed in at least 28 scenarios).Including more precise details on how the potential contravention relates to a serious transnational crime or terrorism offence would more clearly establish this link.
  • Scenarios cited three or more distinct grounds for serious inadmissibility, such as sections 34, 35,36, and/or 37 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act without providing further details as to why all grounds were relevant to the conduct at issue in the scenario (observed in at least 20 scenarios).

This obscured how the grounds related meaningfully to the conduct at issue and why the conduct related to a terrorism offence or serious transnational crime. Including more precise details on how each ground of inadmissibility included in a scenario is relevant to the conduct at issue would help in this regard.

Illustrative examples are provided in Figure 5, and further details on NSIRA’s assessment of compliance with the Customs Act and the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations are provided in Appendix 8.3.

[Figure revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It described two examples where the link to serious transnational crime or terrorism offences was unclear in scenarios.]

Do Flight List Targeting triage practices comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions?

Lack of documentation about why officers selected particular flights or passengers prevented NSIRA from verifying whether Flight List Targeting triaging practices comply with the use restrictions found in the Customs Act or the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations. This lack of documentation also impedes the CBSA’s internal verification that Flight List Targeting triaging complies with these use restrictions.

As Targeting Officers rely on their judgement to triage passengers in Flight List Targeting, record keeping about triaging decisions is important to be able to verify that triaging complies with relevant statutes and regulations and take corrective action as appropriate. Although the National Targeting Centre has a Notebook Policy, which requires officers to “record all information about the officers’ activities,” the National Targeting Policy and the Air Passenger Targeting Standard Operating Procedures do not specify what stages of Air Passenger Targeting need to be documented or what information needs to be recorded at each step. Moreover, the Air Passenger Targeting Standard Operating Procedures, the Target Narrative Guidelines, and the format for issuing targets in the CBSA’s systems do not require officers to include precise details about the potential contravention that motivated their decision to issue a target.

NSIRA was only able to infer why a passenger was first selected for further assessment in Flight List Targeting from the details of targets, even though the explanatory value of analyzing targets for insight about initial triaging is limited. Targets are not issued for all initially selected passengers : only 15 percent of the passengers that were selected for a comprehensive risk assessment led to a target being issued in 2019-20.

As well, the enforcement issue contained within targets may have changed during later stages in the Air Passenger Targeting process and may not necessarily reflect the issue that motivated the initial triaging decision.

NSIRA found that all targets in a sample of 59 targets issued subsequent to Flight List Targeting complied with the first layer of use restrictions under section 107(3) of the Customs Act, as they cited either the “IRPA” or the “Customs Act” in the details of the target. However, the targets did not always specify a particular contravention of these Acts, which created a challenge for determining why the officers’ interest in the passenger related to a terrorism offence or serious transnational crime. Based on other descriptive details about the behaviours or risk factors contained in the target, it was only possible to clearly infer the enforcement issue and determine that it was a terrorism offence or a serious transnational crime in approximately half the targets (29 of 59). Illustrative examples are provided in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Instances Where the Potential Contravention was Unclear in Targets

[***Figure revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It described two examples of targets where the potential was unclear based on the details of the target.***]

Why is precision in record keeping important?

It is important to ensure that the potential contravention at issue is clear in scenario templates and targets and to ensure that recordkeeping about the reasons animating Flight List Targeting triaging is adequate in order to allow effective verification that all triaging activities comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions.

The CBSA’s current oversight functions consist of reviewing new scenarios prior to and in parallel with their activation and of reviewing targets after the fact for quality control and performance measurement. However, the documentation weaknesses identified above prevent the CBSA from ensuring that its triaging activities comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions. The CBSA’s oversight mechanisms should include robust verification that scenarios and manual Flight List Targeting triaging practices are animated by issues relevant to the administration or enforcement of the CBSA’s program legislation. Where Passenger Name Record data is used, oversight should also verify that the enforcement issue constitutes or is indicative of a terrorism offence or serious transnational crime. More precise and consistent recordkeeping of the reasons underlying passenger triage decisions in both Scenario Based Targeting and Flight List Targeting would help in this respect.

Guidance on what the legislative and regulatory restrictions entail for targeting activities was also not clearly articulated in the National Targeting Centre’s policies, standard operating procedures, or training materials. These guidance materials should include further specifics on:

  • Which issues pertinent to admissibility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act or other contraventions of the CBSA’s program legislation constitute or relate to a serious transnational crime or terrorism offence and why; and
  • How to document triaging decisions on a consistent basis to enable internal and external verification that targeting activities align with these legal and regulatory restrictions.

For example, the Scenario Based Targeting Governance Framework included helpful examples of risk categories that identify associated legislative provisions. Though the examples align with the definitions of serious transnational crime and terrorism offences in the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations, no explanation linking the examples to alignment with the regulations are provided. Equivalent guidance does not exist for Flight List Targeting.

Clearly identifying the potential enforcement issue is also important to verifying that the indicators created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data that are used to triage passengers are relevant to the issue and reliably predictive of it. This is important for demonstrating that the triaging practices are reasonable and non-discriminatory (see Section 6.3).

Finding 1. The CBSA’s use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data in Scenario Based Targeting complied with section 107(3) of the Customs Act.

Finding 2. The CBSA does not document its triaging practices in a manner that enables effective verification of whether all triaging decisions comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions.

Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA document its triaging practices in a manner that enables effective verification of whether all triaging decisions comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions.

The CBSA’s Compliance with Obligations Pertaining to Non-Discrimination

The CBSA’s Non-Discrimination Obligations and Why They Matter

The Canadian Human Rights Act and the Charter each establish obligations pertaining to nondiscrimination. The tests for assessing whether or not discrimination has occurred are thematically similar, though with differences in approach and terminology as illustrated in Figure 7. The analysis under both instruments begins with a factual inquiry into whether a distinction is being drawn between travellers based on prohibited grounds of discrimination, and if so, whether it has an adverse effect on the traveller or reinforces, perpetuates or exacerbates disadvantage. If so, the analysis under the CHRA examines whether there is a bona fide justification for the adverse differentiation. The corresponding analysis under the Charter examines whether the limit on travellers’ equality rights is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

Figure 7: Legal Tests under the CHRA and the Charter diagram

What NSIRA Found

Although triaging in Air Passenger Targeting typically relies on multiple indicators that are created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data, some of these indicators are protected grounds or relate closely to protected grounds. Air Passenger Targeting triaging results in impacts on travellers that can be considered adverse in nature and are capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantages. This creates a risk of prima facie discrimination. While these limits on travellers’ equality rights may be justifiable, weaknesses in the CBSA’s program documentation prevented the CBSA from demonstrating that a bona fide justification supported the adverse differentiation of travellers in several instances. A large body of information and intelligence is available to CBSA staff; however, it was not compiled and documented in a way that consistently established why certain indicators used to triage passengers related to a threat or potential contravention and did not always establish that these indicators were current and reliable. This weakness with respect to ensuring precise, well-substantiated documentation is similar to the one already highlighted in relation to the CBSA’s compliance with legal and regulatory restrictions.

Further information on the nature of the differentiations made in Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices and their impact on individuals would be required to conclusively establish whether or not triaging practices are discriminatory. However, the risk of discrimination is sufficiently apparent to warrant careful attention. In this review, NSIRA will recommend measures that could help the CBSA to assess and mitigate discrimination-related risks.

Does the CBSA make a distinction in relation to “protected grounds”?

Some of the indicators relied on to triage passengers are either protected grounds themselves or relate closely to protected grounds. NSIRA observed instances where passengers appeared to be differentiated based on protected grounds.

NSIRA examined all scenarios that were active on May 26, 2021 and a sample of targets to determine whether the CBSA’s triaging practices engage prohibited grounds of discrimination, such as age, sex, or national or ethnic origin. NSIRA refers to these as “protected grounds” in the report. The assessment considered:

  • How the indicators used to triage passengers relate to protected grounds;
  • The significance of the indicators in triage and how individual indicators were weighted in relation to each other; and
  • Whether these indicators created distinctions among individuals, or classes of individuals, based on protected grounds, whether in their own right or by virtue of their cumulative impact.

NSIRA found that the CBSA triages passengers based on a combination of indicators that are created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data. This triaging often included indicators that were either protected grounds themselves or related closely to protected grounds. Examples of these indicators are provided in Figure 8 with further details on how the CBSA relied on these indicators in Appendix 8.4.

Figure 8. Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Data That Relate to Protected Grounds
Figure 8: Diagram/Table of the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Data That Relate to Protected Grounds

Although the CBSA took certain measures to mitigate the possibility that triaging decisions were based primarily on protected grounds, NSIRA observed that these measures did not always adequately mitigate that risk. More specifically:

  • [***Note revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It lists examples of scenarios that relied on single elements.***] NSIRA observed instances where scenarios continued to rely largely on indicators that related closely to protected grounds. This was because the behavioural indicators were often used in a way that related closely to a protected ground (primarily national origin) or because the parameters for the behavioural indicators were very broad (for example: passports as a travel document) and did not significantly narrow the range of passengers captured by the scenario. Examples are provided in Figure 9.
  • Scenario Based Targeting triaging for potential contraventions relevant to national security focused disproportionately on a certain profile of passengers: [***Sentence revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It described a combination of traveller characteristics that relates to protected grounds.***] While individual scenarios considered a variety of other indicators that differed between each scenario and that appeared to be specific to a unique set of personal characteristics and behavioural patterns for each national security risk, the overall effect of the scenarios created a differential impact largely focused on this particular profile.
Figure 9. Instances Where Behavioural Indicators Were Protected Grounds or Did Not Narrow Scope

[***Figure revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes two examples of scenarios where behavioural indicators were used in a way that related closely to a protected ground or because the parameters for the behavioural indicators were very broad and did not significantly narrow the range of passengers captured by the scenario***]

As the CBSA’s triaging practices engage protected grounds and resulted in a differentiation of passengers based on protected grounds in certain instances, NSIRA considered the impacts that these distinctions may produce.

Do distinctions result in adverse impacts capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage?

Distinctions made in passenger triage lead to several types of potential impacts for the passengers that are selected for further assessment. These impacts are adverse in nature and are capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantages.

NSIRA considered the kinds of impacts that Air Passenger Targeting has for the passengers who are selected for further assessment through the initial triage. These impacts are illustrated in Figure 10. Each may have important effects on passengers’ time, privacy, and equality, particularly as the impacts accumulate during the screening process and/or where these impacts are experienced repeatedly by the same travellers.

Figure 10. Impacts on Travellers Resulting from Initial Triage
Figure 10. Impacts on Travellers Resulting from Initial Triage diagram

[Figure revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes numbers of passengers targeted by year.]

These impacts can be adverse in nature and are reasonably understood as being capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage, particularly when viewed in light of possible systemic or historical disadvantages. However, disaggregated data on the ethno-cultural, gender, or other group identity of affected passengers and their circumstances in Canadian society would be required to fully appreciate Air Passenger Targeting’s impacts on affected groups.

A risk of prima facie discrimination is established where these adverse impacts accrue to individuals based on protected grounds. These adverse impacts on protected groups will not amount to discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act if the CBSA can demonstrate a bona fide justification for the differentiation and will be allowed under the Charter if the CBSA can establish that the distinctions are a reasonable limit on travellers’ equality rights.

Does the CBSA have an adequate justification for the adverse differentiation?

While a large body of information and intelligence is available to CBSA’s staff for their triaging activities, weaknesses in recordkeeping, in the coherent synthesis of this information, and in data collection prevented the CBSA from demonstrating, that an adequate justification exists for its use of the indicators it created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data in several instances.

NSIRA examined how the CBSA relied on information and intelligence to support its triaging practices by reviewing a sample of 12 scenarios and a sample of 59 targets issued subsequent to manual triaging in Flight List Targeting. NSIRA also examined performance data for the selected scenarios. In examining the supporting documentation provided for each scenario demonstrated an adequate justification for the indicators created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to triage passengers, NSIRA considered a number of factors:

  • Whether the information was objective and empirical;
  • Whether it was credible and reliable, in terms of its source and the quality of its substantiation;
  • Whether the information was recent and up to date;
  • Whether the information established a meaningful connection between the indicator(s) and the enforcement issue;
  • Whether the indicators were specifically indicative of the enforcement issue or were general;
  • Whether the indicators were based on a representative sample size; and
  • Whether the reliance on the particular indicators to triage passengers was effective in identifying potential contraventions in the past (i.e. whether empirical results support the reliance).

In Scenario Based Targeting, 11 out of the 12 scenarios in the sample reviewed did not provide an adequate justification for the triaging indicators, due in part to weaknesses in the supporting documentation for scenarios.

A summary of NSIRA’s assessment in relation to each of the assessment criteria is provided in Figure 11 and examples are described below.

Figure 11. Summary of NSIRA’s Assessment of Scenario Supporting Documentation
Figure 11: Graph/Table of the summary of NSIRA’s Assessment of Scenario Supporting Documentation

Most of the supporting documentation for the scenario sample was based on empirical information about enforcement actions or other intelligence products developed by the CBSA or its partners that were derived from clearly identified empirical sources. NSIRA considered these products to be objective and reliable sources. However, NSIRA noted three instances where it was unclear what the basis of the information was, and therefore whether it was objective and credible.

Inconsistencies in how supporting documentation for scenarios was maintained created further challenges for verifying that scenarios were based on reliable and up-to-date information, as four of the scenarios examined relied on information that was more than five years old and the CBSA could not locate one or more documents cited as supporting documentation in nine of the scenarios. While deleting older information is appropriate if it is replaced with more recent information, doing so in absence of more recent supporting information may undermine the CBSA’s the ability to justify the basis of the scenario.

In 3 of 12 scenarios examined, it was unclear how the supporting documentation related to the potential contravention identified in the scenario, which prevented further analysis as to how the indicators created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data were meaningfully connected to the enforcement issue. In all except one of the 12 scenarios, the supporting documentation did not mention one or more of the indicators in the scenario, making it unclear what the basis was for relying on those indicators. A number of the unsubstantiated indicators in those scenarios related closely to protected grounds. Two examples are provided in Figure 12.

Figure 12. Examples of Weaknesses in Scenario Supporting Documentation

[***Figure revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes issues observed in the supporting documentation for two scenarios as examples. These concerned the reliability of speculative claims made in an op-ed that was used as supporting documentation for one scenario that did not provide a clear basis for the indicators relied on in the scenario, and lack of information related to one or more of the indicators in the other scenario.***]

In 11 of the 12 scenarios, the supporting documentation did not include enough information to assess whether the indicators in the scenarios were based on a representative sample size of passengers. This prevented verification that the indicators in the scenario and their parameters reflect a pattern or trend in traveller characteristics and travel patterns rather than a single instance or handful of instances. Deriving indicators from too small a sample size also creates a risk that the indicators are not reliably associated to a potential contravention but rather simply connoted individuals who happen to have been the subject of past enforcement activity. A small sample size can also create bias and confirmation bias about stereotypes pertaining to traveller behaviour or personal characteristics.

Lack of information in 11 of the 12 scenarios on the likelihood and impact of the risk posed by the enforcement issue also prevented further assessment of the extent that the indicators and parameters were unique to the particular enforcement issue either individually or collectively. Moreover, in 4 of the 12 scenarios, the supporting documentation did not include any information to indicate that the indicators and parameters of the scenario had indeed been associated with a confirmed contravention of the CBSA’s program legislation or whether the association between the indicators and the enforcement issue was simply hypothetical. While reliable intelligence could also provide an empirical basis for passenger triage to inform the development of scenarios, information about whether scenarios have actually resulted in confirmed contraventions of the CBSA’s program legislation can be integrated into the supporting documentation of scenarios over time. This issue is examined further in relation to performance data below.

Only one of the 12 scenarios in the sample had enough information to get a sense of the enforcement issue, to understand the basis for relying on the particular indicators in the scenario in relation to the enforcement issue, and to establish that the indicators were based on a clear pattern of association with a large number of confirmed contraventions and reflected an appropriate range. Details about this scenario and why the supporting document substantiated the scenario are provided in Figure 13.

[***Figure revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes how the supporting documentation provided for a scenario was based on credible, empirical information that helped to establish the enforcement issue, provided a sense of the prevalence of the issue and its pertinence to the CBSA mandate, established a correlation between the specific indicators in the scenario and confirmed contraventions based on a significant sample size, and established that the parameters for each indicator were appropriately defined.***]

A large body of information and intelligence is available to CBSA staff to inform their targeting activities; however, in all except one of the scenarios, the information, intelligence, and other analytical insights were not brought together coherently to demonstrate that the basis for triaging was justified in those particular instances. The CBSA indicated that they intend to prepare standardized intelligence products that would coherently bring together this information to support the development of new scenarios. Developing such products for all active scenarios would help ensure that an adequate justification exists for all differentiation arising from triaging decisions in Air Passenger Targeting. This issue is examined further in relation to oversight practices below.

In Flight List Targeting, there was insufficient documentation to explain why particular indicators were considered valid risk factors in the context of a particular enforcement issue.

While a large body of information and intelligence exists for Targeting Officers to draw from when triaging passengers in Flight List Targeting, these sources are not necessarily documented in the course of making triaging decisions. Flight List Targeting strategies are not codified and triaging decisions are not consistently documented. This means that the sources and considerations that informed individual triaging decisions were not always apparent in the program documentation that NSIRA reviewed.

Noting the limitations of analyzing targets for insight into initial triaging decisions mentioned previously, the sparse details contained within the sample of 59 targets issued subsequent to Flight List Targeting further limited NSIRA’s assessment. Most of the targets included information specific to each passenger that was obtained through the passenger risk assessment, which reasonably supported a justification for issuing the target. However, this information would have been obtained after initial triaging decisions. Targets occasionally included a brief explanation about why certain elements of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data were considered to be risk factors, suggesting that the Targeting Officer’s triage decision may have been informed by information and intelligence. However, it was often unclear why the passenger data cited as risk factors in the target suggested a threat or potential contravention of the CBSA’s program legislation. Assessing how the passenger data cited as risk factors in a target corresponded with the potential contravention was further complicated where the enforcement issue was also unclear. Examples in Figure 14 illustrate this challenge.

Figure 14. Why the Justification for the Indicators Used in Targeting is Important

[***Figure revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It returns to the examples of targets discussed in Figure 6 where ambiguity about the enforcement issue created further challenges for assessing how the passenger data cited as risk factors in the target corresponded with the enforcement issue.***]

Performance data for the scenario sample indicates that the indicators created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to triage passengers may not be closely correlated with the particular enforcement issue.

The CBSA should be able to demonstrate at the outset that information and intelligence justify the use of particular indicators created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to triage passengers for potential contraventions, particularly where those indicators relate to protected grounds. However, secondary examination results from previously issued targets can provide a source of such information. These results also provide important insight into how strongly certain indicators correlate with potential contraventions and indicate areas where inferences should be revisited and revised.

NSIRA’s analysis of the performance data for the sample of 12 scenarios revealed that the indicators may not necessarily be closely correlated with the particular enforcement issue(s) in the scenarios or predict potential contraventions of the CBSA’s program legislation with high accuracy.

  • In many of the scenarios, less than 5 percent of passengers that matched to the scenario—based on their Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data—resulted in an enforcement action or relevant intelligence at the end of a secondary examination, which the CBSA refers to as a “resultant” target. This is due in part to the fact that the vast majority of passengers who are risk assessed do not result in a decision to issue a target. Additionally, certain enforcement issues may have a low probability of occurring, but a high impact. However, the fact that most passengers who match to a scenario are not of concern raises questions about the accuracy of relying on Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data elements as indicators and about the proportionality of the targeting practices.
  • On average, a quarter of targets issued (through both Flight List Targeting and Scenario Based Targeting) led to a “resultant” secondary examination, though the scenarios in the sample ranged widely from as low as 4.8 percent to as high as 72.7 percent.
  • Only nine of the 12 scenarios led to at least one enforcement action or useful intelligence between 2019-20 or 2020-21. Again, this is not necessarily an issue if an enforcement issue has a low probability of occurring, but a high impact. However, it also raises questions about the empirical basis of the scenario.
  • Many of the scenarios led to examination results for issues other than the one that justified the initial targeting. This suggests that the indicators may not be very precise and raises questions about the underlying assumptions or inferences.

NSIRA also observed that the performance data for scenarios matched to a significantly higher proportion of travellers and yielded a higher proportion of “resultant” targets in one year, with much lower results in the next year, indicating how rapidly travel patterns may change. The CBSA indicated that COVID-19 resulted in major shift in travel and business patterns, which has presented challenges for the CBSA to understand how the indicators have evolved in relation to a diversity of enforcement issues and to adapt their targeting strategies. This emphasizes the importance of ensuring that scenarios and Flight List Targeting activities are supported by up-to-date information and intelligence. It also emphasizes the importance of analyzing performance data to rigorously to evaluate, refine, and/or deactivate scenarios in order to remain consistent with a changing risk environment.

