{"id":13006,"date":"2025-12-04T13:15:00","date_gmt":"2025-12-04T18:15:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dev.nsira-ossnr.gc.ca\/annual-reports\/national-security-and-intelligence-review-agency-annual-report-2023-2\/"},"modified":"2025-12-04T13:19:29","modified_gmt":"2025-12-04T18:19:29","slug":"national-security-and-intelligence-review-agency-annual-report-2024","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/nsira-ossnr.gc.ca\/en\/annual-reports\/national-security-and-intelligence-review-agency-annual-report-2024\/","title":{"rendered":"National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Annual Report 2024"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<style>\n.share-row-container {\n    display: flex;\n    flex-wrap: nowrap;\n    justify-content: center;\n    gap: 10px;\n    border-radius: 10px;\n    list-style: none;\n}\n.share-item-link {\n    color: #fff !important;\n    padding: 4px 12px;\n    border-radius: 5px;\n    text-decoration: none !important;\n    font-size: 14px;\n    display: flex;\n    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has-text-color\" id=\"1-review-backgrounder\">Backgrounder<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Ottawa, Ontario, December 4, 2025<\/strong>\u202f\u2013 The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) 2024 Annual Report has been tabled in Parliament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The report outlines NSIRA&#8217;s key achievements and progress, showcasing how the organization has played a vital role in shaping the national security and intelligence review landscape. Through its work, NSIRA fosters public trust, upholds democratic oversight, and safeguards the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"2-2024-review-highlights\">2024 Review Highlights<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA completed nine reviews, including the <em>Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People\u2019s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference<\/em>. Given its public interest, NSIRA determined that the report and its conclusions should be released to Parliament. As such, this review resulted in NSIRA\u2019s first special report tabled under section 40 of the NSIRA Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Other key reviews in 2024 included:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Royal Canadian Mounted Police\u2019s Human Source Program<\/strong>: Part of a three-part series examining how federal agencies manage and use human sources in national security operations.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>The Lifecycle of CSIS\u2019s Warranted Information<\/strong>: Assessed the entire lifecycle of warranted information, from the moment it is collected through processing, analysis, use, storage, and eventual retention or disposal.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Accountability Mechanisms<\/strong>: Stemming from a Ministerial referral, NSIRA examined whether CSIS and the Department of Public Safety were effectively supporting Ministerial responsibility.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>As of publication of the Annual Report, five of the nine reviews completed in 2024 have been published. Other reviews from 2024 are, as are unpublished reviews from previous years, undergoing processes in relation to redaction of potentially injurious information. NSIRA continues to advance all review reports submitted to the Minister, with additional publications expected upon completion of the redaction processes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"3-recommendations-redactions-and-access\">Recommendations, Redactions and Access<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA introduced dedicated follow-up cycles to evaluate how departments implement its recommendations. Work is underway to develop new internal tracking tools and protocols to improve awareness, follow-up, and public communications about institutional responses and progress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While NSIRA has observed encouraging progress in the timeliness and completeness of responses from several reviewees, the Agency and Secretariat have faced ongoing challenges. Tensions persist regarding institutional resistance to NSIRA\u2019s access rights, inconsistent disclosures in response to requests for information, and overbroad or unsubstantiated demands for redactions in access-to-information consultations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA is exploring options to provide better real-time public visibility into these challenges to support greater departmental accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"4--2024-complaints-investigations-\">2024 Complaints Investigations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>From January 1 to December 31, 2024, NSIRA received 79 new complaints, including 67 related to CSIS. Of these, 52 (66%) involved delays in immigration and citizenship security screening. Under sections 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA, and CSIS advised that the time required can vary based on several factors. As shown in the statistics in the report, many complaints were resolved informally once CSIS completed its screening and issued a letter confirming that its advice had been provided to the requesting department.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA closed a total of 22 investigations in 2024, with 34 carried into 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"5--strategic-direction-\">Strategic Direction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA finalized its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, setting clear priorities for the next three years. The plan reaffirms NSIRA\u2019s core values \u2014 Independence, Professionalism, Transparency, and Inclusiveness \u2014 and serves as a foundation for continuous improvement. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Agency continues to closely collaborate with domestic and international partners to strengthen its review and investigative capabilities. NSIRA aspires to be a globally recognized centre of excellence and a hub for a professional community dedicated to national security accountability.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div><\/section>\n\n\n\n<section id=\"gm01df64f\" class=\"wp-block-gutentor-m4 section-gm01df64f gutentor-module gutentor-advanced-columns\"><div class=\"grid-container\"><div class=\"grid-row\">\n<div id=\"col-gmf7d904\" class=\"wp-block-gutentor-m4-col col-gmf7d904 gutentor-single-column  grid-lg-3 grid-md-12 grid-12 section-sticky\"><div id=\"section-gmf7d904\" class=\"section-gmf7d904 gutentor-col-wrap\">\n<section id=\"e287cc\" class=\"wp-block-gutentor-m13 section-e287cc gutentor-module gutentor-module-table-of-contents\"><div class=\"grid-container\"><div class=\"g-toc\"><div class=\"g-toc-header\"><div class=\"g-toc-heading\"><div class=\"g-toc-title\">Table of Contents<\/div><\/div><\/div><div class=\"g-toc-body\" style=\"display:\"><ol class=\"g-ordered-list\" type=\"none\"><li><a href=\"#1-review-backgrounder\">Backgrounder<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#2-message-from-the-members\">Message from the members<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#3-executive-summary\">Executive summary<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#6-\">NSIRA in Context<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#15-\">Highlights on Key Initiatives<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#21-\">Reviews<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#36-\">Complaint Investigations<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#61-\">Looking Ahead<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#92-annexes\">Annexes<\/a><\/li><\/ol><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/section>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity is-style-wide\"\/>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div id=\"col-gm8b8547\" class=\"wp-block-gutentor-m4-col col-gm8b8547 gutentor-single-column  grid-lg-9 grid-md-12 grid-12 content-body\"><div id=\"section-gm8b8547\" class=\"section-gm8b8547 gutentor-col-wrap\">\n<p class=\"mrgn-bttm-0 has-nsira-blue-color has-text-color\"><strong>Date of Publishing:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"mrgn-bttm-lg wp-block-post-date\"><time datetime=\"2025-12-04T13:15:00-05:00\">December 4, 2025<\/time><\/div>\n\n\n<div id=\"gm13a4200\" class=\"wp-block-gutentor-m1 section-gm13a4200 gutentor-module gutentor-element-button-group g-btn-horizontal-d g-btn-horizontal-t g-btn-horizontal-m\"><div class=\"gutentor-element-button-group-wrap\">\n<div id=\"section-g4edab8\" class=\"wp-block-gutentor-e2 section-g4edab8 gutentor-element gutentor-element-button\"><span class=\"gutentor-button-wrap\"><a class=\"gutentor-button gutentor-block-button btn-modern1 gutentor-icon-before\" href=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/AR_2024-EN-72485.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"><i class=\"gutentor-button-icon fas fa-file-alt\"><\/i><span>Download PDF<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"2-message-from-the-members\">Message from the members<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA, Review Agency) is pleased to present its 2024 Annual Report, highlighting key achievements, progress, and our direction for coming years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>2024 Key Highlights<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA observed a <strong>notable increase in the number of complaint investigations linked to immigration security screening delays.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Additionally, NSIRA has released its first Section 40 public interest report this year, marking an important milestone in its mandate. This report underscores NSIRA\u2019s dedication to transparency and accountability in national security matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>NSIRA\u2019s 2024\u20132027 Strategic Plan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After five years of operation, NSIRA has developed its triennial strategic plan for 2024-2027, which will guide the Review Agency\u2019s efforts in the coming years. The strategic plan focuses on NSIRA\u2019s commitment to enhancing review; investigating complaints in a timely, fair, and efficient manner; fostering transparency; and strengthening public trust in NSIRA\u2019s rigorous, fully independent review approach to Canada\u2019s national security and intelligence activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>NSIRA\u2019s Role on the International Stage<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA continues to strengthen its international partnerships, ensuring its work remains informed by, and a contributor to, global best practices in review. By engaging with international counterparts, NSIRA positions Canada as an active leader in upholding democratic values on the global stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We would like to thank the staff of NSIRA\u2019s Secretariat for their expertise, efforts and resilience throughout this ambitious year and for their innovation, energy and commitment for the year ahead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<strong>Marie Deschamps<\/strong><br\/>\n<strong>Colleen Swords<\/strong><br\/>\n<strong>Craig Forcese<\/strong><br\/>\n<strong>Matthew Cassar<\/strong><br\/>\n<strong>Foluke Laosebikan<\/strong><br\/>\n<strong>Jim Chu<\/strong>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"3-executive-summary\">Executive summary<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Without specialized national security review, much security service conduct would be immunized from scrutiny by reason of national security secrecy. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA)\u2019s raison d\u2019\u00eatre is to ensure that there is no such immunity. NSIRA has two mandates: conducting national security reviews of security or intelligence activities and conducting investigations of complaints from the public brought against a subset of national security and intelligence services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In five years of existence, NSIRA has become a robust and professional reviewbody that conducts reviews and investigates public complaints, which reflect thehighest standards and core values of Canadian society: democracy, transparencyand the rule of law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This 2024 Annual Report outlines the multiple spheres of activity through which NSIRA has contributed meaningfully to shaping the landscape of national security and intelligence review. This work is central to strengthening public trust, ensuring democratic oversight, and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"3-nsira%E2%80%99s-first-five-years\">Reviews<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The Reviews section of this report provides a summary of each of the nine review reports that were approved by Members during 2024, including the <em>Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People\u2019s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference,<\/em> which resulted in NSIRA\u2019s first special report tabled under section 40 of the NSIRA Act, where NSIRA determined that releasing the report and its conclusions to Parliament was in the public interest. The review reports that NSIRA presented to the relevant departments and agencies in 2024 contain 67 findings and 45 recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"4-value-of-expanded-partnerships\">Complaint Investigations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>During the last five months of 2024, NSIRA observed a significant increase of public complaints against CSIS, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening which resulted in NSIRA ingesting an unprecedented number of new complaints.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"6-\">NSIRA in Context<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"7-\">1.1 About NSIRA<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA, the Review Agency) is an independent entity that reviews and investigates public complaints related to national security or intelligence activities to assess their lawfulness, reasonableness, and necessity. NSIRA may have up to seven Members, supported by a Secretariat with expertise in law, technology and national security, and led by an Executive Director appointed by the Governor-in-Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA has two mandates: reviewing Government of Canada national security or intelligence activities and investigating public complaints related to those activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s approach in managing its review process is innovative. Review teams are comprised of individuals with diverse skill sets. They execute reviews under the direction of a designated NSIRA member and relevant Secretariat management personnel. Similarly, NSIRA\u2019s model for investigations of complaints relies on an NSIRA Member serving in a quasi-judicial investigative role, supported by legal, registry, and research staff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"8-\">1.2 NSIRA\u2019s Vision and Mission<\/h3>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"645\" height=\"660\" src=\"https:\/\/dev.nsira-ossnr.gc.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/nsira_mission_vision_EN.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-13397\"\/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"9-\">1.3 Unique Functions of NSIRA<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA holds a unique and pivotal position within Canada\u2019s national security accountability framework. With a mandate spanning the entire federal government, NSIRA can review any national security or intelligence activity, irrespective of the department or agency involved. This extensive jurisdiction enables NSIRA to carry out comprehensive, integrated, in-depth reviews of sensitive operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA also functions as a complaint investigation body, primarily examining national security-related allegations against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) closely related to national security, and denials of security clearance by federal departments. These public complaints often involve serious allegations, and NSIRA\u2019s capacity to address them enhances access to justice and the protection of individual rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With access to classified and legally privileged information, NSIRA is uniquely equipped to examine whether national security powers are exercised incompliance with Canadian law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"10-\">1.4 NSIRA\u2019s Domestic Partnerships<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>As part of Canada\u2019s national security and intelligence accountability framework, NSIRA and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) serve complementary yet distinct roles. While both play crucial roles in ensuring accountability, they differ in structure and mandate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSICOP is a committee of parliamentarians and focuses its reviews on the effectiveness of the national security and intelligence agencies. It is impacted by events such as elections or dissolutions. NSICOP\u2019s makeup makes it uniquely well positioned to examine both the efficacy of the national security and intelligence community, in particular, its legal frameworks, and broad strategic trends across the national security landscape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA operates year-round and maintains consistent engagement regardless of the Parliamentary schedule. Its mandate is to focus on the legality and legal compliance of national security and intelligence activities through in-depth reviews that dig down vertically into the operational events conducted on the ground. To deliver on its mandate to investigate complaints, NSIRA\u2019s continuous operations are essential to ensuring that investigations are conducted without delay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA and NSICOP both enhance transparency and accountability in national security via their distinct mandates, which ensures a complete approach to independent review. They actively coordinate efforts and avoid duplication. The respective secretariats have established a strong working relationship. Together, NSICOP and NSIRA form a complementary system supporting democratic accountability and continuous legal scrutiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA is committed to working within a system of partnerships with key actors. It is part of a larger network of federal review and accountability bodies and regularly engages with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). These collaborations are about best practices, ensuring aligned mandates, minimizing redundancy, and reinforcing a broader framework of transparency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"11-\">1.5 Sustaining an Independent Review Body<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s independence is the cornerstone of its credibility and effectiveness as a national security review body. Operating independently from the executive branch, NSIRA conducts impartial and expert reviews of Canada\u2019s most sensitive security and intelligence activities. This institutional autonomy is not just a privilege, it is an attitudinal necessity and a responsibility that NSIRA takes seriously. It\u2019s vital for preserving the integrity of its operations and cultivating public trust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The NSIRA Act grants access to all information held by reviewed departments, including classified and legally protected information, except for Cabinet confidences. This access allows NSIRA to independently review the legality, necessity, and proportionality of government actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s reports, findings, and recommendations are not subject to any editorial control from the prime minister or any other minister, nor are they subject to any editorial control from senior officials. This approach preserves NSIRA\u2019s voice and commitment to transparency and accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To uphold this independence, NSIRA invests in secure digital systems, enhances internal governance, and develops expertise through targeted hiring and training. These initiatives improve the professionalism and integrity of NSIRA\u2019s work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"12-\">1.6 Protecting Democracy and Freedoms<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA ensures Canada\u2019s national security activities align with the rule of law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enhancing public confidence in Canada\u2019s national security framework. NSIRA\u2019s role is vital in upholding a national security system based on legality and democratic accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA\u2019s reviews tackled foreign interference, bulk data, and technology-enabled intelligence activities. NSIRA\u2019s findings led to recommendations to keep these powers within legal and ethical limits. By reviewing the extraordinary powers of the national security community, NSIRA plays a vital role in preserving the integrity of the rule of law in Canada.