Backgrounder

In September 2022, the then-Minister of Public Safety, the Honourable Marco Mendicino, requested the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to conduct a review—known as a referral— to examine whether the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Department of Public Safety (PS) were effectively supporting Ministerial responsibility.

This review focused on three key areas: CSIS’s risk assessment model, Ministerial Direction, and the mechanisms for sharing information with the Minister.

The referral revisited a long-standing question about the proper level of Ministerial oversight over an intelligence agency. This issue was central to the McDonald Commission of Inquiry in the early 1980s, which investigated misconduct by the RCMP Security Service and ultimately led to the creation of CSIS. The Commission concluded that while a Minister should not manage the “day-to-day operations” of an intelligence agency, the Minister must retain the right to provide direction—so long as it complies with the law. The Commission rejected the idea that the intelligence service should operate like the police, who have more operational independence. Instead, it took the position that while intelligence agencies must be protected from political interference, the answer isn’t to reduce government oversight. Rather, a comprehensive system of specialized review should be in place to ensure intelligence work remains accountable and operates within the law.

NSIRA accepted the referral for two main reasons. First, the Minister’s questions raised important concerns about whether Ministers are adequately equipped to provide informed oversight—a core principle of democratic governance. Second, the circumstances were unusual: unlike typical operational matters involving only the Minister and CSIS, this case involved senior political-level actors from across the Government of Canada. Although operational details remain classified, NSIRA found that directions from these broader interventions introduced unnecessary risks to CSIS operations and harmed Canada’s international reputation. The report refers to these actors as “political-level actors/decision.”

NSIRA’s review identified several significant concerns, including the appropriateness of direction given to CSIS by political-level actors outside the Minister of Public Safety or the CSIS Director, contrary to the CSIS Act; the accuracy and timeliness of information that CSIS and the Department of Public Safety provide to the Minister; the clarity and consistent implementation of Ministerial Direction to CSIS; and the effectiveness of CSIS’s risk assessment processes.

A key contributor to these issues is PS’s reliance on CSIS to identify and share relevant information, which limits the department’s ability to independently support the Minister with a full understanding of CSIS activities.

These findings suggest the Minister of Public Safety may not always receive full and timely support when making decisions about CSIS. This gap poses risks to the effectiveness of democratic oversight and proper Ministerial responsibility.

To address these challenges, NSIRA’s report made six recommendations focused on improving information-sharing within government, strengthening accountability mechanisms, and clarifying lawful and effective Ministerial Direction.