However, the insights that can be drawn from the performance data are limited, because the CSBA does not track the results of secondary examinations arising from random referrals or instances where passengers that were not targeted were later found to have contravened the CBSA’s program legislation by other means. This prevents contextualization of Air Passenger Targeting performance against a baseline (namely, whether Air Passenger Targeting is better, on par with, or less effective at predicting a potential contravention of its program legislation than a random referral). Beyond its relevance for performance measurement, baseline data would help to protect the CBSA against confirmation biases where enforcement results in a few isolated cases may reinforce stereotypes even though they do not represent a meaningful trend. Moreover, a “resultant” secondary examination according to the National Targeting Centre’s definition does not necessarily indicate a confirmed instance of non-compliance. This makes it difficult to analyze performance data as source of empirical information to support the CBSA’s justification for using certain indicators to triage passengers, as a “resultant” search may not always signify a correlation between the indicators and the potential contravention.

In sum, the CBSA was not able to demonstrate that adequate justification consistently supported its use of particular indicators in the scenarios and targets examined by NSIRA. This creates a risk that the triaging activities were discriminatory. To avoid discrimination, the link between the indicators used to triage passengers and the potential threats and contraventions they purport to identify must be well-substantiated by recent, reliable, and documented intelligence or empirical information that demonstrates that the indicators are reasonably predictive of potential harms to Canada’s national security and public safety. The CBSA was able to document an adequate justification for passenger triaging in one scenario. Compiling relevant information and intelligence for its other triaging activities would assist in demonstrating that they are also non-discriminatory.

Further information would be required to determine if any distinctions arising from Air Passenger Targeting that are capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage constitute a reasonable limit on travellers’ equality rights.

The analysis above establishes that Air Passenger Targeting may infringe travellers’ equality rights under the Charter. All Charter rights are subject to reasonable limits, however. To establish that a limit is reasonable, the state must demonstrate that it is rationally connected to a pressing and substantial objective, that it is minimally impairing of the right, and that there is a proportionality between its salutary and deleterious effects. These limits must also be prescribed by law.

The analysis of whether state actions constitute a reasonable limitation of Charter rights is highly fact specific. To examine this question, further data would be required on:

  • Precisely how various indicators relate to protected grounds;
  • Whether the indicators effectively further national security and public safety;
  • The reasonable availability of other means to ensure similar security outcomes at the border;
  • The impacts of Air Passenger Targeting for affected passengers; and
  • The significance of the contribution of Air Passenger Targeting to national security and other government objectives.

NSIRA notes these data gaps may create challenges for the CBSA in establishing that any discrimination resulting from Air Passenger Targeting is demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter. Documenting the contribution of Air Passenger Targeting to national security and public safety, the breadth and nature of its impacts, and contrasting the effectiveness of Air Passenger Targeting relative to other less intrusive means of achieving the CBSA’s objectives would assist the CBSA in demonstrating that the program is reasonable and demonstrably justified in Canadian society.

Has the CBSA complied with its obligations pertaining to non-discrimination?

Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices create a risk of prima facie discrimination. This is due to two key features. First, Air Passenger Targeting relies, in part, on indicators created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data that are either protected grounds themselves or that relate closely to such grounds. This was particularly the case for indicators relating to passengers’ age, sex, and national or ethnic origin. Passengers were differentiated based on these grounds, as they were selected for further assessment due in part to these characteristics. NSIRA also observed that the triaging resulted in disproportionate attention to certain nationalities and sexes, when the cumulative effect of scenarios was taken into account.

Second, this differentiation has adverse effects on travellers. Air Passenger Targeting triaging affects individuals’ privacy through subsequent risk assessments and mandatory referrals for secondary examination. Such scrutiny may also erode an individual’s sense of receiving the equal protection of the law, particularly where these impacts are repeatedly experienced by the same traveller or are perceived to be animated by racial, religious, ethnic, or other biases. These impacts are also capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage, especially when viewed in light of systemic or historical disadvantage.

To comply with its obligations under the Canadian Human Rights Act, the CBSA must be able to demonstrate that a bona fide justification exists for this adverse differentiation. However, the CBSA was not able to demonstrate that its choice of indicators was consistently based on recent, reliable, and documented intelligence or empirical information. This weaknesses in the link between the indicators and the potential threats or contraventions they seek to identify, creates a risk of discrimination.

To comply with its Charter obligations, the CBSA must also be able to demonstrate that any resulting discrimination is a reasonable limit on travellers’ equality rights. The same weaknesses NSIRA observed in the CBSA’s substantiation of the link between particular indicators and potential threats or contraventions they seek to identify also undermines its ability to demonstrate the rational connection between its triaging indicators and potential contraventions of its program legislation. Further information on the contribution of Air Passenger Targeting to national security and its relative value compared to other screening means would also be needed to determine whether Air Passenger Targeting can be justified as a reasonable limit under the Charter.

The weaknesses NSIRA observed stem partly from lack of precision in the CBSA’s program documentation and other recordkeeping issues. These are examined in the following section.

Finding 3. The CBSA has not consistently demonstrated that an adequate justification exists for its Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices. This weakness in the link between the indicators used to triage passengers and the potential threats or contraventions they seek to identify creates a risk that Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices may be discriminatory.

Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA ensure, in an ongoing manner, that its triaging practices are based on information and/or intelligence that justifies the use of each indicator. This justification should be well-documented to enable effective internal and external verification of whether the CBSA’s triaging practices comply with its non-discrimination obligations.

Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA ensure that any Air Passenger Targeting-related distinctions on protected grounds that are capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage constitute a reasonable limit on travellers’ equality rights under the Charter.

What measures are in place to mitigate the risk of discrimination?

The policies, procedures, and training materials reviewed did not adequately equip CBSA staff to identify potential discrimination or to mitigate related risks in the exercise of their duties.

The CBSA’s Air Passenger Targeting policies acknowledged responsibility to respect privacy, human rights, and civil liberties. However, policies, procedures, and training were insufficiently detailed to equip staff to identify and mitigate discrimination-related risks in the exercise of their duties.

  • Targeting Officers did not receive any specific training related to human rights.
  • The CBSA’s policies, procedures, and other program guidance were not precise enough on specific requirements or steps to equip staff to mitigate risks related to discrimination. In particular, details were lacking in how to associate supporting documentation to a scenario or a triaging decision in Flight List Targeting, and when and how to revisit and update that information on are gular basis.
  • No specific policies, procedures, or guidelines were developed for Flight List Targeting beyond the Air Passenger Targeting Standard Operating Procedures, particularly those that relate to record keeping.

The oversight structures and practices that were reviewed were not rigorous enough to identify and mitigate potential discrimination-risks, compounded by an absence of relevant data for this task.

While the CBSA has oversight structures and practices in place for Air Passenger Targeting, it was unclear how these oversight practices were performed. NSIRA identified several areas where they may not be rigorous enough to identify and mitigate potential risks of discrimination as appropriate.

  • Scenarios are reviewed for policy, legal, privacy, human rights, and civil liberties implications as part of their activation and on an ongoing basis. However, it is not clear that these oversight functions are guided by a clear understanding of what constitutes discrimination or that all relevant aspects of scenarios are examined.
  • Scenarios are reviewed individually on a regular basis. However, it is not clear that the collective impact of the CBSA’s targeting activities is also assessed on a regular basis.
  • It is not clear whether any oversight functions related to non-discrimination take place in Flight List Targeting.

Moreover, the CBSA does not gather data relevant to fully assess whether Air Passenger Targeting results in discrimination or to mitigate its impacts.

  • The CBSA does not gather disaggregated demographic data about the passengers affected by each stage of the Air Passenger Targeting program. This is relevant to detecting whether the program may be drawing distinctions on protected grounds and/or whether it has a disproportionate impact on members of protected groups.
  • The CBSA does not compare information about its triaging practices against information relevant to understanding their potential impacts on travellers and whether those impacts indicate an issue with the CBSA’s targeting practices. This includes information about whether complaints about alleged discrimination at the border relate to a person identified through Air Passenger Targeting and whether the nature of secondary examinations resulting from Air Passenger Targeting may differ from those caused by random or other referrals.
  • The CBSA does not gather or assess relevant performance data or data on its impacts against a baseline comparator group in order to contextualize its analysis of this information.

Finding 4. The CBSA’s policies, procedures, and training are insufficiently detailed to adequately equip CBSA staff to identify potential discrimination-related risks and to take appropriate action to mitigate these risks in the exercise of their duties.

Finding 5. The CBSA’s oversight structures and practices are not rigorous enough to identify and mitigate potential discrimination-related risks, as appropriate. This is compounded by a lack of collection and assessment of relevant data.

A number of adjustments to current policies, procedures, guidance, training, and other oversight practices for the Air Passenger Targeting program will help the CBSA mitigate discrimination-related risks by ensuring that distinctions drawn in the initial triage of passengers are based on adequate justifications that are supported by intelligence and/or empirical information. A more detailed treatment on discrimination in training, policies, guidance materials, and oversight for the Air Passenger Targeting program could also provide CSBA staff and the units and committees that perform internal oversight functions with information they may require to exercise their functions accordingly. Careful attention should be paid to the following:

  • Understanding the CBSA’s human rights obligations and how risks related to discrimination should be identified and assessed;
  • Identifying when triaging indicators may relate to protected grounds;
  • Ensuring that any adverse differentiation is based on a well-substantiated connection between the indicators and the potential threat or potential contravention;
  • Ensuring the triage of travellers is informed by recent and reliable information and intelligence, with training on how to assess whether the supporting documents meets these requirements;
  • Identifying and addressing impacts resulting from passenger triaging practices to ensure that they are minimized and proportional to the benefit gained for public safety or national security;
  • Ensuring that impacts resulting from Air Passenger Targeting do not unduly reinforce, perpetuate, or exacerbate disadvantage; and
  • Developing tools to detect and mitigate potential biases by gathering and assessing relevant data on targeting practices, their performance, and their impacts.

In this respect, the obligations created by the United Kingdom Public Sector Equality Duty may be instructive. The duty is procedural in nature and requires that public bodies (including customs and immigration authorities) consider how they may eliminate discrimination in the exercise of their functions. It requires departments to turn their minds to the potential impact their decisions, policies or programs have, and how these may differ based on protected grounds, such as age, sex/gender, and race, ethnic or national origin, colour, or nationality. It also creates an obligation to acquire relevant information, if it is not already available, to avoid direct or indirect discrimination.

It is important to clarify that any data collection and analysis relevant to detecting and addressing potential discrimination should be conducted by a separate unit than the National Targeting Centre. Targeting Officers should not have access to disaggregated demographic data when triaging passengers, as this might increase discrimination-related risks. The CBSA recognizes this in its commitment to removing “sensitive data” about a person’s health or sex life from the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data that it imports into its triaging systems. This precaution should not prevent other units within the CBSA from gathering and considering depersonalized, disaggregated demographic data, including to conduct Gender Based Analysis+ that could reduce the risk of discrimination and/or mitigate its potential impacts.

Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA develop more robust and regular oversight for Air Passenger Targeting to ensure that its practices are not discriminatory. This should include updates to the CBSA’s policies, procedures, training, and other guidance, as appropriate.

Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA start gathering and assessing the necessary data to identify, analyze, and mitigate discrimination-related risks. This includes disaggregated demographic data, data on the effects of Air Passenger Targeting on secondary examinations that may be apparent from related human rights complaints, and data on a baseline comparator group.

Conclusion

The pre-arrival risk assessments performed as part of the CBSA’s Air Passenger Targeting program support the CBSA’s ability to screen inbound travellers in relation to a variety of enforcement issues. However, some of the information used to triage passengers relates to protected grounds. This creates a risk that passengers may be differentiated based on prohibited grounds of discrimination. Triaging may lead to adverse impacts on passengers’ time, privacy, and equal treatment, which maybe capable of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating disadvantage.

Careful attention to the reliability of the information and intelligence that underpin the choice of indicators to triage passengers and their connection to the threats or potential contraventions they seek to identify is needed to verify that the CBSA respects its non-discrimination obligations. This has implications for both Canada’s national security and its international commitments related to combatting terrorism and serious transnational crime and related to privacy and human rights.

NSIRA is satisfied that the CBSA has the legal authority to conduct Air Passenger Targeting. However, NSIRA observed shortcomings in the CBSA’s documentation of its program activities that complicated verification that all triaging decisions complied with statutory and regulatory restrictions. Improvements to documentation in these respects are essential and will help lower future compliance risks by ensuring the CBSA can verify that all triaging decisions comply with the terms of the Customs Act and the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations.

Similarly, the absence of adequate justification in several instances for the CBSA’s reliance on indicators created from passengers’ Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data leads to a risk of discrimination. Improving documentation requirements and setting out further detail in the CBSA’s policies, procedures, and training would better equip CBSA staff to understand these risks and mitigate them in the conduct of their duties. More robust and regular oversight to ensure that adequate justification exists for any adverse differentiation arising from Air Passenger Targeting grounds would equip the CBSA to identify which scenarios or manual Flight List Targeting triaging practices need further support. Improving relevant data gathering and assessment will also support the identification and mitigation of discrimination-related risks in Air Passenger Targeting.

Appendices

Findings & Recommendations

Findings Recommendations
Finding 1. The CBSA’s use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data in Scenario Based Targeting complied with section 107(3) of the Customs Act. Recommendation 1. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA document its triaging practices in a manner that enables effective verification of whether all triaging decisions comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions.
Finding 2. The CBSA does not document its triaging practices in a manner that enables effective verification of whether all triaging decisions comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions. Recommendation 2. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA ensure, in an ongoing manner, that its triaging practices are based on information and/or intelligence that justifies the use of each indicator. This justification should be well-documented to enable effective internal and external verification of whether the CBSA’s triaging practices comply with its non-discrimination obligations.
Finding 3. The CBSA has not consistently demonstrated that an adequate justification exists for its Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices. This weakness in the link between the indicators used to triage passengers and the potential threats or contraventions they seek to identify creates a risk that Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices may be discriminatory. Recommendation 3. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA ensure that any Air Passenger Targetingrelated distinctions on protected grounds that are capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage constitute a reasonable limit on travellers’ equality rights under the Charter.
Finding 4. The CBSA’s policies, procedures, and training are insufficiently detailed to adequately equip CBSA staff to identify potential discrimination-related risks and to take appropriate action to mitigate these risks in the exercise of their duties. Recommendation 4. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA develop more robust and regular oversight for Air Passenger Targeting to ensure that its practices are not discriminatory. This should include updates to the CBSA’s policies, procedures, training, and other guidance, as appropriate.
Finding 5. The CBSA’s oversight structures and practices are not rigorous enough to identify and mitigate potential discrimination-related risks, as appropriate. This is compounded by a lack of collection and assessment of relevant data. Recommendation 5. NSIRA recommends that the CBSA start gathering and assessing the necessary data to identify, analyze, and mitigate discrimination-related risks. This includes disaggregated demographic data, data on the effects of Air Passenger Targeting on secondary examinations that may be apparent from related human rights complaints, and data on a baseline comparator group.

The CBSA’s Authority to Collect and Use Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data in Air Passenger Targeting

Authority to Collect the Data
Customs Act, s. 107.1 & IRPA s. 148(1)(d) Air carriers are required to provide “prescribed information” about any person on board, or expected to be on board, a flight arriving into Canada.
Passenger Information Customs Regulations, s. 5 & Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, s. 269(1) Prescribe the required information, which constitute Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data.
Authority to Use the Data
Customs Act, s. 107(3) “Customs information” (including Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record data)115 may be used for three purposes:
• Administer or enforce the Customs Act, Customs Tariff, or related legislation;
• Exercise the powers or perform the duties and functions of the Minister of Public Safety under the IRPA, including establishing a person’s identity or determining their inadmissibility;
• For the purposes of other program legislation that the Minister of Public Safety or the CBSA is authorized to enforce
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s.149(a) Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data may be used for three purposes:
• for the purposes of the IRPA;
• for the purposes of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act;
• to identify a person for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued in Canada.
Protection of Passenger Information Regulations, s. 4 Passenger Name Record data provided to the CBSA under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act116 may be used for two purposes:
• to identify persons who have or may have committed a terrorism offence or serious transnational crime;
• to conduct a trend analysis or develop risk indicators for that purpose.

Frequently Cited Provisions in Scenario Templates

The figure summarizes the main provisions cited as potential contraventions in scenario templates. [***Sentence revised to remove privileged or injurious information. It describes the number of scenarios that were active on May 26, 2021***]. Five of the provisions that were cited as potential contraventions did not clearly establish a link to a serious transnational crime or terrorism offence in compliance with the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations (PPIR). These are marked in orange and described below.

Provisions Description Complies with Cust Act Complies with PPIR
IRPA s. 20 Presenting visa or other documents Yes Yes*
IRPA s. 34 Inadmissible, national security reasons Yes Yes
IRPA s. 35 Inadmissible, human rights violations Yes Yes
IRPA s. 36 Inadmissible, serious criminality Yes Yes
IRPA s. 37 Inadmissible, organized criminality Yes Yes
IRPA s. 40 Inadmissible, misrepresentation Yes Yes*
IRPA s. 41 Inadmissible, IRPA non-compliance Yes Yes*
IRPA s. 117 Human smuggling Yes Yes
IRPA s. 118 Human trafficking Yes Yes
Customs Act s. 159 Smuggling goods Yes Yes
Customs Act s. 12 Reporting goods Yes Yes*
Customs Act s. 13 Truthfully answering questions about & presenting goods Yes Yes*
Customs Tariff 9899.00.00 Hate or terrorist propaganda; seditious materials Yes Yes
PCMLTFA s. 12 Reporting of currency Yes Yes
PCMLTFA s. 74 General Offences Yes Yes

Section 20 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) concerns the requirement for foreign nationals to have the proper documentation to enter or remain in Canada. As contraventions of the IRPA where a penalty is not specified (such as section 20) are punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to two years under sections 124 and 125 of the IRPA, this contravention does not meet the definition of a serious transnational crime.

Section 40 of the IRPA indicates that a foreign national is inadmissible to Canada for misrepresentation. The link to serious transnational crime would be clearer by citing the provisions that establish misrepresentation as an offence under sections 127 and 128 of the IRPA.

Section 41 of the IRPA indicates that a foreign national is inadmissible for non-compliance with the IRPA. Non-compliance with the IRPA is not itself a terrorism offence or serious transnational crime. Further details about the enforcement concern are necessary to establish such a link.

Sections 12 and 13 of the Customs Act concern traveller requirements to report goods and truthfully answer questions; reference to the penalty provision in section 160(1)(b) indicates it is a serious offence. Reliance on these sections to justify the use of Passenger Name Record data may be problematic however, as these sections relate to future conduct, whereas section 4 of the PPIR focuses on past conduct (“have or may have” committed such acts). Concerns about prohibited goods or potential smuggling of goods may also more appropriately cite section 159 of the Customs Act and/or the Customs Tariff, Item 9899.00.00.

Examples of the CBSA’s Reliance on Indicators Relating to Protected Grounds

The figure below presents examples from both Scenario Based Targeting and Flight List Targeting of how the CBSA relies on indicators created from Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data that are or may relate closely to the grounds of “national or ethnic origin,” “age,” or “sex,” which are prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Charter. The CBSA often relies on more than one such indicator. This is discussed in Section 6.2.2.1. The CBSA’s basis for relying on such indicators is discussed in Section 6.2.2.3.

[***Figure revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It provides statistics on the number of scenarios that rely on indicators that relate to protected grounds for “national or ethnic origin,” “age,” and “sex.”***]

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National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Annual Report 2022

Backgrounder

Ottawa, Ontario, October 30, 2023 – The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s (NSIRA) fourth annual report was tabled in Parliament on October 30, 2023. 

This report provides an overview and discussion of NSIRA’s activities throughout 2022, including our findings and recommendations. Our growth and evolution as an agency, including our continued efforts to refine our approaches and processes, both in our reviews and investigations, allowed us to take on new and challenging work. The report also assesses our review work to date, highlighting important themes and trends that have emerged.  

Our report summarizes review and investigations work during the 2022 period and highlights our continued effort to enhance transparency by evaluating important aspects of our engagement with reviewed departments and agencies. Review highlights in the report include the following: 

  • The annual review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) threat reduction measures (TRMs), and the annual review of CSIS’s activities to inform our report to the Minister of Public Safety; 
  • Reviews of the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) active and defensive cyber operations, a foreign intelligence collection program, as well as the annual review of CSE activities to inform our report to the Minister of National Defence;  
  • A review submitted to the Minister of National Defence under s. 35 of the NSIRA Act on particular human source handling activities undertaken by the Canadian Armed Forces that may not have been in compliance with the law; 
  • A review of the Canada Border Services Agency’s Air Passenger Targeting program; and 
  • Our mandated multi-departmental reviews with respect to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act and sharing of information within the federal government under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act. 

During 2022, NSIRA continued modernizing its complaints investigations process, which helped us improve the consistency and efficiency of our work. While the pandemic continued to impact the investigative landscape, processes introduced will reduce delays moving forward. In addition to its other investigations work, NSIRA completed its investigation in relation to a group of 58 complaints referred by the Canadian Human Rights Commission.  