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"13-\">1.7 Transparency and Engagement<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Transparency is a core value at NSIRA, shaping how the Review Agency conducts its work. Increasing public understanding of NSIRA\u2019s work and its findings and recommendations is a fundamental value of the organization. NSIRA aims to ensure that Parliamentarians, media, civil society, academia, and the broader Canadian public remain engaged in its work, enabling them to form their independent views on national security or intelligence issues and to hold government accountable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the challenging context of national security operations, absolute public transparency could unfortunately provide adversaries and threat actors with information that might harm Canada\u2019s security interests, as well as those of its allies. NSIRA applies a rigorous balanced approach to release as much information as possible about its work in its commitment to transparency and openness, while safeguarding genuinely injurious national security information. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA enhanced its public reporting efforts by announcing on social media each time a report was submitted to a Minister and by informing the public that reports can be accessed under the Access to Information Act. NSIRA also began publishing backgrounders to provide Canadians with greater clarity on the context of its reviews. As part of its commitment to openness, the Agency launched an updated and more accessible website.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Additionally, in 2024, NSIRA expanded its outreach initiatives to enhance public awareness and understanding of its mandate. NSIRA hosted new events with civil society, media, and academia. These initiatives aimed to deepen the understanding of NSIRA\u2019s role and to foster informed dialogue about NSIRA\u2019s work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"14-\">1.8 NSIRA\u2019s Role on the World Stage<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s partnerships extend beyond Canada\u2019s borders through its active role in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC). As a permanent member, NSIRA actively collaborates with review agencies from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, fostering robust collaboration and knowledge exchange.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA has established strong partnerships with European counterparts, including agencies involved in the Intelligence Oversight Working Group made up of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These partnerships transcend routine collaboration, enabling collective learning on review methodologies and facilitating coordinated knowledge exchange on the development of international review best practices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA has also been an active collaborator in some initiatives led by certain United Nations divisions that aim to improve global partnerships in the review and oversight sector. This has led to engagement with new international partners, delivery on online training modules, and new contributions to global standards in review.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Through these international engagements, NSIRA plays an active role in shaping a global community of practice that promotes the values of rigorous independent review of national security or intelligence activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"15-\">Highlights on Key Initiatives<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"16-\">2.1 Reviewee Responsiveness<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Access to information is fundamental to NSIRA\u2019s ability to conduct effective reviews and investigations. In 2024, NSIRA observed encouraging progress in the responsiveness of several reviewees, particularly regarding the timeliness and completeness of their responses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Despite these improvements, frustrations persist: overbroad, unsubstantiated or excessive demands for redactions in access to information consultations a reoccurring in every file, inconsistent disclosures in response to requests for information are routine, institutional resistance to NSIRA\u2019s access rights occurs, and outdated departmental information systems at times impede NSIRA\u2019s ability to conduct its work. NSIRA raises these issues with senior departmental officials and escalates to the Minister when necessary, with mixed results. While responsiveness performance varies across departments, it is fair to say that the status quo is one where process challenges regularly challenge NSIRA\u2019s ability to deliver on its mandate. NSIRA is looking at ways to provide better real-time public awareness of its responsiveness challenges so that relevant departments can be held accountable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"17-\">2.2 Follow-Up on Recommendations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Monitoring the execution of recommendations is pivotal to NSIRA\u2019s commitment to facilitate systemic improvement. In 2024, NSIRA strengthened its follow-up practices by initiating dedicated review cycles designed to evaluate the implementation of prior recommendations. The timeliness and comprehensiveness of recommendation responses differ among departments and agencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To facilitate this endeavour, NSIRA is in the process of developing internal tracking tools and protocols to assist in ensuring more consistent awareness, follow-up, and public communications about institutional responses and progress on NSIRA\u2019s recommendations. NSIRA will continue to make advances in the years to come on this significant initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"18-\">2.3 Investigations: Volume Increase and Streamlining Processes<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA addressed a surge of CSIS-related complaints from the public tied to delays in immigration and citizenship screening. More than half of the new complaints related to such delays. Several of those new complaints resulted in informal resolutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA advanced initiatives to improve and streamline its investigative processes and procedures, as detailed in this report\u2019s <em>Complaint Investigations<\/em> section.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"19-\">2.4 Three-Year Strategic Plan<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA finalized its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, setting a clear direction for its priorities over the next three years. The plan reaffirms NSIRA\u2019s core values \u2014Independence, Professionalism, Transparency, and Inclusiveness \u2014 and serves as a foundation for continuous improvement. It positions both NSIRA and its Secretariat to deliver effective, forward-looking review and investigations of public complaints. NSIRA aims to maintain the highest standards by focusing on contemporary issues, applying rigorous methodologies, delivering on its mandates with impartiality and efficiency, and continuing to modernize NSIRA\u2019s processes and leverage new technologies to accomplish improved outcomes for Canadians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To support NSIRA\u2019s mission, the strategic plan invests in sustainable corporate infrastructure. This includes fostering a culture of continuous learning and maintaining high standards in information management, security, and human resources. The NSIRA Secretariat strives to be an agile and efficient workplace that attracts and retains top talent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA also emphasizes its continued collaboration with domestic and international partners to strengthen its review and investigative capabilities. NSIRA aspires to be a globally recognized centre of excellence and a hub for a professional community dedicated to national security accountability. Through this strategic vision, NSIRA reaffirms its role as the trusted eyes and ears of Canadians in an evolving security landscape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"20-\">2.5 New Offices Built to High Standards<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Between 2021 and 2024, NSIRA\u2019s Secretariat led the planning, development, and delivery of a new office space for its staff. This complex undertaking involved meeting the highest standards of security, functionality, and design, all while supporting NSIRA\u2019s growing operational needs. Despite tight timelines and evolving requirements, the Secretariat successfully transitioned into the new space efficiently, securely, and with minimal disruption to NSIRA\u2019s core mandate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"21-\">Reviews<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"22-\">3.1 Overview<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s review mandate is outlined in subsection 8(1) NSIRA Act and includes reviewing national security or intelligence activities of CSE and CSIS, as well as those of any other federal departments and agencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The review reports presented in 2024 to the relevant departments and agencies contain 67 findings, and NSIRA issued 45 recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Table 1<\/strong> lists the reviews that gave rise to the reports produced and submitted to the responsible minister(s) by NSIRA, in 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <caption>\n            Table 1. NSIRA review activities during 2024\n        <\/caption>\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Review<\/th>\n                <th  style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Department(s)<\/th>\n                <th  style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Status**<\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td>22-07\u2014Canadian Security Intelligence Service\n                    Lifecycle of Warranted Information<\/td>\n                <td>CSIS<\/td>\n                <td>Published<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>23-05\u2014Annual Review of Select CSIS activities\n                <\/td>\n                <td>CSIS<\/td>\n                <td>Submitted<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>23-02\u2014Annual Review of Select CSE Activities\n                <\/td>\n                <td>CSE<\/td>\n                <td>Submitted<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>23-10\u2014Communications Security Establishment\u2019s\n                    Equities Management Framework\n                <\/td>\n                <td>CSE<\/td>\n                <td>Submitted<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>21-20\u2014Royal Canadian Mounted Police\u2019s Human\n                    Source Program\n                <\/td>\n                <td>RCMP <\/td>\n                <td>Published<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>22-12\u2014Public Safety and Canadian Security\n                    Intelligence Service Accountability Mechanisms\n                <\/td>\n                <td>CSIS, GAC, PS,\n                    DOJ<\/td>\n                <td>Published<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>23-11\u2014Review of FederalInstitutions\u2019 Disclosures\n                    of Information under the <em>Security of Canada\n                    Information Disclosure Act<\/em> in 2023\n                <\/td>\n                <td>PS, CSE, CSIS,\n                    GAC, RCMP, CBSA,\n                    IRCC<\/td>\n                <td>Published<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>24-03\u2014Review of Departmental Implementation of\n                    the <em>Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign\n                    Entities Act<\/em> for 2023\n                <\/td>\n                <td>CBSA, CSIS, CSE,\n                    DND\/CAF, GAC,\n                    RCMP<\/td>\n                <td>Submitted<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>23-07\u2014Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence\n                    on People\u2019s Republic of China Political Foreign\n                    Interference, 20218-2023\n                <\/td>\n                <td>CSIS, RCMP, GAC,\n                    CSE, PS, PCO<\/td>\n                <td>Published<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>**Status<\/strong> as of the writing of this report. A review is marked as \u201cSubmitted\u201d when the review report has been approved by NSIRA members and sent to the relevant minister(s).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"23-\">3.2 CSIS Reviews<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"24-\">22-07\u2014Review of the Lifecycle of CSIS\u2019s Warranted Information<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA examined CSIS\u2019s lifecycle management of data resulting from a specific and novel technical capability used to execute a Federal Court warrant. NSIRA inspected CSIS\u2019s primary collection and processing system to directly observe how data was collected, processed, and managed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>CSIS introduced heightened non-compliance risks when deploying the technical capability with inadequate operational policies and procedures, inadequate data stewardship practices, and inadequate technical systems to handle the resulting data. Consequently, CSIS retained information without a clearly articulated authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>CSIS did not consult with Public Safety Canada as required by the Ministerial Direction prior to using the novel technology under review. CSIS\u2019s failure to consult may not have been in compliance with the CSIS Act. CSIS mischaracterized the novel technology as an extension of an existing CSIS technology and failed to inform Public Safety Canada in a timely manner. CSIS did not advise the Federal Court of this novel technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These shortcomings raised concerns about CSIS\u2019s readiness to assess, prepare for and deploy other novel technologies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n    <thead>\n        <tr>\n            <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Findings<\/th>\n            <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Recommendations<\/th>\n            <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Reviewee\u2019s Response<\/th>\n        <\/tr>\n    <\/thead>\n    <tbody>\n        <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n            <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>[*Technology*] as a Novel Technology<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 1.<\/strong> NSIRA found that [*technology*] are a novel technology within CSIS\u2019s suite of technical capabilities.<\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 2.<\/strong> NSIRA found that [*technology*] introduce a significant expansion of collection capabilities and operational risks.<\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 3.<\/strong> NSIRA found that CSIS does not have adequate policies and procedures to manage its [*technology*] program.<\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 4.<\/strong> NSIRA found CSIS did not consult Public Safety Canada in a timely manner regarding its planned use of [*technology*] contrary to the Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service on Accountability issued pursuant to section 6(2) of the CSIS Act. Moreover, CSIS may not be in compliance with section 7(1)(b) of the CSIS Act, which requires the Director to consult with the Deputy Minister when required pursuant to Ministerial Direction.<\/td>\n            <td><strong>Recommendation 1.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that CSIS establish and maintain adequate policies and procedures to manage its [*technology*] program.<\/td>\n            <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n\n        <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n            <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Data Lifecycle Management<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 5.<\/strong> NSIRA found that CSIS incorrectly labelled some data collected during [*operation*] and no quality assurance or compliance process detected this prior to NSIRA\u2019s technical inspection.<\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 6.<\/strong> NSIRA found that CSIS retained collected information without clearly articulating the authority for its retention.<\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 7.<\/strong> NSIRA found that CSIS does not adequately consider data stewardship requirements accruing from new collection activities, which introduces heightened non-compliance risks.<\/td>\n            <td>\n                <strong>Recommendation 2.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that CSIS prioritize investing in technical processes and systems that can assess, ingest, label, use, and destroy data in compliance with its legal obligations.\n            <\/td>\n            <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n\n        <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n            <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Risk Assessment Practices<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 8.<\/strong> NSIRA found that CSIS relies on the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to operationalize the 2019 Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on Accountability. However, the 2020 Framework does not fully capture the requirements of the 2019 Ministerial Direction.<\/td>\n            <td>\n                <strong>Recommendation 3.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service be revised to fully align with the 2019 Ministerial Direction to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on Accountability.\n            <\/td>\n            <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td>\n                <strong>Recommendation 4.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that the definition of \u201cnovel technique or technology\u201d in the 2020 Framework for Cooperation Between Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service be revised to err on the side of inclusivity.\n            <\/td>\n            <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td>\n                <strong>Recommendation 5.