This annual report also highlights how the organization pursued greater engagement with partners, seeking and sharing best practices with like-minded review and oversight bodies. In addition, it discusses our organization’s corporate initiatives, including efforts to increase our capacity across our business lines, including technology and information management. 

NSIRA’s Members continue to be proud of the work of NSIRA’s Secretariat and the dedication and professionalism of its staff. 

Date of Publishing:

Dear Prime Minister,

On behalf of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, it is my pleasure to present you with our third annual report. Consistent with subsection 38(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, the report includes information about our activities in 2021, as well as our findings and recommendations.

In accordance with paragraph 52(1)(b) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, our report was prepared after consultation with relevant deputy heads, in an effort to ensure that it does not contain information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations, or is information that is subject to solicitor-client privilege, the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, or to litigation privilege.

Yours sincerely,

The Honourable Marie Deschamps, C.C.

Chair // National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

Message from the members

As we reflect on this past year’s work, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is proud of what it has accomplished. We pushed past the challenges of the pandemic and pursued our mission with renewed energy and innovation, understanding that we can adapt and even thrive in this new environment. In 2022, our agency focused on building out and refining its processes as we empowered our review and complaints professionals in their work. These efforts enhanced our ability to meet the challenges of our review and investigations mandates, and thereby improve the transparency and accountability of the national security and intelligence activities across the federal government.

In addition to completing a wide array of reviews and investigations, we have stepped back to reflect on our work and activities over the first few years of our mandate. Despite being a relatively new agency, we are now in the position to make broader observations on the themes and trends in our work, and on the community we review. Indeed, as our experience grows, our approaches in our reviews and investigations mature and evolve. We meet our goals of increased efficiency and expertise through a commitment to address the challenges we face, and by seeking out best practices through expanded partnerships with like-minded domestic and international institutions.

During NSIRA’s brief history, ministers of the Crown have referred certain matters to us for review, as provided for in the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act. At the time of writing, we are in the process of such a referral. As this important review progresses, we will ensure that our commitment to independent and professional review is reflected in all our activities.

This report continues themes from previous annual reports by presenting an overview of our work, a discussion on our engagement with reviewees, and an account of the initiatives we undertook to ensure that our products are complete, thorough and professional. It is our belief that as we grow, we bring confidence to the Canadian public with each review and investigation we conduct.

We would like to thank our previous members, Ian Holloway and Faisal Mirza, for their commitment and contribution to advancing the important work of NSIRA during their tenure, and we wish them well in their future endeavours. Finally, we thank the staff of NSIRA’s Secretariat for their professionalism and dedication to fulfilling the agency’s mandate, and we have no doubt that the year ahead will bring further success for NSIRA

Marie Deschamps
Craig Forcese
Ian Holloway
Faisal Mirza
Marie-Lucie Morin

Executive Summary

In 2022, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) continued to execute its review and investigations mandates with the goal of improving national security and intelligence accountability and transparency in Canada. This related not only to the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), but also to other federal departments and agencies engaged in such activities, including:

  • the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF);
  • the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA); and
  • all departments and agencies engaging in national security or intelligence activities in the context of NSIRA’s yearly reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act.

NSIRA has reflected on its work to date and found that a horizontal view of all its findings and recommendations over the past three years reveals the emergence of three major themes: governance; propriety; and information management and sharing. NSIRA observes that there is an interconnected and overlapping aspect to these issues, and as a result believes that improvements to governance could result in broader improvements across all themes.

Reviews

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

The following are highlights of the reviews completed in 2022 along with key outcomes. The number of reviews defined as completed does not include any ongoing reviews, or reviews completed in previous years but that went through or are in the process of going through consultations for their release to the public. Annex C lists all the findings and recommendations associated with reviews completed in 2022, along with the corresponding responses from reviewees, if provided.

In addition to the reviews discussed below, NSIRA determined that a number of ongoing reviews would be closed or terminated. These decisions, based on a variety of considerations, allow NSIRA to redirect its efforts and resources towards other important issues.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

In 2022, NSIRA completed the following reviews on CSIS activities:

  • the third annual review of CSIS’s threat reduction measures, which provided an overview of all such measures conducted in 2021, and also focused on a subset of these measures to consider the implementation of each measure, how what happened aligned with what was originally proposed, and, relatedly, the role of legal risk; and
  • an annual review of CSIS’s activities, which informed, in part, NSIRA’s 2022 annual report to the Minister of Public Safety.

Communications Security Establishment

In 2022, NSIRA completed two dedicated reviews of CSE, and commenced an annual review of CSE activities:

  • a review of CSE’s active and defensive cyber operations (ACO/DCO), which is a continuation of NSIRA’s 2021 review of the governance of ACO/DCO by CSE and Global Affairs Canada;
  • a review of a sensitive CSE foreign intelligence collection program, which assistedNSIRA in better informing the Minister of National Defence about CSE’s activities; and
  • an annual review of CSE activities similar to that for CSIS, begun for the first time in 2022 and that informed, in part, NSIRA’s 2022 annual report to the Minister of National Defence.

Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces

In the course of a review of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) human source handling activities, NSIRA issued to the Minister of National Defence a report on December 9, 2022, under section 35 of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act in relation to a specific operation. Section 35 requires that NSIRA submit to the appropriate Minister a report with respect to any activity that is related to national security or intelligence that, in NSIRA’s opinion, may not be in compliance with the law. NSIRA will complete the broader review of DND/CAF’s human source handling activities in 2023.

Canada Border Services Agency

NSIRA completed its first in-depth review of national security or intelligence activities of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in 2022: a review of air passenger targeting. This review examined the CBSA’s pre-arrival risk assessment of passengers based on data collected by commercial air carriers. It evaluated whether the CBSA’s activities complied with legislative requirements and Canada’s non-discrimination obligations.

Multi-departmental reviews

NSIRA conducted two mandated multi-departmental reviews in 2022:

  • a review of directions issued with respect to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act; and
  • a review of disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act.

Review work not resulting in a final report

During the past year NSIRA determined that certain ongoing review work would be closed or not result in a final report to a Minister. These decisions allow NSIRA to remain nimble and to pivot its work plan. Multiple considerations can lead to the decision to close a review, and doing so allows NSIRA to redirect efforts and resources.

Technology in review

In 2022, NSIRA expanded its Technology Directorate to keep pace with the national security and intelligence community’s evolving use of digital technologies. The team comprises technical experts and review professionals, who are supported by academic researchers. This expanded team launched NSIRA’s first technology-led review, focusing on the lifecycle of warranted CSIS information. In addition to directly supporting NSIRA’s reviews, the Technology Directorate also began hosting learning sessions and discussion forums designed to enhance NSIRA employees’ knowledge of broader technical issues.

Engagement with reviewees

NSIRA continues to address and improve on aspects of its interaction with reviewees during the review process. It saw both improvements and ongoing challenges, and seeks to provide full and transparent assessments in this regard. Updated criteria will be used to evaluate engagement. These criteria are critical for supporting NSIRA’s efforts during a review. This approach builds on the agency’s previous confidence statements and provides a more consistent and complete assessment on engagement.

NSIRA continues to optimize its methods for accessing, receiving and tracking the information required to complete reviews. This involves ongoing discussions and support from reviewees. Limitations and challenges to this process are addressed directly and are communicated publicly where possible.

Complaints investigations

As NSIRA marked its third year of existence in 2022 it continued maturing and modernizing the processes for fulfilling its investigations mandate. The jurisdiction assessment phase was standardized, incorporating a verification protocol for the three agencies for which NSIRA has complaints jurisdiction. To speed up the investigative process, investigative interviews are being used more often, taking over from the formal hearings NSIRA previously relied on.

The pandemic continued to impact the investigative landscape in the first half of 2022. COVID protocols conflicted with security protocols for investigations, which require in-person meetings. Processes introduced in 2022 are expected to reduce delays in the conduct of investigations on a forward basis.

The number of investigation activities last year remained high and included the completion of a referral of a group of 58 complaints by the Canadian Human Rights Commission.

Data management and service standards initiatives that were launched are expected to enhance complaint file management in the coming year.

Partnerships

During the past year, NSIRA expanded its engagement with valuable partners, both domestically and internationally, and has already reaped the benefits through the exchange of best practices. As a relatively new agency, NSIRA sees such relationships as a priority for its institutional development. NSIRA had the privilege of visiting many international partners as an active participant in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council, and also engaged other European partners through various forums that bring together like-minded oversight, review and data protection agencies from all over the world.

Introduction

1.1 Who we are

Established in July 2019, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is an independent agency that reports to Parliament. Canadian review bodies before NSIRA did not have the ability to collaborate or share their classified information but were each limited to conducting reviews on a specified department or agency. By contrast, NSIRA has the authority to conduct an integrated review of Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities, and Canada now has one of the world’s most extensive systems for independent review of national security.

1.2 Mandate

NSIRA has a dual mandate to conduct reviews on and carry out investigations of complaints related to Canada’s national security or intelligence activities.

Reviews

NSIRA’s review mandate is broad, as outlined in subsection 8(1) of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). This mandate includes reviewing the activities of both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), as well as the activities of any other federal department or agency that are related to national security or intelligence. Further, NSIRA reviews any national security or intelligence matters that a minister of the Crown refers to NSIRA.

Investigations

In addition to its review mandate, NSIRA is responsible for investigating complaints related to national security or intelligence. This duty is outlined in paragraph 8(1)(d) of the NSIRA Act, and involves investigating complaints about:

  • the activities of CSIS or CSE;
  • decisions to deny or revoke certain federal government security clearances; and
  • ministerial reports under the Citizenship Act that recommend denying certain citizenship applications.

This mandate also includes investigating national security-related complaints referred to NSIRA by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (the RCMP’s own complaints mechanism) and the Canadian Human Rights Commission.

Observations and themes

NSIRA has a horizontal, in-depth view of the Canadian national security landscape that allows for an assessment of Canada’s complex, interwoven approach to national security. NSIRA annual reports discuss its activities within that framework. This annual report provides an opportunity to reflect on NSIRA’s body of work horizontally, and consider what broad trends or themes emerge.

NSIRA findings and recommendations touch on many aspects of government activities and operations. Grouping all findings and recommendations according to topics that fall under three broad themes helps simplify a horizontal assessment of trends to date. This categorization and the terminology used may evolve over time.

The themes that emerge are governance; propriety; and information management and sharing. These themes appear year after year in NSIRA annual reports. The following topics are included in these themes:

Theme Topics
Governance
  • Policies, procedures, framework and other authorities
  • Internal oversight
  • Risk management, assessment and practices
  • Decision-making and accountability, including ministerial accountability and direction
  • Training, tools and staffing resources
Propriety
  • Reasonableness, necessity, efficacy and proportionality
  • Legal thresholds and advice, compliance and privacy interests
Information management and sharing
  • Collection, documentation, tracking, implementing, reporting, monitoring and safeguarding
  • Information sharing and disclosure
  • Keeping and providing accurate and up-to-date information, timeliness

These themes can be found in every NSIRA annual report, and this year’s is no exception. In this year’s annual report, the following examples illustrate the three themes:

Governance:

  • the review of disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act for 2021 identified that employees did not receive adequate guidance to fulfill their obligations, and recommended improvements to training;
  • the review of a CSE foreign intelligence activity identified several instances where the program’s activities were not adequately captured within CSE’s applications for certain ministerial authorizations, resulting in recommendations that CSE more effectively inform the Minister of National Defence about aspects of its bilateral relationships with certain partners, the extent of its participation in certain types of activities, and the testing and evaluation of products.

Propriety:

  • in a report issued to the Minister of National Defence under s.35 of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA explained that, in its opinion, certain activities undertaken by the Canadian Armed Forces may not have been in compliance with the law;
  • the review of the threat reduction measures of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service found that this agency did not meet its internal policy requirements regarding the timelines to submit threat reduction measure implementation reports.

Information management and sharing:

  • the Canada Border Services Agency air passenger targeting review noted that this agency does not document its triaging practices that use passenger data in a manner that enables effective verification of whether all triaging decisions comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions.

A high-level overview of the past three annual reports shows the number of NSIRA findings and recommendations each year, broken down by theme. Over the three years, governance related findings and recommendations constituted 43% of the overall total. The comparable figures for propriety and information management (IM) and sharing categories were 26% and 31% respectively. The breakdown by year is captured in the following table:

Figure 1: Trends in findings and recommendations

Graph image: Trends in finding and recommendations - Text version follows
Trends in findings and recommendations
  2020 annual report 2021 annual report 2022 annual report
Governance 45% 41% 44%
Propriety 26% 27% 24%
Information Management and Sharing 29% 32% 32%

The interconnected nature of the problems identified in NSIRA reviews, along with the balance of themes illustrated in the graphic above, reveals a narrative. Indeed, issues rarely stand-alone – governance and IM and sharing issues may, for example, culminate in propriety challenges. The number of findings and recommendations over three years that touch on governance, propriety and IM and sharing matters suggest that these are issues deserving close attention. Employees are expected to succeed in meeting intelligence and national security service missions while adhering to policy and legal requirements. Here, improvements to staff training and development are likely to have the most significant impacts.

Review

Details provided on individual reviews are a high-level summary of their content and outcomes. Full versions of each review are available once they have been redacted for public release.

3.1 Canadian Security Intelligence Service reviews

NSIRA has a mandate to review any Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) activity. The NSIRA Act requires NSIRA to submit an annual report on CSIS activities each year to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (with these responsibilities now divided into two portfolios, NSIRA currently submits these reports to the Minister of Public Safety). These classified reports include information related to CSIS’s compliance with the law and applicable ministerial directions, and the reasonableness and necessity of the exercise of CSIS’s powers.

In 2022, NSIRA completed one dedicated review of CSIS, and its annual review of CSIS activities, both summarized below. Furthermore, CSIS is implicated in other NSIRA multi- departmental reviews, such as the legally mandated annual reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, the results of which are described in Multi-departmental reviews.

Threat reduction measures review

This is NSIRA’s third annual review of CSIS threat reduction measures (TRMs), which are measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, within or outside Canada. Section 12.1 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act) authorizes CSIS to take these measures.

NSIRA found that CSIS’s activities under its TRM mandate in 2021 were broadly consistent with these activities in preceding years. NSIRA observed that 2018 was an inflection point for CSIS’s use of the TRM mandate. In that year, CSIS proposed nearly as many TRMs as were proposed in total in the preceding three years — the first three of the mandate. In the following year, however, the number dropped slightly, before a more significant reduction in 2020. The number of proposed TRMs in 2021 went up slightly compared with the previous year, as did both approvals and implementations.

NSIRA selected three TRMs implemented in 2021 for a more intensive review, assessing the measures for compliance with applicable law, ministerial direction and policy. At the same time, NSIRA considered the implementation of each measure, including the alignment between what was proposed and what occurred, and the role of legal risk assessments for guiding CSIS activity, as well as the documentation of outcomes.

For all the measures reviewed, NSIRA found that CSIS met its obligations under the law, specifically the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sections 12.1 and 12.2 of the CSIS Act. In addition to general legal compliance, NSIRA found that CSIS sufficiently established a “rational link” between the proposed measure and the identified threat.

In one case, NSIRA found that CSIS did not meet its obligations under the 2015 Ministerial Direction for Operations and Accountability and the 2019 Ministerial Direction for Accountability issued by the Minister of Public Safety.

The TRM in question involved certain sensitive factors. NSIRA believes that the presence of these factors ought to have factored into the overall risk assessment of the measure. CSIS argued that risks associated with these factors relate primarily to reputational risk to CSIS, which it assessed in this case. Certain risks related to the sensitive factors, however, are not, and in this instance were not, captured by CSIS’s reputational risk assessment.

Similarly, the legal risk assessment for this TRM did not comply with ministerial direction. NSIRA recommended that legal risk assessments be conducted for TRMs involving these sensitive factors, and further, that CSIS consider and evaluate whether the current process for legal risk assessments complies with applicable ministerial direction.

A comparative analysis of the two legal risk assessments provided for the other TRMs under review underscored the practical utility of clear and specific legal direction for CSIS personnel. Clear direction allows investigators to be aware of, and understand, the legal parameters within which CSIS personnel can operate; it also permits reporting after an action is completed to document how implementation stayed within those legal parameters.

With respect to documenting outcomes, NSIRA further noted issues with how quickly CSIS produces certain reports after a TRM is implemented. Although NSIRA recognizes that overly burdensome documentation requirements can unduly inhibit CSIS activities, NSIRA nonetheless believes that the recommendations provided are prudent and reasonable. Relevant information, available in a timely manner, benefits CSIS operations.

Annual review of Canadian Security Intelligence Service activities

In 2022, NSIRA completed its annual review of CSIS activities, which aims to identify compliance-related challenges, general trends and emerging issues using CSIS documents in 12 categories (legislatively required and supplementary) from January 1, 2022, to December 31, 2022. Besides contributing to NSIRA’s Annual Report to the Minister of Public Safety on CSIS activities, the review may identify areas that merit new NSIRA reviews and may produce a briefing or report with its own observations, findings and recommendations. NSIRA provided its report on CSIS activities in 2021 to the Minister of Public Safety on October 12, 2022, and the Chair subsequently met with the Minister to discuss its contents as well as ongoing issues and challenges related to NSIRA review of CSIS.

Statistics and data

To achieve greater public accountability, NSIRA has requested that CSIS publish statistics and data about public interest and compliance-related aspects of its activities. NSIRA is of the opinion that the following statistics will provide the public with information related to the scope and breadth of CSIS operations, as well as display the evolution of activities from year to year.

Warrant applications

Section 21 of the CSIS Act authorizes CSIS to make an application to a judge for a warrant if it believes, on reasonable grounds, that more intrusive powers are required to investigate a particular threat to the security of Canada. Warrants may be used by CSIS, for example, to intercept communications, enter a location, or obtain information, records or documents. Each individual warrant application could include multiple individuals or request the use of multiple intrusive powers.

Table 1: Section 21 warrant applications made by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2018 to 2022
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Total section 21 applications 24 24 15 31 28
Total approved warrants 24 23 15 31 28
New warrants 10 9 2 13 6
Replacements 11 12 8 14 14
Supplemental 3 2 5 4 8
Total denied warrants 0 1 0 0 0

Threat reduction measures

CSIS is authorized to seek a judicial warrant for a TRM if it believes that certain intrusive measures, outlined in section 21 (1.1) of the CSIS Act, are required to reduce the threat. The CSIS Act is clear that when a proposed TRM would limit a right or freedom protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or would otherwise be contrary to Canadian law, a judicial warrant authorizing the measure is required. To date, CSIS has sought no judicial authorizations to undertake warranted TRMs. TRMs approved in one year may be executed in future years. Operational reasons may also prevent an approved TRM from being executed.

Table 2: Total number of approved and executed threat reduction measures, 2015 to 2022
  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Approved threat reduction measures

10 8 15 23 24 11 23 16
Executed 10 8 13 17 19 8 17 12

Warranted threat reduction measures

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Canadian Security Intelligence Service targets

CSIS is mandated to investigate threats to the security of Canada, including espionage, foreign influenced activities, political, religious or ideologically motivated violence, and subversion.6 Section 12 of the CSIS Act sets out criteria permitting CSIS to investigate an individual, group or entity for matters related to these threats. Subjects of a CSIS investigation, whether they be individuals or groups, are called “targets.”

Table 3: Number of Canadian Security Intelligence Service targets, 2018 to 2022
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Number of targets 430 467 360 352 340

Datasets

Data analytics is a key investigative tool for CSIS, providing it with the capacity to make connections and identify trends that are not possible through traditional methods of investigation. The National Security Act, 2017, which came into force in 2019, gave CSIS new powers, including a legal framework for it to collect, retain and use datasets. The framework authorizes CSIS to collect datasets (divided into Canadian, foreign and publicly available datasets) that have the ability to assist CSIS in the performance of its duties and functions. It also establishes safeguards for the protection of Canadian rights and freedoms, including privacy rights. These protections include enhanced requirements for ministerial accountability. Depending on the type of dataset, CSIS must meet different requirements before it is able to use a dataset.

The CSIS Act also requires that NSIRA be kept apprised of certain dataset-related activities. Reports prepared following the handling of datasets are to be provided to NSIRA, under certain conditions and within reasonable timeframes. While CSIS is not required to advise NSIRA of judicial authorizations or ministerial approvals for the collection of Canadian and foreign datasets, CSIS has been proactively keeping NSIRA apprised of these activities.

Table 4: Evaluation and retention of publicly available, Canadian and foreign datasets by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2019 to 2022
  2019 2020 2021 2022
Publicly available datasets
   
Evaluated 9 6 4 4
Retained 9 6 2 4
Canadian datasets    
Evaluated 0 0 2 0
Retained (approved by Federal Court) 0 0 0 2
Denied by Federal Court 0 0 0 0
Foreign datasets    
Evaluated 10 0 0 1
Retained (approved by the Minister and Intelligence Commissioner 0 1 1 1
Denied by the Minister 0 0 0 0
Denied by the Intelligence Commissioner 0 0 0 0

Justification Framework

The National Security Act, 2017, also created a legal justification framework for CSIS’s intelligence collection operations. The framework establishes a limited justification for CSIS employees, and persons acting at their direction, to carry out activities that would otherwise constitute offences under Canadian law. CSIS’s Justification Framework is modelled on those already in place for Canadian law enforcement. The Justification Framework provides needed clarity to CSIS, and to Canadians, as to what CSIS may lawfully do in the course of its activities. It recognizes that it is in the public interest to ensure that CSIS employees can effectively carry out its intelligence collection duties and functions, including by engaging in otherwise unlawful acts or omissions, in the public interest and in accordance with the rule of law. The types of otherwise unlawful acts and omissions that are authorized by the Justification Framework are determined by the Minister and approved by the Intelligence Commissioner. There remain limitations to what activities can be undertaken, and nothing in the Justification Framework permits the commission of an act or omission that would infringe a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter.

According to section 20.1 (2) of the CSIS Act, employees must be designated by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to be covered under the Justification Framework while committing or directing an otherwise unlawful act or omission. Designated employees are CSIS employees who require the justification framework as part of their duties and functions. Designated employees are justified in committing an act or omission themselves (commissions by employees) and they may direct another person to commit an act or omission (directions to commit) as a part of their duties and functions.

Table 5: Authorizations, commissions and directions under the Justification Framework, 2019 to 2022
  2019 2020 2021 2022
Authorizations 83 147 178 172

Commissions by employees

17 39 51 61
Directions to commit 32 84 116 131
Emergency designations 0 0 0 0

Compliance

CSIS’s internal operational compliance program unit leads and manages overall compliance within CSIS. The objective of this unit is to promote a culture of compliance within CSIS by leading an approach for reporting and assessing potential non-compliance incidents to provide timely advice and guidance related to internal policies and procedures for employees. This program is the centre for processing all instances of potential non-compliance related to operational activities.

NSIRA notes that CSIS reports Charter violations as operational non-compliance. NSIRA will continue to monitor closely instances of non-compliance that relate to Canadian law and the Charter, and work with CSIS to improve transparency around these activities.

Table 6: Total number of non-compliance incidents processed by CSIS, 2019 to 2022
  2019 2020 2021 2022

Processed compliance incidents

53 99 85 59

Administrative

  53 64 42
Operational 40 19 21 17
Canadian law
1 2
Charter 6 5
Warrant conditions 6 3
CSIS governance 8 15

3.2 Communications Security Establishment reviews

Overview

NSIRA has the mandate to review any activity conducted by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). NSIRA must also submit an annual report to the Minister of National Defence on CSE activities, including information related to CSE’s compliance with the law and applicable ministerial directions, and NSIRA’s assessment of the reasonableness and necessity of the exercise of CSE’s powers.

In 2022, NSIRA completed two dedicated reviews of CSE and commenced an annual review of CSE activities, all summarized below. Furthermore, CSE is implicated in other NSIRA multi- departmental reviews, such as the legally mandated annual reviews of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, the results of which are described in Multi-departmental reviews.

Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s active and defensive cyber operations

The Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act) grants CSE the authority to conduct active cyber operations and defensive cyber operations (ACOs and DCOs). CSE ACOs and DCOs have become a tool of Government of Canada foreign and security policy. In 2021, NSIRA reviewed CSE’s governance of and the general planning and approval process for ACO and DCO activities. The governance review made several observations about the governance of ACOs and DCOs by CSE — and to a lesser extent, by Global Affairs Canada (GAC). Some of these observations identified gaps that resulted in recommendations. Building on the governance review, the report focused on CSE’s ACOs and DCOs themselves:

  • the operations;
  • the implementation of CSE’s governance; and
  • the legal framework in the context of specific ACOs and DCOs.

NSIRA incorporated GAC, CSIS, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and DND/CAF into this review, given these organizations’ varying degrees of coordination or involvement in these CSE activities. NSIRA also inspected some technical elements of a case study ACO to verify aspects of the operation independently, as well as to deepen NSIRA’s understanding of how an ACO works. While NSIRA reviewed all ACOs and DCOs planned or conducted by CSE until mid-2021, this review focused on a sample of such ACOs or DCOs, each presenting unique characteristics.

Overall, NSIRA found that ACOs and DCOs that CSE planned or conducted during the period of review were lawful and noted improvements in GAC’s assessments for foreign policy risk and international law. NSIRA further observed that CSE developed and improved its processes for the planning and conduct of ACOs and DCOs in a way that reflected some of NSIRA’s observations from the governance review.

NSIRA also made findings pertaining to how CSE could improve aspects of ACO and DCO planning, as well as communication to the Minister of National Defence and coordination with other Government of Canada entities. More specifically, NSIRA identified areas of potential risk:

  • GAC’s capability to independently assess potential risks resulting from CSE ACOs and DCOs;
  • the accuracy of information provided, and issues related to delegation, within some of the applications for authorizations for ACOs and DCOs;
  • the degree to which CSE engaged with CSIS and the RCMP on ACOs and DCOs, and CSE explanations of how it determined whether the objective of an ACO or DCO could not reasonably be achieved by other means;
  • the extent to which CSE described the intelligence collection that may occur alongside or as a result of ACOs or DCOs in applications for ACO and DCO authorizations and in operational documentation; and
  • overlap between activities conducted under the ACO and DCO aspects of CSE’s mandate as well as under all four aspects of CSE’s mandate.

It should be noted that NSIRA faced significant challenges in accessing CSE information on this review. These access challenges had a negative impact on the review. As a result, NSIRA could not be confident in the completeness of information provided by CSE.

Review of a foreign intelligence activity

In 2022, NSIRA completed a review of a sensitive CSE foreign intelligence collection program. As part of this review, NSIRA made several findings and observations regarding the activities carried out as part of this program. Notably, NSIRA identified several instances where the program’s activities were not adequately captured within CSE’s applications for certain ministerial authorizations. As such, NSIRA recommended that CSE more effectively inform the Minister of National Defence about aspects of its bilateral relationships with certain partners, the extent of its participation in certain types of activities, and the testing and evaluation of products.

NSIRA also found several areas where the program lacked adequate governance structures, resulting in improper application of key policy and procedural requirements related to information sharing, confirmation of foreignness, and CSE’s mistreatment risk assessment process. NSIRA made recommendations to strengthen these processes, to establish governance structures specific to the program, and to improve other governance structures with broader applicability throughout CSE.

Annual review of Communications Security Establishment activities

In 2022, NSIRA launched the annual review of CSE activities, which aimed to identify compliance-related challenges, general trends and emerging issues using CSE documents in 11 categories (legislatively required and supplementary) from January 1, 2022, to December 31, 2022. Besides contributing to NSIRA’s Annual Report to the Minister of National Defence on CSE activities, the review may identify areas that merit new NSIRA reviews and may produce a briefing or report with its own observations, findings and recommendations. It is based largely on the structure of the annual review of CSIS activities but has been adapted to CSE. NSIRA’s Chair met with the Minister of National Defence on December 15, 2022 to discuss ongoing issues and challenges related to NSIRA reviews of CSE activities.

Statistics and data

To achieve greater accountability and transparency, NSIRA has requested statistics and data from CSE about public interest and compliance-related aspects of its activities. NSIRA is of the opinion these statistics will provide the public with important information related to the scope and breadth of CSE operations, as well as display the evolution of activities from year to year.

Ministerial authorizations and ministerial orders

Ministerial authorizations are issued to CSE by the Minister of National Defence. Those authorizations support specific foreign intelligence or cybersecurity activities or defensive or active cyber operations conducted by CSE pursuant to those aspects of the CSE mandate. Authorizations are issued when these activities could otherwise contravene an Act of Parliament or interfere with a reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada.

Table 7: Ministerial authorizations issued, 2019 to 2022
Type of ministerial authorization Enabling section of the CSE Act Issued in 2019 Issued in 2020 Issued in 2021 Issued in 2022

Foreign intelligence

26(1)
3 3 3 3

Cybersecurity — federal and non-federal

27(1) and 27(2) 2 1 2 3
Defensive cyber operations 29(1) 1 1 1 1
Active cyber operations 30(1) 1 1 2 3

Note: This table lists ministerial authorizations that were issued in a given calendar year and may not necessarily reflect ministerial authorizations that were in effect at a given time. For example, if a ministerial authorization was issued in late 2021 and remained in effect in parts of 2022, it is counted solely as a 2021 ministerial authorization.

Ministerial orders are issued by the Minister for the purpose of (1) designating any electronic information, any information infrastructures or any class of electronic information or information infrastructures as electronic information or information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada (section 21(1) of the CSE Act); or (2) designating recipients of information related to Canadians or persons in Canada, that is, Canadian- identifying information (sections 45 and 44(1) of the CSE Act).

Table 8: Ministerial orders in effect as of 2022
Name of ministerial order Enabling section of the CSE Act

Designating electronic information and information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada

21(1)

Designating recipients of information relating to a Canadian or person in Canada acquired, used or analyzed under the cybersecurity and information assurance aspects of the CSE mandate

45 and 44(1)
Designating recipients of Canadian identifying information used, analyzed or retained under a foreign intelligence authorization pursuant to section 45 of the CSE Act
45 and 43

Designating electronic information and infrastructures of Ukraine as Systems of Importance

21(1)
Designating electronic information and infrastructures of Latvia as Systems of Importance 21(1)

Note: Ministerial orders remain in effect until rescinded by the Minister.

Foreign intelligence reporting

Under section 16 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to acquire information from or through the global information infrastructure. The CSE Act defines the global information infrastructure as including electromagnetic emissions, any equipment producing such emissions, communications systems, information technology systems and networks, and any data or technical information carried on, contained in or relating to those emissions, that equipment, those systems or those networks. CSE uses, analyzes and disseminates the information for providing foreign intelligence in accordance with the Government of Canada’s intelligence priorities.

Table 9: Number of foreign intelligence reports issued, 2019 to 2022
CSE foreign intelligence reporting 2019 2020 2021 2022

Number of reports released

N/A N/A 3,050 3,185

Number of departments/agencies

N/A >25 28 26
Number of specific clients within departments/agencies N/A >2,100 1,627 1,761

Note: NSIRA did not ask CSE for statistics related to foreign intelligence reporting for its 2019 public annual report. In 2020, statistics were requested, but were provided in general terms due to the classification of the data at the time, and CSE indicated that release of further detail, would be injurious to national security.

Information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada

Information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada (IRTC) is the information about Canadians or persons in Canada that may be incidentally collected by CSE while conducting foreign intelligence or cybersecurity activities under the authority of a ministerial authorization. Incidental collection refers to information acquired that CSE was not deliberately seeking, and where the activity that enabled the acquisition of this information was not directed at a Canadian or a person in Canada. According to CSE policy, IRTC is defined as any information recognized as having reference to a Canadian or person in Canada, regardless of whether that information could be used to identify that Canadian or person in Canada.

CSE was asked to release statistics or data about the regularity with which IRTC or “Canadian- collected information” is included in CSE’s end-product reporting. CSE responded that “this information remains at a classified level. We have determined that the release of thisinformation would be injurious to Canada’s international relations, national defence and security. Furthermore, the sharing of this information would provide an additional level of detail on the success of Canadian collection programs, our level of reliance on information from Five- Eye partners to produce intelligence, as well as a level of detail on Five-Eye use and reporting from Canadian collection that has not been previously made public.”

Canadian identifying information

CSE is prohibited from directing its activities at Canadians or persons in Canada. However, CSE’s collection methodologies sometimes result in incidentally acquiring such information. When such incidentally collected information is used in CSE’s foreign intelligence reporting, any part potentially identifying a Canadian or a person in Canada is suppressed to protect the privacy of the individual(s) in question. CSE may release unsuppressed Canadian-identifying information (CII) to designated recipients when the recipients have the legal authority and operational justification to receive it and when it is essential to international affairs, defence or security (including cyber security).

Table 10: Number of requests for disclosure of CII, 2021 and 2022
Type of request 2021 2022

Government of Canada requests

741 657

Five Eyes requests

90 62
Non-Five Eyes requests
0 0
Total 831 719

In 2022, of the 719 requests received, CSE reported having denied 65 requests. By the end of the year, 51 were still being processed.

CSE was asked to release the number of instances where CII is suppressed in CSE foreign intelligence or cyber security reporting. It indicated that “[d]isclosure of the number of instances where [CII] is suppressed in CSE intelligence reporting would be injurious to CSE’scapabilities. Such a disclosure would reveal information about CSE’s capabilities including theirlimitations. Thus, this information could be used by hostile security threats to counter CSE’s capabilities impeding CSE’s ability to protect Canada and its citizens.”

Privacy incidents and procedural errors

A privacy incident occurs when the privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada is put at risk in a manner that runs counter to, or is not provided for, in CSE’s policies. CSE tracks such incidents via its Privacy Incidents File and, for privacy incidents that are attributable to a second-party partner or a domestic partner, its Second-party Privacy Incidents File.

Table 11: Number of privacy incidents recorded by CSE, 2021 and 2022
Type of incident 2021 2022
Privacy incidents 96 114
Second-party privacy incidents 33 23

Cyber security and information assurance

Under section 17 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to provide advice, guidance and services to help protect electronic information and information infrastructures of federal institutions, as well as those of non-federal entities that are designated by the Minister as being of importance to the Government of Canada.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) is Canada’s unified authority on cybersecurity. The Cyber Centre, which is a part of CSE, provides expert guidance, services and education, while working in collaboration with stakeholders in the private and public sectors. The Cyber Centre handles incidents in government and designated institutions that include:

  • reconnaissance activity by sophisticated threat actors;
  • phishing incidents, that is, email containing malware;
  • unauthorized access to corporate information technology (IT) environments;
  • imminent ransomware attacks; and
  • zero-day exploits, which involves exploration of critical vulnerabilities in unpatched software.
Table 12: Number of cyber incident cases opened by CSE, 2022
Type of incident 2022
Federal institutions 1,070
Critical infrastructure 1,575
Total 2,645

Defensive and active cyber operations

Under section 18 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to conduct DCOs to help protect electronic information and information infrastructures of federal institutions, as well as those of non- federal entities that are designated by the Minister as being of importance to the Government of Canada from hostile cyber attacks.

Under section 19 of the CSE Act, CSE is mandated to conduct ACOs against foreign individuals, states, organizations or terrorist groups as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.

CSE was asked to release the number of DCOs and ACOs approved, and the number carried out, during 2022. CSE responded that it is “not in a position to provide this information for publication by NSIRA, as doing so would be injurious to Canada’s international relations,national defence, and national security.”

Technical and operational assistance

As part of the assistance aspect of CSE’s mandate, CSE receives requests for assistance from Canadian law enforcement and security agencies, as well as from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (DND/CAF).

Table 13: Number of requests for assistance received and actioned by CSE, 2020 to 2022
  2020 2021 2022
Approved 23 32 59
Not approved 1 3 Not applicable
Cancelled Not available Not available 1
Denied Not available Not available 2
Total received 24 35 62

3.3 Other departments

Overview

In addition to the CSIS and CSE reviews above, NSIRA completed the following reviews of departments and agencies in 2022:

  • A review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces;
  • A review of the Canada Border Services Agency; and
  • NSIRA’s annual reviews of both the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act and the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, both of which involve a broader set of departments and agencies that make up the Canadian national security and intelligence community.

Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces

Report issued pursuant to section 35 of the NSIRA Act

In the course of a review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) human source handling activities, which was still ongoing at the time of writing, NSIRA issued on December 9, 2022, a report under section 35 of the NSIRA Act to the Minister of National Defence. According to section 35, NSIRA must submit to the appropriate minister a report with respect to any activity that is related to national security or intelligence that, in NSIRA’s opinion, may not be in compliance with the law. The Minister of National Defence submitted a copy of this report to the Attorney General of Canada and included her comments indicating that her interpretation of the facts and law differs from NSIRA’s. NSIRA stands by its position and is of the view that the Minister’s position is based on a narrow interpretation of the facts and the law. NSIRA will complete the larger review of DND/CAF’s human source handling activities in 2023. While the section 35 report does not include recommendations, the broader review will examine accountability and oversight of the program, its risk framework, and DND/CAF’s discharge of its duty of care with respect to human sources. The review also assesses the lawfulness of the program and its related activities, as well as the sufficiency of its legal and policy foundations. In doing so, the report may include recommendations addressing the observations made in the section 35 report.

Canada Border Services Agency

Air passenger targeting review

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) air passenger targeting program uses pre-arrival risk assessments to identify inbound air travellers at higher risk of being inadmissible to Canada or whose entry, or that of their goods, may otherwise contravene the CBSA’s program legislation.

The first step in these multi-stage assessments is to triage travellers based on the characteristics and travel patterns conveyed to the CBSA by commercial air carriers in AdvancePassenger Information and Passenger Name Record data. This triage may be manual (flight list targeting) or automated (scenario-based targeting). In both methods, the CBSA relies on information and intelligence from a variety of sources to determine which data elements to treat as indicators of risk in relation to particular enforcement issues, including those related to national security. Use of these indicators may lead the CBSA to differentiate among travellers in subsequent stages of targeting or at the border, with impacts on passengers’ time, privacy and equal treatment.

The review of air passenger targeting was NSIRA’s first in-depth assessment of the CBSA’s compliance with relevant law. It focused, first, on whether the CBSA complies with restrictions on the use of passenger data established by the Customs Act and the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations. Next, the review examined whether the CBSA’s use of these types of passenger data was discriminatory under the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

NSIRA found that the CBSA’s use of both types of passenger data in scenario-based targeting was for a purpose authorized by the Customs Act. For flight list targeting, however, the CBSA does not document the reasons underpinning its triage decisions. NSIRA was therefore unable to verify compliance of flight list targeting with the purpose limitations set out in the Customs Act. As well, the documentation did not allow NSIRA to verify that the CBSA’s use of Passenger Name Record data in either triage method complied with the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations, which require that access to retained data be for a purpose related to the identification of persons who have or may have committed a terrorism offence or serious transnational crime.

NSIRA also found that the CBSA did not consistently demonstrate an adequate justification for its selection of particular indicators as signals of increased risk. When adequate justification is not present, differentiating among passengers on the basis of prohibited grounds of discrimination (such as age, national or ethnic origin, or sex) creates a risk of discrimination.

NSIRA recommended that the CBSA document its triage practices in a manner that demonstrates compliance with the Customs Act and, where applicable, the Protection of Passenger Information Regulations. It recommended that the CBSA ensure, in an ongoing manner, that its selection of risk indicators be adequately justified based on well-documented information or intelligence. NSIRA further recommended that the CBSA develop more robust and regular oversight of air passenger targeting, including updates to policies, procedures, training and other guidance. NSIRA also recommended that the CBSA begin collecting the data necessary to identify, analyze and mitigate discrimination-related risks stemming from air passenger targeting.

3.4 Multi-departmental reviews

Review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021

The review of federal institutions’ disclosures of information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA) in 2021 describes the results of a review of the 2021 disclosures made by federal institutions under this legislation. In 2022, NSIRA focused the review on Global Affairs Canada (GAC)’s proactive disclosures.

The SCIDA encourages and facilitates the disclosure of information between federal institutions to protect Canada against activities that undermine or threaten national security, subject to certain conditions. The SCIDA provides a two-part threshold that must be met before an institution can make a disclosure:

  • that the information will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution’s jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada (paragraph 5(1)(a)); and
  • that the information will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances (paragraph 5(1)(b)).

The SCIDA also includes provisions and guiding principles related to the management of disclosures, including accuracy and reliability statements and record keeping obligations.

NSIRA identified concerns that demonstrate the need for GAC to improve its training. NSIRA found that there is potential for confusion on whether the SCIDA is the appropriate mechanism for certain disclosures of national security–related information. For some disclosures, GAC did not meet the two-part threshold requirements of the SCIDA before disclosing the information, which was not compliant with the SCIDA. Two disclosures did not contain accuracy and reliability statements, as required under the SCIDA. With respect to record keeping, NSIRA recommended that departments document, at the same time as they are deciding to disclose information under the SCIDA, the information they are relying on to satisfy themselves that the disclosure is authorized under the Act (paragraph 9(1)(e)).

Review of departmental implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021

This review focused on departmental implementation of directions received through orders in council issued under the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act (ACA). This was NSIRA’s third annual statutorily mandated review of the implementation of all directions issued under the ACA. It assessed departments’ implementation of the directives received under the ACA and their operationalization of frameworks to address ACA requirements. As such, this review constitutes the first in-depth examination of the ACA within individual departments.

This year’s review covered the 2021 calendar year and was split into three sections. Section one addressed the statutory obligations of all departments. Sections two and three were an in- depth analysis of how the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) have implemented the directions under the ACA. NSIRA used case studies, where possible, to examine these departments’ implementation of their ACA framework.