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that CSIS ensure risk assessments performed throughout the lifecycle of new technologies and techniques are rigorous, documented and comprehensive in their scope.\n            <\/td>\n            <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n\n        <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n            <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Operational Technology Review Committee (OTRC)<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 9.<\/strong> NSIRA found that the creation of the Operational Technology Review Committee was an important step forward in CSIS\u2019s management of new technologies and techniques.<\/td>\n            <td>\n                <strong>Recommendation 6.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that, as part of its ongoing development, the Operational Technology Review Committee refine its processes to:\n                <ul>\n                    <li>consider data lifecycle requirements;<\/li>\n                    <li>reference a definition of \u201cnovel technology\u201d that has been agreed upon with Public Safety Canada as part of a revised Framework;<\/li>\n                    <li>include a requirement to consult Public Safety Canada on plans or proposals to seek or develop novel techniques and technologies;<\/li>\n                    <li>define how risk is assessed;<\/li>\n                    <li>better document its technical, legal, foreign policy and reputational risks assessments.<\/li>\n                <\/ul>\n            <\/td>\n            <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n\n        <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n            <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Execution of Warranted Powers<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 10.<\/strong> NSIRA found that, in [*operation*], CSIS intended to [*specific operation details*] beyond warranted targets at a [*location].<\/td>\n            <td>\n                <strong>Recommendation 7.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that language in the [*warrant type*] Warrant more clearly describe the breadth and limitations of what constitutes incidental collection.\n            <\/td>\n            <td><strong>Partially Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td>\n                <strong>Recommendation 8.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that CSIS specify the warrant authority in the operational planning documents in support of [*sensitive info*] to be sought in the operation.\n            <\/td>\n            <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n\n        <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n            <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Regulations<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 11.<\/strong> NSIRA found that CSIS\u2019s [*use of technology*] may not be in compliance with [*specific*] Regulations.<\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n            <td><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n\n        <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n            <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Duty of Candour<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n            <td><strong>Finding 12.<\/strong> NSIRA found that CSIS did not advise the Court prior to using [*technology*] in the execution of warranted powers.<\/td>\n            <td>\n                <strong>Recommendation 9.<\/strong> NSIRA recommends that the classified version of this report be shared with the Federal Court.\n            <\/td>\n            <td><strong>Partially Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n    <\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"25-\">23-05\u2014Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities (ARSCA-CSIS)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA launched a process called the Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities (ARSCA-CSIS). This review covers a range of operational categories which are either routinely communicated to NSIRA by CSIS under a standalone statutory obligation or are of unique interest to NSIRA due to high legal risks or findings of prior reviews. In previous years, NSIRA conducted annual reviews of CSIS Activities that were primarily focused on NSIRA\u2019s requirement to report annually to the Minister of Public Safety. However, these reviews did not culminate in a final report with findings and recommendations issued pursuant to section 34 of the NSIRA Act. The work completed this year as part of the ARSCA-CSIS is being captured in a final report with findings and recommendations, thereby aligning with NSIRA\u2019s other thematic reviews. The report, which starting this year will be completed annually, will also contain the results of NSIRA\u2019s efforts in reviewing an aspect of the CSIS Threat Reduction Regime. The ARSCA-CSIS report that will provide a high level overview of CSIS activities during the 2024 calendar year has been completed in 2025. Its findings and recommendations will appear in NSIRA\u2019s public annual report for the calendar year 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"26-\">3.3 CSE Reviews<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"27-\">23-02\u2014Annual Review of Select CSE Activities (ARSCA-CSE)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA launched a process called the Annual Review of Select CSE Activities (ARSCA-CSE). This review covers a range of operational categories which are either routinely communicated to NSIRA by CSE under a standalone statutory obligation, or are of unique interest to NSIRA due to high legal risks or findings of prior reviews. In previous years, NSIRA conducted Annual Reviews of CSE Activities that were primarily focused on NSIRA\u2019s requirement to report annually to the Minister of National Defence. However, these reviews did not culminate in a final report with findings and recommendations issued pursuant to section 34 of the NSIRA Act. The work completed this year as part of the ARSCA-CSE is being captured in a final report with findings and recommendations, thereby aligning with NSIRA\u2019s other thematic reviews. The ARSCA-CSE report that will provide a high level overview of CSE activities during the 2024 calendar year has been completed in 2025. Its findings and recommendations will appear in NSIRA\u2019s public annual report for the calendar year 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"28-\">23-10\u2014CSE\u2019s Equities Management Framework<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA review of CSE\u2019s Equities Management Framework (EMF) resulted in ten findings and seven recommendations that relate to two areas of concern, as well as several shortcomings related to governance and practices. However, at the time of writing, the full report remains heavily classified. As such, more information regarding this review, along with the related findings and recommendations, will be made available at a later date.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"29-\">3.4 Other Department Reviews<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"30-\">21-20\u2014RCMP\u2019s Human Source Program<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>This review was conducted alongside reviews of similar programs at the Canada Border Services Agency and the Department of National Defence\/Canadian Armed Forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s review focused on three areas: risk management, duty of care to human sources, and ministerial direction accountability. NSIRA found that risk assessments were inconsistently applied, leading to varied assessments on source suitability. The RCMP was overly reliant on confidentiality promises and failed to fully consider risks to sources. Risk assessments often prioritized investigative outcomes over the safety of informants and lacked proper documentation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Additionally, NSIRA found that the RCMP did not exercise the required \u201cspecial care\u201d when sources operated in sensitive sectors. There were no mechanisms to assess the cumulative impact of such operations. Anecdotal evidence suggested these practices negatively affected both investigations and Canadian society. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Findings<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Recommendations<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Reviewee\u2019s Response<\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Policy Implementation<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 1.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    the RCMP\u2019s dated human\n                    source policy does not provide\n                    a sufficient framework for the\n                    consistent application of the\n                    Source Development Unit\n                    methodology in the proactive\n                    recruitment of human sources.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 1.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the RCMP update\n                    its human source policy to include,\n                    at a minimum:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li>a centralized framework that\n                            requires the Human Source\n                            Program policy centre to\n                            establish:<\/li>\n                        <ul>\n                            <li>clear thresholds and\n                                guidance on the appropriate\n                                criteria for the use of\n                                proactive recruitment\n                                methods in national security\n                                investigations,<\/li>\n                            <li>strong oversight and\n                                accountability by monitoring\n                                and tracking policy\n                                compliance; and<\/li>\n                        <\/ul>\n                        <li>entrenched methodology\n                            principles, including for the conduct of a standardized\n                            approach to the assessment of\n                            risk to human sources in all\n                            national security investigations.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n\n                <\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Policy Governance \u2014 Risk Assessment<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 2.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    the risk assessment for agents\n                    is adequate because it is\n                    comprehensive and details\n                    the management of risk as a\n                    shared responsibility involving\n                    multiple independent\n                    stakeholders.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Findings 3.<\/strong> The risk\n                    assessment framework for\n                    confidential informants is\n                    inadequate. The current\n                    assessments of risk:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li>are not well\n                            documented and as\n                            such do not provide\n                            adequate or reliable\n                            information to\n                            decision-makers; and<\/li>\n                        <li>are primarily focused\n                            on operational security\n                            and risk to the\n                            investigation, as\n                            opposed to risk to the\n                            confidential\n                            informants.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n\n                <\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 2.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the RCMP revise\n                    its risk assessment framework for\n                    confidential informants to require\n                    officers to consider all applicable\n                    risks to the confidential informant,\n                    and to aggregate and document\n                    those risks, thereby providing for a\n                    full accounting.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Agents \u2014 Duty of Care and Informed Consent<\/strong>\n                <\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 4.<\/strong> RCMP\u2019s discharge\n                    of its duty of care toward\n                    agents is satisfactory because\n                    the current process:<br \/>\n                    <ul>\n                        <li>considers a wide range of\n                            risks;<\/li>\n                        <li>ensures that\n                            obligations for\n                            informed consent are\n                            met;<\/li>\n                        <li>accounts for risk\n                            mitigation measures;<br \/><\/li>\n                        <li>provides for\n                            administrative\n                            interviews; and<\/li>\n                        <li>includes independent\n                            third party\n                            assessments.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n                <\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 3.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the RCMP adjust\n                    the parameters for the conduct of\n                    agent interviews so that agent\n                    feedback is more descriptive\n                    concerning their experience; and\n                    documented with greater\n                    frequency.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Confidential Informants \u2014 Duty of Care and Informed\n                        Consent<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 5.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    the RCMP over relies on the\n                    promise of confidentiality and\n                    does not adequately consider\n                    the risk to confidential\n                    informants.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 4.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the RCMP\n                    improve its risk assessment\n                    framework for confidential\n                    informants. At a minimum, the\n                    framework should:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li> consider the safety of the\n                            confidential informant;<\/li>\n                        <li> consider the particular\n                            circumstances of the\n                            confidential informant;<\/li>\n                        <li>aggregate information that\n                            allows for the detection of\n                            outstanding vulnerabilities; and<\/li>\n                        <li>provide for consent from the\n                            confidential informant that is considerate of the risks\n                            involved.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n                \n                <strong>Recommendation 5.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that RCMP lower the\n                    threshold to conduct administrative\n                    interviews so they are conducted\n                    with greater regularity and with a\n                    greater proportion of confidential\n                    informants.<\/td>\n              <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Ministerial Direction \u2014 National Security Investigations in\n                        Sensitive Sectors<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 6.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    the RCMP has not\n                    demonstrated special care in\n                    its national security\n                    investigations in sensitive\n                    sectors, contrary to\n                    obligations under the\n                    Ministerial Direction \u2014\n                    National Security\n                    Investigations in Sensitive\n                    Sectors.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 7.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    the RCMP has an inadequate\n                    framework to ensure the\n                    appreciation of the cumulative\n                    impact of national security\n                    investigations in Canadian\n                    Fundamental Institutions<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 6.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the RCMP create\n                    a specialized Sensitive Sector Unit\n                    that is responsible for monitoring\n                    and aggregating information on the\n                    RCMP\u2019s activities as they relate to\n                    Canadian Fundamental Institutions,\n                    assessing the impact of these\n                    activities on the community, and\n                    conduct long-term analysis of the\n                    cumulative effects.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"31-\">3.5 Multi-Departmental Reviews<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"32-\">22-12\u2014 Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Accountability Mechanisms (CSIS, GAC, PS, DOJ)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Following a September 2022 referral by the former Minister of Public Safety (PS), NSIRA reviewed whether CSIS\u2019s risk assessment model, Ministerial Direction, and information-sharing mechanisms supported the Minister\u2019s discharge of their responsibilities for CSIS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Directions to CSIS coming from political level actors\u2014rather than the Minister or the CSIS Director\u2014during an active operation created unnecessary danger for the CSIS team and caused harm to Canada\u2019s international reputation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>CSIS and PS failed to provide timely and accurate information to the Minister, which may result from PS\u2019s dependence on CSIS to identify and receive relevant information. This would inhibit PS\u2019s ability to prepare independent advice to the Minister.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Certain Ministerial Directions to CSIS are subject to inconsistent and contradictory interpretation, which affects their implementation. The report raises a number of issues with the pillars of risk evaluated: operational, legal, foreign policy, and reputational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ultimately, the Minister of Public Safety may not be consistently supported and briefed about pertinent CSIS operations, which raises concerns about the possible erosion of ministerial accountability for the CSIS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th   style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Findings<\/th>\n                <th   style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Recommendations<\/th>\n                <th   style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Reviewee\u2019s Response<\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>Accountability and Consequences for Halting the\n                        Operation [*codename*]<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 1.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that a decision was made\n                    to halt an active CSIS\n                    operation overseas that\n                    was not made by the CSIS\n                    Director under section 6(1) of the CSIS Act, and for\n                    which there is no written\n                    record of a direction\n                    comingfrom the Minister\n                    of Public Safety under\n                    sections 6(1) or 6(2) of the\n                    CSIS Act.