This was the third consecutive year where no cases were referred to the deputy head level in any department. This is a requirement of the orders in council when officials are unable to determine if the substantial risk can be mitigated. Future reviews will be attuned to the issue of case escalation and departmental processes for decision-making.

In the 2019 NSIRA Review of Departmental Frameworks for Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities14, NSIRA recommended that “the definition of substantial risk should be codified in law or public direction.” NSIRA noted that some departments have accounted for this gap by relying on the definition of substantial risk in the 2017 ministerial directions. In light of the pending statutorily mandated review of the National Security Act, 2017 and the importance of the concept of substantial risk to the ACA regime, NSIRA reiterated its 2019 recommendation that the definition of substantial risk be codified in law.

In the review of departmental implementation of ACA in 2020, NSIRA identified the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Safety Canada as not yet having finalized their ACA policies. While the CBSA and Public Safety Canada continue to make advancements, these departments have not fully implemented an ACA framework and supporting policies and procedures.

The RCMP has a robust framework in place for the triage and processing of cases pertaining to the ACA. The in-depth analysis portion of this review found that the RCMP does not have a centralized system of documenting assurances and does not regularly monitor and update the assessment of the reliability of assurances. The RCMP has also not developed mechanisms to update country and entity profiles in a timely manner, and the information collected throughthe liaison officer during an operation is not centrally documented such that it can inform future assessments.

In the analysis of one of the RCMP’s Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee case files, NSIRA found that the RCMP’s Assistant Commissioner’s rationale for rejecting the risk advisory committee’s advice did not adequately address concerns consistent with the provisions of the orders in council. In particular, NSIRA found that the Assistant Commissioner erroneously considered the importance of the potential future strategic relationship with a foreign entity in the assessment of potential risk of mistreatment of the individual.

NSIRA found that GAC is now strongly dependent on operational staff and heads of mission for decision-making and accountability under the ACA. This is a marked change from the findings of the 2019 review that found decision-making was done by the Ministerial Direction Compliance Committee at Headquarters.

GAC has also not conducted an internal mapping exercise to determine which business lines are most likely to be implicated by the ACA. Considering the low number of cases this year and the size of GAC, and that ACA training is not mandatory for staff, NSIRA has concerns that not all areas involved in information sharing within Global Affairs Canada are being properly informed of their ACA obligations.

NSIRA also notes that GAC has no formalized tracking or documentation mechanism for the follow-up of caveats and assurances. This is problematic as mission staff are rotational and may therefore have no knowledge of previous caveats and assurances related to prior information sharing instances.

3.5 Closed review work

This past year NSIRA determined that certain ongoing review work would be closed or not result in a final report to a Minister. These decisions allow NSIRA to remain nimble and to pivot its work plan. Considerations such as shifting priorities, resourcing demands, ongoing work taking place within the reviewed department, and deconfliction with partner review agencies can all be factors that lead to a decision to close a review. Such decisions allow NSIRA to redirect its efforts and resources towards other important issues, and thereby maximize the value of its work.

For example, a review of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) Operations Research Branch was closed. A contributing factor in this decision was that the RCMP branch in question ceased to operate. Another example is the decision to cease an ongoing review of how the RCMP handles encryption in the interception of private communications in national security criminal investigations. This review was cancelled to support deconfliction efforts with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), who were conducting a similar review. Finally, a review of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre’s (FINTRAC) terrorist financing and information sharing regime, which was in its early stages, was cancelled at the same time that NSIRA decided to initiate a review of the Canada Revenue Agency’s (CRA) Review and Analysis Division, which delivers the CRA’s anti- terrorism mandate.

3.6 Technology in review

Integration of technology in review

Digital technologies continue to play a crucial role in the operational activities of Canada’s national security and intelligence community as agencies increasingly use new technologies to meet their mandates, propose new avenues for activities, and monitor new threats.

It remains essential for an accountability body like NSIRA to keep pace with the use of digital technologies in Canada’s national security and intelligence community. By staying apprised of rapidly changing technology ecosystems, NSIRA can ensure that the organizations it reviews are pursuing their mandates lawfully, reasonably and appropriately.

NSIRA’s Technology Directorate is a team of engineers, computer scientists, technologists andtechnology review professionals. The mandate of NSIRA’s Technology Directorate is to:

  • lead the review of Information Technology (IT) systems and capabilities;
  • assess a reviewed entity’s IT compliance with applicable laws, ministerial direction andpolicy;
  • conduct independent technical investigations;
  • recommend IT system and data safeguards to minimize the risk of legal non-compliance;
  • produce reports explaining and interpreting technical subjects;
  • lead the integration of technology themes into yearly NSIRA review plans;
  • leverage external expertise in the understanding and assessment of IT risks; and
  • support assigned NSIRA members in the investigation of complaints against CSIS, CSE or the RCMP when technical expertise is required to assess the evidence.

In 2022, the Technology Directorate grew from one full-time employee to three and welcomed a cooperative education student and two external researchers. With its increased capacity, the Technology Directorate expanded its analysis of technologies in many NSIRA reviews, started formalizing its research methodology, and began hosting micro-learning sessions and discussion forums focused on relevant technical issues, including dark patterns, open-source intelligence and encryption.

The Technology Directorate also began establishing an academic research network with the goal of supporting NSIRA reviews. To date, contributors to the research network have produced valuable internal memos, reports, and discussion forums, which have enhanced NSIRA’s knowledge of a broad set of technical issues.

During the last year, the Technology Directorate also launched NSIRA’s first technology-led review, which focuses on the lifecycle of CSIS information collected by technical capabilities under a Federal Court warrant. This review presents an opportunity for NSIRA to draw on technical standards and review processes used by its Five Eyes peers and the international review and oversight community. NSIRA has been using this review to develop a risk assessment model and technical inspection plan, expanding NSIRA’s broader review toolkit.

Future of technology in review

During the next year, NSIRA will continue to hire more full-time employees in the Technology Directorate, support cooperative education and use external researchers to add capacity. Doing so will augment NSIRA’s ability to keep pace with the rapidly changing and expanding use of digital technologies in Canada’s national security and intelligence ecosystem.

Building on the successes of its budding academic research network, the Technology Directorate intends to prioritize unclassified research on a number of topics, including open- source intelligence, advertising technologies and metadata (content versus non-content data).

NSIRA’s Technology Directorate will also support NSIRA’s complaint investigations team to understand where and when technology factors into their processes and pursuits.

3.7 Engagement with reviewees

Improvements and ongoing challenges

As discussed in previous annual reports, as a new review body, NSIRA experienced initial challenges in its interactions with departments and agencies being reviewed. These challenges are continually being addressed and NSIRA’s relationship with reviewees has matured. While work on this front is not done, reviewees have demonstrated improvements in cooperation and support to the independent review process. The following discussion captures general commentary on the overall engagement with reviewees that were the focus of the past year’s reviews. These overviews cover 2022 and up to the date of writing of this report. Related review-specific commentary or issues, where available, are discussed within each review’s overview above.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

After temporary restrictions and adjustments related to COVID-19 were lifted, NSIRA returned to its pre-pandemic level of occupancy within CSIS headquarters for CSIS-related reviews. This includes dedicated workspace and building passes for NSIRA employees reviewing CSIS activities. NSIRA employees have direct access to CSIS databases, and CSIS provides any training necessary, when requested, to navigate and access those systems. Generally, CSIS responds to NSIRA requests for information in a reasonably timely manner. Delays and challenges occur on occasion, but communication between NSIRA and CSIS is constructive in resolving issues.

Communications Security Establishment

NSIRA continued to use the space it procured within CSE’s headquarters in the Edward Drake Building to conduct review-related business. There was little improvement in 2022 to NSIRA’s access requirements at CSE. However, as of 2023, NSIRA is piloting limited direct access to CSE’s primary corporate document repository, GCDOCS. Issues remain and NSIRA is not in a position to assess the pilot project’s utility. In some instances, CSE has improved its responsiveness to NSIRA information requests in terms of timeliness, although some challenges remain with the quality of responses. NSIRA continues to work diligently with CSE to address these concerns.

Department of National Defence

Discussions continue with respect to developing dedicated office space and access to networks. While there has been little advancement on longer-term solutions, DND/CAF has worked with NSIRA to provide access to relevant documents, including sensitive files. DND/CAF has provided good access to facilities and people. Generally, responses to requests for information have been timely; however, a lack of proactiveness in DND/CAF disclosures has required NSIRA to send additional requests to ensure completeness and accuracy of information. Overall, the communication between NSIRA and DND/CAF has been constructive.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The past year was marked by inconsistencies in the RCMP’s responsiveness to NSIRA’s requests for information. The RCMP has taken steps to add to its capacity to respond to NSIRA, and this has yielded positive results. NSIRA does not have direct access to information systems but has been granted access to the files relevant to the matters under review. NSIRA has, on multiple occasions, had to send additional requests to ensure the completeness of files provided. In most cases, materials are reviewed on site in the dedicated NSIRA office space that has been provided within RCMP Headquarters. Despite challenges earlier in the year, NSIRA generally had access to people, including RCMP regular members who are experts in the areas under review. Overall, the engagement between NSIRA and the RCMP has seen improvements.

Global Affairs Canada

GAC has been responsive to NSIRA’s requests, made effort to clarify requests, and facilitated all meetings requested. During the review of departmental implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021, GAC provided NSIRA with documents requested within a reasonable time frame. NSIRA did not have direct access to GAC systems, however this did not have an impact on NSIRA’s ability to verify information or access sensitive files as GAC was able to transfer all materials requested either by email or through their secure portal.

Canada Border Services Agency

The CBSA has provided NSIRA with adequate access to information and people. Some challenges in terms of timeliness were resolved promptly after NSIRA sent notice of a pending advisory letter. These challenges appear to be related to the CBSA’s lengthy approval process for the release of documents to NSIRA. NSIRA does not have direct access to CBSA systems, but this has not impeded NSIRA’s access to sensitive files. Overall, the CBSA has been responsive to NSIRA requests, ensuring that CBSA employees are available to answer NSIRA’s questions.

Refining NSIRA’s confidence statements

Assessing responsiveness and verification

NSIRA continues to place importance on assessing the overall quality and efficiency of its interactions with reviewees. Previously, NSIRA captured this assessment in a “confidence statement,” which provided important additional context to the review, apprising readers of the extent to which NSIRA was able to verify necessary or relevant information, and therefore whether its confidence in the information was impacted. These statements were also informed by aspects such as access to information systems and delays in receiving requested information.

NSIRA has further refined and standardized its approach for evaluating the key aspects of its interactions with reviewees and going forward will evaluate the following criteria during each review:

  • timeliness of responses to requests for information;
  • quality of responses to requests for information;
  • access to systems;
  • access to people;
  • access to facilities;
  • professionalism; and
  • proactiveness.
Follow-up on timeliness and advisory letters

NSIRA’s 2021 public annual report committed to addressing the ongoing struggle for timely responses from reviewees for requested information. During the past year, all delays have been captured by a request for information tracking system. The results inform one of the criteria discussed above. Additionally, NSIRA continues to leverage its three-staged approach to address continued delays by sending advisory letters to senior officials and ultimately respective Ministers should delays persist. This advisory tool was used at five occasions in 2022, three of which were sent to CSE, and two to the RCMP.

Advisory letters sent to a reviewee during a review may be appended to the final report for both the appropriate minister’s and the public’s awareness of such delays. Combined with the updated assessment criteria discussed above, NSIRA works to provide transparency and awareness of both the challenges and successes on interactions with those reviewed.

Complaints investigations

4.1 Overview

In the three years since its establishment, NSIRA has focused on reforming the investigative process for complaints and developing procedures and practices to ensure the conduct of investigations is fair, timely and transparent. NSIRA previously reported on the creation of its Rules of Procedure, on its policy to commit to the publishing of redacted investigation reports, and on the implementation of the use of video technology. In the past year, NSIRA streamlined its jurisdictional assessment phase and its investigative process through the increased use of investigative interviews as the principal means of fact finding. These developments enabled NSIRA to deal with a significant volume of complaints over this reporting period.

After receiving a complaint, NSIRA must evaluate whether it is within NSIRA’s jurisdiction to investigate based on conditions stated in the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act). For complaints against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), NSIRA must be satisfied that the complaint against the respondent organization refers to an activity carried out by the organization and that the complaint is not trivial, frivolous or vexatious. For complaints referred from the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), NSIRA must receive and investigate a complaint referred to it under subsection 45.53(4.1) or 45.67(2.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act if satisfied that the complaint is not trivial, frivolous or vexatious or made in bad faith. For security clearance denials, with impacts upon individuals as set out in the NSIRA Act, NSIRA must receive and investigate the complaint.

NSIRA has developed a robust process to review and independently verify respondent organization information, mindful of the interests of the complainant and the security imperatives of the organization.

In the past, the Security Intelligence Review Committee routinely dealt with complaints related to CSIS by recourse to formal hearings. While NSIRA retains this statutory power, it has sought to make increasing use of interviews to ascertain the evidence required to fully investigate and consider complaints. Considering the security constraints that limit the disclosure of information to complainants during formal hearings, investigative interviews permit NSIRA access to information in a timely manner and are expected to decrease the length of time toresolve complaints. This will be important as NSIRA deals with an increased complaint case load owing to its mandate (which includes complaints related to CSIS, CSE, RCMP and security clearances), as well as delays resulting from COVID-19 impacts over the last three years.

4.2 Ongoing initiatives

NSIRA has committed to establishing service standards for the investigation of complaints, with the goal of completing 90% of investigations within NSIRA service standards by March 2024. During 2022, NSIRA began developing these service standards, which also aim to encourage prompt and efficient administrative decision-making. The service standards will set internal time limits for certain investigative steps for each type of complaint, under normal circumstances. The service standards will specify the circumstances under which those time limits do not apply. The development of the service standards includes tracking and data collection on whether NSIRA is meeting its own service standards in the investigation of complaints. NSIRA will finalize and publish its service standards in 2023 and is committed to reporting on whether they were met.

For the year ahead, NSIRA will continue to improve its website to promote accessibility to the investigation of complaints. More specifically, NSIRA will develop an online password-protected portal through which complainants will be able to submit complaints and receive updates on the status of their file.

NSIRA began the last phase of the study on race-based data and the collection of demographic information jointly commissioned with the CRCC. The study is assessing the viability of the collection of identity-based and demographic data as part of the CRCC’s ongoing anti-racism initiatives. Improved, more precise and more consistent tracking, collection and measurement of data is necessary to support anti-racism efforts in government. In completing the study, the CRCC and NSIRA will be informed on:

  • meaningful and purposeful data collection;
  • challenges with the collection of data;
  • perspective on how the data collected can be applied to address any potential systemic barriers in NSIRA’s investigations process and its anti-racism initiatives; and
  • public sentiment of the retention of identity-based data.

NSIRA notes that some reforms to its legislation would make it easier to fulfill its investigations mandate. Among these would include an allowance for NSIRA members to have jurisdiction to complete any complaint investigation files they have begun, even if their appointment term expires. Broadened rights of access to individuals and premises of reviewed organizations would enhance verification activities.

4.3 Investigation report summaries

Allegations against CSIS’s role in delaying security assessments regarding permanent resident and temporary resident visa applications (07-403-30)

Background

The complainants filed a complaint against CSIS alleging that it caused delays in their permanent resident and temporary resident visa applications.

Investigations

During NSIRA’s investigation, CSIS provided its advice in relation to the complainants’ permanent resident applications. In light of this information, NSIRA requested confirmation from the complainants regarding whether they still wished to proceed with their complaint. The complainants clarified that they wanted to either receive monetary compensation or an explanation for the delay that occurred in relation to their file.

Conclusion

NSIRA informed the complainants that it does not have the authority to make remedial orders such as requiring CSIS to make monetary compensation to a complainant. However, NSIRA inquired whether CSIS was interested in participating in an informal resolution process to resolve some of or all the issues in the complaint. In the context of NSIRA’s informal resolution process, information was provided to the complainants regarding CSIS’s involvement in their permanent resident and temporary resident visa applications. NSIRA attempted to communicate with the complainants on several occasions to determine whether they had any questions that would assist in clarifying the circumstances of their complaint.

NSIRA determined that reasonable attempts had been made to communicate with the complainants and issued reasons deeming the complaint abandoned as per NSIRA’s Rules of Procedure. The complaint investigation file was closed.

Allegations against CSIS, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency, and Public Safety Canada in relation to their role in processing immigration applications (07-405-1 et al.)

Background

Under subsection 45(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) referred 58 individual and group complaints to NSIRA. This matter constituted the first time NSIRA had received a section 45 referral from the CHRC.

The complainants, Iranian nationals, alleged that the Government of Canada discriminated against them on the basis of national or ethnic origin or race due to the delays in the processing of their temporary or permanent residency visa, or Canadian citizenship.

Under section 46 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, NSIRA is obliged to conduct an investigation and return a report to the CHRC. It further provides that on NSIRA’s report, the CHRC may dismiss the complaint or proceed to deal with the complaint.

NSIRA’s role in section 45 referrals is confined to scrutinizing the components of a matter that are based on considerations relating to the security of Canada and report findings of its investigation into classified information to the CHRC in an unclassified manner. NSIRA does not possess the authority to exercise the CHRC’s statutory discretion to refer the matter to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.

Investigation

During its investigation, NSIRA considered the evidence given by witnesses and submissions of their counsel during an investigative interview, and the documentation and submissions submitted by the government parties, including classified documents disclosed to NSIRA by CSIS, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Safety Canada.

Importantly, NSIRA heard evidence from the government parties in relation to a particular mandatory indicator developed by the CBSA and used by IRCC officers in deciding referrals for security screening of Iranian immigration applications. Prior to reforms made by August 2018, one indicator was based entirely on Iranian nationality, coupled only with the age and sex of the applicant. Where an applicant met the criteria, IRCC officers would automatically refer the file to the CBSA and CSIS for security screening. The evidence showed that the government abandoned mandatory indicators in 2018 because of efficacy concerns and because it contributed to delays.

NSIRA further noted that IRCC did not keep a record of the particular indicator on which the referral was based. This hindered NSIRA’s ability to investigate the other indicators that may have affected the processing of a complainant’s immigration application. That being said, NSIRA acknowledged that an indicator tracking code system was being piloted at the time of the investigative interview. This technical solution would allow for the tracking of the IRCC officers’ decisions to refer immigration applications for security screening through a coding system identifying the reason for the referral.

Conclusion

NSIRA found that:

  • the mandatory age and sex indicator used by IRCC in processing immigration applications until May 2018 relied exclusively on nationality, age and sex, which are listed as prohibited grounds of discrimination in section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act;
  • the mandatory age and sex indicator produced a disadvantage (including in terms of delays) to those Iranians who were subjected to security screening and to those whose own files were linked to these applicants;
  • at the material times at issue in this matter, the application of that mandatory indicator was not justifiable on national security grounds; and
  • the security screening process applicable to citizenship applications in this matter did not produce a disadvantage based on grounds enumerated in the Canadian Human Rights Act, as citizenship applications received by IRCC are sent to CSIS for security screening, regardless of the applicant’s country of birth.

NSIRA submitted its report to the CHRC so that it can assess whether there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for a referral to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal or whether to dismiss the complaints.

Investigation of a complaint regarding the revocation of a security clearance by the Chief of the Defence Staff (1170-17-7)

Background

The complainant was a regular force soldier who held a Top-Secret security clearance. The results of the complainant’s polygraph examination, although not exclusively relied on, were the primary influence in the security assessments of the complainant prepared by CSIS and the DND Departmental Security Officer. As a result of those assessments, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) revoked the complainant’s security clearance. The complainant filed a complaint with NSIRA against the CDS over the revocation of the security clearance.

Investigation

During the Investigation, NSIRA heard from government witnesses from DND and CSIS about the polygraph examination, the investigation into the complainant, and the process leading to the revocation of the complainant’s security clearance. In addition to the oral evidence, the government parties filed documents and made submissions. NSIRA also considered the oral evidence and written submissions provided by the complainant.

NSIRA reviewed all of the evidence it received to determine whether there were reasonable grounds for the CDS to revoke the complainant’s security clearance and to ensure the accuracy of the information the CDS used to reach the decision to revoke.

NSIRA found several deficiencies in the way the complainant’s polygraph was handled, reported and disseminated. In addition, NSIRA found that exculpatory facts were not contextualized nor placed before the CDS prior to the decision to revoke.

Conclusion

NSIRA found that the information the CDS relied on to make the decision to revoke was not accurate. As a result, the decision to revoke the clearance was not reasonable.

NSIRA recommended that CSIS apologize to the complainant for the manner in which the polygraph was handled, reported and disseminated and that the CDS revisit the decision to revoke the complainant’s security clearance.

Review of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s report regarding a public complaint (07-407-3)

Background

The complainant filed a complaint with the CRCC related to the conduct of members of the RCMP. The complainant alleged that the RCMP carried out an unjustified and arbitrary arrest of their minor son, conducted a zealous and abusive search of the family home, and publicized the arrest.

In addition, the complainant alleged that the RCMP disclosed information to U.S. authorities, stated that the complainant’s son’s arrest form would be forgotten and destroyed, and violated the son’s safety and that of his family, their constitutional rights and their whistleblower rights.

The RCMP concluded, in a report sent to the complainant pursuant to section 45.64 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (RCMP Act), that the members had acted appropriately and consequently did not support any of the complainant’s allegations.

The complainant referred their complaint to the CRCC for review as they were not satisfied with the RCMP’s findings. The CRCC referred the complaint to NSIRA pursuant to subsection 45.53(4.1) of the RCMP Act.

Investigation

NSIRA determined that it had jurisdiction to review the request for review of the RCMP’s report under section 19 of the NSIRA Act.

NSIRA’s investigation included a review of:

  • the complaint;
  • the complainant’s request for review filed with the CRCC;
  • the RCMP investigation file related to the complaint, including documents provided by the complainant during the investigation; and
  • the RCMP’s operational file related to the complaint, including numerous audio and video recordings, as well as relevant policies and legislation.
Conclusion

NSIRA found that the RCMP’s conclusions in its report were reasonable.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, NSIRA pointed out to the RCMP the importance of the decision- maker and signatory of an RCMP report having no prior involvement with the file that is the subject of the complaint, in addition to the importance of complete and contemporaneous notetaking.

4.4 Statistics on complaints investigations

Investigation activity continued at significant levels in 2022 (see Annex D). One noteworthy difference in activity from 2021 to 2022 was the significant decline in the number of active investigations: from 81 in 2021 to 19 in this reporting period. This decrease is largely attributed to a referral of close to 60 related files from the CHRC, which were dealt with during this reporting period.

Under section 16 of the NSIRA Act, any person may make a complaint to NSIRA with respect to any activity carried out by CSIS; section 17 covers complaints related to CSE activities. However, for NSIRA to be able to accept a complaint, the complainant to CSIS must first send a letter of complaint to the Director of CSIS; for CSE complaints, a letter must first be sent to the CSE Chief. NSIRA will investigate the complaint if the complainant has not received a response within a period of time that NSIRA considers reasonable or if the complainant is dissatisfied with the response given. In that regard, NSIRA observed that in 2022, 53% of complainants did not receive a letter from CSIS in response to their letter of complaint to the Director of CSIS.

There is a need to increase awareness and understanding on the part of members of the public and complainants on NSIRA’s investigative mandate and process. For example, NSIRA members do not have the ability to make remedial orders, such as compensation, or to order a government department to pay damages to complainants. NSIRA continues to make improvements to its public website to raise this awareness and better inform the public and complainants on the investigations mandate and investigative procedures it follows.

Expanding NSIRA partnerships

NSIRA believes that establishing a community of practice in the business of independent review and oversight is essential and is actively contributing to this effort. During the past year, it resumed and expanded its engagement with valuable partners, both domestically and internationally, and has already reaped the benefits of these efforts.

International partnerships

NSIRA has identified international relationships with counterparts as a priority for its institutional development. During the past year, NSIRA benefited from excellent free-flowing and extensive interactions with its closest international partners. A better understanding of the parameters of the review and oversight activities of NSIRA’s international counterparts, and sharing best practices, are vital to the agency’s growth.

Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council

Since its inception, NSIRA has been an active participant in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council. The council comprises agencies with an oversight and review mandate concerning the national security activities in their respective countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States). NSIRA participates alongside the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner as Canada’s delegation to the council. The group meets annually, and NSIRA participated in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council conference in Washington D.C. in 2022. NSIRA has the distinct pleasure of hosting council partners in Ottawa in fall 2023.

NSIRA also frequently engages bilaterally with council partners at the working level. These exchanges allow NSIRA to better understand critical issues impacting its work, compare challenges and best practices in review and oversight methodology, and discuss views on subjects of mutual interest and concern. For instance, learning about council partners’ information access rights, and the legal framework enabling such access, has helped to contextualize some of NSIRA’s own access challenges.

NSIRA met with one of its council partners, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office in London, U.K. The Commissioner’s office has a broad mandate of activities that includes, among others, approving warrants authorized by the Secretary of State and the independent oversight of the use of the powers by the U.K.’s security and intelligence community. The multi-day meetings provided an opportunity to better understand each other’s respective organizations, exchange ideas and share best practices. NSIRA met with a number of departments with whom the Commissioner’s office engages and shadowed a day-long inspection carried out by the Commissioner’s office. Of particular interest was the Commissioner’s office’s approach for following up on the implementation of recommendations it provides and its insights on the production of annual reports. Support for this important partnership continues, and NSIRA has further engaged with Commissioner’s office staff to cement this strong relationship.

NSIRA was also able to complete working-level visits to the office of Australia’s Inspector- General of Intelligence and Security and to offices of some members of the U.S. inspector general community in Washington.

Additional European engagement

NSIRA also participated in the International Intelligence Oversight Forum, which brings together oversight, review and data protection agencies from all over the world. The event was productive and NSIRA had the additional benefit of constructive bilateral exchanges with participating institutions.

As part of its efforts to build strong relationships with continental European counterparts in like- minded jurisdictions with strong accountability mechanisms, NSIRA visited the Norwegian Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Intelligence and Security Services, the Danish Intelligence Oversight Board, the Netherlands’ Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services, and the Swiss Independent Oversight Authority for Intelligence Activities.

Each of these highly productive visits allowed NSIRA to learn from these partners and make its work more visible within this review community.

Stronger domestic coordination

NSIRA continued to invest in strengthening relationships with key domestic partners — the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP and the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner, as well as the various agents of Parliament who play a key role in government accountability.

NSIRA and NSICOP have complementary roles in enhancing accountability for federal national security and intelligence activities and are required by law to cooperate in the fulfillment of their respective mandates. Regular cooperation meetings are held at various levels and the two agencies continue to refine ways to cooperate and coordinate. NSIRA and NSICOP have supported each other’s work by communicating regularly on review plans to avoid duplication and to make adjustments where required. These coordination efforts contributed to NSIRA’s decision to cease work on an RCMP encryption review. NSIRA has also provided, after ministerial consultation, many of its final reports to NSICOP. For its part, NSICOP has provided NSIRA with its classified reports and background briefings. These exchanges have allowed both organizations to refine their review topics and methodologies. NSICOP’s and NSIRA’s legal teams have also engaged productively, with a view to working through common access challenges, among other things. These frequent and in-depth exchanges serve as an important foundation for a cohesive and robust national security and intelligence review apparatus, and NSIRA and NSICOP enjoy a level of cooperation that is among the strongest of their international counterparts.

As discussed under Ongoing initiatives, NSIRA and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP have jointly commissioned a study on race-based data and the collection of demographic information. This study will inform each organization’s approach to developing and implementing an identity-based data strategy in the context of its complaints investigations. The study is currently in its last phase and is expected to be completed in fiscal year 2023–2024.

In 2022, the NSIRA Secretariat joined a network of legal professionals from across the various agents of Parliament. As a separate agency and separate employer mandated with supporting independent oversight, NSIRA’s Secretariat benefits from collaborating with this community of practice through discussions on legal issues of common interest, professional development and knowledge transfer initiatives.

Emerging cooperation in technology

Building partnerships allows NSIRA’s growing Technology Directorate to gather diverse perspectives, collaborate on common goals, refine methodologies, and build on established best practices. In 2022, the team focused on building relationships with peers who share mandates on technical topics, such as privacy-enhancing technologies, automated decision- making and service design. Within Canada, this included collaboration with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner’s Technology Analysis Directorate, the artificial intelligence team at the Treasury Board Secretariat’s Office of the Chief Information Officer, and the Canadian Digital Service.

International and academic collaborations offered access to rich technical knowledge and expertise of other review and oversight bodies. Knowledge management, talent retention and evolving technical capabilities became the focal point of regular engagement with teams at the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, Australia’s Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, and the Norwegian Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Intelligence and Security Services. Finally, 2022 gave rise to NSIRA’s external research program aimed at informing and supporting reviews already in progress with relevant and timely technical expertise. Building on the past year’s efforts, the Technology Directorate intends to continue developing domestic and international partnerships, including expanding its network with academics, civil society and commercial leaders to ensure key technological issues factor into its approaches.

Conclusions

As NSIRA fulfills its role within Canada’s security and intelligence landscape, it is continually motivated by the vital importance of its mandate. This is expressed through each review and complaint investigation completed. In executing its mission in 2022, NSIRA continued to build best practices across the agency. This ongoing growth and evolution position it well to take on new challenges.

As the agency’s experience grows so too does its knowledge, and it is confident in its ability to be a leading voice in the review and investigations discourse. Partnerships and engagement with reviewees are maturing, and NSIRA is already reaping the benefits of significant effort on both fronts. Applying lessons learned from these partnerships allows NSIRA to iterate and improve its processes and approaches. While there is there is still much work ahead, the results are encouraging.

As NSIRA’s members consider the agency’s accomplishments this past year, they are proud of the diligence and enthusiasm that Secretariat staff have demonstrated. NSIRA has risen to the challenge of changing circumstances and growth and have done so with an outstanding professionalism. The agency looks forward to the year ahead as it carries on with its important work.

Annexes

Annex A: Abbreviations

Abbreviation Full Name
ACA Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act
ACO active cyber operations
CAF Canadian Armed Forces
CBSA Canada Border Services Agency
Cyber Centre Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CDS Chief of the Defence Staff
CHRC Canadian Human Rights Commission
CII Canadian-identifying information
CRA Canada Revenue Agency
CRCC Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DCO defensive cyber operations
DLS Directorate of Legal Services
DND Department of National Defence
DOJ Department of Justice
FINTRAC Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre
FIRAC Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee
GAC Global Affairs Canada
IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
IRTC Information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada
IT Information technology
JPAF Joint Planning and Authorities Framework
MA Ministerial Authorization
NSICOP National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
NSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
NSLAG National Security Litigation and Advisory Group (Justice)
PS Public Safety Canada
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCIDA Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act
SIGINT Signals intelligence
TRM Threat reduction measure

Annex B: Financial overview, staffing, achievements and priorities

Financial overview

The NSIRA Secretariat is organized according to two main business lines: Mandate Management and Internal Services. The table below presents a comparison of spending between 2021 and 2022 for each of these two business lines.

(In dollars) Expenditures (2022) Expenditures (2021)
Mandate Management 7,679,950 7,523,552
Internal Services 11,033,465
8,926,178
Total 18,713,415 16,449,730

In the 2022 calendar year, the Secretariat spent $18.7 million, a $2.3 million (14%) increase from the $16.4 million spent in 2021. This spending increase is mainly attributed to the ramping up of a large infrastructure project and an increased use of external services for corporate activities.

Staffing

As of June 30, 2023, NSIRA Secretariat staff complement stood at 76. In an attempt to address hiring and retention challenges, the Secretariat implemented several initiatives including the introduction of an internal development program for its mandate management sector employees. The Program aims at promoting existing employees once they acquire the level of knowledge and competencies required to be promoted. The program is individualized, informed by regular review of progress in the achievement of core knowledge and competencies expectations. The Secretariat has also launched a program to hire recent Ph D. graduates in fields of expertise that are of interests to NSIRA’s mandate.

The Secretariat also continues to use modern and flexible staffing strategies, procedures and practices. It has adapted its operations and activities to allow, to the extent possible, a flexible hybrid work model.

Clearer articulation of its core competency profiles, operational methodologies and practices also enabled a more effective integration and onboarding of employees into the organization.

Having hired a dedicated employee responsible for the implementation of an employee wellness agenda combined with an active Mental Health and Wellness Committee, several initiatives have been delivered in an aim to foster workplace well-being and increased interactions between employees.

Progress on foundational initiatives

Accessibility, employment equity, diversity, and inclusion

Informed by its three-year action plan and its commitments to the Clerk of the Privy Council, the Secretariat’s internal committee responsible for accessibility, employment equity, diversity and inclusion invited guests and led discussions aimed at increasing awareness, celebrating the Secretariat’s diverse workforce, and identifying barriers and solutions with respect to these themes.

NSIRA also took concrete steps as part of its mandated activities to include, among other things, a Gender-based Analysis Plus lens into the design and implementation of its policies and programs. As a result, NSIRA’s renewed forward-looking review plan is informed by considerations related to anti-racism, equity and inclusion. These considerations apply to the process of selecting reviews to undertake, as well as to the analysis that takes place within individual reviews. NSIRA reviews routinely consider the potential for national security or intelligence activities to result in disparate outcomes for various communities and will continue to do so in the year ahead.

In 2022, NSIRA also continued to work with another review body to develop strategies for the collection, analysis and use of identity-based data. The goal of the exercise is to rely on public consultations to determine how the public perceives the collection, analysis and use of identity- based data in relation to mandate.

Finally, the Secretariat also developed and posted its inaugural accessibility plan on NSIRA’s external website. The plan outlines the steps that will be taken over the next three years to increase physical and information accessibility, both for employees within the organization as well as for Canadians more generally.

Facilities projects, technology and security

The Secretariat is in the process of retrofitting additional workspace to enable it to accommodate all its employees within the confines of one building. The construction phase is expected to be completed late in 2023. Over the course of 2022, the Secretariat worked closely with lead security agencies to ensure the fit-up meets best practices and established standards.

Transparency and privacy

The Secretariat continues to promote transparency by dedicating resources to redact, declassify and release previous reports from the Security Intelligence Review Committee, in addition to proactively releasing NSIRA’s reviews. In 2022, a major upgrade to NSIRA’s external website was initiated with the goal of increasing access to information including access to redacted review reports and recommendations. It is expected that the website will be released in 2023.

From a privacy perspective, the NSIRA Secretariat continued to make progress further to the privacy impact assessment exercise conducted in fiscal year 2021-2022 in relation to review activities and internal services. It also initiated a privacy impact assessment for the investigations function. This work is expected to be completed in fiscal year 2023-2024.

Considering the importance of privacy as part of its activities, NSIRA took concrete steps to implement best practices to protect the privacy of individuals as part of complaints investigations and as part of the conduct of reviews.

Annex C: Review findings and recommendations

This annex lists the full findings and recommendations for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) reviews completed in 2022, as well as reviewees’ management responses to NSIRA’s recommendations, to the fullest extent possible at the time of publication. NSIRA will update such information from all reviews when they are published on its website.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service review

Threat Reduction Measures Annual Review

NSIRA’s findings

NSIRA finds that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS’s) use of its TRM mandate in 2021 was broadly consistent with its use in preceding years.

For all the cases reviewed, NSIRA finds that CSIS met its obligations under the law, specifically the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sections 12.1 and 12.2 of the CSIS Act.

For all the cases reviewed, NSIRA finds that CSIS sufficiently established a “rational link”between the proposed measure and the identified threat.

For Case 1 and Case 2, NSIRA finds that CSIS met its obligations under the 2015 Ministerial Direction for Operations and Accountability and the 2019 Ministerial Direction for Accountability issued by the Minister of Public Safety.

For Case 3, NSIRA finds that CSIS did not meet its obligations under the 2015 Ministerial Direction for Operations and Accountability and the 2019 Ministerial Direction for Accountability issued by the Minister of Public Safety.

With respect to legal risk assessments, NSIRA finds that greater specificity regarding legal risks, and direction as to how said risks could be mitigated and/or avoided, resulted in more detailed outcome reporting vis-à-vis legal compliance.

For Case 2 and Case 3, NSIRA finds that CSIS did not meet its obligations with respect to one requirement of its Conduct of Operations, Section 12.1 Threat Reduction Measures, Version 4. CSIS did not meet its internal policy requirements regarding the timelines to submit TRM implementation reports.

For Case 3, NSIRA finds that the Intended Outcome Report was not completed in a timely manner.

NSIRA finds that current policy for the completion of Strategic Impact Reports may inhibit the timely production of important information.

NSIRA’s recommendations

Recommendation
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that formal legal risk assessments be conducted for TRMs involving [*sensitive factors*].
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that CSIS consider and evaluate whether legal risk assessments under TRM Modernization comply with applicable ministerial direction.
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that CSIS work with the Department of Justice to ensure that legal risk assessments include clear and specific direction regarding possible legal risks and how they can be avoided/mitigated during implementation of the TRM.

Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that Implementation Reports specify how the legal risks identified in the legal risk assessment were avoided/mitigated during implementation of the TRM.

Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that CSIS specify in its Conduct of Operations, Section 12.1 Threat Reduction Measures when the Intended Outcome Report is required, as it does for the Strategic Impact Report.
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that CSIS integrate in policy a requirement that the Strategic Impact Report be completed at the expiry of the TRM authority.

Communications Security Establishment reviews

Review of the Communications Security Establishment’s Governance of Active and Defensive Cyber Operations — Part 2

NSIRA’s recommendations

NSIRA finds that the Global Affairs Canada Foreign Policy Risk Assessment process, as well as the related international legal assessment, improved since the Governance Review, for Communications Security Establishment (CSE) active cyber operations (ACOs) and defensive cyber operations (DCOs).

NSIRA finds that Global Affairs Canada does not have capability to independently assess potential risks resulting from the techniques used in CSE ACOs and DCOs.

NSIRA finds that CSE and the Department of Justice demonstrated a thorough understanding of section 32 of the CSE Act. However, CSE does not appropriately consult with the Department of Justice at the [*specific step*]15 stage to ensure that the assessment of legal compliance remains valid.

NSIRA finds that CSE’s applications for authorizations issued under subsections 29(1) and 30(1) of the CSE Act for [*description*] activities did not include all the available information relevant to a meaningful assessment of the requirements in subsections 34(1) and (4) of the CSE Act.

NSIRA finds that there is potential for overlap between CSE and CSIS activities in the context of capabilities used by CSE to conduct its ACOs and DCOs. However, CSE did not consistentlyconsult with CSIS about CSE’s cyber operations.

NSIRA finds that despite close collaboration with Global Affairs Canada, and the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces on ACOs and DCOs, CSE did not demonstrate consistent engagement with CSIS or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to determine whether the objective of an ACO or DCO could not reasonably be achieved by other means.

NSIRA finds that the Chief’s applications for active and defensive cyber operations activities for the period of review did not accurately describe the relationship between a cyber operation, and intelligence collection.

NSIRA finds that, in its [*a specific document*], CSE did not always provide clarity pertaining to foreign intelligence missions.

NSIRA finds that CSE’s ACOs and DCOs that were planned or conducted prior to July 30, 2021,including the case studies analyzed in this report, were lawful.

NSIRA finds that there is significant overlap between activities conducted under the ACO and DCO aspects of CSE’s mandate, as well as between all four aspects of CSE’s mandate.