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 1.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    Recommends that whenever there is a\n                    decision affecting an active CSIS\n                    operation, which is not made by the\n                    Director of CSIS or their delegates, it\n                    must come as a direction from the Minister of Public Safety under\n                    section 6(1) of the CSIS Act and should\n                    be accompanied by a written record in\n                    keeping with section 6(2).<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 2.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that [*political-level\n                    actors*] halted an active\n                    operation, creating\n                    unnecessary danger for the\n                    CSIS team [**], and\n                    caused harm to Canada\u2019s\n                    international reputation.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Responsibility for Briefing the Minister About [*codename*]\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Findings 3.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that Public Safety and CSIS\n                    failed in their responsibility\n                    to provide timely and\n                    accurate information to\n                    the Minister of Public\n                    Safety about [**] human\n                    source [**] operation.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Public Safety\u2019s Role in Relation to CSIS\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 4.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that Public Safety willingly\n                    remains dependent on\n                    CSIS to identify and\n                    receive relevant\n                    information, which inhibits Public Safety\u2019s ability to\n                    prepare independent\n                    advice to the Minister\n                    about the activities and\n                    operations of CSIS.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 2.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the Minister of Public\n                    Safety take action to ensure that the\n                    Deputy Minister obtains any information\n                    required to fulfill their responsibility to\n                    provide independent advice to the Minister about the activities and\n                    operations of CSIS.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Partially  Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Ministerial Direction to CSIS\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Findings 5.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that multiple Ministerial\n                    Directions to CSIS are\n                    subject to inconsistent and\n                    contradictory\n                    interpretation by those\n                    responsible for their\n                    implementation.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 3.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the Minister of Public\n                    Safety consolidate ministerialdirections\n                    into clear, concise and harmonized\n                    instruments that are derived from\n                    meaningful consultation among those\n                    responsible for their implementation.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Findings 6.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that when preparing\n                    Ministerial Directions to\n                    CSIS, Public Safety\n                    insufficiently consulted\n                    with Global Affairs Canada\n                    and CSIS.<\/td>\n\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        CSIS\u2019s Risk Assessment Process\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 7.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that CSIS\u2019s risk\n                    assessment process has\n                    evolved to become the\n                    central mechanism for\n                    planning operations and\n                    managing associated risks,\n                    and, while it is generally\n                    effective, it lacks clear guidance to employees on\n                    when risk should be\n                    reassessed as operations\n                    evolve.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Legal Pillar\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Findings 8.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that legal advice is often\n                    absent from the final risk\n                    assessment record for\n                    CSIS operations.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 4.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that CSIS, in consultation\n                    with the Department of Justice and\n                    Global Affairs Canada, ensure that legal\n                    risk assessments are comprehensive\n                    and memorialized in writing.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Findings 9.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that the scope of legal\n                    considerations within legal\n                    risk assessment is underinclusive.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Foreign Policy Pillar\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 10.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that Global Affairs Canada\n                    and CSIS do not have a\n                    shared vision with respect\n                    to the role of Global Affairs\n                    Canada in the foreign\n                    policy risk assessment.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 5.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that any pending changes\n                    to CSIS\u2019s risk assessment process\n                    maintain a robust consultation and\n                    information sharing mechanism between\n                    Global Affairs Canada and CSIS.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Reputational Pillar\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 11.<\/strong> NSIRA found\n                    that Public Safety is not\n                    adequately contributing to\n                    the preparation of reputational risk\n                    assessments.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 6.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that Public Safety and CSIS\n                    develop a more robust consultation\n                    mechanism for reputational risk\n                    assessment for CSIS operational activities, and that these assessments\n                    account for the risk of discreditingthe\n                    Government of Canada.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Partially  Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n        <\/tbody>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"33-\">23-11\u2014 Review of Government of Canada Institutions\u2019 Disclosures of Information Under the <em>Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act<\/em> in 2023 (PS, CSE, CSIS, GAC, RCMP, CBSA, IRCC)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The purpose of this review was to determine whether Government of Canada (GC) institutions complied with the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)\u2019s requirements for disclosure and record keeping in 2023. For the first time in SCIDA\u2019s history, NSIRA has found full compliance with the Act, but NSIRA made seven recommendations to mitigate the risks of non-compliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Albeit compliant with the SCIDA, some IRCC disclosures presented a risk of non-compliance with SCIDA\u2019s contribution and proportionality tests. The disclosing institution must be satisfied that both tests are met before making a disclosure under the SCIDA. Yet, four disclosures raised concerns with regard to the amount of personal information that IRCC disclosed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At times, CSIS request letters were unclear, which hindered IRCC\u2019s effort to conclude that the disclosure was authorized. The departments are required to provide information on the accuracy and reliability of the manner the disclosed information was obtained. However, NSIRA found that IRCC provided template statements on accuracy and reliability that were not always relevant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>CBSA\u2019s record of disclosure form contradicts the SCIDA by suggesting that the provision of information on accuracy and reliability is optional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th   style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Findings<\/th>\n                <th   style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Recommendations<\/th>\n                <th   style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\" scope=\"col\">Reviewee\u2019s Response<\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Record Keeping Requirements \u2014 Section 9\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 1.<\/strong> NSIRA found that every\n                    institution that disclosed or\n                    received information pursuant to\n                    SCIDA in 2023 complied with their\n                    record keeping obligations under\n                    section 9, but some records were\n                    inaccurate or imprecise.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Contribution and Proportionality Tests \u2014 Subsection 5(1) <\/strong>\n                <\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 2.<\/strong> NSIRA found, within the\n                    sample of disclosures reviewed\n                    that disclosing institutions\n                    demonstrated they had satisfied\n                    themselves under the contribution\n                    and proportionality tests in\n                    compliance with subsection 5(1)\n                    of the SCIDA.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 1.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that disclosing\n                    institutions explicitly address the\n                    requirements of both\n                    paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in the\n                    records that they prepare under\n                    paragraph 9(1)(e) of the SCIDA.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 3.<\/strong> NSIRA found that IRCC\n                    did not, in one instance,\n                    independently consider whether\n                    its disclosure related to activities\n                    that fell under the SCIDA\n                    exception for advocacy, protest, or\n                    dissent. Instead, IRCC satisfied\n                    itself of the SCIDA\u2019s contribution\n                    test based on assumptions about\n                    how CSIS assessed activities that\n                    undermine the security of Canada.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 2.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that IRCC amend their\n                    SCIDA policy to underscore that IRCC\n                    must independently assess whether\n                    the disclosure is authorized. This\n                    assessment should consider whether\n                    the activity amounts to one of the\n                    exceptions to the SCIDA\u2019s definition\n                    of activities that undermine the\n                    security of Canada.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 4.<\/strong> NSIRA found that,\n                    throughout the course of 2023,\n                    IRCC improved the rigour of its\n                    proportionality assessments\n                    regarding disclosure of passport information. However, NSIRA\n                    identified three instances where\n                    IRCC disclosed visa information\n                    without applying the same\n                    rigorous approach, which risked\n                    disclosing more personal\n                    information than reasonably\n                    necessary in the circumstances.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 3.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that IRCC apply an\n                    iterative approach to its\n                    proportionality assessments, with a\n                    view to disclosing only the minimum information reasonably necessary in\n                    the circumstances to enable the\n                    recipient institution to further their\n                    investigation.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 5.<\/strong> NSIRA found that CSIS\n                    requests to IRCC used\n                    inconsistent terminology and were\n                    often unclear about the\n                    relationship between the subject\n                    of the request and its\n                    investigation. At times, this lack of\n                    clear communication hindered\n                    IRCC\u2019s efforts to satisfy itself that\n                    the disclosure was authorized\n                    underthe SCIDA.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 4.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that CSIS use\n                    consistent terminology, and be clear\n                    about the nature of the link that has\n                    been established between the\n                    subject of a request and its\n                    investigation, to assist IRCC in\n                    satisfying itself of the proportionality\n                    test.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Reliability and Accuracy Statement \u2014 Subsection 5(2)\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 6.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    disclosing institutions provided\n                    information regarding the\n                    accuracy of the information and\n                    reliability of the manner in which it\n                    was obtained in relation to all\n                    disclosures. However, CBSA made\n                    one verbal disclosure that did not\n                    include an explicit statement on\n                    accuracy and reliability.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 5.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that institutions avoid\n                      disclosures whenever\n                    possible. When they must occur,\n                    verbal disclosures should explicitly\n                    convey the requisite information on\n                    accuracy and reliability.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 7.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    CBSA\u2019s record of disclosure form contradicts the SCIDA by allowing\n                    officials to opt out of providing\n                    information regarding accuracy\n                    and reliability.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 6.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that CBSA harmonize its record of disclosure form with the\n                    SCIDA, to convey the mandatory\n                    nature of providing information on\n                    accuracy and reliability at the time of\n                    the disclosure.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 8.<\/strong> NSIRA found that IRCC\n                    used \u201ctemplated\u201d language to\n                    describe the disclosure\u2019s accuracy\n                    and reliability that was not always\n                    relevant or specific to the\n                    circumstances of the disclosure.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 7.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that IRCC tailor its\n                    statements on accuracy and\n                    reliability as to ensure that each\n                    disclosure\u2019s statement is specific to\n                    the circumstances of the case.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Agree<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px;\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>\n                        Information Sharing Agreement \u2014 Subsection 4(c)\n                    <\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 9.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    disclosures between IRCC and\n                    CSE that occurred following the\n                    enactment of their new\n                    information sharing agreement\n                    were compliant with both the\n                    SCIDA and their information\u00ac\n                    sharing agreement.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n\n        <\/tbody>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"34-\">24-03\u2014Review of Departmental Implementation of the <em>Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act <\/em>for 2023: Mitigation and Armed Conflict (CBSA, CSIS, CSE, DND\/CAF, GAC, RCMP)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>This review assessed departments\u2019 compliance with the <em>Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act<\/em> (ACA) and their implementation of the ACA\u2019s associated directions (ACA Directions) during the 2023 calendar year. It focused on how departments mitigated a substantial risk of mistreatment when sharing information with foreign entities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA reviewed a number of cases concerning disclosures to foreign entities engaged in armed conflict and considered how armed conflict affected departments\u2019 ability to mitigate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Three departments that shared with foreign entities engaged in armed conflict may not have been compliant with the ACA Directions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A foreign country\u2019s involvement in armed conflict created challenges for departments in meeting their mitigation obligations under the ACA Directions. NSIRA further observed challenges related to disclosures contemplated to serve humanitarian objectives. NSIRA noted that the circumstances of armed conflict left few options for departments pursuing humanitarian objectives to mitigate the risks resulting from sharing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA directed departments to conduct a study of information-sharing with the foreign entities of countries engaged in armed conflict to analyze challenges incompliance with the ACA Directions and gaps in the ACA regime. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Findings<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Recommendations<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Reviewee\u2019s Response<\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 1.<\/strong> NSIRA found that, in\n                    the cases examined, CSIS, GAC,\n                    RCMP, and IRCC\u2019s mitigation\n                    determinations demonstrated\n                    common deficiencies, including:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li> inadequate design of\n                            mitigation measures to\n                            address the specific risks of\n                            mistreatment present;<\/li>\n                        <li>insufficient assessment of\n                            caveats and assurances for\n                            clarity and reliability; and<\/li>\n                        <li>improper incorporation of\n                            external considerations into\n                            the determinations of\n                            whether a substantial risk of mistreatment could be\n                            mitigated.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n\n                    \n                    <strong>Finding 2.<\/strong> NSIRA found that, in\n                    the case examined, CSIS may not\n                    have been in compliance with the\n                    ACA Directions, as they were\n                    unlikely to have sufficiently\n                    mitigated a substantial risk of\n                    mistreatment when sharing\n                    information with a foreign entity.\n                    Specifically, CSIS:\n                    \n                    <ul>\n                        <li>relied upon caveats and\nassurances that were\ninadequately designed to\naddress the specific risks of\nmistreatment present; and<\/li>\n                        <li>did not resolve substantial\ndeficiencies that\nundermined the reliability of\nthe caveats and assurances.<\/li>\n                        \n                    <\/ul>\n\n\n                    \n                   <p> <strong>Finding 3.<\/strong> NSIRA found that, in\n                    the case examined, GAC\u2019s poor\n                    record-keeping practices\n                    impeded NSIRA\u2019s ability to\n                    determine their compliance with\n                    the ACA Directions.<\/p>\n\n\n                    \n                   <p> <strong>Finding 4.<\/strong> NSIRA found that, in\n                    the case examined, the RCMP\n                    may not have been in compliance\n                    with the ACA Directions, as they\n                    were unlikely to have sufficiently\n                    mitigated a substantial risk of\n                    mistreatment when sharing\n                    information with a foreign entity.\n                    Specifically, the RCMP relied\n                    upon caveats that were\n                    inadequately designed to\n                    address the specific risks of\n                    mistreatment present.<\/p>\n\n\n                    \n                  <p><strong>Finding 5.<\/strong> NSIRA found that, in\n                    the case examined, IRCC may\n                    not have been in compliance with\n                    the ACA Directions, as they were\n                    unlikely to have sufficiently\n                    mitigated a substantial risk of\n                    mistreatment when sharing\n                    information with a foreign entity.\n                    Specifically, IRCC relied upon\n                    measures that were inadequately\n                    designed to address the specific\n                    risks of mistreatment present.<\/p>\n\n\n                    \n\n                    <p><strong>Finding 6.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    many of DND\/CAF\u2019s mitigation\n                    practices served to provide\n                    decision-makers with\n                    information necessaryto\n                    determine whether a substantial\n                    risk of mistreatment could be\n                    mitigated.<\/p>\n\n\n                <\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 1.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that departmental ACA\n                    risk assessments include thorough\n                    mitigation plans wherever a\n                    substantial risk of mistreatment is\n                    identified. These plans should:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li>consider whether all mitigation\n                            measures proposed, taken\n                            globally, adequately address the\n                            specific risks alive in the case at\n                            issue and are capable of\n                            sufficiently lesseningthose risks;<\/li>\n                        <li>evaluate the reliability of any\n                            caveats and assurances\n                            proposed and weigh histories of compliance according to their\n                            quality;<\/li>\n                        <li>exclude any external\n                            considerations that are not\n                            relevant to the question of\n                            mitigation, including the risk of\n                            not sharing, and strategic or\n                            reputational considerations; and<\/li>\n                        <li>include a plan to monitor for\n                            indications of mistreatment and\n                            adherence to caveats and\n                            assurances following an\n                            information exchange.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n\n                <\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 7.<\/strong> NSIRA found that a\n                    foreign country\u2019s involvement in\n                    armed conflict created\n                    challenges for departments in\n                    meeting their mitigation obligations under the ACA\n                    Directions when seekingto share\n                    information with that country\u2019s\n                    entities.\n\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 2.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that officials clearly\n                    document how each identified risk\n                    was mitigated prior to disclosing\n                    information to foreign entities.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 8.<\/strong> NSIRA found that the\n                    practicalrealities of compliance\n                    with the ACA Directions can, in\n                    certain circumstances, create a\n                    dilemma for departments\n                    seeking to share for humanitarian\n                    purposes.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n        <\/tbody>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"35-\">23-07\u2014Review of the Dissemination of Intelligence on People\u2019s Republic of China Political Foreign Interference, 2018-2023 (CSIS, RCMP, GAC, CSE, PS, PCO)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>This review evaluated processes regarding how collected information was shared and escalated to relevant decision-makers, and indicated that there were significant disagreements in the national security and intelligence community as to whether, when, and how to share relevant information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Three basic schisms existed: CSIS struggled to reconcile competing imperatives given the unique sensitivities of political foreign interference; the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP) Panel were geared toward broad, systematic interference and therefore could not adequately address riding-by-riding interference. PCO and CSIS analysts produced overviews of what they considered to be PRC foreign interference activities, but which the Prime Minister\u2019s National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) saw as recounting standard diplomatic activity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This challenging situation prompts us to ask how to address the so-called grey zone whereby political foreign interference may stand in close proximity to typical political or diplomatic activity. NSIRA saw evidence of this challenge across the activities under review. NSIRA\u2019s eight recommendations address these deficiencies. In addition, at the time of writing, NSIRA was still awaiting responses from departments to its recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Findings<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Recommendations<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"\n                    scope=\"col\">Reviewee\u2019s Response<\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>CSIS\u2019s Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence\n                        on PRC Foreign Interference\n                        in the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 1.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    CSIS\u2019s dissemination of\n                    intelligence on political foreign\n                    interference during the 43rd\n                    and 44th federal elections was\n                    inconsistent. Specifically, in\n                    certain instances:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li>the rationale for decisions\n                            regarding whether, when,\n                            and how to disseminate\n                            intelligence was not clear,\n                            directly affectingthe flow\n                            of information; and<\/li>\n                        <li>the threat posed by\n                            politicalforeign\n                            interference activities was\n                            not clearly communicated\n                            by CSIS.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n                <\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 2.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    CSIS\u2019s dissemination and use\n                    of intelligence on political\n                    foreign interference were impacted by the concern that\n                    such actions could interfere, or\n                    be seen to interfere, in the\n                    democratic process.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 3.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    CSIS often elected to provide\n                    verbal briefings as opposed to\n                    written products in\n                    disseminating intelligence on\n                    political foreign interference\n                    duringelections.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 4.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                        there was a disconnect within\n                        CSIS between a region and\n                        National Headquarters as to\n                        whether reporting on political\n                        foreign interference was\n                        subject to higher thresholds of\n                        confidence, corroboration and\n                        contextualization for\n                        dissemination.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 1.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that CSIS develop,\n                    in consultation with relevant\n                    government stakeholders, a\n                    comprehensive policy governing\n                    its engagement with threats\n                    related to political foreign\n                    interference. This policy should:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li>make explicit CSIS\u2019s\n                            thresholds and practices for\n                            the communication and\n                            dissemination of intelligence\n                            regarding political foreign\n                            interference. This would\n                            include the relevant levels of\n                            confidence, corroboration,\n                            contextualization and\n                            characterization necessary\n                            for intelligence to be\n                            reported;<\/li>\n                        <li>clearly articulate CSIS\u2019s risk\n                            tolerance for taking action against threats of political\n                            foreign interference;<\/li>\n                        <li>establish clear approval and\n                            notification processes\n                            (including external\n                            consultations) for all\n                            activities related to\n                            counteringpolitical foreign\n                            interference;<\/li>\n                        <li>make clear any special\n                            requirements or procedures\n                            that would apply during\n                            election\/writ periods, as\n                            necessary, including in\n                            particular procedures for the\n                            timely dissemination of\n                            intelligence about political\n                            foreign interference; and<\/li>\n                        <li>consider best practices from\n                            international partners (in\n                            particular the Five Eyes)\n                            regarding investigating and\n                            reporting about political\n                            foreign interference.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n                <\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>The SITE Task Force and the CEIPP Panel<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 5.<\/strong> NSIRA found that the\n                    SITE Task Force and the CEIPP\n                    Panel were not adequately\n                    designed to address\n                    traditional, human-based\n                    foreign interference.\n                    Specifically:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li>the SITE Task Force\n                            focuses on threat activities\n                            duringthe election period,\n                            but traditional foreign interference also occurs\n                            between elections;\n                            Findings Recommendations Reviewee\u2019s\n                            Response<\/li>\n                        <li>Global Affairs Canada\u2019s\n                            representation on the SITE\n                            Task Force focused on\n                            online foreign interference\n                            activities; and<\/li>\n                        <li>the CEIPP Panel\u2019s high\n                            threshold for a public\n                            announcement is unlikely\n                            to be triggered by\n                            traditional foreign\n                            interference, which\n                            typically targets specific\n                            ridings.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n                <\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 2.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the SITE Task\n                    Force align its priorities with the\n                    threat landscape, including\n                    threats which occur outside of the\n                    immediate election period.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 3.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that Global Affairs\n                    Canada (GAC) and the Privy\n                    Council Office ensure that GAC\u2019s\n                    representation on the SITE Task\n                    Force leverages the department\u2019s\n                    capacity to analyze and address\n                    traditional, human-based foreign\n                    interference, in addition to the\n                    online remit of the Rapid\n                    Response Mechanism Team.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 4.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the Privy\n                    Council Office empower the\n                    CEIPP Panel to develop additional\n                    strategies to address the full\n                    threat landscape during election\n                    periods, including when threats\n                    manifest in specific ridings.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n                <td class=\"text-center\" colspan=\"6\"><strong>The Flow of Intelligence on PRC Foreign\n                        Interference<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 6.<\/strong> NSIRA found that the\n                    limited distribution of some\n                    CSIS and CSE intelligence to\n                    senior officials only reduced\n                    the ability of the Royal\n                    Canadian Mounted Police,\n                    Global Affairs Canada, and the\n                    Privy Council Office to\n                    incorporate that intelligence\n                    into their analysis.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 7.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    CSIS and Public Safety did not\n                    have a system for tracking who\n                    received and read specific\n                    intelligence products, creating\n                    unacceptable gaps in\n                    accountability.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 5.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that, as a basic\n                    accountability mechanism, CSIS\n                    and Public Safety rigorously track\n                    and document who has received\n                    intelligence products. In the case\n                    of highly sensitive and urgent\n                    intelligence, this should include\n                    documenting who has read\n                    intelligence products.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 8.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    the dissemination of\n                    intelligence on political foreign\n                    interference from 2018 to\n                    2023 suffered from multiple\n                    issues. Specifically:\n                    <ul>\n                        <li>intelligence consumers did\n                            not always understand the\n                            significance of the\n                            intelligence they received\n                            nor how to integrate it into\n                            their policy analysis and\n                            decision-making;<\/li>\n                        <li>there was disagreement\n                            between intelligence units\n                            and senior public servants\n                            as to whether activities\n                            described in specific\n                            intelligence products\n                            constituted foreign\n                            interference or legitimate\n                            diplomatic activity.<\/li>\n                    <\/ul>\n                <\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 6.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that Public Safety\n                    Canada, Global Affairs Canada,\n                    the Privy Council Office, and other\n                    regular consumers of intelligence,\n                    enhance intelligence literacy\n                    within their departments.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 9.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    there was disagreement\n                    between senior public servants\n                    and the NSIA as to whether\n                    intelligence assessments\n                    should be shared with the\n                    political executive. Ultimately,\n                    the NSIA\u2019s interventions\n                    resulted in two products not\n                    reaching the political\n                    executive, includingthe Prime\n                    Minister.