NSIRA’s recommendations, and CSE response

Recommendation CSE and GAC Response (June 21st , 2023)
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that Global Affairs Canada develop or otherwise leverage capability to enable it to independently assess potential risks resulting from the techniques used in CSE ACOs and DCOs. Disagree. CSE and GAC disagree with this recommendation.
In accordance with the CSE-GAC Governance Framework, GAC assesses CSE cyber operations for foreign policy risks and compliance with international law. CSE’s internal risk assessment process assesses the cyber operation for technical risks based on the techniques used.
Just as CSE relies upon GAC to provide expertise in foreign policy and international law, GAC relies upon CSE to provide expertise on technologies and techniques at the forefront of development.
Accurate assessment of all risks from a cyber operation relies on the continuation of open and honest dialogue and trust between GAC and CSE. As such, CSE will continue to share information with GAC on techniques, whenever their use may have an impact on GAC’s foreign policy risk assessment.
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that the Department Justice be fully consulted at all stages of an ACO or DCO, particularly prior to operational execution. Agree in principle. CSE agrees with this recommendation in principle.
CSE believes that the advice and guidance provided by the Department of Justice (DOJ) representatives embedded in CSE's Directorate of Legal Services (DLS) is integral to CSE's success. CSE consults with DLS at all relevant stages of a cyber operation. As a matter of practice, CSE consults DLS throughout the Joint Planning and Authorities Framework (JPAF) process and at a key stage, and more consultation is conducted when an activity is new or novel.
Internal tools developed by DLS are used to ensure that activities do not contravene the prohibitions set out in the CSE Act and assist analysts in identifying when a higher risk necessitates further legal review. Additionally, CSE's internal operational policy team is consulted on all key stages.
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that CSE abandon the practice of generic ACO and DCO applications to the Minister of National Defence, and instead submit individual applications. Disagree. CSE and GAC disagree with this recommendation.
When submitting an application for these particular ACO and DCO Ministerial Authorizations (MAs), CSE and GAC always ensure that the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of foreign Affairs are provided with a sufficient amount of information to make an informed decision as to whether CSE’s proposed activities are reasonable and proportionate against a specific set of objectives. To that end, these particular ACO and DCO MAs are structured around key objectives in countering a number of well-defined threats globally. In that sense, they are not “generic”, but their scope is broad enough to give CSE the flexibility to act against a wide range of targets, when the identity of threat actor or the location and context is unknown at the time of application.
For any operations assessed as falling under the authority of these MAs, the current governance framework allows for appropriate risk management of operations. CSE provides GAC with detailed mission plans for each operation, which allows for a proper assessment of foreign policy risks associated with CSE’s cyber operations.
Following Recommendation no. 1 from the Governance review (FCO 1), CSE and GAC increased the amount of information included in the 2021 application for this MA. The level of detail was improved further in the 2022 application. Moreover, CSE and GAC work collaboratively on any new MAs to both ensure that relevant foreign policy objectives are reflected and that authorized operations are sufficiently scoped. Whenever an activity does not fit within the category covered by these MAs, CSE will submit a new application specific to that circumstance.
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that CSE always engage with CSIS, the RCMP, and any other federal departments or agencies as to whether those departments are in a position to reasonably achieve the objective of a cyber operation.
Agree. CSE agrees with this recommendation.
CSE values the importance of consulting with all relevant Government of Canada stakeholders. During the planning of operations, CSE has and will continue to strengthen its collaborative relationships with its partners, including engaging with CSIS, RCMP, and other relevant federal departments or agencies whose mandates may intersect with a planned ACO or DCO.
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that the Chief’s applications for active and defensive cyber operations inform the Minister of National Defence that acquisition of information under a valid foreign intelligence, cybersecurity, or emergency authorization, [*description*]. Agree. CSE and GAC agree with this recommendation.
This recommendation has already been addressed in the applications for the 2022-23 ACO and DCO Ministerial Authorizations.
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that documentation prepared as part of the CSE’s cyber operations framework provide clear links to all known applicable foreign intelligence (or cybersecurity) missions. Agree. CSE agrees with this recommendation.
Since the period under review, and partially stemming from NSIRA recommendations issued in the Governance review (FCO 1), CSE has implemented this change into its cyber operations framework. Under the current framework, the documentation now includes links to s.16 or s.17 operations that are directly relevant to a s.18 or s.19 cyber operation.
Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that CSE continue to refine, and to define, the distinctions between activities conducted under different aspects of its mandate, particularly between ACO and DCO activities, but also with regard to foreign intelligence and cybersecurity activities. Agree in principle. CSE agrees with this recommendation in principle.
CSE agrees with the principle of understanding the nuances of its mandate. The CSE Act (ss.15-20) expressly distinguishes between the five aspects of the mandate. Operations are planned with an understanding of the scope and boundaries of the authorizing aspect of the mandate. CSE works closely with the Directorate of Legal Services (DLS) and its Operational Policy team to ensure that operations are planned and conducted under the appropriate authorities.
In the body of its report, NSIRA acknowledges both the clarity of the Act and of CSE’s ability to explain why an operation should be authorized under a particular aspect of the mandate. CSE’s policies and procedures governing the planning and conduct of operations rely on the distinction between aspects of the mandate. CSE’s Mission Policy Suite addresses each aspect of the mandate and provides a distinction between ACOs and DCOs. The cyber operations framework provides for planning documentation that sets out why the objectives and nature of the planned operation align with the authorities of an ACO versus a DCO, notwithstanding the techniques being applied. Finally, CSE is in the process of launching updated legal and policy training to its operational staff.

Foreign intelligence review

NSIRA’s findings

NSIRA finds that CSE has not updated the Minister of National Defence since [*year*] on its relationship with a foreign partner.

NSIRA finds that in the context of a joint operation, CSE’s analytic exchanges with a partner did not comply with all of CSE’s internal policy requirements relating to such exchanges with its partners.

NSIRA finds that CSE’s applications to the Minister of National Defence for Foreign Intelligence Authorizations did not describe the full extent of CSE’s involvement in [*specific activity*].

NSIRA finds that CSE did not appropriately apply its Mistreatment Risk Assessment process to information shared with a foreign partner. CSE conducted a mistreatment risk assessment only after having already shared substantial information with the partner.

NSIRA finds that CSE did not appropriately justify its mistreatment risk for targets of an operation.

[*Finding not releasable in public report*]

NSIRA finds that CSE does not have a mechanism to obtain timely and concrete verification ofa person’s Canadian status in order to verify that it is not directing its activities at Canadians.

NSIRA finds that CSE has not developed policies and procedures to govern its participation in [*specific activity*].

NSIRA finds that CSE’s contributions to operations with its partners are not governed by any written arrangements with operational activities.

NSIRA finds that CSE’s contributions to operations led by a partner have not been accompanied with the operational planning and risk assessment as described by CSE to the Minister of National Defence.

NSIRA finds that CSE does not obtain operational plans or risk assessments developed by its partners leading the operations, nor contributes to the development of these plans or their associated parameters.

NSIRA finds that CSE’s application for the Authorization did not inform the Minister of National Defence that it intends to conduct testing and evaluation activities under the authority of the Authorization.

NSIRA’s recommendations, and CSE response

Recommendation CSE and GAC Response (March 14th , 2023)
Recommendation 1: CSE should update the Minister of National Defence on of its relationship with a foreign partner. Agree. CSE agrees with this recommendation.

CSE concurs and regularly updates the minister on topics of importance, including the status of relationships with international partners.

CSE plans to continue providing comprehensive updates to the Minister on its international engagements and relationships with foreign partners, including the named foreign partner.

Recommendation 2: CSE should comply with the Releasable SIGINT Products requirements pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Mission Policy Suite when conducting analytic exchanges with its partners in the performance of all operational activities. Agree. CSE agrees with this recommendation.

CSE recognizes that despite having robust policies, practices, and procedures, improvements can still be made in outreach and training to mission staff. CSE is working on a comprehensive revision of its operational legal and policy training, and will consider this recommendation when developing its compliance plans for 2023–2024.

Recommendation 3: CSE should describe to the Minister of National Defence the full extent of its participation in any activities when applying for Foreign Intelligence Authorizations. Agree. CSE agrees with this recommendation.

CSE will include relevant details to clarify [specific activities] in its next Ministerial Authorization application at a level of detail consistent with Ministerial Authorization applications.

Recommendation 4: CSE must perform a Mistreatment Risk Assessment prior to sharing information with [*country*] in accordance with parameters established with the Minister of National Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Privy Council Office in the development of CSE’s working arrangement with this partner. Agree in principle. CSE agrees with this recommendation in principle.

CSE is of the view that its policy instruments are already clear and that there are already established best practices when sharing information with foreign entities about identifiable individuals. CSE continually seeks to improve both the implementation of internal policies, and the training and internal outreach programs for its analysts.

Additionally, it is important to note that there exists a strong mitigating factor in the overarching agreements with [*country*] which contain explicit language regarding how SIGINT may be used, and with explicit prohibitions for purposes that could result in mistreatment.

Recommendation 5: When performing a Mistreatment Risk Assessment, CSE should specify why and how its risk rating applies to each individual implicated in the sharing of information with a foreign partner. Agree in principle. CSE agrees with this recommendation in principle.

Since 2011, CSE has continually refined its mistreatment risk assessment process and documentation. In certain cases where an initial assessment has determined that all of the conditions of information sharing will be identical across a category of individuals in an activity, CSE has determined that a group mistreatment risk assessment appropriately documents the risk profiles for all individuals associated with that activity. In the event that the information sharing conditions change, or specific characteristics related to an individual associated with the activity may change the risk, a separate assessment is conducted.

CSE has continued to improve our documentation to ensure that it better reflects the analysis behind the risk assessment and why a rationale would apply to a group of individuals under a single activity. As CSE’s operational activities continue to evolve, the mistreatment risk assessment process grows to reflect the requirements of those activities.

Recommendation 6: CSE should ensure that a foreignness assessment is completed prior to commencing collection and reporting on individuals. CSE should also develop policy requirements for the documentation, tracking, and management review of foreignness assessments. Agree in principle. CSE agrees with this recommendation in principle.

As part of the SIGINT process, and relying on a combination of policy, administrative, and technological means, CSE already documents a targeting justification demonstrating reasonable grounds to believe that a target is a foreign entity outside Canada. This auditable justification crystallizes the current state of knowledge about the foreignness of a target, at the time of targeting.

In addition, as analysts perform their duties and build knowledge about a target, a foreignness assessment persists throughout SIGINT analysis in a process that is guided by the Mission Policy Suite. Each new fragment of information acquired about a target increases the body of knowledge evaluated by an analyst, including more information about a target’s foreignness that may not have been available at the time of targeting.

If at any point the analyst no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the target is a foreign entity outside Canada, the analyst must de-target the associated selectors and register a privacy incident with CSE’s Program for Operational Compliance team, who will guide internal processes through any additional required remedial steps, such as purging any collected information. In addition, a citizenship check can also be requested from Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) if sufficient information is available.

Recommendation 7: CSE should develop a mechanism with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, or other federal institutions as appropriate, to facilitate timely and concrete confirmation of the Canadian status of individuals implicated in CSE’s operational activities. Agree. CSE agrees with this recommendation.

This recommendation was previously put forward in the SCIDA 2020 final report. CSE continues to pursue discussions with IRCC for an information sharing agreement. CSE is reengaging at both working and executive levels to facilitate progress.

It should be recognized that in order to produce more accurate results, a citizenship check needs to include specific information regarding an individual target, which is not always available to CSE. In the absence of that information, a citizenship check is not guaranteed to produce conclusive results, and cannot be considered as a concrete confirmation of citizenship status. In addition, it is CSE’s understanding that IRCC databases may not capture Canadians born with Canadian citizenship. The citizenship check process and associated timelines are fully within the jurisdiction of IRCC.

Recommendation 8: CSE should develop policies and procedures to govern its participation in [*specific activities*] within the program. Agree. CSE agrees with this recommendation.

CSE remains committed to building robust policy frameworks to govern its activities and ensure that its work continues at the highest level of integrity.

While at the time of review, policies and procedures specific to the program were still in development, CSE’s existing policies and procedures include principles that govern all foreign intelligence activities conducted under CSE authorities, including [*program*].

Recommendation 9: CSE should develop written arrangements with its partners implicated in activities, to set the parameters for collaborating on these activities. Disagree. CSE disagrees with this recommendation.

CSE has enjoyed a uniquely strong relationship with partners for [*amount of time*]. By leveraging shared capabilities, Canada benefits greatly, magnifying its ability to provide quality information exponentially. The cooperation with our partners means that we [*description*], with procedures in place to manage our interactions. CSE’s operations with partners are based on bilateral information sharing and technical cooperation arrangements.

Recommendation 10: When collaborating on an operation with a partner, CSE should prepare an operational plan and conduct a risk assessment associated with the activity with a view to ensuring an operation’s alignment with CSE’s priorities and risk tolerance levels. CSE should also ensure that parameters and any caveats for the partner’s [*specific activity*] be outlined and acknowledged. Agree. CSE agrees with this recommendation.

CSE policy outlines that, when conducting SIGINT operations, including joint operations with a partner, the activity be approved via an operational plan and risk assessment in order to exercise an aspect of the CSE mandate.

Collaboration that involves [*specific activity*] without participating in the resulting operation does not require operational plans or risk assessments to be created at CSE, but rather at the partner agency conducting the operation and adopting the risk. CSE will, however, ensure that the partner agency is aware of and acknowledges any caveats or parameters.

Recommendation 11: When applying for a Ministerial Authorization, CSE should disclose to the Minister any related testing or evaluation activities that it intends to undertake pursuant to paragraph 23(1)(c) of the CSE Act. Disagree. CSE disagrees with this recommendation.

The purpose of a ministerial authorization is to seek authorities for activities that would contravene an Act of Parliament or involve the acquisition of information that interferes with the reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) of a Canadian or any person in Canada. Testing activities, as per s.23(1)(c) of the CSE Act, are not carried out under the authorities of a ministerial authorization if they do not risk contravening an Act of Parliament or do not involve the acquisition of information that interferes with the REP of a Canadian or any person in Canada. In such cases, it is not required to request authorities to conduct testing activities from the Minister through a ministerial authorization. However, at the Chief’s discretion, CSE will inform the Minister of non- ministerial authorization activities through other means.

Paragraph 23(1)(c) provides an exception to CSE’s prohibition on directing its activities at a Canadian or any person in Canada when conducting testing or evaluating products, software and systems. This means that CSE may conduct these activities which will not be considered directed at a Canadian or any person in Canada.

Any foreign intelligence activities, including testing activities, that contravene an Act of Parliament or involve the acquisition of information that interferes with the REP of a Canadian or any person in Canada can only be conducted under the authorities of a ministerial authorization. In such cases, the activities must be conducted under the authorities of an existing ministerial authorization or will require that the Minister issue a new ministerial authorization, and the Minister would be fully informed of the activities being considered before being in a position to approve them.

Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces Review

Report issued pursuant to section 35 of the NSIRA Act

NSIRA’s finding

The report contained a finding that, in NSIRA’s opinion, certain activities undertaken by the Canadian Armed Forces may not have been in compliance with the law.

Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF’s) response

DND/CAF recognize the importance of independent, external reviews of the Government of Canada’s national security and intelligence activities. We fully support NSIRA’s review mandate and take all of its reports seriously.

Upon receipt of NSIRA’s section 35 compliance report, DND/CAF conducted a comprehensive analysis and do not agree with NSIRA’s opinion. Our analysis supports that the reviewed activities were conducted in accordance with the law within a robust system of oversight and accountability. Furthermore, an earlier independent external review was consistent with our analysis and supported a number of recommendations that were implemented to strengthen the governance framework. The Minister is following the steps in order to meet all the requirements outlined in section 35 of the Act.

Canada Border Services Agency review

Air Passenger Targeting Review

NSIRA’s findings

The use of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in scenario-based targeting complied with section 107(3) of the Customs Act.

The CBSA does not document its triaging practices in a manner that enables effective verification of whether all triaging decisions comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions.

The CBSA has not consistently demonstrated that an adequate justification exists for its Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices. This weakness in the link between the indicators used to triage passengers and the potential threats or contraventions they seek to identify creates a risk that Air Passenger Targeting triaging practices may be discriminatory.

The CBSA’s policies, procedures, and training are insufficiently detailed to adequately equip CBSA staff to identify potential discrimination-related risks and to take appropriate action to mitigate these risks in the exercise of their duties.

The CBSA’s oversight structures and practices are not rigorous enough to identify and mitigate potential discrimination-related risks, as appropriate. This is compounded by a lack of collection and assessment of relevant data.

NSIRA’s recommendations, and the CBSA’s responses

Recommendation Response (July 2022)
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA document its triaging practices in a manner that enables effective verification of whether all triaging decisions comply with statutory and regulatory restrictions. Agree. The CBSA will complete a review of its air passenger targeting triaging practices to ensure practices are in place which will enable effective verification of compliance with statutory and regulatory restrictions.
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA ensure, in an ongoing manner, that its triaging practices are based on information and/or intelligence that justifies the use of each indicator. This justification should be well-documented to enable effective internal and external verification of whether the CBSA’s triaging practices comply with its non-discrimination obligations. Agree. While we are satisfied that justification for triaging and targeting practices exist, the CBSA acknowledges that better documentation practices could be implemented to enable effective internal and external verification of whether the CBSA’s triaging practices comply with its non- discrimination obligations.
The CBSA’s Scenario Based Targeting Governance Framework will be updated to include information and/or intelligence that justifies the use of each indicator.
Annual reviews of scenarios will continue to be conducted and documented to confirm that each active scenario is supported by recent and reliable intelligence.
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA ensure that any Air Passenger Targeting- related distinctions on protected grounds that are capable of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage constitute a reasonable limit on travellers’ equality rights under the Charter. Agree. The CBSA will review its air passenger targeting practices to ensure that distinctions based on protected grounds are reasonable and can be demonstrably justified in the border administration and enforcement context.
Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA develop more robust and regular oversight for Air Passenger Targeting to ensure that its practices are not discriminatory. This should include updates to the CBSA’s policies, procedures, training, and other guidance, as appropriate.
Agree. The CBSA acknowledges that policies, procedures, training, and other guidance, as appropriate can be improved to ensure robust and regular oversight for Air Passenger Targeting to ensure that its practices are not discriminatory.
The CBSA will complete a review of its policies, procedures, guidelines and training to ensure practices are not discriminatory.
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that the CBSA start gathering and assessing the necessary data to identify, analyze, and mitigate discrimination-related risks. This includes disaggregated demographic data, data on the effects of Air Passenger Targeting on secondary examinations that may be apparent from related human rights complaints, and data on a baseline comparator group.
Agree. To that end, the CBSA is taking deliberate steps to develop its capacity to capture and analyze reliable and accurate data in non-intrusive ways. The Agency is working on developing standard and consistent positions and frameworks on the collection, use, management and governance of disaggregated data, developing metrics and indicators to measure the impact of decisions and policies on different groups; using data to build more inclusive and representative policies and strategies, and; identifying possible discrimination and bias.

Multi-departmental reviews

Review of Federal Institutions’ Disclosures of Information under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2021

NSIRA’s findings

NSIRA finds that, in 12 out of 13 disclosures, Global Affairs Canada demonstrated that it satisfied itself as to the contribution of the information to the recipient institution’s responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada, as required under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA.

NSIRA finds that, without first conducting the analysis under paragraph 5(1)(a) of the SCIDA, departments risk disclosing information that does not pertain to the national security mandate of the recipient institution or to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

NSIRA finds that, in 1 of 13 disclosures, Global Affairs Canada consulted on more information than necessary to obtain confirmation from CSIS that the disclosure contributed to its mandate and was linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

NSIRA finds that, in 10 out of 13 disclosures, Global Affairs Canada demonstrated that it satisfied itself that the disclosure will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances, as required under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the SCIDA.

NSIRA finds that 2 of 13 disclosures did not contain the accuracy and reliability statements as required by subsection 5(2) of the SCIDA.

NSIRA finds that Global Affairs Canada training on the SCIDA lacks sufficient illustrative examples required to provide employees with adequate guidance to fulfill their obligations under the SCIDA.

NSIRA’s recommendations, and government response

Recommendation Response (February 14th, 2023)
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that consultations be limited to the information necessary to obtain confirmation from the potential recipient that the information contributes to its mandate and is linked to activities that undermine the security of Canada. Agree. Public Safety’s Step-by-Step SCIDA Guide 2022 (“SCIDA Guide 2022”) was updated and distributed to federal institutions in October 2022. Many of the updates to the SCIDA Guide 2022, that were based on practitioner feedback, directly address this recommendation. The updated SCIDA Guide 2022 specifies that preliminary consultations prior to a disclosure should only include general information to ensure that SCIDA thresholds are met before the disclosing institution proceeds with the disclosure. In addition, SCIDA training material was updated in September 2022 with a renewed emphasis on the need for disclosing institutions to strictly limit the information communicated with recipient institutions during preliminary consultations.

Multiple SCIDA trainings have been delivered to federal institutions using the new material. Public Safety will continue to work with federal institutions to provide them with access to training, guidance and other useful resources on the use of the SCIDA. Given the focus of this review, Public Safety will work closely with Global Affairs Canada to address this recommendation.

Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that in order to provide the most valuable and meaningful context for the recipient institution, accuracy and reliability statements should be clear and specific to the circumstances of the disclosure. Agree. Statements regarding the accuracy of the information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained are an essential part of the disclosure process. To ensure greater compliance with this requirement, the SCIDA Guide 2022 and its related templates, as well as the updated SCIDA training material, emphasize the importance of providing statements on the accuracy of the information and reliability of the manner in which it was obtained that are clear and specific to the circumstances of the disclosure.

Public Safety will continue to provide SCIDA training and guidance to federal institutions to highlight the requirement for statements of accuracy and reliability that are clear, complete, accurate and do not include formulaic language in support of disclosures under the SCIDA.

Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that all disclosing departments contemporaneously prepare descriptions of the information that was relied on to satisfy themselves that disclosures were authorized under the SCIDA. Agree. Record keeping is an essential component of the SCIDA, and records of disclosures must include an appropriately robust description of the information relied upon to satisfy the disclosing institution that the disclosure meets the thresholds of the SCIDA. The SCIDA Guide 2022 includes templates that support federal institutions with their record-keeping requirements. This includes sections where disclosing institutions must prepare and maintain records that set out a description of the information that was relied on to satisfy the disclosing institution that the disclosure was authorized under the SCIDA. While paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA does not explicitly require departments to contemporaneously prepare descriptions of the information related to SCIDA disclosures, Public Safety takes note of NSIRA’s recommendation to do so in a timely manner.

Public Safety will continue to provide SCIDA training and guidance to federal institutions to highlight their recordkeeping obligations to ensure that all disclosures are authorized under the SCIDA and assist them in understanding their authorities for requesting and disclosing information under the Act.

Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that additional illustrative examples and scenarios be included in the SCIDA training, including for disclosure threshold requirements, accuracy and reliability statements and record-keeping requirements.

Agree. SCIDA training material was updated in September 2022 with multiple illustrative examples and case studies that provide further details on how to apply the disclosure threshold requirements, accuracy and reliability statements and record-keeping requirements. SCIDA training sessions have been delivered to federal institutions using the new material. Given the focus of this review, Public Safety will work closely with Global Affairs Canada to address this recommendation.

Review of departmental implementation of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2021

NSIRA’s findings

NSIRA finds that the Canada Border Services Agency and Public Safety Canada still have not fully implemented an ACA framework and supporting policies and procedures are still under development.