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 7.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the security\n                    and intelligence community\n                    develop a common, working\n                    understanding of political foreign\n                    interference.<\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Finding 10.<\/strong> NSIRA found that\n                    the NSIA\u2019s role in decisions\n                    regarding the dissemination of\n                    CSIS intelligence products is\n                    unclear.<\/td>\n                <td><strong>Recommendation 8.<\/strong> NSIRA\n                    recommends that the role of the\n                    National Security and Intelligence\n                    Advisor to the Prime Minister,\n                    including with respect to\n                    decisions regarding the\n                    dissemination of intelligence, be\n                    described in a legal instrument. <\/td>\n                <td><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n        <\/tbody>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"36-\">Complaint Investigations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"37-\">4.1 Overview<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA is responsible for investigating complaints from members of the public related to national security. These investigations are carried out with consistency, fairness, and timeliness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s jurisdiction covers complaints regarding activities conducted by CSIS or CSE, national security-related complaints against the RCMP, complaints in relations to security clearance denials and, referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) or under the Citizenship Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA continued to investigate a wide range of complaints from previous years, successfully bringing several to a conclusion. NSIRA also initiated many new investigations, including with respect to a large increase in public complaints against CSIS regarding immigration and citizenship security screening, as detailed further below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Finally, NSIRA continues to implement several initiatives aimed at enhancing and streamlining its processes and procedures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"38-\">Increase of complaints against CSIS regarding delays in immigration or citizenship security screening<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>From August to December 2024, NSIRA observed a significant increase of complaints against CSIS filed pursuant to section 16 of the NSIRA Act, alleging process delays in immigration or citizenship security screening. Out of 79 complaints received pursuant to s.16 of the NSIRA Act in 2024, 52 (66%) related to such delays. Of note, under ss. 14 and 15 of the CSIS Act, CSIS provides security advice to IRCC and CBSA regarding immigration or citizenship applicants. CSIS has advised NSIRA that the time it takes to provide security advice is influenced by several factors, including the prioritization of files, resource limitations, and priorities established by the Government of Canada, such as special immigration measures and humanitarian initiatives in response to crises around the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As depicted by the statistics found at the end of the current section, several of these complaints have resulted in informal resolutions. More specifically, upon completion of CSIS\u2019s security screening of a complainant\u2019s citizenship or immigration application, CSIS provides a letter that can be shared with the complainant which indicates that the advice has been provided to the requesting client, and that CSIS\u2019s role is now complete. The complainant may then elect to continue with their complaint or informally resolve it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"39-\">4.2 Ongoing Initiatives<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s Rules of Procedure govern the process for complaint investigations. While respecting the classified nature of the proceedings, they ensure that parties have the fullest opportunity to participate and make representations, and that all proceedings are conducted as informally and expeditiously as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2024, NSIRA continued its internal review of the Rules of Procedure to identify issues and develop proposals for future revisions. The review aims to ensure that all investigations remain accessible, efficient, and procedurally fair.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Specifically, NSIRA also created a new rule on accessibility and accommodations. The rule will enable NSIRA to meet its commitment to identify, remove, and prevent barriers to accessibility to the greatest extent possible. This will help to ensure that those with disabilities can continue to fully participate in the complaint investigation process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA also began developing another new rule to create a streamlined process for simplified investigations of non-complex complaints.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"40-\">4.3 Investigation Report Summaries<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"41-\">Final Reports Issued<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Harassment allegations against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"42-\">(NSIRA File 07-407-13)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that RCMP members had shown up unannounced and without a warrant at their home. The Complainant alleged harassment by the said RCMP members during that unexpected visit. The RCMP members went to the Complainant\u2019s home following an anonymous report, according to which the Complainant had made threats against the Prime Minister.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The interaction between the RCMP members and the Complainant was filmed by the bodycam worn by a municipal police officer. The video was submitted as evidence by the RMCP in the NSIRA investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Following a review of the documentary evidence submitted by the RCMP and the Complainant, as well as an investigative interview with the latter, NSIRA found that under the implicit invitation provided by Common Law, the RCMP members had the right to go unannounced and without a warrant to the Complainant\u2019s house to have a discussion with the said Complainant. The purpose of the RCMP members \u2019visit was to determine whether the Complainant posed a threat to the public and to the Prime Minister, not to substantiate any accusations against the said Complainant or to make an arrest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA also found that the RCMP members had not harassed the Complainant during the interaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA found the Complainant\u2019s allegations to be unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"42-\">Allegations against the Department of National Defence for denial of Top Secret security clearance and revocation of reliability status <\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"42-\">(NSIRA File 07-404-30)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that, based on their voluntary disclosure during security interviews, they were denied a Top Secret security clearance and had their reliability status revoked, which resulted in their release from the Canadian Forces. NSIRA found that it had no jurisdiction to make findings and recommendations regarding revocation of reliability status and confined its discussion to matters implicating the security clearance decision only.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff\u2019s (VCDS) security clearance decision was flawed for several reasons, including that the Complainant\u2019s sexuality influenced the VCDS decision; the VCDS did not take into account the Complainant\u2019s mental health situation and failed to inquire about amental health nexus in their case and provide accommodation; the decision did not meet DND\u2019s security screening standards; the decision was inconsistent with the recommendation offered by the Complainant\u2019s commanding officer; and the decision did not acknowledge a number of considerations that might mitigate the seriousness of the adverse information against the Complainant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA found the Complainant\u2019s allegations to be unsubstantiated. Specifically, NSIRA found that the VCDS decision was not motivated by a concern or consideration of the Complainant\u2019s sexuality or sexual orientation; that in the circumstances, no duty to accommodate was triggered for the purposes of the VCDS decision based on the Complainants mental health situation; that were unsubstantiated the allegations that the VCDS failed to meet security screening standards and that DND failed to properly review the surrounding circumstances; that the assertion that the VCDS decision was improper because it was inconsistent with the Complainant\u2019s commanding officer\u2019s recommendation was unsubstantiated; and that the Complainant\u2019s other allegations, including those with respect to considerations that might mitigate the seriousness of the adverse information against them, did not individually or collectively render the decision unreasonable. In addition, NSIRA found no violation of procedural fairness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, NSIRA observed that certain exculpatory information was excluded from the Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) before the decision-maker and recommended that this practice be rectified in the future. However, this omission did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness in the circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"44-\">Allegations against CSIS for racial profiling, interrogation and harassment, information-sharing with foreign agencies, travel difficulties, and citizenship issues <\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"44-\">(NSIRA File 07-403-05)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that CSIS had been racially profiling them; that CSIS agents harassed and interrogated them on multiple occasions; that CSIS shared information about them with foreign countries, leading to them having travel difficulties; that CSIS was responsible for their travel difficulties; and that CSIS put their citizenship application on hold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>SIRC took jurisdiction of this complaint in 2018, and when NSIRA came into force in2019, this investigation was deemed to be continued before NSIRA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the investigative report, NSIRA provided clarity on the standard of review in section 16 complaints \u2014 namely, that NSIRA is charged with making findings and recommendations with respect to legality, reasonableness, and necessity in the exercise of CSIS\u2019s powers. In gauging reasonableness and necessity, the Member adopted an objective standard: would a reasonable person charged with exercising CSIS\u2019s mandates and apprised fully of the facts, as were available to CSIS, conclude that CSIS\u2019s exercise of its powers was necessary and proportional?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On the facts of this investigation, NSIRA found that the allegations were unsubstantiated, but made several recommendations. The recommendations addressed observations concerning how CSIS manages the aftermath of section 12 investigations and the circumstances in which CSIS should retract or correct information that it shared with foreign agencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"46-\">Allegations against CSIS for conspiracy, electronic surveillance, travel difficulties, information sharing, and unlawful conduct<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"46-\">(NSIRA File 07-403-69)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that CSIS directed an unlawful seizure of their property in 2011; unlawfully shared information with Canadian and foreign authorities; conspired with government departments; harassed, surveilled, targeted, and intercepted their phone calls; acted unlawfully and breached their human or Charter rights. In addition, the Complainant alleged that they had issues reentering Canada after the impugned seizure took place due to CSIS\u2019s activities. NSIRA found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"48-\">Allegations against CSE for breach of consent and procedural fairness as part of security screening and hiring processes <\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"48-\">(NSIRA File 07-406-04)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that, as part of their security screening and hiring processes at CSE, CSE breached their consent and procedural fairness; squandered government resources; failed to use approved security screening tools that have been approved by TBS and undergone the required Privacy Impact Assessment; received verbal disclosures or slander from the Complainant\u2019s former employer regarding their character; harassed them; denied them a security clearance; and cited suitability concerns as a technique to circumvent NSIRA\u2019s jurisdiction under section 18 of the NSIRA Act with respect to complaints related to denials of security clearances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA concluded that the Complainant\u2019s first allegation that CSE had breached their consent, and more specifically that CSE improperly used information the Complainant disclosed during their security interview for human resources and suitability purposes, was supported. The consent form signed by the Complainant in preparation for the security interview only contemplated the collection of information for the purpose of obtaining a security clearance. The evidence before NSIRA revealed that the Complainant was not advised prior to the security interview that the information collected could have been subsequently used for other purposes, including to assess their suitability for employment. Accordingly, NSIRA found that CSE had not complied with section 7 of the Privacy Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With respect to the Complainant\u2019s remaining allegations against CSE, NSIRA found that they were unsubstantiated by the evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In its Final Report, NSIRA issued two recommendations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul>\n<li>That CSE review the consent form that is presented to and signed by candidates prior to a security interview as part of the security screening process, and amend it accordingly; and<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>That CSE consider undertaking a Privacy Impact Assessment of its security interview questionnaire if one has not been conducted yet.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p> <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"50-\">Allegations against CSIS for racism\/racial profiling, harassment, slander, information-sharing with foreign agencies, travel difficulties <\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"50-\">(NSIRA File 07-403-12)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that CSIS subjected them to harassment, racial profiling, and slander. The Complainant suggests that they were targeted because of their racial or ethnic background, legitimate political opinions, and due to their work as a confidential police informant. They suggested that, due to CSIS\u2019s conduct, they had social, psychological and financial hardship, and difficulty travelling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>SIRC took jurisdiction of this complaint in January 2019, and when NSIRA came into force in July 2019, this investigation was deemed to be continued before NSIRA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA found the Complainant\u2019s allegations to be unsubstantiated. Specifically, it found that CSIS did not unlawfully investigate the Complainant or engage in racial profiling; did not target the Complainant because of their activities as a confidential police informant; did not slander or defame the Complainant, damage their reputation or sabotage their relationships; did not harass the Complainant or conduct interviews with them in an unlawful or unreasonable manner; did not unlawfully or unreasonably share information about the Complainant with foreign agencies or collude with them to interfere with their travel; did not breach the Complainant\u2019s privacy rights under the Charter; and did not unlawfully retain personal information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"52-\">4.4 Other Outcomes<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"53-\">Allegations against CSIS\u2019s role in delaying security assessment regarding immigration or citizenship applications <\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"53-\">(NSIRA Files 07-403-98, 07-403-100, 07-403- 101, 07-403-105, 07-403-106, 07-403-110, 07-403-113, 07-403-118, 07-403-124, 07- 403-125, 07-403-126, 07-403-127, 07-403-129, 07-403-131, 07-403-132, 07-403-133, 07-403-135, 07-403-136, 07-403-151, 07-403-155)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>A number of Complainants filed complaints against CSIS alleging that CSIS caused a significant delay in providing security screening advice for their immigration or citizenship applications. CSIS provided letters to NSIRA that could be shared with the Complainants advising them that CSIS had provided its advice to the requesting client and that CSIS\u2019s role in the security screening process was complete. As the Complainants\u2019 main allegations against CSIS were in relation to the delay in the security screening, NSIRA inquired with the Complainants as to whether they wished to resolve their complaints in light of the update received. In the above-referenced files, the Complainants informed NSIRA that they did not wish to proceed with an investigation into their respective complaints against CSIS. As such, the matters were informally resolved in accordance with Rule 10.10 of NSIRA\u2019s<em> Rules of Procedure<\/em> or withdrawn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"55-\">Deemed abandonment of complaint against a government department for denial of security clearance resulting rescinded job offer<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"55-\">(NSIRA File 07-404-25)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that, after being offered employment by a Government of Canada department conditional upon obtaining a Reliability and Secret clearance, they were denied said clearance because of a residency issue. The Complainant alleged that this was an inaccurate application of clearance policies, and that the employment offer was rescinded after the Complainant indicated that they would pursue the matter further.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA found the complaint to be deemed abandoned according to Rule 15.02 of NSIRA\u2019s Rules of Procedure, following its reasonable attempts to communicate with the Complainant who refrained from participating in the process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"57-\">Informal resolution of a complaint regarding the denial of a security clearance<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"58-\">(NSIRA File 07-404-37)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The Complainant alleged that they were denied employment with an agency in the Government of Canada due to the denial of the required Top Secret security clearance. The Complaint alleged that the decision was based on inaccurate information and that the agency disregarded exculpatory information that the Complainant provided to correct the inaccuracies. The Complainant also alleged that they had a pending Secret security clearance application with another department that was unreasonably delayed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Following an informal resolution meeting facilitated by NSIRA and attended by the Complainant and responding government agency, the parties asked NSIRA to place the investigation into abeyance pending the outcome of the Complainant\u2019s Secret security clearance application. NSIRA granted the request. The Complainant subsequently informed NSIRA that they received their Secret security clearance and no longer wished to proceed with the complaint. NSIRA accepted the informal resolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"58-\">4.5 Statistics on Complaint Investigations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <caption style=\"caption-side: top; font-weight: bold; text-align: left\">\n          January 1\u2013December 31, 2024\n        <\/caption>\n        <thead>\n          <tr>\n            <th\n              colspan=\"2\"\n              style=\"\n                background: black;\n                color: white;\n                padding: 8px;\n                text-align: left;\n                border: 1px solid #ddd;\n              \"\n              scope=\"col\"\n            >\n              INTAKE INQUIRIES\n            <\/th>\n            <th\n              style=\"\n                background: black;\n                color: white;\n                padding: 8px;\n                text-align: center;\n                border: 1px solid #ddd;\n              \"\n              colspan=\"4\"\n              scope=\"col\"\n            >\n              142\n            <\/th>\n          <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n          <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-left\">\n              <strong>New complaints filed<\/strong>\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\"><strong>79<\/strong><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (NSIRA Act),\n              section 16, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS)\n              complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">67<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 17, Communications Security Establishment (CSE)\n              complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 19, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)\n              referred complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">10<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              <em>Citizenship Act<\/em>, section 19\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n\n          <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-left\">\n              <strong> Decision on jurisdiction to investigate<\/strong>\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\"><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">&nbsp;<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\"><strong>Accepted<\/strong><\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\"><strong>Declined<\/strong><\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\"><strong>Withdrawn<\/strong><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">22<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">10<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">7<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">3<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">3<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">Total<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">25<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">17<\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"1\" class=\"text-center\">7<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-left\">\n              <strong>Active investigations as of December 31, 2024<\/strong>\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\"><strong>34<\/strong><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 16, CSIS complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">23<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 17, CSE complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 18, security clearances\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 19, RCMP referred complaints\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">7<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              <em>Canadian Human Rights Act<\/em>, section 45 (CHRC referrals)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n\n          <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-left\">\n              <strong>\n                Informal resolution in progress as of December 31, 2024<\/strong\n              >\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\"><strong>2<\/strong><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              <em>Canadian Human Rights Act<\/em>, section 45 (CHRC referrals)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-left\">\n              <strong> Total investigations closed<\/strong>\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\"><strong>22<\/strong><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n\n          <tr>\n            <td class=\"text-right\">&nbsp;<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\"><strong>Abandoned<\/strong><\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\"><strong>Final Report<\/strong><\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\"><strong>Resolved Informally<\/strong><\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\"><strong>Withdrawn<\/strong><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td class=\"text-right\">NSIRA Act, section 16, (CSIS complaints)<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">3<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">14<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td class=\"text-right\">NSIRA Act, section 17, (CSE complaints)<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 18, (security clearances)\n            <\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 19, (RCMP referred complaints)\n            <\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td class=\"text-right\">\n              Canadian Human Rights Act, section 45 (CHRC referrals)\n            <\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td class=\"text-right\">Total<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">6<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">15<\/td>\n            <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n\n          <tr style=\"background-color: #dddddd; border-left: solid black 4px\">\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-left\">\n              <strong> Investigations carried to the next calendar year<\/strong>\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\"><strong>34<\/strong><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 16 (CSIS complaints)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">23<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 17 (CSE complaints)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\"><\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 18 (security clearances)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              NSIRA Act, section 19 (RCMP referred complaints)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">7<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n          <tr>\n            <td colspan=\"2\" class=\"text-right\">\n              <em>Canadian Human Rights Act<\/em>, section 45 (CHRC referrals)\n            <\/td>\n            <td colspan=\"4\" class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n          <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot><\/tfoot>\n      <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"61-\">Looking Ahead<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"62-\">5.1 Advancing NSIRA\u2019s Vision<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>NSIRA\u2019s vision \u2014 an accountable, transparent, and effective national security and intelligence community that upholds the rule of law \u2014 has guided every aspect of the Review Agency\u2019s work in 2024. Through expanded transparency initiatives, timely public reporting, and continuous methodological refinement, NSIRA has demonstrated its commitment to achieving this vision. Whether through public-facing communications, the release of unclassified\/redacted materials, or the ongoing enhancement of its website, NSIRA has remained focused on building public trust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With the finalization of its 2024-2027 Strategic Plan, NSIRA has established a clear framework for advancing its mandate in the years ahead. The coming year will focus on strengthening the Review Agency\u2019s core activities by enhancing review capacity and output, deepening subject-matter expertise, and expanding on the agility of complaint investigations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Guided by its strategic priorities, NSIRA will place greater emphasis on proactive engagement. This includes increased outreach to the media, academic, civil society, parliamentarians, and domestic oversight bodies such as Agents of Parliament. NSIRA also aims to strengthen its relationships with international counterparts to continue sharing best practices and contribute to global efforts in national security accountability. These initiatives will support NSIRA\u2019s continued evolution as a modern, transparent, and effective review body well positioned to meet the challenges of 2025 and beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"92-annexes\">Annexes<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"93-annex-a-abbreviations\">Annex A: Abbreviations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small englishonly\">\n      <caption style=\"caption-side: top; font-weight: bold; text-align: left\">\n        Abbreviations and Full Names\n      <\/caption>\n      <thead>\n        <tr>\n          <th\n            style=\"\n              background: black;\n              color: white;\n              padding: 8px;\n              text-align: left;\n              border: 1px solid #ddd;\n            \"\n          >\n            Abbreviation\n          <\/th>\n          <th\n            style=\"\n              background: black;\n              color: white;\n              padding: 8px;\n              text-align: left;\n              border: 1px solid #ddd;\n            \"\n          >\n            Full Name\n          <\/th>\n        <\/tr>\n      <\/thead>\n      <tbody>\n        <tr>\n          <td>ACA<\/td>\n          <td>Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>ARSCA-CSE<\/td>\n          <td>Annual Review of Select CSE Activities<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>ARSCA-CSIS<\/td>\n          <td>Annual Review of Select CSIS Activities<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CAF<\/td>\n          <td>Canadian Armed Forces<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CBSA<\/td>\n          <td>Canada Border Services Agency<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CEIPP<\/td>\n          <td>Critical Election Incident Public Protocol<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CHRC<\/td>\n          <td>Canadian Human Rights Commission<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CSE<\/td>\n          <td>Communications Security Establishment<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CSIS<\/td>\n          <td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>DND<\/td>\n          <td>Department of National Defence<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>FIORC<\/td>\n          <td>Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>GAC<\/td>\n          <td>Global Affairs Canada<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>IRCC<\/td>\n          <td>Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>NSICOP<\/td>\n          <td>\n            National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians\n          <\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>NSIRA<\/td>\n          <td>National Security and Intelligence Review Agency<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>OPC<\/td>\n          <td>Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>PCO<\/td>\n          <td>Privy Council Office<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>PS<\/td>\n          <td>Public Safety<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>RCMP<\/td>\n          <td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>SCIDA<\/td>\n          <td>Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>SIGINT<\/td>\n          <td>Signals Intelligence<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>SITE<\/td>\n          <td>Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>TRA<\/td>\n          <td>Threat and risk assessment<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>TRM<\/td>\n          <td>Threat reduction measure<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>VCDS<\/td>\n          <td>Vice Chief of the Defence Staff<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n      <\/tbody>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small frenchonly\">\n      <thead>\n        <tr>\n          <th\n            style=\"\n              background: black;\n              color: white;\n              padding: 8px;\n              text-align: left;\n              border: 1px solid #ddd;\n            \"\n          >\n            Sigle\/acronyme\n          <\/th>\n          <th\n            style=\"\n              background: black;\n              color: white;\n              padding: 8px;\n              text-align: left;\n              border: 1px solid #ddd;\n            \"\n          >\n            D\u00e9nomination\n          <\/th>\n        <\/tr>\n      <\/thead>\n      <tbody>\n        <tr>\n          <td>AMC<\/td>\n          <td>Affaires mondiales Canada<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>ASFC<\/td>\n          <td>Agence des services frontaliers du Canada<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>BCP<\/td>\n          <td>Bureau du Conseil priv\u00e9<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CCDP<\/td>\n          <td>Commission canadienne des droits de la personne<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CPSNR<\/td>\n          <td>\n            Comit\u00e9 des parlementaires sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale et le\n            renseignement\n          <\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CPVPC<\/td>\n          <td>Commissariat \u00e0 la protection de la vie priv\u00e9e du Canada<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CSERCC<\/td>\n          <td>\n            Conseil de surveillance et d\u2019examen du renseignement de la\n            Collectivit\u00e9 des cinq\n          <\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>CST<\/td>\n          <td>Centre de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des t\u00e9l\u00e9communications<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>EACAC-CST<\/td>\n          <td>Examen annuel de certaines activit\u00e9s du CST<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>EACAS-SCRS<\/td>\n          <td>Examen annuel de certaines activit\u00e9s du SCRS<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>EMR<\/td>\n          <td>\u00c9valuation de la menace et des risques<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>FAC<\/td>\n          <td>Forces arm\u00e9es canadiennes<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>GRC<\/td>\n          <td>Gendarmerie royale du Canada<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>IRCC<\/td>\n          <td>Immigration, R\u00e9fugi\u00e9s et Citoyennet\u00e9 Canada<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>LCISC<\/td>\n          <td>\n            Loi sur la communication d&#8217;information ayant trait \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du\n            Canada\n          <\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>LECCMTIEE<\/td>\n          <td>\n            Loi visant \u00e0 \u00e9viter la complicit\u00e9 dans les cas de mauvais\n            traitements inflig\u00e9s par des entit\u00e9s \u00e9trang\u00e8res\n          <\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>MDN<\/td>\n          <td>Minist\u00e8re de la D\u00e9fense nationale<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>MJ<\/td>\n          <td>Minist\u00e8re de la Justice<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>MRM<\/td>\n          <td>Mesure de r\u00e9duction de la menace<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>MSRE<\/td>\n          <td>\n            Menace en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de renseignements visant les\n            \u00e9lections\n          <\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>OSSNR<\/td>\n          <td>\n            Office de surveillance des activit\u00e9s en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\n            nationale et de renseignement\n          <\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>PPIEM<\/td>\n          <td>Protocole public en cas d\u2019incident \u00e9lectoral majeur<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>SCRS<\/td>\n          <td>Service canadien du renseignement de s\u00e9curit\u00e9<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>SIGINT<\/td>\n          <td>Renseignement \u00e9lectromagn\u00e9tique (Signals Intelligence)<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>SP<\/td>\n          <td>S\u00e9curit\u00e9 publique<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n        <tr>\n          <td>VCEMD<\/td>\n          <td>Vice-Chef d\u2019\u00e9tat-major de la d\u00e9fense<\/td>\n        <\/tr>\n      <\/tbody>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"65-\">Annex B: Statistics and Data<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The statistics and data below are provided as per NSIRA\u2019s historical practice of including general data received annually from CSIS and CSE. NSIRA has not independently verified or assessed the numbers. Starting next year, such statistical data will be reproduced with the value added of NSIRA analysis and commentary as part of the summaries of the ARSCA-CSIS and ARSCA-CSE review reports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"66-\">CSIS Statistics and Data<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <td class=\"text-center\"\n                    style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                <\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\"\n                    style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2019<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\"\n                    style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2020<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\"\n                    style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2021<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\"\n                    style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2022<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\"\n                    style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2023<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\"\n                    style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Total Warrant Applications<\/strong><\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">24<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">15<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">31<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">28<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">30<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">28<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Total Warrants issued by the Court<\/strong><\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">23<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">15<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">31<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">28<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">30<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">27<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\"><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>New Warrants<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">9<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">13<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">6<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">9<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">5<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Replacements<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">12<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">8<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">14<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">14<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">10<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">13<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Supplemental<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">5<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">8<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">11<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">9<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Total Denied Warrants<\/strong><\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Note: The warrant statistics found here represent the total number of warrant\n                    applications made to the Federal Court, independent of the actual number of warrants granted in each\n                    application or the number of individuals who were the subject of warrants.<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"67-\">Total Number of Approved and Executed Threat Reduction Measures 2019-2024<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"><\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2019<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2020<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2021<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2022<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2023<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Approved TRMs<\/strong><\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">24<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">11<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">23<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">16<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">14<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">11<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Executed TRMs<\/strong><\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">19<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">8<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">17<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">12<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">19<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">15<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n             <tr>\n                <td><strong>Warranted TRMs<\/strong><\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n          \n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Source: CSIS (NSIRA independently verified these numbers)<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"68-\">Total Number of CSIS Targets, 2019-2024<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\"><\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2019<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2020<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2021<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2022<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2023<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Number of Targets<\/strong><\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">467<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">360<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">352<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">340<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">323<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">389<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n           \n          \n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verified these numbers)<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"69-\">Evaluation and Retention of Publicly Available, Canadian, and Foreign Datasets by CSIS, 2019-2024<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                <\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2019<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2020<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2021<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2022<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2023<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\"><strong>Publicly Available Datasets<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td >Evaluated<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">9<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">6<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Retained<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">9<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">6<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\"><strong>Canadian Datasets<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Evaluated<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Retained<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\"><strong>Foreign Datasets<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Evaluated<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">10<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Retained<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">3<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Source: CSIS (NSIRA did not independently verify this information).<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Note: Datasets collected and evaluated in one year may receive ministerial, judicial or\n                    other authorization in subsequent years. In addition, datasets may be retained for multiple years as\n                    per the CSIS Act.<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"70-\">Authorizations, Commissions, and Directions Under CSIS\u2019s Justification Framework, 2019-2024<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                <\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2019<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2020<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2021<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2022<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2023<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            \n            <tr>\n                <td >Commissions by employees<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">39<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">51<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">61<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">47<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">34<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Authorizations<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">49<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">147<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">178<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">172<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">172<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">175<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n          \n            <tr>\n                <td>Directions to Commit<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">15<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">84<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">116<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">131<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">116<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">128<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Emergency Designations<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">0<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n          \n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Source: CSIS <\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n          \n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"71-\">Total Number of Non-Compliance Incidents Processed by CSIS, 2019-2024<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                <\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2019<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2020<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2021<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2022<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2023<\/td>\n                <td style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\"><strong>Processed incidents<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Administrative<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">53<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">64<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">42<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">48<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">54<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Operational<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">40<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">19<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">21<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">17<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">31<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">28<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td><strong>Total<\/strong><\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">53<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">99<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">85<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">59<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">79<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">82<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\"><strong>Breakdown of Non-compliance (all categories counted)<\/strong><\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Canadian Law<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">5<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>CSIS Act<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">3<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Charter<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">6<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">5<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">15<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">14<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Warrant Conditions<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">6<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">3<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">11<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">13<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>CSIS Governance<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">&#8211;<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">8<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">15<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">27<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">25<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Source: CSIS<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"7\">Note: According to CSIS, each compliance instance was factored in all the categories in\n                    which it was non-compliant. As a result, the sum of instances may exceed the total number.<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"72-\">Ministerial Authorizations<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Name of ministerial authorization<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Enabling section of CSE Act<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Number of Authorizations Issued in 2024<\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Foreign Intelligence Authorization<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">26(1)<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">3<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Cybersecurity Authorization for Federal and Non-Federal Infrastructures<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">27(1) and 27(2)<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">4<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Defensive Cyberoperations Authorization<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">29(1)<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">1<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Active Cyberoperations Authorization<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">30(1)<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">3<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"3\">Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)\n                <br\/>Ministerial authorizations issued in 2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"73-\">Ministerial Orders<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Name of ministerial order<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Enabling section of CSE Act<\/th>\n\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Designating Recipients of Canadian\n                    Identifying Information Used, Analyzed or\n                    Retained Under a Foreign Intelligence\n                    Authorization<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">43<\/td>\n\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Designating Recipients of Information\n                    Relatingto a Canadian or Person in\n                    Canada Acquired, Used or Analyzed Under\n                    the Cybersecurity and Information\n                    Assurance Aspects of the CSE Mandate<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">44<\/td>\n\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Designating Electronic Information and\n                    Information Infrastructures of Importance\n                    to the Government of Canada<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">21<\/td>\n\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Designating Electronic Information and\n                    Information Infrastructures of Ukraine as of\n                    Importance to the Government of Canada<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">21<\/td>\n\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Designating Electronic Information and\n                    Information Infrastructures of Latvia as of\n                    Importance to the Government of Canada<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">21<\/td>\n\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"3\">Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)<br \/>\n           Ministerial authorizations issued in 2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"74-\">Canadian Identifying Information<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Type of request<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Number of requests\n                    received<\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Government of\n                    Canada requests<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">909<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Five Eyes requests<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">78<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Non-Five Eyes\n                    requests<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">6<\/td>\n\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Total<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">993<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"3\">Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)<br \/>\n                    Requests for disclosure of Canadian IdentifyingInformation related to Fl, 2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Disclosure type<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Number of requests\n                <\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Victim notifications<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2,221<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Disclosure to partners<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">9<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Total<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2,230<\/td>\n\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"3\">Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)<br \/>\n                    Disclosures of Canadian IdentifyingInformation related to Cybersecurity, 2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"75-\">Privacy Incidents<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Type of incident<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2024\n                <\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Privacy incidents<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">75<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Second-party privacy incidents<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">44<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Non-privacy compliance incidents<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">13<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"3\">Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)<br \/>\n                    Privacy and non-privacy compliance incidents related to CSE\u2019s Fl mandate, 2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Type of incident<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    2024\n                <\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td>Privacy incidents<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">31<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n\n            <tr>\n                <td>Non-privacy compliance incidents<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">9<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"3\">Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)<br \/>\n                    Privacy and non-privacy compliance incidents related to CSE\u2019s Cybersecurity mandate,\n                    2024<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"76-\">Technical and Operational Assistance<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<table class=\"table table-striped table-bordered small\">\n        <thead>\n            <tr>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Received<\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Approved\n                <\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Denied\n                <\/th>\n                <th style=\"background:black; color:white; padding: 8px; text-align: center; border: 1px solid #ddd;\">\n                    Cancelled\n                <\/th>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/thead>\n        <tbody>\n            <tr>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">48<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">49<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n                <td class=\"text-center\">2<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tbody>\n        <tfoot>\n            <tr>\n                <td colspan=\"4\">Source: CSE (NSIRA did not independently verify these numbers)<br \/>\n                    Requests for technical and operational assistance, 2024.<\/td>\n            <\/tr>\n        <\/tfoot>\n    <\/table>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div><\/section>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2712,"parent":8999,"menu_order":5,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"template-nsira-subpages.php","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false},"categories":[3,8,9,10,28],"tags":[69],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v20.9 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Annual Report 2024 - National Security and Intelligence Review Agency<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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