NSIRA finds that from January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, no cases under the ACA were escalated to deputy heads in any department.

NSIRA finds that the RCMP has a robust framework in place for the triage of cases pertaining to the ACA.

NSIRA finds that the RCMP’s Foreign Information Risk Advisory Committee (FIRAC) risk assessments include objectives external to the requirements of the Orders in Council, such as the risk of not exchanging information.

NSIRA finds that the RCMP use of a two-part risk assessment, that of the country profile and that of the individual to determine if there is a substantial risk, including the particular circumstances of the individual in question within the risk assessment is a best practice.

NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not have a centralized system of documenting assurances and does not regularly monitor and update the assessment of the reliability of assurances.

NSIRA finds that the RCMP does not regularly update or have a schedule to update its Country and Entity Assessments. In many cases these assessments are more than four years old and are heavily dependent on an aggregation of open-source reporting.

NSIRA finds that information collected through the Liaison Officer in the course of an operation is not centrally documented such that it can inform future assessments.

NSIRA finds that FIRAC members concluded that the information sharing would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment that could not be mitigated. The Assistant Commissioner determined that it may be mitigated. This amounts to a disagreement between officials or a situation where “officials are unable to determine whether the risk can be mitigated”.

NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner’s rationale for rejecting FIRAC’s advice did not adequately address concerns consistent with the provisions of the Orders in Council. In particular, NSIRA finds that the Assistant Commissioner erroneously considered the importance of the potential future strategic relationship with a foreign entity in the assessment of potential risk of mistreatment of the individual.

NSIRA finds that Global Affairs Canada is now strongly dependent on operational staff and Heads of Mission for decision-making and accountability under the ACA.

NSIRA finds that Global Affairs Canada has not demonstrated that all of its business lines are integrated into its framework under the ACA.

NSIRA finds that Global Affairs Canada has not made ACA training mandatory for all staff across relevant business lines. This could result in staff being involved in information exchanges without the proper training and knowledge of the implications of the ACA.

NSIRA finds that Global Affairs Canada has not regularly updated its Human Rights Reports. While many were updated during the 2021 review year, more than half have not been updated since 2019. This is particularly problematic when departments and agencies rely on these reports as a key source in assessing risk related to the ACA.

NSIRA finds that Global Affairs Canada does not have a standardized centralized approach for the tracking and documentation of assurances.

NSIRA’s recommendations

Recommendation
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that the RCMP establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and where possible to monitor and document whether said caveats and assurances were respected.
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that in cases where the RCMP Assistant Commissioner disagrees with FIRAC’s recommendation not to share the information, the case be automatically referred to the Commissioner.
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that the assessment of substantial risk be limited to the provisions of the Orders in Council – namely the substantial risk of mistreatment and whether the risk may be mitigated – and external objectives such as fostering strategic relationships should not factor into this decision-making.

Recommendation 4: NSIRA recommends that FIRAC recommendations are referred to an Assistant Commissioner who is not responsible for the branch from which the case originates.

Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure that accountability for compliance with the ACA clearly rests with the Avoiding Mistreatment Compliance Committee.
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that GAC conduct a formal internal mapping exercise of other possibly implicated business lines to ensure it is meeting its obligations set out in the ACA.
Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that GAC make ACA training mandatory for all rotational staff.

Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that GAC ensure countries’ Human Rights Reports are updated more regularly to ensure evolving human rights related issues are captured.

Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that GAC establish a centralized system to track caveats and assurances provided by foreign entities and document any instances of non-compliance for use in future risk assessments.

This review was approved in 2022. Under section 38 (1) of the NSIRA Act, NSIRA is therefore obliged to report on its findings and recommendations as part of its annual report for the calendar year 2022. A summary of this review is available in NSIRA’s Annual Report 2021.

NSIRA’s findings

NSIRA finds that the legal advice-seeking and giving process, and resource constraints at the Department of Justice’s National Security Litigation and Advisory Group (NSLAG) contribute to considerable delays, [*description of timeline*].

NSIRA finds that Justice legal opinions have sometimes been prepared without sufficient attention to the audience that needs to understand and act on them. Opinions have been focused on assessing legal risk, often late in the development of a CSIS activity, with limited effort made to propose alternative and legally sustainable means of arriving at the intended objective.

NSIRA finds that the Justice Legal Risk Management Framework is misunderstood at the working level at CSIS and further that it does not provide an appropriate framework for the unequivocal communication of unlawful conduct to CSIS.

NSIRA finds that difficulties in acquiring prompt and relevant legal advice have contributed to [*discussion of the detrimental effects on and risks to operations*] that may require legal advice. In consequence, the manner in which NSLAG has provided legal advice to CSIS has often not met the needs of CSIS operations.

NSIRA finds that Justice does not generate the necessary business analytics to track its service delivery performance to CSIS.

NSIRA finds that Justice has acknowledged that internal silos at NSLAG between the advisory and litigation wings have sometimes left warrant counsel unaware of emerging legal issues and that Justice has taken steps to resolve these issues.

NSIRA finds that Justice has committed to improve its advice-giving to CSIS, including moving toward “road map” style legal advice that involves working collaboratively and iteratively with CSIS to achieve operational goals within the bounds of the law.

NSIRA finds that CSIS has not always shared all relevant information with NSLAG, prompting a degree of mistrust and limiting Justice’s ability to provide responsive legal advice.

NSIRA finds that CSIS has a history of quick reforms, followed by neglect, high turnover of personnel leading to a loss of institutional knowledge, and resourcing that did not match stated priorities. CSIS does not track or measure the outcome of past reforms adequately and has no performance metrics for assessing success.

NSIRA finds that CSIS policies have not kept pace with operational reality, as they are often vague, dated, overlapping and contradictory. The absence of clear policy creates legal doubt or concerns, and gives rise to disparate interpretations of legal and operational standards.

NSIRA finds that there is little common understanding regarding the process or basis on which a warrant is prioritized. Frequent shifts in this process of prioritization have added to operational uncertainty. The prioritization process has made it very difficult to bring novel issues to the Court with the goal of addressing legal ambiguities through court decisions.

NSIRA finds that the actors involved in the warrant process do not have a common understanding of the rationale for each of the [*multiple*] of steps in the overarching warrant application scheme and are not always sure what role each approval step plays.

NSIRA finds that the proliferation of process in seeking warrants has created a system of diluted accountability widely regarded as slow and unwieldy, with delays caused by multiple levels of approval.

NSIRA finds there is no regular feedback process in which explanations for warrant-related decisions made at one level filter back to other levels. The absence of feedback is especially acute for the regional investigators.

NSIRA finds that often, the sole means to address legal uncertainty is to bring legal questions to the Federal Court through warrant applications. In consequence, an unwieldy warrant process makes resolution of legal doubt more difficult.

NSIRA finds that CSIS has struggled to ensure that all information material to the credibility of sources is properly contained in warrant applications. This “recurring omissions” problem stems from a misunderstanding of the Federal Court’s role in assessing the credibility of sources and from the presence of multiple, siloed information management systems. CSIS has undertaken reforms, but work remains to implement long-term sustainable solutions.

NSIRA finds that the Affiant Unit constitutes a vital and laudable reform within CSIS. However, the Affiant Unit is currently at risk of collapse. CSIS has not supported the unit with resources commensurate with the importance of this unit in fulfilling CSIS’s mission. The benefits of the Affiant Unit are currently in jeopardy because of governance, human resource, and training deficiencies.

NSIRA finds that the Affiant Unit’s placement in the [*Name*] branch is not commensurate with its functions and importance. This governance anomaly most likely contributes to administrative hurdles and resource challenges faced by the Affiant Unit.

NSIRA finds that without a functional Affiant Unit able to produce timely and accurate warrant applications, CSIS puts at risk access to warrants and the information collected under them.

NSIRA finds that the “independent counsel” role falls short of creating a thorough challenge function.

NSIRA finds that the CSIS regional warrants coordinators have not received sufficient training enabling them to translate the contents of the warrants into advice on proper warrant execution.

NSIRA finds that CSIS lacks long-term training programs for Intelligence Officers.

NSIRA finds that CSIS has failed to provide systematic training programs for “non-Intelligence Officers.”

NSIRA finds that the CSIS’s Learning and Development Branch has not been sufficiently resourced to develop and administer comprehensive training programs, especially in specialized areas not covered by the training offered for Intelligence Officers early in their career.

NSIRA finds that CSIS and Justice are at risk of not being able to fulfill their respective mandates. No one reform is likely to succeed unless each is pursued as part of a coherent package. No package will succeed unless backed by prioritization at senior levels, and the stable provision of resources, including people with the means and institutional knowledge to see reforms through. And no reform initiative will succeed unless accompanied by clear performance indicators, measured and analyzed regularly to track progress.

NSIRA’s recommendations and departmental responses

Recommendation Departmental response (March 29, 2022)
Recommendation 1: NSIRA recommends that Justice pursue its commitment to reforming the manner of providing legal advice to CSIS, and its stated commitment to “road map”-style advice as a best practice. In support of this objective and the provision of timely, operationally relevant advice, NSIRA further recommends that Justice implement the following:

  • Whether through an expanded “office hours” and liaison counsel program or otherwise, NSLAG must develop a legal support service operating full time, staffed by experienced lawyers empowered to provide operational advice in real time on which CSIS officers can rely, on the basis of settled Justice positions on recurring legal issues, accessible directly to CSIS officers across all regional offices and at all levels.
  • NSLAG develop a concise reference tool with its position on recurring issues and most common legal authorities invoked and make the tool accessible to counsel to support their real-time advice.
  • To minimize the need to resort to the formalized legal advice-seeking process, NSLAG (in coordination with CSIS) must involve counsel with CSIS officers at the early stage of the planning of key or novel operations and throughout their entire operational lifecycle to case-manage an iterative legal guidance process.
Agree. Prior to NSIRA issuing its report, Justice Canada has been working on a number of measures concerning policies and practices in the provision of legal services to CSIS. These measures include activities related to the duty of candour and the warrant acquisition process, best practices in the delivery of legal services, advising CSIS on legal risks associated with its operations, the sharing of information in the national security context, and tracking and responding to key performance indicators related to the delivery of legal services.

Justice is committed to improving the manner of providing legal services and ensuring practical and timely legal services. The measures undertaken to date and further measures underway support a coordinated approach for legal services, striking the right balance of resources across corporate and operational priorities. This includes providing legal advice in a more accessible, iterative manner, and supporting Counsel through interactive training to better understand and support their work in a proactive manner.

Justice and CSIS working together in an integrated fashion ensures that counsel are involved throughout an operation’s life-cycle, including the early stages. Early integration into operational planning supports the provision of timely and relevant legal advice as operations progress.

Justice has already modified its liaison counsel model. Liaison counsel are experienced counsel designated to support CSIS officers across regional offices and particular operations.

Enhancements to the role have resulted in liaison counsel providing timely and focused advice, supporting operational imperatives, and identifying trends and issues of concern to develop guidance documents and other practical tools.

Justice is developing a suite of practical tools and legal service delivery mechanisms to support CSIS. These include:

  • a user-friendly blog that describes relevant legal issues and concepts in plain-language and with a practical application to CSIS’s work;
  • a field guide for the practical application of legal concerns to CSIS’s operations that can be used by officers in the field and in real time;
  • interpretation and guidance documents; and,
  • knowledge management tools ensuring counsel can access legal precedents and interpretations.
Recommendation 2: NSIRA recommends that NSLAG (in coordination with CSIS) develop Key Performance Indicators to measure the delivery of legal services to CSIS.

Agree. Justice has developed business metrics to measure service delivery performance. Justice will continue to work with CSIS to invest in resources to conduct detailed business analytics to enhance the provision of legal services and make improvements to the existing system. Client feedback surveys are undertaken regularly.
Recommendation 3: NSIRA recommends that CSIS and Justice should include in their training programs interactive scenario-based training developing the operational intelligence activities expertise of NSLAG counsel and the legal knowledge of CSIS operational staff.

Agree. Justice has worked with CSIS to develop and deliver interactive scenario-based training and is committed to continuing that involvement.

Recommendation 4: To ensure Justice is able to give meaningful and responsive legal advice as recommended in recommendation #1, NSIRA recommends that CSIS invite Justice counsel to sit at the table at all stages of the lifecycle of key and novel operations, and that it fully and frankly brief counsel on operational objectives, intent, and details.

Agree. As set out above, Justice is working with CSIS to be involved sooner and more continuously across the lifecycle of operations to provide timely, focused and iterative legal services.
Recommendation 5: NSIRA recommends that Justice’s advice-giving must clearly and unequivocally communicate advice on the unlawfulness of client conduct, whether criminal or otherwise.

Agree. Justice is currently undertaking a review of its legal risk framework in order to improve both how legal risk is assessed, and also how risks are communicated to clients.
Recommendation 6: NSIRA recommends that CSIS adopt, and share internally, clear criteria for the warrant prioritization process.

Agree. CSIS will further refine the warrant prioritization process and work to set clear criteria.
Recommendation 7: NSIRA recommends that CSIS establish a new warrant process eliminating steps that do not make a significant contribution to a more accurate application. The process should assign clear lines of responsibility for the production of accurate applications. The reformed system should ensure that delays associated with managerial approvals are minimized, and that time is reallocated to those steps contributing to the preparation of the accurate applications.

Agree. Work on implementation is underway. CSIS and Justice are committed to streamlining warrant applications, templates, and requests as part of broader modernisation objectives.
Recommendation 8: NSIRA recommends that CSIS integrate the regional stakeholders (including the implicated investigators) at every key milestone of the warrants process.

Agree. CSIS has already undertaken related improvements to address this recommendation, including through the updated Affiant Unit business approach to warrant acquisition, which now includes regional stakeholders.
Recommendation 9: NSIRA recommends that CSIS adopt policies and procedures governing the reformed warrant process that clearly outlines the roles and responsibilities of each participant and the objective of each step in the warrant process and that these policies be kept current as the process evolves. Agree. The revised CSIS Justice Joint Policy on Duty of Candour and the associated guidance document outline the role of all CSIS employees (not just the affiants) in ensuring that disclosure obligations to the Court are met. In addition, CSIS has developed a s.21 warrant policy and the drafting of the related procedure is underway. In 2020 and 2021, CSIS provided Duty of Candour training to all operational employees through a special project.
Recommendation 10: To address the seeming inevitability of “recurring omissions”, NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize the development of [*an improved*] system for human source information management. CSIS should also continue initiatives meant to ensure that source handlers are assiduous in documenting and then reporting in source precis information going to credibility. Even with these reforms, the Affiant Unit should adopt procedures for verifying the information prepared by the regions. Agree. The recommendation endorses a CSIS initiative already underway. An Action Plan approved by the Executive in January 2021 identified the requirement, and CSIS stakeholders are advancing this initiative. CSIS developed a comprehensive requirements package, and identified a potential technical solution. The complexity of the technical development process means this will be a long process.
Recommendation 11: NSIRA recommends that CSIS recognize the importance of the Affiant Unit by assigning affiants and analysts an employment classification congruent with their responsibilities. Agree. CSIS has addressed this recommendation by classifying affiants at one level above the Intelligence Officer working level to recognize the complexity of their work and to attract/retain candidates. A competitive competition process is underway to staff the affiant positions and is anticipated to be completed by the end of March 2022.
Recommendation 12: NSIRA recommends that CSIS should create an Affiant Branch reporting directly to the CSIS Director. Disagree. The Service notes the concerns raised by the committee in its report regarding the Affiant’s Unit current placement in the organization’s hierarchy. This said, throughout the course of this review, CSIS has invested heavily in the Affiant Unit and its employees and has made significant changes to the warrant process and its governance. The Service is confident that these changes will be sufficient to address the concerns that resulted in this finding and recommendation, particularly as it relates to observations related to administrative and human resource challenges. In addition, the current placement of the Affiant Unit with other units with corresponding responsibilities for warrant acquisition best facilitates the provision of ongoing guidance and advice throughout the warrant lifecycle to ensure compliance and duty of candour obligations are met. Given its importance, CSIS commits to ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the Affiant Unit to ensure the concerns highlighted in the report do not re-occur.
Recommendation 13: NSIRA recommends that CSIS urgently resource the Affiant Unit to meet its responsibilities and ensure its sustainability. In deciding the size of the Affiant Unit, CSIS should assess how many warrants an affiant team might reasonably complete every year. Agree. In line with the recommendation, CSIS already increased the resourcing of the Affiant Unit and approved changes to the organizational chart in March 2021. As noted above, a staffing action is currently underway that aims to create a pool of qualified candidates which can be leveraged to help increase the Affiant Unit’s capacity.
Recommendation 14: NSIRA recommends that CSIS, in consultation with Justice, develop a comprehensive training course for all affiants and analysts, codifying best practices and methods for members of the Affiant Unit.

Agree. CSIS intends to provide fulsome training to the affiant unit, as recommended. In late 2021, initial consultations were held to identify appropriate training. Unfortunately, the pandemic has disrupted training efforts.

Justice is supporting CSIS in the development and delivery of all comprehensive and practical training for all those working on warrant applications. Cross-reference recommendations 3 and 18.



Recommendation 15: NSIRA recommends that NSLAG be staffed by a complement of counsel and support personnel sufficient to ensure that CSIS operations are not impeded by resource limitations at NSLAG. Agree. Justice and CSIS will continue to work together on resources and staffing issues.
Recommendation 16: NSIRA recommends that the function of the Independent Counsel as performed by National Security Group counsel at the Department of Justice should be eliminated, in favour of a new challenge function, analogous to the role a defence lawyer would play were warrants subject to an adversarial process, situated at Public Safety and supported by the Public Safety vetting team, and performed by a knowledgeable lawyer from the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, the private sector, or elsewhere, who is independent from Justice management and not otherwise involved in CSIS warrant applications. Agree. Public Safety will develop an enhanced vetting function, housed in Public Safety Canada, that reflects the principles and objectives set out by NSIRA. Public Safety Canada will develop the enhanced vetting function as part of the CSIS warrant acquisition process such that it provides a meaningful challenge function without adding undue complexity or delay. While this work is underway, Public Safety Canada will take steps to strengthen warrant vetting on an interim basis.
Recommendation 17: NSIRA recommends that CSIS regional warrants coordinator positions receive adequate training, and that CSIS professionalize the position and enable warrant coordinators to more effectively translate the content of warrants into advice on warrant execution. Agree. CSIS acknowledges the importance of training and of centers of expertise. CSIS is determining training requirements.
Recommendation 18: NSIRA recommends that CSIS adequately resource and regularly deliver evergreen scenario-based training programs for all CSIS employees, including;
  • annual, comprehensive, warrant training for all operational employees;
  • specialized onboarding training for all employees not part of the Intelligence Officer program; and
  • continued long-term training for all specialized personnel.
Agree. CSIS is committed to improving the training offered to all of its employees, as recommended. Scenario-based training, which helps employees understand the application of policies and procedures, is now an integral part of operational training, which includes the development of an annual operational workshop. A recently approved business case will significantly increase staffing in Learning & Development to further enable training of CSIS employees. This business case includes the creation of a new position responsible for developing an enhanced onboarding for all newly hired employees, as well as the creation of new positions to create and deliver additional learning opportunities for all operational employees. Cross- reference recommendations 3 and 14.



Recommendation 19: The recommendations within this review should be treated as a coherent package and that progress and outcomes in implementing these recommendations be tracked, allowing management, the Ministers of Public Safety and of Justice, and NSIRA, to assess the efficacy of reforms and course-correct if necessary. Agree. PS, CSIS, and Justice are committed to taking a holistic approach to the implementation of the recommendations and will track and course correct as required in this complex operating environment.
Recommendation 20: The full classified version of this report be shared with the designated judges of the Federal Court. Partially agree. The Attorney General of Canada has shared the full report, redacted for solicitor- client privilege, with the designated judges of the Federal Court of Canada.

Annex D: Statistics on complaints investigations

January 1, 2022, to December 31, 2022

INTAKE INQUIRIES 75
New complaints filed 75
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act), section 16, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) complaints

22
NSIRA Act, section 17, Communications Security Establishment (CSE) complaints 2
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances 3
NSIRA Act, section 19, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) referred complaints 3
NSIRA Act, section 19, Citizenship Act 0
NSIRA Act, section 45, Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) referrals 0
Accepted jurisdiction to investigate 6
  Accepted Declined
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints 3 16
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints 0 1
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances 1 1
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints 2 3
Active investigations (at the time of writing) 19
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints 9
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints 0
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances 4
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints 6
NSIRA Act, section 45, CHRC referrals 0
Total investigations closed 65
  Abandoned Final report Resolved informally Withdrawn
NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints 1 0 0 3
NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints 0 0 0 0
NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances 0 1 0 0
NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints 0 2 0 0
NSIRA Act, section 45, CHRC referrals 0 58 0 0
Total 1 61 0 3
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Date Modified:

Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Handling of Encryption

Last Updated:

Status:

Cancelled

Review Number:

21-19

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Date Modified: